EXAMINING COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION AMONGST

AFFECTED SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES:

A CASE STUDY ON THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA

Senior Lieutenant-Colonel (SLTC) Lim Lit Lam is from the Singapore Armed
Forces (SAF) and attended the MPAT Serial Number 36/2016. He holds a Bachelor of
Science in Government and Economics, and a Master of Science in Development
Studies, both from London School of Economics and Political Science.

ABSTRACT
This paper examined the reasons why counter-terrorism cooperation amongst
Southeast Asian states had remained at low levels, despite the region experiencing an
increase of exploitation of transnational weaknesses by terrorist groups. This was
studied against the espoused vision of ASEAN to be a Political-Security Community by
2025. The study was done through a qualitative analysis of relevant incidents and
supported by documents within the context of inter-state cooperation. The extent of the
research was done through interviews with selected experts in the field of
international relations and terrorism. The study traced counter-terrorism cooperation
between the Philippines and Malaysia in recent times, anchored on their internal and
external factors. The external factors are comprised of factors pertaining to the
dynamics of international relations covering security dilemma, ethnoreligious
sensitivities, and ASEAN. The internal factors are focused on the idea of national
approaches, such as how the states are defined and approached the problem and how
domestic considerations helped to shape the decisions on counter-terrorism
cooperation with other states. The insights were are drawn from the policy-makers
and interested parties on the limits of cooperation. They were also based on how it
complements what was available at the regional level with state-centric policies to
counter the growing security threats. The study concluded that while international
relations dynamics between the two states which revolved around the longstanding
territorial dispute and ethnoreligious complexities, had created difficulties in
identifying the common grounds for cooperation. This is because it was primarily
focusing on framing the security problem and solutions, shaped by domestic factors,
that has had a predominant effect on shaping the nature of counter-terrorism
cooperation that existed. The study further concluded that similar conditions were
present in different forms in Southeast Asia. This would result in a continued state of
affairs, particularly as states had assigned more value to state-centric approaches,
and this was complemented with national and specific efforts to find common ground
to cooperate with other states. Given this situation, Southeast Asia would continue to
remain weak in countering transnational terrorism, and states might face more terror
attacks in the near future.

INTRODUCTION
In recent times, Southeast Asia had experienced a number of terrorist attacks,
specifically in Indonesia (2002, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2016), Thailand (2006, 2015),
Malaysia (2016) and the Philippines (2016). These attacks were claimed by
transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda, and more recently by the DAESH (also known
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). For the DAESH, known affiliates to
them included local groups within Southeast Asia such as the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) based in the Philippines, and
Mujahideen Indonesia Timor and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) based in Indonesia. In the
Philippines, Al-Qaeda and the DAESH were previously known to have connections
with militant groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). For JI, it was also known to have established
terror cells in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In recent times,
direct franchises of the DAESH appeared to have penetrated Southeast Asian society,
with the Puchong incident (2016) in Malaysia allegedly executed by local Malaysian
militants directly in touch with their DAESH counterparts1.

This threat had been looming for a while, in the form of an extremist vision
perpetuated by these terrorist groups, with the aim of militarily creating an Islamic
Caliphate in Southeast Asia. Some common features of these terror groups were
identified: (1) a close relationship with terror organisations in the Middle East,
especially for training and support; (2) the growth in scope and scale in some
Southeast Asian countries because of chronic poverty, inadequate education,
perceived injustice and the Muslim demographic in these countries which provided
fertile recruitment grounds for anti-government activities; (3) perpetrators and leaders
of these movements exploiting the porous international boundaries of Southeast Asia

1
Ramechandran, C., 2016, Puchong Bomb Attack directly related to local IS Militants: IGP,
the Sun Daily (4 Jul 2016).
nations to evade from being captured, and planning for their activities2; (4) a rapidly
evolving mode of operations, with radicalisation through propagandas on new media
platforms, and lone wolf attacks are practiced to achieve terror goals; and (5) an
expected buildup of fighters returning from the Middle East, over time, to continue the
DAESHs intentions in this region.

These features called for a strong cooperation on counter-terrorism amongst

the states to complement their domestic measures. This is also to prevent the festering
of terrorism planning and operations. Examples of such cooperation may include the
joint operations to target known terrorist strongholds or training bases in South
Philippines and Indonesia. What had been observed in Southeast Asia however, was a
bleak picture that did not correlate to the need. Even as the conditions in the second
front3 in the Global War on Terror were ripe for transnational terrorism to be
exploited, the regional initiatives and inter-state cooperation are still undeveloped.
While it was acknowledged that there had been gradual increase of emphasis in
intelligence sharing, in joint-patrols of shared borders and in dealing with
transnational crime (such as illegal movement of weapons), one observed that the
realm of cooperation had not been sufficiently substantial in dealing with this growing
threat that had operated with growing efficiency in the region, as evident in the many
recent attacks.

In contrast, measures taken by the Southeast Asian states had been far more
concrete: the Malaysian Government introduced two new anti-terror bills (the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign
Countries Act) in 2015 and established the National Special Operations Force in Oct
20164. This is followed through by the Indonesian Government, as they established
the Detachment 88 (a counter-terrorism squad) as part of the Indonesian National
Police. Many other examples in Singapore and Thailand could be made to this end.
The reality appeared to be that apart from the cursory cooperation amongst Southeast
Asian states, as counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia had been largely state-
led and confined to within national boundaries.

The question to address was thus: why had counter-terrorism cooperation

amongst affected Southeast Asian states are not comprehensive, despite the need to
operate transnationally to deal with an evolving and continually effective terrorism
threat exploiting transnational weaknesses? The answers may shed light on the

2
Until his arrest, Hambali had been actively using safe-houses in Cambodia and Thailand
to remain elusive. The presence of a sizeable group of sympathisers to radical Islam in Indonesia had
also made arrest and conviction of Jemaah Islamiyah members extremely challenging in the last
decade.
3
Declared by then-US President George Bush after 11 Sep 2001, referring more specifically
to the Philippines then and thereafter applied to wider Southeast Asia.
4
Malaysia Launches Special Ops Force to Counter Terror Threats, 2016, AsiaOne (27 Oct
2016).
geopolitical realities of the region. A more immediate aim of this study was to inform
the policy-makers on the existing limits to and prospects for greater cooperation on
counter-terrorism, in line with the ASEAN Vision to be a Political-Security
Community by 2025.

FINDINGS
The study looked at two broad domains of factors: (1) dynamics of international
relations; and (2) national approaches. The study used the case study of the
Philippines and Malaysia to appreciate the weight of these factors in shaping the
present outcome of low levels of tangible counter-terrorism cooperation between the
states in Southeast Asia.

Based on State-on-State Interactions

When looking at the dynamics of international relations, this study considered if there
was an existing security dilemma between the states, which may have led to arms-
length dealings in order to deny an adversarial state an understanding of security
capabilities or operational systems that may be used against such state. The finding
was that even though the territorial dispute over Sabah persisted over decades, both
the Philippines and Malaysia did not appear to be targeting each other in terms of
military build-up, but were instead more distracted by other issues. For the
Philippines, this was in the form of the ongoing fight in the Southern Philippines
against secessionist movements (including the communists). For Malaysia, the
transformation and reorganisation of its military were more toward enabling the
Malaysian Armed Forces to become a full spectrum force and away from the narrow
counter-insurgency form that it had in the 1960s to 1980s.

However, this did not preclude the existence of contextual distrust between the
two states. The study found that the ethnoreligious mix of Southern Philippines
approximates toward that of Malaysia and created particular sensitivities for greater
Malaysian participation in the alleged transnational terrorism-friendly regions in
South Philippines. This idea had been alluded to by scholars like Ramakrishna and
Tan (2003) in their works, as to how the management of different and delicate Muslim
components within the societies and politics of many Southeast Asian states have had
an impact on the pace and type of cooperation5.

This had been worsened by historical episodes of Operation Merdeka, a

clandestine plan conceived by the administration of then-Filipino President Marcos to
destabilise Sabah with a group of Muslim commandos in order to create the conditions

5
Ramakrishna, K., and Tan, S.S. (eds.), 2003, After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in
Southeast Asia.
for the Philippines to claim Sabah as its own6. This led to what was known as the
Jabidah Massacre7 when the commandos refused to obey orders after discovering the
plan and were allegedly killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Eventually, the ensuing anger in the Filipino Muslim community based largely in
South Philippines manifested in the formation of a secessionist political organisation
called the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968, which had an agenda to
create an independent Muslim state comprising Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions8.
The MIM led to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the militant group
which started the separatist fight against the AFP in South Philippines, enduring even
till the present day. Operation Merdeka drew a response from the Malaysian
authorities: in 2001, a statement by then-Prime Minister Mahathir admitted that
Malaysia had previously provided support to MNLF insurgents in Mindanao, but
qualified that it had already ceased to do so (by 2001)9. This exchange would likely
be a source of distrust between the two states in dealing with specific territorial space
South Philippines and also Sabah.

The third factor in the domain of the international relation, aside from security
dilemma and ethnoreligious sensitivities, was ASEAN. ASEAN had been the driver
for greater inter-state cooperation within the region, especially in purporting the
aspiration of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) by 2025. Regarding
non-traditional security issues such as transnational terrorism, the APSC framework
had identified a few thrusts of which two relevant ones would be highlighted, namely
(1) strengthening cooperation in addressing (non-traditional) security issues,
particularly in combating transnational crimes and other transboundary challenges;
and (2) intensifying counter-terrorism efforts by early ratification and full
implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism.

In taking a holistic look at ASEANs initiatives, three observations were made.

First, these had a policing and legal slant toward transnational terrorism and had
distilled terrorism activities into criminal ones, as a way of seeking to address them in
a tangible manner. This also suggested the continued strong influence of the principles
of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. Second, transnational terrorism was
not elevated position above other transnational crimes despite being the impetus for
increased security cooperation (via the ASEAN Concord II), in the backdrop of the
Bali bombings in 2002. Third, the approach adopted by ASEAN as a regional body
had focused on rehabilitation and reform, as well as addressing conditions such as

6
Marcos Order: Destablize, take Sabah, 2000, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2 Apr 2000).
7
Noble, L. G., 1976, The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Pacific Affairs,
405 424.
8
Gowing, P. G., 1979, Muslim Filipinos - Heritage and Horizon. 190192.
9
The context was the arrest of MNLF leader Misuari in Sabah in 2001. Malaysia had
decided to hand him over to the Philippines. Then-Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad said that
although his country had provided support to (MNLF) in the past in its bid for autonomy, Mr Misuari
had not used his powers correctly. Therefore, we no longer feel responsible to provide him with any
assistance. From: Philippines Rebel Leader Arrested, 2001, BBC News (25 Nov 2001).
economic and educational development, rather than tackling the urgent issues like
terrorism training. Together, these three points suggested that ASEANs influence on
counter-terrorism cooperation between the Philippines and Malaysia would not be to
foster the much needed joint operations, but to tackle the crimes at the borders and
develop the legal and policing frameworks. This was assessed to have continued along
the tracks of intelligence sharing and joint border patrols, but had moved less toward
taking decisive actions to weed out terror bases, such as those in the Philippines.

Based on National Approaches

Little had been written in academic literature to define the concept of a national
approach. This paper attempted to provide an operational definition for the purpose
of the study. The concept of national approach looked inwardly at the political
climate, culture, perceptions and processes of the states and at how these acted to
determine the solutions (on counter-terrorism) that had been eventually adopted. This
includes: (1) the definition of the terrorist issue, (2) domestic political
pressures/dynamics (which were not entirely divorced from geostrategic realities); and
even (3) historical experiences.
When looking at the Philippines, this study found that the Philippines
government had at different times regarded the various militant groups (MNLF, Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group(ASG)) as terror
organisations. Hence, its definition of terrorism and the alignment with what had
been understood (as a transnational terrorist affiliated to the DAESH) became unclear.
The nature of terrorism in the Philippines, based on the historical starting point of
Jabidah Massacre in the 1960s, contained a mix of the transnational and local essence,
with the goal of an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia mixed with the desire for
autonomy or independence among a demographic minority. With such ambiguity, it
became clearer how the transnational nature of the terror activities had often been
accentuated by the government, where relevant, in order to gain international support
for its military operations against secessionist movements. It had also been noted that
the Philippines, riding on the momentum of the September 11 attacks on the United
States, had adopted a military approach to dealing with the terrorist problem in its
South. This had brought with it support from external states and international
organisations such as Japan, US, and the European Union which had been
employed to strengthen the states security apparatus. This would partly explain why
cooperation, especially by Southeast Asian states, might have been problematic.
For Malaysia, the terror organisations believed to be active in Malaysia were
more conventional in nature in that these were primarily driven by ideology and had
adopted terror methods (such as bomb attacks) based on the larger politico-religious
ideologies espoused by Al-Qaeda and DAESH. The Malaysian governments response
to terrorism had been shaped by its history. Compared with the Philippines hard-line
military stance, there had been greater emphasis on winning the war of the narrative.
The Malaysian response had a few reasons driving it. First, it was considered as a
success formula when fighting the communists in the 1970s to 1980s. Second, it
recognised the danger of radicalisation of a majority ethnoreligious demographic in
Malaysia, especially of the young and those who were ill-informed about the religion.
Third, this would be more palatable in the eyes of the international Islamic
community, as compared to kinetic operations.

Hence, in Malaysia, the response to terrorism had three key thrusts. The first
was to have an extensive counter-terrorism narrative campaign. The second was to
enhance prevention and response mechanism. This had been enhanced by the passing
of two Counter-Terrorism Acts in Parliament, which had provided the police with the
greater mandate and power to investigate. The third thrust of counter-terrorism was to
emphasise tighter immigration and border controls to prevent potential terror
perpetrators from entering the state, and also to be able to apprehend aspiring freedom
fighters seeking to participate in the Syrian crisis and those returning from fighting in
the Middle East.

The table is the summarized analysis of the differences in counter-terrorism

approaches between the two states. In understanding how the various efforts fit
together, especially with regard to the terrorist havens continuing in South Philippines,
one can, therefore, understand that the Malaysian approach had been out of
pragmatism. It recognised that it would be politically unviable to consider
participating in offensive military actions based on the various reasons stated. The
Philippines itself has had major challenges separating terrorist movements from
criminal and separatists ones if that was even possible.
 TABLE 1 Comparison of Counter-Terrorism Approaches

Malaysia The Philippines

Problem Definition The DAESHs ideology based A complex mix of

for Transnational on religious rally call might
Terrorism penetrate into Muslim majority
demographic. Anti-
establishment combatants are
covert and seek to disrupt
normalcy of life through bomb
attacks. This threat shares
similarities with the communist
insurgency in the 1970s
1980s.
separatist, extremist
ideology (terrorist) and
crime; coupled with drug
and weapons control
issues in South
Philippines. Anti-
government combatants
are armed and in direct
conflict with the
government.

Adopted Solutions (1) Border Control (1) Military approach to

or Strategies remove bomb and weapon
(2) Counter-narrative
threats
(winning hearts and
minds) as a (2) Ensuring peace to
comprehensive and foster prosperity and to
balanced control remove the anti-
government sentiments
(3) Addressing root cause of
the recruitment, such as
sense of injustice, lack
of education and poverty

(4) Develop better

capability to respond,
especially through
integration of national
agencies

The result was that there had been very limited scope for cooperation apart
from those already in motion: (1) intelligence sharing; (2) joint patrols which would
physically deny the movements of terror perpetrators (such as ASG) from South
Philippines to Malaysia; and (3) support efforts to bring peace, development and
prosperity to South Philippines, such as through the commitment of international
monitoring teams.
CONCLUSION
The study concluded that there is scope for a greater inter-state cooperation between
the Philippines and Malaysia beyond intelligence sharing and joint sea border patrols.
Theoretically, this could include the possibility of joint military operations against the
ASG, and to deny the DAESH of utilizing safe areas for their operations. The
conclusion was that while the dynamics of international relations and the national
approach both shape the levels of counter-terrorism cooperation toward low levels, the
national approach factor appeared to be more dominant in shaping the outcome,
especially in terms of how it defined terrorism problem and the solution towards it.

With this, such low levels of counter-terrorism cooperation would be expected

to change only if the situation had become dire, such as if one of the states had failed
and fallen into the arms of the DAESH caliphate. Otherwise, a primarily state-centric
and a response-based approach would be expected. Cooperation would exist insofar as
to prevent an incident in their territories, or as it did not negate or undermine key
national interests.

Based on the case study of the Philippines and Malaysia, because of the
significant difference in the perception of the problem and the solution required, inter-
state cooperation would be cursory and slow moving even as the threat of terror
attacks became more real and present. One is left with a bleak picture that the DAESH
would continue to grow its influence from its base in Southern Philippines and
continue to export its brand of terror to the other states in Southeast Asia, having to
deal primarily with the Filipino authorities through its affiliates as part of the
continuing civil strife. The Philippines would be expected to continue to be the main
terrorist hub of Southeast Asia, with the weak inter-state cooperation being exploited
by the DAESH for training, logistics, and finance of its operations.

Malaysias efforts would primarily be to contain the effects through counter-

radicalisation efforts (i.e. providing counter-narratives and emphasising on tight
control of its borders nationally. It would be expected to be pre-occupied with
controlling the incidents of kidnapping of its citizens associated with the crime-
terrorist nexus of the Philippines dimension, given the political necessity of doing so.
The balance would also be expected to remain firmly with the state-centric approach
and measures, rather than shifting it towards a regional based solution. From another
perspective, the lack of common space for cooperation would almost make discussion
on cooperation a non-event, as states focus nationally on other security issues (such as
the South China Sea disputes) in a more urgent, but equally state-centric, way.
When extending the analysis to the other affected states in Southeast Asia, one
might observe that the conditions affecting the Philippines and Malaysia cooperation
would also be present in other state-on-state dynamics. Ethno-religious sensitivities
exist between Malaysian and Patani South Thailand. The confrontational history
between Malaysia and Indonesia would expect similar longstanding trust issues in
joint operations beyond the borders to address terrorism issues should this be
required10. Between Singapore and Malaysia, the lack of extensive shared borders
would mean that there are the even lesser amount of state-on-state cooperation,
particularly in the limited current form of the venture of joint border patrols. The
historical episode of separation between Singapore and Malaysia in 1965 and the
subsequent different approaches in managing ethnicities between the two states would
also create sensitivities in such cooperation. Hence, the factors affecting the
Philippines and Malaysia in their counter-terrorism cooperation would appear to
manifest themselves in a contextualised form, some more than others, in Southeast
Asia.

The study identified three possible insights for the prospects of the ASEAN
Political-Security Community (APSC). First, for issues and programs that were related
to crime, border and policing, these would most likely be able to advance through
smoothly without the dynamics of international relations or the national approach
getting in their way. Second, for issues that concerning Southeast Asia solidarity, such
as that of the South China Sea, the external and internal factors discussed in this paper
would not likely interfere. Finally, for issues with strong domestic impact or where
states would not see the value of cooperation either because of difficulties in
reconciling the internal and external perspectives or because the common ground
would be hard to find, these would be expected not to make it to the agenda of the
APSC. APSC would be expected to contain some of these characteristics moving
forward.

To allow policy makers to draw insights from the Philippines and Malaysia
case study, four further points would be made. First, there would be a need to
carefully define and contextualise the terrorist problem in the state vis-a-vis other
states where cooperation might be desired. This should be studied deeply from the
historical perspectives and to recognise the complexities that exist, such as for the
Philippines case. Secondly, policymakers should seek to deal or invest in dealing
primarily at the national level as the issues highlighted are expected to persist over
time, even as ASEAN matures as an organisation. Thirdly, policy makers in Southeast
Asia should continue to be resilience because the DAESH is likely to continue to
enjoy the safe haven in South Philippines which are utilized to plan and organise its
operations, especially when the DAESH would only need to deal with the Philippines
authorities instead of a larger collective effort. Fourthly, policy makers should note
that security issues might be rallied at the ASEAN level, but might succeed only based
on the identification of common ground. This might be limited due to the unique
security contexts and perspectives that Southeast Asian states have individually.

10
Current military to military arrangements are largely restricted to joint border patrols in
Borneo, and the Eyes-in-the-sky multilateral arrangement which included also Singapore.
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2016.
Six-state swoop cripples IS terror cell: Bank Staff and School Counsellor among 16
working for Mohamad Wanndy, 2016, The Star (10 Oct 2016)). Retrieved on
11 Oct 2016.

GOVERNMENT / ORGANISATIONS

An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-
Six Entitled An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
G. R. No. 187167. Supreme Court of the Philippines. 16 Jul 2011. Retrieved on 1
Oct 2016.
PUIC. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Malaysian Prime Ministers Office website
Philippines Embassy Website: Philippine Malaysia Agreements
Philippine Statistical Yearbook, East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines:
Philippines Statistics Authority: 1 30. October 2015. Retrieved on 1 Oct
2016.

WEBSITES

Wikipedia: North Borneo Dispute. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.

Wikipedia: Al-Maunah. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Abu Sayyaf Group. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Malaysia-Philippines Relations. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Jemaah Islamiyah. Retrieved on 1 Nov 2016.
Wikipedia: Jabidah Massacre. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Moro National Liberation Front. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Cross Border attacks in Sabah. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Sabah. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.

LECTURES / SPEECHES

Lecture by Thomas Koruth Samuel, Director of Research and Publication, Southeast

Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, to MAF DC on 26 May 2016,
Countering Terrorism: A Counter-Narrative Focus.
MAF DC Dinerss Club talk by YB Khairy Jamaluddin, Minister for Youth and Sports
on Nation Transformation: Strategies and Challenges.