05/04/2017 Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs.

Husserl's Ideas I

AGAINST IDEALISM:
JOHANNES DAUBERT VS. HUSSERL'S IDEAS I(1)

Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith

From: Review of Metaphysics, 39 (1985), 763-93.

ToseektoelucidateHusserl'sphenomenologybycontrastingitwiththatoftheMunich
phenomenologistJohannesDaubert(18771947)istobetrayanintentiontoexplainsomething
wellknownbyreferencetosomethingthatiswhollyobscure.Thusmostphilosophersare
somehowawareofEdmundHusserl.ButJohannesDaubert?
Daubert'sneartotaleclipseisnoaccident.Althoughwehavenohesitationincallinghim
andnotHusserlthetruearchitectofthephenomenologicalmovement,itnonethelessremains
truethathe'neverpublishedaline'.(2)Ithasthereforebeenimpossibleforthewider
philosophicalpublictobecomeacquaintedwiththethoughtofaphilosopherwhomHusserl
himselfheldinhighestesteem,eversincetheirfirstmeetingin1902.
ItwasthroughlecturesanddiscussionsextendingoverseveralyearsthatDaubert'sinfluence
madeitselffeltdiscussionswhichwereamajorfactorintheestablishmentofphenomenology
inbothMunichandGttingen.(3)Butdiscontinuitiesinthephenomenologicaltraditioncaused
bytwoWorldWarsandtheHitlerReichhamperedthehandingdownofDaubert'steachings,
whichhadalreadyreachedthehighpointoftheirinfluenceinthefirstdecadeofthecentury.
StillmoreimportantisthefactthatDaubert,whovolunteeredforthearmyin1914,withdrew
afterthewartoafarmhehadboughtforhimselfoutsideMunich.Thisspelled,forthetime
beingatleast,theendofhisactivephilosophising.Helostcontactwiththenewgenerationof
studentsthatwasestablishingitselfinMunich,thoughhealwaysremainedintouchwith
AlexanderPfnder,thethenleadingspokesmanofMunichphenomenology.TouseBerkeley's
words,Daubertunited'inhisownpersonthephilosopherandthefarmer,twocharactersnotso
inconsistentinnatureasbycustomtheyseemtobe.'(4)
However,themostimportantstumblingblockstandinginthewayofawiderknowledgeof
Daubert'sphenomenologyarehisverymanuscripts,whichhekeptwithhimathisfarmtothe
endofhislife.Theyweretransferredin1967totheBavarianStateLibraryinMunich,where
theywereclassifiedunderthesigil'Daubertiana'.(5)Eventhen,however,theyremained
inaccessibletothereaderinvirtueofthehighlyunusualsystemofshorthandwhichDauberthad
usedthroughout.Onlyin1976didSchuhmannmanagetobreakthiscode.

1.DaubertianaFileAI3andIdeasI
DaubertmusthavestudiedHusserl'sIdeasIduringatleastthreedifferentperiods.Hefirstread
theworkimmediatelyafteritspublication(aroundMay1913).AtthattimeIdeasIwasforhim,
asforhisfriendAlexanderPfnder,mainlyaconfirmationofthecommongroundsharedby
bothHusserlandtheMunichgroup.(6)AsecondphaseisconfirmedbyPfnder'sletterto
HusserlofMarch28,1915.Daubertwasthenatthefront,andPfndersenthim'IdeasIathis
ownrequest,fasciculebyfascicule'.(7)

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Daubert'smostextensivediscussionoftheIdeasishowevertobefoundinthefile
DaubertianaAI3,themajorityofwhose173doublefoliopageswerewrittenbetweenFebruary
1930andSeptember1931.(8)Daubertsoldhisfarmin1929andboughtanewoneonlyinthe
Springof1932,takingadvantageoftheinterveningperiodtomakeafreshstartinphilosophy.
Whatmadehimresumeworkafteraninterruptionofsomefifteenyearswashisplanto
contributetotheforthcomingFestschriftinhonourofhisfriendPfnder'ssixtiethbirthday.
Eventuallythebookappearedwithoutsuchacontribution,thoughthereispreservedaproofof
anearlyversionofitstableofcontentsannouncingDaubert'sprojectedcontributionunderthe
title"ZurPhnomenologiederEvidenz".AllthathascomedowntousofDaubert'sprojectare
thedraftscontainedinfileAI3.
Daubert'sworkischaracterisedbyaconstantstrivingtoincluderelevantideasofother
philosophersinhisdiscussions.Indeedithadbeenhisendeavourtotakeaccountofother
people'sthoughtthathadledhimin1902tothediscoveryofHusserl'sphenomenology,andeven
in1930hisreceptionofthepertinentliteratureisstillastonishinglyuptodate,especiallywhen
onebearsinmindthathehadstayedalooffromdevelopmentsinphilosophyforsolong.Among
theworkssettingthetoneforhisreflectionsare"ZurOntologieundErscheinungslehreder
realenAussenwelt"byHedwigConradMartius,MartinHeidegger'sBeingandTime,Theodor
Celms'bookDerphnomenologischeIdealismusHusserls(1928),Ingarden's"Bemerkungen
zumProblemIdealismusRealismus",publishedintheHusserlFestschriftof1929,andabove
allAronGurwitsch's"PhnomenologiederThematikunddesreinenIch",publishedinthe1929
issueofthePsychologischeForschung,housejournaloftheBerlinGestaltpsychologists.What
alltheseworkshaveincommon,ofcourse,istheiroppositiontoHusserl'sidealism.(9)
TwentyninefullfoliopagesoffileAI3referexplicitlytoIdeasI.Asurveyofthemanuscript
showsthatPartIofHusserl'sworkdoesnotreallydetainDaubert'sattention.Hepaysmore
attentiontotheconceptsofnaturalattitudeandepochandtothetreatmentoftherelation
betweenworldandconsciousnessdealtwithinPartII.InrelationtoPartIII,Daubertbriefly
discussesHusserl'stheoryofthenoemabeforesubjectingtoanextensivediscussionthequestion
ofpositing[setzende]acts.ThedetaileddiscussionofthephenomenologyofreasonofPartIVis
wellinkeepingwithDaubert'soverallaiminfileAI3ofdevelopingaphenomenologyof
evidence.
Allofthesereflectionsareheldtogetherbyacommoninterestintheproblemofthesubject's
cognitiverelationtotheworld,mainlytotheworldofnature.Howcanrealitybegiveninandto
consciousness?Howdoestheidenticalthingpresentitselfinorthroughamultiplicityof
phenomena?Howistrueandevidentcognitionof"thingsoutthere"possibleatall?Inanswering
thesequestionsDaubertdevelopsastrikinglyoriginalalternativetotheHusserlianconceptionof
therelationbetweenconsciousness,whichforHusserlisnotoriouslytakenassomething
absolute,andreality,whichwasDaubert'sownpointofdeparture.Weshallseethatinacertain
sensehestandsHusserlonhishead.

2.OnPerceivingaTree
Perceptionisnormallyseenasprovidingthefundamentallayerinourexperienceofobjects.A
phenomenologyofperceptionisthereforebasictoallfurtherreflectionontherelationbetween
consciousnessandworld.IndeedHusserlintroduceshisdescriptionofthestructuresof
consciousnessinIdeasIwith'aseriesofobservations'onournaturaldirectednesstotheexternal
worldinperception(60).Thinking,reflectionandthereforealsophenomenologyitself
presupposeperceptionastheoriginalmodeofawarenessofthenaturalworld.Butatthesame
timethisperceptualacquaintancewithrealitycannotlegitimateitsowncontentsandisthusnot
proofagainstscepticaldoubt.ForthisreasonHusserlregardsthenaturalattitude,whichaccepts
theclaimsofperceptionatfacevalue,asnomorethan'theconceptionofthenaivehumanbeing'
(69).
Daubert,too,holdstoacertainprimacyofperception.Butforhimthevalueofreflectionor
ofaphilosophicaltheoryisnotmeasuredbythedegreetowhichitmightovercome
perception.Thevalueofreflectiondependsratheruponitscapacitytoremainfaithfulto
perceptionasthesourcefromwhichitsprang.Thisestimateofperceptionasanonplusultra
clearlydiffersconsiderablyfromHusserl'sown.ThusDaubertwrites:

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PreciselythatwhichIperceiveandwhichisgiventomebywayofperceptionis
realandhasitsplaceinrealityithasitschemicalstructure,itburns,etc.Thereis
nothingbehindit.(143r)

ThisremarkisofcoursepromptedbyHusserl'sstatementtotheeffectthat

thetreesimplicitercanburn,beresolvedintoitschemicalelements,etc.Butthe
sensethesenseofthisperception...cannotburnithasnochemicalelements
(184).(10)

NowHusserl'streeexampleisdesignedtoserveasanillustrationoftherelationbetweennoema
andrealthing.(11)Bothare'"preciselythesame"'inregardtowhatisgiven,yetatthesametime
'radicallydifferent,byvirtueof...achangeofsign'(184).Husserl'sownquotationmarksaround
thefirstofthesetwophrasesmarkthefactthattheidentityinquestionistobeunderstoodonly
inanextenuatedsense,andthatDaubertisthereforejustifiedininterpretingHusserl'sstatement
assignifyingadoublingoftheobjectpoleoftheperceptualact.Husserl'sduplicationofreality,
whichisreminiscentofPlato'sdistinctionbetweenanintelligibleandasensibleworld,isof
courseinaccordwithhisownselfavowed'platonicrealism'(40).ForDaubert,however,it
signalsareductioninthesignificancethatisawardedto'real'reality,afirstcrucialstepinthe
directionofidealism.(12)
Daubert,forhispart,refusestheverydistinctionbetweenrealobjectandperceptualsense.
CertainlywemaysufferperceptualillusionanderrorandDaubertwillhavetoaccountforthe
divergencesfromrealitywhichsuchphenomenainvolvebutanyattempttounderstandthem
willitselfhavetobuildfirmlyonthebasisoftheone,omnipresentworld.ThereisforDaubert
'nothingbeyondit'(143r),noHinterwelt.Alloccurrencesbelongingtosubjectiveexperienceare
tobedescribedastheyare,entangledwiththisworld.Itmay,e.g.,betruethatthetreeassuch
canburnwhilemysubjectiveexperienceofthetreecannot.Butontheotherhanditpertainsto
thisveryexperiencethatthetreeIperceivemaycatchfire,thatitmaybeblowndowninastorm,
thatitisrootedinthesurroundingrealityinawholevarietyofways.Doesanattemptto
understandthesenseofmyperceptionwithoutextendingittotherealtreeouttherestillmake
senseofthisperception?ConsiderationsofthiskindapparentlyunderlieDaubert'srefusalto
acceptatwoworldtheory,andhisaffirmationthat'preciselythatwhichIperceive...isreal'
(143r)isacorollarytothis.(13)

3.ConsciousnessasFunction
Daubert'sdenialofaselfsubsistinglayerofsenseswhosetiestorealitycouldbeloosenedor
eveninareductiondispensedwithentirely,hasfarreachingconsequences.Foritwillprove
thatconsciousness'exists'onlywhenandinsofarasitisinvolvedinthisreality.Onecannot
ascribetoconsciousnessanyexistenceofitsown,independentofthisimmediateconnection
withthenaturalworld.DauberttherebygoesbeyondHusserlinaffirmingtheinadequacyofany
Aristotelianconceptionofconsciousnessintermsofbeamsorraysemittedbyaspecial'ego
substance'.(14)Consciousnessitselfcannotbegraspedintermsofthisconception,becauseitis
nothinginfrontofus,nothingonwhichthebeamcanfall,and,withthis,nothingsubstantial.
IndeedDaubertwantstoinsistthat'thatinwhichrealityshowsitselfisnothingexistingbyitself,
butonlyafunctiondirectedtowardsreality'(62v,ouremphasis).(15)Heisclearthat:

Consciousnessisnotabeinginitselfbutrathersomethingwhichfunctionsonlyin
somethingelse[wasnurinAnderesfunktioniert]andinwhichsomethingelse
functionsinitsturn[undinwelcheshineinAnderesfunktioniert].Thefunctioning
beingofconsciousnesshasnospecialexistenceofitsownandisnothingreal(11v).

NootherphenomenologistexceptSartreseemstobesoexplicitindenyingtheexistenceof
consciousness,takenforitself,andthereareSartreanechoesalsoinDaubert'semphasisonthe
distinctionbetweenconsciousnessasamatteroffunctioningactsandconsciousnesswhichgoes
onholidaye.g.bybeingmadeintoanobjectofreflection.Notwithstandingsuchsimilarities,
however,Daubert'sargumenthaslittleincommonwithSartre'ssweepingidentificationof
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consciousnessandnothingness.Thelatterismotivatedasmuchbymetaphysicaldesires
stemmingfromHegelandDescartesasbyaphenomenologicalconcerntodescribewhatisgiven
inexperience.
Daubertexplainshisnotionoffunctionbymeansofthefollowinganalogy:

Consciousnesstakenasact,[i.e.]insofarasitfunctions,hasincontrasttotheobject
noexistenceofitsown.OnlywhenIreflectonitdoesitceasetofunctionandseem
tohaveabeingofitsown.Thisresemblestheproblemofthe'and'.Doesitreceivea
beingofitsowninvirtueofthechangedorwhollynewpositionwetakeupin
thematisingit?Atthispoint,Husserlmakeshisfundamentalmistake.Thispositing,
whichrendersconsciousnessthematic,therebyreinterpretsitinthedirectionofa
peculiarbeingwhichisalientoit,orofaformoranachievementmadeupofreal
componentsofmentalprocesses.Thestaticcharacterwhichthematisingdictatesis
reinterpretedasastaticexistence.(142r,ouremphasis)(16)

Orconsiderthepredication'"And"isaconjunction'.Here,asDaubertpointsout:

'And'isnotanexistentobjectatall,butafunction.Buthereitisthetheme,andsoit
gainsitsexistencewhenIcharacteriseitasaconjunction.(140r)

ThesereflectionsclearlyrefertoHusserl'streatmentinthefourthLogicalInvestigationofthe
problemofhowtounderstandsyncategorematawhentornfromtheircontext.(17)Husserlhad
saidthatwhenwebelieveourselvestounderstandsyncategoremataassuch,i.e.takenin
isolation,thenthiscanonlybebecauseacompletionoftheirsignificationhasoccurredandan
anomaloussignificationhastherebybeenindirectlyawardedtothem.Thusanisolated'and',for
example,isunderstoodbymeansofatacitreferencetoanideaofthetype'AandB'.
ItwasthetheoryofthemodificationofsignificationswhichallowedHusserltodevelophis
theoryofformalontology,foritprovidedhimwithawayofreferringtosuchentitiesas
concepts,Sachverhalte,species,abstractmoments,etc.,withoutpresupposingthatthereferents
ofthesetermsexistinthesamewayasdo,e.g.,physicalthings.Anomalousreferring
expressionsarenotnonsense,onHusserl'stheory(astheyareforWittgensteinintheTractatus).
Theirsenseis,rather,modifiedinacertainway.
Daubert'streatmentofconsciousnessis,now,anextensionofHusserl'stheoryofmodification.
Consciousnessisnotanobjectatall.Toconsideritassuchistomistakeamerefunction
whichis,tocoinaphrase,inneedofsaturationbyitsobjectforanobjectintheworld.(18)The
veryterm'consciousness'cannotbeunderstoodexceptviaasupplementationofitsmeaning.The
termisarelativenoun,reflectingthefactthatconsciousnessisalwaysconsciousnessof.Itsuse
asacategorematicsubstantiveisthereforeanomalous,aviewthatiscorroboratedbyobserving
thattheveryterm'consciousness'anditsequivalentsinotherEuropeanlanguageshasitselfbeen
artificiallyforgedbyphilosophersonlyrelativelyrecently.(19)

4.TheQuestionofIdealism
Consciousnessfunctionsinanormalwayonlywhenit'hits'anobject.Thisthesiscarriesfor
Dauberttheimplicationthatconsciousnessmayacquireastatusofitsown,maycometobe
substantivisedasan'ego',onlybybecomingdeprivedofthis,itsoriginalfunction.Itisin
imaginativeorhypotheticalthinking,inneutralisationorreduction(cf.249f.),when
consciousnessseemstowithdrawindifferentwaysfromcontactwithreality,thatitacquiresa
pseudobeingofitsown.ButinDaubert'sviewtheentanglementwithrealityisstillpreserved,
thoughveiledandhidden,eveninthesemodifications,andthedirectawarenessofrealityisat
workeveninthephenomenologicalepochitself.
Thisentanglementwithreality,whichdoomsallpurportedsuspensionsoftheworldtodraw
onitcomewhatmay,makesitimpossibleforphenomenologytoachieveany'pure'description
ofan'absolute'consciousness.AsDaubertnotes:'Withoutapersistentrealitynocognitionwould
bepossibleatall'(19v),noteventhattypeofcognitionwhichallowsthephenomenological
elucidationofconsciousness.ThuswhereHusserlwouldhavephenomenologyoperate
'exclusivelyinactsofreflection'(174),i.e.exclusivelyin'actsofsecondorder'(95),Daubert
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objectsthatthefoundationsofsuchactscannotsimplybeforgotten.'Onecannotderiveany
realitywhatsoeverfrompureconsciousness'(16r),i.e.fromactsofsecondordertakenalone.
Thequestionofidealism,accordingtoDaubert,cannotbesettledonthebasisofthepeculiar
andexceptionalnatureofreflectiveconsciousness.'InastrictlyreflectiveattitudeIcouldnot
attaintotranscendentobjects,'hesays(7v).Theissueofidealismistobedecidedonlybytaking
carefulaccountofnormalexperience,whichinvolvesourfunctioninginsomewaytowardsan
object.Andtoskipovertheobjectiveterminvolvedintheproblemisnottosolvebuttoavoidit.
Ifforfundamentalreasonstherealobjectremainsoutsideconsciousness,Husserl'sidealism
willeventuallyretainitsright,orrather,itwillbecomeplausible,fortherewillbenoargument
leftfortherealistcase(16v).

5.HyleandThing
Phenomenologicalreflection'canonlypresenttheessentialfeaturesofactsofconsciousness'
(61v).NowasHusserlconceivesthematterinIdeasI,itisessentialtoanactofconsciousness
thatithaveanegopole,thatitbeanactofaphenomenologicalsubject.Itisnothowever
essentialnotevenforanactthatisexperiencedasanactofperceptionthatithavesuchand
suchareal,transcendentobject.Butbythismeansthepureegoacquiresthestatusofanabsolute
substance,realitythatofameredependentaccident.(20)Husserl'sawardinganabsolutestatusto
pureconsciousnessandarelativestatustotheworldofobjectsisthereby,ashehimselfadmits,a
reversalof'thesenseusuallyexpressedinspeakingofwhatis'(93).AsDaubertinsists,however,
thesenseof'reality'and'existence'becomesestablishedineverydaylanguage,priortoany
philosophising,anditcannotbethetaskofphenomenologytooverthrowthissensebutonlyto
elucidateit:phenomenologymustbe'innerclarificationofthegiven'notcriticisminthesenseof
'theoryfromabove'(16v).Husserlnonethelessinsistsuponhis'reversalofsense'.Consciousness
asheconceivesitneverinfactreachesouttorealreality.Itisdirectedinsteadtowardapseudo
realityconstitutedbyconsciousnesstoitsownspecifications.Withthiswecometoafurthertask
whichDauberthastotakeupagainstIdeasI:

Husserl'sphrase:'allbeingiseitherpureconsciousnessorabeingconstitutedby
pureconsciousness'willbeshowntocontainaninternalcontradiction(92v).

Dauberttakesashisstartingpointaninterpretationofconstitutionasanactiveproductionof
noematathroughtheanimationofhyletic(sensory)datainthestreamofacts.Whatgets
constitutedinthisprocessisastructureofnoemata.Tothisheobjectsthat,iftranscendenceis
broughtaboutbyaprogressivebestowalofsense,then'theworldwouldbecomeprogressively
constituteditwoulddevelopintheveryprocessofcognitionitself'(9r).Themovementof
thoughtandrealitywouldcoincide,andHusserl'sabsoluteconsciousness,this'"absolutebeing",
wouldbesuchastocomprehendtherealthingeveninitsmaterialnature'(7v).Butthe
Husserlianviewthuslosessightofthetranscendentobjectbymakingofitanimmanentpartof
consciousness.AlludingtoWilhelmWindelband'sfamousdefinitionofidealismas'the
dissolutionoftheexperientialworldintoprocessesofconsciousness',(21)Daubertsaysthat
Husserl'sidealism'finallysolvestheenigmaofenigmas(consciousness"of")bymeansofan
ontologicaldissolutionofonerealityintoanother'(61r).(22)
NowofcourseHusserlalwaysprotestedagainstconfoundinghisown,phenomenological
idealismwithanyidealismofthetraditionalsort.DoesnotthereferencetoWindelbandprove
thatDauberthasbeenmisledbysuperficialresemblancesbetweenHusserl'sande.g.Berkeley's
position?DoeshenotimputetoHusserlapositionwhichhehimselfexplicitlyrejected?Sucha
view,forallitsattractiveness,wouldbeoverhasty.True,thenoemaisindeed,overagainstthe
streamofconsciousness,'somethingfundamentallyother,notreallyinherentbuttranscendent'
(204).ButinthesamebreathHusserlaffirmsthatthisirreducibleelementisconstituted'"onthe
groundof"thematerialmentalprocesses"by"thenoeticfunctions'(204).Sothiselementfinds
somesortoflast'ground'inconsciousnessafterall,morespecificallyinhyleticdata(23)and
thelatterareundoubtedlyimmanentinconsciousness.Husserlinsistedrepeatedly,andespecially
withhyleticdatainmind,thatconsciousnessis'consciousnessthroughandthrough'(208).(24)
Thus,eventhecomingintobeingofhyleticdataistobedescribedintermsofa(temporal)
constitutioninconsciousness.
TherearegoodreasonswhyDaubertissoworriedbyHusserl'sconceptionofhyleticstuffasa
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reallyinherentpartofconsciousness.'Hyleticdataarenotrealcomponentpartsof
consciousness,becauseconsciousnessasawholeisitselfnothingreal'(124v).Tomakethehyle
belongtoconsciousnesswouldamounttomakingtheformerapropertyoraccidentofthelatter,
andwiththisonewouldrelapseintothereificationofconsciousnessandintotheAristotelian
schemaofsubstanceandaccident.
Amorespecificargumentagainsttheinherenceofhyleticdatainconsciousnessisdrawnfrom
Husserl'sobservationthatthehyleticdataarenotperceivedintheactualperceptualprocessbut
becomeaccessibleonlythroughreflection,therebyundergoing'essentialchanges'(205).(Once
moreHusserlclaimsasortofidentity,notwithstandinganessentialorradicaldifference,a
confusionwhichseemstobeindispensabletohisidealism.)
TothisDaubertobjectsthatitisfalsephenomenologytosupposethathyleticdataareseized
uponbyreflectiveacts,forthelatter'alwaysseizeonlyentitieswhicharealreadyformedand
grasped'(135v).'Hyleticdatacannotbegraspedandinterpreted,forinthatcasetheywouldbe
objectlikeandnotatallhyleticdatalackinginintentionalunity'(12r:thereferenceistoIdeasI,
88).
Daubertdoesnothoweversimplyrejectthenotionofhyleticdata.Heintegratesarevised
versionofitintohisownphenomenology.Thisispossiblepreciselybecauseconsciousnessin
hisviewcanneverbecome'pure'inHusserl'sreductivesenseofthisterm.Consciousnessis
alwaysandinevitablyinconfrontationwiththings.'Nowheredoesonecomeuponitinitspure
form,butalwaysasentangledwithastuffwhichdoesnotoriginateinit'(7v).Hyleticdata,for
Daubert,arethereforelocated'inthetranscendentsphereofobjects'(12r).Theultimateguiding
andimpellingforceunderlyingthecognitiveprocessisthustobesoughtinrealityitself.
DaubertagreeswithHusserlthathyleticdataarenotoriginallycontentsofperception,that
theyrequireaspecialsortofreflectioniftheyaretobebroughttoawareness.ForDaubert,
however,thisreflectionissimplyaprocessofdelineation:hyleticdatabecomethematicthrough
areflectionwhichsinglesthemoutfromthefieldofgivennessbyseveringtheirinterwovenness
withthesurroundingsensoryfield.Theyare'abstractionsfromgenuinegivenness'(73v),
momentsthrownintoreliefbybeingconsideredapartfromtheircontext:
Hyleticdataarenotthemselvessomethinggiven...Theycanbeabstractedonlyascomponent
partsofagivennesswhichalwayscontainsotherFormelementetoo(135v).
Daubertexplainsthisbyreferenceto'thepurelyvisualorpurelyopticalmakeupofmy
momentarilygivensectionoftheworld'(135v).Thelatterisorganisedinatwofoldmanner:'it
hasonedimensionofformsandfiguresinthemselves,e.g.theformofaredsurface'theseare
thehyleticdata,asDaubertconceivesthem.Andithas'anotherdimensionderivedfromfigures
likethingsortheirvisualappearances'thethingsandaspectsinwhoseorbitthehyleticdata
arelocated(135v).
Thereisaproliferationofterminologyhereanditwillbeofsomehelpifwetrytosortout,
provisionally,howtheterms'noema','aspect',etc.aretobeunderstoodinDaubert'stext.The
'noesis/noema'vocabularyisofcoursetakenoverbyDaubertfromIdeasIitself:aswasalready
madeclearabove,thenoemaisthesensewithwhichtheobjectisgrasped,itisthe
AuffassungssinnorGegenstandsauffassung(79v,147r),'theobjectinthemannerofits
determinations'(imWieseinerBestimmtheit)(114v),'containingwithinitselfeverythingwhich
weareconsciousofintheobject'(142r).
'Adumbration'('Abschattung','foreshortening')isanothertermtakenoverbyDaubertfrom
Husserl.Anobjectisgiveninsensoryexperiencealwaysfromthisorthatside,inthisorthat
particularway,thatis,itisnevergivenasawholebutalwaysinadumbrations:'Thingsarenot
adumbratedindataofsensation,butalwaysonlyinmodesofappearanceandinaspects'(12r).
Oragain:'Theobjectcanappear[only]inthisandinthisway.Objectiveappearanceisbound
e.g.tothelawsofperspective'(75v).Daubertgoesoutofhiswaytostressthatadumbrationsare
notcomponentsofacts(7v).Adumbrationsandappearancesdependuponbothsubjectand
object,orrathertheyresultfromtheinterplaybetweentherelativepositionsofthings(bodies),
bothperceivedandperceiving.
ThuswhenHusserlassertedthat'amentalprocessisnotadumbrated'(77),thatistosaynot
givenfromthisorthatpointofview,astranscendentobjectsnecessarilyare,hecouldtakethis
asimplyingthedependenceofrealobjectsonconsciousness.Dauberthoweverdrawsan
oppositeconclusion,for'ifadumbrationsarenotcomponentpartsofacts,thenneitherisnature
relativetoconsciousnessbecauseofitsadumbrations'(7v).Adumbrationsdependontheactual

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presenceofacognisingsubjectinafieldofobjectstheydonotdependonconsciousness.

6.TheRootsofConsciousness
Perceptionproceedsviaperspectivalandotherforeshortenings,whichspringfromvariationsin
therelativepositionsofrealperceiversandrealthings.Itthusreflectsboththefactthatthe
perceiverisawareofhisownpositionvisvisotherbodiesandalsothefactthathebehavesin
certainwaysinrelationtotheseotherbodies:

Theexperienceofwhatisphysicalandofwhatisspatialcannotsimplybegathered
fromanyintuitionwhatsoeveritoriginatesfromaprimordial[quellhaft]experience
ofmyownbodywhichmovesinspaceandwhichdoessowhilealreadyinaction
andinteractionwithotherbodiesinspace(35v).(25)

Wemightsaythatconsciousnessariseswherebodilymovementbecomesstructuredinaway
thatallowsforguidedorientationofmotionsinrelationtootherobjectsintheworld.
Consciousnessisnotarealannextobodies,notarealitysuperaddedtoperceivingorperceived
realthings,itisarelationalstructureobtainingwhereanimatebodiesandthingsintheworld
comeintocontactwitheachotherinspecificsortsofways.
Consciousnesscannevergetoutsideofitselfinordertobecomeawareofitselfassomeother
realthing.Butbyvirtueofitsglancingfunction[Blickfunktion]itcangetoutsideofitselfinthe
sensethatitcanbecomedirectedtowardsotherthingsinthemannerofregarding(143r).
Or,asDaubertelsewhereputsit:'Idonotknowaboutmentalprocessesinvolvedintheactof
seeingIonlyknowtheobjectstowardwhichIturn'(33v).Fromthisitfollowshoweverthat
thereisnoroomforanydisproportionbetweenacquaintanceandthethingoneisacquainted
with:thebehaviouralfamiliarityonehaswitharealthingcannotsomehowbeseveredfromthis
thinginordertobecomparedwithandmeasuredbyit.Thedirectawarenesswehaveofthings
inrealityinvirtueofthisbehaviouralfamiliarityisasitwereperfectlyadaptedtothegraspingof
realexistenceandwecannowsaythatitispreciselythiswhichistheoriginalwayof
functioningofconsciousness.
Animportantconsequence,however,isthat,assoonasconsciousnessturnstowarditselfinan
attitudeofreflection,itwilltendineluctablytobestowthissamesortofexistence
illegitimatelyuponitself,toconceiveitselfbyanalogywitharealthing.Itisthisnatural
tendencytowardsubstantialisationwhichbringsaboutthepseudoconstitutionofconsciousness
asaspecialkindofobjectandthenitisironicalthatthis,atleastaccordingtoDaubert,isthe
onlytypeof'constitution'consciousnessiscapableof.26Itopensuponthesideofthesubjecta
sphereofsemblancesothatHusserl,inDaubert'sview,iscorrectwhenhestatesthat'"fiction"
makesupthevitalelementofphenomenology'(132)i.e.ofthatsortofphenomenologythatis
firmlyweddedtothereflectiveattitude.Onecouldevenconcludethat,ifthereexistsinthe
naturalattitudesomethingwhichbarsthewaytoourunderstandingofconsciousnessand
thereforeneedstoberadicallyaltered,itisnotthedirectednessofconsciousnesstowardsreality,
asHusserlaffirms(37),butratherthissubstantialisationofconsciousnessitself.Anditisthe
latter,accordingtoDaubert,onwhichareductionoughttobeperformed.
Husserldidnotseethroughthisnaturaltendencytopositconsciousnessasarealexistent,but
blindlytrustedthereliabilityofreflectionandimmanentperception,notseeingthat,whenIturn
tograspmyimmanentexperience,thelatter'isnotpreservedinitsoriginalform.The
thematisingturndoesdamagetothatwhichisimmanenttoagreaterextentthanisthecasein
relationtoexternalperception'.(121v)
'Onethingaloneiscertain:therealbeingofmyacts...Butthiscertaintyisguaranteednot
throughanypurecontentofconsciousness,butratherthroughtheevidenceofexperience'
(loc.cit).Theacthas,thankstoitsobject,aconcrete,ostensivecertainty,wherethatwhichis
supposedtobetheuniquelycertainstartingpointforHusserl,pureconsciousness,'isentirelyin
theairithasfromwithinitselfnoaccesstoreality,neitherimmanentnortranscendent.'(loc.cit)
DaubertisthusinsistingthatHusserlhasthingspreciselythewrongwayround:plainand
immediategivennessisattainableonlyinrelationtoexternalrealityinternalperception
necessarilyinvolvesagapbetweenconsciousnessanditsobject,agapwhichisclosedbymeans
ofaspurioussubstantialisation.AndwhereHusserlconceivesthementalprocesstobe'givenas
absoluteinasimpleseeing(andnotinmodesofappearance)',Daubertholdsthat,'tospeak
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properly,inimmanentperceptionthereexistsnosimpleseeingatall'(8vthereferenceisto
IdeasI,81f.)
ItisinterestingthatDaubertaddressesthisobjectionnotonlytoHusserlbutalsotoHeidegger,
whosenotionofDaseiniscriticisedbecauseitrevealsthatHeidegger,too,asDaubertreadshim,
hassuccumbed'tothetemptationtofindhereabeingwhichhasitsexistenceinthe
consciousnessofitself'(16v).

7.ThePhenomenologyofReflectiveConsciousness
BothHusserlandHeideggerareasitwereenchantedbyconsciousness.Theyascribetoitthe
powerto'reachintotheunlimited'(49),beitintoitsowninfinitedepthsoroutinto'infinite
horizons'ofthesurroundingworld.
DaubertemphaticallyrejectsthisCartesianbeliefinatypeofconsciousnessthatwould
positivelytouchinfinity:(26)

Theproblemisnot:HowdoIgetfrom(pure)consciousnesstoreality?but:Howis
idealityembeddedinreality,andhowismytheoreticallookingandthinking
embeddedinrealconsciousness,whichisamultifariousencounterwithwhatisreal
(19r,ouremphasis).

Husserlhadmaintainedthattherewasanabyssbetweentwokindsofbeing:immanentor
transcendentalbeingontheonehandandtranscendentbeingontheother(93142).ForDaubert,
incontrast,'thedifferencebetweenconsciousnessandbeing,thisabyss,liesinsomething
entirelydifferentfromwhatHusserlthinks'(11v).UnderlyingHusserl'saccountofintentionality
isaconceptionofthetotalityofwhatexistsasdismemberedintotwoseparateoratleast
separablepieces,inoppositiontoeachother.Hisjobasheconceivesitistofindsomewayof
puttingthesetwopiecesbacktogetheratwhatevercost.Andthebesthecando,givenhis
startingpoint,istosalvagetheonesideddependenceofanemasculated'reality'ontheresiduum
ofan'absoluteconsciousness'(91).ForDaubert,ontheotherhand,beingisnotatwarwith
itself.Disunionispossibleonlywithinthesphereofconsciousness,foronlythereisthereroom
fornegation,cancellation,contradictionandantitheticalphenomenaingeneral:theworldof
realityisentirelypositive(anideawhichsparkedaseriesofimportantinvestigationsofthelogic
andontologyofthenegativejudgmentbythemembersoftheMunichschool).
IfoneistosticktotheHusserlianconceptionofintentionality,thiswillgiverise,Daubert
says,toatwofoldenigma:

1.Howcantheobjectbeseizeduponatallinanyparticulargrasping?

2.Howcanonebeconsciousoftheobjectevenwhenthelatterisinnowaypresent?
Athingissomethingspatiallyreal.Itisalso,assomethingreal,ineverysenseofthe
termtranscendenttoconsciousness.Consciousnessisegoact[Ichakt]anditexists
now.Theobjectdoesnotenterintothisexistenceperhapsitdoesnotevenexistat
all.(6vthereferenceistoIdeasI,160)

Afurther,relatedpassagebringsouttheimplicationsofthesecondenigma:

[Suppose]anobjectisintended,somethingexistingafterthemannerofaphysical
thingbutwhichdoesnotexistanymore.Itismeantasaphysicalthingandas
existing,butherethephysicalrealityandexistenceisnotitselfpresent.Thetwo
enigmasofconsciousnessthatsomethingcanbe[anobjectof]consciousness
withoutbeingpresentinanywaywhatsoever,andthatanobjectcanbegraspedas
havingthisorthatformimplythatconsciousnessisnotarelationofanysort
betweentheobjectandthesubject,because[inthegivencase]theobject...isnot
present.Theegoofconsciousnessispresent,theobjectisnot.Forthisreasonthe
analysisofconsciousnesscannotstartoutfromthestatement:consciousnessis
relatedtoanobject.(150v).

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Atypeofconsciousnesswhichisconceivedasasubstancerelatedtoothersubstancesrunsinto
thedifficultythat,intheend,itcannotfulfilitsaspirationstoreachrealityexceptatthecostof
thelatter,whichcomestobereducedtoan'intentionalinexistence'(150v),(27)everything
becomesamere'objectofconsciousness'.Therealworlditselfis'representedintheframework
of...consciousnessbycorrespondingsensesorposits'(278).Realityisthusgiventotheisolated
Husserliansubject,atbest,bywayofrepresentations,andhencethissubjectcannotestablishany
differencebetween'realreality'andrealityasfictionorasdream.
HusserlnowherereallydiscussestheCartesianhypothesisthatourexperienceofrealitymight
amounttonomorethanadream,notwithstandinghisstrongsympathyforDescartes'
Meditations.Hedoesatonepointdefineanegooftheintentionalsortas'a"waking"ego'(63),
butthenhismainconcernisexpressedinthequestion:'Howdoes,andhowcan,consciousness
itselfbecomeseparatedout[ofthiswakefullife]asaconcretebeinginitself?'(71).Thedream
hypothesisisimportantbecause,asDaubertpointsout,ourexperienceofwakingupfrom
dreamscanbeusedtobringoutpreciselywhatisessentialtoourexperienceofrealreality:

Indreamingtheworldasawholeispresent,andsoamIinit.Itisalsogiven'as
somethingreallyexisting.'The'asreallyexisting'isnotarealexistence,however,
butaneutralisationwhichimmediatelybecomesevidentassoonasthedreamis
supersededbyactualandwakefullife.Indreaming,givennessismodified,isnotin
factgenuine.Inthisworldourbeliefsinreality[Frwirklichhaltungen]lookexactly
likethoseinwakefullife.Butthesebeliefsinreality,togetherwiththeirpositings,
lackgenuineperceivability,i.e.thepossibilityofencounter,becausethatwhich
makestheactualencounterpossibleisasleep,orratherispresentonlyafterthe
mannerofthedreamandinadreammodification(19v).

Husserlstatedthatneutralisationis'closelyakintoreduction'(258),thoughinanoteinoneof
hispersonalcopiesofIdeasI,helaterretractedthisstatement.If,withDaubert,one
characterisesdreamingasaneutralisation,thenthephantasmagoriaofadreamdisclosebasically
thesameworldasdoesatranscendentalreduction,i.e.therealworldasmodifiedinacertain
way.Inthereducedworld,accordingtoHusserl,'everythingremainsasitwasbefore'(183)
eventhebeliefsproducedinit'lookexactlylikethoseinwakefullife'(19v),asDaubertsays.But
withthisDaubertunderminesHusserl'sthesisthattobeliefcertainty,i.e.to'theprimalformof
believing,'therecorresponds'thecharacteristicofbeingsimpliciter'(215).Suchaparallelism,
evenifitobtains,isofnoavailforsecuringtheclaimsofcognitiontograspreality:thisprimal
formofbelievingmightoccuralsoinadream.

8.DirectAwarenessandCognition
Theoriginalmodeofconsciousness,thatmodeinwhichrealityisfirstdisclosed,iscalledby
DaubertInnesein.Thisdirectawarenessbothunderliesperception(providesitsfoundation),and
furnishesthefeaturewhichdistinguishesitfromexperiencesthataresubjectedtotheneutrality
modification.The'immediateaccess'torealitygrantedbyInneseingives'immediateevidence'of
theworld(11v)andproduces'immediatecertainty'(1r).Itcontains'anabsolutelycertain
awareness'notonlyofmyownrealexistence(121v)butalsoof'externallyperceivedrealityin
itsbeing(itsreality)'(1r).
Itisthisdirectawarenesswhichisthecluewehavebeenlookingfortoreality,tothe'beingin
itself'(10v)whichunderliesallthings,aspectsandmodesofappearance.Thesourceofthis
awarenesswassaidtolieinthestructuresofbodilymovement.Itsnatureandeffectsstillneedto
bedescribed.Directawarenessisaprecognitivemodeofexperience.Asweshallsee,itisina
certainsensepriortothedualismofsubjectandobjectanditprecedesdifferentiationand
negation.'Theimmediateaccesstorealityisnotreachedthroughjudgmentsorpositings'(11v).
Soitnowheretranscendsitself,butnordoesiteverfallshortofitself.Andthepriorityofdirect
awarenesswillyieldforDaubertadecisiveargumentagainstHusserl'sidealism:awarenessis
'thepointwhereaparticipationinrealitytakesplace'(16v).Itislocatedintheactiveinsertionof
theanimateorganismintheenvironingcontextofreality.
Daubertopposesdirectawarenesstocognitionproper,holdingthatHusserl'streatmentof
experienceisrestrictedtothelatter.'Thefundamentalexperienceisnotyeta"cognitionof"'
(19v).Itprecedestheintentionaltypeofconsciousness,i.e.cognition'sseizinguponsomething,
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whichwasthepointofdeparturetakenbyHusserl.Itisamarkofintentionalconsciousness,
accordingtoDaubert,thatitisalwaystransformableintoareflectionuponitself(consciousness
ofconsciousnessofsomethingcf.206)ontheotherhand'myownreality,ofwhichIamaware,
andwithevidence,eludesthereflectiveregard'(41r).
Intentional,cognitiveexperience,withitspositingandsenseconferringcapacities,its
capacitytoorderrealityunderconcepts,isofahigherorder:itspositsare,toborrowaphrase
fromKant,plantedonthe'fertilebathos'ofawareness.Butthedistancebetweenintentional
consciousnessandrealityimpliesthatitisnecessary'todistinguishthefinalvalidityorinvalidity
ofrationalpositingfromthepeculiarbeingoftherealthingwhichisinitselfdefinitiveand
transcendent'(6r).Thismeansthat'onecouldconcedetoHusserlalltherelativityofcognition,
butnotarelativityofreality'(41r).Positingathingasthusandsoalwaysleavesopenthe
possibilityofgraspingthatsamethinginotherrespects,leavesroomforreinterpretation,error,
doubtandotherinvalidatingexperiencesofthesortwhichHusserladducedinorderto
corroboratehisdoctrineoftheabsolutecharacterofconsciousness.Butnowitisasecondmark
ofthedirectawarenessofrealitythatithasnosuchdegreesoffreedom.ThusHusserl'sargument
totheeffectthat,whereonethingcanturnouttobeahallucination,nothingwillbesafeagainst
thispossibility(54f.,86),iscounteredbyDaubertwiththethesissincefamiliarfromthework
ofMerleauPonty,WittgensteinandAustinthatdoubt,error,hallucinationandsoonmake
senseonlywhenseenagainstthegeneralbackgroundoftheawarenessofreality:'Physical
realitycanneverbecancelledbyconflictingcognitions.Asingleobject,itistrue,canturnout
nottobereal,butonlywithregardtothestandardofrealityitself'(35v).(28)Otherwiseonecould
notevensaythat'thisorthatisreally[inWirklichkeit]anillusion'(11v).So,Daubertconcludes:

Therealworldisalwaysonlyasingleone.Anerrororincompletegraspingofa
thingisnotanerroneousorincompletething(126vcf.LUVI10,V20).

Butnowareinterpretedconceptofthenoemacomesintoplay.Daubertsubjectsittoa
transformationwhichissimilartohisrethinkingoftherelationshipbetweenimmanentand
transcendentbeing.Hestartsoutfromthetenetthat:

Allcognitionsrefertobeinginitselfinthattheyfurtheritsbecomingunveiledand
disclosed.Cognitionofbeingcanberelative,buttheinitselfofrealityholdsout
comewhatmay(9v).

Fromthishederivestheinadequacyofcognitionwhichisforevercapableofimprovement
tothecognisedrealthing.Thechangeabilityofthesenseandcontentofouractsofcognition
contrastswiththequitedifferentsortsofchangeswhichmaytakeplaceintheobjectstowhich
theseactsrefer.
Thecontentinwhichtheobjectappearsinspecificmodesofgivennessmaybecalledthe
noema.'Inthenoemaeverythingiscontainedthatbelongstoourconsciousnessoftheobjectata
certainmoment'(142r),andinthesetermsDaubertnowgiveshisownversionofjustthat
differencebetweennoemaandobjectwithwhichwebegan:

Consciousnessofathingisnotitselfathing.Myhouseisbuiltbyworkmeninhalf
ayear.Notmyconsciousnessofthehouse.Myhousecanburndown,notmy
consciousnessofthehouse.Iinsuremyhouseagainstfire,notmyconsciousnessof
thehouse.Thehousecannotbethextowhichaninfiniteseriesofdeterminations
areadded.ItisnotanxthatItaketotheinsurancecompany,forthencalculations
wouldnevercometoanend.But[suchcalculation]hasquitedefinitelimitsand[my
insurancepolicy]bearsexactlyuponthesefinitedeterminations.This,onHusserl's
view,wouldbeunintelligible.Idonotinsurepossibilitiesofperception,anditisnot
possibilitiesofperceptionthatburndown.(126v)

OnemightcallthistheArgumentagainstIdealismfromthePossibilityofInsurance.
Thenoema,asconceivedbyDaubert,maybeconsideredundertwoaspects.First,itisa
meaningentity,isthereforewhollydifferentinitsgenusfromanyobject.Itis'somethingwhich
functionsonlyinourregardtoandinourconceptionoftheobject[istnuretwasimBlickund
BegreifenFunktionierendes]...Assenseitisneitherathingnorapartofathing,butamatterof
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consciousness'(126v).Butontheotherhand'itisnotabeinginconsciousness,notsomething
whichIcoulddescribeasadescriptivefactofpureconsciousness'(126v).'Icaninnoway
gatherthenoematiccontentfromimmanentconsciousnessassuchorfromtheact,butalways
onlyfromthetranscendentworld'(121v).Forthenoemaoriginatesintheobject.Itisnotsome
necessarycounterpartofmentalprocesses,buttheyinturnresultfromit,orratherfromthe
aspectswhichtheobjectofferswhensomeoneisperceivingit.(29)
ForHusserltheobjectwhenreducedtoitsnoema'hasnotlosttheleastnuance'(183):the
contentofbothisoneandthesame.Daubert,incontrast,maintainsthatthenoemaisnecessarily
lessthantheobjectbecauseitisconditionedbytheincapacityoftheperceivertoacquireafull
graspofalltheobject'ssidesandproperties.Anoemaisbutanoema:nottherealthing.Itis
incompleteandpreliminaryanddependsonthemutualrelationbetweenbodies,i.e.between
perceiverandobjectperceived.(30)

9.ARoleforReality
Thetrueabyssliesinconsciousnessitselfandnot,asHusserlwouldhaveit,inariftbetween
consciousnessandrealityastwoirreducibletypesofbeing.Itconsistsintheheterogeneityof
twosortsofconsciousness,directawarenessofwhatexists,ofreality,ontheonehand,and
cognition,ontheother,cognitionofstatesofaffairs,ofessence,ofideality,ofobjectsasfalling
underconcepts.ButifDaubertistosticktothisdualism,thenwillnotthis,too,inevitablyforce
himbackintojustthatsortoftwoworldstheorywhichhehadsetouttoovercome?(31)Toshow
thatitwillnot,weneedtoestablishpreciselyhow,inDaubert'sframework,the'reality'thatis
givenindirectawarenessstandsinrelationtotheobjectsgiveninperceptualandothercognitive
acts.
Aswehaveseen,Daubertwantstoinsistupontheomnipresenceofrealityinall(even
erroneous)cognitionofobjects.Thedirectawarenessofrealityisimpliedasthefoundationof
intentionalactsofallmodesandtypes,eveninthemostbasicactsofperception.ThusifDaubert
acknowledgestheprimacyofperception,whathehasinmindisarelativeprimacy,whichholds
onlyinthesphereofintentionality.'Whatis,properlyspeaking,originallygiveninperception?
Onlythis:thatthroughperceptionrealityismoreimmediatelyaccessiblethaninmeaningorin
representation'(9r,ouremphasis).Incontrasttothis,theimmediateawarenessofrealityisa
'specialcomponent'inallmodesofconsciousness(16r),beitperception,imagination,memory
orwhathaveyou.Directawareness,'thismostoriginalwayofexperiencingtheworld,precedes
everyconsciousnessandall[conceptual]grasping'(35v).'Itmustbemadecrystalclearthat
realityisnotacharacterofperceptionbutsomethingwhichremainsstablethroughoutperception
andindeedbelongstothething'(9r).Realityisgivennotinpeceptionbutinthedirectawareness
onwhichitrests.

DoIperceiverealityordoIexperienceit?Iexperiencethat[theobject]really
exists.Idonotperceiveitsreality,itbecomesmanifesttome.Icanonlyperceive
somethingwhichreallyexistsandtherealityofwhichismanifesttome(9v,our
emphasis).

Realityisthusthestablecoreinallvariegationsofcognition,(32)andthevariousmodesof
consciousnessareclassifiableaccordingtotheirdegreeofproximitytothiscoreasitisdisclosed
indirectawareness.
NowitmightbesupposedthatDaubert's'directawarenessofreality'hasbecomesotenuous
andsoallpervasivethatithasceasedtodoanyworkwithinthetheory,andthat'reality',
correlatively,hasrecededtothestatusofamerethinginitself.ItisinavoidingthisKantian
conclusionthatthereliesthetrueoriginalityofDaubert'sposition.Therealitythatisgivenin
directawarenessthe'phenomenon'isnotanunknownx,butnorisitarticulatedinto
conceptsorstatesofaffairsorintentionalobjects.Itmanifestsitself,rather,assomethingthatis
authoritative[dasMagebende],asastandardormeasureforcognition.Objectsaregiven'inthe
actandthenoemaasastandard[magebend]andindependent[eigenmchtig]withregardtothe
actinquestion'(142r).Cognition,indeed,isseentotaketheformofanefforttoapproximateto
thispregivenstandardandinthisliesthegermofDaubert'srealisttheoryoftruth.(33)

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Thebeingoftheobjectshouldbeauthoritative

1.foritssobeingasstateofaffairs

2.foritsmakeupinperception

3.forthecorrectnessofthejudgment,etc.

Whatisnotauthoritativehoweverisconsciousnessofit,i.e.nothingintheact.But
thebeingoftheobjectisitself[somethingofwhichIam]conscious,otherwiseit
couldnotinturnbeauthoritativeforme.Butithastherebyaquiteotherintentional
positionthanconsciousnessitself,withallthatiswithinthelatterthatreferstothe
object.(118v)

Theobjectinreality'assignscertainlimits'toourfreedomofgraspingitinjudgmentsorin
concepts(138v),anditistheselimitsorboundaryconditionswhicharemademanifestin
experiencesofdirectawareness.'Iexperiencetheautonomy[Selbstherrlichkeit]withwhich[the
realobject]acceptsonedeterminationandrejectsanother'(140r).Thepossibilityofillusion
displaysthefreedomofconsciousnesstomakemistakendeterminationsofperceivedthings.But
ittherebypresupposesthatthelatterhaverealdeterminationswhichonecan,orcannot,grasp.
'Withoutthispersistentelementnocorrectionwouldbepossible'(8r).Thereforetherealthing
withitsdeterminationswillremainforevertheauthoritative'criterion'ofcognition(132v).
OnthispointDaubertopposesboththelaterHusserlandNeoKantianism.Bothcomeclose
totheidealistic'dissolution'oftheworlddescribedbyWindelband.Bothfailtodojusticetothe
autonomyoftheobject,eitherbyreducingittosomethingmerelypositedorbyequatingitwith
anunknownandunknowablex.AndnowDaubertwithhisnotionofdasMagebendeisina
positiontostrengthenhisargumentagainsttheHusserlianideaofconstitution.'Theexistenceof
whatispregivendoesnotdissolveintotheexistenceofbeliefsaboutit'(19v).Evenwerean
objecttobeadequatelygiveninsomesequenceofactsitwouldremainimpossibletoidentify
whatistherebygivenwithanystructureofassociatednoemata,forthiswouldbetoleaveoutall
thatiscontributedbytheobjectindirectawarenessanditisthiswhichguidesandconstrains
thestructureofperception.'Itpertainstothesenseofallsensebestowalandtoallpositingthatit
cannotbestowandpositthestandardgivingbeing[dasmagebendeSein],butalwaysonlya
contentofcognitionwhichreferstoit'(39v).Allnoemata,howevermuchtheymayconformto
theobjectinreality,areseentofloatarbitrarilyintheairwhentheyareconceivedinisolation
fromtherealitywhichconstrainstheexperiencesofdirectawarenessonwhichtheyrest.
Thestandardgivingdimensioninreality,directorbodilyawarenessandcognitiveor
intentionalexperiencearenotthreeseparaterealms.Theymutuallyinterpenetrate:thatwhichis
givenindirectawarenessisrealitytakeninitsfunctionassomethingtheretobeintendedin
cognition.Hencejustasconsciousnessisnothingexistinginitself,soalsotherealthingisnot
lockedupinitselfandbeyondthereachofcognition:
Somethingisauthoritativenotinsofarasitexistsontologicallyinitself,butinsofarasitstands
inacertainrelationtocognition.Butthisisnotarelationbetweensomethingexistinginitself
andacognisingsubject.Everythingpossiblemaybeauthoritativeinsofarasitbecomesanobject
ofcognition.Butitsownpeculiarbeingasopposedtotheerroneousgraspingofitisfixed,
anditisproperlyspeakinginthisthattranscendenceincognitionconsists.(102v)
WecannowseepreciselywhatiswrongwithboththeHusserlianconceptionoftranscendence
intermsofconstitution(atranscendencethat'isentirelyreferredtoconsciousness':92)andthe
NeoKantianconceptionoftranscendenceasanunknownx.Bothsufferfromthefactthatthe
transcendentthinghasbeenrenderedpowerless,hasbeenpreciselyneutralised.ForDaubert,on
theotherhand,thetranscendentthingiscontinuallyatworkassomethingwhichsetslimitsto
cognition.(34)

ThatwhichisauthoritativenevercomestotheforeassuchexceptwhenIfocus
uponit,andthenitis'fixedbythesenseofmycognition'(9r).Directawarenessisa
precognitiverelationtothethingsmakingupreality,notacognitiveawarenessof
thatinthemwhichismagebend.Theconceptualfixationofrealityshouldnot
howeverbemisunderstoodasamatterofarbitraryorspontaneousdecision.The
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conceptsIusetodescriberealityarelimitedontheonehandbytheauthorityof
realityitself,andontheotherhandbymyownpracticalinterestsasananimate
organism,interestswhicharenot'directedindeterminatelybutalwaystowardssome
object'(35r).Thankstopracticalhandlingthingsaredisclosed'intheirpositions
withinmyvariousspheresofinterest'(61v).(35)

AlthoughDaubert'sdescriptionofinterest,hisrootingofcognitioninaction,remainssketchy,it
neverthelessserveshispurposeinhiscriticismofHusserl'sideaofa'transcendentalreduction'.
Iftohaveaninterestimpliesadirectiontowardsanobject,thenanysuspensionoffeaturesofthe
objectpresupposesaninhibitionofaninterestturnedtowardsit.Husserl'ssuspensionofthe
positingofrealityisthereforeinterpretedbyDaubertas'thesuspensionoftheinterestwhich
bearsuponreality'.NowDaubertacceptsthat'thissuspensionispossible,anditistheonlyway
ofgraspingtheessenceofanobject'(61v).Realitycanbeparenthesisedbywithdrawingone's
interestinagivenindividualthingasindividualthing,i.e.aspartandparcelofthisdirectly
experiencedreality,andbyfocussinginsteadonthethingasinstanceofatype.Butthiseidetic
reductionofconcreteobjectstheonlyreductionwhosemeaningfulnessDaubertwill
acknowledgeleavesbehindessenceswhich,although'inthemIhaveindeedparenthesised
reality'(83r),stillrefertothosesameconcreteobjectsastheirfoundationandasthesourceof
theirlegitimation.Thereforetheinterestinrealitysurvives,albeitinamodifiedform,andindeed
survivesastheverysupportofsuchareduction.ButHusserl,inhissocalledtranscendental
reduction,wantstoseveralltieswithrealitybysubstitutingactsofreflectionforstraightforward
ones,asifitwerepossibletobidfarewelltothedirectawarenessofreality.Andbecausethis
directawareness'cannotenterwiththerestintotheepoch'(83v),Husserlianphenomenology
notonlyretreatsfromreality,itbarstoitselftheverypossibilityofanaccesstoit.
ThusDaubertgivesthefollowingfinaljudgment:

Ifthisrealityisforgotten,(36)thenthewholeconnectionofindividualthingsis
transposedintoasphereofdreams,orbetterintoaneutralisedspheretowhichthen
notjustthesinglethingbutrealityasawholeisbanished.(83r)

InIdeasI,Husserlhadaffirmedthat'foraphenomenologyof"truereality"thephenomenology
of"voidseeming"[PhnomenologiedesnichtigenScheins]isalsowhollyindispensable'(318).
Aphenomenologyof'voidseeming',ofaneutralisedreality:ifthisisindeed,asDauberthas
triedtoshow,thetruepredicamentofHusserl'sphenomenologyinIdeasI,thenDaubert's
phenomenology,inoppositiontothatofHusserl,maybyrightsclaimtocontainwhattheearly
phenomenologistssooftenaspiredto,namelyaphenomenologyofrealreality['wirkliche
Wirklichkeit'].
Thephrase'realreality'occursalreadyinaLogiclecturegivenbyTheodorLipps,grandfather
ofMunichphenomenology,in1899.(37)Daubertthenusesitinamanuscriptwrittenin
preparationforhisdiscussionswithHusserlonJan.18,1904(38)anditalsooccursinoneof
Husserl'sSeefeldmanuscripts,i.e.inatextwritteninAugustorSeptember1905duringhisstay
atSeefeld(Tyrol),wherehespentweeksofintensivediscussionswithbothPfnderandDaubert.
(39)Thepreoccupationwiththeproblemof'realreality'isalastingfeatureofDaubert's
thinking.Hisfirstmajorproject,adoctoraldissertationunderLippsplannedasearlyas1899,
wasontheconsciousnessofreality.Thisplanwasabortive,likeallhisotherliteraryprojects,but
theideacontinuedtoplayaroleinhisanalysesofimpersonalsentences,existentialjudgments,
oftheformalontologyofobjectsandstatesofaffairsandofthelogicofquestions.Italsoforms
thebackgroundforhisprojectofaphenomenologyofevidence,towhichFileAI3,Daubert's
lastmanuscript,isdevoted.

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AvLallemant,E.1975DieNachlssederMnchenerPhnomenologeninderBayerischen
Staatsbibliothek,Harrassowitz:Wiesbaden.

Biemel,W.1958"EinleitungdesHerausgebers",HusserlianaII,TheHague:MartinusNijhoff.
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Brentano,F.1929VomDaseinGottes,ed.A.Kastil,Leipzig:Meiner.

Celms,T.1928DerphnomenologischeIdealismusHusserls,Riga:ActaUniversitasLatviensis,
repr.NewYork:Garland,1980.

ConradMartius,H.1916"ZurOntologieundErscheinungslehrederrealenAussenwelt",
JahrbuchfrPhilosophieundphnomenologischeForschung,3,345542.

1959"DietranszendentaleunddieontologischePhnomenologie",inEdmundHusserl1859
1959,TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,17584.

Delius,H.1981SelfAwareness.ASemanticalInquiry,Mnchen:C.H.Beck.

FinkE.1930"VergegenwrtigungundBild",JahrbuchfrPhilosophieundphnomenologische
Forschung,XI,asreprintedinFink'sStudienzurPhnomenologie193039,TheHague:
MartinusNijhoff,1966,178.

Geiger,M.1933"AlexanderPfndersmethodischeStellung",inNeueMnchener
PhilosophischeAbhandlungen,ed.E.HellerandF.Lw,Barth:Leipzig,116.

Glotzbach,P.A.andHeff,H.1982"EcologicalandPhenomenologicalContributionsto
Perception",Nos,16,10821.

Gurwitsch,A.1929"PhnomenologiederThematikunddesreinenIch",Psychologische
Forschung,12,279381Eng.trans.inA.Gurwitsch,StudiesinPhenomenologyand
Psychology,Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1966,175286.

Heidegger,M.1927SeinundZeit,Halle:NiemeyerEng.trans.,BeingandTime,byJ.
MacquarrieandE.Robinson,NewYork:Harper,1962.

Holenstein,E.1972"DerNullpunktderOrientierung:EineAuseinandersetzungmitder
herkmmlichenphnomenologischenThesederegozentrischenRaumwahrnehmung",Tijdschrift
voorFilosofie,34,2878.

Hompf,A.1905UntersuchungenbersymbolischeRelationen,Dissertation,Munich.

Husserl,E.1900/01LogischeUntersuchungen,Halle:Niemeyer,1sted.,2nded.1913/21Eng.
trans.of2nded.byJ.N.Findlay,London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1970.

1905/07"SeefelderManuskripteberIndividuation(VerlegenheitenPfnder/Daubert)",in
HusserlianaX,23768.

1913IdeenzueinerreinenPhnomenologieundphnomenologischenPhilosophie,I.Buch:
AllgemeineEinfhrungindiePhnomenologie,Halle:NiemeyerandasHusserlianaBandIII,1
(ed.K.Schuhmann).(Eng.trans.byF.Kersten,TheHague/Boston/Lancaster:Nijhoff,1983.)

1930"NachwortzumeinenIdeenI",JahrbuchfrPhilosophieundphnomenologische
Forschung,11,54970andinHusserlianaV,13862.

1929"FormaleundtranscendentaleLogik",JahrbuchfrPhilosophieundphnomenologische
Forschung,10,1298,andinHusserlianaXVII,ed.P.JanssenEng.trans.byD.Cairns,The
Hague:Nijhoff,1969.

1962DieKrisisdereuropischenWissenschaftenunddietranszendentalePhnomenologie.
EineEinleitungindiephnomenologischePhilosophie,W.Biemel,ed.,HusserlianaVI.(Eng.
trans.byD.Carr,NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston1970.)

1968"Phnomenologie",2nddraftofarticleforEncyclopediaBritannica,inHusserlianaIX,
ed.W.Biemel,TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,25677.

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Ingarden,R.1929"BemerkungenzumProblemIdealismusRealismus",HusserlFestschrift
(ErgnzungsbandtoJahrbuchfrPhilosophieundphnomenologischeForschung),15990.

James,W.1967"Does'Consciousness'Exist?",asrepr.inEssaysinRadicalEmpiricism,Peter
Smith:Gloucester,Mass.

Kuhn,H.1975"Phnomenologieund'wirklicheWirklichkeit'",inDieMnchener
Phnomenologie,Nijhoff:DenHaag,edH.Kuhn,etal.,17.

Marbach,E.1980"EinleitungdesHerausgebers",HusserlianaXXIII,XXVLXXXII.

MerleauPonty,M.1945Phnomnologiedelaperception,Paris:Gallimard.(Eng.trans.byC.
Smith,London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962.)

Patzig,G.1971"KritischeBemerkungenzuHusserlsThesenberdasVerhltnisvonWahrheit
undEvidenz",NeueHeftefrPhilosophie,1,1232.

Reinach,A.1911"ZurTheoriedesnegativenUrteils",inMnchenerPhilosophische
Abhandlungen,ed.A.Pfnder,Leipzig:Barth,196254andinReinach'sSmtlicheWerke,ed.,
K.SchuhmannandB.Smith,Munich:Philosophia,1989).(Eng.trans.inB.Smith,ed.Parts
andMoments.StudiesinLogicandFormalOntology,Munich:Philosophia,1982,315377.)

Schuhmann,K.1973HusserlberPfnder,TheHague:Nijhoff.

1977HusserlChronik,TheHague/Boston/London:Nijhoff.

Smith,B.1984"Actacumfundamentisinre",Dialectica,38,15778.

H.Spiegelberg,1982ThePhenomenologicalMovement,3rded.,TheHague/Boston/London:
Nijhoff.

1975DoingPhenomenology,TheHague:MartinusNijhoff.

Stumpf,C.1907"ErscheinungenundpsychischeFunktionen",Abhandlungenderkniglichen
preuischenAkademiederWissenschaften,phil.hist.Klasse,4.

Windelband,W.1900GeschichtederPhilosophie,2nded.,TbingenandLeipzig.

WoodruffSmith,D.andMcIntyre,R.1982HusserlandIntentionality,Dordrecht:Reidel.

Endnotes
1. We should like to thank Peter Simons, Robert Sokolowski, Herbert Spiegelberg, and
especially Kevin Mulligan for checking the manuscript and for improving upon both its form and
its content. Thanks are due in addition to the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for the award to
Smith of a grant for study in Louvain and Erlangen, where his contribution to this paper was
composed. We are grateful also to Prof. S. IJsseling, director of the Husserl Archives, for his
kind permission to quote from unpublished Husserl material, and to Drs. Dachs and v. Moisy of
the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek for their unfailing assistance.

2. H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, p.169. This phrase echoes an earlier

remark by Moritz Geiger to the effect that, whilst Daubert had contributed more than anyone else
to making known the ideas of Husserl's Logical Investigations, he had done so 'ohne je eine Zeile
geschrieben zu haben' (1933, p.4).

3. Daubert's own records of many of these discussions have fortunately survived and those of
Daubert's manuscripts relating specically to the Logical Investigations are to appear shortly in a
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volume in the Nijhoff series Primary Sources in Phenomenology.

4. Introduction to Alciphron. Or, as Husserl wrote to Daubert in a letter of Dec. 22, 1923 which it
would be too painful to translate:

FrmichsindSiesemperidem,durchunddurchPhilosoph("wesensmig"),undwennSiesichalsLandwirtwohl
fhlen,soisteszweifellosrecht,weilesphilosophischechtist.

5.SeeAvLallemant1975,pp

6.InadraftofalettertoHusserlofJune26,1913Daubertsays:'YoudealintheIdeasinagrandmannerwith
preciselythosequestionswithwhichIhavebeenoccupiedinmyworkofthelastyears...Therearedifferences,to
besure,buttheyaresurelyinessential.'OnPfnder'ssympatheticreactionstoIdeasIseeSchuhmann,Husserlber
Pfnder,pp.6f.

7.SeealsoHusserl'samazedreactioninapostcardofMarch16,1915addressedtoDaubertatthefront:'Meine
"Ideen"beiIhnenimFelde?SiebringeneszuStande,dieseWirklichkeit"einzuklammern"?'

8.Itwillbenecessarytoquoteextensivelyfromthisfile,whichisnotmerelystillunpublished,buthasnoteven
beenfullytranscribed.Quotationswillbegivenbyreferringtopagenumberwithrecto/versomarkings(e.g.52ror
52v)ofthefoliosinMunich.QuotationsfromIdeasIbygivingthepagenumbersoftheoriginalpublication,which
areretrievablebothfromSchuhmann'sHusserlianaeditionandfromtheKerstentranslation.Thelatterhasbeen
usedwherenecessary,thoughwedonotfollowitinalldetails.Itshouldbenotedinparticularthatweuse'reality'
andnot'actuality'asourrenderingofDaubert'sandHusserl's'Wirklichkeit'.

9.AmongHusserl'sownworkstheLogicalInvestigationsandthethenstillrecentNachworttoIdeasIreceiveonly
minorattentioninDaubert'smanuscript.FormalandTranscendentalLogic(1929)isextensivelydiscussedand
DaubertinadditionusesE.Fink's"VergegenwrtigungundBild"asaguidetoHusserl'smostrecentposition.

10.ThedistinctionadvancedbyHusserlbetweenthesenseofaperceptionanditsobjectoccursalreadyinthe
doctoraldissertationofAloysHompf,wholikeDaubertwasastudentofTheodorLippsinMunich.Hompf
introducesitbymeansofastrikinglysimilarexample:

Theobject'house'cancollapse,catchfire,besoldorbedeclareduninhabitable.Butitwouldofcourseberidiculous
anddevoidofsensetoapplytheseorsimilarpredicatestothecontentofmyperceptionofthehouse.
(UntersuchungenbersymbolischeRelationen,1905,p.39.)

ComparealsothefollowingpassagefromBrentano'sVomDaseinGottes(p.116):Nowindowisgoingtoallow
itselftobebrokenwithapresentedstone.Phenomenadonotfall,andtheydonotenterintochemicalcombinations,
either.'

11.HerewefollowHusserlinequating'noema'and'[erweiterte/extendierte]Sinn'(182).Considerationsofthesort
whichunderliethemoretechnicaldistinctionbetween'Sinn'and'fullnoema'(185)willnotplayaroleinthe
argumentswhichfollow.

12.InhislastperiodHusserlwastoconcedethatoureverydaylifeworldis'theonlyrealworld,theonlyone
that...iseverexperiencedandexperienceable'(TheCrisisofEuropeanSciences,p.49).Evenso,hestilldefendedhis
statementaboutthetreenoemawhichcannotburn(cf.Crisis,70).

13.Thereare,certainly,passagesinHusserl'stextwhichseemtosuggestthathe,too,rejectedthetwoworldtheory
(seee.g.49lastsentence,88,90).Thesestatementsarevalid,however,onlywithintheframeworkofthe
phenomenologicalreduction,andtotheextentthatthereisadistinctionbetweenthereducedandthenatural
attitude,thereisadifferencealsoonthesideoftheobjects.

14.Suchaconceptionmaybeofsomeuseifweabandonthestrictlyphenomenologicalperspectiveandattemptto
understandthestructuresinvolvedwhenaperceivingorganismisrelatedtoanobjectinaperceptualact.SeeSmith
1984,foradefenceofwhatisineffectanAristoteliantheoryofthesubjectactrelationalongtheselines,having
consequencesverysimilartothoseofDaubert'stheory.

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15.Alreadyinanarticleof1904WilliamJameshadputforwardasimilarthesis,andthefollowingremark,atleast
whentornfromitscontext,remindsonecompletelyofDaubert:

Imeanonlytodenythattheword['consciousness']standsforanentity,buttoinsistmostemphaticallythatitdoes
standforafunction(p.3).

BothJames'andDaubert'sviewsmayhavebeendevelopedindependentlyoutofCarlStumpf'snotionof'psychische
Funktion'.James'article,bytheway,alsocontainsaspiritedillustrationofthedifferencebetweenphysicaland
mentalstateswhichremindsone,again,ofHompf's'house',alreadymentionedabove.Consideraroominahouse:

Asaroomitwilltakeanearthquakeoragangofmentodestroyit.Asasubjectivestatetheclosingofyoureyes,or
anyinstantaneousplayofyourfancywillsuffice.Intherealworld,firewillconsumeit.Inyourmind,youcanlet
fireplayoveritwithouteffect.Asanouterobject,youmustpaysomuchamonthtoinhabitit.Asaninnercontent,
youmayoccupyitforanylengthoftimerentfree(op.cit.,p.14,ouremphasis)

16.ThedeviceofthematisationDaubertheretakesoverfromGurwitsch.

17.9,11.AshortsummaryisgivenalsoinIdeasI,126.SeealsoReinach1911,15oftranslation.

18.ThiscriticisminawayrepeatsKant'scriticisminthefirstCritiqueoftheparalogismsofWolffianpsychology.

19.Whiletheterm'Bewutsein'goesbacktoWolff(1719),theEnglishtermfirstbecameprominentinan
anonymoustreatiseOnConsciousnessof1728,thoughithadbeenusedalreadye.g.inLocke'sEssay.

20.Daubertdetectsinthisargumentafallacioustransitionfromessencetoexistence.Andonceagainthereisa
Kantianconnection:hiscriticismcanbesaidtobeareformulationofKant'swellknownrefutationofthe(Wolffian)
ontologicalargument.

21.GeschichtederPhilosophie,p.463n.(DaubertquotesWindelbandatAI3/74r.)

22.ThewordingofthisphraseisstrangelyreminiscentofHusserl'slaterstatementthatthe'interrelationbetween
reasonandwhatis'is'theenigmaofallenigmas'(Crisis,5).

23.Atthetime,DaubertcouldnotknowhowcorrecthewasinapplyingWindelband'sformulatoHusserl.Ina
manuscriptfromSeptember1908whichHusserlentitled"DieAuflsungdesempirischenSeinsinZusammenhnge
desabsolutenBewutseins"(cf.Schuhmann,HusserlChronik,p.119)andalso"SeinderNatursich'auflsend'in
Bewutsein"(MSBII1,cover),hesays:

Andinsofarasitbelongstotheimmanentessenceofsuchconnectionsofconsciousnessthatinthemthe'object'is
thought,posited,isultimatelydeterminedinavalidwayandknown,objectivebeing'dissolvesitself'['lstsich...
auf']intoconnectionsofconsciousness.(MSKII1/12quotedbyG.Patzig1971,p.31,n.13.)

WalterBiemel,whoquotesthisformulationasHusserl'sown(HusserlianaII,"EinleitungdesHerausgebers",
p.VIII),isunawareofitsWindelbandianorigins,thoughHusserl'squotationmarksaround"auflsend"and"lst
sichauf"aresufficientevidencethatheisindeedquotingWindelband.Thesameallusionseemstobepresentalso
whenhestates:'Everythingthatisofferedtousbythesciencesinregardtotheonta"dissolvesitselfintowhatis
phenomenological"'["lstsichinPhnomenologischesauf"].(HusserlianaV,p.78.)Thiscouldbeonemorehintas
totherathertraditionalcharacterofHusserl'sidealism.

24.Thisformulationoccursalreadyinamanuscriptof1909(HusserlianaXXIII,p.265),thoughthereisnotyet
sufficientevidencefortheclaimthatthisoccurrencespellsafundamentalrevisionofHusserl'sdoctrineof
consciousness,asisclaimedbyE.Marbach,"Einleitung",op.cit.,p.LXIIf.

25.Daubert'sanalysisherecouldbecomparedfirstofalltothatofMerleauPonty:

L'expriencemotricedenotrecorps...nousfournitunemanired'accderaumondeetl'objet,une'praktognosie'qui
doittrereconnuecommeoriginale....(Phnomnologiedelaperception,p.164.)

ThereareimportantparallelsalsotoGibson'secologicaltheoryofperception(seee.g.GlotzbachandHeff,1982).
Butthemostdetailedrecentphilosophicalanalysisoftheseproblems,whoseantiegologicalstanceisinmany
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respectscongenialtowhatDauberthasinmind,istobefoundinHaraldDelius'bookSelfAwareness,especiallyin
histreatmentofhowachildlearnstousethewords"Isee":

Thegeneralbehaviouralpatternthatcomestobeassociatedwith"seeing"willcontainasanoutstandingfeaturethat
theperson(oranimal)whichissaidto"nowseesomething",...bymovementsofreachingforsomethingorpointing
atsomething,etc.,putshimselfintoarelationtowardssomethinglocatedatsomedefinitespotinthespace
surroundinghim.Andthe"I"asused,forinstance,bythepersonexclaiming"NowIseeit!"istaken,bythe
observerlearningtheuseofthesewords,tosomehowstandfortheperson(hisbodyandlocationinspace)who
uttersthatexclamation.(SelfAwareness,p.148)

Delius,likeDaubert,comesclosetoGurwitsch(whom,however,hedoesnotdiscuss)whenhesaysthatallofthe
materialorqualitativedifferences,e.g.betweentypesofperceptionlikeseeingorhearing,'belongtothecontents
seenorheard',andthat,whenweabstractfromthedifferencesbetweensuchcontents,seeingorhearingarejust
predicatesdescribingarelationbeweendifferentsenseorgansanddifferenttypesofcontents(cf.op.cit.,p.149:As
Daubertputsitat138v:'Theseeingofatreeandtheseeingofahouseare,asseeings,notdistinguished.')

AsforDaubert,soalsoforDelius,wehavenodirectknowledgeoftheego:'Ourknowlegeoftheexistenceofthis
unknownrelatumisessentiallymediatedbyourknowledgeoftheexistenceoftherelation.'(op.cit.,p.152.)Andas
Daubertlinkedtheproblemofconsciousnesstothatofsyncategorematica,soDeliusshowsthattheegorelationtoa
contentcannotbemadethematicwithoutfirstbeingformulatedinlanguage:statesofselfawarenessare,hesays,
'linguisticallydependentstatesofaffairs',i.e.theirbeingisexhaustedintheirbeingexpressed.

Ontheotherhandtheview,sharedbyDaubertandHusserl,thatthebodyisthenecessaryoriginorsourceofall
cognition,issubjectedtoattackbyElmarHolensteininhisimportantpaper"NullpunktderOrientierung"of1972.

26.IntheseconddraftofhisEncyclopediaBritannicaarticle,HusserlhadacknowledgedthatDescarteshadalready
used'thefirstradicalmethodofreduction'(HusserlianaIX,p.264).Inthissettingheassertsthatinperformingthe
reduction'Iamnotahumanego.'(Op.cit,p.275)Heideggercommentedonthispassage:'OrmaybeIamone
preciselybydoingso',(op.cit.,p.275,fn.1).TheabilitytocarryoutthetranscendentalreductionwasforHeidegger
a'centralpossibilityoftheexistingfactualself'.(Op.cit,p.601f.)Thushe,too,couldcomeunderDaubert'sattack
becausehestillupholdstheCartesianHusserlianbeliefinthe'wonderful'powerofconsciousness.(op.cit.,p.275,
fn.1)

27.Cf.theallusiontoBrentanoinIdeasI,185f.

28.HereagainDaubert'sviewscanbecomparedwithHusserl'sownearlierposition.Seee.g.HusserlianaXVI,
pp.290f.Daubertiscarefultostressthaterrorandillusion'arenothingpsychic.Theyhavenobeingatallinthe
senseinwhichexistingobjectshavebeing.Thebeingoferrorsandillusionsliesinaquitedifferentfactualsphere
(theerrors,thepossibilitiesofthoughtandperception,thepresumptions,theimpossibilities,etc.).'(118v)

29.Husserlhadattemptedtocometogripswiththesamesortofthinginhistreatmentofthegivennessofathing'in
person'(283).Inthecharacteristic'inperson',however,heseesjustonemoremomentorconstituentofthenoema,
linkedtoothersuchmomentsinasystematicway.ThisaspectofHusserl'snoematheoryismadeparticularlyclear
inWoodruffSmithandMcIntyre1982,esp.ch.VIII:'Definite,orDeRe,IntentioninaHusserlianFramework'.

30.'Betweenmyunderstandingandgraspingofthethingintervenesitsappearance.Buttherealappearance
[consistsof:](a)externalconstellations,(b)constellationsarisingthroughmyrelationandpositioninrespecttoit.'
(126v)

31.AdualismwhichwouldresemblemosttheSchopenhauerianversionofPlatonism.Schopenhauerseemsindeed
tohaveexertedacertaininfluenceonDaubert'sreflectionsontheduplicityofconsciousness.HeismentionedatAI
3/74r.

32.Spiegelbergcallsthisthe'onticpermanence'ofreality(DoingPhenomenology,p.146).

33.Compare,again,LUVI39.

34.ForHusserl,too,therearelimitssettocognition,buttheseareexclusivelyamatterofthecoherence,ofthe
harmoniousregularity,ofthefluxofexperiences.Theyarenotinanysenselimitscontributedbythetranscendent

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object.

35.Heidegger'sSeinundZeit,withitsanalysisofthemanipulationofZeug,hasobviouslyinfluencedDauberthere.
Note,however,thatforDaubert,'Mypracticalinterest(whichisthemorebasicone)andmycognitiveinterestdo
notconstituteanything'(138v,ouremphasis).

36.Daubert'sGermanreads:'WirddieseWirklichkeitvergessen...'andheclearlyalludestotheHeideggeriannotion
ofSeinsvergessenheitintheopeningsentenceofSeinundZeit.IndeedDaubert'swordingsuggeststhattohim
Husserlhasmissedthemostfundamentalquestionofphenomenology.

37.NotestakenbyPfnderonDec.6,1899.

38.DaubertianaAI5/81v.

39.Inlatertimes,thephrasewasusedbyConradMartiusinherattempttoovercomeHusserl'stranscendental
phenomenology(seeher"DietranszendentaleunddieontologischePhnomenologie",1959,p.179)andthereafter
inHelmutKuhn'sarticle"Phnomenologieund'wirklicheWirklichkeit'",1975,pp.17.

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