32. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto Ligot, et. al., vs.

Republic
2013
G.R NO.: 176944
Brion, J.
Case Digest By : Gonzalez, J.

DOCTRINE: That in a case of freeze order the proper remedy is petition of review on
certiorari and not a petition for review but this Rule maybe relaxed in the interest of
justice

FACTS: On June 2005, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by

the Anti- Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an Urgent Ex- Parte Application
for the issuance of a freeze order with the CA against certain monetary instruments
and properties of the petitioners pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9160.
This application was base on a letter coming from the Office of the Ombudsman to
AMLC, recommending the latter to conduct an investigation on Lt. Gen. Ligot and
his family. It was alleged in the Ombudsmans Complaint, that Lt. Gen. Ligot served
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 33 years and 2 months. Lt. Gen. Ligot
declared in his SALN that as of December 2003, he had assets amounting to P
3,848,003.00 and in contras to his declared assets in his 1982 SALN, which
amounted to only P 105,000.00. Bearing in mind that the main source of income of
Lt. Gen. Ligot was his salary as officer and the lack of other substantial source of
income, the Ombudsman declared the assets registered in Lt. Gen. Ligots name, as
well as those in his wifes and childrens name, to be illegally obtained pursuant to
the provisions of RA No. 1379. The ombudsman also investigated into Mrs. Ligots
younger brother, Edgardo Tecson Yambao. The records of the SSS revealed that
Yambao has been employed in the private sector from 1977 to 1994, and that based
on his contributions, Yambao did not have substantial salary during his
employment. Despite Yambaos lack of substantial income, he still owns real
properties and vehicles registered in his name, amounting to P 8,763,550.00, which
he acquired from 1993 onwards. The ombudsman also concluded that Yambao is a
dummy or a nominee of the Ligot spouse, and that all properties registered under
Yambao actually belongs to the Ligot family. The Ombudsman resolved that there is
probable cause that Lt. Gen. Ligot violated Section 8 in relation to Section 11, of RA
No 6713, as well as Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. On May 2005 the AMLC
Secretariat filed an application for a freeze order against the properties of the Lt.
Gen. Ligot and the members of his family with the CA. The appellate court granted
the application in its July 2005 resolution, ruling that probable cause existed and
that Lt. Gen. Ligot committed unlawful activity of money laundering. Accordingly
the CA issued a freeze order against the Ligots and Yambaos various bank,
account, web accounts and vehicles, valid for a period of 20 days from the date of
issuances. On July 2005, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Effectivity of Freeze Order, arguing that if the bank accounts, web accounts and
vehicles were not continuously frozen, they could be placed beyond the reach of law
enforcement authorities. The Republics application was granted and the extended
the freeze order until after all the appropriate proceedings or investigation have
been terminated. The Ligots filed a motion to lift the extended freeze order,
principally arguing that there was no evidence to support the freeze order, but the
appellate court denied such claim. Meanwhile, on November 2005, the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of
Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to
an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offenses under Republic Act No. 9061
and that under this rule, a freeze order could only be extended for a maximum
period of six (6) months. Petitioners argument, is that the appellate court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it extended the freeze order issued against him and his family even though no
predicate crime had been duly proven or established to support such allegation of
money laundering.

ISSUE/S: Whether the proper remedy to assail the freeze order is Certiorari?

HELD: No, it is not the proper remedy but there is an exception. As provided in
Section 57 of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases explicitly provides the remedy
available in cases involving freeze orders issued by the CA, should be petition for
review on certiorari, and not petition for certiorari. The court ruled that even
assuming that a petition for certiorari was available to the petitioners, a review of
their petition could not apply under the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture because it only pertains to errors of judgment allegedly committed by the
CA, which fall outside the courts limited jurisdiction. The Ligots should have filed a
petition for review on certiorari and not what is effectively a second motion for
reconsideration within fifteen days from receipt of the CAs resolution. However, the
court considered that this case involves a conflict between Section 10 of RA No. 9160
and Section 53(b) of the Rule in Civil Forfeiture Cases, this court finds it imperative
to relax application of the rules of procedure and resolved this case on the merits in
the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and LIFT the freeze
order issued by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 90238. This lifting is
without prejudice to, and shall not affect, the preservation orders that the lower
courts have ordered on the same properties in the cases before them. Pursuant to
Section 56 of A.M. No. 05-ll- 04-SC, the Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to
remand the case and to transmit the records to the Regional Trial Court Branch 22,
where the civil forfeiture proceeding is for consolidation therewith as may be
appropriate.

33. City of Manila vs. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo

2014
G.R NO.: 175732
Peralta, J.
Case Digest By: Gonzalez, J.

DOCTRINE: That in the interest of justice, a Petition for Review on Certiorari maybe
treated as a Petition for Certiorari.

FACTS: The City of Manila, through its treasurer assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings,
Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc.,
Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus
Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. The taxes were due pursuant to Sections 14,
15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, covering the local business taxes
of petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. The
Petitioners paid the tax because it was a condition in order for the issuance of their
business permit. On January 2004, the private respondents filed a complaint for
Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax,
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The private
respondents also alleged that the said sections of the RRMC violate the limitations
and guidelines under Section 143(h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 on double taxation.
They further averred that the petitioners City Ordinance No. 8011, which amended
portions of the RRMC, had already been declared illegal and unconstitutional by the
DOJ. The RTC granted the private respondents application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and the petitioner Motion for reconsideration was denied.
The Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with CA assailing the
July 2004 and October 2004 Orders of the RTC. The CA dismissed the petitioners
petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the private
respondents complaint for tax refund pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
Republic Act No. 9282, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of
an interlocutory order issued in the case should be filed with the CA.

ISSUE/S: Whether the proper remedy is the instant special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: No, in this case the court ruled in the interest of substantial justice it was
held that the petition for review on certiorari was treated as a petition for certiorari.
The court considered that the (1) present petition was filed within the reglementary
period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) that errors of
judgment were averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules. Therefore under, these considerations the court deems it
proper and justifies relaxing the rules and, thus, treating the instant petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

34. Sps. Ramon Villuga and Mercedita Villuga vs. Kelly Hardware and Construction
Supply Inc
2012
G.R NO.: 176570
NAME OF PONENTE
Case Digest By : Gonzalez, J.
DOCTRINE: That in a motion the adverse party should be informed before hand
and that the ten (10) days is a mandatory requirement before proceeding with the
presentation of evidence.

FACTS: Herein Kelly Hardware filed with the RTC a Complaint for a Sum of Money
and Damages against herein Sps. Villuga alleging that defendants [herein
petitioners] made purchases of various construction materials from Plaintiff
Corporation. These purchases became due and demandable but only a part of the
obligation was paid. Plaintiff made several demands for the same defendants to pay
all their obligations due plaintiff herein, but defendants fail and refuse to comply
with, despite demands made upon them, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff. In
their Answer to Complaint, petitioners admitted having made purchases from
respondent, but alleged that they do not remember the exact amount thereof as no
copy of the documents evidencing the purchases were attached to the complaint.
Petitioners, nonetheless, claimed that they have made payments to the respondent
and they are willing to pay the balance of their indebtedness after deducting the
payments made and after verification of their account. In a Manifestation,
petitioners stated that in order to buy peace, they were willing to pay respondent
but without interests and costs, and on installment basis. In its Counter
Manifestation, Respondent signified that it was amenable to petitioners' offer to pay.
However, respondent insisted that petitioners should also pay interests, as well as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all incidental expenses. Subsequently,
respondent filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings contending that
petitioners were deemed to have admitted in their Answer that they owed
respondent when they claimed that they made partial payments. Based on this
premise, respondent prayed that it be awarded the remaining balance. Petitioners
filed their Opposition to the said Motion. The RTC issued an Order deferring
resolution of respondent's Motion for Partial Judgment on the ground that there is
no clear and specific admission on the part of petitioners as to the actual amount
that they owe respondent. Respondent filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of
court, alleging that petitioners purchased from it (respondent) various construction
materials and supplies, the aggregate value of which is P279,809.50; that only
P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50. In their Answer to
Amended Complaint, petitioners reiterated their allegations in their Answer to
Complaint. Respondent filed a Request for Admission asking that petitioners admit
the genuineness of various documents, such as statements of accounts, delivery
receipts, invoices and demand letter attached thereto as well as the truth of the
allegations set forth therein.
Respondent basically asked petitioners to admit that the latter's principal obligation
is P279,809.50 and that only P20,000.00 was paid. Respondent filed a Manifestation
and Motion before the RTC praying that since petitioners failed to timely file their
comment to the Request for Admission, they be considered to have admitted the
genuineness of the documents described in and exhibited with the said Request as
well as the truth of the matters of fact set forth therein, in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Petitioners filed their Comments on the Request for Admission
stating their objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.
Respondent filed its Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of court. The
amendment modified the period covered by the complaint. Instead of October 1992
to January 5, 1993, it was changed to July 29, 1992 until August 10, 1994. The
amendment also confirmed petitioners' partial payment in the sum of P110,301.80
but alleged that this payment was applied to other obligations which petitioners owe
respondent. Respondent reiterated its allegation that, despite petitioners' partial
payment, the principal amount which petitioners owe remains P259,809.50.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint denying the
allegations therein and insisting that they have made partial payments. Respondent
filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that
petitioners' Comments on respondent's Request for Admission is a mere scrap of
paper as it was signed by petitioners' counsel and not by petitioners themselves and
that it was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. Respondent goes
on to assert that petitioners, in effect, were deemed to have impliedly admitted the
matters subject of the said request. Respondent also contended that it is already
entitled to the issuance of a summary judgment in its favor as petitioners not only
failed to tender a genuine issue as to any material fact but also did not raise any
special defenses, which could possibly relate to any factual issue. In their Opposition
to Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment, petitioners argued that
respondent's request for admission is fatally defective, because it did not indicate or
specify a period within which to answer; that verification by petitioners' counsel is
sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court; that petitioners' request for admission
should be deemed dispensed with and no longer taken into account as it only relates
to the Amended Complaint, which was already abandoned when the Second
Amended Complaint was filed; and that summary judgment is improper and
without legal basis, as there exists a genuine controversy brought about by
petitioners' specific denials and defenses. The RTC issued an Order, the plaintiff's
[herein respondent's] Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby GRANTED. The CA sustained the summary judgment rendered by the RTC.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the
summary judgment rendered by the RTC?

HELD: The Court finds that the CA was correct in sustaining the summary
judgment rendered by the RTC.
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all
or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten
(10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the
hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn
out litigations and useless delays.Such judgment is generally based on the facts
proven summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.
In this respect, the Court's ruling in Nocom v. Camerino, is instructive, to wit:
x x x When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be
tried, the Rules of Court allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed
to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely,
where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A
"genuine issue" is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Section 3 of [Rule 35 of the Rules of Court] provides two (2) requisites for summary
judgment to be proper:
there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of
damages; and
(2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine.

35. Dare Adventure Farm Corporation vs. Sps. Felix and Nenita Ng
2012
G.R NO.: 161122
Bersamin, J.
Case Digest By : Gonzalez, J.

DOCTRINE: Annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature

that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the
judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a
court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.

FACTS: Dare Adventure Farm Corporation (Dare Adventure) bought a parcel of

land from respondent Agripina Goc-ong (Agripina), Porferio Goc-ong, Diosdado Goc-
ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong, Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino
Goc-ong (collectively, the Goc-ongs). Later-on, Dare Adventure discovered that the
property was mortgaged to Felix Ng, married to Nenita N. Ng, and Martin T. Ng,
married to Azucena S. Ng (collectively, the Ngs) to secure Goc-ongs obligation . Go-
ongs apparently failed to pay their obligation. The Ngs fined a complaint for
recovery of sum of money, or, in the alternative foreclosure of the mortgage in
the Regional Trial Court. The Goc-ong being declaired in default for failing to file
an answered, was rendered with an adverse judgment in the RTC. In the Court
of Appeals, an annulment of for the RTC decision was commenced. The CA
dismissed the petition outright for not availing the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies as provided in Sec
1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the action for annulment of judgment was a proper
recourse for Dare Adventure to set aside the decision of the RTC?

HELD: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in

nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if
the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by
a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being
exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus
instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 110 of Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order
or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored
doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone
in the dispensation of justice by the courts.The doctrine of immutability and
unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.

We agree with the CAs suggestion that the petitioners proper recourse was either
an action for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property.

The Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

 36. Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Salavana
2014
G.R NO.: 192074
NAME OF PONENTE
Case Digest By : Gonzalez, J.

DOCTRINE: A government party that is Party Adversely Affected for purpose of an

appeal provided that, the government party has the right to appeal must be the office
or the agency prosecuting the case.

FACTS: LRTA issued an order. The order revoked Atty. Aurora A. Salvaas
designation as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department.
Atty. Elmo Stephen P. Triste, the newly designated OIC of the administrative
department. Instead of complying, Salvaa questioned the order with the Office of
the President. Salvaa applied for sick leave of absence on May 12, 2006 and from
May 15 to May 31, 2006.5 In support of her application, she submitted a medical
certificate6 issued by Dr. Grace Marie Blanco of the Veterans Memorial Medical
Center (VMMC). LRTA discovered that Dr. Blanco did not issue this medical
certificate. Administrator Robles issued a notice of preliminary investigation. The
notice directed Salvaa to explain in writing within 72 hours from her receipt of the
notice "why no disciplinary action should be taken against [her]"8 for not complying
with Office Order No. 119 and for submitting a falsified medical certificate. LRTA
later on found that her reason was unsubstantial and issued a formal charge
against her for Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Document, Grave Misconduct,
Gross Insubordination, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Salvana submitted a manifestation stating that the committee was biased. The
LRTA Board approve the findings of the fact-finding team. The Civil Service
Commission modified the decision and issued a resolution stating that Salvana was
only guilty of dishonesty. LRTA filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the Civil Service
Commisions findings that Salvana was only guilty of dishonesty.

ISSUE/S: Whether the LRTA, as represented by its Administrator had legal

standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service commission of its decision?
HELD: Yes, the parties may appeal in an administrative case involving members of
the civil service. It is a well-settled rule that the right to appeal is not a natural
right but if not granted to a person it can be a violation to the constitutional right to
due process of law. In RA No. 2260 or the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals by the
respondent were allowed on the decisions of the Commissioner of the Civil Service
rendered in administrative cases involving discipline of subordinate officers and
employees. It can also be found in PD No. 807 that provides:

Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

Sec. 39. Appeals. - (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision
unless a petition shall be decided within fifteen days.

The person adversely affected, was not defined in the PD 807 or the
Administrative Code. Its meaning can be found Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, or the URACCS:

(I) Party Adversely Affected refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a
disciplinary case has been rendered.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated November

11, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104225 and Resolution No.
071364 dated July 18, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that respondent, Atty. Aurora A. Salvaa, is found guilty of Less
Serious Dishonesty. The Civil Service Commission is DIRECTED to attach a copy of
this decision to respondent's permanent employment record.