Maimonides

First published Tue Jan 24, 2006; substantive

revision Wed Jun 12, 2013
Moses ben Maimon [known to English
speaking audiences as Maimonides and
Hebrew speaking as Rambam] (11381204) is
the greatest Jewish philosopher of the
medieval period and is still widely read today.
The Mishneh Torah, his 14-volume
compendium of Jewish law, established him as
the leading rabbinic authority of his time and
quite possibly of all time. His philosophic
masterpiece, the Guide of the Perplexed, is a
sustained treatment of Jewish thought and
practice that seeks to resolve the conflict
between religious knowledge and secular.
Although heavily influenced by the Neo-
Platonized Aristotelianism that had taken root
in Islamic circles, it departs from prevailing
modes of Aristotelian thought by emphasizing
the limits of human knowledge and the
questionable foundations of significant parts
of astronomy and metaphysics. Maimonides
also achieved fame as a physician and wrote
medical treatises on a number of diseases and
their cures. Succeeding generations of
philosophers wrote extensive commentaries
on his works, which influenced thinkers as
diverse as Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, and
Newton.
1. Life and Works
Maimonides was born to a distinguished family
in Cordova, Spain in 1138.[1] At that point,
Cordova was under Muslim rule and stood as
one of the great intellectual centers of the
world. In addition to Maimonides, it was the
birthplace of Averroes. But events took a turn
for the worse when the Almohads invaded in
1148 and offered all non-Muslims the choice of
conversion, exile, or death. Maimonides'
family was forced to leave Cordova and travel
through southern Spain and arrived in Fez,
Morocco in 1160. His first philosophic work of
note was the Treatise on the Art of Logic.
Around this time, he began work on his first
religious masterpiece, the Commentary on the
Mishnah, which was finished in 1168. It is
noteworthy for the emphasis Maimonides
places on Oral Torah, by which he means the
details, specifications, and interpretations
derived from the Written Torah, which was
revealed to Moses at Sinai.
It is also noteworthy for Maimonides'
commentary on Chapter 10 of the Mishnaic
tractate Sanhedrin. While discussing the claim
that all Israel has a share in the world to
come, Maimonides lists 13 principles that he
considers binding on every Jew: the existence
of God, the absolute unity of God, the
incorporeality of God, the eternity of God, that
God alone is to be worshipped, that God
communicates to prophets, that Moses is the
greatest prophet, that the Torah was given by
God, that the Torah is immutable, that there is
divine providence, that there is divine
punishment and reward, that there will be a
Messiah, that the dead will be resurrected.
[2]
This was the first attempt to introduce
articles of faith to Judaism and set off a
controversy that persists to this day [Kellner,
1986; 1999].
Maimonides arrived in Egypt in 1166 and
eventually settled in Fustat, a section of Cairo.
With the publication of the Mishneh Torah, he
established himself as a thinker for the ages.
Not only does this work systematize all the
commandments of the Torah, it tries to show
that every part of Jewish law serves a rational
purpose and nothing is given for the sake of
mere obedience.
Of particular note are Book One (The Book of
Knowledge), which sets forth the philosophic
foundations of Jewish belief, a theory of moral
traits or dispositions, the need to study the
Torah, the laws concerning idolatry, and the
importance of repentance. Also of note is Book
Fourteen (Judges), which ends by arguing that
a Messiah will come, restore sovereignty to
Israel, establish peace with the other nations,
and lead the world in the study of science and
philosophy. By contrast, the Messiah will not
make people rich, introduce changes in the
Torah, or be required to perform miracles.
The Guide of the Perplexed was completed in
1190 and contains Maimonides' most
extensive philosophic discussions. Ostensibly
a letter written to an advanced student who
cannot decide whether to follow philosophy or
the teachings of his religion, it is in reality
much more: a commentary on biblical terms
that appear to ascribe corporeal qualities to
God, an uncompromising defense of negative
theology, an extended critique of the kalam, a
systematic treatment of creation, prophecy,
and providence, and a theory of jurisprudence.
According to Maimonides, all of Jewish law
aims at two things: the improvement of the
body and the improvement of the soul. The
former is in every case a means to the latter.
The soul is improved by acquiring correct
opinions and eventually knowledge on
everything humans are capable of knowing.
The more knowledge the soul acquires, the
more it is able to fulfill the commandment
(Deuteronomy 6:5) to love God. The biggest
stumbling block to love of God is the belief
that the only way to remain true to the Bible is
to interpret it literally. The result of literal
interpretation is a material conception of God,
which, in Maimonides' opinion, amounts to
idolatry.
The Guide has long been considered a
controversial work and in some rabbinic circles
was originally banned. By rejecting literal
interpretation, it raises the question of
whether Maimonides' reading of the Torah
corresponds to what the prophets understood
or represents a philosophic reconstruction that
owes more to Aristotle and Alfarabi than it
does to Moses. It also raises the question of
whether the real meaning of the Torah is too
controversial to be taught to the average
worshipper and should be restricted to the
educated few; in short the question of
esotericism.
Maimonides' last two works of note are
the Treatise on Resurrection, published in
1191, and the Letter on Astrology, published
in 1195.[3] The former was written in answer to
the charge that while he may profess belief in
bodily resurrection, Maimonides did not really
hold it. The charge is not without merit given
that Maimonides' conception of the afterlife is
purely intellectual and that his naturalism
makes him suspicious of miracles. He defends
himself by saying that the important issue is
not whether and how resurrection will occur
but whether it is possible for it to occur. As for
the latter, once one accepts belief in creation,
the possibility of bodily resurrection follows
immediately. The Letter on Astrologywas
written at a time when many people believed
that the heavenly bodies exert influence over
human events. Nevertheless, he argues that
there is no scientific basis for this belief and
that it should be abandoned even if support
for it can be found in the sacred literature.
Facing ever-growing demands on his time,
Maimonides worked himself into a state of
exhaustion and died in Fostat in 1204. An old
saying has it that from Moses to Moses, there
was none like Moses.
2. Fundamental Orientation
Maimonides presents a challenge to the
modern reader because his view of truth is
totally unhistorical. We saw that he was
guided by the need to systematize. Given 613
original commandments, he argues that all are
means to the fulfillment of the first two, which
he interprets as belief in the existence of God
and rejection of idolatry.[4] Together these
commandments make up what we
call monotheism. From Maimonides'
perspective, however, there is more to
monotheism than belief in a single deity. To
satisfy the first two commandments, one must
believe in a timeless, changeless, immaterial
deity who is one in every respect and unlike
anything in the created order. A person who
fails to recognize such a deity is accorded the
status of an idolater no matter how many
other commandments she may fulfill or how
fervently she may fulfill them. Simply put, to
worship God under a false description is not to
worship God at all. Not only is this true at
present, as Maimonides sees it, it has been
true since God first spoke to Adam.
Early in the Guide (1.2), Maimonides argues
that Adam is depicted as having the most
perfect metaphysical knowledge a human
being can achieve prior to his expulsion from
the Garden of Eden. By necessity this would
have to include belief in a timeless,
changeless, immaterial deity. Even if the
biblical text makes no mention of Adam's
theology, Maimonides thinks (MT 14 Kings and
Wars, 9.1) it would be impossible for someone
to be this close to God and harbor a
fundamental misunderstanding. Unfortunately
Adam's knowledge was lost during the time of
Enosh and had to be rediscovered by Abraham
(MT 1, Idolatry, 1.12; GP 3.29). Again
Maimonides thinks he is justified in saying that
Abraham discovered proofs for the existence
of a God who is neither a body nor a force in a
body even though the Bible is silent on such
matters. These proofs were supposedly passed
down to Isaac and Jacob but lost during the
Egyptian captivity when the Israelites adopted
the pagan beliefs of their captors.
When Moses arose to lead the people out of
captivity, he faced a serious problem. If all he
did were to offer philosophic proofs again, the
people would forget them just as they had
forgotten before. So instead of offering proofs
alone, he offered the blueprint for a social
order that would help the people remember
their history and the principles on which it is
founded. That is why in addition to the first
two commandments, there are 611 others
designed to create an environment in which
people will have the time, health, and mental
facility needed to grasp the truth of
monotheism (GP 3.2728).
Judaism then is based on a particular
philosophy. Maimonides (GP 1.71) takes this to
mean that before Plato and Aristotle
introduced science and philosophy to the
Greeks, the patriarchs introduced it to Israel.
To someone who asks why we have no explicit
record of their philosophy, Maimonides
answers that any record of such teaching was
destroyed when Israel went into exile and
suffered persecution. So despite the
appearance of a split between Jerusalem and
Athens, Maimonides thinks there is only one
tradition worth preserving: that which affirms
the truth.
He makes this point in the Introduction to
the Guide when he says that what Jewish
tradition taught under the guise of ma'aseh
bereishit (the account of the beginning) is
what Greeks thinkers taught as physics, while
what Jewish tradition taught under the guise
of ma'aseh merkavah (the account of
[Ezekiel's] chariot) is what Greek thinkers
taught under the guise of metaphysics. In
short, Jewish tradition has always been
philosophical. The problem is that these
subjects are too difficult for the average
worshipper to grasp and must be expressed as
parables or metaphors that the educated few
will interpret at one level and the average
worshipper at another [Stern, 2013].
Looking at his own situation, Maimonides
concludes that the tradition of learning that
began in Israel has been lost once again.
People pray to a material God and justify their
actions on the basis of literal interpretation.
Someone was needed to reverse this situation
and reintroduce Jews to the teachings of their
own tradition. Strictly speaking, such truths
are Jewish only in the sense that Jews were the
first to discover them. From an ethnic
standpoint, they are no more Jewish than the
Pythagorean theorem is Greek.
All this goes to show that Maimonides did not
conceive of progress as we do. Although he
regarded mastery of science and philosophy
as essential parts of human perfection, he did
not view them as cumulative. Rather than take
us into new territory, his goal was to
reacquaint us with the territory that Moses
and the patriarchs had already staked out. The
important truths do not change. Human
progress is measured by the degree to which
they are identified and understood. That is
why the primary function of the Messiah will
be to teach these truths and help create
conditions in which more people are able to
reflect on them.
3. Demythologized Religion
It is clear that the religion Maimonides
envisions is not the normal kind. He
recognizes that when one is first exposed to
Bible stories and the ritual of daily prayer, one
may need anthropomorphic descriptions of
God and promises of material reward. As he
points out time and again, the Torah speaks in
the language of ordinary people. If it did not,
its appeal would be greatly reduced. But,
Maimonides continues, the purpose of the
religion is to get one to the point where these
things cease to matter and are eventually
overcome.
To take a few examples, the Bible often
suggests that a prophet, or in one case the
elders of Israel, saw God (e.g., Exodus 24:10,
Numbers 12:8, Isaiah 6:13, Ezekiel 1:2629).
Maimonides counters (GP 1.4) by saying that
the kind of seeing involved is intellectual
rather than visual as when one sees her
way to the solution of a geometry problem. By
the same token, when God is described as
near or close, the Bible is not talking about
physical location but intellectual apprehension
as when scientists say they are close to
finding a cure for a disease (GP 1.18). The
many places where the Bible says that God
spoke to a prophet do not indicate that God
has vocal cords that produce sound but that
the prophet came to understand what God
wants (GP 1.65). In a more complicated way,
Jacob's dream refers to the hierarchical
structure of the physical world and represents
the path the philosopher follows from
knowledge of the sublunar realm to knowledge
of the spheres and awareness of the existence
of God (GP1.15).
Again one is inclined to ask: Is this the religion
of the prophets or a philosophically sanitized
religion concocted by a medieval thinker
under the sway of Aristotle? Maimonides
would reply that there is no difference. The
highest human achievement is the perfection
of the intellect (GP 3.27), which is impossible
without the pursuit of truth. As a sacred
document, the Bible is a source of truth. While
the truths contained in the Bible may not
always be apparent, we know in principle that
they are there if one wishes to dig deeply
enough. It follows that if one's interpretation
ascribes to the Bible a doctrine that is
demonstrably false, such as the claim that
God is corporeal, the interpretation is incorrect
no matter how simple or straightforward it
may seem. Should human knowledge advance
and come up with demonstrations it previously
lacked, we would have no choice but to return
to the Bible and alter our interpretation to take
account of them (GP 2.24). Anything else
would be intellectually dishonest.
Where does this take us? In the Parable of the
Palace (GP 3.51), Maimonides describes the
person who enters the inner habitation of the
King as:
He who has achieved demonstration, to the
extent that it is possible, of everything that
may be demonstrated; and who has
ascertained in divine matters, to the extent
that that is possible, everything that may be
ascertained; and who has come close to
certainty in those matters in which one can
only come close to it
This is not just an intellectual achievement but
a spiritual one as well. In Maimonides' opinion,
it is the goal to which all of the
commandments of the Torah point. There is an
obvious sense of satisfaction that goes with
this, but it has nothing to do with satisfaction
material needs or ecstasy as normally
understood.
4. God and the Via Negativa
Maimonides offers several proofs for the
existence of God, all of which are versions of
the cosmological argument (GP 2.1). Rather
than begin with a definition of God and try to
show that God's essence implies existence, he
begins with a description of the world as we
know it and tries to show that it implies the
existence of God. According to one such
argument, we assume that the heavenly
bodies are engaged in eternal motion. We then
recognize that it is impossible for there to be
an infinite body or an infinite number of finite
bodies. So every corporeal thing is finite. If it is
finite, it can only contain a finite amount of
power. If it can only contain a finite amount of
power, it can only explain motion over a finite
period of time. Because the heavenly bodies
are always moving, the only thing that can
explain that motion is an infinite power.
Because an infinite power cannot be contained
in a finite thing, it cannot be corporeal. If it is
not corporeal, it is not subject to division or
change. Seeing that its power is infinite, it
cannot derive that power from something else.
Thus the only way to explain the motion of the
heavenly bodies is to posit the existence of a
being that is neither a body nor a force in a
body.
Although Maimonides thinks this argument
gives us sufficient grounds for sayingthat God
is, he does not think it provides any grounds
for saying what God is. To see why not, we
have to recognize that God is not one in a way
comparable to anything else: one person, one
number, one idea. According to Guide 1.51:
There is no oneness at all except in believing
that there is one simple essence in which
there is no complexity or multiplicity of
notions, but one notion only; so that from
whatever angle you regard it and from
whatever point of view you consider it, you will
find that it is one, not divided in any way and
by any cause into two notions
If Maimonides is right, there can be no
plurality of faculties, moral dispositions, or
essential attributes in God. Even to say that
God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good
is to introduce plurality, if one means thereby
that these qualities are separate attributes.
The same is true if we say that God is a
composite of matter and form, genus and
specific difference, or essence and accident.
All introduce plurality where none can be
tolerated.
Aside from religious considerations, plurality is
objectionable because it compromises logical
priority. If God were a composite of F and G,
some reason would have to be found for what
brought them together and keeps them
together. In short, if God were a composite,
there would have to be a cause prior to God,
which is absurd (GP 2. Intro., premise 21). For
the same reason, God cannot be subsumed
under a wider concept as man is subsumed
under animal (GP 1.52). Once God fell under a
genus, there would be something prior to or
more inclusive than God, either of which is
absurd. Without a genus or a minimal form of
composition, there is no possibility of defining
God and thus no possibility of saying what God
is. Even superlatives are of no help. To say
that God is the wisest or most powerful thing
in the universe is still to subsume God under a
wider description.
Worse, to say that God is the wisest or most
powerful thing is to imply that God's wisdom
or power bears some likeness to ours. This
Maimonides firmly denies (GP1.5657). The
power manifested by a body is finite and can
be measured in foot/pounds. No matter how
powerful it is, we can easily imagine
something whose power is greater. What is
more, if we are talking about the power of a
body, it always makes sense to ask from what
it derives its power or how its power is related
to something else, e.g. its goodness. None of
this is true of God. Maimonides therefore
concludes (GP 1.56) that it is not true to say
that God's power is greater than ours, that
God's life is more permanent than ours, than
God's knowledge is broader than ours, or that
God's will is more universal than ours, if that
means that God can be put on the same scale
as something else, that God is a bigger,
stronger, better version of something in the
created order.
Does that mean that statements like God
lives or God is powerful are nonsense? The
answer is yes if one insists on interpreting
them as normal subject/predicate
propositions. But they can be understood if
one analyzes them as disguised negations.
Thus God is powerful should be taken as
God is not lacking in power. Maimonides'
appeal to negation (GP 1.58) is often
misunderstood because in normal speech a
double negative usually indicates a positive. If
I say that this dog is not lacking in the power
of sight, you would be justified in concluding
that it can see for the simple reason that sight
is a power normally associated with dogs.
What Maimonides has in mind is a more
extreme form of negation. Thus God is
powerful means God does not lack
power orpossess it in a way that makes it
comparable to other things. Can God do
something like move a book off a shelf? Yes, to
the extent that God does not lack power but
no to the extent that God does not have to
move muscles, summon energy, or receive a
supply of food or fuel. The power to create the
whole universe is so far beyond that needed to
move a book that any comparison cannot help
but mislead.
From an epistemological standpoint, a
statement like God is powerful is
objectionable in so far as it implies that we
have insight into the essence of God. The
advantage of the negative formulation is that
it implies nothing of the sort. To say that God
does not lack power or possess it in a way
comparable to other things is to say that God's
power is beyond our comprehension. And
similarly for God's life, wisdom, unity, or will.
Thus most of the terms we use to describe
God are completely equivocal as between God
and us. There is then no reason to think that
every time we praise God, we are identifying a
separate part of the divine persona and
comparing it to something else.
As severe as Maimonides' position is, even this
is not enough. Although negation is preferable
to affirmation, even negation is objectionable
to the degree that it introduces complexity:
God is neither this nor that. What then?
Maimonides' reply (GP 1.58) is that ultimately
any kind of verbal expression fails us. Rather
than provide a precise metaphysical account
of the nature of God, the purpose of
theological discourse is heuristic: to conduct
the mind toward the utmost reach that man
may attain in the apprehension of Him.
Theological language is important to the
degree that it eliminates error and sets us
along the path of recognizing God's
transcendence. Unless one could speak about
God, she could easily fall into the trap of
thinking that God is corporeal. But in the end,
the only thing it reveals is that God is beyond
the reach of any subject/predicate proposition.
Thus GP 1.59:
Know that when you make an affirmation
ascribing another thing to Him, you become
more remote from Him in two respects: one of
them is that everything You affirm is a
perfection only with reference to us, And the
other is that He does not possess a thing other
than His essence
Citing Psalm 65, Maimonides concludes that
the highest form of praise we can give God is
silence.
Maimonides knows (GP 3.32) that a religion
based entirely on silent reflection would never
succeed, and insists that daily prayer is
mandatory (MT 2, Prayer, 1.1). His point is that
the qualities mentioned in prayer are either
negations or descriptions of the effects of
divine activity; in no case do they provide
knowledge of God's essence. To illustrate this
point, he asks us to consider the effect of fire
on various things that could be put before it. It
would soften wax, harden clay, blacken sugar,
and whiten other things. This does not mean
that fireis soft, hard, black, and white
simultaneously but that it has these effects on
various things.
Applying this analogy to God, we can say that
God is merciful to the extent that the order of
nature (what God created) exhibits merciful
characteristics and angry to the extent that it
is harsh toward things that do not take proper
care of themselves. The point is not that God
possesses emotions similar to ours but that
the effects of God's actions resemble the
effects of ours. Maimonides refers to these
qualities as attributes of action and identifies
them with the goodness God revealed to
Moses at Exodus 33. In that passage, God
refuses to let Moses see the divine face (which
Maimonides identifies with essence) but allows
him to see God's backside (which Maimonides
identifies with the consequences or effects
that flow from God). We can therefore praise
God as long as we realize that all such praise
is indirect and leaves God's essence
undescribed and unknowable.
5. Creation
Throughout the Guide, Maimonides considers
four accounts of creation: that of the kalam,
Moses, Plato, and Aristotle. He rejects the
kalam account (GP 1.7173) according which
one demonstrates that the universe must
have been created and then reasons that if it
was created, it must have a creator. Like
Thomas Aquinas, Maimonides believes it is
impossible to show by logical considerations
alone either that the universe was created or
that it is eternal. Though Maimonides says he
believes in creation, he admits one can do no
more than tip the scales in this direction. As
of Guide 2.13, he limits his discussion to the
theories of Moses, Plato, and Aristotle.
Unfortunately Maimonides' characterizations
of these alternatives are neither precise nor
historically accurate [Seeskin, 2005]. Suffice it
to say that his treatment of them is mainly
thematic. Briefly stated, they are:

Moses: the world was created de novo and

entirely ex nihilo.
Plato: the world was created de novo from
 a preexisting material substrate.
Aristotl the world is eternal and its existence
e: is best understood as eternal
information of matter.

Based on his explicit remarks, Maimonides

prefers the theory of Moses but allows one to
hold that of Plato as a reasonable alternative.
But there has always been a school of thought
that maintains that he is secretly committed
to the view of Aristotle [Harvey 1981]. My own
position is with those who argue that
Maimonides' explicit remarks are an accurate
account of his view and that all the arguments
he offers point in that direction [Davidson
1979; Feldman 1990; Hyman 1988; Wolfson
1973).
The historical Aristotle did argue that the
world is eternal and that whatever is eternal is
necessary [On Generation and
Corruption 338a14, Physics 203b
29,Metaphysics 1050b815]. His medieval
followers took this to mean that while the
world is ontologically dependent on God, there
is no moment when it first comes to be and
therefore does not owe its existence to a
decision to create. As we might say, it exists
not because of anything God does but simply
because of what God is. Because God's nature
does not change, according to this position,
neither does the existence or fundamental
structure of the world. The most important
consequence of this view is that God does not
exercise free choice, which is to say that
according to the Aristotelian alternative, the
world is governed by necessity.
The standard arguments in favor of this
position take one of two approaches: either
they show that there is something inherent in
the nature of the world that makes creation
impossible or that there is something inherent
in the nature of God that does. An example of
the former is that change always proceeds
from something to something else, as when a
chicken springs from an egg or an acorn
develops into a full grown oak tree. If this is
true, it is impossible for something to come to
be from nothing (ex nihilo). An example of the
latter is that if God is perfect, it makes no
sense to suppose that God could ever do
anything new such as bring the world into
being.
Maimonides' answer to the first argument
(GP 2.17) is that given the world as we know
it, change does proceed from one thing to
something else. But why should we assume
the creation of the world has to follow the
same pattern? An account of creation is a
theory of origin, how a thing comes to be
initially. By contrast, an account of change is a
theory of development or alteration, how one
existing thing emerges into another. For all we
know, the origin of a thing may be completely
different from its development later on. Thus it
is presumptuous to suppose that we can
extrapolate from our experience of the world
as it is at present to the moment of its
creation. It follows that the first argument
against creation is not decisive, which means
that creation remains a possibility.
Maimonides' answer to the second argument
(GP 2.18) is that in a perfect being, willing
something new need not imply change. If I will
today to take a trip tomorrow and events
intercede to spoil my plans, I may have to
change my mind, but to suppose that
something analogous happens to God is
absurd. Assume I will today to do something
tomorrow independent of external
circumstances to think about the numerical
characteristics of pi. And assume that when
tomorrow comes, I do exactly as planned.
While I would be undertaking something new,
to the degree that I had intended to do it all
along, it would be misleading to say that I
underwent a change. Certainly I did not
undergo a change of mind.
Maimonides takes this to mean that it is
possible for a being not affected by external
circumstances to will something new as long
as it is part of his original intention. This is
sometimes expressed by saying that changing
one's will is not the same as willing change. So
once again, the argument against creation is
not decisive.
Maimonides is aware that all his arguments
establish is the possibility of creation, not its
actuality. To go further, and argue for the
actuality of creation, he returns to the claim
that everything that is eternal is necessary. If
it could be shown that there are features of
the world that are not necessary, it would
follow that the world must have been created.
Here Maimonides challenges Aristotle and his
followers on the issue of astronomy.
Medieval Aristotelians believed as follows. God
thinks and manifests self-awareness. Because
God is one and simple, what emerges from
God must be one and simple as well. In this
way, God generates the first heavenly
intelligence. According to Alfarabi, because
the first intelligence is aware of two things
itself and God it is capable of generating
two things: the second heavenly intelligence
and the outermost sphere of the universe. By
contrast, Avicenna held that because the first
intelligence is aware of God and duality in
itself, it generates three things. The difference
need not concern us here. The important point
is that God's production of the outermost
sphere is indirect; the immediate cause is the
activity of the first intelligence. The process
continues until we get the ten intelligences
and nine primary spheres that make up the
standard picture of medieval cosmology.
Maimonides criticizes this account in two
ways. First if the originator of a causal
sequence is one and simple, there is no way
for complexity to arise, and everything else in
the sequence should be one and simple as
well (GP 2.22). Even if the sequence contains
thousands of members, there is no way to
account for the complexity of a celestial
sphere, which is a composite of matter and
form. When we get to the inner spheres, we
have to account for even more because not
only is there the sphere itself but the stars or
planets attached to it. They too are
composites of matter and form. How can we
have such complexity if we start with
something that is radically one?
Second, there are features of the heavenly
bodies that defy scientific explanation and
thus appear to be contingent in the sense that
they were chosen rather than necessitated
(GP 2.1924). If the outer spheres impart
motion to the inner ones, we would expect
spherical motion to slow as we move closer to
the earth. But this is hardly the case. As
Maimonides points out (GP 2.19):
We see that in case of some spheres, the
swifter of motion is above the slower; that in
the case of others, the slower of motion is
above the swifter; and that, again in another
case, the motions of the spheres are of equal
velocity though one be above the other. There
are also other very grave matters if regarded
from the point of view these things are as they
are in virtue of necessity.
If there is no explanation for why the spheres
behave in this fashion, or why some stars and
planets emit more light than others, or why
some regions of the heavens are relatively
crowded while others are empty, there is no
reason to think the phenomena in question are
what they are by virtue of necessity. If there is
no necessity, there are no grounds for eternity.
The alternative is to say that God created the
world as a result of a free choice and
fashioned it in a particular way.
Maimonides recognizes (GP 2.24) that his
argument does not constitute a
demonstration. Just because science cannot
explain something now, it does not follow that
it will never be able to explain it. As he himself
admits, science can and does make progress.
But in the case of the heavenly bodies, he
thought progress very unlikely. Because they
too far away to make close observations, and
too high in rank, we can only rely on
inferences based on accidental qualities size,
speed, and direction. As long as this is true,
we will never know their essential natures and
will never be able to support claims of
necessity. As long as this is true, creation,
though not demonstrated, will always be
preferable to eternity.
Maimonides (GP 2.25) also offers a practical
reason for believing in creation: How can a
God without free will issue commandments?
Beyond this there is a textual reason: belief in
creation does less violence to scripture than
belief in eternity. He concludes that the theory
of Moses offers the best alternative, while that
of Plato, which retains the idea of creation de
novo, is acceptable. Though some people fault
Maimonides for not coming up with a stronger
argument on behalf of Moses, he would reply
by saying that given the limits of our
knowledge, this is the strongest argument we
can expect. Although Maimonides is often
seen as part of the Aristotelian tradition, and
often expresses praise for Aristotle, his
account of creation indicate that he is willing
to depart from Aristotle when he thinks the
arguments lead in that direction.
6. Practical Philosophy
We have already seen that for Maimonides the
highest perfection is intellectual and consists
in ascertaining in divine matters everything
that can be ascertained. Proper behavior,
whether for the individual or the community,
is a means to this end (GP 3.27). On a political
level, this means that the state must do more
than protect life and property; it must see to it
that all its citizens are educated in religious
matters and that a small number achieve
mastery (GP 2.40). On a personal level, it
means that morality is not an end in itself but
a way of controlling the passions and creating
an atmosphere in which science and
philosophy can flourish (GP 3.8). While
intellectual perfection is oriented to truth and
falsity and aims at demonstration, moral
perfection is oriented to good and bad and
rests on commonly accepted opinions.
Accordingly Adam was blessed with perfect
metaphysical knowledge in the Garden of
Eden but still did not know that it is wrong not
to cover one's genitals. Although this
knowledge cannot be known with scientific
precision, it does not follow that it is arbitrary.
On the contrary, it is among the most basic
customs one can imagine. Maimonides
expresses this point (GP 2.40) by saying that
revealed law although it is not natural, enters
into what is natural. I take this to mean that
unlike scientific truth, law presupposes a
social context and a sense of shame. In
Maimonides' opinion, it still needs to be
studied in detail. Thus the quote continues: It
is a part of the wisdom of the deity with regard
to the permanence of this species.
Maimonides' practical philosophy begins
with Eight Chapters, an introduction to his
commentary on the tractate Pirkei Avot and
part of his Commentary on the Mishnah.[5] In
concert with Plato and Aristotle, he holds that
like the body, the soul can be diseased or
healthy. Just as those with sick bodies seek a
physician, those with sick souls need to seek
the wise rulers, who are physicians of the soul.
Not surprisingly major portions of his work
attempt to show that Jewish law is based on a
thorough understanding of the soul and the
conditions needed for its perfection. Chief
among them is the attainment of a mean
between extremes. InEight Chapters 3, he
writes: The virtues are states of the soul and
settled dispositions in the mean between two
bad states, one of which is excessive, the
other deficient. Later, in the first book of
the Mishneh Torah (1, Character Traits, 1.4),
he follows up by saying: The right way is the
mean in every one of a person's character
traits.
Like Aristotle, Maimonides recognizes there
will be variations from one person to another
and that sometimes a person may have to
overshoot the mean for therapeutic reasons
(Eight Chapters 4 and MT 1, Character Traits,
2.2). Also like Aristotle, he stresses that virtue
is a habit that can only be developed by
practice. A wise ruler will therefore prescribe
actions and moral habits that must be
repeated until they are no longer burdensome
and become part of a person's character. If a
person develops the wrong habits and goes to
excess, the ruler must follow the same course
in treating it as in the medical treatment of
bodies, which is to reestablish equilibrium
(Eight Chapters 4).
Maimonides claims his theory is sound in its
own right and can be distilled from the sayings
of the prophets and sages. He offers Psalm
19:8 (The law of the Lord is perfect, restoring
the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure,
making wise the simple) as evidence that the
Bible recognizes the idea of psychic health
and disease. He also connects adherence to
the mean with the doctrine of imitatio
Dei (imitation of God), by arguing that
(GP 2.28): The works of the deity are most
perfect, and with regard to them there is no
possibility of an excess or a deficiency. As
God governs nature, so Maimonides thinks,
the wise ruler will attempt to govern society.
It is true, as Maimonides says many times,
that Jewish law does not ask people to live as
hermits, starve themselves, beat themselves,
or jeopardize their health. Though it allows for
a category of extremists in the laws dealing
with the Nazirite, Maimonides is right to say
that it treats the Nazirite with suspicion (Eight
Chapters 4). The qualities that really matter
are good judgment, kindness, and compassion
all things Maimonides explains by going
back to the doctrine of the mean. People are
asked to give to charity, honor their parents,
refrain from certain sexual relations, not hate
or take vengeance, and not eat certain foods
in order establish a moderate disposition. By
the same token, the holidays are arranged so
that some involve rejoicing while others
involve moderate forms of self-denial. In no
case does the law require anything for the
sake of obedience alone.
Maimonides points out there are cases where
the analogy between body and soul breaks
down, in particular the fact that legal
reasoning is different from medical reasoning.
The physician does not treat the concept
humanity but the particular person who comes
to her. But this is not true of the law, which, in
Maimonides' opinion (GP 3.34), treats the
general case and pays no attention to rarities.
That is why the law is not dependent on time
and place but tries to establish a standard that
is absolute and universal. To take a modern
example, the law prescribes a limit to the
amount of alcohol a person can have in his
blood and still be able to drive. Undoubtedly
there are variations among individuals that
allow one person with a certain amount of
alcohol to be much more alert than another.
But it is not the purpose of the law to take
these differences into account. All it can do is
set a norm and enforce it equally.
Still anyone familiar with Maimonides will see
that acceptance of the mean is hard to
reconcile with other aspects of his thought.
When he describes God as governor of the
universe balancing justice with mercy, the
doctrine of the mean makes good sense; when
he describes God as lacking emotion and
incomparable to anything in the created order,
it does not. Similarly, when he describes
prophets as law-givers, the mean is an
appropriate standard; when he describes them
as people who begrudge the time they spend
with others and prefer to contemplate God
alone in silent meditation (GP 3.51), it fails.
Much has been written on which of these
approaches represents Maimonides' real view
[Fox, 1990, Davidson, 1987, Schwarzschild,
1990]. Fortunately we do not have to survey
all of this literature because the problem
arises in the space of a few paragraphs
in MT 1, Character Traits, 1.46. Unlike Eight
Chapters, where the only justification for
overshooting the mean is therapeutic, this
passage recognizes that there are times when
deviation from the mean represents a higher
standard. As Maimonides puts it, a person
whose character traits are balanced can be
called wise (hakham), while a person who
goes beyond the mean when circumstances
warrant is known as pious (hasid):
Whoever moves away from a haughty heart to
the opposite extreme so that he is exceedingly
lowly in spirit is called pious; this is the
measure of piety. If someone moves only to
the mean and is humble, he is called wise; this
is the measure of wisdom. The same applies
to all the rest of the character traits. The pious
of old used to direct their character traits from
the middle way toward one of the two
extremes; some character traits toward the
last extreme, and some toward the first
extreme. This is the meaning of inside the
line of the law [i.e. going beyond the letter of
the law].
Piety then involves going beyond the mean to
a higher standard. In this connection
Maimonides cites Numbers 12:3, which does
not say that Moses was meek but that he
was very meek.
Similar remarks apply to Maimonides' analysis
of anger. For Aristotle [Nicomachean
Ethics 1125b311126a8] a person should be
praised for being angry with the right people
in the right way and at the right time. A
person who allows himself to be abused by
insults without getting angry lacks feeling and
behaves in a manner that is slavish. Virtue is
worthy of honor. Just as it is wrong to ask for
too much, it is equally wrong to ask for too
little.
With respect to anger, Maimonides disagrees,
claiming (MT 1, Character Traits, 2.3) it is an
extremely bad character trait and that it is
proper for someone to move away from it to
the other extreme and to teach himself not to
be angry, even over something it is proper to
be angry about [Frank, 1990]. For Aristotle
meekness indicates a loss of self-esteem; for
Maimonides it is not a virtue but virtue par
excellence. By ascribing it to Moses, he
implies that it represents the highest level a
person can achieve.
A similar sentiment is expressed earlier in
the Mishneh Torah (1, Basic Principles, 4. 12),
when Maimonides discusses the need to study
physics and metaphysics. He concludes with
praise for those who are lowly of spirit:
When a man reflects on these things, studies
all these created beings, from the angels and
spheres down to human beings and so on, and
realizes the divine wisdom manifested in them
all, his love for God will increase, his soul will
thirst, his very flesh will yearn to love God. He
will be filled with fear and trembling, as he
becomes conscious of his lowly condition,
poverty, and insignificance, and compares
himself with any of the great and holy bodies;
still more when he compares himself with any
one of the pure forms that are incorporeal and
have never had association with any corporeal
substance. He will then realize that he is a
vessel full of shame, dishonor, and reproach,
empty and deficient.
It is not that Maimonides has abandoned the
idea that nature avoids excess or deficiency
but that he seems to be saying the highest
level of human excellence sometimes requires
an extreme. Thus Moses went without water
for forty days and nights when he was alone
on the mountain and attained such a high
level of concentration that in Maimonides
opinion all the gross faculties in the body
ceased to function. Seen in this light, the
highest goal is not practical wisdom in the
Aristotelian sense but humility, awe, and
shame in the presence of God.
In other places, Maimonides argues that our
goal should not be to moderate emotion but to
rise above it. We saw that God is not subject
to emotion. Maimonides takes this to mean
that the ideal state is one in which a person
acts in a completely dispassionate way
deciding cases on their merit without recourse
to feeling. While such a person must still make
the appropriate judgment, there will be no
character trait or disposition from which it
springs. According to Guide 1.54:
It behooves the governor of a city, if he is a
prophet, to acquire similarity to these
attributes [jealousy, hatred, or anger], so that
these actions may proceed from him
according to a determined measure and
according to the deserts of the people who are
affected by them and not merely because of
his following a passion. He should not let loose
the reins of anger nor let passion gain mastery
over him, for all passions are evil; but, on the
contrary, he should guard against them as far
as this lies within the capacity of man.
Sometimes, with regard to some people, he
should be merciful and gracious, not out of
mere compassion and pity, but in accordance
with what is fitting.
In the treatise on Character Traits, he admits
that there may be times when it is necessary
for a person to show anger, but insists that
inwardly she should remain completely
tranquil.
What happened to balance and the idea of
mental health? The answer is that while they
are still valuable, they are not ends in
themselves. Throughout his rabbinic and
philosophic works, Maimonides insists (MT 1,
Character Traits, 3.1) that it is impossible to
love God and achieve the highest levels of
concentration if one is sick, undisciplined, or
living in fear of bodily harm. But in the end,
moral perfection is only a necessary condition
for intellectual perfection.
Like Plato, Maimonides believes in the
therapeutic effects of philosophy. In the last
chapter of the Guide (3.54), he claims that
philosophy teaches that most of the things to
which people direct their lives are nothing but
an effort with a view to something purely
imaginary, to a thing that has no
permanence. Just as Job came to see that the
things he once valued are unimportant,
philosophy teaches us to give up our
obsession with money, garments, and land
and focus attention on the eternal.
In the end, the relation between moral and
intellectual virtue is more complicated than
Maimonides first presents. It is not just that
the former is a means to the latter but that
after the latter is achieved, after one comes to
see that earthly goods are fleeting and
ultimately unsatisfying, his behavior will
undergo a transformation: rather than aim for
a moderate amount of earthly goods, he will
forgo them and spend as much time as
possible in a state of awe and reverence,
where the distinction between moral and
intellectual perfection may even break down.
7. Esotericism
Since the publication of the Guide, scholars
have struggled with a thorny issue: whether to
take Maimonides' words at face value or
whether to take them as hints or clues
pointing to a hidden or deeper meaning
(Ravitzky, 1981, 1990, 2005; Strauss, 1952).
By rejecting literal interpretation and playing
down the importance of miracles, he knew he
was taking a controversial stand. As he notes
in the Introduction to the Guide, Jewish law
prohibits one from discussing esoteric matters
like the Account of the Beginning or the
Account of the Chariot in public. The idea is
that these matters should only be discussed
with an advanced student capable of finding
the truth on her own. In Maimonides' view,
both the Bible and the rabbinic commentaries
that grew up around it are esoteric in the
sense that the real meaning is often different
from the surface or apparent meaning. The
reason for this is that the people who read
them have different levels of comprehension.
But Maimonides goes further, saying that in
some cases it is necessary for an author to
contradict himself.
Of the seven reasons for using contradictions,
Maimonides says he will avail himself of two.
The first is relatively unproblematic:
sometimes it is necessary for a teacher to say
one thing to reach a student's level of
understanding and say something else when
the student becomes more advanced. The
second is more troublesome: on very obscure
matters, it is necessary to launch a discussion
that proceeds according to one assumption
and later launch one that proceeds according
to another. He then adds: In such cases the
vulgar must in no way be aware of the
contradiction; the author accordingly uses
some device to conceal it by all means.
This raises several questions. (1) Does
Maimonides employ contradictions of the
troublesome variety? (2) If so, where? (3) Of
two contradictory discussions, which
represents his view? In the twentieth century,
Leo Strauss argued that contradictions are
central to understanding the Guide and that
the more evidence Maimonides presents for a
particular view, the less likely it is that he held
it. [Strauss, 1952]. There is general agreement
that Maimonides' writing is esoteric to the
degree that he addresses difficult topics and
does not put everything he has to say on a
particular topic in any one place. The question
is whether his esotericism goes deeper than
this. We saw for example that he criticizes
Aristotle's on the eternity of the world. Does
this mean that he believed in creation or that
if you strip away the surface meaning, he is
really committed to eternity? As often
happens, one question leads to another: Do
we settle the matter by examining the
strength of his arguments or by looking for
hidden clues? Of late the esotericist reading
appears to be losing favor [Davidson, 2005,
Ivry, 1991, Manekin 2005, Ravitzky, 2005,
Seeskin, 2000].
8. Conclusion
How one assesses Maimonides' philosophy
depends on one's own philosophic view. For a
traditional theist like Aquinas, he is right to
say that there are issues, e.g. creation, that
cannot be resolved by demonstration and to
insist that all attempts to anthropomorphize
God are misguided. The problem is that in
rejecting anthropomorphism, he may have
gone too far. If God bears no likeness to the
created order, and if terms like wise, powerful,
or lives are completely ambiguous when
applied to God and us, the conception of
divinity we are left with is too thin for the
average worshipper to appreciate.
For a naturalist like Spinoza, Maimonides is too
willing to dismiss science and take refuge in
traditional concepts like creation and divine
volition. Granted that medieval astronomy did
not have a good explanation of planetary
motion; with the advent of the scientific
revolution, it found one at least in Spinoza's
opinion. If Maimonides were to remain true to
his word and accept the strongest argument
wherever it leads, as far as Spinoza's is
concerned, he would have to embrace the new
science, the eternity of the world, and the
necessity of every event that takes place in it.
In order to do this, he would have to abandon
the idea that the Bible is a source of
philosophic and scientific truth and look to it
only for the light it sheds on how to live.
Needless to say, this would be a disaster for
Maimonides.
Even if Maimonides were to make this move
and read the Bible for its ethical content,
problems would remain. Maimonides is an
elitist. Closeness to God is measured by how
much knowledge one acquires. The result is
that people whose situations prevent them
from pursuing advanced studies cannot be
close to God or love God. Whether it is right or
wrong, this view offends modern sensibilities,
which are much more democratic.
Finally for an atheist, Maimonides' philosophy
shows us what happens if you remove all
anthropomorphic content from your
conception of God: you remove all content of
any kind. In the end, you are left with a God
whose essence is unknowable and
indescribable Of what possible value is such a
conception either to philosophy or religion?
At his trial for impiety in 399 B.C., Socrates
was asked how it is that the wisest person in
Athens claims to be ignorant of the knowledge
he seeks. His answer (Apology 23a-b) is that
he is wise because unlike others, he
recognizes that when measured against divine
wisdom, human wisdom is of little or no value.
Although it is doubtful that he read Socrates'
words, there is little question that this is the
insight Maimonides is trying to preserve. That
person is wisest who recoils in awe and
humility in the face of something infinitely
greater than he or she can fathom. This is the
point where piety and wisdom come together.
Viewed in a sympathetic light, Maimonides'
elitism stems from the recognition that few
people will be satisfied with this. Although not
everyone in the history of philosophy would
agree, there is no question that Maimonides'
view has a long history and remains a
powerful alternative.
The Three Stages of True Spiritual Life
According Maimonides
return to head of document
The first stage of true spirituality is intellectual
apprehension of God (Ar., al-'idrak; Heb., ha-
hasaga), also known as "love" of God (Ar., al-
mahabba; Heb., 'ahava) . In this type of
spirituality, one acquires as much knowledge
about God as possible. This includes
knowledge of God's creation (the laws of
nature: physics and astrophysics with the
appropriate math, biology, medicine, etc.);
knowledge of what things can, and cannot, be
said about God (the theory of attributes with
the appropriate knowledge of logic and
linguistics); and skill in interpreting holy texts
so that they conform to one's general
knowledge.
With these things, I explain the great general
principles of the work of the Master of the
universe so that they be, for one who
understands, an opening to love God, as the
Sages said concering love [of God], "From this
[i.e., study], you get to know Him Who spoke
and the world was created." ( Mishne
Torah, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 2:2)
When a person contemplates these things and
gets to know all the created beings -- the
angel, the sphere, humanity, and such things
-- he or she [16] increases her or his love for
the Omnipresent. The soul of such a person
will thirst for God, and the flesh will yearn to
love the Omnipresent, may He be blessed.
Such a person will be in awe and will be afraid
of his or her lowliness, poorness [of spirit], and
insignifcance when compared with one of the
great holy bodies [e.g., the spheres] and, even
more so, [when compared with] one of the
pure forms which are separate from matter
and never had contact with it. [17] Such a
person will find herself or himself as a vessel
full of shame and embarrassment, empty and
lacking. ( Ibid., ibid., 4:12)
The study of creation (nature) leads to love of
God. Indeed, the accumulation of knowledge
about creation is the love of God. Furthermore,
the telos of learning is not knowledge itself.
Rather, the purpose of knowledge of the
natural world is a series of spiritual emotions --
awe, fear, insignificance, shame, and
embarrassment. The goal of study is a
thirsting of the soul and a yearning of the
body for God. Study is a type of religious
experience; the intellectual is part of a larger
spiritual realm.
The second stage of true spirituality
is intellectual contemplation of God, also
known as "intellectual worship " of God (Ar., al-
ibada al-aqliyya ; Heb., ha-avoda ha-
sikhlit ) and as "passion" for God (Ar., al-ishq;
Heb., hesheq). In this type of spirituality, one
concentrates on abstract thinking, on
pondering the most abstract and simple of
concepts. But, and this is crucial, as one does
this, one places oneself in the presence of
God. In intellectual contemplation, one
ponders the highest metaphysical
concepts and one resides in the Divine
presence. Intellectual contemplation
("worship," "passion"), thus, comes after the
intellectual love of God, though it is rooted in,
and grows from, the intellectual love of God.
Intellectual contemplation is, thus, a step
beyond intellectual love. It is the moment
when thought fades into mystical experience.
It is the transition from thinking-about-God to
being-in-the-presence of God. It is a mystical
moment or, more appropriately, a mystical-
intellectual way of being in the world.
This kind of worship ought only to be engaged
in after intellectual conception (Ar., al-
tassawur al-aqli ) has been achieved. When
you have apprehended God and His acts in
accordance with what is required by the
intellect, you should afterwards engage in
totally devoting yourself to Him (Ar., al-'inqita
'ilayhi ), endeavor to come close to Him
(Ar., wa-tasi nahwa qurbihi ), and strengthen
the bond (Ar., al-wusla) between you and Him
-- that is, the intellect ... The Torah has made it
clear that this (last) worship to which we have
drawn attention in this chapter can only be
engaged in after apprehension (Ar., al-'idrak)
has been achieved. It says: "to love the Lord
your God and to worship Him with all your
heart and with all your soul" (Dt. 11:13). Now
we have made it clear several times
( Guide 1:39; 3:28; etc.) that that love is
proportionate to apprehension (Ar., al-
mahabba ala qadri al-'idrak ). After love
comes this worship (Ar., al-ibada) to which
attention has also been drawn by the Sages,
may their memory be a blessing, who said,
"This is the worship that is in the heart"
( Talmud Bavli, Berakhot 2a; etc.). In my
opinion it consists in setting thought to work
on the first intelligible (Ar., 'imal al-fikra fi al-
maqul al-'awwal ) and in dedicating oneself
exclusively to this (Ar., wal-'infirad li-dhalika ),
as far as this is within one's capacity.
Therefore you will find that David commanded
his son Solomon and fortified him in these two
things, to endeavor to apprehend Him and to
endeavor to worship Him after apprehension
had been achieved. He said, "And you,
Solomon my son, know the God of your
father and worship Him" (I Chron.
28:9). (Guide 3:51; Pines 620-21) [18]
This is followed [in Ps. 91] by what is said
about divine providence where it gives the
reasons for this great protection, saying that
the reason for this great providence being
effective with regard to the individual in
question is this: "Because he has set his
passion upon Me (Heb., ki vi hashaq ),
therefore I will deliver him; I will set him on
high, because he has known My Name
(Heb., ki yada shemi)" (Ps. 91:14). We have
already explained in the preceding chapters
that the meaning of "knowledge of the Name"
is apprehension of Him (Ar., 'idrakuhu). It is as
if [the psalm] said that this individual is
protected because he has known Me and then
afterwardsset his passion upon Me (Ar., lima
arafani wa-ashiqani bada dhalika ). You
know the difference between the terms "one
who loves" (Heb., 'ohev) and "one who has set
his passion upon" (Heb., hosheq) -- an excess
of love such that no thought remains that is
directed toward a thing other than the beloved
is "passion" (Ar., al-ishq). ( Guide 3:51; Pines
627) [19]
The text is not difficult to grasp: After the work
of thinking and study, a person should ponder
the intellectual results. In addition -- and this
is important -- one should set oneself in the
presence of the intellectual power which is the
source of all thought, that is, God. This latter is
a form of "contemplation" or, in the words of
Maimonides, "passion for God" or "worship of
God." The difficult work of thinking, of
gathering evidence and weighing its truth, is
by contrast called by Maimonides
"apprehension" or "love of God." Both of them
constitute an integral aspect of the
intellectual-spiritual life life of the person who
strives for perfection (Ar., al-'insan al-kamil ).
[20] Intellectual effort alone is not enough;
one must also make a spiritual, experiential
effort if one wishes to attain to the telos of
humanity.
Most interesting is the fact that Maimonides,
who was not deficient in the metaphysical and
scientific vocabulary of his age, chose to use a
series of non-philosophical words to describe
this stage in the spiritual life of the person
striving for perfection. It is important to
highlight these terms by listing them: total
devotion to Him (Ar., al-'inqita 'ilayhi ) (twice),
exclusive dedication to Him (Ar., al-'infirad),
drawing close to Him (Ar., al-qurb minhu )
(twice), being present to Him in the true way
(Ar., al-muthul bayna yadayhi ala al-jihat al-
haqiqa ), standing before Him (Ar., al-maqam
indahu ), and bliss (Ar., al-ghibta; Heb.
parallel, noam [Guide 2:43]) (five
times). [21] Note also: the contact (Ar., al-
wusla) that is between you and Him which is
the intellect (many times), setting thought to
work on the first intelligible (Ar., 'imal al-fikra
fi al-maqul al-'awwal ), and an excess of love
such that no thought remains that is directed
toward a thing other than the beloved which is
"passion" (Ar., al-ishq) (several times). Note
especially Maimonides' use of union of their
intellects (Ar., 'ittihad uqulihim ) and his use
of bliss (Ar., al-ghibta ; Heb., noam).
All these terms find their source in the world of
mysticism, not in the world of physics and
metaphysics. It cannot be happenstance that
Maimonides uses them; rather, he clearly
intends to allude to a spiritual experience and
reality which, though rooted in previous
intellectual activity, transcends that realm. In
order to describe this realm which is beyond
rationalism, Maimonides has recourse to these
clearly mystical terms. There can be no doubt,
then that, for Maimonides, the second phase
of the true spiritual life included intellectual
contemplation; that is, a pondering of the
results of the work of the intellect while, at the
same time, doing so within the presence of
the living God. Precisely because Maimonides
saw himself as, and in fact was, the
authoritative teacher of his day, he was
obligated to present to the public, even if
subtly and with indirection, the experiential
reality of philosophic mysticism -- which is the
proper term for this form of spiritual life. It was
his responsibility to do so and, when
philosophic-scientific vocabulary failed him, he
used mystical vocabulary.
The third stage of true spirituality is
the continuous contemplation of God . It is
characterized by the recurrence of the Arabic
wordda'iman, meaning "continuous, always."
In these passages Maimonides describes a
condition in which a person is in extended
bliss (Ar.,ghibta) or pleasure (Ar., lidhdha). In
such a state, the bliss or pleasure is not a
fleeting moment in human spiritual life but an
ongoing state of mystical consciousness, one
which attends a person always. Continuous
contemplation is clearly an extension of
intellectual contemplation which, in turn, is an
extension of intellectual love. Each is an
intensification of the previous step.
Nonetheless, the three states seem clearly
differentiable. [22] It is continuous
contemplation which is the end, the telos, of
the person seeking perfection.
Thus it is clear that, after apprehension
(Ar., al-'idrak), total devotion to Him
(Ar., al-'inqita 'ilayhi ) and the employment of
intellectual thought in passion for
Him always (Ar., wa-'imal al-fikra al-aqliyya fi
ishqihi da'iman ) should be be aimed at.
( Guide3:51; Pines, 621)
There may be a human individual who,
through one's apprehension of the true
realities and one's bliss in what one has
apprehended, achieves a state in which one
talks with people and is occupied with one's
bodily necessities while one's intellect is
wholly turned toward Him (Ar., masruf
nahwahu ), may He be exalted, such that, in
one's heart one is always in His presence, may
He be exalted (Ar., wa-huwa bayna yadayhi ta
ala da'iman bi-qalbihi ), even while outwardly
one is with people -- in the sort of way
described by the poetical parables that have
been invented for these notions: "I sleep, but
my heart is awake," "The voice of my beloved
knocks," and so on ... This is the rank of
Moses, our master ... this is the level of the
patriarchs ... Through them is explained the
union with God, that is, apprehension and love
of Him (Ar., al-'ittihad bi-Allah, 'ani 'idrakuhu
wa-mahabbatuhu ) and that the providence of
God for them and their descendants is mighty
(Ar. azima) ... Now this is, to my mind, a proof
that they performed these actions with their
limbs only, while their intellects
were constantly in His presence, may He be
exalted (Ar., wa-uquluhum bayna yadayhi ta
ala da'iman ). ( Guide 3:51; Pines, 623-24)
These passages, and others like them, clearly
show a state of continuous contemplation, of
optimal meditation, and equally clearly
indicate that this state is the desired state for
the person seeking perfection.
Maimonides extended this state of continuous
contemplation into his theory of providence to
answer the question of God's protection and of
how evil, including death, befalls the
righteous:
[As to] the individual who is striving for
perfection of the intellect (Ar., al-shakhs al-
kamil al-'idrak ), whose intellect never
ceasesto be occupied with God (Ar., la yabrah
aqluhu an Allah da'iman ), providence
will always be over that person (Ar., takun al-
inaya bihi da'iman ). On the other hand, an
individual striving for perfection, whose
thought sometimes for a certain time is
emptied of God, is watched over by
providence only during the time when one
thinks of God; providence withdraws from such
a person during the time when one is occupied
with something else ... Hence it seems to me
that all prophets and excellent persons
seeking perfection (Ar., al-fudala' al-kamilin )
whom one of the evils of the world befell, had
this evil happen to them during such a time of
distraction or due to the vileness of the matter
with which one was occupied ... The
providence of God, may He be exalted, is
constantly (Ar., takun inayat Allah da'iman )
over those who have obtained this overflow,
which is permitted to anyone who makes an
effort with a view to obtaining it (Ar., li-kull
man saa fi husulihi ). If a person's thought is
free from distraction in apprehending
(Ar., 'idrakuhu) God, may He be exalted, in the
right way and if there is joy in what one
apprehends (Ar., wa-ghibtuhu bima 'adraka ),
then that individual can never be afflicted with
evil of any kind for, then, one is with God and
God is with one (Ar., li-'annahu maa Allah wa-
Allah maahu ). ( Guide 3:51; Pines 624-25)
It is important to note that, in this passage as
in others, Maimonides includes not only the
prophets and the patriarchs but also people
who lead a philosophic-mystical life (Ar., al-
fudala', al-kamilun ); they, too, can attain to
the state of continuous contemplation. [23]
The climax of Maimonides' teaching of
continuous contemplation is to be found in his
views on the ideal death and life-after-death
which he describes as an unending form of
continuous contemplation:
Yet in the measure in which the faculties of the
body are weakened and the fire of the desires
is quenched, the intellect is strengthened
(Ar., wa-qawiya al-aql ), its lights achieve
wider extension (Ar., wa-'inbasatat
'anwaruhu ), its apprehension is purified, and
it is in bliss (Ar., wa-taghbut) in what it
apprehends. The result is that, when a person
striving for perfection is stricken with years
and approaches death, this apprehension
increases very powerfully, bliss (Ar., al-ghibta)
in this apprehension and passion (Ar., al-ishq)
for the object of apprehension become
stronger, until the soul is separated from the
body, at that moment, into this state of
pleasure (Ar., al-lidhdha). Because of this, the
Sages have indicated with reference to the
deaths of Moses, Aaron, and Miriam that the
three of them died by a kiss ... Their purpose
was to indicate that the three of them died in
the pleasure of this apprehension (Ar., fi hal
lidhdhati dhalika al-'idrak ) due to the intensity
of the passion (Ar., min shiddat al-ishq ) ...
the apprehension that is achieved in a state of
intense passion for Him (Ar. inda shiddati
ishqihi taala )... As he [Solomon] said, "Let
him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth"
(Song 1:2), etc. ...The sages mention this kind
of death, which is, in true reality, salvation
from death, only with regard to Moses, Aaron,
and Miriam. The other prophets and excellent
persons (Ar., al-fudala') are beneath this
degree. However, it holds good for all of them
that the apprehension of their intellects
becomes stronger at the separation ... After
having reached this condition of enduring
permanence (Ar. al-baqa' al-da'im ), such an
intellect will remain in one and the same state
(Ar.,fi hal wahida) , the impediment that veiled
it having been removed. One's state of
permanence will be in that state of intense
pleasure (Ar., wa-yakun baqa'uhu fi tilka al-
lidhdha al-azima ) which does not belong to
the genus of bodily pleasures. ( Guide 3:51;
Pines 627-28) [24]
In these passages on providence, the ideal
death, and immortality, one should note yet
again that Maimonides uses mystical terms
and images. He describes the last moments of
the life of the person who strives for perfection
as pleasure (Ar., lidhdha) and writes about the
strengthening of the intellect and the
extension of its lights (Ar., wa-qawiya al-aql
wa-'inbasatat 'anwaruhu ). Most importantly,
he introduces verses and images from the
Song of Songs to describe the continuous
intellectual contemplation of God ("I sleep but
my heart wakes," "Let him kiss me with the
kisses of his mouth," "My beloved knocks,"
etc.). [25] All these terms and images flow
from mystical insight, not from metaphysical
understanding.
In his views on continuous contemplation,
continuous providence, the ideal death, and
the unending bliss of life-after-death,
Maimonides has set forth his true ideal for
human existence. The telos of humanity,
according to Maimonides, is not philosophy
itself. Philosophy is a stage, an instrument, a
means to the end. The end is continuous
contemplation of God, continuous being-in-
the-presence of God, even when one is
conducting one's daily business and especially
as one approaches death. This is achieved by
following the various stages of self-perfection:
meticulous observance of the commandments,
the hard work of studying and thinking about
creation so that it leads to God, the pondering
of the intellectual conclusions in the presence
of the Divine, and the continuous being before
God even in daily activities and especially in
death. Permanent pleasure in the Divine is the
goal.
An additonal problem with the text
of Guide 3:51: The text does not show these
layers clearly; rather, the text mixes the
stages in what appears to be helter-skelter
fashion. It requires work to separate out the
levels from the text. There are probably two
reasons for this. First, Maimonides is hiding
something. As he says in the Introduction to
the Guide, some thoughts will be consciously
hidden from the reader. What, then, is it that
he is trying to conceal, even as he reveals it at
the same time? I think it is the teaching that
the acquired intellect, not the rational soul, is
the part of human consciousness that attains
mortality. Maimonides teaches that the
rational soul is a natural function of the body,
much as the vegetative and animal souls are.
The latter clearly die with the human body
and, to tell the truth, so does the rational soul.
It is, therefore, only the acquired intellect that
survives humanity. [26] Since, however, the
words for soul in
Hebrew, nefesh and neshama, are used in
contexts that the rabbis understood to teach
immortality and, since the term "acquired
intellect" has no clear Hebrew designation,
Maimonides did not want to teach openly that
the rational soul dies with the body. So he
concealed that doctrine, though it is there to
see for whoever is bold enough to think that
the rational soul dies with the body. This desire
to preserve the
Hebrew nefesh andneshama as the bearers of
immortality is the first reason that led
Maimonides to weave a complicated and
unsystematic picture in 3:51.
Second, the states Maimonides is trying to
describe are elusive; they are post-rational,
post-cognitive, post-linguistic. He can only
allude to them. Hence, he mixes the
metaphors and images with the intellectualist
vocabulary, yielding a mixed text.
Having established that, for Maimonides,
metaphysics is a stage in self-perfection not
an end in itself, it is possible to review other
sections of his oeuvre to look for consistency
of view. One such case is his theory of
attributes. After many chapters dealing with
biblical words and images, Maimonides
devotes several chapters to the theory of
attributes and culminates his exposition with
the view that the best one can achieve is the
systematic study of various attributes and the
realization that they cannot be applied to God.
Thus, God cannot be said to be "one" because
God does not fall into the category of beings
subject to quantity. God cannot even be said
to "exist" because that word, too, implies
being in time and space, a category that does
not apply to God. This is Maimonides' via
negativa: God is categorically different from
God's creation and, hence, cannot be
described. Realizing this as fully as possible is
the most humans can achieve. In the end, only
silence is left to us.
... that everyone understands that one cannot
achieve apprehension, within that which we
are capable of apprehending, except by
negation ... that apprehension of Him is the
inability to fully apprehend Him (Ar., 'idrakuhu
huwa al-ajz an nihayat 'idrakihi ). All the
philosophers say, "He blinded us with His
beauty, and is veiled from us by the intensity
of His manifestation" (Ar., 'abharana bi-
jamalihi wa-khafiya anna li-shiddati zuhurihi )
[27] -- as the sun is hidden for those who have
sight because they are too weak to perceive
it ... The clearest thing of all that has been
said in this matter is the word of the psalmist,
"Silence is praise for you" (Ps. 65:2); meaning,
silence for you is a form of praise ... and his
saying, "Speak in your hearts on your beds,
and be silent" (Ps. 4:5). (Guide 1:59; Pines
139-40)
It could be that Maimonides' meaning here is
simple: where negation is the only mode of
thinking about the truth of God's being,
silence is the most befitting option. However,
three elements in this short passage allude to
more: first, the phrase "apprehension of Him is
the inability to fully apprehend Him"; second,
the anonymous but seemingly widespread
saying of the philosophers "He blinded us with
His beauty, and is veiled from us by the
intensity of His manifestation"; and third, his
two quotations from Psalms recommending
silence as the best praise for God. The saying
of the philosophers has parallels in
Maimonides: "The truth was hidden from them
completely, together with the intensity of His
manifestation (Ar., wa-khafiya anhum al-haqq
jumlatan maa shiddat
zuhurihi) ( Guide Introduction; Pines
8) [28] and "Exalted be He Whose perfection
has blinded us" (Ar., fa-subhana man
'abharana kamaluhu ) (Guide 1:72, end; Pines
193). [29] These phrases, yet again, betray a
mystical context, not a metaphysical or logical
one; they allude to a post-philosophic
experience of the Divine which is beyond
verbal and conceptual silence.