History of ethics

The epic poems that stand at the beginning of many world literatures, such as th
e Mesopotamian Epic of Gilgamesh, Homer's Iliad and the Icelandic Eddas, portray
a set
of values that suit the strong leader of a small tribe. Valour and success are
the principal qualities of a hero, and are generally not constrained by moral
considerations. Revenge and vendetta are appropriate activities for heroes. The
gods that appear in such epics are not defenders of moral values but are caprici
ous
forces of nature, and are to be feared and propitiated.[2]
More strictly ethical claims are found occasionally in the literature of ancient
civilizations that is aimed at lower classes of society. The Sumerian Farmer's
Almanac and the Egyptian Instruction of Amenhotep both advise farmers to leave s
ome grain for poor gleaners, and promise favours from the gods for doing so.[3]
A
number of ancient religions and ethical thinkers also put forward some version o
f the golden rule, at least in its negative version: do not do to others what yo
u do
not want done to yourself.[4]
Since the origin of Ethical Monotheism in (Hebrew) Judaism, something Greek-soun
ding like "ethics" may be said to have been originated in Judaism's up to four
thousand years old passed down traditions and instructions of the Torahs (Hebrew
: /'t??r??t/, toroth; plural of Torah), Oral, Written,[5] and Mystical.

Possibly the earliest affirmation of the maxim of reciprocity, reflecting the an

cient Egyptian goddess Ma'at, appears in the story of The Eloquent Peasant, whic
h
dates to the Middle Kingdom (c. 2040 c. 1650 BC): "Now this is the command: Do t
o the doer to make him do."[12][13] This proverb embodies the do ut des
principle.[14] A Late Period (c. 664 BC 323 BC) papyrus contains an early negati
ve affirmation of the Golden Rule: "That which you hate to be done to you, do no
t
do to another."[15]

Ancient China[edit]
The Golden Rule existed among all the major philosophical schools of ancient Chi
na: Mohism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Examples of the concept include:
"Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself." Confucius[16](c
. 500 BC)
"If people regarded other people's families in the same way that they regard the
ir own, who then would incite their own family to attack that of another? For on
e would do for others as one would do for oneself." Mozi (c. 400 BC)
"Regard your neighbor's gain as your own gain, and your neighbor's loss as your
own loss." Laozi[17] (c. 500 BC)

Ancient India[edit]
Sanskrit tradition[edit]
In Mahabharata, the ancient epic of India, there is a discourse in which the wis
e minister Vidura advises the King Yuddhish?hira
Listening to wise scriptures, austerity, sacrifice, respectful faith, social wel
fare, forgiveness, purity of intent, compassion, truth and self-control are the
ten wealth of character (self). O king aim for these, may you be steadfast in th
ese qualities. These are the basis of prosperity and rightful living. These are
highest attainable things. All worlds are balanced on dharma, dharma encompasses
ways to prosperity as well. O King, dharma is the best quality to have, wealth
the medium and desire (kama) the lowest. Hence, (keeping these in mind), by self
-control and by making dharma (right conduct) your main focus, treat others as y
ou treat yourself.
?Mahabharata Shanti-Parva 167:9

Tamil tradition[edit]
In the Section on Virtue, and Chapter 32 of the Tirukku?a? (c. 200 BC c. 500 AD)
, Tiruvalluvar says: Why does a man inflict upon other creatures those suffering
s, which he has found by experience are sufferings to himself ? (K. 318) Let not
a man consent to do those things to another which, he knows, will cause sorrow.
(K. 316) He furthermore opined that it is the determination of the spotless (vi
rtuous) not to do evil, even in return, to those who have cherished enmity and d
one them evil. (K. 312) The (proper) punishment to those who have done evil (to
you), is to put them to shame by showing them kindness, in return and to forget
both the evil and the good done on both sides. (K. 314)

Ancient Greece[edit]
The Golden Rule in its prohibitive (negative) form was a common principle in anc
ient Greek philosophy. Examples of the general concept include:
"Avoid doing what you would blame others for doing." Thales[18] (c. 624 BC c. 54
6 BC)
"What you do not want to happen to you, do not do it yourself either. " Sextus t
he Pythagorean.[19] The oldest extant reference to Sextus is by Origen in the th
ird century of the common era.[20]
"Do not do to others that which angers you when they do it to you." Isocrates[21
] (436 338 BC)

Ancient Persia[edit]
The Pahlavi Texts of Zoroastrianism (c. 300 BC 1000 AD) were an early source for t
he Golden Rule: "That nature alone is good which refrains from doing to another
whatsoever is not good for itself." Dadisten-I-dinik, 94,5, and "Whatever is dis
agreeable to yourself do not do unto others." Shayast-na-Shayast 13:29[22]

> Jewish were the first .... bad things are punished and good things rewarded
All religions including polytheistic ones had a notion of divine beings who main
tained justice, even ones that pre-dated Judaism. So you are completely wrong th
ere.
Read about ancient Egyptian and Babylonian, Sumerian etc. religions.
>...progress ... achieve by getting rid of ...exploitators...but by ... appropia
tion and grow...requires always exploitation of the other in any organism
Your ideas are inconsistent. If an organism is exploited, it will try to free it
self or even destroy its exploiter. That is natural. It is laughable to say that
exploiting is natural and good but fighting exploiters is unnatural and bad.
> I think the french and the american revolution were hardly a progress, in many
aspects backwards movements.
Totally wrong! French revolution was badly managed and ended up right where it s
tarted - in a benevolent dictatorship then monarchy. But it gave the world a lot
of
new ideas. So it was a small step forward. American revolution was a major step
forward.
> the only important thing is the growing in power
That is a very short sighted and unrealistic world view. Anyway you grow in powe
r by defeating those who exploit you and fellow men.?

I ... don't mind Jews...impressed with what they have achieved ... animosity aga
inst them is unfounded
You are just like I was a until some time back. Search in YouTube for a speaker
called Jared Taylor. He is even more mild mannered than I am and speaks more nic
ely than I can. And he doesn't mention Jews. I think it will be a really good st
art in unraveling the tangled web that leads to the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
understanding. No, this is not some lunatic omg-the-British-queen-is-a-shape-shi
fting-reptilian-alien nonsense.
Politics usually come before ethnicity, even for Jews.
I disagree. For the Jewish elite politics is just a way to advance their shared
ethnic goals. That is why they have a controlling presence in both parties, cons
ervative and liberal and push both parties more and more to the left.
Neither are ... Lagarde, . ... Redstone or ... Kushner politically aligned
So much the better for them. They can maintain a controlling influence in all in
stitutions, even ones with different roles or ideologies yet can fool people int
o thinking like you do. I hope you are not naive enough to think that people act
by their publicly stated beliefs, ideologies, intentions etc. These are all jus
t facades, regardless of Jews or Gentiles.
I do not see any evidence of collusion
I think you may be a little out of touch. Trump has back pedalled on a lot of hi
s promises. He is being allowed to deport illegal immigrants in the US for the m
oment, very likely because the elites want to pressure the Mexican government to
comply with some demands they have. Once they comply even the deportations will
end. We will know in about a year.
or have a destructive agenda
Then explain why western countries are pressured to throw open all borders and l
et refugees flood in? Why the suppression of all nationalism and the propaganda
against it? Why push political correctness, "alternative lifestyles", six millio
n new genders besides from male & female on societies and force the majority pop
ulation to bend over backwards to pander to these people? Why the suppression an
d even punishment of any speech that does not comply with political correctness?
 Before you answer you may want to listen to at least Jared Taylor. It is better
to also listen to a few other speakers who present ideas outside the box of sup
erficial but approved, Kosher ideas that are relentlessly drummed into us.?

We can start with the Greeks, and this means starting with Homer, a body of text
s transmitted first orally and then written down in the seventh century BCE. So
what does the relation between morality and religion look like in Homer? The fir
st thing to say is that the gods and goddesses of the Homeric poems behave remar
kably like the noble humans described in the same poems, even though the humans
are mortal and the gods and goddesses immortal. Both groups are motivated by the
desire for honor and glory, and are accordingly jealous when they receive less
than they think they should while others receive more, and work ceaselessly to r
ectify this. The two groups are not however symmetrical, because the noble human
s have the same kind of client relation to the divinities as subordinate humans
do to them. There is a complex pattern that we might call an honor-loop (see Mikal
son, Honor Thy Gods). The divinities have their functions (in Greek, the word is
the same as honors ), such as Poseidon's oversight of the sea, and humans seek the
ir favor with honor , which we might here translate as worship . This includes, for ex
ample, sanctuaries devoted to them, dedications, hymns, dances, libations, ritua
ls, prayers, festivals and sacrifices. In all of these the gods take pleasure, a
nd in return they give honor to mortals in the form of help or assistance, especia
lly in the areas of their own expertise. There is a clear analogy with purely hu
man client-relations, which are validated in the Homeric narrative, since the po
ems were probably originally sung at the courts of the princes who claimed desce
nt from the heroes whose exploits make up the story. The gods and goddesses are
not, however, completely at liberty. They too are accountable to fate or justice
, as in the scene in the Iliad, where Zeus wants to save Hector, but he cannot b
ecause his doom has long been sealed (Iliad, 22: 179).
It is sometimes said that the Presocratic philosophers come out of Homer by reje
cting religion in favor of science. There is a grain of truth in this, for when
Thales (who flourished around 580) is reported as saying Water is the origin (or
principle) of all things, this is different from saying, for example, that Tethys
is mother of all the rivers, because it deletes the character of narrative or s
tory (Aristotle's Metaphysics, 983b20 8). When Anaximenes (around 545) talks of ai
r as the primary element differing in respect of thinness and thickness, or Hera
clitus explains all change as a pattern in the turnings of fire igniting in meas
ures and going out in measures, they are not giving stories with plot-lines invo
lving quasi-human intentions and frustrations (DK 13, A 5, DK 22, B 30). But it
is wrong to say that they have left religion behind. Heraclitus puts this enigma
tically by saying that the one and only wisdom does and does not consent to be c
alled Zeus (DK 22, B 14). He is affirming the divinity of this wisdom, but denyi
ng the anthropomorphic character of much Greek religion. To god all things are be
autiful and good and just but humans suppose some things to be just and others u
njust (DK 22, B 102). He ties this divine wisdom to the laws of a city, for all hu
man laws are nourished by the one divine law (DK 22, B 114), though he does not h
ave confidence that the many are capable of making law. The sophists, to whom Socr
ates responded, rejected this tie between human law and divine law and this was
in part because of their expertise in rhetoric, by which they taught their stude
nts how to manipulate the deliberations of popular assemblies, and so change the
laws to their own advantage. The most famous case is Protagoras (c. 490 21), who
stated in the first sentence of his book Truth that A human being is the measure
of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not (Plato's
Theaetetus, 152a). Protagoras is not correctly seen here as skeptical about mora
lity or religion. It is true that he claimed he was not in a position to know ei
ther the manner in which the gods are or are not (another translation is that the
y are or are not ) or what they are like in appearance (DK 80, B 4). But as Plato
(c. 430 347) presents him, he told the story that all humans have been given by th
e gods the gifts of shame and justice, so as to make possible the founding of ci
ties; this is why each human is the measure. Even Thrasymachus, in the first boo
k of Plato's Republic, thinks of justice as the same thing amongst gods and huma
ns (Republic, 388c). His view of what this justice is, namely the interest of th
e stronger, is disputed by Plato. But the claim that justice operates at both th
e divine and human levels is common ground.
Socrates (c. 470 399) in one of the early dialogues debates the nature of the holy
with Euthyphro, who is a religious professional. Euthyphro is taking his own fa
ther to court for murder, and though ordinary Greek morality would condemn such
an action as impiety, Euthyphro defends it on the basis that the gods behave in
the same sort of way, according to the traditional stories. Socrates makes it cl
ear that he does not believe these stories, because they attribute immorality to
the gods. This does not mean, however, that he does not believe in the gods. He
was observant in his religious practices, and he objects to the charge of not b
elieving in the city's gods that was one of the bases of the prosecution at his
own trial. He points to the spirit who gives him commands about what not to do (
Apology, 31d), and we learn later that he found it significant that this voice n
ever told him to stop conducting his trial in the way that in fact led to his de
ath (Ibid., 40a-c). Socrates interpreted this as an invitation from the gods to
die, thus refuting the charge that, by conducting his trial in the way he did, h
e was guilty of theft i.e., depriving the gods of his life that properly belonge
d to them (Phaedo, 62b). His life in particular was a service to god, he thought
, because his testing of the wisdom of others was carrying out Apollo's charge g
iven by the oracle at Delphi, implicit in the startling pronouncement that he wa
s the wisest man in Greece (Apology, 21a-d).
Socrates's problem with the traditional stories about the gods gives rise to wha
t is sometimes called the Euthyphro dilemma . If we try to define the holy as what
is loved by all the gods (and goddesses), we will be faced with the question Is t
he holy holy because it is loved by the gods, or do they love it because it is h
oly? (Euthyphro, 10a). Socrates makes it clear that his view is the second (thoug
h he does not argue for this conclusion in addressing this question, and he is p
robably relying on the earlier premise, at Euthyphro, 7c10f, that we love things
because of the properties they have). (See Hare, Plato's Euthyphro, on this pas
sage.) But his view is not an objection to tying morality and religion together.
He hints at the end of the dialogue (Euthyphro, 13de) that the right way to lin
k them is to see that when we do good we are serving the gods well. Plato probab
ly does not intend for us to construe the dialogues together as a single philoso
phical system, and we must not erase the differences between them. But it is sig
nificant that in the Theaetetus (176b), Socrates says again that our goal is to
be as like the god as possible, and since the god is in no way and in no manner
unjust, but as just as it is possible to be, nothing is more like the god than t
he one among us who becomes correspondingly as just as possible. In several dial
ogues this thought is connected with a belief in the immortality of the soul; we
become like the god by paying attention to the immortal and best part of oursel
ves (e.g., Symposium, 210A-212B). The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is
also tied to the doctrine of the Forms, whereby things with characteristics tha
t we experience in this life (e.g., beauty) are copies or imitations of the Form
s (e.g., The Beautiful-Itself) that we see without the distraction of the body w
hen our souls are separated at death. The Form of the Good, according to the Rep
ublic, is above all the other Forms and gives them their intelligibility (as, by
analogy, the sun gives visibility), and is (in a pregnant phrase) on the other s
ide of being (Republic, 509b). Finally, in the Laws (716b), perhaps Plato's last
work, the character called the Athenian says that the god can serve for us in the
highest degree as a measure of all things, and much more than any human can, wha
tever some people say; so people who are going to be friends with such a god mus
t, as far as their powers allow, be like the gods themselves.
This train of thought sees the god or gods as like a magnet, drawing us to be li
ke them by the power of their goodness or excellence. In Plato's Ion (533d), the
divine is compared to a magnet to which is attached a chain of rings, through w
hich the attraction is passed. This conception is also pervasive in Aristotle (3
84 22), Plato's student for twenty years. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for example,
the words god and divine occur roughly twice as often as the words happiness and hap
This is significant, given that Aristotle's ethical theory is (like Plato's) euda
imonist (meaning that our morality aims at our happiness). Mention of the divine
is not merely conventional for Aristotle, but does important philosophical work.
In the Eudemian Ethics (1249b5 22) he tells us that the goal of our lives is serv
ice and contemplation of the god. He thinks that we become like what we contempl
ate, and so we become most like the god by contemplating the god. Incidentally,
this is why the god does not contemplate us; for this would mean becoming less t
han the god, which is impossible. As in Plato, the well-being of the city takes
precedence over the individual, and this, too, is justified theologically. It is
nobler and more divine to achieve an end for a city than for an individual (NE
1094b9 10). Aristotle draws a distinction between what we honor and what we merely
commend (NE, 1101b10 35). There are six states for a human life, on a normative s
cale from best to worst: divine (which exceeds the merely human on the one extre
me), virtuous (without wrongful desire), strong-willed (able to overcome wrongfu
l desire), weak-willed (unable to do so), vicious and bestial (which exceeds the
merely human on the other extreme, and which Aristotle says is mostly found amo
ng barbarians) (NE, 1145a15 22). The highest form of happiness, which he calls ble
ssedness, is something we honor as we honor gods, whereas virtue we merely comme
nd. It would be as wrong to commend blessedness as it would be to commend gods (
NE, 1096a10 1097a15). Sometimes Aristotle uses the phrase God or understanding (in G
reek, nous) (e.g., Politics, 1287a27 32). The activity of the god, he says in the
Metaphysics, is nous thinking itself (1074b34). The best human activity is the m
ost god-like, namely thinking about the god and about things that do not change.
Aristotle's virtue ethics, then, needs to be understood against the background
of these theological premises. He is thinking of the divine, to use Plato's meta
phor, as magnetic, drawing us, by its attractive power, to live the best kind of
life possible for us. This gives him a defense against the charge sometimes mad
e against virtue theories that they simply embed the prevailing social consensus
into an account of human nature. Aristotle defines ethical virtue as lying in a
mean between excess and defect, and the mean is determined by the person of pra
ctical wisdom (actually the male, since Aristotle is sexist on this point). He t
hen gives a conventional account of the virtues such a person displays (such as
courage, literally manliness, which requires the right amount of fear and confid
ence, between cowardice and rashness). But the virtuous person in each case acts
for the sake of the noble (or beautiful) , and Aristotle continually associates th
e noble with the divine (e.g., NE, 1115b12).
There are tensions in Aristotle's account of virtue and happiness. It is not cle
ar whether the Nicomachean Ethics has a consistent view of the relation between
the activity of contemplation and the other activities of a virtuous life (see H
are, God and Morality, chapter 1, and Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, chap
ter 7). But the connection of the highest human state with the divine is pervasi
ve in the text. One result of this connection is the eudaimonism mentioned earli
er. If the god does not care about what is not divine (for this would be to beco
me like what is not divine), the highest and most god-like human also does not c
are about other human beings except to the degree they contribute to his own bes
t state. This degree is not negligible, since humans are social animals, and the
ir well-being depends on the well-being of the families and cities of which they
are members. Aristotle is not preaching self-sufficiency in any sense that impl
ies we could be happy on our own, isolated from other human beings. But our conc
ern for the well-being of other people is always, for him, contingent on our spe
cial relation to them. Within the highest kind of friendship a friend is another
self , he says, and within such friendship we care about friends for their own sak
e, but if the friend becomes divine and we do not, then the friendship is over (
NE, 1159a7). We therefore do not want our friends to become gods, even though th
at would be the best thing for them. Finally, Aristotle ties our happiness to ou
r end (in Greek, telos); for humans, as for all living things, the best state is
its own activity in accordance with the natural function that is unique to each
species. For humans the best state is happiness, and the best activity within t
his state is contemplation (NE, 1178b17 23).
The Epicureans and Stoics who followed Aristotle differed with each other and wi
th him in many ways, but they agreed in tying morality and religion together. Fo
r the Epicureans, the gods do not care about us, though they are entertained by
looking at our tragicomic lives (rather as we look at soap operas on television)
. We can be released from a good deal of anxiety, the Epicureans thought, by rea
lizing that the gods are not going to punish us. Our goal should be to be as lik
e the gods as we can, enjoying ourselves without interruption, but for us this m
eans limiting our desires to what we can obtain without frustration. They did no
t mean that our happiness is self-interested in any narrow sense, because they h
eld that we can include others in our happiness by means of our sympathetic plea
sures. The Stoics likewise tied the best kind of human life, for them the life o
f the sage, to being like the divine. The sage follows nature in all his desires
and actions, and is thus the closest to the divine. One of the virtues he will
have is apathy (in Greek apatheia), which does not mean listlessness, but detachme
nt from wanting anything other than what nature, or the god, is already providin
g. Like the Epicureans, the Stoics had an argument against any narrow self-inter
est, but this time based on their conception of right reason which is directed b
y the law common to all, which pervades everything and is the same as Zeus, lord
of the ordering of all that exists (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers,
VII 88. For the views of the Epicureans and Stoics about morality and religion,
see Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, chapters 5 and 7.)
2. The Hebrew Bible And The New Testament
The second line of thought to be traced in this entry starts with the Hebrew Bib
le and continues with the Greek scriptures called by Christians The New Testament .
Morality and religion are connected in the Hebrew Bible primarily by the catego
ry of God's command. Such commands come already in the first chapter of Genesis.
God created by command, for example Let there be light (Gen. 1:3). Then, after th
e creation of animals, God gives the command, Be fruitful and multiply , and repeat
s the command to the humans he creates in the divine image (Gen. 1:22). In the s
econd chapter God tells Adam that he is free to eat from any tree in the garden,
but he must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. When Eve a
nd Adam disobey and eat of that fruit, they are expelled from the garden. There
is a family of concepts here that is different from what we met in Greek philoso
phy. God is setting up a kind of covenant by which humans will be blessed if the
y obey the commands God gives them. Human disobedience is not explained in the t
ext, except that the serpent says to Eve that they will not die if they eat the
fruit, but will be like God, knowing good and evil, and Eve sees the fruit as go
od for food and pleasing to the eye and desirable for gaining wisdom. After they
eat, Adam and Eve know that they are naked, and are ashamed, and hide from God.
There is a turning away from God and from obedience to God that characterizes t
his as a fall into sin . As the story goes on, and Cain kills Abel, evil spreads to
all the people of the earth, and Genesis describes the basic state as a corrupt
ion of the heart (6:9). This idea of a basic orientation away from or towards Go
d and God's commands becomes in the Patristic period of early Christianity the i
dea of a will. There is no such idea in Plato or Aristotle, and no Greek word th
at the English word will properly translates.
In the Pentateuch, the story continues with Abraham, and God's command to leave
his ancestral land and go to the land God promised to give him and his offspring
(Gen. 17:7 8). Then there is the command to Abraham to kill his son, a deed preve
nted at the last minute by the provision of a ram instead (Gen. 22:11 14). Abraham
's great grandchildren end up in Egypt, because of famine, and the people of Isr
ael suffer for generations under Pharaoh's yoke. Under Moses the people are fina
lly liberated, and during their wanderings in the desert, Moses receives from Go
d the Ten Commandments, in two tables or tablets (Exod. 20:1 17, 31:18). The first
table concerns our obligations to God directly, to worship God alone and keep G
od's name holy, and keep the Sabbath. The second table concerns our obligations
to other human beings, and all of the commands are negative (do not kill, commit
adultery, steal, lie, or covet) except for the first, which tells us to honor o
ur fathers and mothers. God's commands taken together give us the law (on some l
ists there are 613 mitzvot, Hebrew for commands .) One more term belongs here, name
ly kingdom . The Greeks had the notion of a kingdom, under a human king (though the
Athenians were in the classical period suspicious of such an arrangement). But
they did not have the idea of a kingdom of God, though there is something approa
ching this in some of the Stoics. This idea is explicable in terms of law, and i
s introduced as such in Exodus in connection with the covenant on Mt. Sinai. The
kingdom is the realm in which the laws obtain.
This raises a question about the extent of this realm. The Ten Commandments are
given in the context of a covenant with the people of Israel, though there are r
eferences to God's intention to bless the whole world through this covenant. The
surrounding laws in the Pentateuch include prescriptions and proscriptions abou
t ritual purity and sacrifice and the use of the land that seem to apply to this
particular people in this particular place. But the covenant that God makes wit
h Noah after the flood is applicable to the whole human race, and universal scop
e is explicit in the Wisdom books, which make a continual connection between how
we should live and how we were created as human beings. For example, in Proverb
s 8 Wisdom raises her voice to all humankind, and says that she detests wickedne
ss, which she goes on to describe in considerable detail. She says that she was
the artisan at God's side when God created the world and its inhabitants. Judais
m distinguishes seven Noahide laws given to Noah before the covenant with Abraham.
In the writings which Christians call The New Testament the theme of God's command
s is recapitulated. Jesus sums up the commandments under two, the command to lov
e God with all one's heart and soul and mind (see Deuteronomy 6:5), and the comm
and to love the neighbor as the self (see Leviticus 19:18). The first of these p
robably sums up the first table of the Ten Commandments to Moses, and the second s
ums up the second. The New Testament is unlike the Hebrew Bible, however, in pre
senting a narrative about a man who is the perfect exemplification of obedience
and who has a life without sin. New Testament scholars disagree about the extent
to which Jesus actually claimed to be God, but the traditional interpretation i
s that he did make this claim; in any case the Christian doctrine is that we can
see in his life the clearest possible revelation in human terms both of what Go
d is like and at the same time of what our lives ought to be like. In the Sermon
on the Mount (Matthew 5 7) Jesus issues a number of radical injunctions. He takes t
he commandments inside the heart; for example, we are required not merely not to
murder, but not to be angry, and not merely not to commit adultery, but not to
lust (see Ezekiel 11:19, I will give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in
my statutes. ) We are told, if someone strikes us on the right cheek, to turn to
him also the left. Jesus tells us to love our enemies and those who hate and per
secute us, and in this way he makes it clear that the love commandment is not ba
sed on reciprocity (Matt 5:43 48; Luke 6:27 36). Finally, when he is asked Who is my
neighbor? , he tells the story (Luke 10) of a Samaritan (traditional enemies of th
e Jews) who met a wounded Jew he did not know by the side of the road, was moved
with compassion, and went out of his way to meet his needs; Jesus commends the
Samaritan for being neighbor to the wounded traveler.
The theme of self-sacrifice is clearest in the part of the narrative that deals
with Jesus' death. This event is understood in many different ways in the New Te
stament, but one central theme is that Jesus died on our behalf, an innocent man
on behalf of the guilty. Jesus describes the paradigm of loving our neighbors a
s the willingness to die for them. This theme is connected with our relationship
 to God, which we violate by disobedience, but which is restored by God's forgiv
eness through redemption. In Paul's letters especially we are given a three-fold
temporal location for the relation of morality to God's work on our behalf. We
are forgiven for our past failures on the basis of Jesus' sacrifice (Rom. 3:21 26)
. We are reconciled now with God through God's adoption of us in Christ (Rom. 8:
14 19). And we are given the hope of future progress in holiness by the work of th
e Holy Spirit (Rom. 5:3 5). All of this theology requires more detailed analysis,
but this is not the place for it.
There is a contrast between the two traditions I have so far described, namely t
he Greek and the Judeo-Christian. The idea of God that is central in Greek philo
sophy is the idea of God attracting us, like a kind of magnet, so that we desire
to become more like God, though there is a minority account by Socrates of rece
iving divine commands. In the Jewish and Christian scriptures, the notion of God
commanding us is central. It is tempting to simplify this contrast by saying th
at the Greeks favor the good, in their account of the relation of morality and r
eligion, and the Judeo-Christian account favors the right or obligation. It is t
rue that the notion of obligation makes most sense against the background of com
mand. But the picture is over-simple because the Greeks had room in their accoun
t for the constraint of desire; thus the temperate or brave person in Aristotle'
s picture has desires for food or sex or safety that have to be disciplined by t
he love of the noble. On the other side, the Judeo-Christian account adds God's
love to the notion of God's command, so that the covenant in which the commands
are embedded is a covenant by which God blesses us, and we are given a route tow
ards our highest good which is union with God.

Several myths seem to reinforce certain moral behaviors. The story of Baucis and
Philemon has a definite moral of "be hospitable to those in need". There are MA
NY stories about hubris, in which those whose sense of undeserved pride made the
m act above others (and especially the gods) and led to their downfall (Phaeton,
Arachne).
The Greek underworld was divided into various areas. In Tarterus, the titans wer
e imprisoned, Sisyphus rolled his rock eternally, and Tantalus hungered and thir
sted amid plenty. In the Elysian fields, heroes and virtuous shades enjoyed eter
nal afterlife in a land of gentle weather and good company. Sounds like a morali
ty to me.
Well, I've been reading Homer's Odyssey lately and several passages seem to impl
y that "God-fearing" people were moral people.
Morality and Ethics are always interesting historical topics. To our modern mind
s, what is basically ethical and moral sometimes seems relatively clear, such as
not cheating or stealing, working hard to earn a living, etc., but even today i
n some societies, that is not always so obvious. Yet most ancient societies cert
ainly had standards of conduct in one form or another.
In ancient Egypt, in order to understand morality and ethics, one must have a ba
sic knowledge of the term, ma'at. Ma'at was the ethical conceptions of "truth",
"order" and "cosmic balance". These principals were also personified in a goddes
s named Ma'at. This goddess represented the divine harmony and balance of the un
iverse, which was thought to affect every aspect of the ancient land of Egypt. P
articularly in the most ancient of times, it should be noted that the people of
Egypt had an obligation to uphold ma'at through obedience to the king, which dou
btless added in the formation of the early state.
In ancient Egypt, there was probably never a theoretical framework as such that
dealt with these issues, but the concept of what the Egyptians considered correc
t moral conduct can be deduced from various written sources, particularly autobi
ographies and texts that we now refer to as wisdom literature. We must be aware
that such texts, and especially those intended for posterity, do not always pres
ent us with what we would consider as objective truth. They were frequently writ
ten to provide their gods with a resume of sorts, setting out the good and fine
deeds of the writer, often in tombs, as judgment day approached. However, they d
o tell us what the ideal was perceived to be, even if this ideal was not always
achieved.
Autobiographies provide us with our earliest source for ethical values. They mos
tly date from the 5th Dynasty onward, and appear to be written for the tomb owne
r's descendents. For example, an official by the name of Nefer-seshem-re tells u
s that:
I have left my city, I have come down from my province,
having done what is right (ma'at) for its lord, having satisfied him with that w
hich he loves,
I spoke ma'at and I did ma'at, I spoke well and I reported well....
I rescued the weak from the hand of one stronger than he when I was able;
I gave bread to the hungry, clothing [to the naked], a landing for the boatless.
I buried him who had no son,
I made a boat for him who had no boat,
I respected my father, I pleased my mother,
I nurtured their children.
Chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead deals with the judgment before the god of th
e underworld, Osiris. It is very useful to our understanding of what was and wha
t was not acceptable behavior. The text includes two declarations of innocence i
n which the deceased denies having committed various crimes. These include some
very generalized statements, such as "I have done no injustice to people, nor ha
ve I maltreated an animal" or "I have done no wrong (isfet)", but it also record
s some very specific faults:
Crimes of a cultic nature: blasphemy, stealing from temple offerings or offering
s to the dead, defiling the purity of a sacred place
Crimes of an economic nature: tampering with the grain measure, the boundaries o
f fields, or the plummet of the balance
Criminal acts: theft and murder
Exploitation of the weak and causing injury: depriving orphans of their property
, causing pain or grief, doing injury, causing hunger
Moral and social failings: lying, committing adultery, ignoring the truth, sland
ering servants before their master, being aggressive, eavesdropping, losing one'
s temper, speaking without thinking.
It has been said that the modern Christian Bible can be summed up in two sentenc
es. Love God. Love your neighbor. Clearly these standards are not new to that te
xt, as most Egyptians loved their gods, and the ancient Egyptian obviously belie
ved that looking out for his neighbors was a high point in his life. Other early
texts, contemporary to that of Nefer-seshem-re include denials of misconduct. W
e find lines such as "Never did I take the property of any person"; "Never did I
say a bad thing about anyone to the king (or) to a potentate because I desired
that I might be honored before the god"; and "Never did I do anything evil again
st any person", all of which are recognizable ethical standards to most of the m
odern world. The ideals expressed in such biographies, including justice, honest
y, fairness, mercy, kindness and generosity, reflect the central concept of ma'a
t, the cosmic and social order of the universe as established by the creator god
.
The king played a pivotal role in the matter of ethics and morality. One must re
member the pharaoh was considered an earthly god, and it was he who ultimately i
nterpreted the concept of ma'at for the living. When Nefer-seshem-re records tha
t "having done ma'at for its lord, having satisfied him with that which he desir
es", he is referring to the king who determines and upholds ma'at. However, one'
s fate after death depended on how one measured up to ma'at, the standard set by
the living king. The traditional funerary prayer begins, "An offering which the
king grants". Though the concept of ma'at underwent some modifications over tim
e, the same ethical and moral values expressed in the Old Kingdom texts continue
to appear in later autobiographies and other texts.
However, wisdom literature from the First Intermediate Period and Middle Kingdom
seems to indicate a weakening of the king's influence over ma'at, linking it mo
re directly with the creator god. For example, in the Story of the Eloquent Peas
ant, which dates to about the 9th or 10th Dynasty, we find the line, "Do ma'at f
or the lord of ma'at" but here a god is inferred rather than the king. Further a
long in this text, the issue is clarified when the peasant claims that his words
expounding on ma'at "have issued from the mouth of Re himself". In another text
s, known to us as the Prophecy of Neferti, we are told that the sun god Re uphol
ds ma'at, and that if disorder prevails, it is because this god has not made his
presence felt.
This shift in emphasis from king to god can be linked with the failure of the ru
lers at the end of the Old Kingdom resulting in the First Intermediate Period. T
he king continued to have a central role in maintaining ma'at through the end of
the pharaonic history. However, he did so as the god's representative on earth.
Nevertheless, the king was fallible, and when dishevel did occur, the king was
often held responsible for his failure to perform this duty.
Hence, ethics and morals did not only affect one's own destiny in the afterlife,
but the country as a whole. And while one was responsible for his or her own co
nduct, it would seem that when upheaval in general occurred, it indicated that t
he gods were perhaps absent, or the king was not fulfilling his duty. In the Mid
dle Kingdom, after the transition from the disorder of the First Intermediate Pe
riod, we can see in the wisdom text an attempt to reestablish the rule of ma'at.
It includes a type of literature known as "Complaints", which lament a state of
affairs in which the social hierarchy has been affected. For example, in the Ad
monitions of Ipuwer, we read that, "Behold, he who had nothing is now a possesso
r of riches... Behold, noble ladies [now travel] on rafts". This social disorder
was thought to be a result of the breakdown of ma'at. Hence, this document also
notes that "Behold, offices are broken into, their records stolen...; behold, t
he laws of the chamber are cast out, men walk on them in the streets, beggars te
ar them up in the lanes;...behold, the great council chamber is invaded.
Though there are several terms that conceptualize the opposite value of ma'at, t
he most common is "isfet", which is usually translated as "sin" or "wrong". The
term appears as early as the Pyramid Texts. Kha-kheper-re-soneb laments that "Ma
'at has been cast out while isfet is in the counsel chamber", and after (or at t
he end of) the Amarna Period, Tutankhamun is said to have "drove out isfet throu
ghout the two lands, M'at being established in her place". In chapter 125 of the
Book of the Dead, the declaration of innocence begins, "Oh wide of movements, w
ho comes from Heliopolis, I have not done isfet".
However, the basic translation of ma'at is "truth", and so another common antony
m is grg, meaning "lie". Thus, in chapter 126 of the Book of the Dead, the apes
who sit at the prow of Re's boat are "ones who live from ma'at, who digest ma'at
, whose ears are free of lies (grg), whose abomination is isfet; [the deceased a
sks] drive out my evil (dwt), remove my wrong (isfet)." It is important to note
that, while isfet is used as an all-embracing term for "wrong", in ancient Egypt
there was no concept of "general sin", a barrier between humankind and the gods
which is the result of the general human condition. Though there might be an al
l powerful god of ancient Egypt, as Amun seems to have been considered during th
e New Kingdom, "sin" and "wrong" were not limited to humans.
The ancient Egyptians did believe that it was at least theoretically possible to
 lead a life free of isfet. Clearly, good Egyptians attempted to follow the way
of ma'at, for in doing so they would prosper and society would function smoothly
, while those who transgressed were doomed to automatic failure. They found, in
the teachings and instructions in wisdom literature, what behavior was compatibl
e with ma'at, but it was also the responsibility of the king to uphold ma'at and
subdue isfet. Even so, there were times when the wicked would indeed prosper by
their actions, and so the ultimate evaluation of a person took place not in his
life but in the hereafter, where the wicked would finally answer for their deed
s.
Interestingly, chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead is intended to equip the dece
ased to face the final judgment and even appeal to the use of powerful magic in
his or her hour of greatest need. The fact that the deceased at least attempted
to use magic to overcome their shortcomings does not diminish the seriousness wi
th which they viewed their moral and ethical behavior, nor should one automatica
lly draw the conclusion that they were ready to use unethical means to reach the
ir desired goal. More probable is that they viewed life much the same as ourselv
es, knowing in their own hearts that their lives, no matter how well they attemp
ted to live, were not sin free.
During the New Kingdom, it becomes more obvious from text that mankind could not
perfectly live up to the standards they espoused. For example, in the Instructi
ons of Merikare, there is indirect evidence for abuse of office among the royal
officials who should uphold ma'at. This texts provides,
"Make great your officials, that they keep your laws; he whose house is rich is
not partial and a propertied man is one who does not lack. A poor man does not s
peak justly, one who says 'Would that I had!' is not upright. He is partial towa
rds him whom he likes, favoring him who rewards (bribes) him".
The fact that Egyptians in general and those officials specifically who were res
ponsible for maintaining ma'at were fallible is better attested from surviving l
etters and documents from the workers village at Deir el-Medina on the West Bank
at Thebes (modern Luxor). From these texts, we find evidence at the end of the
18th Dynasty of a breakdown in standards as well as the spread of corruption. In
fact, during the 19th Dynasty, one papyrus contains a long list of criminal cha
rges against a chief of workmen at Deir el-Medina who is accused, among other ch
arges, of having obtained his position by bribing the vizier. The latter vizier
who heard these charges apparently himself was guilty of wrongdoing, for he was
dismissed by the king. In a papyrus dating to the mid 20th Dynasty, large-scale
embezzlement and misconduct were evidenced against the personnel of the temple o
f Khnum at Elephantine, including one unnamed priest. None of this should surpri
se us. That people in general are not sinless, and that greed and corruption of
power have always existed is not new to us in our modern world.
However, there was a reason in the New Kingdom that traditional Egyptian ethics
and morality broke down. Ma'at came to no longer be the mediating principle betw
een god and humankind. Instead of a direct correlation existing between success
or failure and adherence to or transgression against ma'at, in the later New Kin
gdom we find that success or failure depended solely upon the will of god. Accor
ding to the Instructions of Amenompe:
"Indeed you do not know the plans of god....Man is clay and straw, the god is hi
s builder. He tears down, he builds up daily; he makes a thousand poor by his wi
ll, he makes a thousand men into chiefs".
Thus, mankind appears to be relieved of his responsibilities through predestinat
ion. However, this is not entirely true during the New Kingdom, for Amenompe goe
s on to allow that "Ma'at is a great gift of god, he hives it to whom he pleases
". Now, it seems that ma'at was still present, but subject to the will of the go
d.
The social breakdown that occurred during the New Kingdom was perhaps more due t
o a confusion that existed outside of the traditions. Wisdom literature and auto
biographies continue to espouse the same ethical standards as the earlier source
s and seem to be just as interested in social cohesion, but the results of actin
g against these principals were less clear. Now, success in life was no longer a
bsolutely and directly subject to ma'at, but to the will of god. Even in the aft
erlife, ma'at seems to have become secondary to the gods, which might explain wh
y the will of God seems to be elevated above that of ma'at. People were not perf
ect, and could not perfectly live up to ma'at. Hence, their fate rested in the h
ands their god in the afterlife. Amenomope says that, "Happy is he who reaches t
he hereafter when he is safe in the hand of god". He goes on to say that it is i
mperative that one be "safe in the hand of god (for) man is ever in his failure
(and) there is no perfection before the god".

Religion has become associated with having a focus on morality. But that wasn t al
ways the case, researchers say. Academics have long suspected that the modern wo
rld s major religions were born of major spiritual movements which emerged in Eura
sia about 2,500 years ago due to a population boom, and a subsequent need to cre
ate a moral order out of what could have been chaos in increasingly large commun
ities. However, a recent study challenges that theory, proposing that ancient af
fluence and rising standards of living spurred the rise of morality religions. I
s this a case of more money, more morals ?
Lead author of the study published in science journal Current Biology, Nicolas B
aumard, research scientist at cole Normale Suprieure in Paris believes that the ph
ilosophies of today s major religions Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and Chris
tianity originally arose because populations in the great civilizations in Eurasia
increasingly had access to energy, free time, and

The earlier moralist had little to say beyond caution against drunkenness and gl
uttony, but the latter, Ptah-Hotep (of the reign of Assa), had a much wider rang
e. Here are some of his maxims --
"Wisdom is more difficult to find than emeralds."
"Justice is great, unchangeable, and assured." (Compare the fain ma words of Ant
igone : "This is not of to-day and yesterday, but lives for ever.") "If thou hum
blest thyself in obeying a superior, thy conduct is wholly good before God."
"Do not repeat an extravagance of language; it is a thing which has escaped from
a heated soul." "A good son is one of the gifts of God."
The next document treated of is the "Papyrus of the Scribe Ani," otherwise calle
d "The Bulak Papyrus." Here there is some variety of opinion about the date, bot
h of the composition and of the actual copy which has come down to us. Egyptian
paheography is less definite than that which concerns the Greek and Roman codice
s. Conjectures as to the antiquity of the manuscript range between 1200 and 525*
B.C. The matter is certainly, in part at least, much older. Ethical aphorisms a
re handed down from generation to
generation without much change. Our own proverbs preserve words which are fallen
out of use, " harder than the nether
millstone" is an instance. The matter, however, is, according to Mr. Myer, later
than that of the Prisse Papyrus. The more frequent references to religious ritu
al prove, he thinks, so much. The older document is inspired by a lofty monothei
sm which did not concern itself with worship paid to this or that deity. Orthodo
x thinkers will find Mr. Myer, for once at least, on their side. A more con- vin
cing argument will be found in the evidences of a more developed social conditio
n. "If vices have increased, manners have softened and become more refined." Per
haps the most interesting utterance on the religious side of life is to be found
in the eleventh section, where we have, "Pray humbly, with a loving heart in wh
ich all the words are said in secret." A later section (56) deals with the posit
ion of women. Its precepts do not go much beyond good manners, though Mr. Myer t
hinks that "they advance the idea of an equality of the sexes," and that it is "
to the glory of ancient Egyptian wisdom that it has been the first to express th
e dignity and high position of the wife and the woman." It is quite true, as he
says, that "one of the greatest Sovereigns of Old Egypt was the Queen Hatshepsu.
" But her reign was something like a usurpation. By wearing male attire (a fact
which
Mr. Myer mentions without apparently recognising its sig. nificance) she seems t
o have acknowledged that her position was abnormal.
Part VI. is devoted to the "Papyrus of Sayings," attn. butable, Mr..Myer thinks,
to the time of the Hyksos, When, as the writer, who, according to this theory,
was one of the oppressed race, puts it, "barbarians take from everywhere us- law
ful gain; nothing remains from yesterday.". It contains many allusions to Egypti
an customs and social habits, but as a contribution to ethics it has little impo
rtance.
Mr. Myer thinks that many of the origins of Christianity may be found in Egypt,
and even speculates on the possibility of the Founder having visited that countr
y (otherwise than in His childhood). It does not trouble us to be confronted wit
h anticipations of Christian ethics. No reasonable being ever supposed that a br
and-new code of morals was introduced by the great teacher of Nazareth. The theo
ry really formidable to belief is that of ethical evolution. Even those who care
little for the historical side of Christianity hold that human virtue found its
consummate expression in a living Christ; without this they can hardly "profess
and call themselves Christians." Mr. Myer does not trouble us with all his eulo
gies on the moral teaching of the "Oldest Books in the World." We have gladly se
lected some of the most striking passages. But the selection is not easy. As a w
hore they are vastly inferior to the Old Testament, not to speak of the New Test
ament, ethics. Half a dozen chapters of the "Proverbs of Solomon" far more than
counterbalance the whole.
Nor does the Egyptian doctrine of immortality (discussed in VIII.-X1r.) show all
the greatness which Mr. Myer attri- butes to it. It was certainly not a Gospel
for the poor. It was, to use the phrase of Death in the Alcestis, TrpOc r7Js ivi
rrar, "in favour of the rich." The King or wealthy official who could build a sp
acious tomb for his Ka to inhabit, and could make it worth the while of future g
enerations to provide his surviving self with the necessaries of its ghostly lif
e curious mockeries of reality all of them might expect a continued existence, thoug
h always dependent on the goodwill of the living. But the peasant, however worth
y of immortality, was left outside these hopes. His body was smeared with bitume
n and laid in the sand or in a cave (where it would not be likely to remain undi
sturbed). A staff and an old pair of sandals were his sole equipment for eternit
y. The hopes of Christianity are at least equally valid for rich and poor. Apart
from the exaggerations into which Mr. Myer's theories have led him, this book w
ill be found to be one of considerable value.
The cultures of Mesopotamia had a polytheistic belief system, which means that t
he people believed in multiple gods instead of just one. They also believed in d
emons created by the gods, which could be good or evil. The people of Mesopotami
a worshiped these other worldly beings to keep the beings happy, because if one
of these powerful beings was angered then the people of Mesopotamia would, in so
me way, be punished for that unhappiness. They believed that when something bad
happened, whether a natural disaster or not, it was because the correlating god
was angry at them, so they did their best to keep the gods happy.
Each city had its own patron deity, some of which were connected to specialized
occupations. There were also gods and goddess, the rulers of the sky, air, and m
ore, which received more attention from worshipers. To worship the gods and godd
esses, the people of Mesopotamia built large structures, called Ziggurats that s
erved as temples. Inside the worshiping area of the Ziggurat people would place
carved stone human figures with wide eyes and clasped hands, praying on behalf o
f the people of Mesopotamia. This area was also where people could make offering
s to please the deities or regain their favor.

Nowadays the very concept of personal ethics has become problematic in one domai
n after another. Why shouldn t a businessman or banker pay himself the highest sal
ary he can get away with? Why shouldn t teenagers treat sex as a game so long as t
hey take proper precautions? Why shouldn t the media be sensationalist if it sells
papers, programmes and films? Why should we treat life as sacred if abortion an
d euthanasia are what people want? Even Bernard Williams came to call morality a
peculiar institution. Things that once made sense duty, obligation, self-restrain
t, the distinction between what we desire to do and what we ought to do to many
people now make no sense at all.
This does not mean that people are less ethical than they were, but it does mean
that we have adopted an entirely different ethical system from the one people u
sed to have. What we have today is not the religious ethic of Judaism and Christ
ianity but the civic ethic of the ancient Greeks. For the Greeks, the political
was all. What you did in your private life was up to you. Sexual life was the pu
rsuit of desire. Abortion and euthanasia were freely practised. The Greeks produ
ced much of the greatest art and architecture, philosophy and drama, the world h
as ever known. What they did not produce was a society capable of surviving.
The Athens of Socrates and Plato was glorious, but extraordinarily short-lived.
By now, by contrast, Christianity has survived for two millennia, Judaism for fo
ur. The Judeo-Christian ethic is not the only way of being moral; but it is the
only system that has endured. If we lose the Judeo-Christian ethic, we will lose
the greatest system ever devised for building a society on personal virtue and
covenantal responsibility, on righteousness and humility, forgiveness and love.

"Thy fault will be expelled. Thy guilt will be wiped out by the weighing of the
scales on the day of reckoning." This Biblical-sounding reference to Judgment Da
y is not what it seems to be a prediction by one of the gloomier Old Testament pr
ophets. It is, instead, one of 1,185 hieroglyphic "spells," or sayings, which ha
ve been found on coffins that date back to the Middle Kingdom (2200-1800 B.C.) o
f ancient Egypt. Known collectively as the Coffin Texts, the spells contain the
earliest known body of Egyptian teaching on ethics; what makes...