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[ittp:/fasmail harvard,edu/OWA/ae=Item2&t=IPM Notedi 1/29/2014 2:52 PM CHAPTER x | Of Commandement fin is to ask questions about the circ ulating human behaviour in a ments” (in other we tivit one cates ‘of governing) has recently fallen from pee exercising it, paving the way not for Uncertainty, and ne ht £24 situation of extreme matrial scarcity, Of Commandement a5 heritages, and traditions of which the features have become entangled over time, to the point where something has emerged that has the look cof “custom” without being reducible to it, and partakes of “modernity” without being wholly included in it. One part of this knowledge or ra- tionality is(Golonial rationality) which we must now quickly sketch. (tHe RIGHT TO DISPOSE Commandement, in a colony, rested on a very specific imaginary of state sovereignty. State sovereignty in a colony had, in principle, two main features. On the one hand, it combined weakness of, and inflation of, the no- tion of right: weakness of right in that, in the relations of power and au- thority, the colonial model was, in both theory and practice, the exact ‘opposite of the liberal model of debate and discussion; inflation of right in that, except when deployed in the form of arbitrariness and the right of conquest, the very concept of right often stood revealed as a void. ‘On the other hand, colonial sovereignty rested on three sorts of vio- lkence.! The first was the founding violence. This is what underpinned not only the right of conquest but all the prerogatives flowing from that right. /Thus it played an instituting role, in at least two ways. First, it helped to create the space over which it was exercised; one might say that it pre- supposed its own existence. Second, it regarded itself as the sole power to judge its laws—whence its one-sidedness, especially as, to adopt Hegel's formulation, its supreme right was (by its capacity to assume the act of destroying) simultaneously the supreme denial of right. A second sort of violence was produced before and after, or as part and parcel of, the conquest, and had to do with legitimation. Its function was, as Der- tida speaks of a somewhat different issue to provide self-interpreting lan- Buage and models for the colonial order, to give this order meaning, to justify its necessity and universalizing mission—in short, to help produce an imaginary capacity converting the founding violence into authoriz- ing authority. The third form of violence was designed to ensure this au- thority’s maintenance, spread, and permanence. Falling well short of what is properly called “war,” it recurred again and again in the most banal and ordinary situations. It then crystallized, through a gradual ac- ‘cumulation of numerous acts and rituals—in short, played so important role in everyday life that it ended up constituting the central cultural ‘maginary that the state shared with society and thus had an authenti- cating and reiterating function, 26 Of Commandement Colonial sovereignty only existed in areas where these thece forms of ‘iolence were deployed, forming a seamless web. This violence was of a very particular sor, immediately tangible, and it gave the natives a clear Totton of themselves in proportion to the power that they had los. Its listintive feature was to act as both author ‘o for eo reasons, First it eliminated all distintion between ends and Been deren ca circumstances, this sovereign violence was its own vital aba 28 “instructions for use,” Second, it introduced Perec righ nak mations between what was just and what uns a on atta notight Thus in egardto colonial sovereignty, ight Off thane conld one eas sized in the very act of occurring. In fee ae ly be “wrong” and infraction. Anything that did not ‘Teco 1ority, that contested its protocols, was sav- rity and morality; it could do this indiscriminate force and this power of dis- qualification iat cor hat commandement a sy ee scarcely raised questions of ss sen ‘ety instance that justified them. This is why the colo- Mey nits Projects into effect, did not rule out either the ex- Of Commandment 7 now use and alter, hinv/her at will. As such, he/she belonged to the sphere of objects. They could be destroyed, as one may kill an animal, curit up, cook it, and, if need be, eat it, Iris in this respect that, in the colony, the body of the colonized was, in its profanity, assimilated to all other things. For, being simply a “body-thing,” the colonized was neither the sub: stratum nor the affirmation of any spirit. As for his/her death, it mat- tered litte if this occured by suicide, resulted from murder, o was inflicted by powers it had no connection whatever with any work that he/she had performed for the universal. His or her corpse remained on the ground inunshakeable rigidity, a material mass and mere inertobject, consigned to the role of that which is there for nothing. ‘The second tradition may be called Bergsonian. It rested on the idea that one could, as with an animal, sympathize with the colonized, even “love” him or her; thus, one was sad when he/she died because he/she belonged, up to a point, to the familiar world/Affection for the colo- nized could also be externalized in gestures; the colonized would have to, in return, render the master or mistress the same affection the master/ mistress gave. But, beyond gesture, the master's/mistress’s affection for the animal presented itself as an inner force that should govern the ani- ‘mal. In the Bergsonian tradition of colonialism, familiarity and domes- tication thus became the dominant tropes of servitude. Through the rela tion of domestication, the master or mistress led the beast ro an experience such that, at the end of the day, the animal, while remaining what he/she was—that is, something other than a human being—nevertheless actu ally entered into the world for his/her master/mistress. This entry was, however, only possible after a process of grooming. The colonizer might inculcate habits in the colonized, treat him/her vio- lently if need be, speak to hinvher as.a child, reprimand or congratulate him/her. But, above all, the colonized, like the animal, was an object of experimentation in a game that the colonizer played with himselffher- self, conscious that between him/her and the colonized there hardly ex- isted a community of essence. “We do not live with them if t live means: to be in the manner of the animal. Nevertheless, we are with them. But this being-together is not existing together, as a dog does nor exist but only lives. This being together with the animals is such that we let these animals move about in our own world,” stressed Heidegger. To com- ‘mand an animal (the slave or the colonized) was to play the game of at~ ‘emprting to get himvher out of the encirclement while being fully aware That the circle was never thereby reduced, since grooming and domesti- {ation occured almost always in the animal's own distinctive drives. In a8 (Of Commandement other words, it was to play this game while conscious that, althou animal (the colonized} could belong vo the miler welds hove ree {hunges hist, copulation) could never truly accede tothe sphere of Human posi: Fo by reason of he sort of life the colonized lived, 1¢ belonged to those forms of living whose distinctive feature was to ae enclosed in the virtual and the contingent. wei age and the subject* of commandement com- Fe onc an Pai category, the native. Strictly peaking, the “na roca amintbeconnte andr dicusion. As such the term close Sache diene ats a "Sonor daughter ofthe oil” not some Soi eset tel of immigration or conguest In colonial eaenAiiia ary, a description was applied to colonial subjects in ives making up no more than what Albert Sarraut spoke iy of primitive multitudes” from which coloniza- “the face of anew humanity.” The regime known ‘of as that “unformed cla tion’s task was to shape as the indigénat was it tions, some of recent Biit whatever the forms body ofthe colonized\As sp She feature of doing something to the Trobe ae! parc St agent he/she wasn effect marked, fae labor, obliged to attend ceremonies, tract from hinvher the mash bring him/her to heel but also to ex- its relation oul : oan Possible use{ The colonial relation, in aida ands sina a insepa ble fr : specific forms of aie ala oe ee suse fo vity On this last point, ote ommandemen in the cole nil elation. One characteristic andthe privat the agen oo Charm ate the public at any moment, ‘surp the law and, in ‘nds. But what marked » exercise it for purely private smaller, were the source ofa root sto actions which, becoming ever Of Commandement » time—for example, in the colonial system of the ancien régime restored by Bonaparte,—the colonizers alone enjoyed what passed for civil and political liberties.“ Thus, in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana, the principles of equality before the law, freedoms, and property rights that emerged from the Revolution of 1789 were thwarted by the con- tinued existence of a slave mode of exploitation. By resorting to racial discrimination, punishments, torture, and cruelty, the planters exercised their rule over the slaves and conceived of right as the guarantee that the laws and naked force owed to their properties. Thus, until 1828, the pe- nal code and the civil and criminal-investigation codes recognized only two categories of humans: free and slaves.” This distinction was based on race. The free—that is, essentially, the whites—had rights to the labor of slaves (persons of color) and could raise income on the latter's person. They could hite out slaves to other free persons to work. This was common among smallholders, who would levy an annual charge on the slaves, resell chem as ee ‘or deprive them of any property earned or saved, thus enshrining general regime based on plunderyghat was only abolished in 1848. To dispose of people and things and create utilities, commandement thus proceeded by way of attribution and assignment; the value attached to persons, and their rights, depended on that classification, It was the same with the priva tions they could be compelled to endure, the sufferings and degradation inflicted on them, and the enjoyments to which they might pretend. But to clearly comprehend the particularity of this mode of exercis- ing power, itis necessary to stress four other of its main properties that are found, in various forms, in most postcolonial African societies. First, commandement was based on a régime d’exception—that is, a regime that departed from the common law. This departure from the Principle of a single law for all went hand in hand with the delegation of private rights to individuals and companies and the constitution by those individuals and companies of a form of sovereignty drawing some features from royal power itself.® For example, the bond between the king or queen (the grantor) and the company (the concessionaire) re- sembled the feudal bond between vassal and lord. The attribution of al- most royal rights and prerogatives to, and enjoyment of sovereign Priv: ileges by, companies of ordinary traders were part of a tradition dating back to the Middle Ages. It is well known that, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, the number of lords with the right to hold superior and inferior courts was continually increasing; many lords had the right toraise troops, levy taxes, and wage war. The social and political order, } 30 He j | composed of powerful cl | military orders, was bas Power to accept colonizers ownership of land, to use leges, and monopoli ionopolies—whether in tra | ‘Throughout the coloni ea ' socio-political arrangeme | conquered territories, OF Commandement losed corporations and influential religious and ed on the existence of differential rights, privi- rackets, honors, of titles. Period, there was a connection between these nts and the culture of power developed in the called, at the time, privileges. These and raise taxes, collect rents, mint make war and peace, make treaties, on their territory. As they sometimes had ful sell or rane lad fg MORE Ot es 25 they saw fg hey alone could Hoyed the privilege of hay Pole and the company’s Unlike an apana di Sons to compensate forthe luring the ancien régi benefit always enjos =e had the peculiar feature of being a it - me ie peculiar feature of being a sored acne liar feature of bein; lange for royalties and dues. Finally, they en ving the sole right to tr Tertonyie aM © ktade between the meto- #8¢—a portion of the ro} ir exclusion yal domain granted younger ty from the crown—a privilege, both lse’s expense. Favors were benefits lgent decisions by the Power for exams Mins OF aucen, Benefits could and exped of cor iti Wever expensive =m rg ilar ire tnlcoaeo ee Violence Gere aa peed in breach of ts privilege, re ‘work, and property of the olonies of d to bureaucrats. Even Fhe Martinique, Réunion, and Goa rywhere, except the three Pe, basic rights (political ise {political he whim of decree Pe Contracts, and obligations) “cn Dab tbs the press, credit intza “Settee Of Commandement 3 which meant, by the shifting will of a minister or secretary of state, de- partmental head, or some official owing appointment to patronage.!! The ideal of liberty and autonomy was thwarted by the impunity proconsuls enjoyed and the omnipotence of government agents. ‘The third characteristic of commandement was(the lack of distinction :veen ruling and civilizing)In sub-Saharan Africa colonization met the problems of order and of increasing the supply of goods in its own way. Here, the form of sovereignty that applied both to people and things and to the actual public domain constantly muddled the imperatives of moral: ity, economics, and polities. Colonial arbitrariness notoriously sought to integrate the political with the social and the ethical, while closely sub- cordinating all three to the requirements of production and output. Im- proving the lot of the colonized, and making equipment and goods (trade ‘or non-trade) available to them, was justified by the fact that they were to be enrolled into the structures of production. For a long time, the pre- ferred means of achieving that integration were, not freedom of contract, bur coercion and corruption;Gocial policies tried by successive adi {tations were heavily determined by normative and disciplinary ¢ and were, in fact, designed to alter the moral behavior of the. colonized.) This is what the language of the time gave the apparently distinct tually interchangeable labels of “taming” and “grooming.” To carry through the two tasks together (control of the indigenes along with theis— potentially disruptive—enrollment in the market mechanism), comman- dement introduced extensive surveillance machinery and an impressive array of punishments and fines for a host of offenses. This is the purpose behind the regulations governing forced labor, compulsory crop produc- tion, education, women, the family, marriage and sexuality, vagrancy, health and disease prevention, even prison policy. Within this design for subjection, the colonized had no rights against che state. He or she was bound to the power structure like a slave to a master, and paternalism ad on about expressing itself behind the ideological mask of penevolenes and the tawdry cloak of humanism. #4 ‘7 The(Socia) policies of postcolonial African regimes have also been con- ceived on the basis of an imaginary of the stare making it the organizer cf public happiness. As such, the state arrogated the possibility of exer- cising an unlimited hold over every individual—although in practice, \hether in colonial times or since, the outsize place ofthe stare was never total. Neither colonial commandement nor the postcolonial state was able to bring about the total dismantling, still less the disappearance, of every corporation and all lower-order legitimacies bringing people and com- 4, e” B's x6 oe %% me Of Commandentent munities together atthe local level. To facilitate trade and ensure the se- curity of their property, social actors continued to have recourse to those legitimacies and lower-order institutions that they kept reinventing, thus Providing these with new significations and new functions." Unlike cer- # tain Western experiences,|the extension of the xole-of the state and the | market was thus not automatically achieved through the disruption of 4%, old social tes. Ina number of cases,Gtate domination—or the étatisay (Gon oF society5-was achieved through the old hierarchies and old pa- ‘ronage networks. Two consequences of this process merit mention. On the one hand, it paved the way, more than occurred in other parts of the ‘world, to an unprecedented privatization of public prerogativesOn the other, it not only allowed a degree of socialization of state power gen ina te feel wo mates deve fo the impact ofthese imag nner oF governing the natives, the so-called “art of col onizing.”*" At the level of miki liea ease f theory, the colonial enterprise was, first, the and thing: In ake 03 nezesated but simply arrogated) over persons achieve en ee ONE sage, his involved not simply a right to laced eng needed commodities and in eam imposing mat “toemploy all means nenenaay rn binvolred above al height simply it achieve it."*//Thus, proceeding as if eae teation of utlites, for evample, would consist in PY Seizing, in the subjected area, the commodity or wild Product”—while ready ys for results, “ Tn this regard, such oo on 252 Fests, “to destroy what bears i.” nature,” allowing ecto athet resembles the supposed “state of ahaa BA de winter evi an oye oy sehatexerit pleases since alone is competent to 1adae ee thand since theres no abuse in what- In this sense, it exercises an absolute a 207 eventual sea nntual need berween the parties. Nor Bice dened bythe Set On the contrary, colonial ‘command must in Of its omnipotence; its right to Me rance on the "© case countenance any resist, Partof the native, since, in Hobbes’ This form: fall under our dene © the contrary, : its own, Of Commandement ~ 35 ing it to the level of a human beingy’ ‘That is what A. Sarraut called “the right of the stronger to aid the weaker.” Colonial conquest, he specified, ‘is not the right, but the fact of one who is stronger; the true right of the stronget.is the generous right that he assumes to help, assist ind protect the weaker, to be his guide and his guardian.”** Raising the native towhere he/she can contemplate the recovery of his/her rights requires moral edu- cationS eof whe wave chic oe ‘ise in the chances of vi- : cee urs is in th a a 1 course of public Setter thing the form fetes 2 fthes, popular potest sin- nie break owe Aree red urban riots.” Fy = mde cua s.”” From time to time, oes Pay gic points in the capi- ne leas before, feng Wit Possible, they seize the Tren on =: sae ote propery, Someta emY shop 0d the implosion taking :down feeds on a cul- ao Mae they are joined by gangs fedora at Sree ite mt ati no MOEA ceonomic Dn stisiteats pecs Bee longs to whoni, TR Of Commandement st ss who must be excluded and why. The ‘or who has a right to what, stil es gic of fio immediate consequences of institutional violence and the log ing are to prevent any effective consolidation of so-called civil society while rendering the state totally impotent. Conversely, in states(¢here the predatory rage chafacteristic of the first oe been more or less contained, i is the la G utilities that partially underpinned the legitimacy of postcolonial government ancl also made the relations of inequality and coercion morally Tolerable. his does not mean that inequalities and abuses were passively accepfed, or that faced with state arbitrariness the .on.7 Given the forms taken by eco- nomic relations and the circulation of commodities and means. of liveli- hood, and given also the way economic relations were articulated in the system of social stratification, political struggles would, at times, take onhighly original forms—flight, evasion, dissimulation, subrerfuge, deri- sion, a whole range of forms of indiscipline and disobedience—and be ex- prested in dynamic metaphors such as kinship, genealogy, witchcraft, heal ing, of religiously inspired dissidence. It would be wrong to confuse these social movements with other forms of struggle characteristic of situations where market logics have substantially penetrated social relations.” What can be said is that, in the countries in Africa that were, until recently,/* reputed the “most stable” and the most “prosperous” (Cameroon, coe d'Ivoire, Kenya, Gabon, Zimbabwe), a “compromise” guaranteeing the) ‘welfare of the middle classes and administrative lites had made it pos sible to ensure the viability of the postcolonial state and provide it with, authentically indigenous roots. v “Thanks to this compromise, large sums could be exacted from agricul tural surpluses and oil and mining rents. Coupled with coercion and a some times brutal administration of violence, these public transfers made it pos, sible to buy loyalty and corner allegiance, although at high overall economic cost. The blurring between the strict spheres and the political and administrative ones, Hie SS° = tinction between public ‘and private property and # “Wwfeen private economic agents (national and foreign) and local incumbents “Gt positions of power and authority, made possible ite generalization of “in economy of alosatign of which indigenes were not he ole Beneficiaries. Fee Peds, subsdising of inputs, widespread use of bank overdraft, state approval for foreign loans, debt cancellation, preferential access to stare contacts, and dealing in wory, precious tones, and toxic wade alto constituted a source of profit for foreign businessmen and teaffick- only conduct possible was resignat Bs Of Commandement ers who, on several heads, it ieads, supplemented the rents. Generally, such a po- lial economy paid lite heed to the requirementd af pode So eee led to an accelerated clientelization of élites and in- faluited thee en re erties the salary-earners it also aeaeae rer the level of local exploitat labor the productivity o er etvty of Alcan economies and thee in any decisive way, competitiveness on Airrosion The new facts of international maximize advantage ar oe co Pettion (de lcaliztion, the questo ibor «: a Sessile: ‘costs, growth of industries in free-trade ipelioeal seats strategies, globalization of markets, volat ‘markets, have Hest deregulation in the 1980s of foreign exchange the woridcomese le hese economies to reposition themselves within the word ceonoy aden nina the forms of cheiintepration into and lea apical an he SPE forms of intervention of foreign firms route taken by @ menehe 02 NAY this repositioning could pursue the lumber of countries in Southeast Asia—namely, te- Structuring and reorienti ‘i ting industry ine: al lfng sevice etivites, masteingnew dike nee acces £0 new winning new: te a financial lows, and internationalzing ma 2 tation the marker, the mda , the general configa- tween the bureaucracy and local ees the structure of relations be ble to find in them t capital. Thus whether = ett ‘effective and that it was hardly possi- ts combinations sought by international earn from de-localization, i Hate goods industries, by al- tena oes ot ict8 for export, or by spe reat theme 238th sich comes ave bee Y and profitably into the new iversare nal de Of Commandement 3 vision of labor. In such circumstances, it is understandable that the new, wave of the internationalization of capital should all but ignore them, especially as the end of the Cold War, the opening of markets in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, and the persistence of tyranny and disorder in Africa are accentuating the downgrading of the conti- nent both economically and at the level of ideas and symbols. To this in- ability to turn international factors to the continent's advantage must be added the extraordinary constraint of the compression, worldwide, of finance time” and its reduction to purely computer time. This change is closely connected to the development of new communication and pay- ment technologies. But the gap between this computer time of financial operations worldwide and the historic time of real economic adjustments has grown wider and wider. Helped by the structural inertia of African ‘economies, the bias toward speculative activities (one feature of global- ization) has occurred here as elsewhere, at the expense of productive activities. One side-effect of this gap between several regimes of tempo~ rality and production is the shift of whole ‘swathes of African economies underground. 4 SInaddition, there are the constraints from the implementation of struc- © tural adjustment programs27These take several forms; let us first consider the strictly economic effects. Naturally, one must take account of the va- riety of cases and bear in mind the different ways countries have applied the programs, the stop-and-go processes involved in implementation, the ‘ways that measures recommended by international creditors have ben distorted, earranged, o highiacked by local bureaucracies, the produc: tive structures of the countries implementing the programs, jand the coali- tions supporting or rejecting them.** Nevertheless, whatever the varia: tions, results remain, in strictly economic terms far from conclusive, Eye in contexts where these programs have been implemented in a relatively sustained and determined manner, export growth has proved ee to cover debe repayments; this isthe case despite the scale of evaluations” Overall, the freeing of prices has not brought about the recovery ex pected. Deficit reduction has been achieved atthe price of a marked diminution of public investment and, in some cases, of day by day &s- penditure, Often, the burden of domestic debt has persisted, while the Aecline in state expenditure on wages, and the acceleration of Price ses have had a depressing effect on consumer expenditure and aval ity ‘vestment. In most African countries where these are in effect, the gross domestic product has fallen sharply. And, although pressart has increased, the fiscal crisis has deepened, even as the level of net cap- 34 Of Commandement ital transfers overseas on the head of del me be servicing has remained con- pe The shift of whole swathes of the economy into deri economy bas continued at an unprecedented rat the in eel transactions and deals (including some privatization) ba ne = ‘ramifications even into international dealings. and political effects are even more serious. We have seen how, in the postcoloni Postcolonial African sate eh passed for citizenship did not confer political rig Ire ight3}—the right to Individual representation, socal hts, the aes : oy Between the state and the individual were the the kin, and perhaps the religious brotherhood. Should an individual find hit peas — Bee ce tesine, without resource, even sur- wee 88 not up to the state to ensure basi r isan ns Se that. Should shee be agi ph ete hhad no right against the state, with which, she/he had no direct relationship. We have seen how private appropriation of mn Of public resources sometimes took on the features of an integrating mect Tor the sole mathe utilities taken o ele Benclr of oat ver rarely being consumed teal) esarceaie ar individual (although ialet icc ee nial Afican regimes had aes SBiaBe®. AS We have seen, t00, postcolo of the urban population tee integrate and discipline the bulk when exanined closely al rough the mechanism of the salary—a gift, 4 form of domination Rerienat a the purposes of ins are sation having tsown rationality, the undergroun, ‘ican economies. On the other, there ae i appearance of previously vo » forms it would be wrong to meee teties ards democracy; the disintegration of state Seanis ;Pesition of political pow { ‘ era comes of eu eet ind he NOY charaeriting Ae ee an essen genes in the nineteenth flicts. far and armed violence a8. » the difference from the Western st, the conflict over work, pro- ‘was not only an economic Of Commandement 5s arket society. Three factors enabled that shift to be accomplished. First, the conflict over work, production, and the appropriation of profit paved the way for the institutionalization of so- cial divisions—that is, for the legitimacy of transforming these into sub- jects of political and ideological debate. Second, this conflict constituted, initself, a powerful vector of mass socialization and integration. Finally, s0 far as the capitalist mode of accumulation allowed, the conflict con- tributed to the Keynesian regulation of the economy by imposing a shar~ ing of benefits favorable to mass consumption and the introduction of a compromise form of state, the welfare state. ‘only possible because, despite the violence inthe formation of involving the shift to am: Such transformations were of labor struggles—themselves integrative and useful i collective identities —wage-carners and employers shared what might be called a common material imaginary, production itself being perceived ial good:)Thanks to the ‘mechanisms that consisted in nsticuionalizing the antagonisms on the basis of a representation of “Interests, co the full exercise ofthe suffrage, and to the downgrading of “force as the sole remedy 0 social problems, the conflicts within society ‘were cooled. In this way, revolutions in the name of ending poverty were kept at bay. But the African situation belongs in a quite different e2- jectory. Withoue their being the sole cause, the deregulation policies in= troduced in the 1980s opened the way for a deepening of mass Poverty. Ita neorliberal way out ofthe crisis basso far—led to any renewal of growth, itis growth with unemployment.” The deepening of poverty Sssociaced wth several factors, one ofthe most important being lack of job secuity.*¥ Over the las fifteen years, the labor market allover Africa, has become ighly stratified. Regular, protected wage employment has not orally diseppeared, but the proportion of individuals in such jobs has been falling consistenty, o the point where it ite reasonable 69 hypothesize an end t¢ ployed African labor force as the new century opens, Casual work is becoming the rule for whole sect of EE pOSLnioe, the monthly pay packet has been eplaced by one-off pay” iments, Open and disguised unemployment, jobessness thar is 1ons- Trem anu co nar associated withthe business cyele—-stking 8 FO vided lack of security has taken root ing number of households. A many ced fnacriviy sudden loss of social standing for dismissed worker workers taken back on low wages as temporary contracs pose wars aida jobs, exacerboned conmpexion oan soformal labor Sa Ket eared ths chowsand psy acts im tes of CotomEr 0 are juno broke andoflen poor payee wags of aso and fe Of Commandement Pith eboyment, dropping out of school, daily struggle to earn money to get through from one day to the next, pay the ren, buy medicines, pay scho jane oH esinarmesaization and hardening ofso- use oftheir dis aeabeeaes dim ive treatment of the international determinants Snderiag att tee-ibeal all-out deregulation policies are tus Colonial poe angements tha had, in practice, enabled the post | namic copra i sme counties, o reach more o es dy | ana ee indigenous systems of coercion, and to long-term dynamins on snbot dination This is added undermining othe demographic make geal a work in African societies: the shiftin the tio: the dened” ural ateas and the intensification of migra | the sharp fallin act the environment and the crisis of nomads ants drawn from plantation crops; the entropy of Of the ueban ol nd and #edefinng village powers; the emergence accentuaton of he phat cle of rioting and racketeering: the intense hunt for land ee s88iated with land shortage, andthe ‘some parts the continent; the diminishing num- tor; the impoverishment of wage- : : uring and exploiting labor; the enntiea ts} snovements and the use of prisoners of war as met- owt a mi Faaionoftade The analzation of the raling classes and the lita e evele erase Policies directly affect postcolonial African i'now, and the imaginaries that sus- -othes.the way in which these regimes have secured -community trans distribution of wealth and call- ¢ by the recrudescence of and parts of ew audience on the Atlantic coast, ve TENE Aa for pentecostal religious nee The lta9t Islam along the fringes of the Ocsan, the proliferation of therapeutic and heal- Of Commandement 7 ing techniques, the emergence of new languages in which to make claims ‘on people and wealth, and the rise of rural banditry and urban erime.”* ‘At the same time, the collapse of export revenues and the restructur- ing of cash-crop marketing boards has extended bankruptcy to planters, industrialists, and bankers, bringing to a halt, on the way, the many ac- s that lived on public contracts and used the proceeds to fuel the parallel economy.’ Itis thus the very backbone of these modes of dom- ination that is affected, since the system.of. means of livelihood and re- wards on which the regimes’ legitimacy partly rested is undermined and, in most cases, no longer has ways to reproduce itself, But, contrary t0 the expectations of international creditors, the drying-up of means of livelihood under the onslaught of structural adjustment threatens o lead, not only to the prolonged withering away of the state, bur also to an ex- traordinary fragmentation of the market—the two processes being dis- proportionately conducive an-uncontrolled upsurge of violence,yThis makes the structural adjustment programs important, not from the an- tle of their capacity to re-link Africa to the world market, but from the angle of the political and cultural effects they are producing and of how those effects are undermining fhe postcolonial compromisejemasculat- ing the traditional instruments of state power, and Bringing about a pro- found modification of social structures and cultural imaginations. [As the twenty-first century begins, Africa is faced with the option of launching itself into this new century, victoriously taking up the chal- lenge of productivity—that is, turning to its advantage the conditions of its relationship to the world economy.’ Certainly, the conflict with the world market will not be settled to Africa’s advantage if negotiated, still, in the framework of structural adjustment programs; for the most part, these programs simply offer a return to the 1960s, when the struc ture of African economies made them, above all, net exporters of trop- iggl produce. ‘With or without international creditors, Africa must face wp to the challenge of the competitiveness ofits economies on the world level. This challenge cannot be victoriously met in the current world economy with ‘out an increase in productivity—that is, in the last analysis, without pur~ sing inequality and organizing so- colonial period, the ting in place effective ways of construct cial exclusion, But, as was clearly seen during the c relations between violence, production of inequality, and accumulation are extraordinarily complex. And there are no necessary causal links ‘among these three variables. As for the shift ro democracy, this will de- pend on how the debare on whether socal exclusion is legitimate is his- 38 OF Commandement toric quai (andiin favor of which social forces); otherwise, how will inca aca Centualy be legitimated and codified institutional? It redisibangg nae blesty of such a project especially in contexts where pee alesis omstiuted the supreme social and political me- ete » more than ever, the problems of poverty are re-ignitn socal struggles on a broader scale than inthe past NOTES 1. Téraw here on mail comments by J. Derrida dealing w MiForet dell ais Gale, roqy Oso en er 2 See, for examy ee Pl, the image of “Bula Matari” in B, Jewsiewicki and C. st: History 8 Tragedy,” in B Jews = (Q ions du Septentrion, 1992), 117-38. : Ploring this aspect was suggested by Wambui Mwwangi. In meee was strongly influenced by articles on the journal Alter 5 (1 Sst she Cane sana tee ofc Rs 4 Tse the word subjer eee” en dominaregy Tt, *HDIE” here inthe sense of someone subjected to sover- 5. On this see R, Buel apply, above all, to bureaucrat Sapo the apn Agric ete sk Fr her Kanha 1987) 45-76 1 is nds ise oneries d'Afrique nie Pas writers have called the similar vein, see R.A. Joseph, Democr cianon ate pesos ce) “tenia Examples ofthe practices (0 amin and Y. A. Fauréy Lt Of Commandement S. Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in ‘Sub-Sabaran Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993); J 1 Guyer, “Household and Community in African Studies,” African Studies Review 24, 23 (198th 87-157 ‘6. On this ast point, se the analysis by J. M. Gasella, Riches pysans de Cote d'voie (Pans L'Hlarmattan, 1985), 121~37. More generally, see anthro- pologial works on kinship and the economy: M. Ales eal, Age, pout et Societé en Afrique noire Pacis: Karthala,r98s): Sabi, Le pouwot des ignaees en Afrique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1986); C. Vidal, Sociologie des passions (Patis: Karthala, 1991), 87-98 and 161-78. ‘ $7. A. Mark, "a pas F'argent: 'endeté insolvabl et le créancier lous deux figures complémentaires de la pauvreté abidjanaise,” Revue Tiers Monde 36.142 (1995): 305-306 68. M. Le Pape, L’énergie sociale & Abidjan: Economie politique de la ville on Afrique noire, 1930-1995 (Pars: Karthal, 1997). G9. R. Bate, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Bass of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 7. For examples, se Je. Fletcher, “The Political Uses of Agriclrral Mar kets in Zambia,” Journal of Modern African Studies 24, 4 (1986): 603-18, oF N. Casswell, “Autopsie de PONCAD: La politique arachididgere au Sénégal, 1966-1980" Politique afrcaine 14 (1984) 1. Information on these developments will be found in . A. Fauré and. E Médard, eds,, Etat et Bourgeoisie en Céte d'ivoire (Paris: Karthala, 1982) and P. Geschiere and P. Konings, eds., Proceedings of the Conference on the Politi: cal Economy of Cameroons Historical Perspectives (Leiden: Afrika Studiece- team, 1989). 72. Maca, Enteprenes ar artes he Sree fox Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Oa. C. Newbury, “Dead and Buried? Or Just Underground? The Privatza- tion of the State in Zaire,” Canadian Journal of African Studies x8, 1 (1984). "74. See “Les massacres de Katekelayi et de Luamuela,” Politique africaine 6 (1982): 72-106. } 4 75. D. Rodriguea-Tocres, “Entre informe! et illegal Survivre & Nairobi, Poli tiqu arcane 70 (1998) $4-60- 76. Cl. JL. Grootaets ed, “Mort et mal 30-32 (1998). 77. Sec R, Bazenguisa-Canga, “Milces politiques er ances armées A Braz zaville,” Les Etudes du CERI 13 (1996)- bolic 78 Sethe cole work by J Bayar A. Mbembs sad. Toulabor: Le politique parle bas en Afrique noire (Paris: Karthals, 1992). ig, 79. See the comments in D, Desjeux, ad 987). Esso sur la gestion de Vincettude (Pais UHatmaan, ey ‘80. P. Swedberg, “The Export cee aa Africa, nomi Devslopmnctt and Char Change 3953 0990 APES a tee devlopments, sce P Hirt and Zein, “Flexible Special adie au Zaire,” Cahiers africans a Of Commandement ‘ton versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications," Economy $id Society a0, x (r99x): 1-56, See also G. R. D, Underhil, “Markets beyond jolts The State andthe Inernationalization of Financial Markets,” Europes Journal of Political Research 19(1991): 197-225. Be (ce, Amsden, “Third World Industralization: “Global Fords’ or a New Model," New Left Review 182 (1990): -31 £3: See for example, J. Chalmers, “Political Institutions and Economic Per ‘pamanees The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Ganat7 it F Dero, The Pottical Economy of the Neto Asian industrials (lthaca; Cornell University Press, 1989), i ged: W- Thomas and M. S. Grindle, “After the Decision: Implementing 20lo’ Relorms in Developing Countries" World Development 18, 829908 4163-81, and J. Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and. Policy Choice: The Politics of Aditstment in he Third World (Princeton: Prineton Univeroty Pros, 199°) ld, ed, Ghanas The Political 86. See, among others, the works of J.D Fayard, 1984); A. O. Hirschman, (Parise Fayard, 1991); P. Rosanvallor onzelot, invention du social (Paris: Jeuce Siecles de rhétorique réactionnaire mn, Le sacre du citoyen (Paris: Gallimard, ustment in Céte dlwoire, Working Document 20 Terese ee Basser 6G tpch eee Domoaoes, ron; Cornell University Food and fam, Working Paper no, 16, 1991; E. 0. Boateng etal A Poverty Profile for Ghana, 1987-88. Social es Dimensions of Adjustment i 1990. + Working Paper no. s, World Bank, Washington, D.C, 58. Secthe saharnte: B Lachaud, ed, Pawresé et marché du tava urbin Aru abscharome:Anegeneoetn et in for Labour Stdien ropa) Ps OmPaative (Geneva: International Instat $e A Mace "Ys pa araee”so4-J05, " Faas $2 for example, Faussey-Domalainand en 6 demographic dacs le ae te the pase iligu forestier érivurbain,” Tiers Monde 32, sie papers in “Exams esocins nomadone special issue of Africa Hanover, NFL: Gage 7s dy Land and Soctetyin Comveriponery ‘al, “International Feet ey 2 ress of New England, 1988); A. R. Zolberg aes reap onthe Formation of Refugee Movements,” Inter mation Review 20,1 9865 spe Jarret and FR. Mahiew, Soca, Partition: L’exemple dela Cote d'ivoire,” 39-62, fast seal gt laan and W.T. M. van Haaren, “African ews aetna plisiment: The Experience of Sub-Saharan a ee Neem cs kean sae .— 65 Of Commandement uel sur ici *Limpac des poiiques dajstement struct ‘itn rl tng” ener Mond 12 9908 35-1 Egak Oe te cra lexity. of such a lea ), see the experience considerec Le nde he's Nest Gant: South Koes nd ate nro (Oviord ad New York: Oxford University Press, 1589).

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