Uy Vs Sandiganbayan

Case Digest: Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of the Philippines GR Nos 172476-
99
Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of the Philippines
GR Nos 172476-99 September 15, 2010
Facts:
Ramiscal Jr (Ramiscal) was a retired officer of AFP and the former president of AFP-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of
AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development as housing
projects. On August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the
attorney-in-fact of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st
Deed) over the subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After the
payment @ P 10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral Deed of Sale
(2nd Deed) over the same property with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m.
Thereafter the 2nd Deed was presented by Flaviano for registration which became the basis
of the Certificate of Title of the said property.
Ramiscal Jr filed his first Motion for Reconsideration date February 12, 1999 with a
supplemental motion dated May 28, 1999 regarding the findings of the Ombudsman. With
this, a panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case, they found out
that Ramiscal Jr., indeed participated in an affixed his signature on the contracts and found
probable cause. The Ombudsman acted positively on the findings of the prosecutor and
scheduled the arraignment of Ramiscal Jr. Howver, Ramiscal Jr., refused to enter a plea for
petitioner on the ground that there is a pending resolution of his second Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration is valid and should hold his
arraignment.
Whether or not there is probable cause to file a case for violation of Section 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and falsification of public documents.
Ruling:
No, Sec 7 of Rule 11 of the Rules provides that only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed xxxxx the filing of a
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filling of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject
of the motion.
The arraignment may be suspended under Sec. 11 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court are:
unsoundness of mind, prejudicial question and a pending petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor in the DOJ in which the suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
Ramiscal Jr., failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case.
With respect to the finding of probable cause, it is the Ombudsman who has the full
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with the said court, it is the Sandiganbayan,
and no longer the Ombudsman which has full control of the case. Ramiscal Jr., failed to
establish that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion, thus, there is probable
cause in the filing of the case.
Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan Digest
G.R. Nos. 172476-99: September 15, 2010
BRIG GEN. (RET.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with
the rank of Brigadier General. when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the
acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing
projects.
AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual
vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the
actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter.
Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the
basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-
RSBS.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which
includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with
27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsmanfound petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.
THE Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
and 12 informations for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the
informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing
that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale,
and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property.
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP
recommending the dropping of petitioners name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the
OMB-Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first
motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found that petitioner indeed
participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various
agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per
square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution
of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter.
The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioners continued prosecution.
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that
whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in denying petitioners motion to set aside his
arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
finding of probable cause against him
POLITICAL LAW: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the
immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even
during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration.
HELD:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15,
Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of
probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the
Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration.
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be
allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman,
or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases
where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding
information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.
(Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of
the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the
normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court
must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from
the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later,
thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall
be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. xxx
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same
thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court.
Furthermore, Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for
suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it
proceeded with petitioners arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
UY vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001
DOCTRINE: (1) RA 8249, the latest amendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that
such will have jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the Philippine Army and air force
colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher rank.
(2) The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees
during their tenure of office.
FACTS: Petitioner George Uy was the deputy comptroller of the Philippine Navy designated to act on
behalf of Captain Fernandez, the latters supervisor, on matters relating the activities of the Fiscal
Control Branch. Six informations for Estafa through falsification of official documents and one
information for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act) were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner Uy and 19 other accused. The petitioner was said to have signed a
P.O. stating that the unit received 1,000 pieces of seal rings when in fact, only 100 were ordered. The
Sandiganbayan recommended that the infomations be withdrawn against some of the accused after a
comprehensive investigation.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that it is the Court Martial and not the Sandiganbayan
which has jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused. Petitioner further contends
that RA 1850 which provides for the jurisdiction of court martial should govern in this case
The court ruled that: It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner
since he was a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of
the Articles of War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for the trial by courts-martial of
members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank requirement
stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the
regular courts ,as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that In cases where none of the accused
are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic
Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against Uy in the RTC. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers
only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, which was then denied. The
instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto of the Court's
ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.
ISSUE: (1) WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the person of the
petitioner
(2) WON the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
HELD: (1) No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
(2) No, the power of the Ombudsman is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority between the Ombudsman and other investigative agencies of the government in prosecution of
cases.
RATIO: (1) The fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. Thus, Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
petitioner at the time of the filing of the informations and as now prescribed by law.
RA 8249, the latest amendment of PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan provides that such will have
jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 of members of the Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval
captains and all officers of higher rank.
In the case at bar, while the petitioner is charged with violation of RA 3018, his position as Lieutenant
Commander of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval captains and all officers of higher rank. It
must be noted that both the nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are
conditions sine qua non before Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. Thus, regular
courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the person of the accused as provided by the
Sandiganbayan Law which states that incase where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper
RTC, MTC, MCTC or METC pursuant to BP Blg. 129. Consequently, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction
over the offense charged since under Section 9 of RA 3019, the commission of any violation of said law
shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month to fifteen years. The
indictment of the petitioner therefore cannot fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC, METC or MCTC.
(2) The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all
criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any
illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other
offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public
officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770,
the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Even a perusal of the law (PD
1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the
amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of theOmbudsman
was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
GEORGE UY, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN
AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. Nos. 105965-70,
March 20, 2001 ]
FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

blogID=1058219614445985143G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was
Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Comptrollership was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA
3019. The petitioner filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged and that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the
offense.
The court ruled that :
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a
regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of
War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the
Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines
2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank
requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is
vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that In cases where none of
the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision
dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
RULING: No. The http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as
well. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman is plenary
and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It
has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other
offenses committed by public officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public
officers and employees is one of the most important functions of
the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman. In passing
RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of
thehttp://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman then (to be
known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its
inception, the Office of thehttp://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?
blogID=1058219614445985143Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and
prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
Sta.RosaMiningCompanyvs.AssistantProvincialFiscalZabala[GRL44723,31August1987]EnBanc,Bidin
(J):12concur,1tooknopartFacts:On21March1974,Sta.RosaMiningCompanyfiledacomplaintfor
attemptedtheftofmaterials(scrapiron)formingpartoftheinstallationsonitsminingpropertyatJosePanganiban,
CamarinesNorteagainstRomeoGarridoandGilAlapanwiththeOfficeoftheProvincialFiscalofCamarines
Norte,thenheadedbyProvincialFiscalJoaquinIlustre.ThecasewasassignedtothirdAssistantFiscalEstebanP.
Panotesforpreliminaryinvestigationwho,afterconductingsaidinvestigation,issuedaresolutiondated26August
1974recommendingthataninformationforAttemptedTheftbefiledagainstGarridoandAlapanonafindingof
primafaciecasewhichresolutionwasapprovedbyFiscalIlustre.GarridoandAlapansoughtreconsiderationofthe
resolutionbutthesamewasdeniedbyFiscalIlustreinaresolutiondated14October1974.On29October1974,
FiscalIlustrefiledwiththeCourtofFirstInstance(CFI)ofCamarinesNorteanInformationdated17October1987
(CriminalCase821),chargingGarridoaandAlapanwiththecrimeofAttemptedTheft.Inaletterdated22October
1974,GarridoandAlapanrequestedtheSecretaryofJusticeforareviewoftheResolutionsoftheOfficeofthe
ProvincialFiscaldated26August1974and14October1974.On6November1974,theChiefStateProsecutor
orderedtheProvincialFiscalbytelegramto"elevateentirerecordsPFOCase577againstGarridoetal.,reviewin
fivedaysanddeferallproceedingspendingreview."On6March1975,theSecretaryofJustice,afterreviewingthe
records,reversedthefindingsofprimafaciecaseoftheProvincialFiscalanddirectedsaidprosecutingofficerto
immediatelymoveforthedismissalofthecriminalcase.TheCompanysoughtreconsiderationofthedirectiveof
theSecretaryofJusticebutthelatterdeniedthesameinaletterdated11June1975.Amotiontodismissdated16
September1975wasthenfiledbytheProvincialFiscalbutthecourtdeniedthemotiononthegroundthatthere
wasaprimafacieevidenceagainstGarridoandAlapanandsetthecasefortrialon25February1976.Garridoand
Alapansoughtreconsiderationofthecourt'srulingbutinanOrderdated13February1976,themotionfiledfor
saidpurposewaslikewisedenied.Trialofthecasewasresetto23April1976.Thereafter,FiscalIlustrewas
appointedajudgeintheCFIofAlbayandFiscalZabalabecameofficerinchargeoftheProvincialFiscal'sOffice
ofCamarinesNorte.On19April1976,FiscalZabalafiledaSecondMotiontoDismissthecase.Thissecond
motiontodismisswasdeniedbythetrialcourtinanorderdated23April1976.Whereupon,FiscalZabala
manifestedthathewouldnotprosecutethecaseanddisauthorizedanyprivateprosecutortoappeartherein.Hence,
theCompanyfiledapetitionformandamusbeforetheSupremeCourt.Issue:Whetherthefiscalcanrefuseto
prosecutethecaseiftheSecretaryofJusticereversedthefindingsofprimafaciecasebythefiscal.Held:Ifthe
fiscalisnotatallconvincedthataprimafaciecaseexists,hesimplycannotmoveforthedismissalofthecaseand,
whendenied,refusetoprosecutethesame.Heisobligedbylawtoproceedandprosecutethecriminalaction.He
cannotimposehisopiniononthetrialcourt.Atleastwhathecandoistocontinueappearingfortheprosecution
andthenturnoverthepresentationofevidencetoanotherfiscaloraprivateprosecutorsubjecttohisdirectionand
control.Wherethereisnootherprosecutoravailable,heshouldproceedtodischargehisdutyandpresentthe
evidencetothebestofhisabilityandletthecourtdecidethemeritsofthecaseonthebasisoftheevidence
adducedbybothparties.ThemerefactthattheSecretaryofJusticehad,afterreviewingtherecordsofthecase,
directedtheprosecutingfiscaltomoveforthedismissalofthecaseandthemotiontodismissfiledpursuanttosaid
directiveisdeniedbythetrialcourt,isnojustificationfortherefusalofthefiscaltoprosecutethecase.Oncea
complaintorinformationisfiledinCourtanydispositionofthecaseasitsdismissalortheconvictionoracquittal
oftheaccusedrestsinthesounddiscretionoftheCourt.TheCourtisthebestandsolejudgeonwhattodowith
thecasebeforeit.Thedeterminationofthecaseiswithinitsexclusivejurisdictionandcompetence.Amotionto
dismissthecasefiledbythefiscalshouldheaddressedtotheCourtwhohastheoptiontograntordenythesame.
Itdoesnotmatterifthisisdonebeforeorafterthearraignmentoftheaccusedorthatthemotionwasfiledaftera
reinvestigationoruponinstructionsoftheSecretaryofJusticewhoreviewedtherecordsoftheinvestigation.
STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY vs. ASSISTANT PROV FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA
Facts:
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case.
In March 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft against Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte.
The case was assigned to Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who filed the
information for Attempted Theft on a prima facie case which was approved by Prov Fiscal Joaquin
Ilustre.
Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte the Information.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of prima facie case and directed said
prosecuting officer to dismiss the case.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Motion to Dismiss the case which was denied.
The fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the fiscal be compelled to prosecute the case, after motion to dismiss has been denied
by the trial court?
Held:
Notwithstanding his personal convictions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence
to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment.
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for
the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same.
He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action.
He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the
prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court.
CASE: JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE AUTHOR: Magsanay
TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and NOTES: Prosecuting Officer, as
MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners, the representative of the state,
vs. always controls and directs the
JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding private prosecutors
Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, (representative of the offended
Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, party).
respondents.
[G.R. No. DATE] G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976
TOPIC: Rule 110 Complaint or Information
PONENTE: ANTONIO, J
PETITIONERS:
Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment
of respondent Judge's Orders
(a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to
disqualify or to inhibit himself (insert the facts of the bribery of Judge Gallardo
in the powerpoint) from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial;
(b)Order of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and
(c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein)
from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the National Penitentiary,
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of
prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with
the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
Petitioner assert that Judge Gallardo illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the two
cases against them. During the trial of those cases, Judge Gallardo received two bottles of whisky from
Mayor Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims. One of the private prosecutors gave a
bottle of wine and something else inside the wrappings. The decision in those cases were literally
copied, although with some corrections, from the memorandum of the prosecution, and Judge Gallardo
changed the double life sentence to death penalty. Therefore, petitioners strongly present that his
decisions were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice.
February 12, 1976, the petitioners averred that the private prosecutor has
"absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings and, hence, without any
personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.
RESPONDENT:
August 27, 1975 Judge Gallardo was given a temporary restraining order to enjoin from further
proceeding with the criminal cases.
January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
submitted that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution were not free from
suspicion of bias and prejudice. Considering the circumstances of the instant case,
the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the
evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to
have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to
avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being
dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of
said official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition
of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proffered by
the accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as may
be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the
aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial
judge, after the parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they may
wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court may deem
fit to impose.
January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of
the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this
case.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this
Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to
that of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE(S): WON the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of
the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the
proceedings?
HELD: NO. the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a
position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General.
WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial
court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and
to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence.
RATIO:
Resolution of October 1, 1975: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the
preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To
collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was
never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of
or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.
Suarez v. Platon, et al., the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."
People v. Esquivel, et al., that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting
attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with
methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps
and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape
unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to
the accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-
mentioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the
direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the
offended party, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or
reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended party may intervene in the
proceedings, personally or by attorney, especially in case of offenses which
cannot be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. 6 The only
exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or
expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in
which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to
have lost his interest in its prosecution.
And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a
criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and
control of the prosecuting official. "
Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is
authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the Fiscal."
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they
are NOT IN CONTROL OF THE CASE, and their interests are subordinate to those
of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. The right which the
procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the
prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal
action and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
People v. Orais: the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that
of the promotor fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent
the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution
of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to
institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or
not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, except when the
case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the offended
party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding.
Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the
competent Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal
thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured
by the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the
accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not
entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a
public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his
right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it
cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the promotor
fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order
overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the
promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58.
To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an
order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition
of the promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the
direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the
above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58.
There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the
Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of
Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining
the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides:
SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor

General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies
and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ...
The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government, and such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a
lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party.
xxx xxx xxx
(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court,
tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which in
his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may
require.
It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to
represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private
prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take
a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be
tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal
proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
PEOPLE v. TEVES
July 20, 1999 | Davide, C.J. | Automatic Review | Complaint and Information Form and Constituent
Allegations
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines

RESPONDENT: Godofredo Teves
SUMMARY: Godofredo Teves was charged with multiple rape of his 13 yr. old daughter. Four
informations of rape were filed against him with the accusatory portion for each informations containing
the same charge with the date as the only difference. His daughter, Cherry, narrated on the witness
stand the different instances when his father took advantage of her. Godofredo relied his defense to
rebut such narration on alibi and denial. The court convicted the accused of simple rape on two of the
cases filed against the latter but acquitted him on the other two due to the fact that it was not
corroborated by Cherrys testimony. The court, however, did not appreciate the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship to make the felony one of qualified rape since they were not alleged in the
information. Hence, the offense was that of simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
DOCTRINE: For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must have been specifically pleaded in
the information. This is in conformity with the rule that the Constitution guarantees the right of every
person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation
against him.
FACTS:
1. Cherry Rose Teves filed complaint against his father for multiple counts of rape committed against
her. These were allegedly committed since 1993 up to the 1st, 3rd and 8th day of January 1995.
2. The provincial prosecutor of Cavite filed four separate informations of rape against Godofredo.
Except for the dates, the accusatory portions of the informations were similar which emphasizes that
Godofredo take undue advantage over the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen years old.
3. The four cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Upon arraignment, Godofredo pleaded not
guilty.
4. As his defense, Godofredo relied solely on the basis of alibi and denial stating that the testimony
of his daughter is hollow and totally unworthy of belief.
5. Cherry testified that on the day before New Year of 1995 her father touched her breast. On that
same day she was raped by her father. A week after that she was also raped by her father while she was
taking a bath by asking her to pass the tabo. And on another occasion she was was raped by her
father after asking her brother to buy cigarettes. She testified that her mother was a laundrywoman and
was away during those instances that her father took advantage of her.
6. The trial court applied Sec. 335 of RPC as amended by Sec. 11 of RA 7659 which imposes death
penalty when the victim is below 18 yrs of age (she is only 13 yrs old at that time) and the accused is the
parent.
7. Godofredo contend that Cherrys testimony contained uncertain and conflicting answers: 1) She
failed to recall the exact date and details of the rape instances; 2) The testimony did not prove force and
intimidation; 3) The evidence was purely speculative and conjectural; 4) there is unreasonable delay in
the filing of the complaint (2 years).
ISSUE/S: (Main Issue in class is Issue #7)

1. WON Cherrys testimony is credible? YES
2. WON inconsistencies in tstimony weaken the Case? NO
3. WON forcible carnal knowledge is proven? YES
4. WON the delay in instituting the criminal charge gives doubt to the guild of Godofredo? NO
5. WON there is ill motive in the charge? NO
6. WON all the charges were sufficiently proven? NO
7. WON death penalty is properly imposed? - NO
RULING: CA decision is REVERSED for Criminal Cases 3872-95 and 3874-95 and accused is
ACQUITTED therein, and MODIFIED as to Criminal Cases 3873-95 and 3875-95. As modified, said
accused is found GUILTY of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer penalty of reclusion perpetua.
RATIO:
1. When the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question as it
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial.
The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstance of weight and substance which
could affect the result of the case. We sustain the trial courts ruling as to the credibility of CHERRY and
find that GODOFREDO miserably failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the exceptions. Our
review of CHERRYs testimony has us fully convinced of her sincerity, candor and truthfulness as to the
fact of rape, to the extent that the only issue to be resolved is the number of times she was raped.
2. What must be borne in mind was that she was merely fourteen (14) years old when she testified;
moreover, GODOFREDO did not object to her testimony as to the time of the commission of the crime. It
is settled that the precise time of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. We
cannot reasonably expect her to recount in detail her humiliating experience since the accused is of her
own flesh and blood. The natural vacillation of a daughter to publicly denounce her father and to testify
in an unfamiliar and unfriendly environment on such a delicate matter very well explain the minor lapses
in her testimony. We find no iota of evidence showing that CHERRYs account was a result of deliberate
falsehood. Settled is the rule that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor matters do not impair the
essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness honesty. Such
inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of the memory, even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken the credibility of the witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed
testimony.
3. In a rape committed by a father against his daughter, the moral dominance and parental influence
that essentially flows from the reverence and respect a child has toward their parents which are
ingrained and observed in the minds of the Filipino children, substitute for force and intimidation, which
produce reasonable fear in the child.
4. The delay in instituting the present criminal prosecution likewise does not engender doubt as to
GODOFREDOs guilt, in light of the established fact that CHERRY kept silent about the incident because
of GODOFREDOs death threat. CHERRY, a young barrio lass and with a simple and unsophisticated
mind, cannot be expected to have the fortitude and courage of an adult, mature and experienced woman
who may disregard the threat and, with promptitude, condemn in the open the shameful scandal wrought
upon her by her very own father. It is not uncommon that young girls usually conceal for some time the
assault upon them because of the threats on their lives.
5. There is absolutely no showing that CHERRY was actuated by a sinister motive to falsely charge
and implicate her own father in a serious crime. Briefly, if she did admit the ignominy she had
undergone, allowed her private parts to be examined, exposed herself to the trouble and inconvenience
of a public trial and endure the embarrassments and humiliation which a public revelation of what ought
to be kept secret, she had nothing in mind except to obtain justice.
6. It is clear to that the rapes that were duly proved were those committed on: (a) New Years day of
1995; (b) a week after said New Years day; and (c) on 23 January 1995. There is no factual basis for
the rapes charged in the information in Criminal Case 3872-95, allegedly committed sometime in the
year 1993, and in the information in Criminal Case 3874-95, on 3 January 1995.
7. Pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659, the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases under the
last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with any of the
seven attendant circumstances. These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature
of the crime of rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances. Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere
aggravating circumstances, which merely increase the period of the penalty. Hence, these qualifying
circumstances must be specifically pleaded in the information. The Constitution guarantees the right of
every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of
Court. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-95 and 3875-95 do not sufficiently allege the twin
special qualifying circumstances of the victims age and the relationship between the culprit and the
victim. What is emphasized in the informations is that GODOFREDO took undue advantage to the
person of his own daughter. To impose upon GODOFREDO the penalty of death under these
circumstances would be to deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation. The penalty should thus only be for simple rape, in each of the two cases, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua under the second paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
Hipos Sr vs Bay GR No 174813-15 17 March 2009
Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel
and two others before RTC presided by Judge Bay. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-
accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. Hipos
and other filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed against them. However, 2nd Asst.
City Prosecutor reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable cause. City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the
motion hence the petition.
Issue: WON the Hon. Supreme compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of
mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no
probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw
information.
Decision: Petition bereft of merit.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done,
when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it
is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in
those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise
of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either. While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to
Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at
bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had
already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available

anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of
Judge Bay.
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO
REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING
ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice,
Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information
for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos,
Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
Private complainants filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against
petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.
Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the
crimes charged.
The Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed against petitioners and
their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86.
The 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, reversed the holding that there
was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
ISSUE:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?
RULING:
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done,
when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise
of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to
grant the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against
petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial
discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion
are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action
in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act
on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same,
he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the
case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had
already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore.
If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of
Judge Bay.
CRESPO VS. MOGUL RULING DOES NOT APPLY.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor
General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper
remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners
cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou:
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a
grave abuse of such discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in
special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but
as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of
discretion that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such
a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not
certiorari or prohibition. (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context...xxx... We held that even
this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not
find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the PROSECUTORS in
that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of
charges against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but
against the TRIAL COURT, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to
Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The prosecution has already
filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr., we reiterated the doctrine
we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul, that once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal
or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court.
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should
be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary
to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information
or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only
qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the
accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When
the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the
Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or
defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial
prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should
have "deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an
accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for
reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on
the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss
based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was
taken thereon to the Department of Justice.
As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant
to establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor
of whether or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the
discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the
court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a
motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after
a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records
upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the
court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the
People to due process of law.
In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant
their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to
compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is
never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular
way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the
ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of
the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such
motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.
Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding
of probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the
case. After going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court
that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial.
We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful
of the undue influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is
only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
ALBERTVSSANDIGANBAYAN580SCRA279
FACTS:
SpecialProsecutionOfficerIIoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanforMindanaochargedtheaccusedin
violationofSection3(e)R.A.3019.ItallegedintheinformationthatRAMONA.ALBERT,apublicofficer,
thePresidentoftheNationalHomeMortgageandFinanceCorporationwithsalarygradeofabove27
actedwithevidentbadfaithandmanifestpartialityandorgrossneglectofduty,enterandmakeit
21
appearinTaxDeclarationthattwoparcelsofrealpropertyareresidentiallandswhenintruthandin
fact,thetwopiecesofrealpropertyagriculturalland,andbyreasonofaccusedsmisrepresentation,the
NHMFCreleasedtheamountwhichishigherthantheloanableamountthelandcouldcommandbeing
agricultural,thuscausingundueinjurytothegovernment.
SandiganbayanissuedaHoldDepartureOrderagainstpetitionerandhiscoaccused.Petitionerfileda
MotiontoDismiss.PendingtheresolutionoftheMotiontoDismiss,petitionerfiledaMotiontoLiftHold
DepartureOrderandtobeAllowedtoTravel.Theprosecutiondidnotobjecttothelattermotiononthe
conditionthatpetitionerwouldbe"provisionally"arraigned.Sandiganbayanarraignedpetitionerwho
enteredapleaof"notguilty."SandiganbayandeniedpetitionersMotiontoDismissandorderedthe
prosecutiontoconductareinvestigation.On7October2003,theprosecutionfiledaMotionforLeave
toAdmitAmendedInformationwhichreplacedgrossneglectofduty"with"grossinexcusable
negligence.Petitioneropposedthemotion,allegingthattheamendmentmadeontheinformationis
substantialand,therefore,notallowedafterarraignment.Sandiganbayangrantedtheprosecutions
MotiontoAdmitAmendedInformation.Itruledthatevengrantingthattheamendmentofthe
informationbeformalorsubstantial,theprosecutioncouldstilleffectthesameintheeventthatthe
accusedhadnotyetundergoneapermanentarraignment.PetitionerfiledaMotionforReconsideration,
whichwasdeniedbytheSandiganbayan.Hence,thispetition.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthereplacementofgrossneglectofduty"with"grossinexcusablenegligence"isa
substantialamendmentoftheInformationwhichisprejudicialtohisrights
HELD:
NO.Thetestastowhentherightsofanaccusedareprejudicedbytheamendmentofacomplaintor
informationiswhenadefenseunderthecomplaintorinformation,asitoriginallystood,wouldno
longerbeavailableaftertheamendmentismade,andwhenanyevidencetheaccusedmighthave,
wouldbeinapplicabletothecomplaintorinformationasamended.Ontheotherhand,anamendment
whichmerelystateswithadditionalprecisionsomethingwhichisalreadycontainedintheoriginal
informationandwhich,therefore,addsnothingessentialforconvictionforthecrimechargedisan
amendmenttoformthatcanbemadeatanytime.Inthiscase,theamendmententailsthedeletionof
thephrase"grossneglectofduty"fromtheInformation.Althoughthismaybeconsideredasubstantial
amendment,thesameisallowableevenafterarraignmentandpleabeingbeneficialtotheaccused.Asa
replacement,"grossinexcusablenegligence"wouldbeincludedintheInformationasamodalityinthe
commissionoftheoffense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRIQUE GALVEZ, accused-

appellant.
FACTS: At the time of the incidents complained of, private complainant AAA, the niece of accused-
appellant Galvez, was thirteen (13) years old.
On several occasions during the summer vacation of 1995, complainant AAA stayed at
the house of her father's brother, accused-appellant Galvez, at Sitio [XXX], Barangay [YYY],
Subic, Zambales, to keep company accused-appellant's wife.
On several days, such as on May 14, 15, 16 and 18, 1995, when accused-appellant's wife
was not in the house, accused-appellant Galvez removed AAA's clothes and underwear, went on
top of AAA, forced himself on AAA, and had sexual intercourse with her. Private complainant
could not do anything.
Afterwards, AAA was able to leave accused-appellant's house and go to her house.
There, AAA told her father what had happened to her. AAA's father brought her to the Subic
Police Station, where she gave a Sworn Statement [about the alleged incidents of rape].
Afterwards, AAA's father brought her to the San Marcelino District Hospital, where AAA was
examined by Dra. Echaluse.
ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF QUALIFIED RAPE.
SC RULING: NO, The accused is not guilty of qualified
rape but is guilty of simple rape.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape and enumerates its elements, to wit:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Carnal knowledge
Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into the female
organ; the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the
victim's genitalia constitutes consummated rape.
Moral ascendancy in substitution of
violence and intimidation
With respect to the element of violence or intimidation, it is settled in jurisprudence that said element
may be substituted by moral ascendancy. 36 The Court reiterated this rule in numerous cases where the
offender and the victim were the uncle and niece respectively. 37
In this case, the CA recognized the existence of moral ascendancy because accused-appellant is AAA's
uncle and AAA lived with him and his wife during the time the acts of rape occurred. 38 We agree with the CA
that accused-appellant had moral ascendancy over AAA who was a young girl living in accused-appellant's
house where the only adults to provide for and discipline AAA were the accused and his wife.
Qualifying circumstance of the
victim being below 18 years of age
coupled with the fact that the
offender is a relative within the
third degree of said victim|||
With respect to the element that makes the offense qualified rape, that is, the minority of
the victim coupled with the fact that the accused is related to her within the third civil
degree, 41 it bears stressing that both minority and the third degree relationship must be
established.||| (People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 212929, [July 29, 2015])
In this case, no birth certificate was offered in evidence to prove AAA's age. 43 Neither was
there any other authentic document offered to prove AAA's age. It must also be pointed out
that there is doubt as to AAA's real age based on the records of this case.
Since the Informations contained only a statement that the accused-appellant was the uncle of AAA without
stating that they were relatives within the third civil degree, the qualifying circumstance of relationship cannot
likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
In sum, since the prosecution was able to prove the elements of carnal knowledge and the moral ascendancy of
accused-appellant over AAA but failed to clearly prove the age of AAA and allege the third degree relationship
between accused-appellant and AAA, accused-appellant should be convicted of the crimes of simple rape only.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARSENIO D. MISA III, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
That on or about the 18th day of October 2004 at about 12:00 p.m. more or less, in the
City of Talisay, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there have
carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 5 a minor, 8 years of age, without the consent and against
the will of the latter, thus committing other acts of child abuse or other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The Information was later on amended changing AAA's age to eleven years old. 7
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 8 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF QUALIFIED RAPE/
SC RULING. NO, THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF SIMPLE RAPE.
A person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable of
giving consent to a sexual act. 31 The crime of rape is defined and punished under Article 266-A and Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC). It provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
For a successful prosecution for the crime of statutory rape there are two elements which must be
proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the incident and (2) carnal knowledge by
the assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an accused may be found guilty of statutory rape.
This Court has held that for minority to be considered as an element of a crime or a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it must also be established
with moral certainty.
Absent AAA's certificate of live birth and other means by which her age as alleged in the Information could have
been ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained to agree with the CA and deem the crime committed as
simple rape.|||
G.R. No. 206442 July 1, 2015

JOVITO CANCERAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
The records disclose that Canceran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was charged with
"Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:
That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery Department,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Jovito Canceran, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another with his co-accused
Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever Philippines merchandiser both of
Ororama Mega Center, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream
valued at P28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center, represented by William Michael N. Arcenio, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of theft as a consequence but, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of some cause independent of accuseds will, that is, they were discovered by the
employees of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds
White Beauty Cream, to the damage and prejudice of the Ororama Mega Center.
ISSUE: whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information
RULING:
Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against
person or force upon things. "Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of
execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all."18
"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the concept
of taking itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen
item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and not frustrated
stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking not having been
accomplished."19
A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated
Theft" only.
As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of
consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead, the
Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage only.
Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.
The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this case,
although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of
Attempted Theft only.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARSENIO D. MISA III, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
That on or about the 18th day of October 2004 at about 12:00 p.m. more or less, in the
City of Talisay, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there have
carnal knowledge with one [AAA], 5 a minor, 8 years of age, without the consent and against
the will of the latter, thus committing other acts of child abuse or other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The Information was later on amended changing AAA's age to eleven years old. 7
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 8 After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
ISSUE: WON THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF QUALIFIED RAPE/
SC RULING. NO, THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF SIMPLE RAPE.
A person commits rape when he sexually assaults another who does not consent or is incapable of
giving consent to a sexual act. 31 The crime of rape is defined and punished under Article 266-A and Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC). It provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
For a successful prosecution for the crime of statutory rape there are two elements which must be
proven: (1) that the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of the incident and (2) carnal knowledge by
the assailant of the victim. Both must be proven before an accused may be found guilty of statutory rape.
This Court has held that for minority to be considered as an element of a crime or a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape, it must not only be alleged in the Information, but it must also be established
with moral certainty.
Absent AAA's certificate of live birth and other means by which her age as alleged in the Information could have
been ascertained beyond doubt, this Court is constrained to agree with the CA and deem the crime committed as
simple rape.|||

Uy Vs Sandiganbayan

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Case Digest: Ramiscal Jr vs SANDIGANBAYAN and People of the Philippines GR Nos 172476-

GR Nos 172476-99 September 15, 2010

Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.

HELD: (1) No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

RULING: No. The http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

The exercise by the http://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?

Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case.

He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action.

SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

PETITIONER: People of the Philippines

ISSUE/S: (Main Issue in class is Issue #7)

Hipos Sr vs Bay GR No 174813-15 17 March 2009

motion hence the petition.

Decision: Petition bereft of merit.

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to

is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action

Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be

already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available

G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRIQUE GALVEZ, accused-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARSENIO D. MISA III, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 206442 July 1, 2015

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