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51 Spouses Perea v. Spouses Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, The Pereas appealed.

The Pereas appealed. They argued that the award was improper as Aaron was
merely a high school student, hence, the award of such damages was merely
August 29, 2012
speculative. They cited the case of People vs Teehankee where the Supreme Court
did not award damages for the loss of earning capacity despite the fact that the victim
there was enrolled in a pilot school.
Torts and Damages Heirs of a high school student may be awarded damages for
loss income ISSUES: Whether or not the defense of due diligence of a good father by the Pereas
is untenable. Whether or not the award of damages for loss of income is proper.
In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate contracted Teodoro and Nanette Perea to
transport their (Zarates) son, Aaron Zarate, to and from school. The Pereas were HELD: Yes, in both issues.
owners of a van being used for private school transport.
Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father
At about 6:45am of August 22, 1996, the driver of the said private van, Clemente
Alfaro, while the children were on board including Aaron, decided to take a short cut
This defense is not tenable in this case. The Pereas are common carriers. They are
in order to avoid traffic. The usual short cut was a railroad crossing of the Philippine
not merely private carriers. (Prior to this case, the status of private transport for
National Railway (PNR).
school services or school buses is not well settled as to whether or not they are
private or common carriers but they were generally regarded as private carriers).
Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to block vehicles crossing the railway) Private transport for schools are common carriers. The Pereas, as the operators of a
was up which means it was okay to cross. He then tried to overtake a bus. However, school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a
there was in fact an oncoming train but Alfaro no longer saw the train as his view was business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking to carry passengers over
already blocked by the bus he was trying to overtake. The bus was able to cross established roads by the method by which the business was conducted; and (c)
unscathed but the vans rear end was hit. During the collision, Aaron, was thrown off transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited clientle, the Pereas
the van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head was severed. He was only 15 operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready
years old. transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or
near where they operated the service and for a fee.
It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the train honking from 50 meters away
before the collision because the vans stereo was playing loudly. Being a common carrier, what is required of the Pereas is not mere diligence of a
good father. What is specifically required from them by law is extraordinary diligence
The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereas (Alfaro became at-large). Their cause of a fact which they failed to prove in court. Verily, their obligation as common carriers
action against PNR was based on quasi-delict. Their cause of action against the did not cease upon their exercise of diligently choosing Alfaro as their employee.
Pereas was based on breach of contract of common carriage.
(It is recommended that you read the full text, the Supreme Court made an elaborate
In their defense, the Pereas invoked that as private carriers they were not negligent and extensive definition of common and private carriers as well as their distinctions.)
in selecting Alfaro as their driver as they made sure that he had a drivers license and
that he was not involved in any accident prior to his being hired. In short, they Award of Damages for Aarons loss of earning capacity despite he being a high
observed the diligence of a good father in selecting their employee. school student at the time of his death

PNR also disclaimed liability as they insist that the railroad crossing they placed there The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a reputable school (Don Bosco). He was
was not meant for railroad crossing (really, thats their defense!). of normal health and was an able-bodied person. Further, the basis of the
computation of his earning capacity was not on what he would have become. It was
The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In the based on the current minimum wage. The minimum wage was validly used because
decision of the RTC and the CA, they awarded damages in favor of the Zarates for with his circumstances at the time of his death, it is most certain that had he lived, he
the loss of earning capacity of their dead son. would at least be a minimum wage earner by the time he starts working. This is not
being speculative at all.
The Teehankee case was different because in that case, the reason why no damages passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death, (2)
were awarded for loss of earning capacity was that the defendants there were indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages.
already assuming that the victim would indeed become a pilot hence, that made the In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled
assumption speculative. But in the case of Aaron, there was no speculation as to to indemnity for the death of Marie Grace which under current
what he might be but whatever hell become, it is certain that he will at the least be jurisprudence is fixed at P50,000.
earning minimum wage. The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the
deceaseds earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a
rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
52 Victory Liner, Inc. v Rosalito Gammad, et al., November 25, claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
2004 damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
Facts absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
Gammad showed that his wife Marie Grace was on board a Victory employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
Liner bus running at high speed when it fell on a ravine, which resulted laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
to her death and physical injuries to other passengers. deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
The heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for damages arising the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
from culpa contractual. the petitioner claimed that the incident was minimum wage under current labor laws. Rosalito did not present
purely accidental and that it has always exercised extraordinary evidence attesting to Marie Graces earning capacity as BIR Section
diligence. Chief.
The trial court ordered Victory Liner to pay actual damages, death However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate
indemnity, exemplary and moral damages, compensatory damages, damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to
attorneys fees and cost of the suit. The CA affirmed the trial courts respondents. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or
decision but reduced the actual and exemplary damages. The CA moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
denied the MR. Hence, the present petition wherein VL argues that the compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
award of damages were without basis and should be deleted. some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Issue Anent the award of moral damages, the same cannot be lumped
Whether the award of damages was proper with exemplary damages because they are based on different jural
foundations. These damages are different in nature and require
Ruling separate determination. In culpa contractual or breach of contract,
Petitioner was correctly found liable for breach of contract of moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad
carriage. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost wanton disregard of contractual obligations and, as in this case, when
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the the act of breach of contract itself constitutes the tort that results in
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764 in relation to Article
common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or 2206 of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case
is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage. On the
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the other hand, exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of
common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by example or correction for the public good may be recovered in
evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. There is no contractual obligations if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent,
evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that the proximate cause reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
of Marie Graces death was the negligence of petitioner. Respondents in the instant case should be awarded moral
Nevertheless, the award of damages should be modified. Article damages to compensate for the grief caused by the death of the
1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, holds the common deceased resulting from the petitioners breach of contract of carriage.
carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the death of a Furthermore, the petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the
extraordinary diligence required for common carriers, it is presumed to (1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming
have acted recklessly. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is
of the typhoon is a fortuitous event
proper. Under the circumstances, we find it reasonable to award
respondents the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. These amounts are not (2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
Actual damages should be further reduced to P78,160.00, which (3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum
was the amount supported by official receipts. absque injuria
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may also
be recovered in the case at bar where exemplary damages are
awarded. The Court finds the award of attorneys fees equivalent to
10% of the total amount adjudged against petitioner reasonable.
In the instant case, petitioner should be held liable for payment of (1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a
interest as damages for breach of contract of carriage. Considering fortuitous event or an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence,
that the amounts payable by petitioner has been determined with delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
certainty only in the instant petition, the interest due shall be obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code which results
computed upon the finality of this decision at the rate of 12% per in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation between
annum until satisfaction
themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law
on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
"whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done." Act of God
53 NPC v. CA or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
Facts: though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
near the Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the
their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause
warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed
exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the case at bar,
warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not
no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of
negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living the loss and damage.
near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of
the nature of damnum absque injuria. (2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED",
would not strike one to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to
Issues: set alarm and cause people to take precautions for their safety's sake.
The notices were not delivered, or even addressed to responsible
officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated that Javilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned his work, and transferred
to another shop, Raymond Machine Shop, located within the same vicinity
the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and
as Padilla Machine Shop; that some months after, Javilgas returned and
policemen. As it happened, the said notices do not appear to have pleaded to be re-employed with them; that Rodolfo Padilla took Javilgas
reached the people concerned, which are the residents beside the Angat back to work, but their customers were not satisfied with the quality of his
River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did not receive any such work; hence Javilgas was assigned to the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas
warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly sent incurred numerous absences in the Novaliches branch; that Javilgas had
the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they opened his own machine shop and even pirated the clients of
do in their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice petitioners; and finally, Javilgas again voluntarily left Padilla Machine Shop
without prior notice. Decisions of Lower Tribunals 1. The Labor arbiter
has absolved them from liability.
found that he was illegally dismissed. 2. The NLRC reversed the LAs
decision as Javilgas was never dismissed stating that he was never notified
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error of his dismissal nor was he prevented from returning to work. Javilgasas
that the damage caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature allegation as to the dates of his dismissal likewise was not appreciated. 3.
of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the
physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous Labor Arbiter. It held that the burden of proof is on the petitioners, to show
events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty and that Javilgas was dismissed for a valid and just cause. As to the
inconsistency in the dates of Javilgas termination, the appellate court
obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat
noted that it was a case of miscommunication. Javilgas was found to be
Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble illiterate, as he did not even get to finish Grade School. Likewise, the delay
their intention may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly of eight months in the filing of the complaint should not work against
because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening respondent because it took time for him to obtain the services of a
the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not counsel. ISSUE: Was there abandonment so as to give a valid cause of
entitled to counterclaim. dismissal? HELD: No. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on
the employer to show that the employee was dismissed for a valid and just
54. PADILLA MACHINE SHOP VS. JAVILGAS cause.Petitioner did not elaborate or show proof of the claimed
abandonment. Instead, he concluded that Javilgas abandoned his
corresponding duties and responsibilities when he established and created
FACTS: Javilgas was hired by Padilla Machine Shop. His work consisted of
his own machine shop outfit. For abandonment to exist, it is essential: (a)
reconditioning machines. In July 1998, his salary was increased and in
That the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been
January 1999, his salary was again increased until his dismissal in April
absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (b) That there must have
2002. Petitioners made regular deductions for his SSS contributions, but
been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship
sometime in 2002, he found out that his employer was not remitting the
manifested by some overt acts. The establishment of his own shop is not
contributions to the SSS; as a result, he was not able to avail of the
enough proof that Javilgas intended to sever his relationship with his
benefits thereof when his wife gave birth. When he complained about the
employer. Petitioners consistently deny that Javilgas was dismissed from
failure of his employer to remit his SSS contributions, the latter transferred
service; that he abandoned his employment when he walked out after his
him to the Novaliches branch office. Javilgas further alleged that in April
conversation with Rodolfo and never returned to work again. But denial, in
2002, Rodolfo Padilla called him by telephone and told him to stop working
this case, does not suffice; it should be coupled with evidence to support it.
but without giving any reason therefor. He stopped reporting for work and
In the Machica case, the memorandum, among others, represented clear
sued petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the payment of
and convincing proof that there was no intention to dismiss the employees;
backwages, pro rated 13th month pay, separation pay, and moral and
it constituted evidence in support of the employers denial. In the instant
exemplary damages. On the other hand, petitioner Rodolfo Padilla
case, petitioners failed to adduce evidence to rebut Javilgas claim of
(Rodolfo), proprietor of Padilla Machine Shop, alleged that in 1999, SSS and
dismissal and satisfy the burden of proof required. As regards the eight-
Medicare contributions were deducted from Javilgass salary and remitted
month hiatus before Javilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case, we
to the SSS; that in 2000, they (petitioners) submitted a report to the SSS
sustain the Court of Appeals ruling that Javilgas filed the complaint To solve its problem of power shortage affecting some areas within its
within a reasonable period during the three-year period provided under coverage, MOELCI expressed its intention to purchase a 10 MVA power
Article 291 of the Labor Code. Machica Case: In Machica v. Roosevelt transformer from David. For this reason, its General Manager, Engr.
Services Center, Inc.,[12] we sustained the employers denial as Reynaldo Rada (Engr. Rada), went to meet David in the latters office in
against the employees categorical assertion of illegal dismissal. In that Quezon City. David agreed to supply the power transformer provided that
case, several employees who allegedly refused to sign a memorandum[13] MOELCI would secure a board resolution because the item would still
from their employer, detailing the commission of alleged anomalies that have to be imported.
resulted in the overpricing and overcharging of customers, filed an illegal On June 8, 1992, Engr. Rada and Director Jose Jimenez (Jimenez), who
dismissal case three days after receiving the said memorandum. They was in-charge of procurement, returned to Manila and presented to David
claimed that they were illegally dismissed and were told not to report for the requested board resolution which authorized the purchase of one 10
work anymore; the employer denied this and asserted that the workers MVA power transformer. In turn, David presented his proposal for the
(who appeared to be the suspects in the anomalies) were merely given acquisition of said transformer. This proposal was the same proposal that
three to five days off to decide whether or not to agree to share the loss he would usually give to his clients.
suffered by it as a result of the anomalies. The Court, in ruling that there After the reading of the proposal and the discussion of terms, David
was no illegal dismissal, held that: The rule is that one who alleges a fact instructed his then secretary and bookkeeper, Ellen M. Wong, to type the
has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their names of Engr. Rada and Jimenez at the end of the proposal. Both signed
allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It the document under the word "conforme." The board resolution was
must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, thereafter attached to the proposal.
positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of As stated in the proposal, the subject transformer, together with the basic
proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the accessories, was valued at P5,200,000.00. It was also stipulated therein
respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners. We have reviewed the that 50% of the purchase price should be paid as downpayment and the
Memorandum of respondent Dizon and find nothing therein to indicate that remaining balance to be paid upon delivery. Freight handling, insurance,
any of the employees of respondent corporation, including the petitioners, customs duties, and incidental expenses were for the account of the
would be considered terminated from employment if they refused to share buyer.
in the P23,997.58 loss. Petitioners and other employees of respondent The Board Resolution, on the other hand, stated that the purchase of the
corporation were merely required to affix their signatures in the said transformer was to be financed through a loan from the National
Memorandum on the space opposite their respective names, to confirm Electrification Administration (NEA). As there was no immediate action on
that they had read and understood the same. As elucidated by the NLRC in the loan application, Engr. Rada returned to Manila in early December
the assailed Resolution: Read in its entirety, the Memorandum reflects the 1992 and requested David to deliver the transformer to them even
GOOD FAITH of the employer in resolving a discovered anomaly. First, it is a without the required downpayment. David granted the request provided
declaration of AMNESTY and FORGIVENESS; it did not name names; it did that MOELCI would pay interest at 24% per annum. Engr. Rada
not state that the guilty ones will be pursued and punished. Second, it acquiesced to the condition. On December 17, 1992, the goods were
asked for SHARING among the employees for the loss due to the shipped to Ozamiz City via William Lines. In the Bill of Lading, a sales
discovered anomaly. Third, it indicated a POSITIVE BUSINESS DIRECTION as invoice was included which stated the agreed interest rate of 24% per
it exhorted the employees from participating in similar anomalies annum.
henceforward :
65 David v. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, I.SSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THERE CAN BE VALID AWARD OF ATTY
That being said, the Court now comes to Davids prayer that MOELCI be
The Facts:
made to pay the total sum of P5,472,722.27 plus the stipulated interest at
Petitioner Virgilio S. David (David) was the owner or proprietor of VSD
24% per annum from the filing of the complaint. Although the Court
Electric Sales, a company engaged in the business of supplying electrical
agrees that MOELCI should pay interest, the stipulated rate is, however,
hardware including transformers for rural electric cooperatives like
unconscionable and should be equitably reduced. While there is no
respondent Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI),
question that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate
with principal office located in Ozamis City.
on any interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 iii the professional standing of the lawyer.
which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 3 In all cases, AF must be addressed in a full-blown trial
1983, it is also worth stressing that interest rates whenever and not on the bare word of the parties. And always,
unconscionable may still be reduced to a reasonable and fair level. There they are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.
is nothing in the said circular which grants lenders carte blanche
authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.16 Accordingly, the
excessive interest of 24% per annum stipulated in the sales invoice should
be reduced to 12% per annum.
Atty. Serquina, petitioned the respondent court for the
Indeed, David was compelled to file an action against MOELCI but this
reason alone will not warrant an award of attorneys fees. It is settled that probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita
the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule. Farlin. He also petitioned the court in his capacity as
Counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and as
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
executor under the will. The will was unopposed and
litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated
to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense,
the court issued a certificate of allowance.
attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by
his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter; while in its
extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for
damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's Later on, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for
fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in attorney's fees" against the petitioners, alleging that
Article 2208 of the Civil Code 17 which demands factual, legal, and the heirs had agreed to pay, as and for his legal
equitable justification. Its basis cannot be left to speculation or services rendered, the sum of P68,000.00. Thereafter
conjecture. In this regard, none was proven.
Moreover, in the absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded
summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were
attorney's fees only in case plaintiffs action or defendant's stand is so a complaint against said heirs" directing them to
untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith.18 is MOELCI's answer the motion.
case cannot be similarly classified.
Also, David's claim for the balance of P73,059.76 plus the stipulated
interest is denied for being unsubstantiated.
Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the
56 Lacson v. Reyes, 182 SCRA 729 claim for P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed
DOCTRINES: upon was only P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly
already paid.
1 A lawyer who is both the executor and administrator of
the estate may not charge the estate, but the HEIRS
who are his clients.
2 Attorneys fees are in the nature of actual damages, RTC Judge Reyes ordered the heirs to pay Atty.
which must be duly proved: Serquina. The heirs appealed but the court denied
i they must be reasonable, that is to say, they their notice of appeal for failure of the heirs to file a
must have a bearing on the importance of the
subject matter in controversy; record on appeal. Atty. Serquina then moved for
ii the extent of the services rendered; and execution, which was granted by Judge Reyes.
GR: Under Rule 85, Sec. 7 an attorney who is
concurrently an executor of a will is barred from
ISSUES & HELD: recovering attorney's fees from the estate.

1 Whether or not Atty. Serquina should have paid E: An administrator or executor may be allowed fees for
docket fees before filing the "motion for attorney's
the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but
he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate.
Payment of docket fees is mandatory. It may be true His compensation is fixed by the rule but such a
that the claim for attorney's fees was but an incident in compensation is in the nature of executor's or
the main case, still, it is not an escape valve from the administrator's commissions, and never as attorney's
payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether fees.
separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the
payment of docket fees is mandatory.
Who shoulders attorney's fees? We have held that a
Assuming, therefore, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty.
lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge
Serquina's demand for attorney's fees in the sum of
the estate for his fees, but rather, his CLIENT.
P68,000.00 is valid, he, Atty. Serquina, should have paid
the fees in question before the respondent court could
validly try his "motion".
Attorney's fees are in the nature of actual damages,
which must be duly proved. They are also subject to
2 The respondent court gravely abused its discretion certain standards, to wit:
in denying the heirs' notice of appeal for their
failure to file a record on appeal; and 1 they must be reasonable, that is to say, they must
have a bearing on the importance of the subject
The court says this is a dead issue since they are matter in controversy;
annulling the decision anyway. 2 the extent of the services rendered; and
3 the professional standing of the lawyer.

3 The respondent court also gravely abused its

discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to In all cases, they must be addressed in a full-blown trial
the provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules and not on the bare word of the parties. And always, they
of Court. are subject to the moderating hand of the courts.
The court held that Atty. Serquina is entitled to P15,000.00 (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
for his efforts on a quantum meruit basis. Hence, we hold the
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and employers
heirs liable for P9,000.00 more. liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
57 Petron Corporation v. National College of Business (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
and Arts (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
The sole question raised in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.[10]
whether petitioner Petron Corporation (Petron) should be held liable to pay
attorneys fees and exemplary damages to respondent National College of
Business and Arts (NCBA). Article 2208(5) contemplates a situation where one refuses unjustifiably
and in evident bad faith to satisfy anothers plainly valid, just and
This case, however, is but part of a larger controversy over the lawful demandable claim, compelling the latter needlessly to seek redress from
ownership of seven parcels of land[2] in the V. Mapa area of Sta. Mesa, the courts.[12] In such a case, the law allows recovery of money the
Manila (the V. Mapa properties) that arose out of a series of events that plaintiff had to spend for a lawyers assistance in suing the defendant
began in 1969.[3] expenses the plaintiff would not have incurred if not for the defendants
Sometime in 1969, the V. Mapa properties, then owned by Felipe and refusal to comply with the most basic rules of fair dealing. It does not
Enrique Monserrat, Jr., were mortgaged to the Development Bank of the mean, however, that the losing party should be made to pay attorneys fees
Philippines (DBP) as part of the security for the P5.2 million loan of Manila merely because the court finds his legal position to be erroneous and
Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. (MYTC) and Monserrat Enterprises Co. MYTC, for its upholds that of the other party, for that would be an intolerable
part, mortgaged four parcels of land located in Quiapo, Manila. transgression of the policy that no one should be penalized for exercising
the right to have contending claims settled by a court of law.[13] In fact,
On March 31, 1975, however, Felipes undivided interest in the V. Mapa even a clearly untenable defense does not justify an award of attorneys
properties was levied upon in execution of a money judgment rendered by fees unless it amounts to gross and evident bad faith.[14]
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Filoil Marketing Corporation v.
MYTC, Felipe Monserrat, and Rosario Vda. De Monserrat (the Manila case).
[4] DBP challenged the levy through a third-party claim asserting that the
V. Mapa properties were mortgaged to it and were, for that reason, exempt 58 Estate of the Deceased MR. AND MRS. FLORENCIO P. BUAN,
from levy or attachment. represented by BIENVENIDO P. BUAN and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS, co-
administrators, doing business under the name and style of
Issue: is Petrons liability for exemplary damages and attorneys fees. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, petitioners,
Held: Article 2208 lays down the rule that in the absence of stipulation, PRISCILLO CAMAGANACAN, respondent.
attorneys fees cannot be recovered except in the following instances:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to In the night of December 14, 1954, Priscillo Camaganacan, a pay
litigate with third persons or to incur expense to protect his interest; passenger bound for Grace Park, Caloocan, Rizal, took at San Fernando,
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; Pampanga, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 79 belonging to the Estate of Mr. and
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the Mrs. Florencio P. Buan, of which defendants are the administrators. In
plaintiff; Malolos, Bulacan, the bus tried to overtake a La Mallorca bus. The two
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to buses ran a race. As it overtook the La Mallorca bus in Guiguinto, Bulacan,
satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim; and while driven at a fast clip, the Philippine Rabbit bus ran smack into a
(6) In actions for legal support; Delbros trailer travelling in the opposite direction.
conclusion without a premise, as basis being improperly left to speculation
In consequence, Priscillo Camaganacan suffered a fracture of the right and conjecture.
wrist, a crushing injury on the second finger of the left hand, a lacerated
wound on the right leg. Brought to the Malolos Provincial Hospital, he was
on the next day December 15, 1954 transferred to the National 59 Eastern Shipping vs CA
Orthopedic Hospital in Mandaluyong. Discharged on January 22, 1955, he GR No. 97412, 12 July 1994
received further treatment until April 15, 1955. His hospital expenses were 234 SCRA 78
paid by defendants.1wph1.t
The text of the decision should state the reason why attorneys' fees are Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping from
being awarded, otherwise, the award is disallowed (Fed. of United Namarco Japan. The shipment as insured with a marine policy. Upon arrival in Manila
Distributors, Inc., et al. vs. National Marketing Corp., L-17819, and National unto the custody of metro Port Service, which excepted to one drum, said
Marketing Corp. vs. Tan, etc., et al., L-17768, 31 March 1962; Jimenez vs. to be in bad order and which damage was unknown the Mercantile
Bucoy, L-10221, 28 Feb. 1959; Castillo vs. Samonte, L-13146, 30 January Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment
1960). from Metro, one drum opened and without seal. Allied delivered the
shipment to the consignees warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum
Issue:Is the award of attys fees proper: which contained spillages while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake. As consequence of the loss, the insurance company paid
Held: no, The very opening paragraph of Article 2208 reveals that the the consignee, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of
award of attorneys' fees remains exceptional in our law, and it is up to the consignee against the defendants Eastern Shipping, Metro Port and Allied
court to make an express finding of the facts that bring the case within the Brokerage. The insurance company filed before the trial court. The trial
execution and justify the grant of counsel fees: court ruled in favor of plaintiff an ordered defendants to pay the former
with present legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of the filing of
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys' fees and expenses of the complaint. On appeal by defendants, the appellate court denied the
litigation, other than judicial costs can not be recovered, except: same and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

the general rule being still that it is not sound public policy to place a ISSUE
penalty on the right to litigate (Tan Ti vs. Alvear, 26 Phil. 568); nor should (1) Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.
counsel fees be awarded every time a party wins a lawsuit (Jimenez vs.
Bucoy, supra.). (2) Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or
damage is to be computed from the time the complaint is filed from the
It is true that, in No. 11 of Article 2208, recovery of counsel fees is allowed date the decision appealed from is rendered.
"where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys' fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered", but even in such cases the HELD
conclusion must be borne out by findings of facts and law. What is just and (1) The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from the
equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of decision of the court a quo. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
demonstration. This is specially true since the last part of Article 2208 forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damaes
expressly adds that the "attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation must be awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
reasonable". In the present case, for the award of P2,680.00 in actual per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages the appealed decisions awards no less than P2,000.00 in counsel damages except when or until the demand can be established with
fees, which is hardly reasonable. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion reasonable certainty.
in the award of attorneys' fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
demands a factual, legal, or equitable justification upon the basis of which When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
the court exercises its discretion. Without such justification, the award is a and executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of money. ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter is correct.

The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD. HELD: No. There are two parts of a decision when it comes to illegal
dismissal cases (referring to cases where the dismissed employee wins, or
(2) From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is loses but wins on appeal). The first part is the ruling that the employee was
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from illegally dismissed. This is immediately final even if the employer appeals
the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty cannot but will be reversed if employer wins on appeal. The second part is the
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest ruling on the award of backwages and/or separation pay. For backwages, it
shll begin to run only from the date of judgment of the court is made. will be computed from the date of illegal dismissal until the date of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. But if the employer appeals, then the end
date shall be extended until the day when the appellate courts decision
(3) The Court held that it should be computed from the decision rendered shall become final. Hence, as a consequence, the liability of the employer,
by the court a quo. if he loses on appeal, will increase this is just but a risk that the employer
60 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August cannot avoid when it continued to seek recourses against the Labor
Arbiters decision. This is also in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
13, 2013

G.R. No. 189871 : August 13, 2013 Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory
damages, the Supreme Court ruled that the old case of Eastern Shipping
703 SCRA 439 Civil Law Torts and Damages Actual and Lines vs CA is already modified by the promulgation of the Bangko Sentral
Compensatory Damages Legal Rate of Interest is now 6% ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796 which lowered the legal
Labor Law Labor Relations Illegal Dismissal Computation of rate of interest from 12% to 6%. Specifically, the rules on interest are now
Monetary Benefits as follows:

Dario Nacar filed a labor case against Gallery Frames and its owner Felipe 1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans:
Bordey, Jr. Nacar alleged that he was dismissed without cause by Gallery
Frames on January 24, 1997. On October 15, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) a. If stipulated in writing:
found Gallery Frames guilty of illegal dismissal hence the Arbiter awarded
Nacar P158,919.92 in damages consisting of backwages and separation a.1. shall run from date of judicial demand (filing of the case)
a.2. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated
Gallery Frames appealed all the way to the Supreme Court (SC). The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the decision b. If not stipulated in writing
became final on May 27, 2002.
b.1. shall run from date of default (either failure to pay upon extra-judicial
After the finality of the SC decision, Nacar filed a motion before the LA for demand or upon judicial demand whichever is appropriate and subject to
recomputation as he alleged that his backwages should be computed from the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code)
the time of his illegal dismissal (January 24, 1997) until the finality of the
SC decision (May 27, 2002) with interest. The LA denied the motion as he b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
ruled that the reckoning point of the computation should only be from the
time Nacar was illegally dismissed (January 24, 1997) until the decision of 2. Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)
the LA (October 15, 1998). The LA reasoned that the said date should be
the reckoning point because Nacar did not appeal hence as to him, that
decision became final and executory.
a. If already liquidated, rate of interest shall be 6% per annum, 4pm, Mayo was driving a Philippine Rabbit bus along the McArthur
demandable from date of judicial or extra-judicial demand (Art. 1169, Hway in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Private respondent (PR) Linda
Civil Code) Navarette, on the other hand, was aboard a Mitsubishi Lancer along
with several others including two children. The Lancer was driven
b. If unliquidated, no interest
by June Navarette and was cruising steadily at the right lane of the
Except: When later on established with certainty. Interest shall still be 6%
road while the Rabbit bus was trailing closely behind the Lancer.
per annum demandable from the date of judgment because such on such Behind the bus is a Tamaraw jeep. At first, the Tamaraw jeep was
date, it is already deemed that the amount of damages is already ahead, followed by the Lancer, and behind it is the Rabbit bus, all
ascertained. travelling towards Manila. The Lancer as well as the Rabbit bus
following one after the other overtook the Tamaraw jeep. As the
3. Compounded Interest vehicles approached the Mabalacat Institute, the Rabbit bus, picked
up speed and swerved to the left lane to overtake the Lancer
This is applicable to both monetary and non-monetary obligations however an oncoming vehicle from the opposite lane appeared and
flashed its headlights to warn the Rabbit bus to give way. The
6% per annum computed against award of damages (interest) granted by
Rabbit bus then suddenly swerved to the right in an effort to return
the court. To be computed from the date when the courts decision
becomes final and executory until the award is fully satisfied by the losing to the correct lane and avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle. In
party. the process however, it hit and bumped the left rear side of the
Lancer causing its driver to lose control of the wheel and it swerved
4. The 6% per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively: across the left lane and hit a bystander then crashed against a
concrete fence of another person. The Lancer was heavily damaged
Final and executory judgments awarding damages prior to July 1, 2013 and the passengers including the driver sustained physical injuries
shall apply the 12% rate; in varying degrees.
Final and executory judgments awarding damages on or after July 1, 2013
RTC RULING: Mayo was convicted and charged and the civil
shall apply the 12% rate for unpaid obligations until June 30, 2013; unpaid
obligations with respect to said judgments on or after July 1, 2013 shall still aspect of the case was heard in the criminal case. The
incur the 6% rate. complainants therein including PR Navarette were awarded
damages wherein the amount of moral damages awarded to her
was Php700,000.00 (while to others ranged from 5k to 60k).

61 cCASE TITLE: Eustaquio Mayo Y Agpaoa v. People of the CA RULING: Mayo appealed with the CA which affirmed the RTC
Philippines Decision with the modification only with respect to the
G.R. No. 91201 December 5, 1991 imprisonment aspect. Mayos MR denied, hence, the Petition.
Mayos contention was that the CA did not discuss the specific
PRINCIPLE: MORAL DAMAGES factual circumstances which would justify the award of arbitrary
and exorbitant amount of moral damages and instead stated only
FACTS: Petitioner Mayo was charged with the crime of Reckless general terms.
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Multiple Serious,
Less Serious, and Slight Physical Injuries. This charge arose from The CA, on the other hand, cited the provisions of the NCC,
an Information which states that sometime in August of 1982 at specifically Arts. 2217 and 2219 to justify the legal basis of moral
damages and based thereon concluded that the amount is not proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
excessive and is in accord with the law and the facts of the case. Moreover, Art. 2219 of the NCC provides that:

ISSUE/s: The sole issue in this case is whether or not the findings Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
of the lower court justify the award of Php700k as moral damages analogous cases:
in favor of PR Navarette.
1. A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.
SC RULING: To arrive at its Decision, the SC examined the records 2. Quasi-delicto causing physical injuries.
of the case and established that prior to the accident, PR Navarette 3. Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
was an Economist by profession and a graduate of BS Home 4. Adultery or concubinage.
Economics at UP. She was an Asst VP and Resident Manager of Club 5. Illegal search.
Solviento in QC as well as a Food consultant receiving a gross 6. Libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
income of Php17k. As a result of the accident, she suffered from a 7. Malicious prosecution.
permanent partial facial disfigurement and total loss of vision of her 8. Acts mentioned in article 309.
right eye which was replaced by a false eye. 9. Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
According to the doctor, PR Navarettes right eye could not be
saved since the right eyeball needed to be removed as it was SC agrees that PR Navarette is entitled to moral damages. She
heavily lacerated and there was a necessity of an artificial eye suffered injuries as a result of the criminal offense by Mayo.
placement in the socket. Upon advice of her doctor in Makati Med, Moreover, her injuries resulting in a permanent scar at her forehead
she had to go to San Francisco, USA for further treatment. She went and the loss of her right eye undoubtedly gave her mental anguish,
twice to San Francisco and incurred expenses around Php60k to wounded feelings and shock. The psychological effect on her as
80k. regards the scar and her false eye must have devastated her
considering that women in general are fastidious on how they look.
Furthermore, PR Navarette declared that she had a boyfriend whom More importantly, the loss of her eyesight resulted to her giving up
she lost after the accident. She broke down over the misfortune her job not only because of her prolonged absences but because of
and placed a value of her mental, psychological, and moral the physical handicap she suffered.
sufferings in the amount of Php500k as moral damages and asked
the lower court to double the amount making it Php1M stating as Nevertheless, the SC finds no justification to award moral damages
reason that her boyfriend would have been her lifetime partner and to PR Navarette for the loss of her boyfriend. No doubt, the loss of
her guide of her eye forever had she not lost him. her boyfriend after the accident added to her mental and emotional
sufferings and psychologically affected and disturbed her. However,
The foregoing findings form the only basis for the award of moral there is no clear evidence on record to show that her boyfriend left
damages in favor of PR Navarette by the RTC and the CA. her after the accident due to her physical injuries. He may have left
RATIO PART: According to the SC, there is no question that moral her even if she did not suffer the slightest injury. The reasons for
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious the break-up of a courtship are too many and too complicated such
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, that they should not form the basis of damages arising from a
social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary vehicular accident. Moreover, granting that her boyfriend left her
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the due to her physical injuries, we still find no legal basis for the award
of moral damages in her favor because of the loss of a boyfriend.
Art. 2219 quoted above enumerates cases wherein moral damages G.R. No. 150487. July 10, 2003
may be granted. Loss of a boyfriend as a result of physical injuries
after an accident is not one of them. Neither can it be categorized Facts: Gerardo Samson deposited to his BPI account a Prudential Bank
Check in the amount of P3,500.00. When he asked his daughter to
as an analogous case.
withdraw 2, 000 pesos inorder to pay his creditor who came to his house,
he came to know that his previous deposit was not credited to his account.
Heading on to the propriety of the amount of Php700k as moral Because of this he was embarrassed infront creditor. Moreover, when
damages, the SC ruled that the well-entrenched principle is that petitioner informed respondent of his concern respondent's manager
moral damages depend upon the discretion of the trial courts displayed arrogance, indifference and discourtesy. Petitioner then filed a
based on the facts and circumstances of each case. This discretion case for damages against respondent.
is, however, conditioned in that the amount awarded should not
be palpably and scandalously excessive so as to indicate that it The RTC awarded 200, 000 as moral damages. The CA reduced the same to
was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial 50, 000.
Issue: whether or not the award of moral damages is correct.
court. In determining the amount of moral damages, the actual
losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the gravity of the
Held: Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any
injuries must be considered. Finally, moral damages are physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the suffering inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were
defendants culpable action. never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.

Applying these principles in the instant case, the SC finds that the Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
award of Php700k as moral damages in favor of PR Navarette is
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its
unconscionable and excessive. SC further rejects Navarettes claim
award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status
for Php1M for the loss of her boyfriend. The SC notes that she quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since
asked for the amount of Php500k as moral damages for her each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no
physical injuries and therefore, the award for moral damages hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount.
should not exceed such amount. The SC rules that under the
circumstances of the instant case, the amount of Php200k as moral The social standing of the aggrieved party is essential to the determination
damages in favor of PR Navarette is reasonable, just and fair. of the proper amount of the award. Otherwise, the goal of enabling him to
obtain means, diversions, or amusements to restore him to the status quo
ante would not be achieved.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly
GRANTED. The questioned decision of the CA is MODIFIED in that
We believe that the award should be increased to P100,000, considering
the amount of Php700k as moral damages granted to complainant (1) that petitioner was a businessman and was the highest lay person in
Navarette is reduced to Php200k. the United Methodist Church; (2) that he was regarded by respondent and
its officers with arrogance and a condescending manner; and (3) that
62 Samson Jr. vs. BPI; Moral Damages respondent successfully postponed compensating him for more than a
09/10/2013 decade. This amount is more than the P50,000 granted by the CA, but not
0 Comments as much as the P200,000 granted by the RTC.
That petitioner reported the missing check deposit to respondent only after o However, it was later on found out that pieces of
three weeks did not constitute contributory negligence. The injury resulted the pledged jewelry items were still in the shop,
from the denial of his withdrawal due to insufficient funds, an injury he indicating that the pawnshop either bought
suffered before learning that his check deposit had been lost. Respondent,
some of the unredeemed pledgers or did not sell
not he, immediately knew that a deposit envelop was missing, yet it did
nothing to solve the problem. His alleged delay in reporting the matter did
not at all contribute to his injury.
As for the pledged jewelry for the first loan, Mrs.
Salvador tried to redeem them as well but all she got
63 Villanueva v. Salvador in response were unclear information as to their
GR No. 139436 whereabouts. Mr. Salvador also tried to tender
25 January 2006 payment of the amounts due on both loans and
demanded return of the pledged jewelry. However,
Facts: Ever Pawnshop refused to accept the tender.
Spouses Salvador secured two loans from Ever Thus, a complaint was filed against Villanueva and
Pawnshop, owned and managed by Villanueva. They Ever Pawnshop. The spouses alleged that the public
pledged their jewelry items for the loans that they auction sale of the 2 sets of jewelry pledged was not
contracted. The first and second loan indicate 10 April valid because it was done without notice.
1992 and 22 May 1992, respectively, as the last day to o After summons were served to Villanueva, his
redeem the jewelry. counsel informed the Salvadors that his client is
The redemption periods came and went, but the now willing to accept the payment and have the
spouses failed to redeem the jewelry. jewelry items for the first loan redeemed.
However, the Salvadors turned down this
Their son partially paid the first loan on June 1 while
belated offer.
the second loans maturity date was extended to June
(Since the spouses turned down his offer...) Villanueva
o Due to the partial payment of the first loan, the averred that he reminded the spouses regarding the
maturity dates and redemption period of the loans. He
loan was renewed with regard to the remaining
also said he provided sufficient notice to the spouses
as there was a publication on June 4 in Manila Bulletin
o As for the second loan, Ever Pawnshop provided
regarding the public auction of the jewelry items.
that the spouses must pay 20% of their second
o Villanueva said that there was a caveat printed
loan obligation on or before June 4, else, the
on the dorsal side of the pawnshop tickets
jewelry will be auctioned as scheduled.
issued to the spouses which state that the
Spouses Salvador failed to pay 20% of the second loan
pledged items shall be auctioned off if they are
on June 4 and so, Ever Pawnshop issued a notice not redeemed before the expiry date of the
regarding the public auction sale of the jewelry. The redemption period.
notice appeared in Manila Bulletin on June 4, the
RTC ruled in favor of Salvadors and awarded them
very day of the auction itself.
moral damages. Naturally, Villanueva appealed. CA
On July 1, the spouses tendered the 20% payment for
upheld RTCs decision.
the second loan, but the pawnshop refused to accept
it. The pawnshop informed the spouses that the Issue:
pledged jewelry had already been auctioned last June
W/N there was valid notice of the sale - NO
W/N the award of moral damages was proper - NO
o The wrongful act or omission of the defendant
Held: must be the proximate cause of the injury
No valid notice of sale sustained by the claimant
The Pawnshop Regulation Act accord the pawner a 90- o The award of damages is predicated on any of
day grace period from the date of maturity of the the case stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code
loan obligation within which to redeem the pawn. Also, There need not be a showing that the defendant acted
even before the lapse of the 90-day period, it also in a wanton or malevolent manner, BUT there must
mandates that the pawner be notified of the still be proof of fraudulent action or bad faith for
proposed auction sale through a publication in at a claim for moral damages to succeed.
least 2 daily newspapers during the week Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa
preceding the date of the auction sale. contractual, except when bad faith supervenes
o Petitioner failed in both aspects. Ever Pawnshop and is proven
only caused publication of the auction in one o Bad faith does not simply connote bad
newspaper AND on the very day of the judgment or negligence; it imports dishonest
scheduled auction sale itself. Verily, a notice of purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
the auction sale on the very day of the auction doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty
defeats the purpose of the notice which is to through some motive or interest or ill-will that
inform the pawner beforehand that a sale is to partakes of the nature of the fraud
occur. o The person claiming moral damages must
provide convincing evidence of the existence of
Award of Moral Damages is Not Proper (the case bad faith (since good faith is presumed)
discussed concepts first then the ruling) In this case, the cause of action arose from negligence
Proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary to justify award of the petitioners. While gross negligence may
of moral damages. sometimes amount to bad faith, the negligence in this
However, it is essential that the claimant satisfactorily case is just simple negligence. The RTCs categorical
proves the existence of the factual basis of the finding that the case came about owing to the
damages and its causal connection to the defendants petitioners mistake in renewing the loan when the
wrongful act or omission. sale of the article to secure the loan had already been
o This is so because moral damages, although effected
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed o RTCs factual finding was that the jewelry
to compensate the claimant for actual injury pawned for the first loan were already
suffered and not to impose penalty on the auctioned in May. Due to an oversight, the
wrongdoer pawnshop committed a mistake when it allowed
Conditions required in awarding moral damages: the renewal of the loan in June despite the sale
o There must be an injury, whether physical, of jewelry in May.
mental, or psychological, clearly sustained by Since there was no bad faith on the part of the
the claimant pawnshop, awarding of moral damages is not proper.
o There must be a culpable act or omission
factually established 64 IGLECERIO MAHINAY, petitioner,
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.5 While
respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish,
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated December 20, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove
2001 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the "order and them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness
resolution" dated October 31, 1977 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
Naval, Biliran in Civil Case No. B-0923, for damages. wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly
suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not
The instant case arose from the alleged defamatory remarks of petitioner suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.6 No
Iglecerio Mahinay against respondent Gabino A. Velasquez, Jr. other person could have proven such damages except the respondent
himself as they were extremely personal to him.
According to Olipio Machete, overseer of respondent, petitioner uttered the
following malicious and insulting statement against respondent: "Your In Keirulf vs. Court of Appeals,7 we held:
master, a candidate for Congressman, Ben Velasquez, is a land grabber."
Machete informed respondent of what petitioner said about him. This "While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
impelled respondent to file a complaint for damages against petitioner, may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of
claiming that his utterances besmirched his and his familys reputation and the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
caused him anxiety, mental anguish and sleepless nights. show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal
connection to defendants acts. This is so because moral damages, though
As no amicable settlement could be reached by the parties, trial on the incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
merits ensued. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of respondent on designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
the basis of the sole testimony of Machete and awarded to respondent impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. In Francisco vs. GSIS, the Court held
moral damages in the amount of P100,000 and exemplary damages in the that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of
amount of P50,000.2 No other evidence was adduced by either party. mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and
testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation vs.
order lacked factual basis. The Court of Appeals, however, modified the National labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "additional facts
award, as follows: must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under
the Civil Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings,
"WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that the award for moral and grave anxiety, etc. that resulted therefrom."
exemplary damages is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this The testimony of Machete was not enough evidence of the moral damages
appeal DISMISSED. that the respondent supposedly suffered. Machete may have clearly
testified on the specific words uttered by petitioner against respondent but
SO ORDERED."3 he could not have testified on the wounded feelings respondent allegedly
went through by reason of petitioners slanderous remark. The award of
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner comes to this moral damages must be anchored to a clear showing that respondent
Court arguing that the appellate court gravely erred in: (a) affirming the actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless
trial court order despite the lack of sufficient factual basis and (b) awarding nights, wounded feelings or similar injury. There was no better witness to
moral and exemplary damages to respondent despite his failure to take the this experience than respondent himself. Since respondent failed to testify
witness stand.4 on the witness stand, the trial court did not have any factual basis to award
moral damages to him.
We agree.
Neither is respondent entitled to exemplary damages. "If the court has no petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the
proof or evidence upon which the claim for moral damages could be based, car bumped the trucks front right tire.
such indemnity could not be outrightly awarded. The same holds true with The trial court found for petitioners and held PLDT and Del Rosario jointly
respect to the award of exemplary damages where it must be shown that and severally liable for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
the party acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."8 damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
Furthermore, this specie of damages is allowed only in addition to moral Tortious Act: Collision of a 16 wheeler truck and a Sedan causing
damages such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the paralysis to the driver.
claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. What is it? Quasi-Delict
Legal Basis: Art. 2205
The affirmance of the Court of Appeals of the ruling of the trial court is Issue:
therefore not in order as it lacked sufficient factual basis. Whether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by
Mercury Drug
Held: NO
65 Mercury Drug v. Huang We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del
Fast Facts: Rosario. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
of a six-wheeler truck with. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla Chapter.
GLI Sedan. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
around 10:30 p.m. within the municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. Both is responsible.
were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general xxx
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
to its right. When the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island functions.
where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. xxx
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or
Violation Receipt (TVR). His drivers license had been confiscated because immediate. It is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving. employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also
The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen joint and solidary with the employee.
Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it
Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of
life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
treatment. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and
and reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the
failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
and supervision of its driver. implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit
the accident was respondent Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial RTC: proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's driver.
evidence on its hiring procedure. According to Mrs. Merlie Caamic, the Pantranco North Express, Incorporated to pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf
Recruitment and Training Manager of petitioner Mercury Drug, applicants for the damages of the Isuzu pick-up and Porfirio Legaspi
are required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and psychological CA: Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to
examination. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs. Caamic pay costs
admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination ISSUE: W/N both Lucila should be awarded moral damages
when he applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied
for the position of Truck Man. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages to
Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the Lucila and Legaspi is hereby INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00
driving tests. Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to P200,000.00.
development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye Legaspi is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00
and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and
police clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that
attended only three driving seminars on June 30, 2001, February 5, 2000 he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual
and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real
accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984. personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct
driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has from that of the injured person. Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to
been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate. consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by
Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not know of any company policy the evidence on record.
requiring back-up drivers for long trips. The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due awarding moral damages.
diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious
the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given
license. He was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he her
reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite
was not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing
was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings,
that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her
employee, petitioner Del Rosario. teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments.
Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt
66 Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433 that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to
FACTS: undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She
February 28, 1987 7:45 pm: Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
control and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the accident.
east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior
pickup driven by Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting physical injury to that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required
Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were treated at the Quezon by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender
City General Hospital discretion of the court
The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA (1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,
Despite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a
portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
and gasoline dispensing equipment compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temporate, yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably
liquidated or compensatory damages; and and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner." plaintiffs.
exemplary damages awarded increased to P200,000
The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe that Legaspi, being 67 G.R. No. 188979 September 5, 2012
also a victim of gross negligence, should also receive exemplary damages
Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of
defendant CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, Appellant.
Porfirio that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and that during said
period he did not have any income
P16,500 as compensation for loss of earning capacity for the period is
amply supported by the records and is demandable under Article 2205 of FACTS:
the Civil Code
Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven
A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping beside her two-
Mere proof of Lucila's earnings consisting of her 1983 and 1984 income tax year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sisters room, when the
returns would not suffice to prove earnings for the years 1985 and 1986.
appellant hugged her and kissed her nape and neck.5 AAA cried, but the
The incident happened on February 28, 1987.
An estimate, as it is categorized, is not an actual expense incurred or to be appellant covered her and BBB with a blanket.6 The appellant removed
incurred in the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short
reasonable considering that in this instance such estimate was secured by pants and briefs.7 The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her hands.
the complainants themselves AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using his own legs, and
in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina.8 The appellant stopped when
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof
AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellants upper thigh as the latter
of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court
was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and
it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone.
existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to Immediately after, the appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself with a
defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of blanket and cried.10
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of
penalty on the wrongdoer.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape
status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances,
there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. The
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. It explained that a slight penetration
of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to constitute rape.
, the prosecution failed to present sufficient and convincing evidence to
establish the required penile penetration. AAAs testimony did not
establish that the appellants penis touched the labias or slid into her
ISSUE: private part. Aside from AAAs testimony, no other evidence on record,
such as a medico-legal report, could confirm whether there indeed had
been penetration, however slight, of the victims labias. In the absence of
WON the rape was consummated. testimonial or physical evidence to establish penile penetration, the
appellant cannot be convicted of consummated rape.

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an

attempt when the offender commenced the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
The Court ruled in the negative. We find that the prosecution desistance. In People v. Publico,29 we ruled that when the "touching" of
failed to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate,
of consummated rape. We convict him instead of attempted rape, as the attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely
evidence on record shows the presence of all the elements of this crime. acts of lasciviousness.

In the present case, the appellant commenced the commission of rape by

the following overt acts: kissing AAAs nape and neck; undressing her;
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellants penis did not removing his clothes and briefs; lying on top of her; holding her hands
penetrate, but merely touched (i.e.,"naidikit"), AAAs private part. In fact, and parting her legs; and trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The
the victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not appellant, however, failed to perform all the acts of execution which
succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs should produce the crime of rape by reason of a cause other than his
Sinumpaang Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was holding the own spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim's loud cries and resistance.
victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This The totality of the appellants acts demonstrated the unmistakable
circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she was objective to insert his penis into the victims private parts.
resisting the appellants attempt to insert his penis into her vagina
makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, "In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case
nothing in the records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only
penis penetrated, however slightly, the victims female organ. logical and inevitable conclusion."42 We emphasize that a conviction
cannot be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to
Simply put, "rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of discharge its burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
the labia majora or pudendum of the female organ."27 Without any
showing of such penetration, there can be no consummated rape; at
most, it can only be attempted rape [or] acts of lasciviousness.
68 G.R. No. 188603 January 16, 2013 Brain- pale
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, Heart-chambers, contain small amount of dark clotted blood
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA," Accused-Appellant. sutured, healing, 3.0 cms, located on left chest, 15.0 cms. from the
anterior median line directed backwards and medially involving the skin
Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision1 of the Court and underlying tissues passing between the 6th and 7th left ribs, entering
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413,2 which affirmed with the thoracic cavity and severed the lower lobe of the left lung with a depth
modification the May 29, 2006 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), of 7-8 cms.
Branch 86, Quezon City in Crim. Case No. -Q-99-82409, entitled People of THORACOSTOMY INCISIONS-
the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal that found appellant Ramil Rarugal alias sutured, 3.5 cms., located on the left chest, 19.0 cms. from the anterior
"Amay Bisaya" guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. median line; sutured, 3.2 cms. located on the right chest 20 cms. from the
On December 8, 1998, the following information for the crime of murder anterior median line
was filed against appellant: Hemothorax- left, 500 cc
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippine, Visceral organs- pale
the above-named appellant, with intent to kill, qualified by evident Stomach- empty
premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and CAUSE OF DEATH:
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person STAB WOUND, LEFT CHEST
of one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at
weapon, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in
upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo,
cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Pangasinan on October 19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997.
the said Arnel M. Florendo.4 He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at
Appellant was only arrested sometime in August 2001. During his any point. On cross-examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in
arraignment on August 27, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the front of his house in Novaliches, Quezon City.10
merits ensued. On May 29, 2006, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
RTC found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m., while Code. It stated:
victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita Street, After evaluation, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant was proven
Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use of a long beyond reasonable doubt. Witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as
double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving him of the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive identification made by Sit-
his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This Jar, the denial and alibi made by [appellant] has no leg to stand on. Under
incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of positive
appellant in court. identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify.
Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his Moreover, Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events appellant. Florendo, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound,
of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took statements made by a person under the consciousness of an impending
Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The
General Hospital, due to the unavailability of blood. It was there that positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
Florendo died6 on October 26, 1998 with the family spending about consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the
P2,896.007 for his hospitalization and P25,000.008 for his funeral. liability of herein appellant.
Autopsy Report signed by Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, xxxx
showed the following Postmortem Findings9: As shown by the evidence, the killing of Arnel Florendo was sudden
Cyanosis, lips and fingernailbeds indicating treachery and the appellant being then armed with a knife, the
killing was done with abuse of superior strength. These circumstances (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is
qualify the crime to murder, all of the elements of the offense being entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
present. demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern
xxxx if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya" GUILTY beyond reasonable consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
amount of P28,124.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for civil indemnity themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
and P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.11 (Citations omitted.) testifying under grueling examination.21
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 21, 2006.12 He questioned the We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. After a careful review
RTCs finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the commission of the of the records, we find that appellant failed to negate the findings of the
crime and its appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He trial court with concrete evidence that the latter had overlooked,
argued that witness Sit-Jar lacked credibility for giving inconsistent misconstrued, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
testimony. Moreover, he averred that there was no basis for the finding substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with
that treachery qualified the crime to murder since its elements were not the Court of Appeals that the prosecution witness recounted the details of
established.13 that fateful night in a "clear, straightforward and convincing manner,
On June 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the May devoid of any signs of falsehood or fabrication."22
29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness Sit-Jars positive First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the
identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes victims assailant in contrast to the appellants defense of denial and alibi.
precedence over appellants defense of denial and alibi. Moreover, We have stated in Malana v. People23 that:
appellant failed to adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
motive to falsely testify against him. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive
the appeal in the following manner: on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant RAMIL RARUGAL is serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P27,896.00 as positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is
actual damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when
The said Decision in all other respect STANDS.14 the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them
Hence, this appeal.15 Petitioners confinement was confirmed by the to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x.
Bureau of Corrections on September 30, 2009.16 (Citations omitted.)
Both the appellee17 and the appellant18 waived the filing of supplemental The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible
briefs and adopted the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals. for appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it was
We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with committed. Appellants bare alibi that he was working as a farm
modification respecting the award of damages. administrator in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was allegedly staying there at
This Court has consistently stated that the trial court is in a better position the time of the commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the
to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is affirmed alleged physical impossibility that he committed the crime charged,
by the Court of Appeals.19 We have been reminded in People v. Clores20 moreso in the face of positive identification by the witness, who was not
that: motivated by any improper motive to falsely testify against him.
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time
guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was
the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had appellant who had stabbed him.
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case x x x;
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made from the defense which the offended party might make.28 Here, appellant
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed him
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect
and surrounding circumstances of such death. himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own
The Court has stated in People v. Maglian24: person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
if the following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and commission of the crime.
the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC,
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarants reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised
death." x x x. (Citation omitted.) Penal Code.29
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to However, to conform to existing jurisprudence, the Court must modify the
his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded by the
It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice courts a quo.
on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
and under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been interest, in proper cases.30
competent to testify had he survived.25 It is enough to state that the We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim were able
deceased was at the time competent as a witness.26 Lastly, the dying to prove before the trial court actual damages in the amount of P27,896.00
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death. based on the receipts31 they submitted. Moreover, we agree with the
We reproduce the statement of the RTC: Court of Appeals that the award of exemplary damages is proper in this
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the case. We have stated that:
appellant. The victim, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound, Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules, damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
liability of herein appellant.27 circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to
incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
consequence of appellants stabbing him in the chest. damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.32
Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellants act of (Emphasis omitted.)
suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.0033
Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted and the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.0034 to conform
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery to recent jurisprudence.
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, We sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising of the victims heirs.35 As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and 70 Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center
anguish on the part of the victims family.36
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the GRN 141994 January 17, 2005
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.37 Carpio, J.:

69PazFores,Petitioner FACTS:
IreneoMiranda,Respondent Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program Expose. Respondent Ago was the owner
GRno.L12163March4,1959 of the Medical & Educational center, subject of the radio program Expose. AMEC claimed
Reyes,J.B.L.,J. that the broadcasts were defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC claimed for
MirandawasoneofhtepassengersonajeepneydrivenbyEugenioLuga.Whilethejeepwas damages. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With
descendingSta.Mesabridgeatanexcesisvespeed,thedriverlostcontrolcausingittoswerveand the supposed expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations and as
hitthebridgewall. such, destroyed plaintiffs reputation. FBNI was included as defendant for allegedly failing
Fiveofthepassengerswereinjured,includingMirandawhosufferedafractureoftheupperright to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The trial court
humerus.Hewasubjecttoaseriesofoperationsyetatthetimeofthetrial,hehasnotyet found Rimas statements to be within the bounds of freedom of speech and ruled that the
recoveredtheuseofhisrightarm. broadcast was libelous. It ordered the defendants Alegre and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for
moral damages.
courtwhichfoundthatthejeepcarriedtheplateno.TPU1163,seriesof1952andregisteredinthe ISSUE:
Therewasnoevidencepresentedtoprovethecontrary. Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
1.IstheapprovalofthePublicServiceCommissionnecessaryforthesaleofapublicservicevehicle RULING:
2.WONmoraldamagesmaybeawarded.NO. A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
1.TheCAansweredYEStothisquestion.UnderSec.20ofthePublicServiceActitwasunlawful serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. Nevertheless, AMECs claim, or moral
fortheowner,lesseeoroperatortosell,alienate,mortgage,encumberorleaseitspropertyamong damages fall under item 7 of Art 2219 of the NCC.
thefranchiseinrelationtothepublicisconcerned. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
Foresassailsthisarguingthattheintherulingsbeingapplied,theoperatordidnotconveybylease slander or any other form of defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff
orbysale,thevehicleindependentlyofhisrightsunderthefranchise.SCnobasis.Theprohibition is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can
isclear,itwasmeanttoprotectthepublicinterest.Untiltheapprovalisobtained,incontemplation validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
oflaw,thevehicleisstillundertheserviceoftheownerofoperatorstandingintherecordsofthe Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implied damages. In such a
Commissionwhichthepublichastorelyon case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party
thesalebetweenthepartiesisstillvalid. libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se.
2.theP2,000(reducedfromP10,000)andtheP3,000asatty'sfeeswerevalidawardsofactual thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, we find the award P500,000 moral
damages.Asforthemoraldamages,itmustdiscarded.Moraldamagesarenotrecoverablein damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous,
damageactionsredicctedonabreachofthecontractoftransportation(art.2219and2220ofthe per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
NCC). Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages to P150k.

Thus,incaseofbreachofcontractproofofbadfaithorfraudisessentialtojustifyanaward JOIN TORT FEASORS are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
ofmoraldamagesandthatabrechofcontractcannotbeconsideredincludedinthedescriptiveterm encourage, advice countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a
analogouscasesinArt.2219.Art.2176excludescaseswherethereisapreexistingcontractual tort, as who approve of it after it is done, for its benefit.