G.R. No.

L-44484, March 16, 1987

OSMUNDO G. RAMA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE ABALA, MELCHOR
ABANGAN, EUTIQUIO ALEGRADO, EMIGDIO BLANCO, ISABELO CABUENAS, CESAR
CAMILLO, JOSE CENIZA, ANDRES CAMPANA, FIDEL CORONEL, MARCIANO
CUESTAS, IGNACIO DACLIZON, ROLAND ENRIQUEZ, DIONISIO FLORES, PATERNO
FLORES, MODESTO GERALDE, CENON GESIN, LEONCIO GUMBOC, CLAUDIO
LEGASPI, INOCENCIO LLANOS, HIPOLITO MANUBAG, MAURICIO MANACAP,
CONSTANCIO MAMAYAGA, BIENVENIDO MATIS, MODESTO NAMONG, CATALINO
OCHIA, CECILIO QUIJANO, HILARIO DE LOS SANTOS, FELICIANO SACARES,
ENRIQUE SAROMINES, ALFONSO TABAY, ANGEL TEVES, SR., JAIME TRANI,
RODULFO VERANO, VICENTE VILLARCA, DOROTEO ARMAS, ISABELO ABAPO,
GREGORIO ABASTILLAS, RAFAEL ABASTILLAS, LORETO ALICAWAY, CIRIACO
BARILLO, MIGUEL BINOLINAO, CELERINO BUT-AY, IGNACIO BELLEZA,
ANATOLIO BINOYA, ZACARIAS BUCARIZA, FERNANDO CASTRO, MARCIANO DE LA
CERNA, VERANO BADANA, DONATO CABANERO, ANECITO DE LA CERNA, DIOSDADO
CANETE, GABRIEL CANETE, ERIBERTO DACALOS, NONILO DE CASTILLA, SERGIO
DAYANAN, FLAVIANO DEIPARINE, BERNARDO GAMBOA, ISMAEL GANTUANGCO,
CESAR HERNANDEZ, JORGE JACA, GORGONIO JACALAN, SEVERIANO LANGBID,
TOMAS LANGBID, DIOSDADO LASTIMADO, PABLO LUNA, MAXIMO LARIOSA,
VICENTE LAPAZ, RICARDO MAGALLON, EMILIANO MATARIO, RAMON PADRIGA,
NICANOR OPURA, ALBERTO MINTILLOSA, RUFINO REPONTE, BLAS PARDILLO,
ESMAEL REGUDUS, MARCELIANO DELOS SANTOS, CANDIDO RUFLO, LUIS SALAPA,
PEDRO SACEL, FRISCO SACEL, MIGUEL SARAMOSING, JULIAN VELOSO,
BERNARDO TALLO, ARQUIPO YRAY, PATRICIO VILLARMIA, VICENTE VILLAMORA
AND LEONCIO ZABALA, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. L-44842. MARCH 16, 1987]

RENE ESPINA, PABLO P. GARCIA, REYNALDO M. MENDIOLA AND VALERIANO S.

CARILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, FROILAN FRONDOSO AND
JEREMIAS LUNA, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. L-44591. MARCH 16, 1987]

RENE ESPINA, PABLO P. GARCIA, REYNALDO M. MENDIOLA AND VALERIANO S.

CARILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND (SAME RESPONDENTS AS
IN L-44484), RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. L-44894. MARCH 16, 1987]

PROVINCE OF CEBU AND ITS SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN, PETITIONER, VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, FROILAN FRONDOSO AND JEREMIAS LUNA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

ALAMPAY, J.:
During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu, Osmundo G. Rama as vice-governor
and Pablo P. Garcia, Reynaldo M. Mendoza and Valeriano S. Carillo as members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, said officials adopted Resolution No. 990 which appropriated funds "for the maintenance and
repair of provincial roads and bridges and for the operation and maintenance of the office of the provincial
engineer and for other purposes". (L-44591 Rollo, pp. 34-37).

In said resolution, the provincial government of Cebu under the aforementioned officials, declared its policy "to
mechanize the maintenance and repair of all roads and bridges of the province (including provincial roads and
bridges receiving national aid 'JJ'), to economize in the expenditure of its Road and Bridge Fund for the
maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid 'JJ' and to adopt a more
comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and orderly operation and maintenance of the Office of the
Provincial Engineer".

To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to abolish around thirty positions[1] the salaries of which
were paid from the 'JJ' Road and Bridge Fund thus doing away with the caminero (pick-shovel-wheelbarrow)
system. Consequently, around 200 employees of the province were eased out of their respective jobs and, to
implement the mechanization program in the maintenance of roads and bridges, the provincial government
purchased heavy equipment worth P4,000,000.00. However, contrary to its declared policy to economize, the
provincial administration later on hired around one thousand new employees, renovated the office of the
provincial engineer and provided the latter with a Mercedes-Benz car (Decision in CA-G.R. No. 49328-R, L-
44591 Rollo, p. 37).

Aggrieved by these turn of events, the employees whose positions were abolished filed separate petitions for
mandamus, damages and attorney's fees aimed at the annulment of Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement and
the recovery of damages. The aforementioned provincial officials who, together with the provincial auditor,
provincial treasurer, provincial engineer and the province of Cebu, were named respondents in said action, were
sued "both in their official and personal" capacities as a result of their alleged "unjust, oppressive, illegal and
malicious' acts (Petition, Record in Civil Case No. R-10704, p. 3).

In Civil Case No. R-10704, the Court of First Instance of Cebu declared Resolution No. 990 null and void and
ordered the respondent officials to re-create the positions abolished, to provide funds therefore, to reinstate the
56 petitioners headed by Jose Abala, and to pay them back salaries. For "lack of legal and factual basis", no
damages were awarded to petitioners and no pronouncement as to attorney's fees were made as the petitioners
had agreed to pay their lawyers 30% of whatever amount they would receive as back salaries (L-44591 Rollo,
pp. 33-34).

All the parties appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 49328-R). Eventually, said appellate court,
through its First Division, affirmed the lower court's decision with the modification that respondents were
ordered to pay jointly and severally in their "individual and personal capacity" P1,000.00 moral damages to
each of the petitioners considering that the case involved a quasi-delict (L-44591 Rollo, p. 54).

From that decision, Osmundo G. Rama, interposed an appeal to this Court (G.R. No. L-44484). Espina, Garcia,
Mendiola and Carillo then filed their own petition for review (G.R. No. L-44591). But before Espina, et al.
could file said petition, the province of Cebu and its Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed their own petition for
review questioning that portion of the appellate court's decision which ordered the reinstatement with back
salaries of the dismissed employees. Said petition, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-44572, was dismissed by
this Court for lack of merit in the resolution of October 25, 1976. Entry of judgment was made on November
24, 1976.
Meanwhile, dismissed employees Froilan Frondoso and Jeremias Luna, who also had filed their own petition
for mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, elevated their case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
SP-04649). In its decision, the Court of Appeals' Ninth Division followed the ruling of its First Division in CA?
G.R. No. 48328-R, held that the wrong committed by the respondent public officials was a quasi-delict, and
ordered the reinstatement with back salaries of Frondoso and Luna and the payment in solidum by respondent
public officials of P1,000.00 each to Frondoso and Luna as moral damages plus P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.
With the exception of Rama, the respondent public officials appealed to this Court (G.R. No. L-44842).
Subsequently, the Cebu Assistant Provincial Attorney, representing the Province of Cebu and its Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, also appealed to this Court from that decision (G.R. No. L-44894).

On March 28, 1977, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591 and L-44894
considering that said cases involve the same issues and factual background (L-44591 Rollo, p. 344).

Thereafter, Frondoso and Luna filed a motion to dismiss L-44894 and L-44842. They alleged that as the
petition in L-44572 had been dismissed on October 25, 1976, said two cases should likewise be dismissed
because they, together with the private respondents in L-44572 who, like them, were also permanent appointees
to their respective positions, "were separated from the service on the same date by the same petitioners" (L-
44894 Rollo, p. 140) and therefore, the petitions in L-44894 and L-44842 were barred by the rule of stare
decisis.

The motion to dismiss, however, was noted in the resolution of February 17, 1978, it appearing that said two
cases had already been submitted for decision (L-44894 Rollo, p. 148; L-44842 Rollo, p. 139). Frondoso and
Luna filed another motion to dismiss L-44894 but after the petitioners had filed their comment thereon, said
motion to dismiss was also noted in the resolution of February 22, 1981 (L-44894 Rollo, p. 186).

We find, however, that Frondoso's and Luna's contention that L-44894 should be dismissed is meritorious. The
issues raised in L-44894 and L-44572 are the same. In fact, the prayer in the petition in L-44894 is virtually a
verbatim reiteration of that in L-44572. The allegation of petitioner province of Cebu and its Sangguniang
Panlalawigan that the question of jurisdiction was not raised in L-44572 (L-44894 Rollo, p. 150) cannot
successfully save L-44894 from dismissal. In their petition, the province of Cebu and its Sangguniang
Panlalawigan merely argued that the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, considering
that Frondoso and Luna's appeal was perfected after the expiration of the reglementary period and that their
brief was filed one month too late.

However, the trend of the rulings of this Court in matters pertaining to the timeliness of the perfection of an
appeal is to afford every party-litigant amplest opportunity to present their case "for the proper and just
determination of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities." (Rodriquez vs. Court of Appeals, L-
37522, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 262). Applying the above ruling to this case, the Court of Appeals may
not, therefore, be faulted for assuming jurisdiction over the appeal of Frondoso and Luna.

Hence, with respect to L-44894, this Court is bound by the dismissal of L-44572 and so L-44894 should
likewise be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed.

Proceeding now to resolve the issue, common to L-44484, L-44591 and L-44842, which is whether or not
Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution which
abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof, this Court has held that, at least, in principle, a
public officer by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from
illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of oppression
(Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals, L-16290, October 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 413).

Thus, in Correa vs. CFI of Bulacan, L-46096, July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 312, We held personally liable a mayor
who illegally dismissed policemen even if he had relinquished his position. Therein, We held that:

"A public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is
not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor like any private individual (Palma vs. Graciano, 99
Phil. 72, 74; Carreon vs. Province of Pampanga, 99 Phil. 808). This principle of personal liability has been
applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the
reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from
office, the officials were acting outside of their official authority (Stiles vs. Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 123 NE 615,
4 ALR 1365, cited in 63 Am. Jur. 2d. 770)."

We hold that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally liable for damages because of their
precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal means.

The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are binding on this Court, found that the provincial employees
concerned were "eased out because of their party affiliation". i.e., they belonged to the Liberal Party whose
presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmena, Jr. (CA Decision in G.R. No. 49328-R, p. 6, L-44591 Rollo, p.
38). Such act of the petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers of the rival
political party so as to accommodate their own proteges who, it turned out, even outnumbered the dismissed
employees.

Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly, and if the work which
they perform is done rather to injure an individual than to discharge a public duty (56 Am. Jur. 2d 334, citing
Yealy V. Fink, 43 Pa 212). As we have held in Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, L-26882, April 5, 1978, 82
SCRA 294, 307-308, a public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the
performance of their duties as public officers or for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article
20, Civil Code) or for wilfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs and/or public policy (Article 21, New Civil Code).

Neither can petitioners shield themselves from liability by invoking the ruling in the cases of Carino vs.
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, L-23966, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 268. In
those cases, the erring public officials were sued in their official capacities whereas in the instant cases,
petitioners were specifically sued in their personal capacities.

For their part, the dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they have suffered a special and
peculiar injury from the wrongful act of which they complain (Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices
and Officers, p. 391). It is an undeniable fact that the dismissed employees who were holding such positions as
foremen, watchmen and drivers, suffered the uncertainties of the unemployed when they were plucked out of
their positions. That not all of them testified as to the extent of damages they sustained on account of their
separation from their government jobs, cannot be used as a defense by the petitioners. Suffice it to state that
considering the positions they were holding, the dismissed employees concerned belong to a low-salaried group,
who, if deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic hardships.
Justice demands that they be recompensed for the predicament they were placed in, apart from the back salaries
which they are entitled to as a matter of right. We are inclined to agree that the amount of P1,000.00 damages
granted to each of them by the Court of Appeals was fixed by that court judiciously and is a reasonable sum
(Article 2216, Civil Code).

Petitioner Rama's protestations that when he eventually became the governor of Cebu, he reinstated most of the
dismissed employees through provincial board Resolution No. 392 (L-44484 Rollo, p. 16) cannot erase the fact
that he had a hand in the adoption of Resolution No. 990. His subsequent benevolent act cannot sufficiently
make up for the damage suffered by the dismissed employees during their period of unemployment.

Apropos the practice of victorious politicians to remove government employees who did not support them in
their campaign for office, this Court has said: "There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local
elective officials, upon assumption to office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing
employees with their own proteges regardless of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at
the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts." (Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, L-
20977, September 7, 1968, 25 SCRA 1).

WHEREFORE, in L-44894, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. In L-
44484, L-44591 and L-44842, the decision of the First and Ninth Divisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioners.

G.R. NO. 141309, June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, PETITIONER, VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167,
which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina,
Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The
complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its
constitutional rights arising from petitioner's issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals.[3]

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while
respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect
on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands "Champion," "Hope," and "More" were
considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July
 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.[4] RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More," and
"Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, [5] (c)(1) on locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes
an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos
(P5.00) per pack."[6]

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via
telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in particular.
On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC
37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of
RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.[7] The same letter assessed
respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of
RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. [8] On August 3, 1993,
respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September
30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. [9] In its decision
dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable
and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to
RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.[10] It was held, among others, that RMC
37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint[11] for damages against
petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss [12] contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum
shopping was signed by respondent's counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the
principal party who should sign the same.

On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss holding that to rule on
the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without
allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against
forum shopping was cured by respondent's submission of the corporate secretary's certificate
authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive
portion thereof, states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by
plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to
file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.[13]
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not
act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code
is the general law on the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that
governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages. It
also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping was cured by the
submission of the corporate secretary's certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code
which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows
recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers;
while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers' liability,
such that, if the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same
is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification against forum shopping,
she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers' "acts" from which
civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers'
violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a
cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,[14] respondent alleged that under Article 32 of
the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not
required that said public officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even
granting that the complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner liable.

The issues for resolution are as follows:

(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office?

(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should
govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of action?

(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum
shopping?

(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may suffer
arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.[15] An officer
who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages
that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not
amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.[16] However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of
his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.[17]
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same
Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer's act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. Thus
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.

x x x x

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for
acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or
negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts
under orders or instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[18] that a public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the
Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the
decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place
naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to
particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.[19]

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two
acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone, would include the
same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative
intent more clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular
and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its
words any meaning at all.[20]

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle.
Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act;
and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms,
unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.[21]

Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,[22] the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds provinces,
cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other
public works, is a special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of
Manila, in determining the liability for defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held
for damages or injuries arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law,
or ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained by the Court:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special
law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the
entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4
refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.[23]
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,[24] the issue was which law should govern the publication of a tax
ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and which requires their
publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in particular with
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges," and which demands publication only after
approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the
City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local
governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law
as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law
is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates
a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law
of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the
special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly
is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of
the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.
In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless
dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here,
as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

x x x x

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

x x x x

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

xxxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be
so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of another person's constitutional rights only if the
public official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these
reasons:

"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is
the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to
put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.

"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to
implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official is abusing and we made the article so
strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that
official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely
abuse the individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the
law to comply with one's duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this article, that would practically nullify
the object of the article. Precisely, the opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified
by a plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."[25]
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly
liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant
under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which
is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the
plaintiff.[26]

Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.[27] A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been
defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury,
directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.[28] There are cases in which it has been stated that civil
liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are
circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would
determine whether the act was wrongful.[29] Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another's legal right; that is, liability in tort is
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.[30]

The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for
violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant.[31] This is a fundamental
innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative
powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection
on civil liberties.

In Aberca v. Ver,[32] it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a
superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that
he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected
rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the
widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the
rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil
liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both
superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that
will make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties,
without specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act"
that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights
and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional
rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows
redress from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with
Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant
case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and
malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the
same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a
violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the
secretary's certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured
the defect of respondent's complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the
rules.[33]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch
272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.

In Escola vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (150 P. 2d 436, Cal. [1944]), the plaintiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was placing into the
refrigera-tor bottled products of the defendant that had been delivered about 36 hours earlier. As she was putting a bottle into the
refrigerator, the bottle exploded in her hand causing severe injuries. The jury awarded damages in favor of the plaintiff and this award
was af-firmed on appeal on the ground that the negligence of the plaintiff was the cause of the injury. The appellate court sustained the
award using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur stating that: The bottle was admittedly charged with gas pressure, and the charging of
the bottle was within the exclusive control of the defendant. As it is a matter of common knowledge that overcharge would not
ordinarily result without negligence, it follows under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that if the bottle was in fact excessively charged,
an inference of defendants negligence would arise.
Justice Trayor concurred in the result but argued that the neg-ligence should no longer be singled out as the basis of plaintiffs right to
recover in cases of similar factual background. He opined that it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute
liability when an article that he placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have defect that
causes injury to human being. He supported his argument with the follow-ing explanation:
x x x Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most
effec-tively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufac-turers can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recur-rence of others, as the public cannot. Those who
 suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of the injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be
insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to
discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find
their way into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the
manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a
constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer
is best situated to afford such protection.
The injury from a defective product does not become a mat-ter of indifference because the defect arises from causes other
than the negligence of the manufacturer, such as negligence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose defects
could not be revealed by inspection, or unknown causes that even by the device or res ipsa loquitur cannot be classified as
negligence of the manufacture. The inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper care. x
x x An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence or identity of cause of the defect, for
he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In leaving it to the jury to decide
whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of
strict liability. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability
without negligence. If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods responsible for their quality regardless of
negligence there is no reason not to fix the responsibility openly.

On the other hand, Greenman vs. Yuba Power Products, Inc., (377 P. 2d 897, 900-901, Cal. [1962]) involved a power tool (that could
be used as a saw, a drill and a wood lathe) which was given to the plaintiff by his wife. While working the lathe, a piece of wood
suddenly flew out of the machine and struck him in the forehead resulting in serious injur y. The plaintiffs action for damages was
sustained by the appellate court through Justice Traynor using the strict liability theory. The court ruled that to establish the
manufacturers liability, it was sufficient that the plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the power tool in a way it was
intended to be used and as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware, the tool was unsafe for its
intended use. In the said case, it was established during the hearing that the power tool was defec-tive because its screws were of
insufficient strength to hold the wood in place while the lathe was being operated.
It is clear that Greenman could not have been the basis of Arti-cle 2187 of the New Civil Code because it was
decided only in 1962. Neither could Escola been the source of the rule in the said provi-sion because as pointed
out earlier, the opinion of Justice Traynor that strict liability should be applied was not the majority opinion.
Nevertheless, there is no reason why the reasons given by Justice Traynor cannot be used to justify strict
liability under Article 2187. The view of Justice Sanco regarding this matter is still conceptually sound because
of the very language of the provision indicating that the liability is strict.