16-17-164

Topic: Reforms (political, economic and land) of Ayyub Khan, Z.A

Bhutto and Zia Ul Haq and their comparison
Submitted To;
Madam Sadia Rafique
Submitted by;
Hafiz Javaid Iqbal
Roll No;
0543-R-BH-ISL-13
Semester:
4th
Session:
2013-17

Government College University, Lahore

 Contents

Era of Ayyub Khan

1. Introduction
2. Land reforms
3. Economic reforms
4. Social reforms
5. Agricultural reforms
6. Political reforms
7. Introduction of new laws

Era of Z.A Bhutto and his reforms

1. Political reforms
2. Land reforms
3. Comparison of Ayyubs and Z.A land reforms
4. Economic reforms
5. Miscellaneous reforms

Era of Zia Ul Haq

1. Economic reforms
2. Political reforms
3. Land reforms

Comparison b/w reforms of these rulers

Conclusion
Era of Ayyub Khan:
Introduction:
On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the Constitution and declared Martial
Law in the country. This was the first of many military regimes in Pakistans history. The
Constitution of 1956 was abrogated, ministers were dismissed, Central and Provincial
Assemblies were dissolved and all political activities were banned. General Muhammad Ayyub
Khan, the then Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, became the Chief Martial Law
Administrator. The parliamentary system in Pakistan came to end. Iskander Mirza was ousted by
General Ayyub Khan, who then declared himself President. This was actually welcomed in
Pakistan as the nation had experienced a very unstable political climate since independence.
Despite economic growth, continuing economic and social inequalities, the disadvantaged
position of East Pakistan, and limitation of civil liberties provoked increasing discontent with his
regime. Ayyub Khan used two main approaches to governing in his first few years. He
concentrated on consolidating power and undermining the opposition. He also aimed to establish
the groundwork for future stability through altering the economic, legal, and constitutional
institutions. The imposition of martial law targeted antisocial practices such as abducting
women and children, black marketeering, smuggling, and hoarding. Many in the Civil Service of
Pakistan and Police Service of Pakistan were investigated and punished for corruption,
misconduct, inefficiency, or subversive activities. Corruption had become so widespread within
the national and civic systems of administration that Ayyub Khan was welcomed as a national
hero by the people. The new military government promised that they would carry out reforms in
the entire government structure and would cleanse the administration of the rampant corruption.
A thorough screening process of all government servants was conducted and service records
were closely scrutinized. Public servants were tried for misconduct by tribunals consisting of
retired judges of the Supreme Court or High Court. Disciplinary actions such as dismissal or
compulsory retirement of the public servant could take place against corrupt officials. A public
servant could also be disqualified from holding any public office for 15 years. About 3,000
officials were dismissed and many other were reduced in rank as a result of these measures. A
law called the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, popularly known as E. B. D. O, was
promulgated for the disqualification of politicians. Under this law, a person could be disqualified
from being a member of any elective body. Under this harsh law, several politicians like
Suhrawardy and Qayyum Khan were disqualified. The E. B. D. O, particularly its application,
was severely criticized in the legal and political circles throughout Pakistan.

Ayyub Khans regime can be divided into two distinct phases: the first phase beginning from
1958 to 1965, which can further be sub-divided into two periods. From 1958 to 1962, Ayyub
Khan governed the country as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and then from 1962 to 1965
as
President after the withdrawal of Martial Law in 1962. The first phase of Ayyub Khans regime
 was characterized by authoritarian pattern of governance aided by the Martial Law authorities. In
this phase, Ayyub Khan tried to introduce the modernist version of Islam through public policies.
His efforts to modernize the Pakistani society led him to introduce some constitutional, legal and
social changes in the country.

The traditionalists, led by the ulama (religious scholars), vehemently resisted the modernization
agenda of the government. The second post-elections phase of his regime, i.e. from 1965 to
1969, represents democratic form of government, though dubbed as controlled democracy. It
saw a reversal in the public policies aimed at modernization, as the modernization agenda was
abandoned by the regime. A host of factors were responsible for this reversal. By and large, it
was owing to the pressure of various forces, predominantly the religious leaders, who posed a
threat to the legitimacy of Ayyub Khans regime that led the government to reverse its policy.

Land Reforms:
The first of our self-styled savior generals also disliked the notion of feudalism. A commission
was set up present recommendations and it presented its report within three months of the
military takeover in January, 1959. Deemed radical by the then military junta, it side stepped
the issue of ceilings on land holdings by proposing a fairly liberal one and was in its own words
pragmatic and middle-of-the-road an often abused set of terms used to represent anything
that cannot be handled appropriately due to political realities. In reality, it was far from
revolutionary.
Recommendations included:-

1. A ceiling of 500 acres for irrigated and 1000 acres for un-irrigated land be imposed with
due compensation to owners (the complex issue of Produce Index Unit has been left in this
essay). Land was to be redistributed amongst to tenants already cultivating the land.
2. Abolition of Jagirs which had already been abolished in Punjab and NWFP in 1950.
However, the 1.1 million acres of Jagirs in Sind were abolished along with 150 and 258 acres in
Bahawalpur and Baluchistan respectively.
3. Permanent proprietary rights for occupancy tenants.
4. Idea of economic holdings and subsistence holdings of no less than 50 acres was
proposed in order to consolidate holdings (in reality economic holdings was supposed to create a
middle class amongst the peasantry and to attract private investment in agriculture).
One person however dissented with the majority opinion on the land ceiling recommended and
his name was Ghulam Ishaq Khan, later to become the serial 58-2(b) user. GIK viewed the
imposed limit as way too liberal and he thought that the net effect of the proposed measures
[will leave] the concentration of land in families instead of individuals. Therefore, he proposed
the ceiling of 150 acres and 450 acres for irrigated/un-irrigated land alongwith a 300/900 acres
limit for families to own land (irrigated/un-irrigated). He also dissented on a number of other
issues (exemptions for orchards transfer of land by gift, etc.). Clearly, GIK was the
revolutionary amongst the committee members.

Formation of New Dams and Canal System:

Water and Power Investments: Massive investments were made in water and power in West
Pakistan, including the Indus Basin Replacement Works spending. Total water and power
investments in West Pakistan during the 1960s exceeded US $2.5 Billion and accounted for
more than 50% of total public sector spending. The most explosive of Indo-Pakistan disputes was
the question of sharing the waters of the Indus basin. On April 1, 1948, India cut off the supply
of water from the two head works under her control. Fortunately, Eugene Black, President of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development offered the offices of
the Bank for the solution of the water problem in 1952. A solution acceptable to both
governments was agreed upon in 1960 at the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement at
Karachi. This treaty is commonly known as the "Indus Water Treaty". The treaty allowed for a
transitional period of 10 to 13 years, after which the three eastern rivers would fall
exclusively to India's share and the three western rivers to Pakistan. During the transitional
period, Pakistan would construct a system of replacement works consisting of two dams, five
barrages and seven link canals financed by the Indus Development Fund.
The waters of river Jehlum, Chenab and Indus were given to Pakistan under the Indus Basin
Treaty while Ravi, Beas and Sutlej were taken up by India.

The Indus Basin Replacement Works: The Indus Basin Replacement Works represented
about half of the total spending in water and power sector and was of a special nature.

Investments: it was Ayyubs political decision to go ahead with the Indus Basin Treaty in
1960 which accelerated the pace of investments in water and power.

Role of Ghulam Ishaq Khan : Large water investments were also driven in part by the
forceful Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman of Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)
created in 1958. He convinced the donors especially the World Bank that water was the most
important constraint in agricultural development. Without the readily available of water the
economy of Pakistan cannot progress any further.
Phase 1958-1968:

Tarbela Dam: Ghulam Ishaq Khan along with S.S.Kirmani (Head of Indus Basin Works)
persuaded the reluctant donors to include Tarbela dam in Indus Works. Investment in the multi-
purpose Tarbela Dam, which was completed in 1971, despite major technical difficulties turned
out to be extremely economic because the rise in international oil prices after 1973 sharply
increased the cost of thermal power, the alternative to hydroelectric power. The 1973 oil crisis
began in earnest on October 17, 1973, when Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), during the Yom Kippur War, announced that they would no longer
ship petroleum to nations that had supported Israel in its conflict with Egyptthat is, to the
United States and its allies in Western Europe. At around the same time, OPEC members agreed
to use their leverage over the world price-setting mechanism for oil in order to quadruple world
oil prices. Costs: But there were costs of preoccupation with investment in water resources.

1. Negligence in fertilization production: Fertilizer production, for instance, was relatively

neglected and West Pakistan found itself heavily dependent on imported fertilizer as the use of
fertilizer for dwarf varieties of wheat and rice spread. Only one large fertilizer factory came into
production in West Pakistan during 1965-1970.

2. Social Sector Investments: similarly, the social sector investments in education and health
sectors were squeezed.

3. Waste of Water Resources: ample availability of water from public sources accompanied by
unwillingness or inability of the government to enforce reasonable water charges led to a waste
of water resources.

4. On-Farm Irrigation Development: On-Farm Irrigation Development, including levelling of

land which can be very helpful in increasing the effectiveness of water use, has been negligible
in Pakistan because incentives for such investment do not exist. As a result, irrigated yields have
remained low.

Foreign Aid: The consequences of Growing Dependence:

Net foreign inflows: Pakistan was already receiving large net foreign inflows in 1959-60 and by
1964-5 the net foreign flows had more than trebled to about 7% of GDP for the country as a
whole. In the second half of 1960s the net foreign inflows tended to stabilize but were still
higher in relative terms in 1969-70 than a decade earlier. This was leading Pakistan to high
dependence on foreign developed countries. We were getting reliant on the developed countries
for every sector of our economy.

Effect of 1959 reforms:

The recommendations were put into force through the Martial Law Regulation No. 64 on
February 7, 1959.2.5 million acres of land was resumed, 2.3 million of it distributed amongst
183,271 tenants and small owners. The land resumed constituted around 4.5 percent of the total
cultivable land in Pakistan, the share of beneficiaries being even smaller. Even these figures were
an eye-wash since the number of beneficiaries who had holdings below subsistence level (12.5
acres) was only 59, 906 and just 0.65 million acres was distributed amongst them. By another
account, the government overtook only 35% of the holdings that exceeded the ceiling. Clearly,
this was no revolution or big achievement. As calculated by a book published by the PIDE, had
GIKs recommendations been put into place, it they would have yielded four times the land that
was resumed under the 1959 recommendations.
In 1947, Less than 1 percent of farm owners control more than 25 percent of agricultural land.
After the 1959 reforms, less than 8.5 percent of farm owners control more than 42 percent of
agricultural land. Average holding per landlord however was still 7,208 acres in Pakistan and
11,810 acres in Punjab due to the states inefficiency (read alliance with landlords) to implement
the legislation on many large holdings.

Social Reforms
Ayyub Khans government also aimed at reforming some social institutions. Some of the key
areas of social reform reflecting his liberalism were as such: The Ayyub government set up an
Ulema Academy in Lahore. It was an attempt by the government to modernize the ulama and
religious
leadership in the country. Moreover, religious leaders associated with the Academy were
handpicked by the government, who could extend help to and support the regime in the hour of
need. Population planning program began in Pakistan in the early fifties. Under Ayyub Khan, it
was expanded into full-fledged ministry (Syed, 1985). To check the inordinate growth of
population in 1965 in the Third Five Year Plan, a sum of Rs. 284 million was allocated for family
planning. It was one of the most ambitious family planning programs in the developing world.
Ayyub Khans personal interest gave an added impetus to the drive. In addition to Family
Planning Boards at provincial and district levels, a network of paid family planning officers
was also established. An extensive well-directed propaganda was also carried out (Williams,
1975). Family Planning Commission was established and Enver Adil was appointed as its head.
Ayyub Khan also established a National Research Institute of Family Planning as well. Ayyub
Khan appointed General Burki as the Minister for Heath, Social Welfare and Labor who gave a
new impetus to the social welfare sector. Women organizations like All Pakistan Women
Association (APWA) felt being helped, consulted, utilized and encouraged (Williams, 1975).
The long-term program of national reconstruction also aimed at the improvement of the status of
women in Pakistani society.

Introduction of New Laws:

Ayyub Khan also wanted to effect social change and bring modernism through legislation. It can
be well assessed from the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. In fact, in 1954, a Commission
on Marriage and Family Law was appointed which presented its report in June 1956. The
recommendations of the Commission were, however, implemented in March 1961 during the
regime of Ayyub Khan (Khan, 1960). The recommendations of the Commission could not be
implemented earlier after the submission of the report owing to the controversy it had generated.
It was Ayyub Khan who took the bold step of introducing some reforms at social level
recommended by the Commission. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 provided that
marriages and divorces be registered; permission be sought from the court for second and
subsequent marriage(s); divorce be effective only after it had been approved by the court;
minimum age for marriage be fixed at 14 for female and sixteen for male; and a grandson of a
predeceased son be allowed to inherit property of his grandfather. The Ordinance is regarded as
the first step toward modernization of family life (Jr., 1975) and the most progressive
interpretation of Muslims family law to be implemented in the subcontinent (Rosenbloom,
1995). In addition to the Ordinance, the Child Marriage Restraint Act and Dissolution of Muslim
Marriage Act were also enacted in 1961. It was only after outmaneuvering the ulama that Ayyub
Khan had got passed the bill from the National Assembly. These Acts and Ordinance discouraged
polygamy, protected the rights of wives and granted the rights of inheritance to grandchildren
(Wriggins, 1975). In 1959, the Ayyub Government promulgated West Pakistan Auqaf Properties
Ordinance, 1959, and established Ministry of Auqaf for the supervision and management of
religious endowments including shrines and tombs of Sufi Shaikhs. This measure was aimed at
containing the power of the mullahs and pirs, especially in rural areas
of the country.

Economic Policies:
Public frustration within the perception of unequal sharing of growth benefits began to merge
after 1965 as investment and industrial growth slowed down in West Pakistan. The concentration
of wealth and economic power was transformed into a major political issue in 1968 as a result of
Mahbub Ul Haqs now famous speech of 22 families. His speech was not aimed against the
 business community but was intended as a symbolic criticism of the entire system of distribution
and social justice developed during the Ayyub regime. The speech had an electrifying effect on
public attitude as it said that the economy of Pakistan had become dominated by 22 families who
controlled 66% of total industrial assets, 70% of insurance and 80% of banking. The top four
families were Dawoods, Saigols, Adamjees and Amins. In the public mind the distinction
between control and ownership of asset was not clear. A myth was thus created that 22 families
had acquired most of the national wealth and has been a major beneficiaries of the Ayyub regime.
This was harmful for the private sector development in Pakistan and resulted in large scale
nationalization of industry, banks and insurance companies in early 1970s. It had 2 unintended
effects: firstly, it hardened the East Pakistanis who were arguing for greater resource transfers to
the East because development in West Pakistan was not benefiting a few only. Secondly it added
to the difficulties of reducing big tax exemptions and subsidies received by big landlords.

Z.A Bhutto and his Land Reforms:

Riding a wave of socialism, a feudal lord from Sind came into power after the country split into
two. As the Civilian Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and then President, he promulgated on
March 1, 1972,Martial Law Regulation No. 115 of 1972, often called Land Reforms Regulation
1972. The ceiling on land holdings was lowered to 150 and 300 acres from irrigated an un-
irrigated land respectively, down from the 500 and 1000 imposed earlier. No compensation was
to be given to the land owners. Exemptions for orchards, stud farms, etc. were abolished. The
concept of PIUs however meant that ceiling was different in different areas depending on
productivity.
The reforms failed to produce the expected results and a second wave of reforms were
introduced through the Land Reforms Ordinance, 1977 (Ordinance II of 1977) on January 5,
1977. Ceiling on land holdings was reduced to 100 acres for irrigated land and 200 acres for un-
irrigated land, this time compensation was to be given to the landowners.
Major Differences between 1959 Reforms, 1972 Reforms and 1977 reforms

1. Differences in land ceilings varying by region due to the concept of PIUs. Overall
500/100 acres vs. 150/300 vs. 100/200.
2. Owners of expropriated excess land received compensation through non-negotiable, non-
transferable but heritable bonds vs. no compensation vs. compensation in the form of bonds
3. Beneficiaries to pay Rs. 8 per PIU vs. no charges vs. no charges
4. Exemptions for orchards, stud farms abolished by 1972 reforms and exemptions for
religious holdings (waqf) abolished in 1977.
5. Income tax on agriculture was introduced in 1977 (exemptions for small holdings)

Effect of the 1972 and 1977 reforms:

Under the 1973 reform, 1.3 million acres of land was resumed and 0.9 million of that was
distributed amongst 76,000 beneficiaries. Under the 1977 reform, another 1.8 million acres of
land was resumed of which 0.9 million acres was distributed amongst 13,143 beneficiaries.
By the end of the 1970s Ayyub Khan and Bhuttos measures had benefited only 272,000 out of
the total 10 million eligible rural populations, and only 4.5 million acres of cultivated land (less
than 10% of the total) were redistributed. The state, even at the heights of its power, proved
incapable of reigning in the landed elite. The two land reforms at best clipped their wings, but
they remained the most powerful force in rural Pakistan.
The reforms did not yield the expected results due to a variety of reasons which I cannot go into
due to the paucity of space. However, the commonly held view that it somehow failed merely
due to the lack of application of the law (accompanied by lack of enthusiasm for it) is not
necessarily wrong but is a very big simplification that ignores other causes (benchmark used
being 1940 productivity, etc.) and is aimed at vilifying the intentions of the people who brought
them forward. The lack of meaningful reform in Sind affirms this viewpoint (average land
holding in Punjab had come down to 466 acres compared to 566 acres in Sind both in violation
of the ceiling imposed). In Punjab, only 42% of the holdings in excess of the ceilings were taken
over compared to 59% in Sind. However, still 30% of the nations farm lands were owned by less
than 0.5% percent of the population. Meanwhile, wage laborers in rural areas had become a
burning socio-economic issue. Needless to say, the reforms did not radically change the nature of
land tenure in the Pakistan in practice, however it infuriated the landed aristocracy who were up
in arms over the issue and the 1977 abolition of exemption to religious holdings sent the religion-
political groups running around with their slogans against land reforms.

Economic Reforms:

Bhutto and his party came to rule by clamoring socialist reforms for the poor and deprived
classes of the state. Rotti, Kapra aur Makkan was there frequently enchanted slogan. Bhuttos
economic policies were influenced by socialist ideas and promises to the removal of feudalism.
Rapid industrialization created a gulf between different societies and exacerbated the grievances
of people.
The main step in order to reform economic system of Pakistan was the adoption of process of
Nationalization. Which was launched in early 70s when Bhutto came to power. Land Reforms,
Labor Reforms, Banking system and finance corporations were the main reforms in his era.
Arab-Israel war 1n 1973 caused rapid inflation in order to curtail that rupee was devalued which
proved to be favorable for time being and foreign also liquidated economy but after 2 years in
1974 inflation rose 20% to the previous growth.
Bhutto made efforts to curb inequality and feudalism and his policies reflected those ideas. His
reforms were slightly stringent than the previous one. By introducing MLR-115 land reforms
were made. That the maximum limit of land allowed to be owned was 150 acres of irrigated
land and 300 acres of un-irrigated land. However intra-family land transfer was allowed which
did not prove to be helpful. In 1977 he made more strict criteria the ceilings were lowered to 100
acres of irrigated land and 200 acres of un-irrigated land. On 10 th of Feb 1972 Bhutto announced
radical labor reforms that union power of labor was increased with formation of Work Councils
and Labor courts for industrial disputes. Profit sharing was increased in big industries from 2-
4%. Employers were given cheap housing and education for their children.
In Jan 1972, nationalization was introduced over thirty large firms in ten industries. Then after
few months this process exacerbated towards small and medium industries. In 1974 Bhutto
nationalized all private banks and in 1972 private colleges were nationalized in time of two years
and no compensation was given to those people who owned them at first place. After this process
Bhutto government owned about 2 billion of assets which were used properly as they should
have been. In 1976 public sector which was flouring rapidly had been descended to fall on
ground. More than 3000 of small manufacturing units were nationalized. Banks and Finance
corporations were nationalized in order to help other deprived classes. The deformation and
inefficiency seen in coming years regarding previously nationalized institutions were the
outcomes of Bhuttos so called economic reforms.

Era of Zia Ul Haq:

Introduction:
It may be too early to talk of historys verdict on Gen Zia Ul Haqs contribution to the Pakistani
peoples miseries but he is likely to be remembered as one of the few who caused the greatest
possible harm to Pakistan and its population. Driven by runaway ambition to seize power at a
time when the countrys political elite had found a way to resolve the PPP-PNA confrontation,
which both sides had unwisely fueled, and earned the dubious distinction of being the only
dictator in the countrys history to be denounced by the apex court as a usurper. Then, during his
decade-long rule hardly any part of public life in the country escaped his predatory forays.
Politicians and politics had been demonized in Pakistan ever since the bureaucracys rise to
power in the 1950s but Gen. Zia pushed the process to its ultimate limit by engineering the
execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after a trial that will haunt the countrys judiciary forever.
Bhutto was no angel and perhaps the people had more complaints against him than the contents
of the charge-sheet drawn up by the Zia regime. But the people alone had the right to judge and
punish him and this through a legitimate political process. By going all out to secure Bhuttos
hanging, Zia also strengthened the unsavory trends towards the politics of revenge and violence.
Further, he demonized political parties and politics by taking the unprecedented step of holding
non-party elections, the disastrous consequences of which, in the form of peoples alienation
from democratic politics, are evident to this day.
Land Reforms:
Here is no doubt that agriculture is the backbone of Pakistan. Forty three per cent of our labor
force depends on it for its livelihood and it constitutes a sizable portion of our GDP and exports.
We have often heard that land reforms are desperately needed and how they hold the key to
unleashing our agricultural potential and will play an important role in raising the living
standards of the poor of our nation. The argument could not be more right.
The last time an effort was made to rock the boat was by Ayyub Khan in 1959 and then by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1972 and 1977. The idea was simple take the land from the rich and
distribute it amongst the poor free of cost. This broad based Land Reforms Act affected one
Qazalbash Waqf with large tracts of land near Lahore. The Waqf, which had been in place for
centuries doing good for people in the name of God, approached the courts.
The Qazalbash Waqf argued that Islamic laws provide broad protection from expropriation to the
property owners if their property was acquired, in the first place through legitimate means.
However, the courts in December 1980 found nothing un-Islamic in the case and ruled against
the Waqf.

Meanwhile, much was changing as Zia Ul Haq had come into power in 1978 with his
Islamization agenda. After he took control, it was announced that firstly no law in Pakistan may
be repugnant to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah and secondly that federal Sharia courts were to
be established. In parallel, the martial law government picked up the heat and advised the
deprived:

It is not for employers to provide roti (bread), kapda (clothes) aur (and) makaan(homes). It was
for God Almighty who is the provider of livelihood to his people. Trust in God and He will
bestow upon you an abundance of good things in life. Zia Ul Haq

The Waqf didnt give up and filed a review petition and decided to wait it out. During the next
decade, 1980-1990, much changed on the political and societal front. Renowned Islamic
scholars like Taqi Usmani and others argued the case on the premise that the expropriation of
land, or any property, by the state without paying compensation is un-Islamic.
It was finally in 1990 that he was able to swing the courts ruled in favor of the Waqf. Whether it
was strength of Taqi Usmanis argument or the weakness of the opposition, land reforms were
declared un-Islamic.

Fast forward 20 years and we are still where we were not an inch forward. In the past half a
century scholars have interpreted the Islamic law both for and against the land reforms but the
way forward remains in limbo with much to talk about but little to do. We have a great deal too
gained and lose from an economic, social and human perspective. What we choose to do with
this will determine our future and define our history.
Political Reforms:
Besides Bhuttos hanging, Gen. Zia contributed to brutalization of society in several other ways.
By staging fully publicized hangings and floggings in public, he lowered the threshold of
tolerance in society. And by obliging courts to enforce harsh, inhuman, and degrading
punishments, he tried to deprive judicial authorities, as well as the people at large, of their prized
traits of restraint and compassion.
The result of Gen. Zias efforts to make the constitution and the laws subject to belief is that
Pakistan is facing difficulties in conserving its democratic foundations; the country has become
the most notorious exporter of militants and their extremist doctrines.

Zia dealt other blows, too, to the judiciarys independence and dignity. He abused the innovation
of asking the judges to make an oath upon an earlier oath to squeeze out judges suspected of
commitment to truth and justice a perverse tradition followed by the next usurper. He also
humiliated a chief justice by forcing him to grant him the power to amend the constitution by
threatening him with dismissal. (That the CJ became an accomplice by buckling down and was
discarded shortly afterwards is a different story.)
The media received its share of the Zia potion. He killed over a dozen newspapers with a single
stroke of his pen. He also maintained a regime of press censorship for the longest period in the
countrys history. In addition, he developed the art of corrupting journalists by distributing cash-
filled envelopes among them and ordering public institutions to advance them loans (non-
recoverable) although not all of them had asked for such favors. Finally, he not only threatened
journalists of being hung upside down but also had some of them flogged.
Women were a special target of his malice but in contest with them he met his Waterloo. The
more he tried to trap the women of Pakistan with his mantra of chader and chardivari, the more
they came out and braved police violence and torture in dungeons at more than one torture
centers. More women than ever took to the prohibited arts during the Zia period, which also saw
the birth of a robust womens movement that is still one of the redeeming features of public life
in Pakistan.
Above all, Gen. Zias choice of means to deal with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, his
role in distorting the concept of jihad, and his decision to wreck the Geneva Accords not only
made Pakistan a victim of what is described as Kalashnikov and drug mafia but which also had
worldwide repercussions. He is responsible, in no small measure, for the bloodshed in
Afghanistan and the destruction of that country. And Ziaul Haqs signatures can be seen on the
images of the carnage going on in Arab lands.
It is a tribute to the saner elements in society and their resilience that resistance to Gen. Zias
pernicious designs never ceased. Politicians wedded to democratic values survived the dark
decade and so did judges of integrity and journalists and social activists blessed with the courage
of their convictions. Yet, all of them put together have not been able to roll back Gen. Zias
thorny legacy. In a sense, Pakistan is still living under the canopy planted by Gen. Zia, thanks to
the changes in the laws of the country and its constitution made by him.
Gen. Zias greatest disservice to Pakistan and its society was an almost complete transformation
of the state into a controversial, theocratic entity that its founder had declared it was never going
to be.

Economic policies:

Rapid growth, widespread prosperity, and relatively stable prices made the Zia period appear to
be an era of exceptional political and economic stability in Pakistans history. Like Ayyub, Zia
relied heavily on the bureaucracy for economic management, and under the able guidance of Mr.
Ghulam Ishaq Khan the bureaucrats did a fair job of short-term economic management partly
under pressure from international financial institutions which provided critical balance of
payments support in the early and mid-1980s. The flexible exchange rate policy strengthened
export incentives and improved the climate for private investment. The initial reduction in
budget deficits, through additional taxation and efforts after 1980, to reduce subsidies and to
bring agricultural prices in line with international prices helped economic growth and moderated
the inflationary pressures. That high economic growth was partly a matter of luck and reflected
the influence of exogenous economic developments, notably the boom in worker remittances,
does not detract from the steady and more or less consistent day to day management of economic
policies during the 1980s.
However, major structural weaknesses remained in the economy and indeed were intensified in
some instances. Even though medium-term economic planning was revived in 1978, long-term
policy issues were either not pursued with any seriousness or suffered due to poor
implementation. A major criticism was the growth in public spending from 23.5 per cent of GDP
in 1976-7 to 27 percent in 1987-8. Government expenditures adjusted for inflation increased
nearly 150 per cent during 1977-88. Since revenue growth was slow, the budget deficits had
risen to an unsustainable level of over 8 per cent of GDP in the final years of the Zia regime
essentially mortgaging future production and price stability.

Finally, the two major policy problems inherited from the 1960s and the 1970s the inelasticity
of the tax system and the strong anti-export bias of the trade. The economic policy performance
of the Zia period was much better than that of the Bhutto period. The point, however, is that the
long period of political stability and sustained growth under Zia offered opportunities for
tackling the difficult underlying structural issues, which were not exploited. For instance, the
opportunities for raising national savings and improving the balance of payments offered by the
huge worker remittances and rapidly expanding economy were not seized. Instead, the
government launched another round of large increases in defense spending and pre-empted an
important part of private savings through large-scale non-bank borrowing. The relative roles of
state and private sector in development were left to be decided largely on the basis of inertia.
Weaknesses of the direct taxation collection machinery, a fundamental cause of continued heavy
reliance on indirect taxation, were not addressed even though martial law extended over a period
of eight and a half years. The policy-makers did not learn from the mistakes of the 1960s, such as
the overemphasis on growth, the neglect of the social sector, and lack of adequate attention to
structural change in agriculture and large-scale industry. They were also slow to gain from the
experience of East Asian countries where a economic miracle had been unfolding.

Just as much of the credit for the relatively good short-term economic management must be
given to Ghulam Ishaq, a good deal of the responsibility for the missed opportunities in
economic policy and neglect of structural issues must rest on him because he was clearly in
charge of countrys finances and economic apparatus during 1978-85. Ishaq, a strong and able
economic manager, had, however, a public sector bias which dated from his days (1961-5) as the
successful chairman of WAPDA in West Pakistan. His mis*trust of the private sector was
probably a factor in his acceptance of the Bhutto nationalization as fait accomplish. Bureaucracy
as a whole also quickly came to appreciate the power and the privileges, which an extended
public sector afforded it. Zias early attempt to involve pro-private sector individuals in decision-
making was successfully undercut by Ishaq. Similarly, like many other economic managers in
Pakistan, Ishaq was not totally convinced about the advantages of a strategy of labor-intensive
manufactured export growth based on imported raw materials. Ishaq did make major efforts after
1978 at re-imposing financial discipline and mobilizing additional resources but was much less
successful in improving the efficiency of the tax system.

Comparison of Reforms: