Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF

INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR
SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in
existent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC)
instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office,
represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The
letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O.
Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for
a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It
was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley
Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated
October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No.
084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October
12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of
the situation.5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the
situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,

2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in
an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the
latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for
Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be
prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal
Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that
disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to
the Office of the Bar Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion
on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent
laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that
Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he
had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy
Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue
in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from
Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong,
Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the
assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been
responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of
the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported
decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the
petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the
respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized
her conclusions thusly:

Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of
the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the
decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent
failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely
invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this
known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally,
there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely
implicate him in this incident.19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-70921
denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-
063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his
appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the
petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment
within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.

Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he
had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of
Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in
Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a
history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.

However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation
of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the
respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive
evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence.1wphi1 It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-
affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him
to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than
an after thought.

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared
that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But
such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered
unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and
betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic
decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing
that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity
and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for
them to:

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x
x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as
lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny
the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary
authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.29
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this
decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated

against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

DANIEL G. SEVILLA,
Complainant,

-versus -

JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 55,

MALABON CITY,
Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2016-
MTJ]

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

BRION,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:

February 9, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

A trial judge who allows, or abets, or tolerates numerous unreasonable postponements of the
trial, whether out of inefficiency or indolence, or out of bias towards a party, is administratively
liable.

Antecedents

On July 4, 2007, Daniel G. Sevilla charged Hon. Francisco S. Lindo, then the Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 55, in Malabon City with delay in the disposition
of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260 (a prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 [BP
22] entitled People v. Nestor Leynes).
Sevilla alleged that he was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260, which was
filed on June 10, 2003, and raffled to Branch 55, presided by Judge Lindo; that he testified once
in the case, but his testimony pertained only to his personal circumstances; that after he gave
such partial testimony, Judge Lindo adjourned the session for lack of material time, and
persistently reset the subsequent hearings for lack of material time; that Judge Lindos
indifference was designed to force him to accept the offer of an amicable settlement made by the
accused; and that Judge Lindos coercion was manifested in open court and in his chamber by
telling him in the presence of the accused: Mr. Sevilla, ang hirap mo namang pakiusapan.
Konting pera lang yan. Bahala ka maghintay sa wala.

Sevilla asserted that Judge Lindo thereby violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which requires that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay;
that Judge Lindo also violated Section 1, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that
justice be impartially administered without unnecessary delay; that Judge Lindos unreasonable
resetting of the hearings 12 times rendered inconsequential his right to the speedy disposition of
his case; and that such resettings were made upon the instance of Judge Lindo, not upon motion
of the parties.

In his comment dated July 26, 2007,[1] Judge Lindo refuted the charge, claiming that the
postponements were upon valid grounds; that he set the initial trial on August 17, 2004, but due
to Sevillas absence on said date, he ordered the provisional dismissal of the case upon motion of
the Defense and with the express conformity of the accused and the public prosecutor; that in the
interest of fairness, he set aside the provisional dismissal and reinstated the case upon motion of
Sevilla; and that he set the initial trial on October 19, 2004, but the hearing was reset on
December 7, 2004, and was further reset on February 1, 2005 due to his official leave of absence.
Judge Lindo cited the other dates of hearings and the corresponding reasons for their
postponement, as follows:

a) March 4, 2005, April 26, 2005, October 4, 2005, November 29, 2005, and August 2, 2006
agreement of the parties;

b) May 20, 2005 absence of the public prosecutor;

c) August 12, 2005 docket inventory;

d) January 10, 2006 absence of the complainant;

e) March 14, 2006 lack of material time due to the continuation of the trial of two other criminal
cases that preceded Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260;

f) May 16, 2005 and January 12, 2007 absence of the lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO); and

g) September 1, 2006 and November 24, 2006 lack of material time due to the continuation of
the trial of two criminal cases that preceded Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260.

Sevilla submitted his reply on August 2, 2007,[2] clarifying that he did not agree with Judge
Lindos orders of postponement but was only forced to comply with them, and that he affixed his
signature to the minutes of hearings only as proof of his personal presence at the hearings, not as
a ratification of what transpired.

On May 20, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report,[3] which
included the following evaluation and recommendation:

EVALUATION: While it may appear that the reasons or justifications proffered by respondent
Judge seem acceptable, a close scrutiny of the results of the judicial audit conducted by the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on July 12 to 19, 2007 in the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 55, Malabon City, of which Respondent was the Presiding Judge until he was
compulsorily retired from the service on July 24, 2007, revealed that quite a number of cases that
have been submitted for decision remained unacted upon. Twenty-three cases, seventeen of
which were undecided beyond the 90-day day reglementary period, seven cases with pending
incident/motion submitted for resolution which have been unresolved, 6 of which beyond the
reglementary period. There were twenty-one cases with no action taken since their filing in court.

The judicial audit also revealed the following findings:

(1) there was no proper recordkeeping;

(2) they had no updated inventory of cases;
(3) there were twenty-one (21) inherited cases inside the chambers of Judge Lindo which were
submitted for decision way back in the 80s. There were not reflected in the docket inventories
submitted to OCA but these were reportedly just found in 2000 while the branch staff were
relocating to another place following a fire that gutted their courthouse in July 2005 and were not
properly turned over to him;
(4) case folders of one hundred seventy-five (175) criminal cases were not presented to the
audit team for examination;
(5) two hundred seventy (270) criminal cases were not reported/reflected in the docket
inventory that was subsequently updated up to 2007;

If the telling results of the judicial audit were not an irrefragably clear manifestation of
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the courts branch, more particularly its presiding judge, how
could the herein respondent Judge convincingly argue that there was indeed no delay in the
disposition of the case in respect of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260. This Office, after a
circumspect evaluation of the records at hand, together with the report on the judicial audit
conducted at the MeTC, Branch 55, Malabon City, cannot help finding for the complainant and
deems it reasonable to mete upon the respondent Judge a fine of TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P21,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is

our recommendation that the instant complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter
and respondent Judge be found GUILTY of Delay in the Disposition of Cases tantamount to
Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties and be meted a fine of
P21,000.00 to be deducted from the retirement benefits of the herein respondent Judge who was
compulsorily retired from the service effective July 24, 2007.
On August 4, 2008, the Court noted the complaint, comment, and reply, and re-docketed the case
as a regular administrative matter.[4]

On October 22, 2008, Judge Lindos rejoinder was noted.[5]

Thereafter, Judge Lindo moved for the early resolution of the case and for the release of his
retirement benefits.[6] The Court noted his motion on January 12, 2009. [7]

On February 17, 2009, Judge Lindo filed an ex parte manifestation,[8] stating that he was
involved in A.M. No. 08-3-73-MeTC entitled Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, another administrative case; that the Court,
in the resolution dated April 22, 2008, ordered the release of his retirement benefits subject to the
retention of P100,000.00 and to clearance requirements; and that the OCAs Docket Division
refused to issue a clearance due to the pendency of this case; and that the P100,000.00 retention
be considered as sufficient for both A.M. No. 08-3-73-METC and this case.

As the OCAs report stated, Judge Lindo mandatorily retired from the service on July 24, 2007.

On June 17, 2009, the Court ordered the release of Judge Lindos retirement benefits subject to
the P100,000.00 retention.[9]

On July 31, 2009, the Court promulgated a decision in A.M. No. 08-3-73-MeTC,[10] disposing:

WHEREFORE, retired Judge Francisco S. Lindo, former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and undue
delay in rendering a decision. He is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) in accordance with Section 11, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, to be deducted from the One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000,00.) we ordered
withheld from his retirement benefits pursuant to our Resolution dated April 22, 2008. The Chief
of the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to
immediately release to retired Judge Francisco S. Lindo the remaining Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000.00).
By resolution dated July 19, 2010,[11] this case was transferred to the Third Division for
resolution.

Issue

The only issue is whether or not retired Judge Lindo was administratively liable for the
numerous postponements in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260.

Ruling

We agree with and adopt the report and recommendation of the OCA that Judge Lindo be held
liable for delay in the disposition of his cases that was tantamount to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of his official duties, and that he be meted a fine of P21,000.00
to be deducted from his retirement benefits due to his compulsory retirement from the Judiciary
effective July 24, 2007. We point out that the findings of the OCA were based on the records of
Judge Lindos Branch that the OCA subjected to a judicial audit in anticipation of his mandatory
retirement.

Although the postponement of a hearing in a civil or criminal case may at times be unavoidable,
the Court disallows undue or unnecessary postponements of court hearings, simply because they
cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the peoples faith
in the Judiciary,[12] aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants.
For this reason, the Court has enjoined that postponements and resettings should be allowed only
upon meritorious grounds,[13] and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm
policy against improvident postponements.[14]

The strict judicial policy on postponements applies with more force and greater reason to
prosecutions involving violations of BP 22, whose prompt resolution has been ensured by their
being now covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Court has pronounced that the Rule
on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases.[15]

Yet, Judge Lindo postponed five hearings for lack of material time without bothering to state the
specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four hearings supposedly upon
the agreement of the parties, which the complainant credibly denied because that was prejudicial
to his interest. He even cancelled the hearing of May 25, 2007 on the ground that he had to file
on May 28, 2007 his application for compulsory retirement and leave of absence until July 24,
2007, and set the next hearing on August 17, 2007, when he could have set the hearing sooner
either on May 26 or May 27 in view of his impending long period of absence. Considering that
we cannot discern any rationality for his actions in the handling of Criminal Case No. J-L00-
4260, a simple BP 22 case involving only P2,000.00, we can only adjudge such actuations as
smacking either of indolence and utter inefficiency, or of bias, if not hostility, towards Sevilla, or
both.

Judge Lindo cited the absence of the public prosecutor in one hearing and of the PAO lawyer in
two hearings as justifications for the cancellation of the hearings. Such excuses for delay were
not credible, however, for he could have summoned a relief prosecutor and a relief PAO attorney,
or made arrangements for their attendance pursuant to the Courts Circular 1-89 (dated January
19, 1989) to avoid unnecessary postponements. Indeed, Circular 1-89 relevantly provided:

2. The Presiding Judge shall make arrangements with the prosecutor and the CLAO attorney so
that a relief prosecutor and CLAO attorney are always available in case the regular prosecutor
and CLAO attorney are absent; [16]

As can be seen, Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable postponements that
inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of Criminal Case No. J-
L00-4260 out of manifest bias in favor of the accused, to the prejudice of Sevilla as the
complainant in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260. Thus, he flagrantly violated the letter and spirit
both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
required him as a trial judge to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

That his conduct proceeded from his bias towards the accused rendered his acts and omissions as
gross misconduct. It is settled that the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of long-standing rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.[17]

Gross misconduct consisting in violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge
under Section 8 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
xxx
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
xxx

and is punished under Section 11 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, thuswise:

Section 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00

xxx

With Judge Lindo having earlier retired, only the third sanction of fine can be a practical
sanction. In Hernandez v. De Guzman,[18] the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the
respondent judge for allowing frequent and groundless postponements of the hearings in a
criminal case. Similarly, in Arquero v. Mendoza,[19] the Court meted a fine of P5,000.00 on the
respondent judge for allowing unreasonable delay in the proceedings of prosecutions for a
violation of BP 22. However, the recommendation of the OCA for a fine in the amount of
P21,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits, is fully warranted, considering that
Judge Lindo was previously fined for undue delay in rendering a decision in A.M. No. 08-3-73-
METC.[20]
WHEREFORE, we find and declare respondent retired Judge Francisco S. Lindo guilty of grave
misconduct, and, accordingly, punish him with a fine of P21,000.00, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
The incumbent Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, in Malabon City is
directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260 with dispatch, and to decide it
within the required period if the case has not yet been resolved.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA,

Petitioners,
 - versus -

THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 174759

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

September 7, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First
Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the
petitioners have come to the Court for relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First
Divisions finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because the language
they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was contumacious.
Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006,[1] whereby the CTA First Division
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F.
Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT.
Each counsel is

hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT
for a period of ten (10) days.

SO ORDERED.[2]

and the resolution dated July 26, 2006,[3] whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion
for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.

Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought
from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid
from 1995 until 2000.[4] After the City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for
refund,[5] Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield
Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor
of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch 214.[6] Surfield later amended its petition to
include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.[7]

On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the
claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The
RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of
mandamus.[8]
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review
(CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City
Assessor, Mandaluyong City).[9] The appeal was assigned to the First Division, composed of
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate Justice
Caesar A. Casanova.

In its decision dated January 5, 2006,[10] the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253[11] and Section
226[12] of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield,[13] insisting that the
CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282;[14] and arguing that
the CTA First Division manifested its lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare
decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250
SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.

On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the
issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section
7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals
from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the
real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was
claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning
real property tax cases fell under a different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a
separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.

In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the
motion for reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they
should not be liable for indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be
considered as the final decision on the matter.

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the
law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the
grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal
expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and this Court lacked the
understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers; they vow solemnly to conduct themselves with all good
fidelityto the courts. As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its superior importance. Therefore, petitioners counsel
is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he
should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.[15]
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,[16] in which they appeared to
apologize but nonetheless justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the
Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.[17]
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in
sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words that were so strong, which brings
disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance
and grave abuse of discretion, to wit:

In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel
and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged
ignorance and grave abuse of discretion. Their chosen words are so strong, which brings
disrepute the Courts honor and integrity. We quote:

a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation
of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental
issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based (par. 3 of
the Compliance; docket, p. 349);

b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored Section 7(a)
(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional
Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware
or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as
well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the
unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an
honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was influenced by its
failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its
lack of jurisdiction (par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);[18]

Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of
court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts,
sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,[19] the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct
contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to
describe the error of judgment and was not directed to the character or competence of the
decision makers; (b) there was no unfounded accusation or allegation, or scandalous, offensive or
menacing, intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive statements or
words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in their motion
for reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into
disrepute; and (d) they had repeatedly offered their apology in their compliance.[20]

Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which
declared through its second assailed resolution that:

The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The
scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors of judgment almost always result to
the destruction of the high esteem and regard towards the Court.[21]
and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER
IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.

SO, ORDERED.[22]

Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their (z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error
committed by the CTA First Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of the law,
the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:

I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS
CONTUMACIOUS;

II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE
ARROGANT;

III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE
SUPREME COURT; AND

IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT
CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict
legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division;
and that the statements described by the CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory,
offensive and disrespectful should be viewed within the context of the general tone and language
of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered, restrained and
respectful and should not be construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as a flouting or
arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA
First Division did not appreciate the sincerity of their apology; and that they merely pointed out
the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and
the character of the words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements reflected
no humility, nor were they expressive of a contrite heart; and that their submissions instead
reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to again deride the public
respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision.[23]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and that the CTA First Division did not
abuse its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court.[24]
Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its
discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys
thus:

Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges
provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. In that regard,
we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re:
Almacen:[25]

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it
is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected
to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)[26]

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a)
[i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction
over the instant petition;[27] (b) [t]he grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is
matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction;[28] and (c)
the Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.[29]

The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting
prompt penalty.

We agree.

By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as
attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of
gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a
serious allegation,[30] and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the
same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because
they are equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to interrupt the administration of justice.[31] This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or
malicious statements are not read in open court.[32] Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S.
Caguioa,[33] where the petitioners motion for clarification stated that the respondent judges
decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and
sophistry, the Court held that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
when submitted before a court or judge in which the proceedings are pending is direct contempt
because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge
as to interrupt the administration of justice.[34]

In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements were
strong, tactless and hurtful,[35] regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily
assuming the level of contempt for being explanations of their position in a case under
consideration and because an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings.[36]

Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the
characterization that the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously correct,
provides no ground to be lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless
and hurtful statements were used to explain their clients position in the case.[37] The statements
manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First Division approaching
disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their strong, tactless and hurtful language minimized on
the basis that snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered
contemptuous considering that unfavorable decision usually incite bitter feelings.[38] By
branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as totally unaware or ignorant of Section
7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners
plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To hold such
language as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the
CTA and the members of its First Division is not altogether unwarranted.

The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their
side found firm confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly emphasized such
disdain in the following telling words:

3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the
undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation
of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and transcendental
issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section 7(a)
(3), to perfunctorily find that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional
Trial Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware
or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well as,
the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal
expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank
articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was influenced by its failure to understand
why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction.
(emphasis supplied)[39]
We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the
statements had they convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft
of jurisdiction over the appeal of their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions
involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA First Division. This result
became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic
Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to
wit:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis
supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them
in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction. The provision is clearly limited to local
tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the CTA
cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals. In its
resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly explained why,
contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a real
property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a local tax.[40]

It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted
their blatant error upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about the untenability of
their legal position on the matter, but they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated
March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their perception about the CTA First
Divisions being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3) due to the terseness of the Decision dated 05
January 2006, viz:

12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly
ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the
undersigned counsel perceived the Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3).
Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in the 05
January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned counsels to have formed
the above-mentioned perception.[41] (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners
contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige,
should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant of the law, especially if there was no
sincere or legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and temperate
language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate
language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should
strive to win arguments through civility and fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as the
Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins,[42] to wit:

The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the
counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to
express our opinion that excessive language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force
of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has
shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice. We therefore
bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing
attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their
contentions with that courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)

We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. They threw out self-
restraint and courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all
members of the Legal Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of
their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the highest degree of zealousness in
defending the causes of clients did not permit them to cross the line between liberty and license.
[43] Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language, though
forceful, must still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting
advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession.[44] It is always worthwhile to
bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions that were emphatic,
yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive.[45] No
attorney worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the
Court calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge.
Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First Division was not bona fide or done in good
faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.

The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of
court in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
[46] We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited upon the petitioners was
preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect that attorneys and their
clients should bear towards the courts of justice.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably
feigned, for they did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not
merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of
P2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous and
offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.

The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and
other written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform. The
treatment has dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or
administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged from a warning (to be
more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition of the misconduct, a fine
of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as
contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel
S. Sorreda,[47] the errant lawyer who made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters
and compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Although he
was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no separate penalty on
him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his actions that
resulted from cases that were decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,[48] the complaining State Prosecutor, despite his strong statements
to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was warned to be more
circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern
warning for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this Court, which
declared such language to be below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty.
Arturo B. Astorga,[49] Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer for hurling insulting language against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language was
dealt with administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar,[50] the
Court prescribed a higher fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning against Atty. Alar who,
in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against the NLRC First
Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.

Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they
should explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be held
for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action,[51] the CTA First Division was
content with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1,[52] Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended
courts treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them
a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into
consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals,
the second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted.
Yet, they are warned against using offensive or intemperate language towards a court or its judge
in the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.

ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May
16, 2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel
and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them
only to pay the fine of P2,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

IMELDA BIDES-ULASO, A.C. No. 7297

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CORONA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
LEONARDO- DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 29, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question to be resolved in this administrative proceeding is whether or not the
notarization of the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping
attached to the initiatory pleading even before the plaintiff-client has affixed her own signature
amounts to censurable conduct on the part of the notary-counsel.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, the
notary-counsel, guilty of gross negligence and of a violation of the Notarial Law; and
recommended her suspension from the practice of law for six months.[1] She now pleads her
cause before us.[2]

Antecedents

The respondent was the counsel of Irene Bides (Bides) when the latter filed a civil action in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City against complainant Imelda Bides-Ulaso (Ulaso), her
own niece; Alan Ulaso (Ulasos husband); Bartolome Bides (Ulasos father and Bides brother); the
Register of Deeds of Region II, Metro Manila; and the Revenue District Office of San Juan,
Metro Manila. The action was docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 2481 and raffled to
Branch 167 of the RTC.

Bides amended the complaint on June 23, 2003 to demand the declaration of nullity of the deed
of sale dated May 27, 1996 pertaining to the parcel of land situated in San Juan, Metro Manila of
which Bides was the registered owner. Bides averred that Ulaso had taken her owners certificate
of title during her absence from her residence and that Ulaso had then caused the transfer of the
property to herself through the fraudulent execution of the deed of sale.[3]

The amended complaint of Bides contained a so-called amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping dated June 18, 2003, on which was a signature preceded by the word for
above the printed name IRENE BIDES. The signature bore a positive resemblance to the
respondents signature as the notary on the jurat of the amended verification and affidavit of non-
forum shopping.[4] Seeing the defective execution of the amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping, Ulaso and her co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 22, 2003,[5]
citing the defect as a ground, along with another.
Through the respondent as her counsel, Bides opposed the motion to dismiss on August 6, 2003,
claiming an inadvertent mistake committed in relation to the signature appearing above the
printed name of the affiant, but offering the excuse that the defective amended verification and
affidavit of non-forum shopping had actually been only a sample-draft intended to instruct Irene
Mallari, the respondents new secretary, on where Bides, as affiant, should sign. Bides also
claimed that the respondents signature above the printed name of the affiant had not been
intended to replace the signature of Bides as the affiant; that the correct amended verification and
affidavit of non-forum shopping to be appended to the amended complaint had been executed
only on June 23, 2003 due to her (Bides) delayed arrival from her home province of Abra; and
that Mallari had failed to replace the defective document with the correct amended verification
and affidavit of non-forum shopping.[6]

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and even declared Ulaso and her co-defendants in default.
The RTC ultimately decided the action in favor of Bides, granting reliefs like the nullification of
the deed of sale between Bides, as seller, and Ulaso, as buyer.[7]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs judgment.[8]

Bides and the respondent brought other proceedings against Ulaso. On September 26, 2003,
Bides sued Ulaso and others for ejectment in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in San Juan,
Metro Manila, to evict them from the premises of Bides property subject of the RTC case.[9] She
next formally charged Ulaso and two others with falsification of a public document in the Manila
Prosecutors Office for the execution of the nullified deed of sale, resulting in the criminal
prosecution of Ulaso and the others before the MeTC, Branch 17, in Manila.[10] The respondent
actively prosecuted the criminal charge against Ulaso after being granted by the MeTC the
express authority for that purpose pursuant to the Rules of Court.[11] The respondent herself
commenced disbarment proceedings in the IBP against Atty. Yolando Busmente, Ulasos counsel;
and proceedings for usurpation against Elizabeth de la Rosa, for appearing as Ulasos other
counsel although she had not been a member of the Philippine Bar.[12] The disbarment
proceedings against Atty. Busmente were docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1462.
To counteract the aforestated moves of Bides and the respondent, Ulaso initiated this proceeding
against the respondent on March 2, 2005, praying for the latters disbarment due to her act of
signing the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping attached to the amended
complaint of Bides and notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides and despite the non-
appearance of Bides before her.[13]

On July 21, 2005, Bides and Ulaso entered into a compromise agreement to settle the criminal
case for falsification, whereby Bides agreed to drop the criminal charge against Ulaso in
exchange for, among others, Ulasos withdrawal of the disbarment complaint against the
respondent.[14] The MeTC, Branch 17, in Manila approved the compromise agreement.
The agreement on the dropping of the criminal case notwithstanding, the complaint for
disbarment continued against the respondent. The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline designated
Atty. Patrick M. Velez as Investigating Commissioner. After due hearing, Atty. Velez submitted
his report and recommendation dated December 8, 2005,[15] in which he rendered the following
resolution and findings, viz:

IV. RESOLUTION AND FINDINGS

We are not impressed with the excuses presented by the respondent. The lapse committed by the
respondent is clear based on the facts and pieces of evidence submitted in this case.

The respondent admits signing the questioned verification and there is also no dispute that she
notarized the same. Even if her tale is true, the fact that she notarized her own signature is
inexcusable. It cannot even be pardoned as a simple act of negligence as the standards set by
notarial law are stringent enough to require all notaries public to exercise caution in order to
protect the integrity and veracity of documents.

We also cannot understand the fact that all the pleadings submitted to the court do not bear the
corrected verification and certification. It may be easy to convince us that she is really innocent
of the charges if at least one of those documents or even that one copy furnished to the other
party in that case would bear at least one such corrected verification. But no, there was none at
all. This certainly militates against the position that respondent lawyer took.

We have already stated earlier that lawyers may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public,
and now emphasize that the respondent can not even hide behind the mantle of good faith or
throw blame to her secretary. Even as the Supreme Court stated that:

If the document he notarized turned out to have been falsified, without the fact being known to
him at the time, he may still be admonished for not taking pains to ascertain the identity of the
person who acknowledged the instrument before him. (Cailing vs. Espinoza, 103 Phil. 1165)

Indeed, we may even consider her being grossly negligent in allowing her secretary to commit
that error. She gave her secretary blanket authority where she should have exercise sufficient
prudence to protect the integrity of her documents. The burden of preparing a complete pleading
falls on counsels shoulders, not on the messenger (Tan v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 765
[1998]) and not even on the secretary.

Besides, even if the story she tells us is true, it would appear that the document was pre-notarized
based on the very averments made in Irene Mallaris Affidavit of Merit when she stated that:

3. Atty. Lacsamana was scheduled for an out-of-town trip on Monday, June 23, 2003, thus she
hurriedly notarized another prepared set of Amended Verification dated June 23, 2003, and
repeatedly told me to file the amended complaint not later than that afternoon to this Honorable
Court after replacing its old June 18, 2003-Amended Verification;

4. Irene Bides arrived only after lunch and after her niece cause her to sign the amended
verification, I replaced the last page of the sets of the Amended Complaint without knowing that
I missed its original copy and the copy I hurriedly sent to the counsel for the respondent.

Respondent was not around when the document was signed by the respondents client. That is a
violation of notarial law and deceitful conduct of the part of a lawyer, since he is notarizing a
document which he did not actually witness being signed in his presence.

Even page 8 of the respondents notarial register will not help her in this case. All that it shows is
the alleged document no. 36, but what about document no. 35 which should appear in page 7 of
Book no. 1? The second document was notarized on another page and it is incumbent on the
respondent to show that the same was really not recorded as such. The failure of respondent to
present such evidence should be treated as disputable presumption that the same would be
detrimental to his interests if so presented. Thus, when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of all facts as they existed and rebut
the inference which the circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof,
the natural conclusion is that proof if produced, instead of rebutting, would support the inference
against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion (Herrera, Remedial Law, VI,
1999 ed p. 63 citing Worcester vs. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42).

This commission feels that respondent is not being truthful with her defenses. The problem with
using such unjustified excuses is that one lie will pile up over the other. Somewhere along the
way, the story will leak out its sordid details exposing the excuse as a mere concocted tale and
nothing more.
We have the impression that respondent is trying to mislead this Commission, which we cannot
allow.

The issue in this case is really limited and focused on the signature and the notarization of the
verification and certification against forum shopping for Irene Bides. Does it constitute
actionable misconduct? The other matters raised by the respondent have little bearing herein
because it refers to other cases which she has against the complainant. But the causes of action
are different so we will deign to entertain such other matters.

The practice of law is a privilege and respondent has gravely abused the same:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the
rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which courts and clients must, by
necessity, repose in him or unfit to continue in the exercise of his professional privilege. His
misconduct justifies disciplinary action against him or the withdrawal of his privilege to practice
law. (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 Ed., 392; citation of cases omitted.)

What is far worse is that the respondent has taken a habit of making such excuses for similar
mistakes she committed. This Commission notes that the respondent herein is also a complainant
in a different case against Atty. Yolando Busmente docketed as CBD case no. 05-1462. In that
case, again no certification against non-forum shopping was made in that case, but instead of
admitting the lack thereof (as it is not absolutely required in CBD cases) she went on to create a
different story that her lawyer was negligent. Unfortunately said lawyer is already dead and
cannot answer her accusations. She tried to pass off another set of certification which allegedly
was not included with the original documents. What is however telling is that in all the seven (7)
copies submitted to the CBD and that one (1) copy furnished to the respondents in that case, no
such certification appears.

This unacceptable pattern of behavior compels us to recommend stricter measures to ensure that
respondent lawyer is reminded of her solemn duty and obligation to be truthful and honest.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby recommended that the respondent lawyer, Atty. Edita Noe-
Lacsamana be suspended from the practice of law for a period of not less than two (2) years and
that she be required to take three (3) units of MCLE required legal ethics before she may be
allowed to practice law again.[16]

In its Resolution No. XVII-2006-272 dated May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors approved
the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification,[17] to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for notarizing a
verification which she has executed, gross negligence and violation of the notarial law, Atty.
Edita Noe-Lacsamana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Respondents Motion for Reconsideration

On August 29, 2006, the respondent came to the Court to seek the overturning of the IBP
resolution, contending that:

I.

THE METED 6-MONTH SUSPENSION FROM THE LAW PRACTICE OF THE

RESPONDENT IS REPUGNANT TO THE FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINANT TO SHOW
PROOF OF HER ALLEGED GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND VIOLATION OF THE NOTARIAL
LAW, AS EVENTUALLY SELF-MANIFESTED BY THE COMPLAINANT, WHO, ABSENT
KNOWLEDGE OR INVOCATION OF THE RESPONDENT, WITHDREW HER INSTANT
COMPLAINT, AS EMBODIED IN THE JULY 22, 2005-DECISION OF HON. GERMANO
FRANCISCO D. LEGASPI OF BRANCH 17, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA.

II.
THE BLEMISH CAUSED ON THE MORE THAN 26-YEARS OF UNSULLIED
REPUTATION OF THE RESPONDENT AS A LAWYER IS COMPELLING HER TO
ENTREAT THE HONORABLE BAR CONFIDANT TO ASSESS AND RECONSIDER THE
UNJUST AND SPECULATIVE PORTRAYAL OF INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
PATRICK M. VELEZ IN HIS DECEMBER 8, 2005-REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO
THE IBP, THAT RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF DISHONESTY AND/OR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE, WITH AN UNACCEPTABLE PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR, WHICH
ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFIED, IS COMPATIBLE WITH A DEROGATORY CONCLUSION
THAT SHE LACKS THE REQUIRED CANDOR, INTEGRITY AND PROFESSIONAL
DECORUM OF A MEMBER OF THE BAR, IN REPUGNANCE TO THE MANDATE IN
MANUBAY VS. GARCIA, 330 SCRA 237, THAT:

The lawyers guilt cannot be presumed. Allegation is never equivalent to proof and a bare charge
cannot be equated with liability.

III.

THE FALLACIES OF THE COMPLAINANT WERE MISSED, DELIBERATELY OR

OTHERWISE, IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE,
PARTICULARLY ON THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT IS CONFINED ON A REHASH
OF THE QUESTIONED AMENDED VERIFICATION AND AFFIDAVIT OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING, TWO (2) YEARS AFTER ITS DISPUTE WAS SETTLED AT THE LOWER
COURT AND AT THE COURT OF APPEALS, THUS, FILED OUT OF RANCOR OF THE
COMPLAINANT FOR HAVING LOST ALL HER CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS
PRO BONO CLIENT, THUS, SHE WAS UNJUSTLY DENIED OF THE RULE IN SANTOS
VS. DICHOSO, 84 SCRA 622, THAT:

The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything
which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons and particularly disgruntled
opponents may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent
their rancor on members of the bar. (underscoring supplied)

Ruling

We affirm the findings against the respondent.

A. Preliminary Considerations

The respondent argues that this proceeding should be abated by virtue of its withdrawal by Ulaso
pursuant to the compromise agreement concluded in the criminal case and approved by the trial
court.

The respondents argument is unwarranted.

The agreement between Bides and Ulaso stipulating the withdrawal of the disbarment case
against the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to
continue the present administrative proceeding against the respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar. We explained why in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos,[18] viz:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not,
in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven. xxx. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. xxx.

The respondent next contends that we should reject the disbarment complaint because it was
filed only after the lapse of two years from the occurrence of the cause; and that personal
vendetta impelled its filing.

The respondents contention cannot be upheld.

Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of the cause nor the motivation for the filing of the
complaint diminished the Courts inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar whenever
appropriate. First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or
suspension proceedings against members of the Bar.[19] Indeed, such proceedings are sui
generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights are
enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of
the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers
expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law.[20] The proceedings, which
the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors. The public
interest is their primary objective, the true question for determination being whether or not the
respondent members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed to retain their memberships and to enjoy
the privileges appurtenant to such memberships.[21]

B. Basis for Disciplinary Action

Ulaso insists that the respondents act of signing the amended verification and affidavit of non-
forum shopping for Bides as plaintiff-affiant violated the penal law, the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Notarial Law.

In contrast, the respondent maintains that her signature was made not to fool the trial court, but
only to illustrate to her new secretary how and where Bides should sign the form; and that the
amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping, merely a sample-draft, was wrongly
attached.

Investigating Commissioner Velez found that the respondent had deliberately and with malice led
the trial court to believe that her signature in the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping had been that of Bides.

We regard the finding of deliberation and malice to be unjustified. The admitted precedence by
the word for of the signature on the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum shopping
was an indicium that the respondent did not intend to misrepresent the signature as that of Bides.
The apparent resemblance of the signature after the word for with the respondents signature as
the notary executing the jurat rendered improbable that the respondent had intended to deceive,
considering that the respondent would have instead written the name Irene Bides or forged the
signature of Bides had she wanted to pass the signature off as that of Bides.

The respondent, by notarizing the document sans the signature of Bides, was only anticipating
that Bides would subsequently sign, because, after all, Bides had already signed the original
verification and affidavit. Ostensibly, the amended verification and affidavit of non-forum
shopping was intended to replace the original one attached to the initiatory pleading of Bides.
Thus, bad faith did not motivate the respondent into notarizing the amended verification and
affidavit of non-forum shopping.

The lack of bad faith notwithstanding, we nonetheless concur with the findings of Investigating
Commissioner Velez that the respondents notarizing the amended verification and affidavit of
non-forum shopping in the absence of Bides as the affiant constituted a clear breach of the
notarial protocol and was highly censurable.[22]

The jurat is that end part of the affidavit in which the notary certifies that the instrument is sworn
to before her. As such, the notarial certification is essential. Considering that notarization is not
an empty, meaningless, routinary act,[23] the faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in the jurat are sacrosanct.[24]

Specifically, the notarial certification contained in the jurat of the amended verification and
affidavit of non-forum shopping SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, on this 18th
day of June 2003, affiant IRENE BIDES, showing to me her CTC Nos. 11833475 issued on
November 21, 2002, in Manila[25] indicated both the necessity for the physical presence of
Bides as the affiant and the fact that the signing was done in the presence of the respondent as the
notary. The physical presence of Bides was required in order to have her as the affiant swear
before the respondent that she was that person and in order to enable the respondent as the notary
to ascertain whether Bides had voluntarily and freely executed the affidavit.[26] Thus, the
respondent, by signing as notary even before Bides herself could appear before her, failed to give
due observance and respect to the solemnity.

Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge with
fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the requirements and
solemnities of the Notarial Law.[27] It was emphatically her primary duty as a lawyer-notary to
obey the laws of the land and to promote respect for the law and legal processes.[28] She was
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to
have remembered that a graver responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her
being a lawyer.[29]

In imposing the penalty upon the respondent, however, we opt to reprimand her instead of
suspending her from the practice of law for three months, as the IBP recommended. This we do
after we take into account, firstly, the absence of bad faith in her notarizing the unsigned
document; secondly, the fact that the infraction was the first lodged against her in her long years
of membership in the Bar; and thirdly, her recuperating from the debilitating stroke that had left
her unable to perform any work since July 11, 2007.[30]

ACCORDINGLY, we modify the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by

reprimanding respondent Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, with a warning that a similar infraction in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
EN BANC

ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III ROHERMIA

J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ,
Complainant,
-versus -
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN.
Respondents.
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 24, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman initiated this administrative matter by filing an affidavit-
complaint dated October 23, 2008 to charge Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong (Justice
Ong); Jose R. Hernandez (Justice Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada),
who composed the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with Justice Ong as
Chairman, at the time material to the complaint, with (1) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming
a Justice, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service; (2) falsification of public
documents; (3) improprieties in the hearing of cases; and (4) manifest partiality and gross
ignorance of the law.[1]

Before anything more, the Court clarifies that this decision is limited to the determination of the
administrative culpability of the respondent Justices, and does not extend to the ascertainment of
whatever might be the effects of any irregularity they committed as members of the Fourth
Division on the trial proceedings. This clarification stresses that the proceedings, if procedurally
infirm, resulted from the acts of the Sandiganbayan as a collegial body, not from their acts as
individual Justices. The remedy against any procedural infirmity is not administrative but
judicial.

Details of the Charges

A.
Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents
Under Section 1, Rule IV of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, cases originating
from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao shall be heard in the region of origin, except only when the
greater convenience of the parties and of the witnesses or other compelling considerations
require
the contrary.[2] Thus, for the period from April 24 to April 28, 2006, the
Fourth Division scheduled sessions for the trial of several cases in the Hall of Justice in Davao
City.

Prior to the scheduled sessions, or on April 17, 2006, the complainant sent a memorandum to
Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio) to invite his
attention to the irregular arrangement being adopted by the Fourth Division in conducting its
provincial hearings.[3] The memorandum reads as follows:

The Prosecution Bureau IV is due to leave for Davao City on April 23, 2006 for their scheduled
hearing which will be held on April 24 to 28, 2006. In conducting provincial hearing, the Fourth
Division has adopted a different procedure. They do not sit as collegial body, instead they divide
the division into two. In such a manner, the Chairman will hear some of the cases alone and the
other members will hear other cases, conducting hearing separately and simultaneously.

We find this procedure to be advantageous to the Prosecution and also commendable on the part
of the Justices. While there are no objections manifested by the defense lawyers, we are
apprehensive of the consequences, considering that this constitutes procedural lapses. In a case
decided by the Supreme Court, the conviction of the accused by the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division) was invalidated by the court when it was shown that the members of the court who
heard his case were constantly changing. The Petitioner assailed the decision of the
Sandiganbayan in its capacity as a trial court.

In one of her hearings, the undersigned has already called the attention of the Hon. Chairman and
expresses (sic) her concern on the matter, and even opined that they might be charged of
falsification, by issuing orders that they heard the cases as a collegial body, when in fact only the
Chairman was present during the trial and the other members are hearing cases in the other
chamber.

The Chairman, however, welcomes any question on the procedure they are presently adopting.

We do not want to take chances. In cases where conviction are issued, the accused would surely
assail this procedure.

For your information and appropriate action.[4]

The complainant stated in her affidavit-complaint that Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio

responded to her memorandum by instructing her and the other Prosecutors to object to the
arrangement and to place their objections on record.

During the hearing in Davao City, the Fourth Division did not sit as a collegial body. Instead,
Justice Ong heard cases by himself, while Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada heard the
other cases together. Complying with Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacios instructions, the
complainant objected to the arrangement, but her objections were brushed aside.[5]

The complainant averred that her recording of her continuing objections incurred for her the ire
of the Justices; and that faced with such predicament and out of her desire to avoid any
procedural defects, she decided to forego the presentation of NBI Investigator Atty. Roel Plando
as her witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 28103 to 28104 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Payakan Tilendo in the last hearing date of April 27, 2006. Instead, she requested another
Prosecutor to inform the Fourth Division that she was then suffering from migraine, and to
request the cancellation of the hearing.
The complainant was surprised to learn later on that the Fourth Division had issued a warrant for
the arrest of Atty. Plando for his non-appearance at the hearing.

On May 8, 2006, Atty. Plando filed a motion to lift bench warrant,[6] in which he explained that
he had arrived in Davao City in the morning of April 27, 2006 in order to appear in court, and
had called up the complainant, who had told him that she would not be presenting him as a
witness due to lack of time for the necessary conference; and that she had also told him about her
having migraine on that morning.

On May 15, 2006, the Fourth Division directed the complainant to comment on Atty. Plandos
motion. In her comment dated May 24, 2006,[7] the complainant averred that she had decided
not to proceed with the presentation of Mr. Plando on April 27, 2006 due to her apprehension
that the Honorable Court might again conduct the hearing in division; and that incurring the ire
of the Justices by her continuing objections to the hearing procedure had been a stressful
situation that had induced her migraine.

Although lifting the warrant of arrest issued against Atty. Plando through the order dated May
26, 2006,[8] the Fourth Division directed the complainant in the same order to answer questions
from the court itself on June 6, 2006 relative to statements made in [her] Comment dated May
24, 2006.

For the June 6, 2006 hearing, the complainant was accompanied by Acting Director Elvira Chua
of Bureau IX, Director Somido, and Stenographer Yolanda Pineda. According to the
complainant, Justice Hernandez berated her for bringing her own stenographer. The Fourth
Division then directed Stenographer Pineda to show cause why she should not be cited in
contempt for taking notes without prior leave of court.[9]

Complying with the directive to show cause, Pineda submitted an explanation/compliance,[10]

explaining that Director Chua had asked her to attend the hearing on June 6, 2006, and to take
stenographic notes of the proceedings.
Director Chua confirmed Pinedas explanation in her own manifestation and explanation,[11]
stating that the complainant had requested that a stenographer from the Office of the Special
Prosecutor be tasked to take notes at the hearing; and that on 27 April 2006 when Prosecutor
Rohermia Rodriguez was supposed to present her NBI Agent witness in Davao City, she left
Davao at 4:30 in the morning of the said date so that it would be physically impossible for her to
be in court at 8:30 in the morning.
The Fourth Division issued an order on June 20, 2006,[12] directing the complainant to comment
on Director Chuas manifestation and explanation, and to explain why she should not be cited in
contempt of court for failing to present the NBI agent as a witness on April 26 and 27, 2006. She
complied by submitting her compliance on July 10, 2006.[13] The incident has remained
unresolved by the Fourth Division.

The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body, respondent Justices not only
contravened Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, but also committed acts of falsification by
signing their orders, thereby making it appear that they had all been present during the hearing
when in truth and in fact they were not.

B.
Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority and Grave
Misconduct
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez made the following intemperate and
discriminatory utterances during hearings.

Firstly, the complainant alleged that Justice Ong uttered towards the complainant during the
hearing held in Cebu City in September 2006 the following:

We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we
fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of
the Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and
frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from
which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs) own alma mater. The complainant
opined that the query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the San Beda College of Law,
the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of Justice Hernandez, were the
best law schools.

Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing in Cebu City in September 2006, Justice Hernandez
discourteously shouted at Prosecutor Hazelina Tujan-Militante, who was then observing trial
from the gallery: You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are
you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing
nothing.
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean Raul
Pangalangan, thus:

Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you are acting like that! Do
not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother.

C.
Justices Ong, Hernandez, and Ponferradas Gross Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Manifest
Partiality for Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801,
Entitled People v. Puno, upon a Demurrer to Evidence
In imputing manifest partiality to respondent Justices, the complainant cited the Fourth Divisions
resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Punos demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801,
and dismissing the case upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never been perfected,[14]
which finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.

The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had never been perfected
was based on a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth
Division appreciated in the guise of taking judicial notice. She contended that taking judicial
notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous, and
constituted gross ignorance of the law.

Comments of Respondents

Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez filed their joint
comment.[15] Although admitting having tried cases in the provinces by apportioning or
assigning the cases scheduled for hearing among themselves, they emphasized that they had
nonetheless ensured at the outset that: first, there was a quorum, i.e., all the three members of the
Division were present in the same courtroom or venue, thereby preserving the collegial nature of
the Division as required by law, specifically Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the
Division were within hearing or communicating distance of one another, such that they could
readily confer with each other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases
separately being heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the arrangement, and thus
could not later on assail the proceedings to which they had given their full assent, based on the
equitable principle of estoppel.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in the best
interest of the service, because they had thereby expedited the disposition of their cases, resulting
in considerable savings in time, effort, and financial resources of the litigants, lawyers,
witnesses, and the court itself; but that they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement after it
had piled up so much work at a much faster pace than the Fourth Division could cope with. They
argued that even assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement had been irregular, it could only be
the subject of a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a
mere procedural lapse.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainants allegation on their use of
intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of stenographic notes to
prove that there was no record of the intemperate and discriminatory utterances on the date
specified by the complainant.[16] Justice Ong dared the complainant to produce a copy of the
order that contained his following alleged utterance:

We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is already out, we
fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of
the Supreme Court.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted having asked the lawyers appearing before them
about the law schools they had graduated from, but explained that they had done so casually and
conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two Justices teasing each other from
time to time. They claimed that their queries were usually made in jest, and were intended to
break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom setting.

Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but conceded the
possibility of having observed that her presence in Cebu City was a waste of government funds,
because she was not one of the Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any of the scheduled cases.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating to the
grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801), Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action by dismissing
the petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued in G.R. No.
171116 on June 5, 2006.[17]

Justice Ponferradas separate comment[18] echoed his co-respondents assertions in their joint
comment.
Report of the Court Administrator

In our resolution dated January 20, 2009,[19] we noted the comments of respondent Justices, and
referred the matter to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In his report dated October 6, 2009,[20] then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a Member
of the Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit, because:
Viewed in the foregoing light, the charge of grave misconduct cannot stand. It is understood that
grave misconduct is such which affects a public officers performance of his duties as such officer
and not only that which affects his character as a private individual and requires reliable evidence
showing that the judicial act complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law. Our perusal of the record shows that respondents adoption of the assailed practice was not
motivated by corruption and/or an illegal purpose. Indeed, the best interest of the service was
clearly aimed at. To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, the law requires that the error
or mistake if there be such must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.

For the very same reasons, respondents cannot likewise be held liable for falsification of public
documents arising out of the alleged falsity of the collegiality reflected in the minutes and/or
stenographic notes taken during the proceedings in which the assailed practice was adopted. For
liability to be assessed for the offense of falsification of official documents thru untruthful
narration of the facts, the rule is settled that the following elements should concur, viz: (a) the
offender makes in a document an untruthful statement in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has
a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender
are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
wrongful intent to injure a third person. The absence of the enumerated elements clearly
discounts respondents liability for said offense.
Inasmuch as mere allegation is not evidence, it is a fundamental evidentiary rule that the party
who alleges a fact must prove the same. For all of complainants imputations against respondents,
the record is bereft of any showing that the latter are guilty of oppressive conduct and/or grave
misconduct, particularly with reference to the comment the former was required to file regarding
the motion to lift bench warrant filed by the witness Roel Plando in Criminal Case Nos. 28103-
104. Given the variance between the allegations in said motion and the reasons complainant
initially advanced for the non-presentation of said witness at the April 27, 2006 hearing in said
cases, respondents were clearly acting within their prerogative when they decided to clarify the
matter from the former and her colleague, Prosecutor Almira Abella-Orfanel. Although
subsequently required to explain why she should not be cited for contempt in the June 20, 2006
order issued in the case, the record is, more importantly, bereft of any showing that complainant
was, in fact, declared in contempt of court or actually fined in the sum of P18,000.00 as
purportedly threatened by respondents.

Squarely refuted in the affidavits executed by her colleagues, namely, Prosecutors Cornelio
Somido, Almira Abella-Orfanel, Elvira Chua and Rabenranath Uy, complainants bare allegations
clearly deserve scant consideration insofar as they impute such further irregularities against
respondents as threatening or humiliating her during the hearing/s conducted in the aforesaid
cases and/or causing disrespect to Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio or otherwise allowing
interference in the latters handling of a case. Because administrative proceedings like the one at
bench are governed by the substantial evidence rule, the same may be said of the disparaging
comments respondents are supposed to have made regarding the barong and/or intelligence of
practitioners appearing before them which are, on the whole, devoid of any bases in the record
outside of complainants averments and the affidavit belatedly executed by Assistant Special
Prosecutor Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante. By substantial evidence is meant such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion and does not mean
just any evidence in the record of the case for, otherwise, no finding of fact would be wanting in
basis. The test is whether a reasonable mind, after considering all the relevant evidence in the
record of a case, would accept the findings of fact as adequate.

As regards the charge of improprieties, it appears that the complainant has not discharged the
onus of proof by substantial evidence. The intemperate and immoderate statements attributed to
respondents are, to repeat, without sufficient substantiation. What comes near to but is not
equivalent to impropriety is the jocular banter admitted by respondents about their respective
alma maters, the intention being to break the usual monotony and seriousness of the courtroom
setting or to put practitioners appearing before them at ease. It cannot be said that public
confidence in the Judiciary was eroded by the conduct. No discourtesy was shown towards either
the parties or to each other.
As for the charge of manifest partiality insofar as the grant of the demurrer in Criminal Case No.
25801 is concerned, suffice it to say that members of the bench like respondents are presumed to
have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Because notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a
judges function, the rule is settled that bias, prejudice and undue interest cannot be presumed
lightly. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is, consequently, not enough; there
should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. As a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action- he cannot be subject to civil, criminal or
administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. These principles find resonance in the case at bench where, in addition to the total
dearth of evidence to prove the charge of manifest partiality, it appears that respondents grant of
the demurrer in Criminal Case No. 25801 was affirmed in the following wise in the June 5, 2006
resolution issued by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 171116, to wit:

G.R. No. 171116 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. REYNALDO PUNO). xx xx On the
basis thereof, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari dated 2 March
2006 assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan for petitioners failure to submit a valid
affidavit of service of copies of the petition on respondent and the Sandiganbayan in accordance
with Sections 3 and 5, Rule 45 and Section 5(d), Rule 56 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of the
Rules, there being no jurat and signature of the affiant in the attached affidavit of service of the
petition.

In any event, the petition is an improper remedy and failed to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case x x x. (emphasis
supplied)

Ruling of the Court

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court Administrator.

A.
Respondents Violation of the provisions of PD 1606
and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan

Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division despite
their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same
venue and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of one another.
The contention is not well-taken.

Section 3 of PD 1606,[21] the law establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides:

Section 3. Division of the Courts; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of
three Justices each. The three divisions may sit at the same time.

Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in division; Provided, that when the
required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or
temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may
designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the
reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and
prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases
assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case the
President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or
Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.
An implementing rule is Section 3, Rule II of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan,
viz:

Section 3. Constitution of the Divisions. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) Divisions of
three (3) Justices each, including the Presiding Justice. The five (5) Divisions may sit separately
at the same time. Each of the five (5) most senior Associate Justices including the Presiding
Justice, shall be the Chairman of a Division; each of the five (5) Associate Justices next in rank
shall be the Senior Member of a Division; and each of the last five (5) Associate Justices shall be
the Junior Member of a Division.

Under the foregoing provisions, the Sandiganbayan is a collegial court. Collegial is defined as
relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, a collegium is an executive body with
each member having approximately equal power and authority.[22] In a collegial court,
therefore, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. Thus, PD 1606, as
amended, and the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, supra, call for the actual
presence of the three Justices composing the Division to constitute a quorum to conduct business
and to hold trial proceedings. Necessarily, the exclusion or absence of any member of a Division
from the conduct of its business and from the trial proceedings negates the existence of a quorum
and precludes collegiality.
As if underscoring the need for all three members to be actually present and in attendance during
sessions, Section 3 of PD 1606, as amended, further requires that:-

xxx when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal
disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the
Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict
rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said
division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and
determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be
prejudiced thereby, in which case the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding
Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein.

Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all of them to sit together as
members of the Fourth Division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto.
The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other
judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one
of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each
member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the
three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one
another at the hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight, because even in those
circumstances not all of them sat together in session.

Indeed, the ability of the Fourth Division to function as a collegial body became impossible
when not all of the members sat together during the trial proceedings. The internal rules of the
Sandiganbayan spotlight an instance of such impossibility. Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings on oral motions made or
objections raised in the course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be made by the Chairman
of the Division. Obviously, the rule cannot be complied with because Justice Ong, the Chairman,
did not sit in the hearing of the cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could the other
respondents properly and promptly contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the hearings before
him.

Moreover, the respondents non-observance of collegiality contravened the very purpose of trying
criminal cases cognizable by Sandiganbayan before a Division of all three Justices. Although
there are criminal cases involving public officials and employees triable before single-judge
courts, PD 1606, as amended, has always required a Division of three Justices (not one or two) to
try the criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, in view of the accused in such cases
holding higher rank or office than those charged in the former cases. The three Justices of a
Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to
apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding such cases. The tighter standard is due in
part to the fact that the review of convictions is elevated to the Supreme Court generally via the
discretionary mode of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of Court, which
eliminates issues of fact, instead of via ordinary appeal set for the former kind of cases (whereby
the convictions still undergo intermediate review before ultimately reaching the Supreme Court,
if at all).

In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.,[23] the Court delved on the nature
of a collegial body, and how the act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without
the participation of the others, cannot be considered the act of the collegial body itself. There, the
question presented was whether Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, as chairman of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC), could alone act in behalf of and bind the NTC, given
that the NTC had two other commissioners as members. The Court ruled:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.
Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He

alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and
the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning
a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the
historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under
Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the
illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive
Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was
a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
The foregoing observations made in GMCR, Inc. apply to the situation of respondent Justices as
members of the Fourth Division. It is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive
impelled respondent Justices into adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers,
they ought to have been well aware of the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of
their trial proceedings.

We find that the procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings was in
blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of
a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected litigants,
including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to
serious challenge on the ground that a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the
Sandiganbayan was of the very essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of
law.

Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time forgets.[24] They
are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules.[25] For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot
be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should
be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or
gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined
as the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence,[26] or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of
well-known legal rules[27] considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the
complainant did not refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding
their separate hearings within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable
for gross ignorance of the law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act
complained of was ill-motivated, corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules;[28] on the contrary, none of these circumstances
was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices have convincingly shown that they had not been
ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous
procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby expedite their disposition of cases in the
provinces.

Nonetheless, it remains that the respondent Justices did not ensure that their proceedings
accorded with the provisions of the law and procedure. Their insistence that they adopted the
procedure in order to expedite the hearing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely
exonerate them, even if no malice or corruption motivated their adoption of the procedure. They
could have seen that their procedure was flawed, and that the flaw would prevent, not promote,
the expeditious disposition of the cases by precluding their valid adjudication due to the
nullifying taint of the irregularity. They knew as well that the need to expedite their cases, albeit
recommended, was not the chief objective of judicial trials. As the Court has reminded judges in
State Prosecutors v. Muro,[29] viz:
Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it should be
borne in mind that speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration
for the administration of justice is more important than a race to end the trial. A genuine respect
for the rights of all parties, thoughtful consideration before ruling on important questions, and a
zealous regard for the just administration of law are some of the qualities of a good trial judge,
which are more important than a reputation for hasty disposal of cases.
xxx xxx xxx
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that
judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit
limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.

The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is
not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to
draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the primordial necessity of
order in the social life.

Relevantly, we do not consider the respondent Justices signing of the orders issued during the
flawed proceedings as a form of falsification or dishonesty, in that they thereby made it appear
that they had all been physically present when the truth was different. Such act merely ensued
from the flawed proceedings and cannot be treated as a separate offense.

B.
Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez

The Court approves the Court Administrators finding and recommendation that no evidence
supported the complainants charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the
improper and intemperate statements attributed to them.

A review of the transcripts of the stenographic notes for the hearings in which the offensive
statements were supposedly uttered by them has failed to substantiate the complainants charge.
In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the Court must accept such transcripts as the
faithful and true record of the proceedings, because they bear the certification of correctness
executed by the stenographers who had prepared them.

Even so, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing
before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings
in casual conversation about their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their
professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public
magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking
their lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes
should avoid especially during their performance of judicial functions. They should not exchange
banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter how good-
natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands
that they behave with dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.

Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
clearly enjoins that:

Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the
part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct
was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise
to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with
individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.

Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial
duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or
group on irrelevant grounds.[30] It is very essential that they should live up to the high standards
their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest
the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with
appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and
judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct,
which is defined as improper performance. Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method.[31]

C.
Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality
The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld
the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have failed to sufficiently show that
the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

At any rate, it is worth stressing that a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an
unjust judgment only if he acts with bad faith, malice, revenge, or some other similar motive.[32]

D.
Penalties

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC, classifies the
offense of simple misconduct as a less serious charge, viz:

Section 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:

xxx xxx xxx
7. Simple Misconduct.

Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court alternatively prescribes the sanctions on judges and
justices guilty of a less serious charge, as follows:

Section 11. Sanctions. xxx

xxx xxx xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more
than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P 20,000.00.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, unbecoming conduct is a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, thus:

Section 10. Light Charges. Light charges include:

1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;

xxx xxx xxx

and is punishable under Section 11(C), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by a fine of not less than
P1,000.00, but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with
warning.

Analogizing from Section 55 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
in an instance where the respondent is guilty of two or more charges, the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest of the charges are considered as
aggravating circumstances.

That respondent Justices responsibilities as members of a Division were different compels us to

differentiate their individual liabilities.
1.
Justice Ong
Without doubt, the Chairman, as head of the Division under the internal rules of the
Sandiganbayan, is primus inter pares.[33] He possesses and wields powers of supervision,
direction, and control over the conduct of the proceedings coming before the Division.

In exercising his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and steered his
Division into the path of procedural irregularity. He thereby wittingly failed to guarantee that his
Divisions proceedings came within the bounds of substantive and procedural rules. We cannot, of
course, presume that he was unaware of or unfamiliar with the pertinent law and correct
procedure, considering his already long tenure and experience as of then as a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, having risen from Associate Justice to Chairman of his Division.

We hold that the condign and commensurate penalty to impose on Justice Ong is a fine of
P15,000.00, after taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that this administrative
offense was his first and the aggravating circumstance of the light charge of unbecoming
conduct. The penalty goes with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar of such
offenses shall be dealt with more severely.

2.
Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada

As mere members of the Fourth Division, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada had no
direction and control of how the proceedings of the Division were conducted. Direction and
control was vested in Justice Ong, as the Chairman. Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada
simply relied without malice on the soundness and wisdom of Justice Ongs discretion as their
Chairman, which reliance without malice lulled them into traveling the path of reluctance to halt
Justice Ong from his irregular leadership. We hold that their liabilities ought to be much
diminished by their lack of malice.

In addition, the fact that this is the first case for Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada is a
mitigating circumstance in their favor.

Although Justice Hernandez is liable for the less serious charge of simple misconduct,
aggravated by a light charge but appreciating his reliance without malice and the mitigating
circumstance of this offense being his first, the Court admonishes him with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely.

The liability of Justice Ponferrada for the less serious charge of simple misconduct, without any
aggravating circumstance, is obliterated by his reliance without malice and the mitigating
circumstance of its being a first offense. However, he is warned to be more cautious about the
proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.

Final Note
It becomes timely to reiterate that an honorable, competent and independent Judiciary exists to
administer justice in order to promote the stability of government and the well-being of the
people.[34] We warn, therefore, that no conduct, act, or omission on the part of anyone involved
in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes the
faith of the people in the Judiciary shall be countenanced.[35] Public confidence in the judicial
system and in the moral authority and integrity of the Judiciary is of utmost importance in a
modern democratic society; hence, it is essential for all judges, individually and collectively, to
respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and to strive to enhance and maintain
confidence in the judicial system.[36]

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:

1. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with a

stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;

2. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOSE R. HERNANDEZ is admonished with a warning that a

repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely; and

3. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA is warned to be more cautious

about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings before his court.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
EN BANC

March 11, 2014

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC.

(REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON.
RICARDO R. ROSARIO

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held
liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the
judges and the Judiciary.

AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation
of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v.
The Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA
Land, Inc.

Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.1 Due
to the projects location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and
staging area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the
Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to
WWRAI, which ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along
Fordham Street that it enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the
field office and set up a fence to deny access to AMALIs construction workers, which prompted
AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed
as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALIs prayer for the WPMI.3

In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed
use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALIs petition for corporate rehabilitation
was approved.4

On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing
its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The
denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari
with an application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC
from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668.5

After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift
and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for
Reconsideration.

On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file its
Comment. AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion for partial
reconsideration of the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent
Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left unresolved
when the CA Tenth Division, which included Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.6

On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting
the petition of WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.8

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra
Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of
the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI,
and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint
for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary
must be supported by at least substantial evidence.10 But when the charge equates to a criminal
offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the
service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.11

AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment against respondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204,
Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision" is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to
have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken
the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly means "sure
knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the complainant must
not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision.14 In
other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive in
issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure of the judge
to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable.17

But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer
knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and declaration be made in
administrative investigations and proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public
prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious only a superior court acting by virtue of
either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such
determination and declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer
may be usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by
law elsewhere in the appellate court.

Moreover, AMALIs allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA
through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice
by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting
judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re:
Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon.
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,18 we
emphatically held that the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to wit:

It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take
respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule
of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of
administrative investigation and prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him
in his regular performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the
independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are
neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for
such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis
supplied)

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in
its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1wphi1 The complaint herein is actually
the second one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation to the
performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified
Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and
Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,19 AMALI accused
respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct,
and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court
dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the propriety of the interlocutory
orders issued by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately
observed:

A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties respective allegations disclosed that the
acts complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before the respondent CA Justices
and the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the exercise of
their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed
by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies.
Disciplinary proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to
parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.

xxxx

In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the
questioned order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action by the Court.
Consequently, a decision on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the
respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if
the subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only
attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to
exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded
the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred
simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALIs bare and
self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAIs counsel in knowingly
and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct," no act
clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA
Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge
has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed
to the evaluation of the Court in the resolution of AMALIs petition for review on certiorari.

Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial
issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote
the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts dockets. Those who seek relief
from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in
their efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)

This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the complaint
herein containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were intended
to intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the performance of their judicial functions.

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also
an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative
charges against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of
their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first
administrative case AMALI or its representative personally responsible for the unfounded
charges brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do so in
order to uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest
of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their penchant for
harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing so even if
the latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would
be to reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court
and its judicial officers.

Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer
for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public
duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer justice area function of
sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for granted. As a recognized commentator on public
offices and public officers has written:20

It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be
sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been
injured by the officers judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case,
the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his
duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous
in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others.

A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule.
Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have
a controversy before him, is not the end and object which were in view when his court was
created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds;
they are to do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the
political society, and that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end
to be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and
thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the
occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if
he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be called to account by the State in such
form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the duty neglected is not a
duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible."21

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALIs authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its
Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had
authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be
held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against
respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless
administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by
the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled
thereto;

(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines:22

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority.
In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a
legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or
insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted
by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be
no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect,
and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves
and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate
Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice
President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc.
who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate
Justices to show cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished
for indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices,
and for interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice