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Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v.


G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013


On July 12, 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved a
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay
City for a military reservation.The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley,was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). On May 28 ,1967,
President Ferdinand E.Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No.208, amending
Proclamation No.423,which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services-Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(MSS-PVAO). Again ,on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.2476
,further amending Proclamation No.423,which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan,Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No.423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos.(R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of
Proclamation No.2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum ,which reads; P.S.-
This includes Western Bicutan (SGD.)Ferdinand E.Marcos The crux of the controversy started
when Proclamation No.2476 was published in the Official Gazette on February 3,1986. Without
the above-quoted addendum. Years later,President Corason C.Aquino issued Proclamation
No.172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No.2476, as published, but this time
excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No.423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provinsion of R.A. 274 and 730. On August
27,1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig,Inc. (NMSMI) filed a
Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP).


Whether or not the handwritten addendum was considered published also at the time the
Proclamation was published.

No. ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provide. Under the provision, the
requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase unless otherwise provided refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the laws publication in the Official
Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. Court
cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No.2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthemore, under Section 24,
Chapter 6. Book I of the Administrative Code, the publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority. Thus,
whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
speculative. Simply put, the courts my not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words appearing in the law. This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the
law when, evidently, there is none.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009


The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on June 17,
1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation
of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already
insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and
the general public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In
the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that After the payment of all liabilities
and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal
rate of interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the
closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed
bank. Relying on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval
of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity
Bank creditors to surplus dividends.

The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they
being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro,
judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated
in Article 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and
oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its
retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the
contrary, Section 28. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following
the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v Tangco

G.R. No. 165732, December 14, 2006


On November 3, 1997 at about 2:50 p.m, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch in Quezon City to renew her time deposit. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder
with corresponding permit to carry the same outside of her residence, approached Pajarillo,
security guard of Ecology Bank deposit the firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside of her residence, approached Pajarillo, security guard of Ecology Bank to deposit
the firearm for safekeeping, suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting
her in the abdomen causing her death. Evangelines husband, Lauro , together with his six minor
children filed with the RTC a criminal case against Pajarillo, where they likewise reserved their
right to file a separate civil action on the said criminal case.Pajarillo was subsequently convicted
of homicide in January 19, 2000 by the RTC and the CA upheld the decision with modification
on the penalty on July 21, 2000. On January 14, 1998, respondents filed with the RTC of
Marikina City a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and
against Safeguard Security Agency Inc. for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. The respondents prayed for actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.

The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be
conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's
evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of
regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance
of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.
G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated
from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and
separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed
and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.
Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile on
Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico in
Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.Immediately upon learning of
such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective
plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12,
1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites
should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the

Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico
should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.

The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions and
that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary
dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While it may
be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does
not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well
suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the
first. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily
becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such
issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility.
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour. To
forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed for the
suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of
their marriage is a prejudicial question.

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In
the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he
can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a
final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is
no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.
G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage
with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint alleges that he was again forced, threatened and intimated
by defendant and her relatives into entering the marriage with her on August 21, 1957. In her
answer, she denies the material allegations of the complaint and avers as affirmative defenses
that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan. On
February 19, 1958, after he had filed, defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint for
bigamy against plaintiff Abundio Merced. Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said
criminal case in abeyance until final termination of the said civil case. Reason alleged for the
motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the

Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be
illegal and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for
bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

On January 23, 1979, an information for bigamy was filed against herein petitioner, Leonilo C.
Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The information was filed based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan. On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's
arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September
26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering
into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous
knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30,
1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second
marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced
by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to
marriages of exceptional character. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a
motion to suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the
nullity of his second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal case
of bigamy.
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioners guilt
or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz
Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioners consent to marriage was obtained through duress,
violence or intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of
prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to
petitioners second marriage he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for
more than five years. He only came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was
secured through force, threat and intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second

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