Picart vs Smith
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at
San Fernando, La Union. The plaintiff was riding on
his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half
way across, the defendant approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate
of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it
appeared to him that the man on horseback before
him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart and
his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did not
move his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his
horse closer to the railing. Smith continued driving
towards Picart without slowing down and when he
was already so near the horse he swerved to the other
lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body
across the bridge; the horse struck the car and its
limb got broken. Picart suffered injuries which
required several days of medical attention while the
horse eventually died.
Issue: Whether or not Smith is negligent.
Held: Yes and so was Picart for being on the wrong
side of the road.
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith
saw at a distance when he blew his horn that Picart
and his horse did not move to the other lane so he
should have steered his car to the other lane at that
point instead of swerving at the last minute. He
therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the
unfortunate incident. When Smiths car has
approached the horse at such proximity it left no
chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance on
his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore
recover damages from Smith but such should be
proportioned by reason of his contributory
negligence.
In the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co.,
this Court there held that while contributory
negligence on the part of the person injured did not
constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in
evidence to reduce the damages which would
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the
other party.
People v. Delos Santos
FACTS:
On the early morning of October 5, 1995, at the
Maitum Highway in Cagayan de Oro City, a team of
PNP members undergoing a Special Training Course
were performing an Endurance Run. They were
jogging at the right side of the lane. A speeding Isuzu
Elf ran into them, resulting to deaths and injuries. The
accused surrendered to the Governor, and was
eventually convicted of Multiple Murder, Multiple
Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted Murder.
He was sentenced to death by the Trial Court. Hence,
this automatic review.
ISSUE:
Whether there was intentional killing or attempt to
kill the policemen, or a mere reckless imprudence
HELD:
From the convergence of circumstances, we are
inclined to believe that the tragic event was more a
product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious
intent on Glenns part. First, as testified to by
prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place
of the incident was "very dark," as there was no moon.
And according to PAGASAs observed weather report
within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a
radius of 50 kilometers, at the time the event took
place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely
no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial
dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon
and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts
that illuminated the highway. Second, the jogging
trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-
shirts, black short pants, and black and green combat
shoes, which made them hard to make out on that
dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither
reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights in giving
hand signals. Third, GLENN was driving on the
proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other
hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong
lane, the same lane as Glenns vehicle was traversing.
Worse, they were facing the same direction as Glenns
truck such that their backs were turned towards the
oncoming vehicles from behind. Fourth, no convincing
evidence was presented to rebut Glenns testimony
that he had been momentarily blinded by the very
bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at
the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve.
He must have been still reeling from the blinding
effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle
when he plowed into the group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one
to stop or swerve to a safe place the moment he sees
a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid
bumping or killing the same"; and more so if the one
on the road is a person. It would therefore be
inconceivable for GLENN, then a young college
graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young
children who were dependent on him for support, to
have deliberately hit the group with his truck.
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it
was in light of the number of persons killed and
seriously injured, was an accident and not an
intentional felony. It is significant to note that there is
no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind
against the police trainees that would drive him into
deliberately hitting them with intent to kill. Glenns
offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve
his vehicle to the left or to a safe place the movement
he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he
done so, many trainees would have been spared.
The test for determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration (1) his employment or
occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his
physical condition; and (3) other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an
experienced driver, should have known to apply the
brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon
hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further
hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
established that the road was slippery and slightly
going downward; and, worse, the place of the incident
was foggy and dark. He should have observed due
care in accordance with the conduct of a reasonably
prudent man, such as by slackening his speed,
applying his brakes, or turning to the left side even if
it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being
no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the
opposite direction). It is highly probable that he was
driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was
driving within the speed limits, this did not mean that
he was exercising due care under the existing
circumstances and conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway
reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the (NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines from Mabalacat, and via
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San Fernando
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and going to its milling factory. The TRB furnished the
less serious physical injuries. Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC)
(the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll
I.SHORT TITLE: PNCC vs CA facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
II. FULL TITLE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL Expressways) with a copy of the said request for it to
CONSTRUCTION comment thereon.
CORPORATION, Petitioners, On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered
vs. into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), where the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, latter was allowed to enter and pass through the
RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA NLEX on the following terms and conditions:
LATAGAN, RICARDO
GENERALAO and PAMPANGA 1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;
SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;
COMPANY, INC.,
CORPORATION, Respondent. 3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at
G.R. No. 159270. August 22, the rear end of the convoy with a sign which should
2005. CALLEJO, SR., J. read as follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!;
III. TOPIC: Test to determine the existence of 4. Tollway safety measures should be properly
Negligence observed;
5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities
arising out of any activity related to this approval
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO;
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc.
6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their
(PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat
stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience
and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo
to the other motorists;
eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul
via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission
7. This request will be in force only while the national
bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul
via Magalang remain impassable.
At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin,
the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees
Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling
Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of
sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and
southbound lanes of the road. They placed lit cans
with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes,
including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to
warn motorists of the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin
and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office,
believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it
since it was the only milling company in the area.
They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the
area. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECOs
equipment supervisor and transportation
superintendent, told them that no equipment operator
was available as it was still very early. Nonetheless,
Mallari told them that he would send someone to
clear the affected area. Thereafter, Sendin and
company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic.
At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived,
and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane.
They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road.
The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a
few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As
the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and
transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there
was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was
already approaching, Sendin and company removed
the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to his
office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the
necessary report.
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified
mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY
Marketing, Inc., was driving his two-door Toyota
Corolla along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per
hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his
friend Ricardo Generalao; they were on their way to
Baguio to attend their grandmothers first death
anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered
sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
several times. The accident threw the car about
fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.
Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the
matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the
road, on both lanes, which appeared to be flattened.
On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and
Generalao filed a complaint for damages against
PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-64803. They
alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence,
PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe
for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks
with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass
through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled
sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put
up emergency devices to sufficiently warn
approaching motorists of the existence of such
spillage; and that the combined gross negligence
of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and
proximate cause of the injuries sustained by
Latagan and the damage to Arnaizs car. They
prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due
hearing, judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs,
ordering the defendants jointly and severally:
(a) To pay unto plaintiff Rodrigo Arnaiz the sum of
P100,000.00 representing the value of his car which
was totally wrecked;
(b) to pay unto plaintiff Regina Latagan the sum of
P100,000.00 by way of reimbursement for medical
expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages, and the sum of P30,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages;
(c) To pay unto plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo
Generalao the sum of P5,000.00 by way of
reimbursement for medical expenses; and
(d) To pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by
way of attorneys fees; plus the costs of suit.
Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which the Honorable
Court may find due them in the premises.16
In its Answer, PNCC admitted that it was under
contract to manage the North Luzon Expressway, to
keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the
mishap was due to the "unreasonable speed" at
which Arnaizs car was running, causing it to
turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of
flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the
proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECOs
gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and
its failure to clear and mop up the area
completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty
of contributory negligence in driving his car at
such speed.
The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim
against the plaintiffs and cross-claim against its co-
defendant PASUDECO.
On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its
decision in favor of Latagan, dismissing that of
Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of
evidence. The case as against the PNCC was,
likewise, dismissed. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered:
I. ORDERING defendant PASUDECO:
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees
P50,000
2. To pay costs of suit.
II. The case is DISMISSED as to defendant PNCC. No
pronouncement as to costs. Its counterclaim is,
likewise, DISMISSED.
III. The claims for damages of plaintiffs Rodrigo
Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao are hereby DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and
defendant PASUDECO appealed the decision to the
CA. Since the plaintiffs failed to file their brief, the CA
dismissed their appeal.
Resolving PASUDECOs appeal, the CA rendered
judgment on April 29, 2003, affirming the RTC
decision with modification. The appellate court
ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his
car, but that such negligence was merely
contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e.,
PASUDECOs failure to properly supervise its
men in clearing the affected area. Its supervisor,
Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while
their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the
appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC,
jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
DECISION is hereby MODIFIED and judgment is
hereby rendered declaring PASUDECO and PNCC,
jointly and solidarily, liable:
1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:
a. P25,000 = for actual damages
b. P15,000 = for moral damages
c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees
2. To pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The PNCC, now the petitioner, filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The petitioner asserts that the trial court was
correct when it held that PASUDECO should be
held liable for the mishap, since it had assumed
such responsibility based on the MOA between it
and the TRB. The petitioner relies on the trial
courts finding that only PASUDECO was given a
permit to pass through the route.
The petitioner insists that the respondents failed
to prove that it was negligent in the operation
and maintenance of the NLEX. It maintains that it
had done its part in clearing the expressway of
sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles of
sugarcane along the road when its men left Km. 72;
only a few scattered sugarcanes flattened by the
passing motorists were left. Any liability arising from
any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanes should
be borne by PASUDECO, in accordance with the MOA
which provides that "accidents or damages to the toll
facilities arising out of any activity related to this
approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."
The petitioner also argues that the respondents
should bear the consequences of their own fault or
negligence, and that the proximate and immediate
cause of the mishap in question was respondent
Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross negligence.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding PNCC and
PASUDECO jointly and solidarily liable for damages
VII. RULING:
The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it
the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate
and maintain toll facilities covering the expressways,
collectively known as the NLEX. Concomitant thereto
is its right to collect toll fees for the use of the said
expressways and its obligation to keep it safe for
motorists.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2176 of
the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would do. It also refers to the conduct which
creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that
other person suffers injury. The Court declared the
test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in Picart v. Smith, viz:
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of
the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The test for determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of
another is this: could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to
guard against its mischievous results, and the failure
to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight
of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition
born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.35
In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner
failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The
lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were
removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered
on the ground. The highway was still wet from the
juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The
petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition
of the highway would endanger motorists passing by
at night or in the wee hours of the morning.
Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee
PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the
maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in
the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC
should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private
agreement, to other parties.
PNCC declared the area free from obstruction
since there were no piles of sugarcane, but
evidence shows there were still pieces of
sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists.
There must be an observance of that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the
situation demands. There should have been
sufficient warning devices considering that there
were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along
the tollway.
The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that
Arnaizs car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled
from a hauler truck.
Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to
the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to
property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX
who are not privies to the MOA.
PASUDECOs negligence in transporting sugarcanes
without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in
removing the emergency warning devices, were two
successive negligent acts which were the direct and
proximate cause of Latagans injuries. As such,
PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.
As the Court held in the vintage case of Sabido v.
Custodio:39
According to the great weight of authority, where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of
two or more persons, although acting independently
of each other, are, in combination, the direct and
proximate cause of a single injury to a third person
and it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for
the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage
might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-
feasor. ...
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence
in order to render a person liable need not be
the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that
his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the
proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where
several causes combine to produce injuries, a person
is not relieved from liability because he is responsible
for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not
have resulted to as great an extent, and that such
cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is
no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors
that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or
wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an
injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or
any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable,
and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as
though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
Thus, with PASUDECOs and the petitioners
successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors
who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage
under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.
Anent respondent Arnaizs negligence in driving
his car, both the trial court and the CA agreed
that it was only contributory, and considered the
same in mitigating the award of damages in his
favor as provided under Article 2179 of the New
Civil Code. Contributory negligence is conduct
on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. Even the
petitioner itself described Arnaizs negligence as
contributory.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 47699, dated April 29, 2003, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
ANECO v. Balen
Facts:
Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO)
is a duly organized and registered consumers
cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in
the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City.
Petitioner ANECO installed an electric post in Purok
4, Ata-atahon, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, with its
main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing
Angelita Balens residence. Balens father, Miguel,
protested the installation with the District Engineers
Office and with ANECO, but his protest just fell on
deaf ears.
This case arose when Balen, Hercules Lariosa and
Celestino Exclamado were electrocuted while
removing the television antenna from Balens
residence. The antenna pole touched ANECOs main
distribution line which resulted in their electrocution.
Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa
suffered extensive third degree burns.
Balen and Lariosa (respondents) then lodged a
complaint for damages against ANECO with the RTC
of Butuan City. Petitioner tried to free itself from
liability arguing that it is the respondents negligence
that caused their injury.
Issue:
Whether or not ANECO was negligent, hence liable
for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, by reason of which
such other person suffers injury.
As found by the courts, petitioner's negligence is
the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the
respondents. Instructive is the test in adapted in
determining proximate cause- Foreseeability Test, viz:
"Where the particular harm was reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the defendants misconduct,
his act or omission is the legal cause thereof.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of the law of
negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have
acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain
interests of certain persons were unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risk which
made the actors conduct negligent, it is obviously the
consequence for the actor must be held legally
responsible. Otherwise, the legal duty is entirely
defeated. Accordingly, the generalization may be
formulated that all particular consequences, that is,
consequences which occur in a manner which was
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of
his misconduct are legally caused by his breach of
duty."
Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have
reasonably foreseen that, even if it complied with the
clearance requirements under the Philippine
Electrical Code in installing the subject high tension
wires above MIGUEL BALENs house, still a potential
risk existed that people would get electrocuted,
considering that the wires were not insulated.
Moreover, quoting Benguet Electric Cooperative vs.
CA, the Court declared that "as an electric
cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in
supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet
province, its primordial concern is not only to
distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to
ensure the safety of the public by the proper
maintenance and upkeep of its facilities."
 Thus, by leaving an open live wire unattended for
years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for
the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo's
death was an accident that was bound to happen in
view of the gross negligence of BENECO. Likewise,
this pronouncement is against ANECO for letting its
main distribution wires not insulated despite that fact
that it traverses in a populated area.
Contrary to petitioners claim despite the facts that
the incident happened only after 11 years, is not a
valid ground to mitigate is liability.
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.
ALLAN RAPANAN
G.R. NO. 199886, December 3, 2014, Villarama,
JR., J.
FACTS:
A motorcycle with 3 passengers figured in a
mishap along the National highway of Maddalero,
Cagayan. It was driven by its owner, Camilo Tangonan
who eventually died from the accident, his
companions Rapanan and Erwin Coloma suffered
injuries.
Rapanan together with Camilos common-law-
wife filed a case for damages against CAGELCO. They
alleged that the accident was caused by a live tension
wire from the electric post which struck and
electrocuted them. They alleged that the accident was
caused by the Coops negligence as it failed to fix and
change live tension wires.
In its defense, CAGELCO alleged that typhoons
struck its areas of responsibility which caused some of
the poles to fall, high tension wires to snap or cut-off.
It claimed that they cannot be faulted for negligence if
there were electric wires dangling along the national
road since they were caused by typhoons which are
fortuitous events.
During the trial, Dr. Hasim, the physician who
attended them upon arriving in the hospital that the
abrasions of Rapanan were caused by pressure when
the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but
she is uncertain as towhether a live electric wire
could have caused them. She further said that she did
not find any electrical burns on Rapanan. As with
Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma on his
body and that the cause of death was due to "cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to strangulation." She
also opined that the strangulation could have been
caused by an electric wire entangled around Camilos
neck.
RTC dismissed the complaint for damages and
eld that the proximate cause of the incident is the
negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the
motorcycle.
CA set aside RTCs decision and awarded
damages.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not CAGELCOs negligence in its
maintenance is the proximate cause of the
death and injuries?
2 Whether or not award of damages is proper?
HELD:
1 NO. there is no negligence, from the
testimonies of petitioners employees and
the excerpt from the police blotter, at the
time of that fatal mishap, said wires were
quietly sitting on the shoulder of the road,
far enough from the concrete portion so as
not to pose any threat to passing motor
vehicles and even pedestrians.
The elements necessary to establish a quasi-
delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the
defendant or by some person for whose acts
the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.
The motorcycle was probably running too
fast that it lost control and started tilting
and sliding eventually which made its foot
rest cause the skid mark on the road.
Therefore, the mishap already occurred
even while they were on the road and away
from petitioner's electric wires and was not
caused by the latter as alleged by
respondents. It just so happened that after
the motorcycle tilted and slid, the
passengers were thrown off to the shoulder
where the electric wires were.
Had Camilo driven the motorcycle at an
average speed, the three passengers would
not have been thrown off from the vehicle
towards the shoulder and eventually
strangulated by the electric wires sitting
thereon. Moreover, it was also negligent of
Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride
with him and for Rapanan to ride with them
when the maximum number of passengers
of a motorcycle is two including the driver.
This most likely even aggravated the
situation because the motorcycle was
overloaded which made it harder to drive
and control. When the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.

2 NO. the second and third elements are
lacking thus precluding the award of
damages in favor of respondents. Thus,
there was no neglience. Adviento,
petitioners employee testified that their
electric poles along the highways, including
the one where the mishap took place, were
erected about four to five meters from the
shoulder of the road. In addition, As a mere
common law wife of Camilo, she is not
considered a legal heir of the latter, and
hence, has no legal personality to institute
the action for damages due to Camilo' s
death.
Ruks Konsult vs. Adworld Sign
Ruks Konsult vs. Adworld Sign
GR No. 204866, January 21, 2015
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:
Adworld filed for damages against Transworld when
Transworlds billboard structure collapsed and
crashed against Adworlds billboard structure, which
was misaligned and its foundation impaired.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred
that the collapse of its billboard structure was due to
extraordinarily strong winds that occurred instantly
and unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage
caused to Adworlds billboard structure was hardly
noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a Third-Party
Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the
collapsed billboard structure in the formers favor. It
was alleged therein that the structure constructed by
Ruks had a weak and poor foundation not suited for
billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks
should ultimately be held liable for the damages
caused to Adworlds billboard structure.
Issue:
Whether Ruks was solidarily liable with Transworld
for the damages in Adworlds billboard
Held:
Yes.
Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTCs
finding that Transworlds initial construction of its
billboards lower structure without the proper
foundation, and that of Rukss finishing its upper
structure and just merely assuming that Transworld
would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2)
successive acts which were the direct and proximate
cause of the damages sustained by Adworld. Worse,
both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the
foundation for the formers billboard was weak; yet,
neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the
same. They merely relied on each others word that
repairs would be done to such foundation, but none
was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances
show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of
negligence in the construction of the formers
billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its
collapse and the resulting damage to Adworlds
billboard structure.
As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily
liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint tortfeasors are those
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done,
if done for their benefit. They are also referred to as
those who act together in committing wrong or whose
acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a
single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code,
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each
liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves." The Courts pronouncement in
People v. Velasco is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Where several causes producing an injury are
concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury
may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by
them to the injured person was not same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors]
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more
persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury.
LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner,
vs. WILFREDO L. PASCASIO, RAUL R. ARNAU,
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA JR., Honorable
CONDRADO M. VASQUEZ, all of the Office of the
Ombudsman; JESUS F. GUERRERO, PORFIRIO
MACARAEG, and GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, all of
the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Manila, respondents. [G.R. No.
118141. September 5, 1997]
Topic: Elements of Medical Malpractice
Facts: Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner issued the assailed resolution dismissing the
Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation complaint for lack of evidence. In fine, petitioner
at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the
blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the
Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda government prosecutors and to approve and
Balatbat Reyes was the anesthesiologist. Six hours disapprove the same.
after the surgery, Florencio died of complications of
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave
unknown cause, according to officials of the UST
abuse of discretion in refusing to file an information
Hospital. Leonila requested that the NBI perform an
for graft against the respondent City Prosecutors.
autopsy on her husbands body. The NBI found that he
had died because of lack of care by the attending Ruling:
physician in administering anesthesia and
recommended that Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes be The
charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence Om
before the Office of the City Prosecutor. bud
sma
A series of nine prosecutors tossed the responsibility n
of conducting a preliminary investigation to each did
other with contradictory recommendations not
(investigative pingpong). Prosecutor Eudoxia T. com
Gualberto recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in mit
the criminal information of Homicide through gra
Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of ve
Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was abu
transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. se
Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any of
wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by both disc
City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City reti
Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. Frustrated, Leonila filed on
graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) in
of Republic Act No. 3019 against Prosecutors dis
Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest
mis
partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the
sin
Ombudsman. On July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman
g
the
plai
nti
ffs
com
plai
nt
for
lack
of
evid
enc
e.
The powers and functions of the Ombudsman have
generally been categorized into the following:
investigatory powers, prosecutory power, public
assistance function, authority to inquire and obtain
information, and function to adopt, institute and
implement preventive measures.
The Ombudsman then may dismiss the complaint if he
finds it to be insufficient in form and substance or if
he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the
inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation of
the complaint if, in his view, it is in due and proper
form.
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsmans action when there is an abuse of
discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
may exceptionally be invoked.
From a procedural standpoint, it is certainly odd why
the successive transfers from one prosecutor to
another were not sufficiently explained in the
Resolution of the Ombudsman. Being the proper
investigating authority with respect to misfeasance,
non-feasance and malfeasance of public officials, the
Ombudsman should have been more vigilant and
assiduous in determining the reasons behind the
buckpassing to ensure that no irregularity took place.
The NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that
there was indeed negligence on the part of the
attending physicians in administering the
anaesthesia. The fact of want of competence or
diligence is evidentiary in nature, which can be best
determined on a full-blown trial for it is virtually
impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical
negligence case without extensive investigation,
research, evaluation and consultations with medical
experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a
competent position to pass judgment on such a
technical matter, especially when there are conflicting
evidence and findings.
As to Medical Malpractice
Medical malpractice or medical negligence is that
type of claim which a victim has available to him or
her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient
must prove that a health care provider, in most cases
a physician, either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done;
and that that failure or action caused injury to the
patient.
There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation.
When the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio
and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient relationship was
created. In accepting the case, said doctors in effect
represented that they will employ such training, care
and skill in the treatment of their patients. They have
a duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances. The
breach of these professional duties of skill and care,
or their improper performance, by a physician
surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in
health, constitutes actionable malpractice.
Consequently, in the event that any injury results to
the patient from want of due care or skill during the
operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in
damages for negligence.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases
involving the administration of anaesthesia, the
necessity of expert testimony and the availability of
the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have
been applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to
hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a
patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia.
Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence:
evidence as to the recognized standards of the
medical community in the particular kind of case, and
a showing that the physician in question negligently
departed from this standard in his treatment.
Another element in medical negligence cases is
causation which is divided into two inquiries: whether
the doctors actions in fact caused the harm to the
patient and whether these were the proximate cause
of the patients injury. Indeed here, a causal
connection is discernible from the occurrence of the
victims death after the negligent act of the
anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a
fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of
the appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the
allegation of negligence is not entirely
baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the
attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary
interview of the patient prior to the operation. It
appears that the cause of the death of the victim could
have been averted had the proper drug been applied
to cope with the symptoms of malignant
hyperthermia.
Dela Torre vs Imbuido
Facts:
At around 3:00pm of February 3, 1992, Carmen (sps
of petitioner Pedrito Dela Torre) was brought to
Divine Spirit General Hospitals operating room for
her caesarian section operation, which was to be
performed by Dr. Nestor Imbuido. By 5:30pm, of the
same day, Pedrito was informed by his wifes delivery
of a baby boy. In the early morning of February 4,
1992, Carmen experienced abdominal pains and
difficulty in urinating. She was diagnosed to be
suffering from urinary tract infection (UTI), and was
prescribed medication by Dr. Norma. On February 10,
1992, Pedrito noticed that Carmens stomach was
getting bigger, but Dr. Norma dismissed the patients
condition as mere fratulence. When Carmens
stomach still grow bigger despite medications, Dr.
Norma advised Pedrito of the possibility of a second
operation on Carmen. Dr. Norma, however, provided
no details on its purpose and the doctor who would
perform it. At around 3:00pm on February 12, 1992
Carmen had her second operation. Later in the
evening, Dr. Norma informed Pedrito that everything
was going on fine with his wife. The condition of
Carmen, however, did not improve. It instead
worsened that on February 13, 1992, she vomited
dark red blood. At 9:30pm of the same day, Carmen
died. Per her death certificate upon information
provided by the hospital, the immediate cause of
Carmens death was cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to cerebro vascular accident, hypertension
and chronic nephritis induced by pregnancy. An
autopsy report prepared by Dr. Partilano, medico-legal
officer designate of Olongapo City, however, provided
that the cause of Carmens death was shock due to
peritonitis severe with multiple intestinal adhesions;
status post caesarian section and exploratory
laparotomy. Pedrito claimed in his complaint that the
respondents failed to exercise the degree of diligence
required of them as members of the medical
profession, and were negligent for practicing surgery
on Carmen in the most unskilled, ignorant, and cruel
manner. Dr Partilano testified during the trial.
Issue: Whether or not respondents were liable for
medical malpractice that resulted to Carmens death.
Held:
No. Medical malpractice or, more appropriately,
medical negligence, is that type of claim which a
victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has
caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue
such a claim, a patient, or his or her family as in this
case, must prove that healthcare provider, in most
cases, a physician, either failed to do something which
a reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done;
and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Four essential elements must be established
namely: 1.) duty; 2.) breach; 3.) injury and 4.)
proximate causation. All four elements must be
present in order to find the physician negligent
and thus, liable for damages.
For the trial court to give weight to Dr. Partilanos
report, it was necessary to show first Dr. Partilanos
specialization and competence to testify on the degree
of care, skill and diligence needed for the treatment of
Carmens case. Considering that it was not duly
established that Dr. Partilano practiced and was an
expert on the fields that involved Carmens condition,
he could not have accurately identified the said
degree of care, skill and diligence and the medical
procedure, that should have been applied. Similarly,
such duty, degree of care, skill and diligence were not
sufficiently established in this case because the
testimony of Dr. Patilano was based solely on the
results of his autopsy on the cadaver of Carmen. His
study and assessment were restricted by limitations
that denied his full evaluation of Carmens case. He
could have only deduced from the injuries apparent in
Carmens body, and in the condition when the body
was examined. Judging from his testimony, Dr.
Patilano did not even take full consideration of the
medical history of Carmen, her actual health condition
at the time of hospital admission, and her condition as
it progressed while she was being monitored and
treated by the respondents.
CASUMPANG v. CORTEJO
G.R. No. 171127 | March 11, 2015
FACTS:
On April 22, 1988, at about 11:30 in the morning,
Mrs. Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer,
to the Emergency Room of the San Juan de Dios
Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing,
chest pain, stomach pain, and fever. Thereafter,
she was referred and assigned to Dr. Casumpang,
a pediatrician. At 5:30 in the afternoon of the same
day, Dr. Casumpang, upon examination using only
a stethoscope, confirmed the diagnosis of
Bronchopneumonia. Mrs. Cortejo immediately
advised Dr. Casumpang that Edmer had a high
fever, and had no colds or cough but Dr.
Casumpang merely told her that her son's
bloodpressure is just being active and remarked
that that's the usual bronchopneumonia, no colds,
no phlegm.
Dr. Casumpang next visited the following day. Mrs.
Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention
and stated that Edmer had a fever, throat
irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs.
Cortejo also alerted Dr. Casumpang about the
traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Despite these
pieces of information, however, Dr. Casumpang
simply nodded and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that
Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia.
At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988,
Edmer vomited phlegm with blood streak
prompting the Edmer's father to request for a
doctor. Later, Miranda, one of the resident
physicians of SJDH, arrived. She claimed that
although aware that Edmer had vomited phlegm
with blood streak she failed to examine the blood
specimen. She then advised the respondent to
preserve the specimen for examination. Thereafter,
Dr. Miranda conducted a check-up on Edmer and
found that Edmer had a low-grade fever and
rashes.
At 3:00 in the afternoon, Edmer once again
vomited blood. Dr. Miranda then examined
Edmer's sputum with blood and noted that he was
bleeding. Suspecting that he could be afflicted
 with dengue, Dr. Miranda conducted a tourniquet
test, which turned out to be negative. Dr. Miranda
then called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told
him about Edmer's condition. Upon being
informed, Dr. Casumpang ordered several
procedures done. Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's
parents that the blood test results showed that
Edmer was suffering from Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever. Dr. Casumpang recommended Edmers
transfer to the ICU, but since the ICU was then
full, the respondent, insisted on transferring his
son to Makati Medical Center.
At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his
parents and by Dr. Casumpang, was transferred to
Makati Medical Center. Upon examination, the
attending physician diagnosed Dengue Fever Stage
IV that was already in its irreversible stage. Edmer
died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988. His
Death Certificate indicated the cause of death as
Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock/Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV.
Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the
negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors,
the respondent instituted an action for damages
against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr.
Casumpang and Dr. Miranda.
Dr. Casumpang contends that he gave his patient
medical treatment and care to the best of his
abilities, and within the proper standard of care
required from physicians under similar
circumstances.
Dr. Miranda argued that the function of making the
diagnosis and undertaking the medical treatment
devolved upon Dr. Casumpang, the doctor assigned
to Edmer. Dr. Miranda also alleged that she
exercised prudence in performing her duties as a
physician, underscoring that it was her
professional intervention that led to the correct
diagnosis of Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever.
SJDH, on the other hand, disclaims liability by
asserting that Dr. Casumpang and Dr. Miranda are
mere independent contractors and consultants (not
employees) of the hospital; hence, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code does not apply.
ISSUES:
1 W/N Casumpang had committed inexcusable lack
of precaution in diagnosing and in treating the
patient
2 W/N Miranda had committed inexcusable lack of
precaution in diagnosing and in treating the
patient
3 W/N Whether or not the petitioner hospital is
solidarity liable with the petitioner doctors
4 W/N or not there is a causal connection between
the petitioners' negligent act/omission and the
patient's resulting death
HELD/RATIO:
1 YES, Casumpang was negligent.
 Even assuming that Edmer's symptoms completely
coincided with the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, we still find Dr. Casumpang
guilty of negligence. Wrong diagnosis is not by
itself medical malpractice. Physicians are generally
not liable for damages resulting from a bona fide
error of judgment and from acting according to
acceptable medical practice standards.
Nonetheless, when the physician's erroneous
diagnosis was the result of negligent conduct, it
becomes an evidence of medical malpractice.
In the present case, evidence on record
established that in confirming the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, Dr. Casumpang selectively
appreciated some and not all of the symptoms
presented, and failed to promptly conduct the
appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum,
Dr. Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue
fever, which failure, especially when reasonable
prudence would have shown that indications of
dengue were evident and/or foreseeable,
constitutes negligence. Apart from failing to
promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also
failed to promptly undertake the proper medical
management needed for this disease. Dr.
Casumpang failed to measure up to the acceptable
medical standards in diagnosing and treating
dengue fever.
Dr. Casumpang's claim that he exercised prudence
and due diligence in handling Edmer's case, sside
from being self-serving, is not supported by
competent evidence. He failed, as a medical
professional, to observe the most prudent medical
procedure under the circumstances in diagnosing
and treating Edmer.
2 No, Dr. Miranda is not liable for negligence.
We find that Dr. Miranda was not independently
negligent. Although she was subject to the same
standard of care applicable to attending
physicians, as a resident physician, she merely
operates as a subordinate who usually refer to the
attending physician on the decision to be made
and on the action to be taken. We also believe that
a finding of negligence should also depend on
several competing factors. In this case, before Dr.
Miranda attended to Edmer, Dr. Casumpang had
diagnosed Edmer with bronchopneumonia. There
is also evidence supporting Dr. Miranda's claim
that she extended diligent care to Edmer. In fact,
when she suspected, during Edmer's second
episode of bleeding, that Edmer could be suffering
from dengue, she wasted no time in conducting the
necessary tests, and promptly notified Dr.
Casumpang about the incident. Indubitably, her
medical assistance led to the finding of dengue
fever. Dr. Miranda's error was merely an honest
mistake of judgment; hence, she should not be
held liable for medical negligence.
3 Yes, causal connection between the
petitioners' negligence and the patient's
resulting death was established
Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with
dengue fever despite the presence of its
characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of
the delayed diagnosis, he also failed to promptly
 manage Edmer's illness. Had he immediately
conducted confirmatory tests, and promptly
administered the proper care and management
needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications
or even death, could have been substantially
reduced. That Edmer later died of Dengue
Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV, a severe and fatal
form of dengue fever, established the causal link
between Dr. Casumpang's negligence and the
injury. The element of causation is successfully
proven.
4 YES, SJDH is solidarily liable.
As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the
negligence of its independent contractors.
However, it may be found liable if the physician or
independent contractor acts as an ostensible agent
of the hospital. This exception is also known as the
doctrine of apparent authority.
SJDH impliedly held out and clothed Dr.
Casumpang with apparent authority leading the
respondent to believe that he is an employee or
agent of the hospital. Based on the records, the
respondent relied on SJDH rather than upon Dr.
Casumpang, to care and treat his son Edmer. His
testimony during trial showed that he and his wife
did not know any doctors at SJDH; they also did
not know that Dr. Casumpang was an independent
contractor. They brought their son to SJDH for
diagnosis because of their family doctor's referral.
The referral did not specifically point to Dr.
Casumpang or even to Dr. Miranda, but to SJDH.
Mrs. Cortejo accepted Dr. Casumpang's services
on the reasonable belief that such were being
provided by SJDH or its employees, agents, or
servants. By referring Dr. Casumpang to care and
treat for Edmer, SJDH impliedly held out Dr.
Casumpang as a member of its medical staff. SJDH
cannot now disclaim liability since there is no
showing that Mrs. Cortejo or the respondent knew,
or should have known, that Dr. Casumpang is only
an independent contractor of the hospital. In this
case, estoppel has already set in.
CITY OF MANILA vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
FACTS:
Genaro N. Teotico managed to hail a jeepney. As he
stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, he
fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue. His head hit the rim of the manhole
breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
thereof to pierce his left eyelid and also suffered
contusions on different parts of his body. Teotico then
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a
complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer
and chief of police.
The defense presented evidence to prove that the
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a
report of the uncovered condition of a catch basin but
the same was covered on the same day; that it has
always been a policy of the said office, which is
charged with the duty of installation, repair and care
of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a
report is received from whatever source of the loss of
a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately
attended to, either by immediately replacing the
missing cover or covering the catchbasin and in order
to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the
City by constructing them under the sidewalks with
concrete cement covers and openings on the side of
the gutter.
The City of Manila invoked Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city
officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions as
against:
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should
prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a
special law, intended exclusively for the City of
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,
applicable to the entire Philippines.
The CFI of Manila rendered sustained the position of
the defendants. On appeal taken by plaintiff, this
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but
applied Article 2189, which was sentenced the City of
Manila to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila
which raised that the City of Manila cannot be held
liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident
involving him took place in a national highway; and 2)
because the City of Manila has not been negligent in
connection therewith.
ISSUE:
Whether the present case is governed by the City
charter or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Article 2189 should apply. Section 4 of the charter
refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189
governs liability due to "defective streets," in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.
The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a
national highway was made, for the first time, in its
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a
question of fact, which had not been put in issue in
the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time,
on appeal, much less after the rendition of the
decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is
not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to
the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is
that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. In
which case, has been exercised by the City of Manila
and is proved by its regular inspection of such
manholes.
G.R. No. 71049, May 29, 1987
BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, PETITIONER, VS. CITY
OF MANILA AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with his neighbors, went to Sta.
Ana public market to buy bagoong when the public
market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After
his purchase, he stepped on an uncovered opening
which could not be seen because of the dirty
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail,
stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left
leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth of
about one and a half inches. He felt ill and developed
fever thus he was rushed to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital where he had to be confined for (20) days
due to high fever and severe pain.
His injury prevented him from attending to the school
buses he is operating. As a result, he had to engage
the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his
business for an aggregate compensation of P900.00.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and
the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (Asiatic) under
whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had
been placed.
The lower court rendered decision in favor of
respondents. The appellate court absolved the City of
Manila. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate Court
erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila
should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic
Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner
suffered.
HELD:
Yes, the appellate court erred. The City of Manila is
negligent thus a joint tortfeasor for quasi-delict with
Asiatic which are both jointly and severally liable for
damages to petitioner.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides that:
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any
person by reason of defective conditions of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between respondent City and
Asiatic remained under the control of the former. This
is evidenced by employment by the City of a market
master to take direct supervision and control and to
check safety of the place for the public.
Moreover, a customer in a store has the right to
assume that the owner will comply with his duty to
keep the premises safe for customers.
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-
delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family. The City of Manila failed in
this regard. Ordinary precautions could have been
taken during good weather to minimize the dangers to
life and limb under those difficult circumstances.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED, making the City of
Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation
solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs P221.90 actual
medical expenses, P900.00 for the amount paid for
the operation and management of the school bus,
P20,000.00 as moral damages due to pain, sufferings
and sleepless nights and P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.
Municipality of San Juan vs CA
Facts:
KC (K.C. Waterworks System Construction), the
contractor, was instructed by MWSS to conduct and
effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and
Santolan Road, a national road, in San Juan City. KC
is working under a Contract for Water Service
Connection between it and the MWSS. The workers
installed four (4) barricades made up of two-inch thick
GI pipes welded together, 1.3 meters wide and 1.2
meters high, at the area where the digging is to take
place. The digging operations started at 9 oclock in After trial, the lower court found the
the morning and ended at about 3 oclock in the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages in
afternoon. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide favour of Ms. Biglang-awa.
and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the
excavated portion of the road with the same gravel The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
and stone excavated from the area. At that time, only with a slight modification on the amount of damages.
of the job was finished in view of the fact that the
workers were still required to re-excavate that The municipality of San Juan appealed the
particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing that since
water connections to the concessionaires. Santolan Road is a national road, it is not liable for
accidents thereon, since as a municipality, it is only
On May 31, 1988, Priscilla and a passenger, Ms.
responsible for the construction, improvement, repair
Biglang-Awa, a prosecutor, passed thru the right side
and maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues,
of Santolan Rd going to Pinaglabanan St., at a speed
alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public
of 30 kilometres per hour. The streets were flooded
places, under the provisions of the then existing Local
owing to the heavy rains. Suddenly, the left front
Government Code. It also argued that the under the
wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers
terms of Metropolitan Manila Commission circular,
of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the
the permitted excavator is liable for damages, not the
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa
municipality.
was fractured. Thereupon, Priscilla Chan contacted
Biglang-awas husband who immediately arrived at
Issue: WON the Municipality of San Juan is liable.
the scene and brought his wife to the Cardinal Santos
Hospital.
Held:
According to the police officer who investigated
In denying the appeal filed by the municipality of San
the accident, he did not see any barricades placed on
Juan, the Supreme Court ruled:
the road when he arrived less than an hour after the
accident.
Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise
under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the
Because of this, Ms. Biglang-awa filed an action
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
for damages against the MWSS, the municipality (now
public works, is not a controlling factor, it being
a city), some municipal officials, and KC.
sufficient that a province, city or municipality has
control or supervision thereof. This, we made clear in
City of Manila vs. Teotico, et al:
 At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or
streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either control or supervision over said street or
road.
Doubtless, the term regulate found in the
aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean
that petitioner municipality exercises the power of
control or, at the very least, supervision over all
excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and
other pipes within its territory.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1]
[bb] of Section 149, supra, of the Local Government
Code, the phrases regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water,
sewer, and other pipes, and adopt measures to
ensure public safety against open canals, manholes,
live wires and other similar hazards to life and
property, are not modified by the term municipal
road. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the
same provision of Section 149 that petitioners power
of regulation vis--vis the activities therein mentioned
applies only in cases where such activities are to be
performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the
municipalitys liability for injuries caused by its failure
to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground
for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes,
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or
excavation is made on a national or municipal road,
for as long as the same is within its territorial
jurisdiction.
Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai
Facts:
At 5:30 in the morning, on Highway 54 (now
EDSA) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village, Marcial
CAedo was driving his Mercury car from Quezon City
to the airport (southbound) to bring his son who was
going to Mindoro. Coming from the opposite direction
was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Paraaque (northbound) home to Wack Wack for his
regular round of golf. Considering there was no traffic
at that time, both cars were traveling a fairly
moderate speeds- Caedo at 40-50kph, Bernardo 48-
56kph. In front of the car of Bernardo and YU Khe
Thai was a carretela going in the same direction. The
carretela was towing another horse by means of a
short rope coiled around the carretelas post. The
carretela had 2 lights, one on each side.
Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping
behind the carretela, veered to the left in order to
pass. As he did, his car caught the rim of the
carretelas left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it
along as the car skidded to the other land, colliding
with Caedos car. Caedo tried to avoid the collision by
going farther to the right, but was no successful.
Caedo and the members of his family were
injured because of the accident, so they filed this suit
for recovery of damages from Bernardo and Yu Khe
Thai.
Issue: whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the
Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver.
Held: No.
The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner
is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations
at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor
was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could
have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his
own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that
Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since
1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo
Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten
years. During that time he had no record of violation
of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for
having employed him at all may be imputed to his
master.
The time element was such that there was no
reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the
risks involved and warn the driver accordingly.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and
inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their
own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for
them precisely because they are not trained or
endowed with sufficient discernment to know the
rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers
posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent
omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a car
owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the
part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not
similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is
his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned,
absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver
that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a
uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services,
would be effectively proscribed.
BIENVENIDO GELISAN VS. BENITO ALDAY
FACTS:
On January 31, 1962, Gelisan and Espiritu entered
into a contract under which the latter hired Gelisans
freight truck for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar,
flour and fertilizer. It was agreed that:
the rate would be P18.00 per trip within Manila, the
loads shall not exceed 200 sacks, and that Espiritu
shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending
the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him.
Espiritus driver then took the truck on February 1,
1962. Plaintiff Alday, a trucking operator, owns about
15 freight trucks, and had known the Espiritu since
1948 as a truck operator. Alday had a contract to haul
the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation
(Atlas) from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its Warehouse in
Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4
and the latter offered the use of his truck with the
driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of fertilizer.
Alday accepted the offer and instructed his checker to
let Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls
of 200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was
delivered to his driver and helper with the necessary
way bill receipts. However, he did not deliver the
fertilizer to the Atlas bodega at Mandaluyong and he
could not be found.
Alday reported the loss to the Manila Police
Department. Espiritu was later arrested and booked
for theft while the truck was found by Alday on Sto.
Cristo St., and was later impounded by the police.
Gelisan claimed the truck but as he could not produce
at the time the registration papers, the police would
not release the same to him. He paid the premium of
P300 to a surety company for the release of the truck.
Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags
of fertilizer, in the amount of P5,397.33, to Atlas so
that, he filed a complaint against Espiritu and Gelisan
with the CFI of Manila, for the recovery of damages
suffered by him thru the criminal acts committed by
the defendants. The defendant, Roberto Espiritu failed
to file an answer and was, accordingly, declared in
default.
On the other hand, Gelisan, disowned responsibility.
He claimed that he had no contractual relations with
the plaintiff Alday as regards the hauling and/or
delivery of the 400 bags of fertilizer; that the alleged
misappropriation or nondelivery by Espiritu, was
entirely beyond his (Gelisan's) control and knowledge,
and which only became known to him when his freight
truck was impounded by the police; and that in his
written contract of hire with Espiritu, it was expressly
provided that the latter will bear and pay all loss and
damages attending the carriage of goods to be hauled
by him.
CFI ruled that only Espiritu was liable since Gelisan
was not privy to the contract between Espiritu and
Alday. CA ruled that Gelisan is also liable for being the
registered owner of the truck; and that the lease
contract between Gelisan and Espiritu, with the
stipulation that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses
attending the carriage of goods, is not binding upon
Alday for not having been previously approved by the
Public Service Commission. Gelisan appealed to SC.
ISSUE: WON Gelisan is liable for damages to Alday
for the nondelivery of the bags of fertilizer
HELD: Yes. The registered owner of a public service
vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise
from consequences incident to its operation or that
may be caused to any of the passengers therein.
Montoya vs. Ignacio: Since a franchise is personal in
nature any transfer or lease thereof should be notified
to the Public Service Commission so that the latter
may take proper safeguards to protect the interest of
the public. xxx It follows that if the property covered
by the franchise is transferred, or leased to another
without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer
is not binding against the Public Service Commission
and in contemplation of law the grantee continues to
be responsible under the franchise in relation to the
Commission and to the Public. Nevertheles, Gelisan
has a right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the
amount that he may be required to pay as damages to
Alday. The lease contract in question, although not
effective against the public for not having been
approved by the Public Service Commission, is valid
and binding between the contracting parties
SC also find no merit in the petitioner's contention
that his liability is only subsidiary. The Court has
consistently considered the registered owner/operator
of a public service vehicle to be jointly and severally
liable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a consequence of
injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicles.
YHT Realty Corp, Erlinda Lainez and Anicia
Payam vs. CA and Maurice McLoughlin
[G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005]
Facts:
Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian
businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at Sheraton
Hotel during his trips to the Philippines when he met
Tan. Tan befriended McLoughlin and convinced him to
transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where
Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were employed.
Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez
and Payam had custody of the keys for the safety
deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of
McLoughlins booking at the Tropicana where he
started staying during his trips to the Philippines.
He rented a safety deposit box and is aware of the
procedure observed by Tropicana relative to its safety
deposit boxes; that it could only be opened through
the use of two keys, one of which is given to the
registered guest, and the other remaining in the
possession of the management of the hotel. When a
registered guest wished to open his safety deposit
box, he alone could personally request the
management who then would assign one of its
employees to accompany the guest and assist him in
opening the safety deposit box with the two keys.
McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his
safety deposit box:
- US$15,000.00 which he placed in two
envelopes
- envelope containing US$10,000.00, and
- the other envelope US$5,000.00;
- AUS$10,000.00 Australian dollars which he
also placed in another envelope;
- 2 other envelopes containing letters and credit
cards;
- 2 bankbooks; and
- a checkbook, arranged side by side inside the
safety deposit box.
Before leaving for a brief trip to Hongkong,
McLoughlin opened his safety deposit box and took
the envelope containing US$5,000, the envelope
containing AUS$10,000, his passports and his credit
cards. McLoughlin left the other items in the box as
he did not check out of his room at the Tropicana
during his short visit to Hongkong. He discovered that
there was only $3,000 in the envelope which ought to
have $5,000, but thought that it was just a result of
bad accounting of his money.
After returning to Manila, he checked out of
Tropicana and left for Australia. He then discovered
that:
- the envelope with US$10,000.00 was short of
US$5,000
- the jewelry which he bought in Hongkong and
stored in the safety deposit box upon his return
to Tropicana was likewise missing, except for a
diamond bracelet.
When McLoughlin came back to the Philippines, he
asked Lainez if some money and/or jewelry which he
had lost were found and returned to her or to the
management. However, Lainez told him that no one in
the hotel found such things and none were turned
over to the management.
He again registered at Tropicana and rented a safety
deposit box. He placed
- envelope containing US$15,000.00
- envelope containing AUS$10,000.00 and
- other envelopes containing his traveling
papers/documents.
McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his
safety deposit box. He noticed that:
- in the envelope containing US$15,000,
US$2,000 were missing and
- in the envelope previously containing
AUS$10,000, AUS$4,500.00 were missing.
When McLoughlin discovered the loss, he immediately
confronted Lainez and Payam who admitted that Tan
opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned
to him. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlins
key while he was asleep and was able to open the
safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez,
Payam and Lainez.
McLoughlin requested the management for an
investigation of the incident, and Lopez wrote a
promissory note.
Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan,
McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who
must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered.
However, Lopez refused to accept the responsibility
relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit
box entitled Undertaking For the Use Of Safety
Deposit Box, specifically paragraphs (2) and (4)
thereof, to wit:
2. To release and hold free and blameless
TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from any
liability arising from any loss in the contents
and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause
whatsoever, including but not limited to the
presentation or use thereof by any other person
should the key be lost;
4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE
in favor of TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL
upon giving up the use of the box.
McLoughlin went back to Australia and he consulted
his lawyers, and they opined that the stipulations are
void for being violative of universal hotel practices
and customs. His lawyers prepared a letter which was
sent to the Office of the President, Corazon Aquino.
The Office referred the letter to the DOJ which
forwarded the same to the Western Police District
(WPD).
After receiving a copy of the indorsement in Australia,
McLoughlin came to the Philippines and went to
Malacaang to follow up on his letter but he was
instructed to go to the DOJ. The DOJ directed him to
proceed to the WPD for documentation, but
McLoughlin went back to Australia as he had an
urgent business matter to attend to.
Upon his return to the Philippines, the WPD
conducted an investigation which resulted in the
preparation of an affidavit forwarded to the Manila
City Fiscals Office. Said affidavit became the basis of
preliminary investigation but McLoughlin left again
for Australia without receiving the notice of the
hearing. Thus, the case at the Fiscals Office was
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mcloughlin
requested the reinstatement of the criminal charge
for theft. In the meantime, McLoughlin and his
lawyers wrote letters of demand to those having
responsibility to pay the damage.
Meetings were held between McLoughlin and his
lawyer which resulted to the filing of a complaint for
damages against YHT Realty Corporation, Lopez,
Lainez, Payam and Tan (defendants) for the loss of
McLoughlins money.
During the trial of the case, McLoughlin had been in
and out of the country to attend to urgent business in
Australia, and while staying in the Philippines to
attend the hearing, he incurred expenses for hotel
bills, airfare and other transportation expenses, long
distance calls to Australia, Meralco power expenses,
and expenses for food and maintenance, among
others.
RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of McLoughlin.
It was established that McLoughlins money, kept in
Tropicanas safety deposit box, was taken by Tan
without McLoughlins consent, through the use of the
master key which was in the possession of the
management. Payam and Lainez allowed Tan to use
the master key without authority from McLoughlin.
The trial court added that if McLoughlin had not lost
his dollars, he would not have gone through the
trouble and personal inconvenience of seeking aid and
assistance from the Office of the President, DOJ,
police authorities and the City Fiscals Office in his
desire to recover his losses from the hotel
management and Tan.
As regards the loss of US$7,000.00 and jewelry worth
approximately US$1,200.00, no claim was made by
McLoughlin for such losses because he was not sure
how they were lost and who the responsible persons
were. But considering the admission of the defendants
that they allowed Tan to open the box, the trial court
opined that it was logical and reasonable to presume
that his personal assets jewelry were taken by Tan
from the safety deposit box without McLoughlins
consent through the cooperation of Payam and Lainez.
The trial court also found that defendants acted with
gross negligence in the performance and exercise of
their duties and obligations as innkeepers and were
therefore liable to answer for the losses incurred by
McLoughlin.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that paragraphs (2)
and (4) of the Undertaking For The Use Of Safety
Deposit Box are void for being contrary to the express
mandate of Article 2003 of the New Civil Code and
against public policy. Thus, there being fraud or
wanton conduct on the part of defendants, they
should be responsible for all damages which may be
attributed to the non-performance of their contractual
obligations.
CA: Affirmed the disquisitions made by the lower
court except as to the amount of damages awarded.
Issues:
1 Whether the finding of gross negligence on the
part of petitioners in the performance of their
duties as innkeepers is supported by the
evidence on record;
2 whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety
Deposit Box admittedly executed by private
respondent is null and void; and
3 whether the damages awarded to private
respondent, as well as the amounts thereof, are
proper under the circumstances.
Ruling:
1 Yes. The evidence reveals that two keys are
required to open the safety deposit boxes of
Tropicana.
One key is assigned to the guest while the other
remains in the possession of the management. If the
guest desires to open his safety deposit box, he must
request the management for the other key to open the
same. In other words, the guest alone cannot open the
safety deposit box without the assistance of the
management or its employees. With more reason that
access to the safety deposit box should be denied if
the one requesting for the opening of the safety
deposit box is a stranger. Thus, in case of loss of any
item deposited in the safety deposit box, it is
inevitable to conclude that the management had at
least a hand in the consummation of the taking, unless
the reason for the loss is force majeure.
Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who
were employees of Tropicana, had custody of the
master key of the management when the loss took
place. In fact, they even admitted that they assisted
Tan on three separate occasions in opening
McLoughlins safety deposit box. This only proves that
Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside
from the registered guest had access to the safety
deposit box. Yet the management failed to notify
McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to
discover the taking before it disclosed the matter to
him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible
for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of
the negligence of its employees.
 box a number of times at the early hours of the
morning. Tans acts should have prompted the
The management should have guarded against the management to investigate her relationship with
occurrence of this incident considering that Payam
McLoughlin. Then, petitioners would have exercised
admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three due diligence required of them. Failure to do so
times in opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin
warrants the conclusion that the management had
at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was been remiss in complying with the obligations
still asleep. In light of the circumstances surrounding
imposed upon hotel-keepers under the law.
this case, it is undeniable that without the
acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the
opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of
McLoughlins money could and should have been Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those
avoided. who, in the performance of their obligations, are
guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to
who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article
2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that
The management contends, however, that
the owners and managers of an establishment or
McLoughlin, by his act, made its employees believe
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
that Tan was his spouse for she was always with him
caused by their employees in the service of the
most of the time. The evidence on record, however, is
branches in which the latter are employed or on
bereft of any showing that McLoughlin introduced Tan
the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court
to the management as his wife. Such an inference
has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is
from the act of McLoughlin will not exculpate the
presumed that the employer was negligent in
petitioners from liability in the absence of any
selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the
showing that he made the management believe that
victim to prove the negligence of such employer. Thus,
Tan was his wife or was duly authorized to have
given the fact that the loss of McLoughlins money was
access to the safety deposit box. Mere close
consummated through the negligence of Tropicanas
companionship and intimacy are not enough to
employees in allowing Tan to open the safety deposit
warrant such conclusion considering that what is
box without the guests consent, both the assisting
involved in the instant case is the very safety of
employees and YHT Realty Corporation itself, as
McLoughlins deposit. If only petitioners exercised due
owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held
diligence in taking care of McLoughlins safety deposit
solidarily liable pursuant to Article 2193.
box, they should have confronted him as to his
relationship with Tan considering that the latter had
been observed opening McLoughlins safety deposit
2 Yes. Article 2003 is controlling, thus:

Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from
responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he
is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any
stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth
in Articles 1998 to 2001 is suppressed or diminished
shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code
as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to
situations such as that presented in this case. The
hotel business like the common carriers business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for hotel guests and security to their persons and
belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of
the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty
to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily
appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers
on guests for their signature.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly
contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for
they allow Tropicana to be released from liability
arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the
safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever.
Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any
claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of
the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was
incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil
Code is explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-
keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the
personal property of the guests even if caused by
servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns
as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from
any force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure
that may spare the hotel-keeper from liability. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the
thief or robber was done with the use of arms or
through an irresistible force to qualify the same as
force majeure.
Petitioners likewise anchor their defense on Article
2002 which exempts the hotel-keeper from liability if
the loss is due to the acts of his guest, his family, or
visitors. Even a cursory reading of the provision would
lead us to reject petitioners contention. The
justification they raise would render nugatory the
public interest sought to be protected by the
provision. What if the negligence of the employer or
its employees facilitated the consummation of a crime
committed by the registered guests relatives or
visitor? Should the law exculpate the hotel from
liability since the loss was due to the act of the visitor
of the registered guest of the hotel? Hence, this
provision presupposes that the hotel-keeper is not
guilty of concurrent negligence or has not contributed
in any degree to the occurrence of the loss. A
depositary is not responsible for the loss of goods by
theft, unless his actionable negligence contributes to
the loss.
In the case at bar, the responsibility of securing the
safety deposit box was shared not only by the guest
himself but also by the management since two keys
are necessary to open the safety deposit box. Without
the assistance of hotel employees, the loss would not
have occurred. Thus, Tropicana was guilty of
concurrent negligence in allowing Tan, who was not
the registered guest, to open the safety deposit box of
McLoughlin, even assuming that the latter was also
guilty of negligence in allowing another person to use
his key. To rule otherwise would result in undermining
the safety of the safety deposit boxes in hotels for the
management will be given imprimatur to allow any
person, under the pretense of being a family member
or a visitor of the guest, to have access to the safety
deposit box without fear of any liability that will
attach thereafter in case such person turns out to be a
complete stranger. This will allow the hotel to evade
responsibility for any liability incurred by its
employees in conspiracy with the guests relatives and
visitors.
Petitioners contend that McLoughlins case was
mounted on the theory of contract, but the trial court
and the appellate court upheld the grant of the claims
of the latter on the basis of tort.[45] There is nothing
anomalous in how the lower courts decided the
controversy for this Court has pronounced a
jurisprudential rule that tort liability can exist even if
there are already contractual relations. The act that
breaks the contract may also be tort.[46]
3 Yes. It is within the province of lower courts to
settle factual issues such as the proper amount
of damages awarded and such finding is
binding upon this Court especially if sufficiently
proven by evidence and not unconscionable or
excessive.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19 October
1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioners are directed,
jointly and severally, to pay private respondent the
following amounts:
1 US$2,000.00 and AUS$4,500.00 or their peso
equivalent at the time of payment;
2 P308,880.80, representing the peso value for
the air fares from Sydney to Manila and back
for a total of eleven (11) trips;
3 One-half of P336,207.05 or P168,103.52
representing payment to Tropicana Copacabana
Apartment Hotel;
4 One-half of P152,683.57 or P76,341.785
representing payment to Echelon Tower;
5 One-half of P179,863.20 or P89,931.60 for the
taxi or transportation expense from
McLoughlins residence to Sydney Airport and
from MIA to the hotel here in Manila, for the
eleven (11) trips;
6 One-half of P7,801.94 or P3,900.97
representing Meralco power expenses;
 7 One-half of P356,400.00 or P178,200.00 In Feburary 1946, litigation was instituted in the
representing expenses for food and Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines Sur, to
maintenance; compel re-transfer.
8 P50,000.00 for moral damages;
9 P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and After having been duly summoned, the defendant
10 P200,000 representing attorneys fees. failed to answer. Consequently, upon plaintiff's
motion, he was defaulted by order of May 10, 1947.

On September 23, 1947, considering the plaintiff's

I.SHORT TITLE: ISAAC v. MENDOZA evidence the court rendered judgment requiring the
II. FULL TITLE: Fausto Isaac, plaintiff-appellee, defendant to execute a deed of re-sale of the land, to
vs. Leopoldo Mendoza, defendant- receive the amount of P90 Philippine currency, which
appellant. Isaac had consigned in court, to pay damages in the
G.R. No. L-2820, June 21, 1951 sum of P95.
J. Bengzon
On December 9, 1947 Mendoza submitted a petition
to set aside the judgment invoking accident, mistake,
III. TOPIC: Negligence; Particular Acts of or excusable negligence. Basis of defendant's petition
Negligence; Attorneys was the allegation that as his attorney Jorge C.
Briones had not received notice of the court's denial
of his motion to dismiss the complaint, he had reason
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS: to believe the time to answer had not expired.
Opposed by plaintiff, the petition was denied.
In February 1944, Isaac (Plaintiff) sold to Mendoza
(Defendant) a parcel of land in Pili, Camarines Sur, for Wherefore defendant appealed directly to this court.
the amount of Php 450.00, Japanese currency,
reserving the right to repurchase within four years.
VI. ISSUE:
After liberation, the seller offered to redeem, but
defendant objected, saying the redemption was 1. Whether or not the court below erred in declaring
premature. defendant-appellant in default.
2. Whether or not defendant-appellant should not
suffer from his lawyers shortcoming.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 3. Whether or not defendant-appellant has standing in
court.

VII. RULING:
1. No. It appears from the record that, duly
summoned, defendant through Attorney Briones filed
a motion to dismiss, which was overruled by order of
April 8, 1946. At the bottom of that order there is
notation that had been furnished Attorney Briones by
ordinary mail. On February 8, 1947, the plaintiff filed
his motion for default, asserting that, defendant's
motion to dismiss had been denied and that so far,
defendant had interposed no answer. On February 15,
1947 the court issued an auto suspending
consideration of plaintiff's motion and giving the
defendant a period of ten days within which to reply
thereto, if so desired. Copy of this directive was sent
by registered mail to Attorney Briones, but the latter
"refused to claim the registered letter despite the
notices given him by the postmaster". And according
to an affidavit submitted to the court, Attorney Peas
for the plaintiff, had again and gain reminded Briones
that the time was come for the answer.
Apprised of the foregoing circumstances, the court of
first instance denied the petition to set aside.
We think such denial was entirely proper. According
to the rules, Attorney Briones is deemed to have
received the copy of the auto of February 15, 1947
which he declined to accept from the mails (Rule 27
section 8). That order was sufficient to advise him of
the rejection of his previous motion of dismissal,
supposing he had not actually received the copy of the
order of April 8, 1946, which had been forwarded to
him by ordinary mail.
2. No. The appellant insist here that "the record fails
to show a conclusive evidence that Atty. Jorge C.
Briones . . . was notified". This is refuted by the above
account of the facts and of the governing principles. It
is remarkable that, to meet the conclusions therein
set forth, defendant has not introduced any sworn
statement of Attorney Briones.
In connection with the argument that defendant
should not suffer for his lawyer's shortcoming, it
should be explained that the client is bound by the
acts, even mistakes of his counsel in realm of
procedural technique; but if the client is prejudiced by
the attorney's negligence or misconduct he may
recover damages.
3. No. Another point, which is equally decisive. Unless
the appellant has filed a motion to set aside the order
of default, on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule
38, he has no standing in court nor the right to
appeal.3 Examining appellant's motion of December
9, 1947 we observe that he merely requested for the
annulment of the decision rendered after his default
(September 23, 1947) without praying for the
revocation of the order of May 10, 1947 declaring him
to be default. But granting, for the sake of argument
that the aforesaid pleading impliedly included the
second prayer, we are met by the insuperable
objection that the petition was too late. Because filed
beyond the six-month period within which applications
for relief under Rule 38 may be entertained. From
May 10 to December 9 seven months had elapsed.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, this appeal being without merit, we affirm
the order of the trial judge denying the petition to set
aside. With costs.
STEPHEN CANG and GEORGE NARDO y JOSOL,
Petitioners, vs. HERMINIA CULLEN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 163078; November 25, 2009; J. Nachura
FACTS:
Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle, along P.
del Rosario Street, Cebu City, occupying the middle
portion of the outer lane. The taxi, on the other hand,
was traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind,
but to the left of, the motorcycle.
Cullen alleged that between Sikatuna and D.
Jakosalem Streets, the taxi veered to the right and
sideswiped the motorcycle, then attempted to speed
away. Peace officers near the scene flagged down the
taxi. As a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously
injured. Cang and Nardo, claimed that it was the
motorcycle that bumped into the taxi. Nardo narrated
that he was driving the taxi on the inner lane (near
the center island) along P. del Rosario St., moving
towards the intersection of D. Jakosalem St. When the
"caution" signal of the traffic light flashed, he
immediately slowed down. It was at that point that the
motorcycle bumped into the taxis rear.
Cullen, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of
Saycons hospital and medical expenses amounting to
P185,091.00. She also alleged that due to the injuries
Saycon sustained, he was unable to work. For
humanitarian reasons, Cullen had given Saycon an
amount equivalent to his wages and P2,000.00 per
month from June 1997 until he was able to return to
work.
Cullen filed a Complaint for damages against Cang
and Nardo praying that judgment be rendered
ordering the Cang and Nardo, jointly and severally,
P205,091.00 in actual damages; P2,000.00 per month
from June 1997 up to the time Saycon would be able
to return to work, with 6% per annum interest from
the date of extrajudicial demand; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; 20% of the total amount by way
of attorneys fees; P10,000.00 as acceptance fee;
P500.00 per court appearance, as appearance fee;
P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the cost of the
suit.
Cang filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the
complaint violated the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law but the motion was dismissed.
Cang averred that Nardo was not driving the taxi as
the his employee, but that Nardo was leasing the taxi
from him. Also, Nardo did not sideswipe the
motorcycle driven by Saycon, nor did the latter speed
away after the incident. They maintained that, at the
time of the impact, Nardos taxi was on its proper lane
and that it was the motorcycle that veered into
Nardos lane and bumped the taxi. After the impact,
Nardo drove the taxi backward to where Saycon and
the motorcycle were slumped on the road. He then
alighted from the taxi. Meanwhile, two traffic
enforcers had crossed the street. After examining
Saycons injuries, one of the enforcers ordered Nardo
to bring the former to a hospital. In addition, Saycon
was driving the motorcycle without any protective
headgear and that the latter was not authorized to
drive the motorcycle since he only had a students
permit. Cang prayed that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit, for lack of cause of action and for
lack of legal capacity.
RTC ruled in favor of Cang and Nardo.
CA reversed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER Cullen, as Saycon's employer, is
lisble for damages caused by her employee.
HELD: YES.
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the
time of the accident. Corollarily, Article 2185 of the
Civil Code states:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
To determine whether there is negligence in a given
situation, this Court laid down this test: Did
defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence.
Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that
Saycon was negligent. In the first place, he should not
have been driving alone. The law clearly requires that
the holder of a student-drivers permit should be
accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating
a motor vehicle. Further, there is the matter of not
wearing a helmet and the fact that he was speeding.
All these prove that he was negligent.
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code, [w]hen the
plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.
The trial court gave more credence to Nardos version
of the accident that he was on his proper lane, that he
was not speeding, and that it was the motorcycle that
bumped into his taxi. The trial court established that
the accident was caused wholly by Saycons
negligence. It held that "the injuries and damages
suffered by Cullen and Saycon were not due to the
acts of Cang and Nardo but due to their own
negligence and recklessness."
Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he
would not have been entitled to recover damages
from Cang and Nardo had he instituted his own
action. Consequently, Cullen, as his employer, would
likewise not be entitled to claim for damages.
Further militating against respondents claim is the
fact that she herself was negligent in the selection
and supervision of her employee. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
When an employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer
is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family. Thus, in the
selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. With respect to the
supervision of employees, employers must formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a
students permit is, to our minds, proof enough that
Cullen was negligent either she did not know that he
only had a students permit or she allowed him to
drive alone knowing this deficiency. Whichever way
we look at it, we arrive at the same conclusion: that
she failed to exercise the due diligence required of
her as an employer in supervising her employee.
Thus, the trial court properly denied her claim for
damages. One who seeks equity and justice must
come to this Court with clean hands.
In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found
that it was Saycon who caused the accident and, as
such, he cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On
the other hand, Cullen, as Saycons employer, was
also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of
diligence required in supervising her employee.
Consequently, she cannot recover from petitioners
what she had paid for the treatment of her employees
injuries.
DR. IDOL L. BONDOC, Petitioner, v. MARILOU R.
MANTALA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203080, November 12, 2014
FACTS:
Marilou Mantala (Mantala) was admitted at the
Oriental Mindoro Provincial Hospital (OMPH) on April
3, 2009, at 11am, with referral from the Bansud
Municipal Health Office (BMHO). She was due to
deliver her fifth child and was advised by the BMHO
for a cesarean section because her baby was big and
there was excessive amniotic fluid in her womb. She
started to labor at 7:00 in the morning and was
initially brought to the Bongabon Health Center.
However, said health center also told her to proceed
directly to the hospital.
Mantaala alleged that inside the delivery room of
OMPH, she was attended to by petitioner who
instructed the midwife and two younger assistants to
press down on respondent's abdomen and even
demonstrated to them how to insert their fingers into
her vagina. Thereafter, petitioner went out of the
delivery room and later, his assistants also left. As she
labored in pain, she felt the movement of her baby
inside her womb and the intermittent stiffening of her
abdomen.
At about 4pm, Mantala still has yet to give birth. The
midwife and the younger assistants again pressed
down on her abdomen causing excruciating pain on
her ribs and made her very weak. They repeatedly did
this pressing until the baby and placenta came out.
When she regained consciousness, she was already at
the recovery room. She learned that an operation was
performed on her by petitioner to remove her
ruptured uterus but what depressed her most was her
stillborn baby and the loss of her reproductive
capacity. Mantala noticed that her vulvawas swollen
and that there was an open wound which widened
later on and was re-stitched by Dr. Bondoc. Dr.
Bondoc was heard uttering words unbecoming of his
profession pertaining to the respondents state while
in labor. Respondent filed then a complaint for grave
misconduct against the petitioner before the
ombudsman. The petitioner resigned as medical
officer of OMPH, alleging that the complaint against
him is now moot and academic.
On August 12, 2010, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon rendered a Decision finding
the petitioner administratively liable (penalty of
DISMISSAL). It held that by fully entrusting to his
subordinates the task of handling respondent's
complicated delivery, petitioner exhibited an improper
or wrongful conduct and dereliction of duty as
medical practitioner.
The foregoing ruling was affirmed by the CA and
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bondocs conduct during the delivery
of respondents baby constitute grave misconduct.
HELD:
YES. Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
a public officer,13 a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment.14 It generally means
wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by
a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The
term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption
or criminal intent. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected
with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer. On the other hand, when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest,
the public officer shall be liable for grave
misconduct.15
In deliberately leaving the respondent to a midwife
and two inexperienced assistants despite knowing
that she was under prolonged painful labor and about
to give birth to a macrosomic baby by vaginal delivery,
petitioner clearly committed a dereliction of duty and
a breach of his professional obligations. The gravity of
respondent's condition is highlighted by the expected
complications she suffered - her stillborn baby, a
ruptured uterus that necessitated immediate surgery
and blood transfusion, and vulvar hematomas.
Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of
the Medical Profession in the Philippines states:
A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and
conscientiously. He should secure for them all
possible benefits that may depend upon his
professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to
adjudge the physician's failure to fulfill his obligation
to his patients is, in most cases, his own conscience,
violation of this rule on his part is discreditable and
inexcusable.
A doctor's duty to his patient is not required to be
extraordinary. The standard contemplated for doctors
is simply the reasonable average merit among
ordinarily good physicians, i.e. reasonable skill and
competence. Even by this standard, petitioner fell
short when he routinely delegated an important task
that requires his professional skill and competence to
his subordinates who have no requisite training and
capability to make crucial decisions in difficult
childbirths.
Not only did petitioner routinely delegate his
responsibility to his subordinates, he casually
instructed them to press down repeatedly on
respondent's abdomen, unmindful of her critical
condition as borne out by his very own findings.
Worse, petitioner haughtily and callously spoke of
respondent's case to the other doctors and medical
staff while performing a CS after he had briefly
attended to her at the delivery room "...paanakin na
long 'yon, abnormal din naman ang bata kahit
mabuhay, kawawa lang siya." Such insensitive and
derisive language was again heard from the petitioner
when he referred for the second time to respondent's
traumatic delivery, saying that: "Pinilit no 'ng tatlong
ungas, ayon lumusot pero patay ang bata, tapos ito,
mukhang pumutok" As a government physician,
petitioner's demeanor is unbecoming and bespeaks of
his indifference to the well-being of his patients.
Petitioner thus not only committed a dereliction of
duty, but also transgressed the ethical norms of his
profession when he failed to render competent
medical care with compassion and respect for his
patient's dignity.
A physician should be dedicated to provide competent
medical care with full professional skill in accordance
with the current standards of care, compassion,
independence and respect for human dignity.
A grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that
the accused is a first time offender or by the length of
service of the accused. The Court stressed that
dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been
and should remain anathema in the civil service. They
inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to
continue in office. When an officer or employee is
disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer or employee but the improvement of the
public service and the preservation of the public's
faith and confidence in the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
E. M. WRIGHT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO., defendant-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914
FACTS: The defendant is a corporation engaged in
operating an electric street railway in the city of
Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of
Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts
on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so
that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is
obliged to cross defendant's tracks. On the night
mentioned plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in
crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse
stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the
vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop,
threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the
injuries complained of.
It is undisputed that at the point where plaintiff
crossed the tracks on the night in question not only
the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon
which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
half of their depth out of the ground, thus making the
tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the
level of the street.
It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in
maintaining its tracks as described, but it is
contended that the plaintiff was also negligent in that
he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the
accident that he was unable to take care of himself
properly and that such intoxication was the primary
cause of the accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent,
but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as
defendant's and under the authority of the case
of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359)
apportioned the damages and awarded plaintiff a
judgment of P1,000.
Both parties appealed from the decision, the
defendant on the ground that it was not liable and the
plaintiff on the ground that the damages were
insufficient according to the evidence, and while the
plaintiff made a motion for a new trial upon the
statutory grounds and took proper exception to the
denial thereof
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff was negligent,
and, if so, to what extent.
HELD: NO.
In support of the defendant's contention counsel says:
"Defendant's negligence was its failure properly to
maintain the track; plaintiff's negligence was his
intoxication; the 'principal occurrence' was plaintiff's
fall from his calesa. It seems clear that plaintiff's
intoxication contributed to the fall; if he had been
sober, it can hardly be doubted that he would have
crossed the track safely, as he had done a hundred
times before."
There seems to have been two hearings, one on the
31st of August and the other on the 28th of
September. Not all the evidence taken on the hearings
being before the court so the SC refused, under the
rules, to consider even that evidence which is in the
Court; and, in the decision of this case, the Court is,
therefore, relegated to the facts stated in the opinion
of the court and the pleadings filed.
In the trial courts decision, there is nothing in the
opinion which sustains the conclusion of the court
that the plaintiff was negligent with reference to the
accident which is the basis of this action. Mere
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but
a circumstance to be considered with the other
evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the
general rule that it is immaterial whether a man
is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or
prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater
degree of care is required than by a sober one. If
one's conduct is characterized by a proper
degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial
whether he is drunk or sober.
After showing clearly and forcibly the negligence of
the defendant in leaving its tracks in the condition in
which they were on the night of the injury, the court
has the following to say, and it is all that can be found
in its opinion, with reference to the negligence of the
plaintiff: "With respect to the condition in which Mr.
Wright was on returning to his house on the night in
question, the testimony of Doctor Kneedler, who was
the physician who attended him an hour after the
accident, demonstrates that he was intoxicated. . . . .
If the defendant or its employees were
negligent by reason of having left the rails and
a part of the ties uncovered in a street where
there is a large amount of travel, the plaintiff
was no less negligent, he not having abstained
from his custom of taking more wine than he
could carry without disturbing his judgment
and his self-control, he knowing that he had to
drive a horse and wagon and to cross railroad
tracks which were to a certain extent
dangerous by reason of the rails being elevated
above the level of the street.
If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in
question and had not attempted to drive his
conveyance while in a drunken condition, he
would certainly have avoided the damages
which he received, although the company, on its
part, was negligent in maintaining its tracks in
a bad condition for travel.
Both parties, therefore, were negligent and
both contributed to the damages resulting to
 the plaintiff, although the plaintiff, in the
judgment of the court, contributed in greater
proportion to the damages that did the
defendant.
As is clear from reading the opinion, no facts are
stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the
plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had
been sober he would not have been injured is not
warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say
that a sober man would not have fallen from the
vehicle under the conditions described. A horse
crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but
a portion of the ties themselves aboveground,
stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling,
the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force
as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a
person from the vehicle no matter what his condition;
and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a
sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man
did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of
speculation and guesswork.
It having been found that the plaintiff was not
negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question
presented by the appellant company with reference to
the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P.
Co., above; and the Court do not find facts in the
opinion of the court below which justify a larger
verdict than the one found.
ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL. v. THE MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-39587, 24 March 1934, EN BANC,
(VILLA-REAL, J.)
FACTS:
Aleko E. Lilius, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and
his 4-year old daughter Brita Marianne Lilius, left
Manila in their Studebaker car driven by Aleko E.
Lilius for the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on
a sight-seeing trip. It was the first time that he made
said trip although he had already been to many
places, driving his own car, in and outside the
Philippines. He was entirely unacquainted with the
conditions of the road at said points and had no
knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing at
Dayap. Before reaching the crossing in question,
there was nothing to indicate its existence and
inasmuch as there were many houses, shrubs and
trees along the road, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters
from the crossing, coming from Calauan, the plaintiff
saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road.
Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the
said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He
slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded
his horn for the people to get out of the way. With his
attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing
but he heard two short whistles. Immediately
afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon
him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the
defendant company's train coming eastward from Bay
to Dayap station. The locomotive struck the plaintiff's
car right in the center. After dragging the said car a
distance of about ten meters, the locomotive threw it
upon a siding. The force of the impact was so great
that the plaintiff's wife and daughter were thrown
from the car and were picked up from the ground
unconscious and seriously hurt. In spite of the efforts
of engineer Andres Basilio, he was unable to stop the
locomotive until after it had gone about seventy
meters from the crossing. Prior to the accident, there
had been no notice nor sign of the existence of the
crossing, nor was there anybody to warn the public of
approaching trains. The flagman or switchman arrived
after the collision, coming from the station with a red
flag in one hand and a green one in the other, both of
which were wound on their respective sticks. The said
flagman and switchman had many times absented
himself from his post at the crossing upon the arrival
of a train. The train left Bay station a little late and
therefore traveled at great speed.
ISSUE:
Is Manila Railroad Company negligent?
RULING:
YES. This court is of the opinion that the
accident was due to negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company, for not having had on
that occasion any semaphore at the crossing at Dayap,
to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in
order that they might take the necessary precautions
before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its
employees the flagman and switchman, for not
having remained at his post at the crossing in
question to warn passers-by of the approaching train;
the stationmaster, for failure to send the said flagman
and switchman to his post on time; and the engineer,
for not having taken the necessary precautions to
avoid an accident, in view of the absence of said
flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and
continuously ringing the bell and blowing the whistle
before arriving at the crossing. Although it is probable
that the defendant-appellant entity employed the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its
aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such
diligence in supervising their work and the discharge
of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a
semaphore or sign at the crossing and, on previous
occasions as well as on the night in question, the
flagman and switchman would have always been at
his post at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The
diligence of a good father of a family, which the law
requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to
the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or
employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
However, in order that a victim of an accident
may recover indemnity for damages from the person
liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has
been guilty of negligence, but it is also necessary that
the said victim has not, through his own negligence,
contributed to the accident, inasmuch as nobody is a
guarantor of his neighbor's personal safety and
property, but everybody should look after them,
employing the care and diligence that a good father of
a family should apply to his own person, to the
members of his family and to his property, in order to
avoid any damage. It appears that the herein plaintiff-
appellant Aleko E. Lilius took all precautions which
his skill and the presence of his wife and child
suggested to him in order that his pleasure trip might
be enjoyable and have a happy ending, driving his car
at a speed which prudence demanded according to
the circumstances and conditions of the road,
slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and
blowing his horn upon seeing persons on the road, in
order to warn them of his approach and request them
to get out of the way, as he did when he came upon
the truck parked on the left hand side of the road
seven or eight meters from the place where the
accident occurred, and upon the persons who
appeared to have alighted from the said truck. If he
failed to stop, look and listen before going over the
crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12
miles per hour after having been free from obstacles,
it was because, his attention having been occupied in
attempting to go ahead, he did not see the crossing in
question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its
existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand.
The first and only warning, which he received of the
impending danger, was two short blows from the
whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the
collision and when the accident had already become
inevitable.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this
court is of the opinion that the defendant the Manila
Railroad Company alone is liable for the accident by
reason of its own negligence and that of its
employees, for not having employed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of the said
employees in the discharge of their duties.
Arada v. CA
Facts: Alejandro Arada doing business under the
name and style South Negros Enterprises is engaged
in the business of small scale shipping as a common
carrier, servicing the hauling of cargoes of different
corporations and companies with 5 vessels it was
operating. It entered into a contract with San Miguel
Corporation to transport as a common carrier cargoes
of the latter from San Carlos City Negros Occidental
to Mandaue City using one of its vessels M/L Maya.
The cargoes of San Mig Corp valued at 176, 824. 80.
The master crew applied for clearance to sail which
was denied by the Phil Coast Guard due to a typhoon.
However, the next day, it was granted clearance as
there was no storm and the sea was calm. So, ML
Maya left for Mandaue City. While it was navigating
towards Cebu, a typhoon developed and said vessel
sank with whatever was left if its cargoes. The crew
was rescued. The Board of Marine Inquiry exonerated
Arada and his crew from administrative liability.

Meanwhile, San Miguel Corporation filed with the
RTC for the recovery of the value of its cargoes
anchored on breach of contract of carriage.
The RTC rendered its decision dismissing the claim of
San Miguel for recovery of the value of its cargoes.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Arada is liable for the loss of the cargo of
San Miguel Corporation.
Held: Yes. South Negros Enterprises was exercising
its function as a common carrier when it entered into
a contract with San Miguel Corp to carry and
transport the latters cargoes. A common carrier both
from the nature of its business and for insistent
reasons of public policy is burdened by law with the
duty of exercising extraordinary diligence not only in
ensuring the safety of passengers, but in caring for
the goods transported by it. The loss, or deterioration
or destruction of goods turned over to the common
carrier for the conveyance to a designated destination
raises instantly a presumption of fault or negligence
on the part of the carrier, save only in cases where
such loss, destruction or deterioration arises from
extreme circumstances such as a natural disaster or
calamity.
In order that a common carrier may be exempted
from responsibility, the natural disaster must have
been the proximate cause of the loss. However, the
common carrier must exercise due diligence to
prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after
the occurrence of the flood, storm or other natural
disaster in order that the common carrier may be
exempted from liability from the destruction or
deterioration of the goods.
In the case at bar, Southern Negros failed to observe
extraordinary diligence over the cargo in question
was negligent previous to the sinking of the carrying
vessel. The master crew knew that there was a
typhoon coming before his departure but did not
check where it was. He should have verified first
where the typhoon was before departing. The master
crew did not ascertain where the typhoon was headed
by the use of his vessels barometer and radio.
Neither did the captain of the vessel monitor and
record the weather conditions as required under Art.
612 of the Code of Commerce.
A common carrier is obliged to observed
extraordinary diligence and the failure of the master
crew to ascertain the direction of the storm and the
weather condition of the path they would be
traversing, constitute lack of foresight and minimum
vigilance over its cargoes taking into account the
surrounding circumstances of the case.
I.SHORT TITLE: Cruz vs CA
II. FULL TITLE: DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI,
respondents. G.R. No. 122445.
November 18, 1997, Francisco,
J;
III. TOPIC: Standard of Care for Physicians in
medical malpractice cases; the
necessity of an expert witness
thereto
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was
the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation
of the deceased were charged with "reckless
imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic)
homicide" in an information which reads:
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San
Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
abovenamed, being then the attending
anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did then
and there, in a negligence (sic), careless, imprudent,
and incompetent manner, and failing to supply or
store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to
meet any and all exigencies apt to arise before, during
and/or after a surgical operation causing by such
negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and
incompetence, and causing by such failure, including
the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert
a tragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on
the day following said surgical operation."
On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness,
Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother
to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital
situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna.
They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the
afternoon of the same day. Prior to March 22, 1991,
Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a
"myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena
and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of
March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on
the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was
untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty
prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe
the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy
state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation. The
following day, before her mother was wheeled into the
operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the
operation could be postponed. The petitioner called
Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation.
Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told
her that she must be operated on as scheduled.
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband,
her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating
room while Lydia underwent operation. While they
were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating
room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules
which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one
hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this
time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought
type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the
same was brought by the attendant into the operating
room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner
informed them that the operation was finished. The
operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic
to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia
was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher
and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with
petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood
available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person
arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to
Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was
attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and
Rowena's husband together with the driver of the
accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital
to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of
oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around 10:00
o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District
Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and
further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City
District Hospital was without the prior consent of
Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found
out about the intended transfer only when an
ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo
District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then
boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District
Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room
and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her
because there was blood oozing from the abdominal
incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr.
Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District
Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia
was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he
could do to help save the patient. While petitioner was
closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus, on
March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia
Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate
states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the
antecedent cause.
On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina
Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for
insufficiency of evidence while her co-accused Dra.
Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the
death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and
therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of
arresto mayor with costs."

The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision
of the MTCC prompting the petitioner to file a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari assailing
the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction
with modification that she is further directed to pay
the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found
the following circumstances as sufficient basis to
conclude that she was indeed negligent in the
performance of the operation:
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of
provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any
contingency that might happen during the operation.
The manner and the fact that the patient was brought
to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation
indicates that there was something wrong in the
manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation.
There was no showing that before the operation,
accused Dr. Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary
clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It
was (sic) said in medical parlance that the "abdomen
of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do
not know the whole thing the moment it was open
(sic) and surgeon must be prepared for any
eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a
public document was not presented because it is only
there that we could determine the condition of the
patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in
Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished to
postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed
upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The
court finds that Lydia Umali died because of the
negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra.
Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood during the
operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness
and for lack of skill, the reason why the patient was
brought for operation at the San Pablo City District
Hospital. As such, the surgeon should answer for such
negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the
anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that
she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who
actually did the operation."
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of
the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of
"incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and
skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the
subject patient before and after the operation." And
likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the
Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and
filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate
negligence, it nevertheless shows the absence of due
care and supervision over her subordinate employees.
Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating
room? Were the surgical instruments properly
sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have
contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the
petitioner could answer these, but she opted not to
testify. This could only give rise to the presumption
that she has nothing good to testify on her defense.
Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the
prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and
unrebutted.
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version
indicating the following facts: that the accused asked
the patient's relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while
the operation was already in progress; that after an
hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for
the patient; that after the surgery, they were again
asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was
not anymore available from the source; that the
oxygen given to the patient was empty; and that the
son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the
petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City District
Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. All these
conclusively show that the petitioner had not
prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before
going into the first surgery, which was not emergency
in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had
no ready antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly
typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen
supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep
nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-
pulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by an
internist, which are standard requirements before a
patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner
determine as part of the pre-operative evaluation, the
bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding
time and clotting time? There is no showing that these
were done. The petitioner just appears to have been
in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the family
wanted the postponement to April 6, 1991. Obviously,
she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get
the family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she
did not prepare a medical chart with instructions for
the patient's care. If she did all these, proof thereof
should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed,
these are overwhelming evidence of recklessness and
imprudence."
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's conviction of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, arising from an alleged medical
malpractice, is supported by the evidence on
record.
VII. RULING:
This court, however, holds differently and finds
the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing
or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be
without malice; (4) that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment
of his patient is to be determined according to
the standard of care observed by other members
of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced
state of the profession at the time of treatment
or the present state of medical science. In the
recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L.
Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a
case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ
such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition
under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is
essential to establish not only the standard of
care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care
falls below such standard.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of
this case is the absence of any expert testimony on
the matter of the standard of care employed by
other physicians of good standing in the conduct
of similar operations. The prosecution's expert
witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala
and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to
the possible cause of death but did not venture
to illuminate the court on the matter of the
standard of care that petitioner should have
exercised.
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the
facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of
provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain
medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a
cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the
omission of any form of blood typing before
transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of
Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may
be true that the circumstances pointed out by
the courts below seemed beyond cavil to
constitute reckless imprudence on the part of
the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived
at not through the educated surmises nor
conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by
the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon
has exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove
that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of
care employed by other physicians in good standing
when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a
physician are admitted, as in the instant case,
there is an inevitable presumption that in proper
cases he takes the necessary precaution and
employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood
in the case at bench. loss.
Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir. (Underscoring
facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of supplied.)
provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests
on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia
The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto
to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
Salvador:
performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even
without expert testimony, that petitioner was "Q. And were you able to determine the cause of
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a death by virtue of the examination of the specimen
surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these submitted by Dr. Arizala?
circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it
absence of the fourth element of reckless would be difficult for me to determine the cause of
imprudence: that the injury to the person or death, sir.
property was a consequence of the reckless Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr.
imprudence. Arizala?
In litigations involving medical negligence, the A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in
plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's connection with your pathology report.
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of Q. What could have caused the death of the
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on victim?
the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection
of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. A. This pathologic examination are (sic)
compatible with the person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of
Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of hemorrhagic compatible?
the deceased summarized his findings as follows:
A. It means that a person died of blood loss.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood
indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the and so the victim before she died there was shock of
cause of death? diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings probably before the actual complete blood loss, sir.
are compatible with hemorrhagic shock. Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this was due on (sic) operation?
hemorrhagic shock? A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.
Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone
surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be cut
while on operation and this cause (sic) bleeding, or
may be set in the course of the operation, or may be
(sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are
other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood
replacement?
A. Yes, sir." (Underscoring supplied.)
The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage
or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death. However,
as likewise testified to by the expert witnesses in open
court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during
surgery may be caused by several different factors.
Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration on the matter:
"Atty. Pascual:
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that
you mentioned you said that it could be at the moment
of operation when one losses (sic) control of the
presence, is that correct? During the operation there
is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of
considerable size?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may
have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible
also to some clotting defect, is that correct?
A. May be (sic)." (Underscoring supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the
following expert opinion:
"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic)
would suffer hemorrage what would be the possible
causes of such hemorrage (sic)?
A. Among those would be what we call
Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for
the bleeding, sir, which cannot be prevented by
anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and to any
persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the
cutting or the operations done in the body?
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not
related to any cutting or operation that I (sic) have
done.
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes
(sic) that could be the cause for the hemorrhage or
bleeding in a patient by an operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic)
and it is possible that the ligature in the suture was
(sic) become (sic) loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if
proven.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does
not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or any
suture that become (sic) loose the cause of the
bleeding could not be attributed to the fault of the
subject?
A. Definitely, sir." (Underscoring supplied.)
According to both doctors, the possible causes of
hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the failure of
the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; (2)
allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3)
the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied
to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect
known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture
that the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body
of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut
blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie
or suture of a cut blood vessel had become loose
thereby causing the hemorrhage. Hence the following
pertinent portion of Dr. Arizala's testimony:
"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you
know whether these were sutured ligature or plain
ligature
A: Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if
the cut structures were tied by first suturing it and
then tying a knot or the tie was merely placed around
the cut structure and tied?
A: I cannot recall, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because
you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is that
correct?
A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were
sutured, sir.
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know
whether any of the cut structures were not sutured or
tied neither were you able to determine whether any
loose suture was found in the peritoneal cavity?
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do
not preclude the probability that DIC caused the
hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC
which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding
tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a
complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major
hemorrhage occurs.i[42] And as testified to by defense
witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC
"cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone,
anytime." He testified further:
"Q.Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility
as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be
prevented?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?
A. Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that
will tell you whether this patient suffered among such
things as DIC?
A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of
the patient.
Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the
record of the deceased Lydia Umali looking for the
chart, the operated (sic) records, the post mortem
findings on the histophanic (sic) examination based on
your examination of record, doctor, can you more or
less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could
have been the caused (sic) of death of this Lydia
Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the
caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic) Intra
Vascular Coagulation or the DIC which resulted to
hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is
knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the doctor
her (sic) has been (sic) fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on
finding they just read the chart as well as the other
record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Precisely based on this examination.
ATTY. MALVEDA:
Not finding, there was no finding made.
COURT:
He is only reading the record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the
surgeon, sir."
This court has no recourse but to rely on
the expert testimonies rendered by both
prosecution and defense witnesses that
substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's
allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was
DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness,
cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or
negligence. The probability that Lydia's death
was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial
and has engendered in the mind of this Court a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
Nevertheless, this Court finds the
petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia
Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to
establish civil liability.
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient
puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence
this Court was not able to render a sentence of
conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and
imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out
her duties. A precious life has been lost and the
circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief
of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased
continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the
present timeii[46] and this Court is aware that no
amount of compassion and commiseration nor words
of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt
for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of
moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of
Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR.
NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia
Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages,
and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Canlas vs CA
G.R. No. 112160 February 28, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and
Damages)
Laws Applicable: Article 1173
FACTS:
August, 1982: Osmundo S. Canlas executed a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing Vicente
Maosca to mortgage 2 parcels of land situated
in BF Homes Paranaque in the name of his wife
Angelina Canlas.
Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell
the lands to Maosca for P850K, P500K payable
within 1 week, and the balance serves as his
investment in the business. Maosca issued 2
checks P40K and P460K. The P460K lacked
sufficient funds.
September 3, 1982: Maosca mortgage to Atty.
Manuel Magno the parcels of lands for P100K with
the help of impostors who misrepresented
themselves as the Spouses Canlas.
September 29, 1982: Maosca was granted a
loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB)
for P500K with the parcels of land as security and
with the help of the same impostors. The loan was
left unpaid resulting in a extrajudicially
foreclosure on the lots.
January 15, 1983: Canlas wrote a letter
informing ASB that the mortgage was without
their authority. He also requested the
sheriff Contreras to hold or cancel the auction.
Both parties refused.
The spouses Canlas filed a case for annulment
of deed of real estate mortgage with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
RTC: restrained the sheriff from issuing
a Certificate of Sheriffs Sale and annulled the
mortgage
CA: reversed holding Canlas estopped for
coming to the bank with Maosca and letting
himself be introduced as Leonardo Rey
ISSUE: W/N the ASB had was negligent due to the
doctrine of last clear chance
HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consist in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply
The degree of diligence required of banks is
more than that of a good father of a family
not even a single identification card was
exhibited by the said impostors to show their true
identity
 acted simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing signatures which
tended to match the signatures affixed on a
previous deed of mortgage to Atty. Magno
previous deed of mortgage did not
bear the tax account number of the spouses as
well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina
Canlas
doctrine of last clear chance
where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of
time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the consequences arising therefrom
the antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude recovery of damages caused by
the supervening negligence of the latter, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence
Antecedent Negligence: Osmundo Canlas was
negligent in giving Vicente Maosca the
opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting
him the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of
title of subject parcels of land
Supervening Negligence: Failing to perform the
simple expedient of faithfully complying with the
requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of
the persons transacting with them - ASB bears the
loss
Canlas went to ASB with Maosca and he was
introduced as Leonardo Rey. He didn't
correct Maosca. However, he did not know that
the lots were being used as a security for he was
there to make sure that Maosca pays his debt so
he cannot be estopped from assailing the validity
of the mortgage
But being negligent in believing the
misrepresentation by Maosca that he had other
lots and that the lot were not to be used as a
security, Canlas was negligent and undeserving of
Attorney's fees.
the contract of mortgage sued upon was
entered into and signed by impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas = complete
nullity
G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004
Jonas Aonuevo, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and Jerome
Villagracia, respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Facts:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Ave. on his
bicycle, while Aonuevo,traversing the opposite
lane was driving a Lancer car owned by Procter
and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos
brother. Aonuevo was in the course of making
a leftturn towards Libertad Street when the
collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries and had to
undergo four operations. Villagracia instituted
an action for damages against P&G Phils., Inc.
and Aonuevo before the RTC. He had also fi led
a criminal complaint against Aonuevobefore
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong,
but the latter was subsequentlyacquitted of the
criminal charge.
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traff ic
regulations when he failed to register his
bicycle or install safety gadgets. He posits that
Article 2185 of the Civil Code applies by
analogy. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a
persondriving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
violating any traff ic regulation.
Issues:
A Whether or not Art. 2185 of the New Civil
Code should apply to non-motorized vehicles,
making Villagracia presumptively negligent.
B Whether or not Villagracia was negligent for
failure to comply with traff ic regulations.
C Whether or not Villagracia is guilty of
contributory negligence
Held: No to all.
A Application of Article 2185
Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic
regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or
install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article
2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The
provision reads:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
of the mishap he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply
by analogy to all types of vehicles [23]. He points out
that modern-day travel is more complex now than
when the Code was enacted, the number and types of
vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of
then. He even suggests that at the time of the
enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen
that only motor vehicles were of such public concern
that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today,
the interaction of vehicles of all types and nature has
inescapably become matter of public concern so as to
expand the application of the law to be more
responsive to the times.[24]
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed
a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from
human-powered contraptions on wheels such as
bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such
as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport
were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s
and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the
New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with
the use of the term motorized vehicles. If Aonuevo
seriously contends that the application of Article 2185
be expanded due to the greater interaction today of
all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts
historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles
as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was
significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be
certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such
has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons
over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant
intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-
motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to
the present.
There is pertinent basis for segregating
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles.
A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
limitations in physical exertion. Is capable of
greater speeds and acceleration than non-
motorized vehicles. At the sam etime, motorized
vehicles are more capable in infl icting greater
injury or damage in the event of an accident
or collision. This is due to a combination of
factors peculiar to themotor vehicle, such as
the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of
mass, and greater combustibility due to the
use of fuel.
B Negligience on the part of Villagracia
The existence of negligence in a given case is
not determined by the personal judgment
of the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is
the law which determines what would be reckless
or negligent. Aonuevo asserts that Villagracia
was negligent as the latter had transgressed
traff ic regulations. However, Aonuevo was
speeding as hemade the left turn, and by his own
admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance
of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he
should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had
ample opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia, such
negligent act was the proximate cause of the
accident.
Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see
Villagracia because the bicycle was not
equipped with headlights, such lapse on the
cyclists part would not have acquitted the
driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded
to make the left turn.
C Contributory Negligience
To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries,
it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. [60] To
prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to
establish a causal link, although not proximate,
between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is
contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.[61]
As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower court
s adjudged Aonuevo assolely responsible for the
accident. The petition does not demonstrate
why this fi nding should be reversed. It is hard
to imagine that the same result would not have
occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had been
equipped with safety equipment.
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in
their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK
RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS
SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO
HOSAKA and DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ,
respondents (2002)
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to
remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon,
to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would
find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not
go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the
operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
botched the administration of the anesthesia
causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain
damage. The botched operation was witnessed by
Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of
College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital,
the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages.
The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that
Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist
in not exercising reasonable care in intubating
Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist
saying Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda
was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist failed to
exercise due care in intubating the patient, the
surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a
good anesthesiologist and for arriving 3 hours late
and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the
doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the
surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly
and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The
CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether the private respondents were
negligent and thereby caused the comatose condition
of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are
solidarily liable for the damages.
Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary rule
which means the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where
ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the
complaining party must present expert testimony to
prove that the attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day
of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered
her person to the private respondents who had
complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from
the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound
and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose
and brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!the thing
speaks for itself!
Liability of the Anesthesiologist
The anesthesiologist was not able to disprove the
presumption of negligence on their part in the care of
Erlinda and her negligence was the proximate cause
of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist
to tell whether the intubation was a success. [res ipsa
loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found
that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first
time on the day of the operation which indicates
unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of
negligence and irresponsibility. The anesthesiologist
omitted to perform a thorough preoperative
evaluation on Erlinda.
The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not
normally happen absent any negligence in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of an
endotracheal tube. As was noted in our Decision, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia,
including the endotracheal tube, were all under the
exclusive control of private respondents Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka.
Captain of Ship Doctrine Liability of the Surgeon
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He
failed to exercise the proper authority as the captain
of the ship in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was
late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
From the facts on record it can be logically inferred
that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the
very least, supervision over the procedure then being
performed on Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to
petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he
represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez
possessed the necessary competence and skills. Drs.
Hosaka and Gutierrez had worked together since
1977. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he
would always engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to
administer the anesthesia on his patient.
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the
attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when Erlinda
showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave
instructions to call for another anesthesiologist and
cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda.
Third, it is conceded that in performing their
responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka and
Gutierrez worked as a team. Their work cannot be
placed in separate watertight compartments because
their duties intersect with each other.
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr.
Gutierrez were secured primarily for their
performance of acts within their respective fields of
expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and
that one does not exercise control over the other, they
were certainly not completely independent of each
other to absolve one from the negligent acts of the
other physician.
It is quite apparent that they have a common
responsibility to treat the patient, which responsibility
necessitates that they call each others attention to
the condition of the patient while the other physician
is performing the necessary medical procedures. Liability of the Hospital
No ER-EE relationship between the respondent
It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka doctors and the hospital. As such, the Hospital is not
was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner liable.
Erlinda promptly, for he arrived more than three (3)
hours late for the scheduled operation. In reckless
disregard for his patients well being, Dr. Hosaka
scheduled two procedures on the same day, just thirty
minutes apart from each other, at different hospitals.
Thus, when the first procedure (protoscopy) at the
Sta. Teresita Hospital did not proceed on time, Erlinda
was kept in a state of uncertainty at the DLSMC. The
unreasonable delay in petitioner Erlindas scheduled
operation subjected her to continued starvation and
consequently, to the risk of acidosis, or the condition
of decreased alkalinity of the blood and tissues,
marked by sickly sweet breath, headache, nausea and
vomiting, and visual disturbances. The long period
that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him certainly
aggravated the anxiety that she must have been
feeling at the time. It could be safely said that her
anxiety adversely affected the administration of
anesthesia on her. As explained by Dr. Camagay, the
patients anxiety usually causes the outpouring of
adrenaline which in turn results in high blood
pressure or disturbances in the heart rhythm.

Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct of arriving very

late for the scheduled operation of petitioner Erlinda
is violative, not only of his duty as a physician to serve
the interest of his patients with the greatest
solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill,
but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires
a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with
justice and give everyone his due.
i

ii