P O L ITICA L STU D IES: 2005 VO L 53, 694715

Interest Group Strategies: Navigating

Between Privileged Access and
Strategies of Pressure
Anne Binderkrantz
University of Aarhus, Denmark

The literature often contrasts interest groups possessing insider status and outsider groups forced
to seek influence through more indirect means. Drawing on data from a survey of all national
Danish interest groups, this article demonstrates that most groups have an action repertoire includ-
ing both direct contacts to bureaucrats and parliamentarians and indirect activities such as media
campaigns and mobilizations of members. Different strategies of influence are correlated positively,
hence, there is no contradiction between pursuing strategies associated with insider access to
decision-making and strategies where pressure is put on decision makers through media contacts
and mobilizations. An analysis of four distinct strategies an administrative, a parliamentary, a
media and a mobilization strategy finds interesting variations in the factors that affect the pur-
suance of the various strategies of influence. Groups with a privileged position vis--vis decision
makers have high levels of activities targeting these decision makers, but the lack of a privileged
position does not lead groups to pursue indirect strategies. Indirect strategies are most intensively
pursued by cause groups and groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with regard
to attracting members.

Interest groups with ambitions to influence public policy can choose from a wide
range of methods to accomplish this aim. Relevant decision makers can be con-
tacted, media campaigns can be launched or members can be mobilized to exert
pressure on politicians. The literature has, however, pointed to systematic varia-
tions in the methods groups utilize. Notably, a distinction has been made between
insider groups enjoying privileged access to decision-making processes and out-
sider groups seeking influence through indirect strategies of pressure (Grant,
2000a).
There is controversy with regard to the continued usefulness of this distinction.
Scholars have argued that today it is possible for any group to gain status as at least
a peripheral insider, and it has been shown that nearly all British interest groups
have one or more insider characteristic (Maloney et al., 1994, p. 32; Page 1999, pp.
20910). Further, outsider strategies are becoming more widely used as interest
groups operate in increasingly complex environments (Grant, 2001, pp. 33947;
2004, p. 412; Richardson, 2000, pp. 1,0203). Even though insider strategies are
generally seen as the more effective (Jordan and Maloney, 1997, p. 181), outsider
strategies seem to be on the rise not only in use, but also in terms of effectiveness
(Grant, 2004, p. 412; Richardson, 2000, pp. 1,0113).
The insider/outsider debate has attracted most attention among British political sci-
entists, but the described trends seem to be mirrored in other European countries.
In Denmark the empirical focus of this article corporatist structures have been

Political Studies Association, 2005.

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INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 695

under rupture in the last decades. Groups traditionally regarded as highly privi-
leged have complained about being excluded from central decision-making
processes, and a wider range of groups is now included in governmental hearing
processes. Also, the media has gained increasing importance in the political process
as well as in the strategies pursued by interest groups (Blom-Hansen, 2001;
Christiansen and Nrgaard, 2003a).
Although there is now consensus that strategies targeting the media and mobiliz-
ing members are becoming more common, there is not much systematic evidence
revealing exactly how widespread these strategies are. Empirical studies of inter-
est groups in Europe have largely focused on their direct interaction with public
decision makers, while the use of outsider or indirect strategies has received
less attention. The first task ahead is, therefore, to shed light on the prevalence of
different methods of influence. Upon investigating how widespread strategies are,
the article goes on to examine whether or not interest groups combine different
strategies of influence, and what factors affect the use of strategies.
Wyn Grant, who in 1977 coined the insider/outsider distinction with regard to
group strategies,1 argues that groups can temporarily combine insider and outsider
strategies, but must eventually opt for primarily pursuing one strategy or the other.
Insider groups are expected to behave responsibly and the simultaneous pursuance
of different strategies is likely to compromise group relations with decision makers
(Grant, 2000b, p. 32; 2001, p. 343). Other authors have argued that government
officials know and understand the constraints under which group leaders operate,
and therefore accept that groups loudly criticize governmental decisions without
depriving them of insider access (Jordan and Richardson, 1987, pp. 367; Page,
1999, p. 212). Further, groups can use different strategies in different stages of the
policy-making process and for different purposes (Christiansen and Nrgaard,
2003b, p. 22). While these arguments are plausible, little evidence exists to sub-
stantiate the claims about the compatibility of different strategies.
Drawing on data from a survey of all Danish interest groups, this article demon-
strates that both direct and indirect strategies of influence are part of the standard
repertoire of interest groups. Most groups combine different methods, implying
that groups are perfectly able to engage both in strategies normally associated with
insider status and in strategies of using the media or mobilizing members. There
are nevertheless important differences between groups in terms of preferred strat-
egy of influence. Direct strategies targeting bureaucrats are typically pursued by
groups controlling important revenues; parliamentarians are often contacted by
groups engaged in a wide range of policy areas; and indirect strategies are popular
among groups finding themselves in a competitive situation when it comes to
attracting members. Indirect strategies are to be seen not as a fall-back option for
groups excluded from insider politics, but rather as an active choice of groups
needing to demonstrate high levels of activities to members and potential members.

Classifying and Explaining Strategies of Influence

Two main routes are usually identified for groups to achieve their political objec-
tives: an insider strategy of close consultation with decision makers and an
696 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

outsider strategy based on public appeals through the media and mobilization of
group members and citizens (Gais and Walker, 1991, p. 103; Jordan and Maloney,
1997, p. 181; Kollman, 1998, p. 23). While both types of strategies have been on
the American research agenda (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 152), the Euro-
pean literature has mainly focused on insider strategies. The terms insider and
outsider reflect the assumption that groups generally prefer insider strategies, as
well as a tendency to equate status as insider or outsider with different strategies
(Maloney et al., 1994, p. 181). Strategies are chosen by the group, while insider
status is largely ascribed to the group by decision makers. By differentiating
between status and strategy, it is possible to examine the relationship between
privileges conferred on groups and group choices (Maloney et al., 1994, p. 29).
In order to avoid the connotations of the terms insider and outsider and the
assumption that outsider strategies are inferior, it is preferable to distinguish
between direct strategies where groups approach public decision makers, and indi-
rect strategies where influence on policy is sought in more indirect ways. Among
direct strategies, a further distinction is made between actions directed toward
bureaucratic actors and actions targeting politicians and parties. Indirect strategies
are divided into those directed toward the media and those where members or cit-
izens are mobilized. Table 1 provides an overview of the four strategies and exam-
ples of activities. Strategies of influence are the overall approaches taken by groups
when they pursue political goals. Empirically, strategies can be observed as com-
binations of different activities (Berry, 1977, p. 212; Grant, 2000a, p. 410).

Table 1: Categorization of Influence Strategies and Examples of Activities

Direct strategies Indirect strategies

Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilization

strategy strategy strategy strategy

Contacting the Contacting Contacting Arranging public

relevant parliamentary reporters meetings and
minister committees Writing letters conferences
Contacting Contacting party to the editor Organizing letter-
national public spokespersons and columns writing
servants Contacting other Issuing press campaigns
Actively using members of releases and Arranging strikes,
public parliament holding press civil disobedience,
committees, Contacting party conferences direct action
etc. organizations Publicizing and public
Responding to analyses and demonstrations
requests for research Conducting petitions
comments reports
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 697

Large parts of the literature regard the pursuance of indirect strategies as a fall-
back option for groups excluded from direct access to decision-making processes.
The policy process is described as highly structured, providing some groups with
insider status, which enables them to be continually involved in decision-making
processes. Other groups find themselves in less privileged positions and must resort
to indirect strategies of pressure. Groups can be outsiders either by necessity or by
choice, but outsider strategies are generally considered less likely to succeed than
insider strategies, and most groups are assumed to aspire to insider status (Grant,
2000a; 2004, pp. 34).

Similar ideas are found in the British network approach, which calls attention to
structured patterns of policy-making within different policy areas and the differ-
ent options these structures afford interest groups (Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 79; Marsh
and Smith, 2001, p. 533; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). The network approach shares
common ground with the Scandinavian corporatist literature, which describes the
degree of corporatism as varying across policy areas. In this tradition, corporatism
is synonymous with the granting of privileged institutional positions in relation to
political and administrative decision-making processes to certain interest groups
(Christiansen and Nrgaard, 2003a, p. 13).2 Depending on how integrated groups
are in these corporatist structures, they have different strategic opportunities. In a
similar vein, Wyn Grant points out how the insider/outsider distinction highlights
the way the state sets the rules of the game for pressure group activity (Grant,
2000b, p. 20).

The implication of the discussed literature is that interest groups will show a pre-
ference for either direct or indirect strategies. Privileged groups are expected to
stick to approaching central decision makers. Non-privileged groups will resort to
indirect strategies. If indirect strategies are thus a fall-back option for groups
excluded from direct access, the pursuance of different types of strategies should
be negatively correlated. Further, the possession of a privileged position can be
expected to shape group strategies in important ways. Among the implications is
a negative effect on the tendency to use indirect strategies. With an eye to testing
this, multivariate analyses of the four strategies of influence will be conducted. In
these analyses a number of other hypotheses drawn from different strands of the
literature will be included in order to investigate more thoroughly the factors that
shape the use of influence strategies by interest groups.

Interest groups are typically described as requiring insider status as part of resource
exchanges between groups and government actors (Grant, 2000b, p. 27; Maloney
et al., 1994, pp. 20, 36). General resources such as members, financial resources
and staff are important, but in addition, some groups control more specific
resources valued by decision makers. A well-known argument is that business
groups are particularly privileged because they control crucial economic resources
(Lindblom, 1977). The argument can be extended to include trade unions and
other groups with economic or otherwise central positions in society (Christiansen
and Nrgaard, 2003a, p. 139). In particular, groups representing parts of the public
sector such as schools or local authorities control resources and possess specialized
knowledge of value to decision makers. In the analyses a measure of general
resources will be included along with a variable constructed to test whether or not
698 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

groups in control of specific resources valued by decision makers show a higher

tendency to utilize direct strategies.
Dense policy-making networks are often found where issues are seen as technical
matters most appropriately decided upon by experts, bureaucrats and interested
parties. A group that is capable of fixing its political assets within a specific range
of identifiable problems has good chances of achieving its goals through interac-
tion with bureaucrats (Browne, 1991, p. 347). Groups engaged in a narrow range
of policy areas are, therefore, more likely to achieve insider status and to pursue
their goals through direct strategies. Conversely, groups engaged in many different
policy areas can be expected to rely more on strategies involving politicians, the
media and mobilization. The importance of close, direct interaction between
groups and governmental actors is also assumed to be at its highest when general
attention is low. If an issue area attracts attention from various actors, corporatist
structures of policy-making become less central, while other modes of influence
attain increased importance. In order to test these relationships, two measures
related to the political involvement of interest groups are included in the analyses.
The first is a measure of the scope of policy areas each group is involved in. The
second is a measure of the degree of politicization of the policy area that the group
is most active in.
Authors focusing explicitly on the use of indirect strategies argue that these are
not mere fall-back options for groups excluded from privileged access. Rather, they
are chosen because they are instrumental in demonstrating to members or poten-
tial members that the group is working actively to promote group goals (Gais and
Walker, 1991, p. 105; Jordan and Maloney, 1997, p. 184). Groups with a far-flung
membership united only by support for group goals tend to choose strategies that
will capture the attention of their diffuse membership and reinforce the loyalty of
group members (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 545, 638; Gais and Walker, 1991, pp.
1056). Public interest groups or cause groups are thus likely to pursue indirect
strategies of influence (Gais and Walker, 1991, pp. 1134; McFarland, 1984, pp.
979; Maloney et al., 1994, p. 35). Furthermore, members of some cause groups
expect that unconventional methods are used and find it illegitimate for groups to
develop close working relationships with officials (Christiansen, 1999, p. 154;
Jordan and Maloney, 1997, pp. 1813; Rommetvedt, 2000, p. 117).
On the other hand, interest groups formed to obtain benefits for specific groups of
people are more likely to approach decision makers directly. Their potential
members are more readily identifiable, and are mainly interested in the groups
ability to secure them goods. Their special interests might also be difficult to justify
to the general public (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 202; Gais and Walker, 1991, p. 120;
Grant, 2000b, p. 28; Maloney et al., 1994, p. 36). Finally, these groups often find
themselves in a monopoly situation when it comes to supplying their members
with certain goods, while groups with more idealistic goals typically experience
competition from other groups (Dunleavy, 1991, pp. 202, 545, 638).
This last argument centers on the role played by exit opportunities in influencing
group strategies. The other side of the coin voice with regard to members
options to influence group strategies is not discussed very intensively in the inter-
est group literature, and it is less clear what strategic choices a high degree of mem-
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 699

bership influence may lead to. On the one hand, members want their group to
demonstrate a high level of activity and may use their influence to dismiss leaders
who do not pursue public, visible strategies (Grant, 2001, p. 343). On the other
hand, members with high levels of influence can be expected to have insight into
group affairs, and thus to care more about what the group achieves than about the
public visibility of the group.
The role of exit and voice is investigated by creating a measure of the degree of
competition for members as well as a measure of the influence group members
acquire upon joining the group. In order to test differences between cause groups
and other groups, groups are divided in two groups depending on whether they
are formed to obtain benefits for specific groups of people or can be classified as
cause groups working for goals that will not benefit their members or potential
members in particular (Berry, 1977, p. 7).

Empirical Approach and Measures of Variables

The analysis is based on a survey of all national Danish interest groups. Interest
groups are defined as membership organizations working to obtain political influ-
ence. Members can be individuals, firms, governmental institutions or even other
interest groups.3 Limiting the study to membership groups is in accord with the
suggestion by Grant Jordan et al. that a distinction should be made between inter-
est groups defined as membership organizations and other actors seeking political
influence (Jordan et al., 2004, pp. 2056).
Identifying the relevant groups is not without problems. Notably, it cannot be
determined from the names of groups whether they seek political influence or not.
Therefore, all groups that might possibly be classified as interest groups were con-
tacted. The questionnaire opened with a series of questions asking groups whether
or not they worked to influence different aspects of politics. Groups who reported
no political ambitions were excluded from the survey. A total of 2,465 groups were
contacted of whom 70 percent responded to the survey. Of the responding groups,
493 indicated that they did not seek any form of political influence. The completed
questionnaires from the 1,229 groups working to influence public policy consti-
tute the empirical basis of the analysis.
Measures of the four strategies of influence are based on questions asking groups
how often during the last year they used a wide range of different methods to gain
political influence. These questions were weighted by the degree of importance
ascribed to each activity by the group. For each strategy, groups received their
average score on all weighted activities related to the strategy in question. All
indexes were coded to range from 0 to 100. Appendix A reports the specific ques-
tions used to construct the indexes.4 Groups were asked to bear in mind the situa-
tion in the policy area in which they were most active. This enables a test of the
effect of policy area related factors, and avoids asking groups to aggregate their
strategic choices across different policy areas. Groups are, on the other hand, still
asked to aggregate from the level of specific issues to the level of the policy area
(Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, p. 164; 2001). The study is designed to give a
picture of the usefulness of the insider/outsider distinction as well as testing a series
700 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

of hypotheses regarding factors influencing group strategies. These purposes can

be most effectively met by investigating group strategies at the level of the policy
area.

The independent variables included in the multivariate analyses are briefly dis-
cussed here, while details about the construction of indexes for most variables are
listed in appendix A. Indexes constructed for independent variables have been
coded to range from 0 to 100. In order to investigate both direct and indirect effects
on the use of strategies, variables are entered into the analyses in four steps. The
first model incorporates only basic group characteristics. Based on group names
and descriptions of the kind of members groups appeal to, a dichotomous variable
for cause groups is constructed. The variable assumes the value 1 for cause groups
and 0 for other groups. Also, a dichotomous variable for groups with specific
resources is constructed. Trade unions, business groups and groups with institu-
tional members such as schools or public authorities are given the value 1, while
the other groups are given the value 0.

General group resources such as members, finances and staff might also affect
group strategies. It is not possible to test the importance of the number of members,
because the groups examined have different membership types. Measures of other
types of resources are highly correlated and the number of employees working
with political issues is chosen as the measure of resources most directly related to
pursuing strategies of influence. A visual inspection of the relation between this
measure and group strategies reveals an exponential relationship. The number of
political employees is, therefore, logarithmically transformed.5

Model 2 incorporates two measures of secondary group characteristics. In order to

test whether or not groups who find themselves in a competitive situation with
regard to attracting members show a preference for indirect strategies, a measure
of membership competition is constructed. Similarly, a measure based on ques-
tions about the level of membership influence is constructed to investigate pos-
sible effects of voice on group strategies. Both measures are indexed based on group
answers to a number of questions about the internal dynamics of the group.

The third model includes variables related to the political engagement of groups.
Groups engaged in only one or a few policy areas are expected to be more likely
to approach relevant decision makers directly than groups involved in many policy
areas. The questionnaire included a list of 20 policy areas and asked groups how
active they were within each of these. For each area, groups answering very active
were given 3 points, those that were active to some degree 2 points, and slightly
active groups, 1 point. Those indicating that they were not involved in the policy
area at all or did not answer the question were given no points. The index for the
scope of areas adds together group scores for the 20 policy areas.

This study comprises all groups that seek to influence at least some aspect of pol-
itics. Some groups barely live up to this criterion, while others seek influence on
everything from public opinion to everyday decisions by bureaucrats and do so
to a very large degree. In order to control for these variations in the general level
of group engagement in politics, an index of the intensity of influence as goal
is included in the analysis. Finding an effect of this measure will not be very
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 701

interesting in itself, but it must be included as the effects of other variables would
otherwise be distorted by variations in political ambitions.
Finally, model 4 includes measures of area politicization and group privileges. To
investigate whether or not low levels of attention and politicization are associated
with close consultation between groups and decision makers, respondents were
asked a number of questions regarding the degree of conflict and attention in the
policy area in which they were most engaged. These questions form the basis for
an index of area politicization. Last, but certainly not least, an index of privileged
position was constructed based on group answers to questions such as whether or
not the group was routinely asked to comment on bills and whether it was repre-
sented on public committees.
Even though an analytical distinction can be made between group status and the
pursuance of an administrative strategy, it is questionable to regard one as the sole
determinant of the other. The quest for insider status is reinforced by the utiliza-
tion of insider strategies, and insider status fosters the use of insider strategies
(Maloney et al., 1994, p. 29). A very high bivariate correlation between the level
of group privileges and the use of the administrative strategy (Pearson correlation
= 0.740) demonstrates how closely these two variables are related. Because of the
ambiguity concerning the direction of causality, the measure of group privileges is
omitted from the analysis of administrative strategy, but included in the analyses
of other strategies where similar problems do not arise.

Investigating Action Repertoires: Are Different

Strategies Compatible?
The first empirical task is to get a clear picture of the prevalence of different
methods of influence. Previous research has demonstrated that most groups have
contacts with relevant decision makers (Christiansen and Nrgaard, 2003a), but
little is known about the prevalence of activities associated with indirect strategies
of influence. As illustrated in Table 2, Danish interest groups have a wide range of
methods in their action repertoire. Most activities are used by more than two thirds
of the groups, and activities of both a direct and indirect nature are among those
most commonly used. Contrary to conventional wisdom, that groups concentrate
their efforts on interaction with bureaucrats, the four most widely used tactics are
actually indirect. There are more groups approaching reporters and encouraging
members to contact decision makers than groups contacting public servants and
parliamentarians.
Differences between the number of groups reporting the use of methods related to
the administrative strategy, the mobilization strategy and the media strategy are
small. Targeting parliamentary actors is, on the other hand, less common than other
types of activities. However, when asked how important they believed different
methods to be in their attempts to seek influence, parliamentary tactics were given
ratings comparable to activities associated with the other strategies (figures not
shown). Thus, the overall conclusion is that all four strategies of influence are
important parts of the action repertoire of Danish interest groups.
702 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

Table 2: The Use of Different Activities, Percentages

Very often +
Very Very often + Fairly often +
Activity often Fairly often Occasionally

Contacting reporters (3) 13.0 35.1 83.9

Arranging debate meetings and 14.5 42.5 83.8
conferences (4)
Encouraging members and others to 4.8 24.7 79.3
contact decision makers (4)
Writing letters to the editor and 9.0 28.0 78.2
columns (3)
Actively using public committees and 13.6 34.2 76.3
other bodies (1)
Contacting national public servants (1) 14.8 37.7 74.3
Contacting the minister (1) 7.7 24.8 72.9
Issuing press releases and holding press 9.1 27.8 72.9
conferences (3)
Responding to request for comments (1) 19.6 40.4 72.5
Contacting parliamentary committees (2) 5.2 19.5 68.8
Encouraging members and others to write 3.3 15.1 65.4
letters to the editor (4)
Contacting party spokespersons (2) 6.2 20.6 64.5
Contacting other members of 3.4 12.1 62.6
parliament (2)
Publishing analyses and research 6.0 15.1 57.2
reports (3)
Paid advertisements in newspapers, 1.4 6.9 36.9
etc. (3)
Contacting party organizations (2) 2.1 6.0 31.7
Legal direct action, public demonstrations 1.1 3.2 22.6
and happenings (4)
Conducting petitions (4) 1.0 2.3 17.1
Strikes, civil disobedience and illegal 0.3 0.7 4.1
direct action (4)

Notes: N = 1,16076. The table reports responses to the question: How often during the last year has the group
engaged in these activities? The groups were asked to bear in mind the situation in the policy area in which it was
most active. Tactics related to the four different strategies are identified as follows: (1) administrative strategy, (2)
parliamentary strategy, (3) media strategy and (4) mobilization strategy. Entries are ordered after the percentage of
groups respending very often, fairly often or occasionally.

A modification of this general picture is warranted because certain methods of

mobilization are rather uncommon. Few groups engage more than occasionally in
direct action, public demonstrations, strikes, civil disobedience or in conducting
petitions. A common denominator for these types of mobilization is that they are
rather confrontational, indicating that a large majority of Danish interest groups
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 703

prefer conventional and inoffensive tactics. Even when pressuring decision makers
through mobilization activities, they tend to choose the least confrontational
methods such as arranging debate meetings and conferences or encouraging
members to contact decision makers. With regard to media strategies, Wyn Grant
argues that it is possible to combine close relations to decision makers with media
use of a so-called responsible character (Grant, 2000b, pp. 1356). The fact that
more than two thirds of Danish groups report using a wide array of activities
demonstrates that groups are indeed able to combine direct contacts with decision
makers with mobilization and media-oriented strategies at least if the tactics used
are not too confrontational.
More information about the compatibility of different strategies can be gained by
looking at correlations between strategies. While the analysis above focused on the
use of individual activities, attention is now directed toward the four overall strate-
gies of influence. As shown in Table 3, all four strategies are positively correlated.
There is, therefore, no indication of a contradiction between seeking a close rela-
tionship with government actors and pursuing indirect strategies of influence.
On the contrary, it is perfectly possible for an interest group to combine different
strategies.
These findings might reflect that different strategies are used at different stages of
decision-making processes and for different purposes (Christiansen and Nrgaard,
2003b, p. 22). Possibly indirect strategies are used when groups want to place an
issue on the agenda, while groups rely on direct strategies in later stages of
decision-making processes. It is also possible that groups combine strategies in more
outright ways and pressure decision makers through the use of indirect strategies,
while simultaneously approaching decision makers directly. It might even be that
indirect strategies are used in understanding with bureaucrats and politicians with
an eye to attracting public attention that might favor both interest groups and
governmental actors (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002, p. 22).
Either way, decision makers seem to respect that groups seek attention from the
media and the general public without excluding them from access to making their

Table 3: Correlations between Different Strategies of Influence

Administrative Parliamentary Media Mobilization

strategy strategy strategy strategy

Administrative strategy 1
Parliamentary strategy 0.622 1
Media strategy 0.430 0.600 1
Mobilization strategy 0.298 0.498 0.534 1

Notes: Entries are Pearson correlations. All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). N: administra-
tive/parliamentary strategy: 1,166; administrative/media strategy: 1,159; administrative/mobilization strategy: 1,153;
parliamentary/media strategy: 1,157; parliamentary/mobilization strategy: 1,150; media/mobilization strategy: 1,162.
704 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

standpoint heard in decision-making processes (Jordan and Richardson, 1987, pp.

367; Page, 1999, p. 212; Richardson, 1993, p. 90). Whether or not this respect
even extends to accepting that groups use direct and indirect strategies simultane-
ously remains to be seen, as the analyses do not speak to the details of how groups
navigate between different strategies. In order to investigate these questions, more
detailed insight into how and when groups pursue different strategies is warranted.
This is an obvious area of interest for more qualitatively oriented research in the
future.
Although the general picture is one of compatibility, certain tactics seem less rec-
oncilable. Correlations (Pearsons r) between some of the more confrontational
outsider activities and a number of tactics related to the administrative strategy are
negative (although not significant). As discussed, confrontational tactics are,
however, not very commonly used. Less than 10 percent of groups engage more
than occasionally in at least one of the three types of activities that seem difficult
to combine with insider access to decision-making processes. No more than 18
groups or 1.5 percent of respondents engage in two or more of these activities
more than occasionally. Table 4 demonstrates the relation between engaging in
confrontational activities and contacting public servants. As can be seen, groups
employing these activities at least fairly often are less likely to contact bureaucrats
than other groups. In fact, a rather large share of these groups do not approach
public servants at all.
The implication is that the small number of groups routinely engaging in con-
frontational activities can meaningfully be characterized as outsiders with regard
to administrative decision-making processes. They concentrate their efforts on dis-
ruptive tactics without supplementing them with contacts with bureaucrats either

Table 4: Relation between Confrontational Activities and Contacting National

Public Servants

Contacting public servants

Number of confrontational Very often +

activities engaged in Very often + Fairly often +
more than occasionally Very often Fairly often occasionally N

Zero 15 40 75 1,066
One 11 42 67 88
More than one (17) (22) (56) 18

All groups 15 38 74 1,172

Notes: The table reports responses to the question: How often during the last year has the group engaged in these
activities? The respondents were asked to bear in mind the situation in the policy area in which they were most
active. Included as confrontational activities are: (1) strikes, civil disobedience and illegal direct action; (2) legal
direct action, public demonstrations and happenings; and (3) paid advertisements in newspapers, etc. Percentages
in the more than one row are based on a small N.
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 705

because their confrontational tactics result in closed doors or because they choose
not to interact with bureaucrats. The number of groups with these characteristics
is too small to draw any definitive conclusions, but a closer examination reveals
that most of them are to be found on the ideological far left. They can thus be con-
sidered what Wyn Grant terms ideological outsider groups groups who believe
in challenging established authorities and institutions (Grant, 2000a, p. 415).
The conclusion regarding the usefulness of the insider/outsider distinction is
twofold. On the one hand, while the large majority of groups can be classified as
insiders, it has been possible to identify a small group of outsider groups. On the
other hand, distinguishing between insiders and outsiders fails to capture impor-
tant variations in the use of different strategies. In particular, it is interesting to
investigate which groups tend to rely more on approaching bureaucrats and par-
liamentarians and which concentrate their efforts on approaching the media and
mobilizing members. Even though different strategies are compatible, the remain-
der of the article will demonstrate that different factors are important in deter-
mining the use of the four strategies of influence.

Explaining the Use of Strategies: Multivariate Analyses

As discussed, the analyses are conducted in four steps in order to investigate both
direct and indirect effects of the variables included. Results of the analysis of the
administrative strategy are shown in Table 5. The first interesting finding is that
groups with many political employees and groups controlling resources valued
by decision makers are more likely to engage in an administrative strategy than
other groups. A high level of membership influence also has a positive effect on
pursuing the administrative strategy. On the other hand, groups experiencing a
high level of competition for members are less likely than other groups to target
the bureaucracy.
Model 3 introduces variables related to the political engagement of groups. The
scope of areas that groups seek to influence does not have a significant effect, but
the measure of the extent to which groups have an ambition to influence politics
has a strong positive effect on approaching bureaucrats. Lastly, model 4 introduces
the measure of area politicization, which has a positive effect on pursuing an
administrative strategy. In this final model, the aforementioned effects of group-
related variables still hold. On top of that, when controlling for other variables,
cause groups use this strategy somewhat less than other groups.
Table 6 presents the analysis of the parliamentary strategy. The number of employ-
ees working with politics has a significant effect on the pursuit of a parliamentary
strategy throughout all four steps. Cause groups seem more likely to pursue a par-
liamentary strategy than other groups in the models including only group-related
variables, but this effect is weakened when introducing other variables. The
measure of membership influence at first seems to have a positive effect on
approaching politicians, but the effect disappears when new variables are controlled
for. This indicates that groups whose members have high levels of influence are
generally more interested in affecting politics but the variable does not have a
direct effect.
706 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

Table 5: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Administrative Strategy

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Cause group -2.304 -1.711 -4.844* -5.530*

Political employees 29.153*** 25.236*** 14.561*** 13.592***
(transformed)
Specific resources 8.110*** 6.278*** 4.434** 4.108**
Membership competition -0.131** -0.159*** -0.168***
Membership influence 0.281*** 0.133*** 0.117***
Scope of areas 0.027 0.003
Influence as goal 0.538*** 0.520***
Area politicization 0.095**
Constant 27.643 17.803 -3.135 -5.451

R square (adjusted) 0.206 0.248 0.439 0.443

Notes: N = 1,059. Entries are non-standardized regression coefficients. Levels of significance: * > 0.05 ** > 0.01
*** > 0.001.

The nature of the political engagement of the group is an important influence on

targeting parliamentary actors. Groups with strong ambitions to influence politics
and groups active in a wide range of policy areas have high levels of parliamen-
tary activity. The introduction in model 4 of the last two variables shows that area
politicization is not important for the pursuance of a parliamentary strategy, while
the level of group privileges has a positive effect. Interestingly, the control of spe-
cific resources has a small negative effect on pursuing a parliamentary strategy
when all other variables are controlled for. The resources that had a positive effect
on approaching bureaucrats thus have the opposite effect when it comes to con-
tacting politicians.
The analysis of the first indirect strategy the media strategy shows a pattern
rather dissimilar to the analyses of direct strategies, and in particular to the admin-
istrative strategy. Consistent with expectations, cause groups and groups experi-
encing membership competition are more involved in media-oriented activities
than other groups. On the other hand, groups controlling specific resources trade
unions, business groups and institutional groups are less likely than other groups
to pursue a media strategy. More in line with the other strategies, group resources
in terms of political employees are a rather important determinant of this strategy.
Initially, a high level of membership influence seems to affect the use of the media
strategy positively, but consistent with the pattern in the analyses above, this effect
vanishes when controlling for the political engagement of the group (Table 7).
Model 3 shows that groups with high ambitions to influence politics are more
prone to use media related activities than other groups, and that engagement in
many policy areas has a positive effect on pursuing this strategy. As expected,
groups operating in highly politicized policy areas are also more likely to seek
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 707

Table 6: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Parliamentary Strategy

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Cause group 6.341*** 5.827*** 2.538 3.096*

Political employees 23.542*** 20.938*** 11.100*** 9.397***
(transformed)
Specific resources 0.995 0.891 -0.933 -1.751*
Membership competition 0.040 0.005 0.024
Membership influence 0.187*** 0.050 0.041
Scope of areas 0.203*** 0.177***
Influence as goal 0.346*** 0.305***
Privileged position 0.098***
Area politicization 0.022
Constant 15.845 5.089 -8.450 -9.392

R square (adjusted) 0.169 0.196 0.382 0.392

Notes: N = 1,055. Entries are non-standardized regression coefficients. Levels of significance: * > 0.05 ** > 0.01
*** > 0.001.

Table 7: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Media Strategy

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Cause group 9.741*** 8.206*** 5.404** 4.631**

Political employees 29.017*** 27.068*** 18.841*** 16.954***
(transformed)
Specific resources -1.952 -0.641 -2.272* -2.966**
Membership competition 0.188*** 0.158*** 0.151***
Membership influence 0.134*** 0.022 -0.003
Scope of areas 0.170*** 0.128***
Influence as goal 0.286*** 0.247***
Privileged position 0.003
Area politicization 0.140***
Constant 20.037 7.070 -3.864 -7.356

R square (adjusted) 0.255 0.294 0.424 0.442

Notes: N = 1,061. Entries are non-standardized regression coefficients. Levels of significance: * > 0.05 ** > 0.01
*** > 0.001.
708 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

Table 8: Linear Regression Analysis (OLS) of the Mobilization Strategy

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Cause group 6.916** 5.875*** 3.734*** 3.323**

Political employees 7.239*** 4.691*** -1.083 -1.948
(transformed)
Specific resources -3.524*** -3.000*** -4.158*** -4.461***
Membership competition 0.111*** 0.086*** 0.082***
Membership influence 0.178*** 0.101*** 0.089***
Scope of areas 0.190*** 0.171***
Influence as goal 0.142*** 0.124***
Privileged position 0.011
Area politicization 0.067***
Constant 17.239 5.285 -0.146 -1.819

R square (adjusted) 0.086 0.165 0.286 0.295

Notes: N = 1,059. Entries are non-standardized regression coefficients. Levels of significance: * > 0.05 ** > 0.01
*** > 0.001.

influence through media strategies than other groups. Finally, a privileged position
does not have a significant effect on pursuing the media strategy.
As presented in Table 8, the first two steps of the mobilization strategy analysis
reveal a pattern comparable to that of the analysis of the media strategy. Cause
groups, competition for members and high levels of membership influence have
positive effects on the level of mobilization activities. This is also the case for a high
number of political employees, while controlling specific resources leads to lower
levels of mobilization. The effect of the two measures of political engagement is
similar to the effect on the media strategy strong and positive but in models 3
and 4 resources in terms of political employees have no significant effect. Finally,
operating in a highly politicized policy area makes it more likely that a group will
have high levels of mobilization activities, while a privileged position does not sig-
nificantly influence this strategy.
When comparing the four analyses, it is evident that different factors come into
play in explaining the use of different strategies. The only variable with similar
effects on the pursuance of all strategies is the measure of the intensiveness of a
groups goal to obtain influence. This finding is in itself rather trivial as it merely
demonstrates that groups with strong ambitions to influence politics engage in
many activities to achieve their aims. It is, however, important for the analysis of
the other variables that the effect is controlled for.
Of more interest is that having a privileged position vis--vis bureaucrats does not
affect the pursuance of either the mobilization or the media strategy negatively.
This sharply contradicts those parts of the literature that view these strategies as
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 709

fall-back options for groups finding themselves excluded from insider options to
exercise influence. A privileged position is, on the other hand, closely related to
pursuing direct strategies.6 The analysis also lends support to the proposition that
interest groups acquire this privileged position or insider status as part of a resource
exchange with decision makers. Groups who control resources assumed to be
valued by decision makers are more likely to approach bureaucratic actors than
other groups.
Groups in control of specific resources are, on the other hand, less likely to engage
in the other three strategies. In particular, the strong negative effect on the mobi-
lization strategy suggests that these groups are disinclined to put pressure on deci-
sion makers through strategies of mobilization. As discussed above, there is no
general contradiction between pursuing different strategies simultaneously. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that groups controlling specific resources prioritize an adminis-
trative strategy above all others could indicate that for these groups, close relations
to bureaucrats lead to the downgrading of other strategies.
General group resources, measured as the number of political employees, affect all
strategies, but the mobilization strategy positively. When interpreting the magni-
tude of this effect, it is, however, important to bear in mind that the variable has
been logarithmically transformed (the mean score on the transformed variable is
0.27 and the standard deviation 0.33). Group resources have a particularly large
effect on the media strategy, which makes for an interesting contrast to the mobi-
lization strategy, where the coefficient for political employees is negative, but not
significant. Engaging in a mobilization strategy seems to require different resources
than other strategies. An active membership is likely to be among the important
resources, as indicated by the positive effect of a high level of membership influ-
ence in pursuing a strategy of mobilization. Interestingly, this variable also has a
positive effect on the administrative strategy, implying that an active and influen-
tial membership can give rise to different strategic choices. On the one hand, there
is a relation between membership influence and a visible strategy of involving
members. On the other, the effect on the administrative strategy suggests that
members with influence and insight in the workings of an interest group care about
the results achieved through interactions with relevant bureaucrats.
Above it was hypothesized that groups involved in only a few policy areas tended
to be more inclined to pursue a strategy targeting relevant bureaucrats. This is not
supported by the analyses, but the measure of the scope of areas has a positive
effect on all other strategies. The more policy areas a group is involved in, the more
its political work includes targeting politicians, the media and mobilizing members.
Finally and contrary to expectations politicization has positive effects on all but
the parliamentary strategy. A likely interpretation is that it takes more effort to
gain influence where attention and conflict is high and that groups therefore inten-
sify their direct contacts to bureaucratic decision makers as well as their indirect
efforts in politicized policy areas.
The strands of the literature emphasizing networks of policy-making and corpo-
ratist structures privileging interest groups provide good explanations of the use
of the administrative strategy and also go a long way toward explaining the
710 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

parliamentary strategy. Other perspectives are, however, required in order to give

a sufficient picture of when and why groups choose to engage in indirect strate-
gies. As discussed, the nature of the political engagement of groups provide some
pieces of the jigsaw. Indirect strategies are thus more commonly used by groups
who work in highly politicized policy areas and who engage themselves in many
different areas.
Other important variables affecting the use of indirect strategies are related to the
situation of the group vis--vis its members and potential members. Cause groups
and groups competing intensely for members rely more heavily on indirect strate-
gies than other groups. These groups are, on the other hand, less active when it
comes to activities targeting the bureaucracy. In accord with arguments made pri-
marily by American interest group scholars, interest groups who find themselves
in a competitive situation when it comes to attracting and maintaining members,
show a preference for strategies that are well-suited to demonstrating to members
and the general public that they are highly active. In order to satisfactorily explain
the whole array of strategies, it is thus necessary to call on different strands of the
literature.

Conclusion
A well-known distinction is made between interest groups possessing insider status
and outsider groups forced to seek influence through more indirect means. Based
on evidence from a survey of all national Danish interest groups, it has been
demonstrated that most interest groups utilize a wide repertoire of tactics and
strategies, ranging from directly approaching bureaucrats and politicians to influ-
encing politics by more indirect means of mobilization or media campaigns. While
the insider/outsider distinction entails a contradiction between different strategies,
the analysis showed direct and indirect strategies to be positively correlated inter-
est groups are perfectly able to combine direct access to decision makers with indi-
rect strategies of pressure. The more widely used indirect tactics are, however, all
rather conventional. Disruptive tactics such as direct action and strikes are only
used by a minority of groups. These activities are difficult to reconcile with close
contacts with bureaucrats, and a small number of interest groups can thus be clas-
sified as true outsiders. However, the insider/outsider distinction does not capture
relevant variations within the large majority of groups engaging in various combi-
nations of direct and indirect activities.
As expected, occupying a privileged position vis--vis public decision makers is
highly correlated with the administrative strategy and has a positive effect on pur-
suing the parliamentary strategy. However, in contrast to the assumptions behind
the insider/outsider distinction, not occupying a privileged position does not lead
to increased use of indirect strategies. This indicates that indirect strategies are not
a fall-back option for groups who find themselves excluded from insider politics.
Even though privileged access might lead to some constraints on group actions, it
generally does not prevent groups from supplementing direct strategies with indi-
rect ones. At least in Denmark, interest groups are able to navigate between direct
interaction with decision makers and indirect methods like media campaigns and
member mobilization.
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 711

Indirect strategies are more accurately seen as an active choice by groups who find
themselves in a competitive situation with regard to attracting members. Most
groups have both direct and indirect strategies as part of their action repertoire,
but cause groups and groups experiencing intensive membership competition rely
more on media and mobilization strategies than other groups. These strategies are
well-suited to demonstrating high levels of activity and thus recruiting new
members as well as reinforcing the loyalty of the present membership. Explaining
the use of indirect strategies requires incorporating insights from those parts of the
literature that have not been preoccupied with studying insider access and dense
networks of policy-making.
The architecture of the political system is among the important determinants of
the choice of strategies (Goldstein, 1999, p. 30), and the balance between differ-
ent strategies is likely to differ over time and from county to country. Therefore,
the results about the prevalence of different tactics must be regarded as specific to
the present Danish national context. In particular, the finding that few groups use
disruptive tactics might not be replicated if other European countries were singled
out for study. Other results are likely to have wider applicability than the Danish
case. Notably, there is reason to expect different strategies to be compatible in other
European countries as well. If anything, insider access should be harder to combine
with indirect strategies in the Danish political system, which has traditionally been
considered among the most corporatist. Nevertheless, similar studies in other coun-
tries is an obvious way to shed more light on the use of different strategies of influ-
ence and the factors influencing this.

Appendix A: Index Construction

Each index included in the analyses is based on a number of questions. Depend-
ing on their answer to each question, groups were given from one to four points.
Indexes were constructed by assigning the mean score on the relevant questions
to each group. Respondents who due to missing answers had scores on less
than half of the questions included in an index construction were excluded. Where
nothing else is reported, groups could answer: not at all, a little, to some degree
or to a high degree.

Strategies of Influence
Indexes for strategies of influence are based on answers to the following question:
Below is a list of activities that interest groups can engage in to gain political influ-
ence. Again, we ask you to bear in mind the situation in the policy area in which
the group is most intensively involved. We ask you to indicate both how impor-
tant the activities are when the group seeks political influence and how often
within the last year the group has engaged in the different activities. The acti-
vities included in the four indexes are reported in Table 2. With regard to impor-
tance, groups could respond: not important, less important, important or very
important. With regard to frequency possible answers were: never, occasionally,
fairly often or very often. The indexes have values of Cronbachs alpha ranging
from 0.70 to 0.85.
712 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

Measure of Competitive Member Situation

The measure of member competition is based on the following questions:
How many of the present group members have joined within the last year?
How large a part of the potential members have actually joined the group?
Groups could answer: a small part, a significant part, most or almost every-
body. With regard to the second question, points were given in reverse order.
Answers to the following two questions were included in the index as well. How
well do the following statements characterize the group?
The number of members fluctuates from year to year
Other interest groups are competing for the same members
Cronbachs alpha: 0.49.

Measure of Membership Influence

The measure of membership influence is based on the following questions: How
well do the following statements characterize the group?
The statutes of the group give group members influence on the political work
of the group
In reality group members have influence on the political work of the group
Members participate actively in the political work of the group
There are internal fractions or groupings who disagree on group policy
There are contested elections for central positions in the group
Cronbachs alpha: 0.71.

Measure of Privileged Position

The index for privileged position is based on answers to the question: How often
does the following take place in the policy area in which the group is most inten-
sively involved?
The group is asked to comment bills, proposals for administrative decrees or the
like
The group is represented on public committees and similar bodies
The group is asked to comment on the statutes for public committees and similar
bodies
The group is asked to comment on the composition of public committees and
similar bodies
The group is contacted by public officials
Answer possibilities were: never, occasionally, fairly often or very often.
Cronbachs alpha: 0.89.

Measure of Area Politicization

The index of politicization of a policy area is based on the question: How well do
the following statements characterize the policy area in which the group is most
intensively involved?
INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES 713

There are other interest groups with whom the group typically agrees
There are other interest group with whom the group typically disagrees
The policy area is characterized by high levels of media attention
The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from politicians
The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from the general
public
Cronbachs alpha: 0.75.

Measure of Intensiveness of Influence as Goal

The measure of the intensiveness of influence as a goal is based on the question:
Does the group work to influence the following?
public opinion
the media agenda
the political agenda
bills or parliamentary decisions
administrative decrees
decisions made by the public bureaucracy
Cronbachs alpha: 0.81.
(Accepted: 11 May 2005)

About the Author

Anne Binderkrantz, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Bartholins All, Bldg
331, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark; email: asb@ps.au.dk

Notes
Thanks to Frank R. Baumgartner, Jens Blom-Hansen, Jrgen Grnnegaard Christensen, Asbjrn Sonne
Nrgaard, Sren Serritslew, Rune Stubager, Lise Togeby and three anonymous referees for helpful
comments.
1 Credit for distinguishing between insider groups and outsider groups must, however, be accorded to
E. E. Schattschneider (1935, p. 166).
2 There are many versions of corporatism in the literature. In the Scandinavian literature, which is
referred to here, the term corporatism is used to describe phenomena rather similar to what Amer-
ican scholars might refer to as subgovernments and what British authors call corporate pluralism
(Jordan, 1984; McConnell, 1966).
3 A small number of groups without formal membership can be considered functional equivalents to
membership groups and are, therefore, included in the study. These groups typically have volunteers
rather than members.
4 Factor analyses show that activities associated with an administrative, a parliamentary and a media
strategy, respectively, can meaningfully be described by one-dimensional measures (the analyses
result in only one factor with an eigenvalue above 1). With regard to the mobilization strategy, the
analysis results in one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.6 and a second factor with an eigenvalue of 1.2
the second factor distinguishing between conventional and confrontational tactics of mobilization.
However, the first factor captures a much larger percentage of the variance than the second, all activ-
ities have high positive scores on the first factor and all activities are positively correlated.
5 The variable is transformed to: ln (ln [number of political employees +2.718]).
6 The measure was not included in the analysis of the administrative strategy (because of difficulties
in unequivocally determining the direction of causality), but the correlation between a privileged
position and pursuing the administrative strategy is very high.
714 ANNE BINDERKRANTZ

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