A Recent Controversy over the Interpretation of "Shr"

Author(s): Fazlur Rahman

Source: History of Religions, Vol. 20, No. 4 (May, 1981), pp. 291-301
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1062457
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 Fazlur Rahman A R E C E N T
CONTROVERSY
OVER THE
INTERPRETATION
OF SHURA

Ever since the permeation of the modern Western political

concepts in Islamic societies in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, there has been a debate between the democratic-
populist interpretations of Islam and elitist-royalist ones. The
first major, sustained, and most original democratic interpre-
tation to date is that of the Turkish thinker Namik Kemal,
contained in a series of articles concerning the Qur'anic concept
of shurd (consultation or mutual consultation), but in the
context of the Ottoman Sultanate.1 Since the general abolition
of monarchies in the Islamic world in recent decades, there
has not been much overt defense of autocratic kingly rule
against democracy,2 but there have been important voices
projecting some form of elitist rule in the name of Islam. Both
sides invoke the Qur'anic shuar to justify their stands.
In the recent past, Maudfidi, founder and leader of the
Jamacat-i-Islami (the Islamic party of the subcontinent) since
1942 (d. 1979), declared-in an Urdu treatise composed in the
I have translated some of these into English and, time permitting, hope to
complete the translation and to publish it.
2
Recently, however, General Zia-ul-Haq stated before a press conference of
foreign reporters that an Islamic state can either be some form of democracy or a
monarchy (see Overseas Weekly Dawn [Karachi] [November 3, 1979]).
? 1981 by The University of Chicago. 0018-2710/81/2004-0004$01.00
292 Controversyover Shura
late thirties entitled "The Political Theory of Islam" (pub-
lished in English in Islamic Law and Constitution, 1959)-that
modern Western democracy was incompatible with Islam; and
that Muslims should rather elect a head of state who should,
through his own Ijtihad, interpret the Qur'an and the sunna of
the Prophet with the aid of an advisory council (majlis-i-shurd)
appointed by himself. Some years after the creation of Paki-
stan, Maudidi admitted the Islamic legitimacy of the parlia-
mentary democracy, and his party participated in elections,
although many believe, probably correctly, that this shift was
basically only a political strategy on his part. Much more
recently, General Zia-ul-Haq, the current military ruler of
Pakistan, after repeatedly promising general elections for over
two years, suddenly announced on October 21, 1979, that
Western democracy was incompatible with Islam. In Iran, the
present religio-political leader Khomeini has been saying the
same thing. Thus, this question is of very considerable practical
concern to Muslims and consequently to the world at large.
Below we shall briefly discuss a more recent debate between
two Egyptian scholars, which took place in 1969 in the Islamic
University of Umdurman in the Sudan, and shall also bring
in Maudtidi's views for the sake of comparison. The thesis that
the Islamic concept of shurd cannot allow for "general elec-
tions" or the direct participation of the masses in the political
process was propounded by cAbd al-Hamid Mutawalli (who
was then professor of Islamic jurisprudence at Umdurman and
later at the University of Alexandria); it was briefly criticized
by Shaikh Muhammad al-Ghazali (director of the Office of
Public Preaching at Cairo who, in the early fifties, had engaged
in a famous debate with Khalid Muhammad Khalid and, in
refutation of the latter's book Min hund nabda', had written
his min hund naclam) and defended by Professor Mutawalli.
The present presentation is based on the second edition (Cairo,
1972) of the treatise entitled Mabda' al-Shurd fi'l Islam.
There are several questions relating to shara: Is it incumbent
upon the ruler to have a body of advisers? If so, is the advice
tendered by this body mandatory, or is it purely consultative,
so that the ruler can set it aside? The question as to whether
the advice may express a majority opinion or a unanimous or
near-unanimous opinion is not discussed by Mutawalli, nor
was it discussed by Maudfidi before him. What are the proper
subjects to be discussed by this body? While Maududi strongly
 History of Religions 293

implies, without explicitly discussing the issue, that the primary

field of the shard is legislation, Mutawalli exhibits himself to
be extremely traditional and states that the Prophet and the
early caliphs sought advice primarily only in matters of war,
thus making this shard more or less useless in the modern
world. This is despite the fact that he also explicitly equates
the Islamic shaur with a modern elected parliament or a house
of representatives (majlis al-niydba). Again, neither Maudtidi
nor Mutawalli allows the opinion of the shurd to be binding on
the ruler with the result that, whereas they disallow decisive
Ijtihdd to the community or its effective leaders, they allow it
to one individual, that is to say, the head of state.
For our present subject, the more basic question is whether
the masses can participate in electing the shurd and hence the
shurd does, in fact, represent them. In his treatise mentioned
above, before he condescended to accept the idea of a parlia-
ment, Maudfiud believed that the shard is to be appointed by
the head rather than being elected. This is a clear retrogression
from the classical Sunni theory of the state, since according to
that theory the shard or the "people of loosening and binding
(ahl al-hall wa'l-caqd)"have to elect a head of state and there-
fore preexist him (presumably thanks to their intrinsic impor-
tance in and for the society) rather than be appointed by him.
The view of Mutawalli and Maudtdi that the head can veto
the shdrd is also heretical in the sense that it finally gives the
head of state the power to legislate, which never happened
during the caliphate, although the postcaliphate rulers-the
Ottomans and the Mughals-did legislate. In connection with
the question of the public's participation in the political process,
Mutawalli discusses the issue of sovereignty, as had been done
also by Mauduidi, and which we shall also review. At the end,
we shall briefly give our own observations.
In the case of both Maudfdi and Mutawalli, the basic
reason for disallowing general public participation in electing
a government is the twofold premise that the average man is
incapable of arriving at a correct decision concerning affairs of
public life and also that his moral faculties for choosing the
right and virtuous conduct are inherently unreliable, while the
conduct of state requires both to the maximum degree possible.
At the heart of the matter, therefore, lies an acute crisis of
confidence in the human intellect and, even more than that,
moral capacities. In support of this thesis Mutawalli declares
294 Controversyover Shuira
that "there is nothing in this verse (42:38) which asks Muslims
to manage their affairs through shirda-as is clear-indicating
a system of general elections which history has known only
since the middle of the last century" (p. 30, lines 7-8).3 After
this, Mutawalli takes up another verse of the Qur'an brought
by the populists to support general elections: "You [Muslims]
are the best community brought out for mankind: you com-
mand good and prohibit evil and you believe in God" (3:11).
Against the populist thesis that this verse speaks of the entire
community and not of an elite thereof, Mutawalli, relying on
certain traditional authorities (p. 30) and also invoking Mau-
duidi (p. 24), contends that shurd is restricted to certain special
groups in the community that are capable of this task. Thus,
the term Umma, Mutawalli tells us, does not mean here the
entire Muslim community, but only a special group or groups
thereof.
Another verse of the Qur'an, very similar to the one we have
just cited, is also interpreted by Mutawalli in his support. This
verse (3:104) reads, "Let there be of you a community (or a
group) who call people to goodness, command what is good and
prohibit what is evil; it is these who are successful." The
Egyptian modernist thinker Muhammad cAbduh had adduced
this particular verse to prove the necessity of the principle of
shird in Islam and asserted that this verse was, in fact, a much
stronger proof for shird than the locus classicus, 42:38 (see
p. 12, lines 14 ff. and the relevant note). Mutawalli, therefore,
argues that the ahl al-shura are a well-specified group of people
with special qualifications and that not everyone can have
access to that precinct. Mutawalli then announces:
In Islam, shara is not a question of numbers as the concept behind the
system of general elections would indicate. In Islamic affairs, numerical
majority is not the criterion of truth, for the Qur'an has repudiated any
such idea. There are many Qur'anic verses which have clearly set out this
truth. For example, the saying of God the Exalted, "most people do not
understand";4 "if you were to follow most of those on the earth, they would
lead you astray from God's path";5 "We did not find in most of them any
(reliability in their) pacts and we, indeed, found most of them unrighteous" ;6

3 It is, of course, clear that the Qur'ancannot have mentionedgeneralelections,

but does the Qur'an prevent their evolution? (All page numbers in text refer to
CAbdal-Hamid Mutawalli, Mabda' al-Shra ft'l Islam [Cairo, 1972].)
4 There is no Qur'anic verse with
exactly this wording, although words like
"they do not understand" occur in different contexts.
5 Qur'an, 6:116.
6
Ibid., 7: 102.
History of Religions 295
"most of them are ignorant."7 For this reason, God the Exalted said, "ask
the People of Admonition if you do not know."8 [P. 32]

The author asserts that, besides this fundamental considera-

tion, there are two other reasons for rejecting the principle of
direct franchise, although this principle has become the hall-
mark of Western democracies in recent times. According to
Mutawalll, this principle of "direct democracy (al-dimaqrdtiya
al-mubdshira)" requires that the proposed laws (mashru cdt
al-Qawdntn) be put directly to a vote as was the practice in the
ancient Athenian city-democracy. Since, in the modern Western
democracies, this is not normally done, Mutawalli most prob-
ably means by his term "proposed laws" policy platforms, as
parties in modern democracies claim to fight elections on the
basis of policy platforms. But I fail to understand what is
wrong with this. In any case, we must go on with the two
reasons our author adduces for rejecting direct franchise (pp.
34 ff.).
The first reason given is that while such a democracy may be
feasible in a geographically restricted area like a given country,
it is unpractical in the case of Islam which is a global religion.
The second reason is that, while the ritual aspect (cibaddt) of
Islam is unchanging and eternal, Islam has left the field of
public affairs flexible, so that it can make necessary adjust-
ments with changes in society. If this field were left inflexible,
this would create difficulties for the people, something which
Islam has repudiated on principle. I must confess I fail to
understand the relevance of each of these two arguments to
the question of direct franchise. As for the consideration that
Islam is spread out on a large part of the globe and therefore
direct franchise is impossible, first of all there is no unitary
center for the Islamic world which is divided into so many
countries, big and small. Should, however, the Muslim coun-
tries decide upon some effective form of unity, the parliaments
or legislative assemblies in these countries can always act as
electoral colleges and, since these have presumably been elected
by a popular vote, this procedure should be sufficient. And I
have already said that nowhere in any modern democracy are
legal questions put to direct vote.
As for the second question, namely, that Islam wants to
make public affairs flexible rather than rigid, I do not see at
7 Ibid., 6:111.
8 Ibid., 16:43.
296 Controversyover Shuira
all why this should militate against universal franchise. The
author may, perhaps, have in mind something like the fact
that flexibility requires Ijtihdd (original thought for solving
problems) which, in turn, requires that only people qualified
to perform Ijtihdd should be involved in the process of law
making. But then it is the Ijtihdd of these people that has to
be put before the bar of popular opinion even though Ijtihdd
itself has been arrived at by specialized processes of thought.
Of course, there is an aspect to this activity which may be
highly technical, but what is to be put to public debate is the
aspect of legislation which affects the life of the average person
and the community as a whole-like taxation, education,
health, war and peace, and a thousand other matters.
Next, the author contends (pp. 37-38) that direct democracy
can lead to dictatorship as it did several times in France and
Germany. It would be more correct to say that democratic
methods can sometimes be exploited by dictators. Even so,
however, in Britain and America this has not happened. De-
mocracy of general polls may not be the best conceivable
system in the world, but it is certainly the best system working
in the world and the one least exploitable by any dictator. It is
correct that the level of awareness and sense of discrimination
of the average elector in these countries can hardly be regarded
as satisfactory, as we shall have the occasion to remark below,
but there is no satisfactory alternative to popular democracy
and to an effort to inculcate in the average elector a proper
sense of discrimination and moral responsibility. Mutawalli
concedes (p. 38) that the system of universal franchise may be
introduced in a Muslim country that deems it suitable, but
that this principle cannot be regarded as universally binding;
yet such concession appears to be inconsistent with his earlier
basic contention that the common man inherently lacks the
capacity for correctly judging and chosing among alternatives.
In this connection, the author finally discusses the question
of sovereignty and criticizes certain earlier Egyptian authors,
like cAli cAbd al-Raziq and Shaikh Bikhkhlt, for holding the
view that Islam espouses the doctrine of the sovereignty of the
Umma. Earlier, Maudldi, in his aforementioned treatise The
Political Theoryof Islam, had upheld that, whereas sovereignty
in modern democracies belongs to the people, in Islam it
belongs to God and that, therefore, modern democratic sys-
tems were guilty of shirk, that is, associating partners with
History of Religions 297
God. Mutawalll's contention that the idea of sovereignty in a
state is a modern growth, that it was first put forward to
defend the divine right of kings and subsequently to support
doctrines of popular sovereignty, is correct. This clarification
helps dispel the confusion created by Maududi and his fellow
travelers on the basis of a misinterpretation of several Qur'anic
verses which speak of the rule of Allah in the heavens and the
earth. Such verses convey the meaning of God's general power
over the entire creation as creator, sustainer, guide, and judge,
but have nothing to do with the specific concept of political
sovereignty which is, indeed, a modern growth. This modern
idea of political sovereignty is, among other things, intimately
connected with the question of locating in the body social a
factor that possesses the necessary coercive power to ensure
obedience to its laws. In Britain (and France), this was for-
merly the king (or queen), and it is now the people. Since God
either has no such coercive power or, at least, does not exercise
it, God cannot be regarded as sovereign in this political sense.
But is Mutawalli correct in concluding that, therefore, it is
wrong to ask this question in an Islamic context? He suggests
that if an Islamic factor has to be designated as corresponding
to the modern concept of sovereignty, then it is the Sharica or
the law of Islam. He criticizes Maudfdi (p. 67, n. 52) for
saying that Islam is not a democracy but a theocracy and
asserts that Maudfdi's further statement that Islamic theoc-
racy is different from the Western concept of theocracy is not
of much help. Mutawalli further avers that those people who
define Islam's political aspect as theocracy "do an incalculable
harm to Islam in the eyes of the West" (p. 68, lines 3-4), since
in the eyes of the Westerners theocracy represents a primitive
stage in the political life of mankind. It should be noted that
Maudfiud did not characterize Islam as "theocracy" but as
"theo-democracy," whatever that may mean. We have already
seen that neither Mauduidi nor Mutawalli gives the right of
interpretation of the Sharncato the representatives of the com-
munity; since the Sharica is divine only the head of state with
the aid of a consultative council can effectively interpret it.
But neither of these two writers comes realistically to grips
with the modern problem of sovereignty. Maududi's designa-
tion of God as sovereign is a misunderstanding, because God
does not possess or does not exercise directly the effective
political power. Mutawalli's suggestion that the Sharca law
298 Controversyover Shura
may be regarded as sovereign in Islam is equally mistaken
because law is something impersonal and cannot, by itself, be
said to exercise political power. This is why one speaks of the
"rule of law" but not of the "sovereignty of law," since law is
that which issues from a sovereign power. Finally, in despera-
tion, as it were, Mutawalli tells us that the question of sover-
eignty should not be raised in Islam for, "It is clear from the
foregoing that Islam is not in need of raising this question or
this difficulty, the raising of which does not solve any of its
[i.e., Islam's] problems-indeed, it generates a fresh difficulty
which is unnecessary for Islam" (p. 68, lines 16-19).
Mutawalli, therefore, neither wants theocracy nor democ-
racy. It is clear that by thinking away a problem, that problem
will not go away and Muslims have to decide which one-
among the three visible factors or powers in the modern
political structure, namely, the community, the parliament,
and the head of state-has the most basic or ultimate political
power or effective force. There is no doubt that in this setup it
is the community which is the repository of supreme power.
In his quick critique (he had only five minutes to criticize
Professor Mutawalli's entire paper) Shaikh Muhammad al-
Ghazali seeks to justify the populist view without elaborately
discussing the questions of popular sovereignty. First of all,
al-Ghazali rejects both views, namely, the view that it is
supererogatory on the part of a ruler to consult people and
the view that consulting or seeking advice does not result in
binding the ruler to a mandatory course. Al-Ghazali states
correctly that shaur is not something that Islam had originated
for the first time since it is a perennial demand of man's nature
as a social being. According to him, the words of the Qur'an in
the aforementioned verse-"Consult them [O Muhammad!]
in the affair; when you have determined [upon a course], then
put your trust in God" (3:159)-do not mean that, after
consulting people, when the Prophet has determined upon a
course which may be against the advice tendered, he should
put trust in God. They rather mean that after obtaining advice
from the community, the Prophet should determine upon a
course in accordance with the advice tendered and for its
practical consequences, whatever they be, he should put his
trust in God. This is why the Qur'an told him to persist in
shurd even though the advice tendered at the time of the
battle of Uhud as to where the Muslims should give battle to
History of Religions 299
the attacking Meccans subsequently was proved wrong. Other-
wise, the Qur'anic command to obtain advice would become
children's play (p. 47, lines 6-20).
As for the question of the participation of the generality of
Muslims in the process of shard and not just the few elect,
al-Ghazali states:
As for the lecturer's contention concerning the [incapacity] of the general
public [for] general elections, this has no meaning, since it contradicts the
Qur'an and the Sunna. As for the Qur'an, there is no genuine interpretation
which supports the view that the [aforequoted] verse of the Qur'an [3:110],
"You are the best community brought out for mankind ..." refers only to
the Companions of the Prophet [and not to Muslims at large] ... There are,
in fact, other verses of the Qur'an to the same effect-for example [2:143],
"And even so have We appointed you as the Median Community, that you
be witnesses upon mankind and the Messenger be a witness upon You..."
-certain verses of the Qur'an whereby the honorable lecturer has sought to
support himself, for example "But most people are ignorant," such verses
refer (not to Muslims but) to deviant peoples and to pagans. [P. 48, lines 5-17]

In a footnote (p. 48), Professor Mutawalli states that he

has gone back to the Qur'an, and while he found that many
such verses actually denounce the non-Muslim opponents of
the Prophet, he found some verses denouncing the generality
of Muslims as well. Mutawalli refers to the oft repeated words
of the Qur'an "most people do not understand" and also to
the verse, ". .. but most people refused except disbelief" (17:
89; 25:50; cf. 17:99). The fact, however, is that none of the
verses in which these words occur has any reference to Muslims,
and I am astonished at the extraordinarily bold assertion of
Mutawalli. This is all the more amazing, since there appears
to be no conceivable reason why Mutawalli could have been
deceived on this issue. One may very well contend that, for
example, the present-day Muslim community has, as a whole,
strayed far away from Islam; but to contend that Muslims,
in general, of the Prophet's day could have been denounced
by the Qur'an in this way is absolutely inexplicable to me.
Al-Ghazali goes on to say that all matters which have not
been explicitly and decisively covered by the Qur'an are the
proper subject of Ijtihad, and in all such matters the ruler is
duty bound to consult the community, since their well-being
is tied to these decisions. After quoting the reported words of
Abu Bakr upon his election-"You are the people who have
put me in power when so willed, and when you so will, it is
you who will depose me.... If you see good [in me], help me
[in discharging my duties], but if you should find evil [in me],
300 Controversyover Shtura

put me right"-al-Ghazal! says, "This is the meaning of the

sovereignty of the Community viz. that the ruler is a person
hired by the people and that the people must call him to
account" (p. 49, lines 10-11). Finally, al-Ghazal asks how it is
that the taxpayer can be excluded from the process of decision-
making about taxation, and the one who has to lay down his
life in battle can be excluded from the decision concerning the
declaration of war.
There is no doubt that the obvious and direct meaning that
can be assigned to the term Umma (in verses 3:110 and
2:143) is that of the entire community, and it will be impos-
sible to put any restriction upon this general meaning by any
amount of manipulation. Even the verse "Let there be of you
a Community that calls people to goodness, commends righ-
teousness and forbids evil. . ." (3:104) clearly means the
whole community. Although many have interpreted the words
"of you" as meaning "a part [i.e., a group] among you," in its
context-which consistently talks of the Umma as a whole and
not a part thereof-the verse most naturally means the entire
community and the idea (as in 3:110 and 2:143) is that it is
the Muslim community that is charged with the task of calling
all people to goodness and prohibiting evil. Again (in 22:41)
we have concerning the entire community, "those who, if We
should give them power upon the earth, will establish prayer,
pay up Zakdt and shall command goodness and forbid evil.
. .." None of these verses can fairly be restricted in its import
to any elite, a special group or the ulama, even though many
of the ulama have contended this.
It is, of course, true that the community at large is sunk in
ignorance and superstition. This is thanks mainly to two
factors: the rapid expansion of the community geographically
and numerically and the sad dereliction of the ulama in both
properly understanding and teaching others the Qur'an and
the sunna of the Prophet. We have, time and again, called
attention to the fact that the primary duty of the ulama is not
to legislate but to disseminate Islamic guidance among the
people, so that a genuine Islamic conscience is cultivated in
the public mind. This is best done by the ulama setting forth
before the public their opinions and their points of view on
different issues, so that the public can reach its conclusions in
the light of the Islamic teaching. But before everything, the
History of Religions 301
ulama have to have a real insight into the Qur'an'smessage
which can be done satisfactorilyonly after evolving an accept-
able methodologyof its study.9
Universityof Chicago
9 See Fazlur Rahman, "Epilogue," in Islam, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979); and "Islamic Modernism, Its Method and Alternatives,"
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 1, no. 4 (1970); also the final
chapter in A. Welch and P. Cacia, eds., Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979).