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 POTENTIAL
FAILURE MOD AND
EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
Reference Manua
Fourth Edition

Flrst Edition, February 1993 * Second Edition, February 1995 Third Edition, Juty 2001,
Fourth Edition, June 2008
Copyright 1993. 1995, 2001, 2008
Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, Genera Motors Corporation
ISBN: 978-1-60534-136-1
 FOREWORD
4 ,h Edition

The FMEA 4& Edition is a reference manua to be used by supplieis to Chrysler IXC, Ford Motor
Company, and Genera Motors Corporation as a guide to assist them in the development of both
Design and Process FMEAs. The manua does not define requirements; it is intended to clarify
questions concerning the technical development of FMEAs This manua is aligned with SAE
11739

Sum mary of Changes in the 4th edition FMEA Reference Manua

The DFMEA and PFMEA methods described in the 4* edition FMEA Reference Manua include
those associated with design at the system, subsystem, interface, and component level and the
process at manufactuiing and assembly opeiations

Genera Changes
The formatting used in the 4& edition is intended to provide easier reading
o An index is included
o icons are used to indicate key paiagraphs and visual cues aie used
Additional examples and veibiage have been provided to improve the utility of the
manua and to provide a closer tie into the FMEA process as it develops
Reinforcement of the need for management suppoit, inteiest, and ieview of the
FMEA process and resuits
Define and strengthen the understanding of the linkage between DFMEA and
PFMEA as well as defining the linkages to othei tools
Improvements to the Seveiity, Occunence, Detection ranking tables so that they aie
moie meaningful to real woild analysis and usage
Alternative methods are introduced that are currentiy being applied in industry
o Additional appendices which have example foims and special case application of
FMEA.
o The focus on the "standard form" has been repiaced with seveial options that
represent the current application of FMEA in industry
The suggestion that RPN not be used as the primary means for assessing risk. The
need for rmprovement has been revised including an additional method, and the use
of thiesholds on RPN is ciaiified as a practice that is not recommended

Chapter I provides genera FMEA guidelines, the need for management suppoit and having a
defined piocess fot developing and maintaining FMEAs, and the need fot continuous
impiovement

Chapter U describes the genera application of the FMEA methodology, which is common
between DFMEA and PFMEA processes This includes the planning, stiategy, action plans, and
the need for management suppoit and responsibility in FMEAs

Chapter Ifl focuses on DFMEA (Design Failure Mod Effects and Analysis), establishing the
scope of the analysis, use of bock diagrams, vaiious types of DFMEAs, formation of the teams,
basie piocedure for analysis, action plans, and follow-up, aftematives to RPN, and connection to
PFMEAs and validation plans

i
Chapter IV focuses on PFMEA (Piocess Failure Mod Effects and Anatysis), establishing the
scope of the anatysis, use of flow diagtams, foimation of teams, basie procedur foi analysis,
action plans, the connection to DFMEAs and the development of contro! plans

The Appendices have seveial examples of foims for DMFEA and PFMEA and addresses
different applications and piocedures for addressing design and piocess tisk.

The Suppliei Quality Requirements Task Foice would like to thank the fbllowing individuals, and
theii companies, who have contiibuted their time and eftbits to the development of this edition of
the FMEA Refeience Manua:

Michael Down, Genera Motois Coipoiation

Lawrence Biozowski, Genera Motois Corporation
Hisham Younis, Ford Motor Company
David Benedict, Chrysler LLC
JohnFcghali, Chiyslei LLC
Michael Schubert, Delphi
Rhonda Brender, Delphi
Gregory Giuska, Omnex
Glen Vallance, Contiol Planning Initiatives
Milena Krasich, Bose
William Haughey, ReliaTiain

This manua is a copyiight of Chrysler LLC, Ford Motoi Company and Genera Motois
Coiporation, with all nghts reserved. Additional copies may be obtained irom AIAG @
www.aiag.org Supply chain oiganizations of Chrysler LLC, Ford Motoi Company 01 Genera
Motois Corporation have peimission to copy foims used in this manual.

:i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Genera Changes
Chapterl
Genera FMEA Guidelines
Intioduction
FMEA Process
Puiposeof Manua
Scope of Manua
Impact on Organization and Management
FMEA Explained
Follow-up and Continuous Improvement
Chapreill
Ovetview of FMEA Sttategy, Planning and Implementation
Intioduction
Basic Stiucture
Approach - ...
Identify the I eam
Define the Scope
Define the Customer
Indentify Functions, Requiiements, and Specifications
Identify Potential Failure Modes
Identify Potential Effects....
Identify Potential Causes
Identify Contiols
Identifying and Assessing Risk ....
Recoramended Actions and Results
Management Responsibility
Chapterlll
DFMEA Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis ......
mnoduction
Customei Defined . . . .
IeamAppioach
Manufactuiing, Assembly and Seiviceability Considerations
Development of a Design FMEA
Piereuisites
Bock (Boundaiy) Diagiams ..
Parametei (P) Diagiams
Functional Requiiements. .
Other Tools and Infoimation Resouices
Example DFMEA
Header of the Design FMEA Foim (fields A-H)
Body of the DFMEA Foim (fields a - n)
MaintainingDFMEAs
Leveraging DFMEAs
Linkages
Design Veiification Plan & Repoit (DVP&R)
PFMEA
Chaptei IV' .. . *
PF MEA Process Failure Mod and Effects Analysis . .
Intioduction
Customer Defined
Ieam Approach .
DesignConsideiations ........
Development of a Process FMEA

iii
 Prerequisites
Process Flow Diagram and Iinkage to PFMEA
Olher Tools and Infoimation Souices. ...
Reseaich Infonnation ,
ExamplePFMEAForm
Headei of the Process FMEA Form (fields A-H)
Body ofthe PFMEA Fonn(fields a-n)
Mainlaining PFMEAs -
LveiagingPFMEAs
Linkages -
ToDFMEA
To Conaoi Plan
APPENDICES
Appendix A; Sample Foims
DFMEAFoims
PFMEA Forms
Appendix B: System Level FMEA
Inteifaces
Inteiactions -
Relationships
Multiple Levels of Design F ME As
Appendix C: Altemative Risk Assessments
AItematives to RPN
Altemative: SO (S x O)
Alteinative: SOD, SD . . . .
Appendi* D: Alternative Analyses Techniques
Failure Mod, Effect and Ciiticality Analysis (FMECA)
Design Review Based on Failure Modes (DRBFM)
Fault Iree Analysis (FTA)
Refeiences and Suggested Readings
Index

!V
 TABLESandFIGTJRES
Figur III la Bock (Boundaiy) Diagram Examples 19
Figures ID. Ib, c Bock (Boundary) Diagram Examples 20
Figur IH2 Example of a Paiametei (P) Diagram foi aGeneiic Catalytic Converter 21
Table HI 1 Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal Infoimation Elemenls & Example Entries 24
labie 1H.3 Example Potential FailureModes . 32
labie m 4 Examp!e Potential EtTects 35
labie Ci l Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria 37
Table III 5 Example Potential Causes 42
Table Cr2 Suggested DFMEA Occurrence Eraluation Ciiteria 46
n
Table III 6 Examples of Prevention and Detection Design Contiols .. 51
labie Cr3 Suggested DFMEA/PFMEA Prevention/Detection Evaluation Ciiteiia ... 54
labie III.7 Examplesof Causes, ConOols and Recommended Actions 64
Figur III. 7 DFMEA Intbimation Intenelationships Flow 65
Figur IV 1 Highl_evel toDetailed ProcessMaps .71
Figur IV.2 Example Process Flow Diagiam 72
Table IV 1 Sample PFMEA Foim with Minimal Infoimation Elements Sc Example Entries 74
labie TV 2 Example of Piocess Step/Function/Requiiements Columns on PFMEA Form including Potential
FailureModes ... .81
IableIV3ExampleofEffects 85
Table Cr 1 Suggested PFMEA Seveiity Evaluation Ciiteiia 88
Table Cr2 Suggested PFMEA Occuirence Evaluation Ciiteria 93
Table IV.4 Examples ot Causes and Contiols 96
Table Ci 3 Suggested Process FMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria 100
Table IV.5 Examples of Causes. Controls and Actions 110
Figur 1V.S PFMEA Infoimation Inteirelationship Flow 111
DFMEAFormA 115
DFMEA FoimB - 116
DFMEAFoimC... 117
DFMEA FoimD 118
DFMEAFormE 119
DFMEAFormF 120
PFMEAFoimA 122
PFMEA FoimB 123
PFMEAFoimC .' 124
PFMEAFoimD 125
PFMEAFoimE 126
PFMEAFoimF 127
PFMEA Form G 128
PFMEAFoimH 129
Figur B 1 Interfaces and Inteiactions 130
F igure B 2 Item, Functions, andFailuie 132
Figur B 3 DFMEA EffectsLinkages 134
labie C 1 Contiast among RPN, SOD and SD 136
Figur D 1 ExampIeof DRBFM Elements 138
FigurD2FTA TreeStructure 139

'.
Vi
Chapter I Geneial FMEA Guidelines

Chapter I

Genera FMEA
Guidelines
Chaptci I Genera FMEA Guidelines

Introduction
This manua introduces the topie of Potential Failure Mod and
EtTects Analysis (FMEA) and gives genera guidance in the
application of the technique

FMEA Process
FMEA is an analytical methodology used to ensuie that potentia!
problems have been considered and addiessed thioughout the
product and process development process (APQP - Advanced
Pioduct Quality Planning) Its most visible result is the
documentaiion of the coIlective knowledge of cross-functional
teams
Part of the eva!uation and analysis is the assessment of risk The
impoitant point is that a discussion is conducted regaiding the
design (pioduct or process), ieview of the functions and any
changes in application^ and the resulting risk of potential failuie.
Each FMEA should ensure that attention is given to eveiy
component within the product oi assembly Critical and safety
related components oi processes should be given a highei
priority
One of the most important factois fot the successful
implementation of an FMEA program is timeliness It is meant
to be a "before-the-event" action, not an "after-the-fact"
exercise To achieve the greatest valuc, the FMEA must be done
before the implementation of a pioduct or process in which the
failure mod potential exists Up-ftont time spem piopeily
completing an FMEA, when pioduet/process changes can be
most easily and inexpensively implemented, will minimize late
change crises Actions iesulting fiom an FMEA can leduce oi
eliminate the chance of implementing a change that would create
an even larger concern.

Ideally, the Design FMEA process should be initiated in the

early stages of the design and the Process FMEA before tooling
or manufacturing euipment is developed and purchased The
FMEA evolves throughout each stage of the design and
manufacturing development process and may also be used in
problem solving
FMEA can also be applied to non-manufacturing areas. For
example, FMEA could be used to analyze risk in an
v administration process or the evaluation of a safety system. In
geneial, FMEA is applied to potential failures in product design
and manufacturing processes wheie the benefits are cleai' and
potentially significant

2
Chapter I Geneial FMEA Guidelines

Purpose of Manua
This manua describes the basie piinciples and iraplementalion
of the FMEA1 process and how it is integialed within the
product and process development cycle This includes the
documentation of this process and how the analyses can be
applied for timely necessary improvement of a product 01 a
process in its early and fuli deveiopment stage
This manua also provides descriptions and examples of alternate
and suppoiting methodologies for these analyses, their specific
advantages and limitations, guidance of how the analysis is to be
cariied out for the maximum icliability impiovement or
mitigation of potential safety risks. The manua provides
guidance on how the risk can be represented, measuied and
prioritized for cost eftective mitigation of the failure effects

As a tool in risk evaluation, FMEA is considered to be a method

to identiiy severity of potential effects of faiiuie and to provide
an input to mitigating measures to reduce iisk In many
applications, FMEA also includes an estimation of the
probability of oceunence of the causes of faiiuie and theii
tesultant faiiuie modes This broadens the analysis by providing
a measure of the failure mode's likelihood To minimize iisk, the
likelihood of failure occutience is reduced which inereases
product or ptocess reliability FMEA is a tool that is instrumental
in reliability impiovement

Theie aie three basie cases for which FMEA process is to be

applied, each with a diffeient scope 01 fbcus:

Case 1: New designs, new technology, or new process.

The scope of the FMEA is the complete
design, technology, or process
Case 2: Modifications to existing design 01 process
The scope of the FMEA should focus on the
modification to design or process, possible
interactions due to the modification, and field
history This can include changes in regulatory
recjuirements

Case 3: Use of an existing design or process in a new

environment, location, applicatlon, or usage
profile (including duty cycle, regulatory
requirements, etc)
The scope of the FMEA should focus on the
impact of the new environment, location, or
application usage on the existing design or
process

The F MEA present herein also is known as a Faiiuie Modes Effects and Ciiticality Analysis (FMECA)
sice it includes a quantification of the risks

3
Chaptet I Genera FMEA Guidelines

Scopeof Manua
The analytical melhods presented in this manua are applicable
to any product or process. However, this manua will focus on
those applications pievalent within the automotive industry and
its suppliers

Impact on Organization and Management

FMEA is an impoitant activity within any company Because the
development of an FMEA is a multi-disciplined activity
affecting the entiie pioduct realization piocess, its
implementation needs to be well planned to be firlly effective
This piocess can take considetable time and a commitment of the
iequired resouices is vital. Impoitant to FMEA development is a
process ownei and senioi management commitment

Implementation apptoach will vaiy depending on the size and

stiucture of the company concemed, although the principles will
be the same:
The scope will cover FMEAs produced in house and by multi-
tier supplieis.
Address Design and Piocess FMEAs, as applicable
Accomplish this by having the FMEA process an integral pait
of the APQP piocess
Pait of engineeiing technical reviews
Pait of the regulai sign-off and appioval of the pioduct or
process design
An FMEA is deveIoped by a multi-functional (01 cross-
functional) team The team size will depend both on the
complexity of the design and the size and organization of the
company Team members need relevant expeitise, available time
and authority sanctioned by management
A comprehensive tiaining progiam should be implemented
including:
Management Oveiview
Tiaining foi users
Supplier Training
Facilitaloi Training
Ultimately, management has the responsibility and owneiship for
development and maintenance of the FMEAs

4
 Geaeial FMEA Guidelines

ned
FMEAs are aa integiaL part of managing iisk and supporting
continual improvement. Consequently, FMEA becomes a key
patt of Product and Process development The Advanced Product
Qua!ity Planning (APQP) process identifies five genera areas of
focus in this deve!opment process:
Plan and Define Program
Product Design and Development
Process Design and Developmenl
Product and Process Validation
Feedback, Assessment and Conective Action
The APQP Reference manua shows DFMEAs as an activity in
the Product Design and Development section of the timing chart
and PFMEAs in the Process Planning and Development section
The development of eithei DFMEA 01 PFMEA is a process that
helps to guide the tearas in developing product and process
designs that meet expectations
The FMEA analysis should not be consideied a single event, but
a long-term commitment that complements the product and
process development to ensure potential failures are evaluated
and actions are taken to icduce their iisk
One key aspect of continual improvement is the retention of
knowledge fiom past learning which often is captured in
FMEAs It is advisable for organizations to capitalize on prior
analyses of similar product and process designs for use as the
starting point for the next program and/oi application
The language used in FMEAs should be as specific as possible
when describing an item (for example, failure mod, or cause)
and not extend or extrapolate beyond the team's level of
understanding as to what the faihue effects may be
Clear statements, concise terminology and focus on the actual
effects are key to the effective identiftcation and mitigation of
iisk issues

*
Chaptei I Geneial FMEA Guideliaes

Follow-up and Continuous lmprovement

The need foi taking effective pieventive/conective actions, wilh
appiopiiate follow-up on those actions, cannot be
oveiemphasized Actions should be communicated to all affected
activities A thoroughly thought-out and well-developed FMEA
will be of limited value without positive and effective
preventive/conective actions.
Team leadeiship (typically the team leadei/lead engineei) is in
charge of ensuring that all iecommended actions have been
implemented 01 adeuately addressed The FMEA is a living
document and should always reflect the latest level, as well as
the latest relevant actions, including those occuuing aftei the
staitof pioduction
The team leadei/lead engineei has seveial means of assuring that
iecommended actions aie implemented They include, but are
not limited to the following:
Reviewing designs, processes, and related iecoids to ensiue
that iecommended actions have been implemented,
Confuming the incorpoiation of changes to design/assembly/
manufactuiing documentation, and,
Reviewing Design/Piocess FMEAs, special FMEA
applications, and Coratiol Plans

6
Chaptei II Sbategy, Planning, Implementation

Chapter I!

Overview of FMEA
Strategy, Planning and implementafaon

7
Chaptei II Strategy, Planning, Implementation

Introduction
FMEA development, eithei design or piocess, usys a common

appioach to addiess:
Potential pioduct oi piocess failure to meet expectations
Potential conseueaces
Potential causes of the failure mod
Application of cuirent controls
Level of iisk
Risk reduction
Befoie the FMEA dokument is started, the team must define the
scope of the project and collect existing infoimation which is
necessaiy for an effective and efficiem FMEA development
ptocess

Basic Structure
The purpose of the recommended FMEA fbimats described in
this manua is to oiganize the collection and display of relevant
FMEA infoimation Specific formats may vaty based on the
needs of the oiganization and the requiiements of the customei J
Fundamentally, the format utilized should addiess:
Functions, requirements, and deliveiables of the product 01
piocess being analyzed,
Failuie modes wheti functional reuiiements aie not met,
Effects and conseuences of the failuie mod,
Potential causes of the failure mod,
Actions and contr ols to address the causes of the failure mod,
and,
Actions to pievent lecunence of the failure mod

Approach
There is no single or unique piocess ioi FMEA development;
howevei there aie common elements as described below

s
 Chaptei II Sttategy, Planning, Implemenlation

Identify the Team

As pieviously mentioned, FMEA developraent is the
responsibility of a multi-disciplinaiy (or cross-functional) team
whose raembers encompass the necessary subject mattet
knowledge This should include facilitation expeitise and
knowledge of the FMEA piocess A team approach is
recommended to benefit the FMEA development piocess to
ensuie input and collaboration fiom all affected ftinctional aieas.
The FMEA team leadei should select team membeis with the
relevant expeiience and necessaiy authoiity In addition to the
design and piocess engineeis, the following aie examples of
additional resoiuces:

FMEA development topie Relevant Resources or Expertise

Scope
Functions, iequirements and expectations
Potential failure mod - the way a piocess 01
pioduct might tai
Effects and conseuences of the failure - to
both the organization's piocesses 01 to a
downstieam customer
Causes of the potential failure
Freuency of occunence of potential failuie
Application of cuirent controls-prevention
Application of current contiols-detection
Recommended actions requiied
Program Management, Customer, Integiation responsible
individual(s)
Customei, Program Management, Integiation iesponsible
individual(s), Seivice Opeiations, Safety, Manufactuiing
and Assembly, Packaging, Logistics, Materials
Customer, Piogram Management, Integiation responsible
individual(s), Service Opeiations, Safety, Manufacturing
and Assembly, Packaging, Logistics, Materials, Quality
Customer, Program Management, Integiation responsible
individual(s), Seivice Opeiations, Safety, Manufactuiing
and Assembly, Packaging, Logistics, Materials, Quality
Customei, Manufacturing and Assembly, Packaging,
Logistics, Materials, (^uality, Reliability, Engineering
Analysis, Equipment Manufactuier, Maintenance
Customer, Manufacturing and Assembly, Packaging,
Logistics, Materials, Quality, Reliability, Engineeiing
Analysis, Statistical Analysis, Euipment Manufactuier,
Maintenance
Manufacturing and Assembly, Packaging, Logistics,
Materials, Quality, Equipment Manufacturei, Maintenance
Customer, Manufactuiing and Assembly, Packaging,
Logistics, Materials, Quality, Maintenance
Customer, Program Management, Integiation responsible
individual(s),-Manufactuiing and Assembly, Packaging,
Logistics, Materials, Quality, Reliability, Engineering
Analysis, Statistical Analysis, Euipment Manufactuier,
Maintenance

9
Chapter II Stiategy, Planning, mplementation

Define the Scope

Scope establishes the boundaiy ofthe FMEA analysis It defines
what is included aod excluded, deteimined based on the type of
FMEA being developed, i e., system, subsystem, 01 component
Befoie the FMEA can begin, a elear undetstanding of what is to
be evaluated must be deteimined What to exclude can be just as
impoitant as what to include in the analysis The scope needs to
be established at the stait ofthe piocess to assuie consistent
diiection and focus
Ihe following raay assist the team in defining the scope ofthe
FMEA:
Function Model
Bock (Boundaiy) diagiams
Paiameter (P) diagiams
Intei face diagiams
Process flow diagiams
Inteiielationship matiices
Schematics
Bili ofMateiials (BOM)

System FMEA
A system FMEA is mad up of vaiious subsystems Examples of
systems include: Chassis System, Poweitiain System, 01 Inteiioi
System, etc The fbcus of the System FMEA is to addiess all
inteifaces and inteiactions among systems, subsystems, the
enviionment and the customei.

Subsystem FMEA
A Subsystem FMEA is a subset of a system FMEA. An example
of a subsystem is the fiont suspension subsystem, which is a
subset ofthe chassis system The focus ofthe Subsystem FMEA
is to addiess all inteifaces and inteiactions among the subsystem
components and inteiactions with othei subsystems ot systems

Component FMEA
A Component FMEA is a subset of a subsystem FMEA Foi
example, a biake pad is a component of the biake assembly,
which is a subsystem of the chassis system
NOT: Any subseuent adjustments to the scope may icuire a
modification ofthe team structiue and membeiship

10
Chaptei II Strategy, Ptanning, Implementation

Define the Customer

There are foui major customeis to be considered in the FMEA
piocess, all need to be taken into account in the FMEA analysis:
END USER: the person or oiganization that will utilize the
pioduct The FMEA analysis affecting the End Usei could
include, for example, durability.
OEM ASSEMBLY and MANUFACTURING CENTERS
(PLANTS): the OEM locations wheie manufactuiing
opetations ( e g , stamping and poweitrain) and vehicle
assembly take place Addiessing the inteifaces between the
product and its assembly process is critical to an effective
FMEA analysis

SUPPLY CHAIN MANUFACTURING: the supplier location

wheie manufactuiing, fabiicating oi assembling of pioduction
mateiials oi parts takes place This includes fabiicating
pioduction and seivice paits and assemblies and piocesses
such as heat tieating, welding, painting, plating oi othei
finishing seivices This may be any subsequent or downstieam
opeiation or a next tier manufactuiing piocess

REGULATORS: govemment agencies that define

iequiiements and monitoi compliance to safety and
enviionmental specifications which can impact the pioduct oi
piocess
Knowledge of these customers can help to define the functions,
teuiiements and specitications moie robustly as well as aid in
deteimining the effects of related failuie modes

Indentify Functions.
Requirements, and
Specifications
Identify and undeistand the functions, reuiiements and
specifications ielevant to the defined scope. The puipose of this
activity is to claiify the item design intent or piocess puipose
This assists in the deteimination of the potential failuie mod foi
each attiibute or aspect of the function

.1
Chaptei n Strategy, Planning, Implementation

Identify Potential
Failure Modes
Failure mod is defined as the way 01 mannei in which a pioduct
or piocess could fail to raeet design intent 01 piocess
ieuiiements The assumption is mad that the failure could
occur but may not necessaiily occur A concise and
undeistandable failuie definition is impoitant sice it piopeily
focuses the analysis Potential failuie modes should be desciibed
in technical teims and not as a symptom necessarily noticeable
by the customer. A laige number of failuie modes identified for
a single iequirement may indicate that the defined iequiiement is
not concise

Identify Potential
Effects
Potential effects of failuie aie defined as the effects of the failuie
mod as perceived by the customei The effects or impact of the
failure aie desciibed in teims of what the customei might notice
or expeiience The customei may be an intemal customei as
well as the End User
Deteimining potential effects includes the analysis of the
consequences of the failures and the seveiity 01 seriousness of
those conseuences

Identify Potential
Causes
Potential cause of failuie is defined as an indication of how the
failuie could occur, desciibed in teims of something that can be
conected oi can be contiolled. Potential cause of failuie may be
an indication of a design weakness, the cohsequence of which is
the failuie mod.
Theie is a diiect relation between a cause and its tesultant failuie
mod (i e , if the cause occurs, then the failuie mod occuis).
Identifying the ioot cause(s) of the failuie mod, in sufficient
detail, enables the identification of appropiiate contiols and
action plans A sepaiate, potential cause analysis is perfoimed
foi each cause if theie are multiple causes

1/
Chapter II Strategy, Planning, Implementation

Identify Controls
Controls aie those activities that pievent oi detect the cause of
the failuie oi failure mod In deve!oping contiols it is impoitant
to identify what is going wrong, why, and how to prevent oi
detect it Controls aie applicable to pioduct design or
manufactuiing processes. Contiols fbcused on pievention will
provide the gieatest return.
Identifying and
Assessing Risk
One oi the impoitant steps in the FMEA piocess is the
assessment of iisk This is evaluated in thiee ways, severity,
occunence, and detection:
Severity is an assessment of the level of' impact of a failiue on
the customei
Occurrence is how often the cause of a failuie may occui.
Detection is an assessment of how well the pioduct ot piocess
contiols detect the cause of the failuie oi the failuie mode.
Oiganizations need to undeistand theii customei iequiiements
for iisk assessment
Recommended
Actionsand Results
The intent of recommended actions is to reduce oveiall iisk and
likelihood that the failure mod will occur The recommended
actions address ieduction of the severity, occuirence and
detection.
The fllowing can be used to assuie that the appropiiate actions
aie taken, including but not limited to:
Ensuiing design reuirements including reliability are
achieved,
Reviewing engineering drawings and specifications,
Confirming incorpoiation in assembly/manufacturing
processes, and,
Reviewing telated FMEAs, control plans and opeiations
instiuctions.
Responsibility and timing to complete the iecommended actions
should be recoided.
Once actions aie completed and results captured, the updated
iatings for seveiity, occunence and detection should also be
lecoided

13
Chapter II Strategy, Planning, Impleraentation

Management Responsibility |
Management owns the FMEA piocess Management has the
ultimate responsibility of selecting and applying iesources and
ensuiing an effective risk management piocess including timing
Management iesponsibility also includes providing diiect
suppott to the team through on-going ieviews, eliminating
loadblocks, and incoipoiating lessons leamed

14
Chapter III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Chapter !li

DFMEA
Design Faiiure Mod and Effects Analysis

Chapter III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Introduction $
The Design Failuie Mod Effects Analysis, lefened to as
DFMEA, suppoits the design piocess in leducing the risk of
failures by:
Aiding in the objective evaluation of the design, including
functional ieuiiements and design alteinatives,
Evaluating the initial design for manufactuiing, assembly,
ser vice, and recycling ieuiiements,
Increasing the probability that potential failuie modes and theii
effects on system and vehicle operation have been consideted
in the design/develt>pment process,
Providing additional infoimation to aid in the planning of
thotough and efficient design, development, and validation
piograms,
Developing a ianked list of potential failuie modes accoiding
to theii effect on ihe customer, thus establishing a piioriTy
system for design impiovements, development, and validation
testing/analysis,
Pioviding an open issue format for recommending and
tracking risk-ieducing actions, and,
Pioviding mtuie refeience, ( e g , lessons learned), to aid in f
addiessing field conceins, evaluating design changes, and
developing advanced designs
Ihe DFMEA is a living document and should:
Be initiated befoie design concept finateation,
Be updated as changes occui 01 additional infoimation is
obtained thioughout the phases of pioduct development,
Be fundamentally completed befoie the production design is
ieleased, and,
Be a souice of lessons learned foi futur design iteiations.

Customer Defined
The definition of "Customei" provided in Chapter U applies to
DFMEA It is important to conectly identify the customei(s)
because such knowledge diiects the development of the
DFMEA, including the impact of the function of the design

I.

16
Chapter Tli Design Failure Mod and Effecls Analysis

Team Approach
The DFMEA is developed and maintained by a multi-
disciplioaiy (oi cioss-functional) team typically led by the design
responsible engineei fiom the responsible design source (e g,
OEM, Tier 1 supplier or Tiei 2 supplier and below)
The iesponsible engineei is expected to directly and actively
involve iepresentatives fiom all affected areas The areas of
expeitise and iesponsibility may include, but are not limited to,
assembly, manutacturing, design, analysis/test, reliability,
materials, quality, seivice, and supplieis, as well as the design
aiea iesponsible for the next higher or tower assembly or system,
subsystem, or component
Manufacturing,
Assembly and
Sen/iceability
Considerations
The DFMEA should include any potential failure modes and
causes that can OCCUI during the manuractuiing oi assembly
process which aie the result of the design Such failure modes
may be mitigated by design changes ( e g , a design featute which
prevents a part fiom being assembled in the wiong orientation -
i e., eiior-proofed) When not mitigated during the DFMEA
analysis (as noted in the action plan foi that item), theii
identification, effect, and control should be transfeired to and
coveied by the PFMEA

The DFMEA does not rely on process controls to overcome

potential design weaknesses, but it does take the technical and
physical limits of a manufacturing and assembly piocess into
consideiation, foi example:
Necessaiy mold drafts
Limited suiface finish capability
Assembling space (e g , access for tooling)
Limited haidenability of steels
Tolerances/process capability/per foi mace
The DFMEA can also take into consideiation the technical and
physical limits of produci serviceability and iecycling once the
pioduct has entered field use, foi example:
Tool access
Diagnostic capability
Materia classification symbols (foi recycling)
Materials/chemicals used in the manufacturing piocesses

17
Chaptei III Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Development of a Design FMEA

The DFMEA focuses on the design of the product that will be
delivered to the fina custoraer (End Usei). The pretequisite tasks
for an effective analysis of the product design include:
assembling a team, deteimining scope, creating bock diagiams
01 P-diagrams depicting product function and requirements. A
elear and complete deflnition of the desired product
chaiacteiistics better facilitates the identification of potential
failure modes A DFMEA foim is used to document the results
of the analysis including any recommended actions and
responsibilities (See Table III 1)

The DFMEA piocess can be mapped to the customer or

oiganization's product development piocess

Prereguisites
A DFMEA should begin with the development of information to
understand the system, subsystem, oi component being analyzed
and define their flinctional requiiements and characteristics
In ordei to determine ihe scope of the DFMEA, the team should
consider the following as applicable to component, subsystem ot
system DFMEAs: i
What processes, mating components, oi systems does the
product inteiface with?
Are there functions oi features of the product that afect other
components or systems?
Aie there inputs provided by othei components or systems tha:
are needed to peifoim intended functions of the pioduct?
Do the producfs functions include the prevention or detection
of a possible failure mod in a linked component or system?
The following sections describe tools that may be applied, as
appropiiate, to assist Ihe team in developing the DFMEA

Bock (Boundary) Diagrams

The bock diagram of the pioduct shows the physical and logical
lelationships between the components of the product There aie
different appioaches and foimats to the constniction of a bock
diagiam
The bock diagiam indicates the inteiaction of components and
subsystems within the scope of the design This interaction may
include: flow of information, energy, fbice, or fluid The
objective is to understand the requirements or inputs to the

!S
Chapter HI Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

system, the activities acting on the inputs or function peifotmed,

and the deliverables or output
The diagram may be in the form of boxes connected by lines,
with each box corresponding to a major component of the
pioduct oi a major step of the piocess. The lines coirespond to
how the pioduct components aie related to, or interface with
each other The organization needs to decide the best approach
or foimat for the bock diagram. Figur III.la, b, and c contain
examples of bock diagrams
Copies of the diagrams used in DFMEA pieparation should
accompany the DFMEA

Lift Gale Bali LiftGate

Waadier
Studs
Strtps

Hamess

H.:nS
MFG Plant Sttuts ,3J
Rip Glass xxx N ses| tosd
xxx N oad
xxxN
nviT-mwni FKp Glass
-j- U - J S - - . - . - . Applique
Studs

Z
Assembly
TH
SCIM cc
=Hp Glass Wlper
Stnkw .4.:5r"i-.ir

Customet
ixxxN O ad

Lalch
Assembly

Koy:
Ora way action/Tunctlon: *
TWiMWy interactionffunction: .
Soundary Une
Cmical Meriace focus
Crtical Assembly tbcus
Numbere miale to detali on interface Analysis

Figur IH.la Bock (Boundary) Diagram Esamples

19
Chaptei III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

9-
c
o
i?

co
-o
0)
CL

CG
CU
co

'co

iiiill

I
II
^
-
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iii '

Figur es III Ib, c Bock (Boundaiy) Diagram Examples

20
Chaptei III
Parameter (P) Diagrams
Snai: lX-:iiyr. & Ma-uriai
Mount Materia / Wire / Seals
Substrate
Geometry fcontourilength)
Celi Denslty
WaJIthickness
Packaglng Location & Volume
Row Distribution
(Pip* & Cone Geometry)
Siana |
Mass
Exnaust Gas Composllion
Energy
ThermaJ
Mechanical
Chemical
Pr-essure
i . - - '--'"'
.
Changes Ovr_Timc/Miie
Btockage / restriction
Weld cteterioration / taligue
Substrate retenlion
(Mount degradation)
Subsirale efosion / breaooe
Catatyst chemical ageing
Corrosion of sheH
Loosening of heat shield
.trnl Enyjronrnen.t
Amblent temperatur
Road load / vibralion
Off Road - debrls / rccks
Road Saltf mud/ water
Figur III.2 Example of a Parameter (P) Diagram for a Generic Catalytic Converter
Design Failuie Mod and EfFects Analysis
The P-Diagiam is a structuied tool to help the team undeistand
the physics related to the function(s) of the design The team
analyzes the intended inputs (signals) and outputs (responses 01
functions) for the design as well as those contiolled and
uncontrolied factois wbici can impact peifoimance.
Ihe inputs to the pioduct and outputs fiom the pioduct, i e., the
intended and unintended functions of the pioduct, are usetul in
identifying eiror states, noise factors, and control factois.
The enot states conespond to the Potential Faiiure Modes in the
DFMEA.
Chamic!
Wash coat Technology
Ptecious Metal toadinc/Ratto
Effor States:
ff^fo; Functional
Output gases do not meet
Control Factors emission requirernents
Non-Functionaf
mm Skt#fc Odor/Smell
Nose/Raffle
Power Loss
i
-
Excessive Heat (internal)
Excesslve Heal (extemal)
Exhaust leak
lnadvertant Chsck Engine signal
u--^
Respoosa;
Y, = Regulated Emission
(HC CO NOx) [gms/mile]
Y, = Non-Regulated Emission
(H2S) [ppm/test]
Noise F a c t o r s Custorncr Usage
Short, Iow speed trips
High speed with Irailei tow
Fuel type & quality / sulfur tevel
yarialion
Service damage
Materia vartalion Shipping mishandling
Substrate Wash Composftion Driving with engine errora
Cannng forces:
Clampjng farcs
Wrap tighiness Systurn Intoractions
Crimping force Heat SNeid / NVH PaCs 1
Assembly process Weded Exhaust Manlfokl Leaks
Misbiald / mtslabets Engine misfire Excessive Heat
Orientation and centralny Oli contamlnatlon
Mount gap
IMatl/WlreJ/SheflOD
Dimension (Assembly)
1 Power train load vibration
Dynamie load (engine induced)
Calibration
Backpressure
Welding process
21
Chaptei III Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Functional Requirements i
Anothei step in the DFMEA process is a compilation of the
functional and inteiface iequirements of the design I his list may
include the following categoiies:
Geneial: This category considers the puipose of the ptoduct
and its oveiall design intent
Safety
Govemment Regulations
Reliability (Life of the Function)
Loading and Duty Cycles: Customei ptoduct usage profile
Quiet Opeiations: Noise, vibiation and hatshness (NVH)
Fluid Retention
Ergonomics
Appeaiance
Packaging and Shipping
Service
Design for Assembly
Design fot Manufactuiability #(

Other Tools and Information Resources

Other tools and resouices that may help the team understand and
define the design reuirements may include:
Schematics, diawingSj etc
Bill of Materials (BOM)
Intenelationship matiices
Intetface matrix
Quality Function Deployment (QFD)
Quality and Reliability Histoiy
The use of these tools, suppoited by engineenng experience and
histoiical information, can assist in deflning a comprehensive set
of ieuirements and functions
-v Aftei considering these pteieuisites, statt filling out the fbim
(labie 111 lbelow)

22
Chapter HI Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

This page intentionaliy left blank.

23
Chapter m Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

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Table 111.1 Sample DFMEA Foim with Minimal Intbiraation Elements & Example Entries

24
Chapter III Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

ExampleDFMEA
The example used with the saraple foim deals wilh a Fiont Door
assembly The product has several fiinctiooal requirements:
Peimit ingtess to and egress fiom vehicle
Piovide oceupant piotection &om
o Weather (comfort)
o Noise (comfort)
o Side impact (safety)
Support anchoiage foi dooi hardware including
o Minoi
o Hinges
o Latch
o Window regulator
Provide proper surface for appeaiance items
o Paint
o Soft trim
Maintain integrity of innei dooi panel
The fina DFMEA would include analysis of all these
requirements The example includes pait of the analysis of the
requirement: "Maintain integrity of innei dooi panel"

Header of the Design FMEA Form (fields A-H)

The following describes the infoiraation to be entered on the
foim
Ihe headei should cleaily identify the focus of the FMEA as
well as infoimation lelated to the document deve!opment and
control process. This should include an FMEA number,
identification of the scope, design lesponsibility, completion
dates, etc The header should contain the following elements2:

The letters at the end of each heading indicate the aiea referred to on the sample fbim

25
Chapler III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

N,'b

ic :?vi-c

..:. . . . J . J J I ;

M.e-^

I I iii
LL 9 U
- ^

- mu m
> 3

m i 3 Iw -
i II
UJ

"iii I ,1 is
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li: -:5 iill
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23
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:,. :. i :;..,

< Q
LU
'-
y
LU
LC
-

*.;
^
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-: -.'

.h
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L - ; : - - - 1 : ; - : - - - _-

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Table III.I Sam ple DFMEA Form with Minima! Information Elements & Example Entries

26
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

FMEA Number (A)

Enter an alphanumeiic stting which is used lo identify the FMEA
document This is used foi document conool

System, Subsystem, or Cornponent Name

and Number (B)
Enter the name and number of the system, subsystem, or
cornponent which is being analyzed (See section entitled Define
the Scope)

Design Responsibiiity (C)

Entei the OEM, oiganization, and depaitment or gioup who is
design lesponsible Also entei the supply oiganization name, if
applicable

Model Year(s)/Program(s) (D)

Enter the intended model yeai(s) and piogiam(s) that will use 01
be aifected by the design being analyzed (if known)

Key Dat (E)

Entei the initial DFMEA due dat, which should not exceed the
scheduled production design ielease dat

FMEA Dates (F)

Entei the dat the oiiginal DFMEA was compieted and the latest
revision dat

Core Team (G)

Entei the team members responsible for developing the DFMEA
Contact infoimation ( e g , name, oiganization, telephone
number, and email) may be included in a leferenced
supplemental document

Prepared By (H)
Enter the name and contact infoimation including the
oiganization (company) of the engineer lesponsible for piepaiing
the DFMEA

27
 - , . L _ ..._' .'

Chapti ffl Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

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rabie m . l Sample DFMEA Form with Minimal Inirmation Ele me im & Esample Entries

28
Chaptei HI Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Body of the DFMEA Form (fields a - n)

The body of the FMEA contains the analysis of lisks idated to
the potential failuies, and impiovement action being taken 3

Item / Function / Requirements (a)

Item/Function can be sepaiated into two (or moie) columns ot
combined into a single, bridged column which encompasses
these elements Inteifaces (as "items" of analysis) can be eithei
combined or separate. Components may be listed in the
item/function column, and an additional column may be added
containing the functions or iequiiements of that item "Item",
"Function", and "Requiiements" aie desciibed below:

Item (a1)
Enter the items, inteifaces, 01 pmts which have been identified
thiough bock diagiams, P-diagiams, schematics and othei
diawings, and othei analysis conducted by the team
The teiminology used should be consistent with customei
iequirements and with those used in othei design development
documents and analysis to ensuie tiaceability.

Function (a1)
Enter the runction(s) of the item(s) 01 inteiface(s) being analyzed
which aie necessaiy to meet the design intent based on customei
iequiiements and the team's discussion. If the item(s) or
inteiface nas mor than one function with different potential
modes of failuie, it is highly lecommended that each of these
runctions and associated failure mode(s) is listed sepaiately

Function becomes a2 if Item and Function are Split

Requirements (a2)
An additional column, "Requirements", may be added to fuithei
refine the analysis of the failure mode(s) Entei the
iequirement(s) for each of the functions being analyzed (based
on customei iequirements and the team's discussion; see also
Chaptei II, Section: Pieiequisites) If the function has moie than
one iequirement with different potential modes of failure, it is
highly recommended that each of the ieuiiements and functions
are listed separately
\ Requirment becomes a3 if Item and Function are Split into
\ separate columns, e g , a1 and a2

The letters at the end of each heading indicate the area refeited to on the sample tbim

29
 POTENTIAL
FAILURE MOD ANO EFFECTS ANALWIS FMEANumber. A :T

(DESIGN FMEA) -o
. Sulwytum P9t

Componam B DMign ReaponsfcJit/. l ' f ( , j ' l iv . H

=
M o d e l Ybflf ( s y P i o j a m i s ) _ D v -[).-- : " i . i ,_

Cote T a m _

Currenl Design t.cac.i

Polenlial Poleir.ai Polential ResponeltWv
Racommended
'..;-. li T 11 i Failure Effect(s) of Cause(s) or Actlons Taken
r
Controls Conlrols :
. '!!
JTarget
a i iiro .'.jl'j*.';f. ConipteUon Data CoiTobtUY) D o l e
Fuoaon

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 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Potential Failure Mod (b)

Potential failure mod is defined as the manner in which a
component, subsystem, or system could potentially fail to meet
01 delivet the intended function desciibed in the item column
Identify the potential failuie mode(s) associated with the
tunction(s)/requirement(s) Potential failuie modes should be
desciibed in technical teims, and not necessaiily as a symptom
noticeable by the customei
Each function may have multiple failure modes A large numbei
of failure modes identified for a single function may indicate that
the iequirement is not well defined.
The assumption is mad that the failuie could occur, but may not
necessaiily occur, conseuently the use of the woid "potential"

i
! Potential failure modes that could occur only under certain
: operating conditions (i.e., hot, cold, dry, dusty. etc) and under
j certain usage conditions (i e., above-average mileage, rough
terrain, city driving only, etc) should be considered

After determining all the failure modes, a validation of the

completeness of the analysis can be mad through a review of
past things-gone-wrong, concems, reports, and gioup
biainstorming
The potential failure mod may also be the cause of a potential
failuie mod in a higher Ievel subsystem 01 system, or lead to the
effect of one in a lower level component
Example failuie modes, as related to diffeient requiiements, aie
shown in table III .3

31
Chaptei III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Item Function Requirement Failure Mod

Disk Stop vehicle on
Stop vehicle travelmg Vehicle does not stop
Brake demand
system (consideiing on dry asphalt
pavement within Vehicle stops in excess of
enviionmental
specified distance specified distance
conditions such
as wet, dry, etc ) within specified g's of
force Stops vehicle with mor than xx
g's of force
Activates with no demand;
Allow unimpeded Vehicle movement is partially
vehicle movement on impeded
no system demand ActWates with no demand
Vehicle cannot move
Biake Allows tiansfer Must deliver specified
Rotoi of force from toiue lesistance at axle Insufficient torque lesistance
biake pads to delivered
axle
'.;' : - ' ''. . . ; '

Tabie ffl.3 Example Potentia! Failure Modes

32
Chapter III Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

This page intentionally left blank.

33
 # Sv-&err,
POTENTlAl
FAILUflf MOOE AND EFFECfS ANALYSIS FMEANumttc A 9
(DflOJ FMfAl
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Current pesKir* A c u o n ReHilta

ll e m Potential r'otu-i>;.' Polenlial Reconuiinde<l
RespoisiDitlly
RsHwemanl Failure Efecl(s) of Cause(s) of Acuon A c b o n s Tafcen
Controls Controls 'N STargel
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Modo Failure Failure PiertiiUOJi i--.''..i Com&WUo. D a l a CcrrletWii Dat
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 Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Potential Effect(s) of Failure (c)

Potential effects of failuie aie defined as the effects of the failure
mod on the fiinction, as peiceived by the customei(s).
Desciibe the effects of the failuie in teims of what the customei
might notice or expeiience, iemembering that the customei may
be an internal customei as well as the ultimate End User State
clearly if the failuie mod could impact safety or non-
compliance to regulations. The effects should always be stated in
teims of the specific system, subsystem, 01 component being
analyzed Remember that a hieiarchical relationship exists
between the component, subsystem, and system levels4 For
example, a pait could fiactuie, which may cause the assembly to
vibrate, resulting in an inteimittent system opeiation The
inteimittent system operation could cause peifoimance to
degiade and ultimately lead to customei dissatisfaction The
intent is to piedict the potential failure effects to the team's level
of knowledge

Typical failure effects should be stated in teims of product or

system peifoimance Table III 4 shows example effects of the
failure modes nom Table JII.3

Item Failure Mod Effect

Disk Biake Vehicle does not
Vehicle control impaired; Regulatory non-compliance
System stop
Vehicle stops in
excess of specified Vehicle controE impahed; Regulatory non-compliance
distance
Stops vehicle with
mor than xx g's of Regulatoiy non-compliance
foice

Activates with no
demand;
Decreased pad life; dirninished vehile control
Vehicle movement is
paitially impeded
Activates with no
demand Customer unable to drive vehicle
Vehicle cannot move
*&JK':.-:*;;'.- ; ; '-"''' ~.":''.-1 ; -.' '

Tab!e HL4 Esample Potential Effects

4
See also Appendix B

35
 .Syslem
POTENTIAL
FAILURE MOD AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMFA N t m l w r . A
_ Sgbyalom
(DESIGN FMEA)

B Design R e & p o r a b i l f y .C H
Model

Core ftam.
Yt&i{ePK>9tam{*)-
D KevQoW FMEADauiOrtg.).

Current Design *"onRi*i

Potenlial Polential Potenlial ResponstolliN
RecommendBd
-"I : . . . ' ,1 Failure E f f e c t ( s ) of Cause{s) of Controls Conlrols <-N Aclion A d l o n s Taken
&Taigel
Mod Failure Fai ute CompaUoo D a i e Coftpclioa Dale
FundkMi

MMilatflaiMQ*r -MwllyOafcli r. ,. I . , :
F u r t DOM L I ...... : i ' lilM-MMy A. I M e
.-i--;-::/. Gl nmli 4 K I .BBa elirofl. HqnraiKnis ( a u K n n l no.
IMUI dD3f pdIKU d i l t y IDU. aody Engiwei
,:-- o i of o w a .':_. ,'i i 1461) i * l * i d ^ j
T-ia rn tXK(CdU)Mil
ax<pal lot r r o W * pa^tiU BcHBSClfcB W 09 OJ ipaa i * c d I 2 i
DrtmootM M M GX09K
Iilcoow
Uikuaucicn TiSI w - l l i (ren
IneutfcUM wa Wi-J-
1 ..: . . " , . . i.'..
MB. I 0 1 I W K *
atiufciiytrai Body Enanaai
I \ K I ituougii p a w . .i . i i - . ;
(nficact h a l
r-na m
wetUne.
l n p a r d lurclHr E iBB) Wij 0X000) K00oqiD(c.
0 * 0 0 30
I,J i r i
BOTUMUI Body Engktoei .wisi** m
[COtOnta
. - - . . 0X10 IB
OH 1 0 1 5

MUh*y Ftnwiwa ..

formunooi> w ^ c m * : CI t'ii.'jl ..."

us-ieai
PW. ISES H I
- W . i-
0iiT4ix(vmL
i-iiB PI

c o n t r ouan < [-..; . I I .! 'S i'Y.nfc lont&il:

l * . i W i iav t u p allnai- o u O M i b n iKing Bofly EnglDM SMdMMWwn
IKOI iMcrmg a l fcjIinfilMIt) F"*J!il>n s c i a . Md *av O n i ,.:::. ;. ...:I.-J ,
W i v r r t IB)
' ".l-.i- icnor-li-oatol!
ttutabilytefl.
1-118 ff

SAMPLE i;i.ll.:.:
tKftrrcn paneli
_ [ '.-.i
?>4fiMfa>ec>
sam
etft*tiOn IMMQ
t f c * 9 n a a one*
W1315
*xui i*) W U 15
whkto
durabt* i *>H.
T-11B P)

a1 a2 b
i g rn -~n

-*V- -*.
Chapter 1H Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Severity (S) (d)

Severily is Ihe value associated with the most seiious effect fot a
given failuie mod Seveiity is a relatiye lanking within the
scope of the individual FMEA
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agiee on evaluation criteiia and a ranking
system and apply them consistently, even if modified for
individual piocess analysis (See Table Crl below for criteiia
guidelines)
\ lt is not recommended to modify criteria ranking values of 9 and
3 10- Faiiure modes with a rank of severity 1 should not be
a analyzed further

Criteria:
Effect Severlty of Effect on Product Rank
(Customer Effect)_

Failurc to Potential faiiure mod afiects safe vehicle opeiation and/oi ivolves 10
Meet Safety noncompliance with goveinment legulation without waining
and/oi
Regulatory Potential failuie mod affects safe vehicle opeiation and/oi involves 9
Requh ements noncompliance with govemment regulation with waming

Loss of piimary function (yehicle inopeiable, does not affect sale 8

Loss oi-
vehicle operation)
Dcgradation
(lt PMTliaiy
Degiadation of piimary function (vehicle opeiable, but at reduced 7
Function level of performance)

Loss of secondaiy function (vehicle opeiable, but comfort / 6

Loss o
convenience functions inoperable)
Degiadation
of Secondaiy
function Degradation of secondaiy function (vehicle opeiable, but comfoit / 5
convenience functions at reduced level of performance)

Appearance oi Audible Noise, vehicle opeiable, item does not 4

confoim and noticed by most customeis (> 75%)

Appeaiance or Audible Noise, vehicle opeiable, item does not 3

Annoyance
conform and noticed by many customeis (50%)

Appearance or Audible Noise, vehicle operable, item does not 2

conform and noticed by disciiminating customeis (< 25%)

No effect No disceraible effect 1

Table Crl Suggested DFMEA Severity Evaluation Criteria

37
 POTENTIAL
Sysiein FAILURE MOD AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FW6ANun*et_
(DESIGN FMEA1
n . Sobsyslejn Pago

___Cocnponent B Dragn Ropoob(y C PropareO Bv: H

MoOe Yesr(aVPro9fafii(8_ D FMGADatefOflg.;

I CofeTam

Currenl Design Al ' .' C.;-..<-.

c taiji. . . . r i n . l
Potential
Failure
Potential
Etfect(s) of
Potential
Cause(s) ot
R . ' . ' i . u 'I, -I
Aclion
Responsiblllly
ActonsTaken
Contrds Conlrols ?PN STatgel
Failure ' r - - . Hm 1. i jlt:_M, Liciy CcnpletHfl Date
FwfwWon

F M f [ t o > rlf l r.f .:. ' . ' i - . - Dcalji ..f .IT.' i i-i:.-i :.'i
:.! ir.-.r . , , :/. A. K M

I
t o m cmtrsa 'I ( I I . . W l i PuM<il>lHU
pana accmsolura MCcafcm tp*ita) - -" j i o i Wsi 14*1) u r t W fdo*
Cdi '- S.;;r--H- Q*C003 l^OC(BKad12S
mwb* ppaun W30
*n bodAg v>

I UnuKibcMiy

appcwanceoiiew

oic( Imc.
i:-- i ' VCM:K
HiKgQHvKal
7-118 (T)
' LJL". !..: Mac
BodvE
i:-, I.'
IU>. U81)*KW
:;

i
' i.lll li 1IS1.T OXH30
; :. J Sray.no
:,.- .I. Bod.' Engneer
nsLUi- i-
:-.
|DC!in*ftt
IhKtaMtt Ot tt 18
.1' V. >.
I ,.....' . ..
Melry
- lomuiihnii^.^h-1 UMyJnrO OemkaiLab
3 Ph>. (MS (5)

ou**rtivte*i
I-11B 17)

1TB leam T.l on ISH

PRAWI* w a w n p -iinfon- Bfcl*tn uang i . . .r-....... 3 o43U^vX vom
tmm roadaig al '. : t " KiMhKlwn spqn irniM proM^d ^
3 arcos dcpipmenl o/id adMMarNG
.dieto JX11 15 trNOC-^IMiod)
= OiueiiUvkai. 0X U i*
S T-11B pj

FI
x
SAMPLE u (tom
ib>diOnal

HM&M (
<aiualcn uam

iru *pw/ n u l
....:, ! ' . . . I - . . .

IWUIS
0X1"5
3 Wrete
o duabtlr l*a<
S 118 (7|

=
-
s a1 a2 b h 9 m n--

^-.
 Design Failuie Mod and Effecls Analysis

Classification (e)
This column may be used to highlight high-piiority failuie
modes and theii associated causes
As a result of this analysis, the team may use this infoimation to
identity special chaiacteiistics
; Customer specific requirements may identify special product or
process characteristic symbols and their usage
A characteristic designated in the design record as special
; without an associated design failure mod identified in the
DFM6A is an indication of a weakness in the design process

Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) of Failure

Mod (f)
This infoimation can be separated into multiple columns 01
combined into a single column
In the development of the FMEA, the identification of all
potential causes of the failuie mod is key to subsequent
analysis Although vaiied techniues (such as brainstoiming) can
be used to determine the potential cause(s) of the failuie mod, it
is recommended that the team should focus on an understanding
oitbs failure mechanizm for each failuie mod

Potentia! Mechanisrn(s) of Failure Mod (f1)

A failuie mechanism is the physical, chemical, electiical,
theimal, 01 other process that results in the failuie mod It is
impoiiant to make the distinction that a failuie mod is an
"obseived" or "extemar effect so as not to confuse failuie mod
with failuie mechanism, the actual physical phenomenon behind
the failure mod 01 the process of degradation 01 chain of events
leading to and resulting in a paiticular failuie mod

To the extent possible, list eveiy potential mechanism for each

failuie mod The mechanism should be listed as concisely and
completely as possible.
For a system, the failure mechanism is the process of enor
propagation following a component failure which leads to a
system failuie
A product or process can have several failure modes which are
: correlated to each other because of a common failure
l mechanism behind them
I Ensure that process effects are considered as part of the
. DFMEA process

39
Chapler III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Ndti

oo)a

_r. m a r c i e

'.;.;: -;-.:

i i
Z 3 II -Vi
in 5 liii lin
f-l
ii s s
<s5 Hi 1 3

!ii Ul
illlf ,1!
ucpa|>G

O LU
3
3 ii

MUJJIOTQ
33^
-

:- U uli!; lilii!: _c

O)
3 ^

ii
CJ

: 1
& s pis
IP ,'..! L;
fii
: - -

ii! CD

u;
'4
'" Hil o

LJ
COO O
lii Hi
_l
CL
CN
TO
i <;
LO
CTJ

I able III-I Sample DFMEA Form with Minlmal Inoimalion Kle ments & Esample Entries

40
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Potential Cause(s) of Failure Mod (f2)

Potential cause of failure is defined as an indication of how the
design process could al Iow the failuie to occur, described in
terms of something that can be corrected or can be contiolled
Potential cause of failure may be an indication of a design
weakness, the consequence of which is the failure mod

-
] Causes are the circumstances that induce or activate a failure
i mechanism

In identifying potential causes of failuie, use concise

desciiptions of the specific causes of failures, eg., specified bolt
plating allows for hydiogen embiittlement Ambiguous phtases
such as, pooi design or impropei design, should not be used
Investigation of causes needs to focus on the failure mod and
not on the effect(s) In deteimining the cause(s), the team should
assume the existence of Che cause under discussion will icsult in
the failuie mod (i e , the failure mod does not iequiie multiple
causes to occur)
Typically, there may be several causes each of which can result
in the failuie mod. This lesults in multiple lines (cause
bianches) for the failure mod
To the extent possible, list eveiy potential cause for each failure
mode/failuie mechanism The cause should be listed as concisely
and completely as possible Sepaiating the causes will icsult in a
focused analysis for each cause and may yield different
measuiement, contiols, and action plans
Table III 5 shows sample causes fbi the failure modes in Table
UJ 3 Although not reuiied as pait of the minimum FMEA foim
elements, the table includes the failure mechanism to show the
relationships among failuie mod, failuie mechanism, and cause
In piepaiing the DFMEA, assume that the design will be
manufactuied and assembled to the design intent Exceptions can
be mad at the teams discietion wheie histoiical data indicate
deficiencies in the manufacturing piocess

1
Chaptei III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Failuie Mod Mechanisra Cause

Mechaoical Unkage break due to inadequate corrosion

protection

No transfer ot lorce Master cylinder vacuum lock due lo seal design

Vehiciedoes not stop
from peda to pads
l oss of hydraulic fluid from loose hydraulic lin due to
incorrect connector torque specification
Loss of hydraulic fluid due to hydraulic lines
crimped/compressed, inappropriate tub mateiial specified
Mechanical linkage joints stiff due to inappropriate
lubrication specification
Reduced transfer of Mechanical linkage joints corroded due to inadequate
Vehicle siops io exces$ of corrosion protection
force from peda to
yyfeet pads
Partial loss of hydraulic fluid due to hydraulic lines
crimped, inappropiiate tub materia specified

ExcessiveAapid
Slops vehicle wilh mor Cumulative pressure build-up rn master cylinder due to
transfer of force from
than xx g's oi force seal design
ActWate with no demand; Corrosion or deposit build up on rails or pad eais due to
Vehic!e moveraent is Pads do not releasc surface frnish not promoting adequate self cleaning and
impeded corrosioa protection
Actfvate with no demand Hydraulic pressure
Master cylinder vacuum lock due to sea! design
Vebicle cannot raove does not idease
.;,V,-.:.;'. .-
. ,' mm& -:.--. W-''--

Table III.5 Example Potential Causes

42
Chaptei III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

This page intentionaly left blank.

4^

i
Chaptei III Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

\da

-&
M09J)ft0

A)ua.vj

.h li;
llll Ki! I im Si*
M*i
1
I 5
s

1
5 |
S 2 !i: ifi; li
-i
&

li
21
ie
O
MU?Wtl30
c
::.
IG

III n,g * :

!lft*3Z
CD
o UJ

1
II
c ?
o *;
O
i .liii 1
! _ o
ii i!
5 u:
HI
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-.:.-
-:

"U

P !! liii},!,
:lf
o

LU
CODO NI
'-i i

co
$JJ U")
co
5?
Table ULI Sample DFMEA Form with Min ima I nfor mation Elements & Example Entries

44
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Occurrence (O) (g)

Occunence is the likelihood ihat a specific cause/mechanism
will occur resulting in tbe failuie mod within the design life
The likelihood of occurrence ranking numbei has a ielative
raeaning iather than an absolute value (See Table Cr2).
A consistent occunence ranking system should be used to ensuie
continuity Ihe occuirence numbei is a ielative tanking within
the scope of the FMEA and may not ieflect the actual likelihood
of occunence
Suggested Eva!uation Critetia
The team should agiee on evaluation criteiia and a ranking
system and apply them consistently, even if modified foi
individual piocess analysis Occunence should be estimated
using a 1 to 10 scal using Table Cr2 as a guideline.
In deteimining this estimate, questions such as the following
should be consideied:
What is the seivice histoiy and field expeiience with similar
components, subsystems, 01 systems?
Is the item a canyover or similar to a pievious level item?
How significant aie changes fiom a pievious level item?
Is the item ladically dif feient fiom a previous level item?
Is the item completely new?
What is the application 01 what are the environmental
changes?
Has an engineenng analysis ( e g , ieliability) been used to
estimate the expected comparable occunence late for the
application?
Have preventive contr ols been put in place?

4.'
Chaptei m Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Criteria: O c c u r r e n c e
Likelihood Criteria: O c c u r r e n c e of C a u s e - DFMEA of C a u s e - DFMEA
Rank
of Failure ( D e s i g n life/reliability of i t e m / v e h i c l e ) (Incidents per
items/vehicles)

New tecbnology/new design with no hisiory 100 per thousand

Very High 10
1 in 10
Failure is inevitable with new design, new application, or 50 per thousand
change in duy cycle/operating condilions 9
1 in20
Failure is Ukcly with new design, new application, or 20 per thousand
High change in duty cycle/opetating conditions 8
' T. 50
Failure is uncenain wilh new design, new application, or 10 pet thousand
change in duy cycle/operaiing condilions 7
,..

1 in 100
Fieuent failurcs associated with sirnilai designs or in 2 pei thousand
design simulation and testing 6
1 in500
Occasional failuies associated with similai designs 01 in 5 pei thousand
Modetale design simulation and testing 5
1 in 2,000
Isolated failurcs associated with sirnilai design 01 in I per thousand
design simulation and testing 4
1 in 10,000
Only isolated failures associated with almost idenlical 01 per thousand
design or in design simulation and testing 3
I 1 in 100,000
Mo observed failurcs associated with almost identical 0 0 1 pet thousand
design oi in design simulation and testing 2
1 in 1,000,000
Failure is eliminated through preventive contro! Failure is eliminated
Veiy 1 ow through preventive 1
control.

Table Ci2 Suggested DFMEA Occurrence Evaluation Criteria

4
Chapter IIT Design Pailure Mod and Effects Analysis

This page intentionally left blank.

47
Chapter III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

i.
^L'.J.U-:: -

: .:. i;=c

Xi)jt\s5

LL iii. !!F
S
Ii !il
II:
I I I1 IS 3

if - f ^^ ffi
Mi
l5|B*l*J

iii
2 5 Se ^
3 C3
iii SJ: M
(O
3* :-
;,- i . i . . . .,:.

Hi CJ> ex
Z u
< Q
UJ
C II [fsii
_ O

iii:
ucfiesyiss&e^
M =-;
a>

Iii II1 ss!l li

U
i PIW o

H
LU
cnn a
U CL-
i CN
i s l lii ca
i iii I to
co

Table III-I Sample DFMEA Form with Minimai Iniormation Elements & Example Entiies

48
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Current Design Controls (h)

Cunent Design Controls aie those activities conducted as part of
tbe design process that have been completed 01 committed to and
that will assuie the design adeuacy for the design functional and
reliability leuirements under consideiation.
Theie aie two types of design controls to consider:
PreventioD:
Eliminate (prevent) the cause of the mechanism of failuie or the
failuie mod fiom occuning, oneduce its tat of occurrence.
Detection:
Identify (detect) the existence of a cause, the lesulting
mechanism of failuie or the failure mod, eithei by analytical or
physical methods, beibie the item is released foi pioduction.

: The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if

j possible The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
l prevention controls provided they are integrated as part of the
design intent

Detection contro! should include identification of those activities

which detect the failure mod as well as those that detect the
cause.
The team should consider analysis, testing, ieviews, and othei
activities that will assure the design adeuacy such as:
Prevention Controls
Benchmaiking studies
Pail-safe designs
Design and Mateiial standards (interna! and exteinal)
Documentation - records of best piactices, lessons Iearaed, etc
fiom similar designs
Simulation studies - analysis of concepts to establish design
reuirements
Eiioi-proofing
Detection controls
Design reviews
Prototype testing
VaIidation testing
Simulation studies - validation of design
Design of Expeiiments; including reliability testing
Mock-up using similai parts

49
 POTENTIAL
. SvsMm FAILURE MOD AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEANumbar A
iDtSKti FMEA1
_5..:'.v.;-.;i-r Paot- w

.Componsnl B Design RssponsiDMIf H

toOsi Y*ai(3yprogram(a)_ D Kv Ctai FMADato (Ora.! F
Coio Team

Currenl Design Atuen Rc&tus

Polenlial Polenlial Polenlial Rcspcislbilily
Re ;.:"*: undOli
->.'... r i .nit Failure Eect(s) of Cause(s) ol Conlrols Controls 'U Aclon Adlona Taken
STarget
Mecie Failure failirr r-iu-oi.... i i, mcior ".:: . l-li., i j-.il.i CompWkm Dale
i .,iL:iii

. . . . .. u - -'.,
".Weto
! '
reniDoof L > irBeyt* Offaii Cii .!..> I t i . . (Jppoi i i ; j e o) A I M
pllfCi::v; . ! ] St"flrjlca reulls (IM* ra>
k * t aoar p w e b Hm dli Hv Ust.
panel JWCMOIIIW 3|ipl:aU?r. W * < ' ' B * J ?1!8l-M T-llfl fff ..'< ni .a- [.;- i a i ) ufrtf s o j a
BoarpjrH 0X.(C3 tceciMwd12S
( c innef tfnoi p * M *
&P3Wt CX.U83U
d o c (13*19 101
UawtaiMicn tal naMt flfiH
p p c r a c o cbe tal fct A.iau
cknau ICMPCI CeOCT. f*> I4Bl)qftw
mei tnnkmii para Wirprtin*! i^KCftOli*!!**
T.iiB (r) . .-..jl....-
impaMd 'mtkn I. l , ' . . - i ;
oftftturwa
..: i .' j smytt*
Bud Engnpcr kWStoe m BCBOTiM
"-
'i:o:-i.niV.i. itBtrau&
ihr.incu OtfttMB KCfUCc
gxi02S

impproprttf* * ii:. ; ii I.;:..

mi R401
Ho 1165 |<)

. . i : ' . . . , .:!
i-ti t?>

comaiWuen
- F , I,
prd>mli w a t * * P
fuliBhirws
'! cvatoito.i j u n j 3jdC<mui\Bm
Iran i t o d b i g a* mtKciOn w KO pmkbd n
mciii Ensir rcaO (6) o j w a a i i ard a*o:ifti area
*|MI9fttl Si 0X1116
djalrtl.iKt IW 1214
I 118 <n

SAMPLE " " " ' i i i 1-1,1'

ti-un p * W f naLnlunnl
-|l"-ll'B1
e>u(iuioii irtig
Dodi noneof
5T0 A t C V i
EokWod ano**]

0X12 15
W 1115

(U-SrUy tm*.
1M1B |T)

a1 i2 g h rr, -II-

.^s
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Tbe example Design FMEA foim in this manua has rwo

columns for the design controls (i.e, separate columns foi
Prevention Contiols and Deteclion Controls) lo assist the team in
cleaily distinguishing between these two types of design
contiols. This allows fo-i a quick visual deteimination that both
types of design contiols have been considered
If a one-column (foi design contiols) foim is used, then the
following prefixes should be used For prevention contiols, place
a 'P' befoie each pieventon contiol listed Foi deteclion contiols,
place a 'D' befoie each deteclion contiol listed
Preventing the causes of the failuie mod through a design
change 01 design piocess change is the only way a reduction in
the occunence ianking can be effected
Table III 6 shows example pievention and detection contiols for
the causes identified in Table III.5.

Failure Cause Prevention Detection

Mod controls controls
Vehicle Mechanical linkage Designed per Enviionmental
does not bieak due to inadeuale mateiial standard stress test 03-9963
stop conosion piotection MS-845
Master cylinder vacuum Carry-ovei design Pressure vaiiabiiity
lock due to seal design with same duty testing - system
cycle leuiiements level
Loss of hydraulic fluid Designed per Vibiation step-
trom loose hydiaulic torue stiesstest 18-1950
Iine due to incoirect reuirements -
connectoi torue 3993
specification
Loss of hydiaulic fluid Designed pei Design of
due to hydiaulic lines materia standaid Expeiiments (DOE)
ciimped/compressed, MS-1178 -tubeiesiliency
inappropriate tub
materia specified
,-,:..' ^mm'-y' ../:

Table III.6 Esamples ol Prevention and Detection Design Controls

5;
 POTENTIAL
FUEANuii-ci A n
FAlLURE M O D A N D EFFECIS ANALYSIS
(DESIGN FMEA1
iir
_Cwnpontnl B Ocagn RespoiistiUty. Patc&Ktl Bv- H
Model Yar(*VPm8ram(s)_ D KayDale !-Mi-.\D.-.:" ; t . > n j : .
,
G
C ufren! Design ",-i:.n
Potential Potenlial Polenlial ResponsibiSy
RecominiHiCed
Re^uKemmi Failure Effec(s) of C a u s e ( s ) of Acions Taken
Conlrds Contrds \rt
.'..' ii.
&Targ
VC,:H rnilu'G (-nil ; r n '-'..".-I
JI.UH
Pteywton Comptuliw DaW C o i r p t e C m (Jai

:r, Baicdwlml
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Detection (D) (i)

Detection is the iank associated with the best detection conttol
listed in the Cuiient Design Con&ol Detection column When
mor than one control is identified, it is recommended that the
detection ranking of each control be included as pait of the
description of the control Record the lowest ianking value in the
Detection column
A suggested appioach to Cuirent Design Control Detection is to
assume the failure has occuned and then assess the capabilities
of the cunent design contr ols to detect this failure mod
Do not automatically presume that the detection ranking is Iow
because the occuiience is Iow It is impoitant to assess the
capability of the design contiols to detect Iow fieuency failure
modes 01 reduce the risk of them going futther in the design
releaseprocess
Detection is a relative ianking within the scope of the individual
FMEA In order to achieve a lower ranking, geneially the design
control (analysis or verification activities) has to be improved

Suggested Evaluaticn Criteria

The team should agiee on evaluation criteria and a ranking
system and apply them consistently, even tf modified lor
individual piocess analysis. Detection should be estimated using
Table Cr 3 as a guideline

The ranking value of one (1) is reserved for failure prevention

: through proven design solutions

53
Chaptei III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Opportunity Ltkeiihood
Criteria:
for m Rank -.of ..;,

Detection Likefihood of Detection by Design Control Detection

'.I J.iiwii.i!'.
No detection , Alm ust
No cuirenl design control; Cannot detect ot is not analyzed 10
opportunity

Not likely to Design anaiysis/detection contiols have a weak detection : Very,.'

detect at any capabilily; Virtual Analysis (e g , CAE, FEA, etc ) is not
stage cprrclau-d ;o expeeted aciual operating conditions Rumu te

Product verification/validation aftei design freeze and prioi to

launch with pass/fail testing (Subsystem or system testing with Ws&M.
acceptance criteria such as nde and handling, shipping ;
evaluaiion, etc)

Post Design
Freeze and Pioduct veiification/validation after design fieeze and prior to
prior to launch launch with test to falure testing (Subsystem ex system testing
until failure oceurs, testing of system inteiactions. etc)

Pioduct vetification/validaIion after design fieeze and prior to

launch with riegradation testing (Subsystem or system testing
after durability test. e g , function check)

Product validation (ieliability testing, development or

validation tests) prior to design freeze using pass/fali testing
(e g , acceptance ctiteiia for performance, function checks,
etc)

Prioi to Design Product validation (reliability testing, dcvclopment ot Moderatply-

Fjeeze validation tests) prioi to design freeze using test to failure
(e g , until leaks, yields, cracks. etc )

Product validation (reliability tesling, development or

validation tests) prior to design freeze using degradation
testing (e g , data trends, before/aftet values, etc)

Design anaiysis/detection contiols have a stiong detection

Viitual
capability Virtual analysis (e g , CAE, FEA, etc ) is hihlv
Analysis -
corretated with actual 01 expected operating conditions prioi
Correlaled
to design fieeze

Detection not
Failure cause ot failure mod can not occui because it is fully ;
- Almost
applicable;
prevented through design solutions (c g , prowen design
Failuie standard, best praclice or common materia, etc) Cci
Prevention

Table C t 3 Suggested DFMEA/PFMEA Prevention/Detection Evaluation Criteria

v-
 Chaptei III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

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55
Chaptei IU Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

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56
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Determining Action Priorities

Once the team has completed the initial identification of failuie
modes and effects, causes and controls, including lankings foi
sevexity, occuiience, and detection, they must decide if fuithei
efforts are needed to ieduce the risk Due to the inherent
limitations on tesouices, time, technology, and other factots,
they must choose how to best piioritize these eflbrts
The initial focus ofthe team should be oiiented towards failuie
modes with the highest seveiity iankings When the sevetity is 9
01 10, it is impeiative that the team must ensuie that the risk is
addiessed thiough existing design contiols or recommended
actions (as documented in the FMEA).
For failure modes with severities 8 or below the team should
considei causes having highest occuiience oi detection iankings
It is the team*s lesponsibility to look at ihe infoimation
identified, decide upon an approach, and deteimine how to best
piioritize the risk reduction effoits that best serve theii
organization and customeis

Risk Evaluation;
Risk Priority Number {RPN) Q)
One appioach to assist in action prioiitization has been to use the
Risk Piioiity Numbei:
RPN - Sevetity (S) x Occuiience (O) x Detection (D)
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value can rang
between 1 and 1000
The use oj an RPN rhreshold te NOT a recommended ptactice
fot determining the needfor actwm
Applying thiesholds assumes that RPNs are a measuie of ielative
risk (which they often are not) and that continuous improvement
is not iequired (which it is)
Foi examp!e, if the customei applied an arbitrary thieshold of
100 to the following, the suppliei would be reuiied to take
action on the chaiactestic B with the RPN of 112.

Item Severity Occuiience Detection RPN

A 9 2 5 90
B 7 4 4 l:2

57
 POTENTIA
FAILURE MOD ANO EfFECTS ANALYSlS A
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In this exaraple, the RPN is higher foi chaiacteristic B, but the

priority should be to woik on A with the highei severity of 9,
although the RPN is 90 which is lower and below the thieshold.
Another concern with using the threshold approach is that theie
is no specific RPN value that reauiies mandatory action.
Unfoitunately, establishing such thiesholds may promote the
wiong behavior causing team membeis to spend time trying to
justify a lowei occurtence ot detection ranking value to ieduce
RPN This type of behavioi avoids addressing the teal problem
that underlies the cause of the failure mod and merely keeps the
RPN below the thieshold It is impoitant to recognize that while
determining "acceptable" risk at a particulai program milestone
( e g , vehicle launch) is desiiable, it should be based on an
analysis of severity, occunence and detection and not thiough
the application of RPN thresholds

: Use of the RPN index in the discussions of the team can be a

i useful tool The limitations of the use of RPN need to be
understood However, the use of RPN thresholds to detetmine
l action priority is not recommended

Recomrnended Action(s) (k)

In genera, prevention actions (i e , reducing the occunence) are
preferable to detection actions An example of this is the use of
proven design standard or best practice rather than product
verification/vaIidation after design fieeze
The intent of recommended actions is to improve the design
fdentifying these actions should consider reducing rankings in
the following order: severity, occunence, and detection
Example approaches to ieduce these are explained below:
To Re duce Severity (S) Ranking; Only a design ievision can
bring about a leduction in the seveiity lanking

\ High severity rankings can sometimes be reduced by making

| design revisions that compensate or mitigate the resultant
severity of failure For example: The requirement for a tire is to
i "retain applied air pressure under use" The severity of the effect
- of the failure mod "rapid loss of air pressure" would be lower for
.- a "run fiat" tire

\ A design change, in and of itself, does not imply that the severity
I will be reduced Any design change should be reviewed by the
l team to determine the effect to the product functionality and
j process

59
Chaptei III Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

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60
 Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Foi maximum effectiveness and efficiency of this appioach,

changes to the pioduct and piocess design should be
implemented early in the development piocess Foi example,
altemate materials may need to be consideied eaily in the
development cycle to eliminate conosion seveiity.
To Reduce Occurrence (O) Ranking: A reduction in the
occunence ianking can be effecied by removing 01 controlling
one oi mor of the causes 01 mechanisms of the failure mod
through a design ievision Actions such as, but not limited to,
the following should be consideied:
o Enot proof the design to eliminate the faihue mod
o Revised design geometry and toleiances
o Revised design to lowei the stiesses ot replace weak
(high failure piobability) components
o Add redundancy
o Revised mateiial specifkation
To Reduce Deteetion (D) Ranking: The piefened method is
the use of eiroi/mistake prooflng An increase in design
validation/venfication actions should result in a leduction of
the deteetion ianking only In some cases, a design change to a
specific pait may be iequired to increase the likelihood of
deteetion (i e , reduce the deteetion ianking) Additionally, the
following should be consideied:
o Design of Experiments (particularly when multiple
oi interactive causes of a failuie mod aie piesent)
o Revised test plan
If the assessment leads to no recommended actions foi a specific
failure mode/cause/contiol combination, indicate this by enteiing
"Non" in this column. It may be useful to also include a
rationale if "Non" is enteied, especially in case of high severity
For design actions consider using the following:
Results of design DOE oi reliability testing
Design analysis (ieliabilify, structural oi physics of failuie)
that would confum that the solution is effective and does not
introduce new potential faihue modes
Diawing, schematics, ot model to confirm physical change of
taigetedfeature
Results fi om a design review
Changes to a given Engineering Standard or Design Guidelines
Reliability analysis lesults

61
Chaptet III Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

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62
 Design Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Table III .7 below provides an example of the application of

causes (Column f), controls (Column h) and recommended
actions (Column k)

Rssponsibility & Target Completion Dat (I)

Entei the name of the individual and organization responsible for
completing each lecommended action including the taiget
completion dat The deslgn-responsible engineei/team leader is
responsible for ensuiing that all actions iecommended have been
implemented or adequately addiessed

Action Results (m-n)

Ihis section identifies the results of any completed actions and
their effect on S, O, D rankings and RPN

Action(s) Taken and Completion Dat (m)

After the action has been implemented, entei a bfief description
of the action taken and actual completion dale

Severity, Occurrence, Detection and RPN (n)

Aftei die preventivev'conective action has been completed,
determine and lecord the resulting seveiity, occuirence, and
detection rankings
Calculate and record the resulting action (lisk) priority indicatoi
( e g , RPN)
All ievised rankings should be reviewed. Actions alone do not
guaiantee that the problem was solved ( i e , cause addtessed),
thus an appropriate analysis or test should be completed as
verification If finthei action is considered necessary, repeat the
analysis The focus should always be on continuous
impiovement

63
 Design Failure Mod and Efiects Analysis

Item Failure Cause Preventfon Detection Recommended

Mod Controls Controls Actions
Disk Vebictc Mechamcal linkage Designed pet Environraental stress Change materia to
Brakc doesnot break, due lo materia test 03-9963 stainless steel
system stop inadequate coirosion standaid MS-
proteclion 845
Maslet cylinder Carry-over Pressure variability Use carry-over aeal
vacuum lock due to design with testing - system leve! design
seal design same dury cycle
reuiieraents.
Lossof hydraulic Designed per Vibiation step-stiess Modtfy connector
fluid from loose loiue test 18-1950 &om bolt-style to
hydiaulic lin due to leuirements - quick-connect
incoirect coiwectoi 3993
rorue specificalioo
Loss of hydiaulic Designed per DOE-tube Modify hose
fluid due to hydraulic materia resiliency design &om MS-
lines standaid MS- 1178 to MS-2025
ci imped;corapiessed, 1178 toincreasestiength
inappropriate tub
materia! specified :
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labie 111-7 Esamples oi Causes, Conttols and Recommended Actions

Maintaining DFMEAs
The DFMEA is a lLving document and should be reviewed
whenevei there is a pioduct design change and updated. as
iequiied. Recommended actions updates should be included into
a subseuent DF MEA along with the fina lesults (what wotked
and what did not wotk)
Anothei element of on-going maintenance of DFMEAs should
include a peiiodic ieview of the rankings used in the DFMEA
Specific focus should be given to Occunence and Detection
rankings This is paiticularly impoitant where impiovements
have been mad eithet thiough pioduct changes oi impiovements
in design controls Additionally, in cases wheie field issues have
occmred, the lankings should be ievised accordingly

M
Chaptei III Design Failute Mod and Effects Analysis

Leveraging DFMEAs
If a new pioject or application is functionally similai to the
existing product, a single DFMEA may be used with customer
concurrence Using a fundamentally sound baseline DFMEA as
the staiting point piovides the gieatest opportunity to leverage
past expeiience and knowledge If there are slight differences,
the team should identify and focus on the effects of these
differences

Linkages
The DFMEA is not a "stand-alone" document. Foi example, the
output of the DFMEA can be used as input foi subsequent
product development processes It is the summaiy of the team's
discussions and analysis Figur III 7 shows the linkages of
some of the commonly used documents

Boundary (Biock) Diagram,

P - Diagram, etc.

DFMEA

Design Verification
Plan& Report (DVP&R),
PRv1EA:etc.

Figur I H 7 DFMEA Information Inteirelationships Flow

65
Chapter Iii Design Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Design Verification Plan & Report (DVP&R)

DFMEA and DVP&R have an impoitant Iinkage The DFMEA
identifies and documents the cunent design prevention and
detection contiols which become input to the test desciiption
included within the DVP&R The DFMEA identifies "what" the
contiols are while the DVP&R provides the "how" such as
acceptance ciitetia, proceduie and sample size

PFMEA
Anothei impoitant Iinkage is between the DFMEA and PFMEA
For example, a Piocess (PFMEA) failuie mod oi a Design
(DFMEA) failuie mod can iesult in the same potential pioduct
effect In this case, the effects of the design failuie mod should
be ieflected in the effects and seveiity rankings of the DFMEA
and PFMEA.

66
 Chaptet IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effccts Analysis

)
PFMEA
Process Faiiure Mod and Effects Analysis

67
 n->

Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

The piocess FMEA, leferred to as PFMEA, supports

manufactuiing piocess development in reducing the risk of
failures by:
Identifying and evaluating the piocess functions and
reuiiemems,
Identifying and evaluating potential pioduct and piocess-
related failure modes, and the effects of the potential failures
on the piocess and customeis,
Identifying the potential manufactuiing oi assembly process
causes,
Identifying piocess variables on which to focus process
contiols for occunence reduction or incieased detection of the
failuie conditions, and
Enabling the establishment of a piioiity system foi
pteventive/conective action and controls
The PFMEA is a living document and should:
Be initiated before ot at the feasibility stage,
Be initiated piior to tooling for production,
Take into account all manufactuiing opeiations fiom
individual components to assemblies, and
Include all piocesses within the plant that can impact the
manufactuiing and assembly opeiations, such as shipping,
receiving, transporting of materia, storage, conveyors or
labeling
Eaily review and analysis of new oi ievised piocesses is advised
to anticipate, resolve, or monitoi potential process concerns
duiing the manufactuiing planning stages of a new model ot
component ptogram
The PFMEA assumes the product as designed will meet the
design intent Potential failuie modes that can occur because of a
design weakness may be included in a PFMEA Theii effect and
avoidance is covered by the Design FMEA
The PFMEA does not rely on pioduct design changes to
overcome limitations in the process Howevei, it does take into
consideiation a pioducfs design chaiacteiistics relative to the
planned manufacturing oi assembly process to assure that, to the
extent possible, the resultant pioduct meets customer needs and
expectations. Foi example, the PFMEA development generally
assumes that the machines and euipment will meet their design
intent and therefoie aie excluded frorn the scope Control
mechanisms for incorning paits and mateiials may need to be
considered based on histoiical data

68
Chaptei r v Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Customer Defined
The definition of "Customer" for a PFMEA should normally be
the "End User" However, the customer can aiso be a subseuent
oi downstream raanufacturing oi assembly opeiation, a seivice
opeiation, oi regulator5
Team Approach
The Pf MEA is developed and maintained by a mulri-disciplinaiy
(or cross-functional) team typically led by tire responsible
engineer During the initial development of the PFMEA, the
lesponsible engineei/team leadei is expected to directly and
actively involve repiesentatives from all affected aieas These
aieas should include but are not limited to design, assembly,
manufactuiing, materials, quality, service, and supplieis, as well
as the aiea responsible for the next assembly The PFMEA
should be a catayst to stimulate the inteichange of ideas between
the aieas affected and thus promote a team approach

Design Considerations
The team should assume the pioduct as designed will meet the
design intent
During the development of a PFMEA, the team may identify
design oppoitunities which, if implemented, would either
eliminate or reduce the occurrence of a piocess failuie mod For
example, adding a feature to a part and a matching featute to a
fixtuie will eliminate the possibility of an operator placing a part
in the wtong orientation Such infoimation must be piovided to
the responsible design engineer as well as the tooling /
equipment / fixture design-iesponsible individual for
consideration and possible implementation

See discussion in Chapter IT, Customer Defined

69
 Chapter IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Development of a Process FMEA

The process-iesponsibie engineer/team leader has at his or her
disposal a number of documents that will be useful in pieparing
the Pf MEA. The PFMEA begins by developing a list of what the
process is expected to do and what it is expected not to do, i.e.,
thepiocess intent
The PFMEA should begin with a flow chait of the genera
process This flow chart should identify the pioduct/process
chaiacteristics associated with each opeiation Identification of
product effects ftom the corresponding DFMEA should be
included Copies of the flow chart used in the PFMEA
prepaiation should accompany it
In ordei to facilitate documentation of the analysis of potential
failures and theii conseuences, example PFMEA forms have
been developed and aie piovided in Appendix A The minimum
infoimation content ieuired foi a PFMEA is discussed below
(AlsoseeTablelYl)
Prerequisites
A PFMEA should begin with the development of infoimation to
understand the manufactuiing and assembly opeiations being
analyzed and define theii reuiiements.
The process flow diagiam is a piimaiy input to the PFMEA The
flow diagiam is used as a tool to help establish the scope of
analysis duiing manufactuiing system design

Process Flow Diagram and linkage to PFMEA

A process flow diagiam6 describes the flow of the pioduct
through the process - fiom incoming to outgoing This should
include each stp in a manufactuiing or assembly piocess as well
as theii related outputs (pioduct chaiacteristics, teuirements,
deliveiables, etc) and inputs (process characteiistics, souices of
vaiiation, etc) The detail of the process flow depends on the
stage of piocess development discussion Ihe initial flow
diagiam is generally considered a high level piocess map It
needs mor detailed analysis to identify the potential failure
modes.

6
The Process Flow Diagram is also refeired to as a Process Flow Chart

70
Chapter IV Piocess Failwe Mod and Effects Analysis

High Level Process Map

B-B-S-0
Detailed Process Flow Diagram

Figur IV 1 High Level to Detailed Process Maps

The PFMEA should be consistent with the information in the

process flow diagram The scope of the piocess flow diagram
should include all manufactuiing operations ftom processing of
individual components to assemblies including shipping,
ieceiving, transportation of materia, stoiage, conveyois,
labeling, etc A pieliminary tisk assessmenl using the process
flow diagram may be peifbimed to identify which of these
operations or individual steps can have an impact on the pioduct
manufactuiing and assembly and should be included in the
PFMEA

The PFMEA development continues by identifying the

iequiiement(s) for each process/function Requiiements aie the
outputs of each operation/step and relate to the reuirements for
the producl The Requirements provide a desciiption of what
should be achieved at each operation/step The Reuirements
provide the team with a basis to identify potential failure modes

In order lo assure continuity, it is highly recommended that the

same cioss-functional team develop the Process Flow Diagiam,
PFMEA, and Contiol Plan
See Figur IV 2 foi an example process flow diagram

71
Chaptei IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effecls Analysis

Deprtment: _ xxxxxxxxxxx Page of

Dat:. 09/24/08
Belt Drive C o m
Prod/Svc* Pon6'nt ID N u m b e r xxxxxxxxxx

Sources of Variation Process Flow

(Experience-based)

Spillage, rough handiing

Materia Hardness, Structure,

and Dirnensions
Coolant Contaminalion and
Pressure
Tool setup by preset
Maintenance
Tool (insert) consistency

Lack of maintenance

Materia consistency
Tool (insert) consistency
Improper setup
Poof chip remova (ie Iow
coolant pressure

Improper setup
Toollng consistency
Cootant flow
Dress/compensation
consistency & accuracy

Dirty/oily parts
Poor gage maintenance

Consistency of maintenance

Operation f \ 100% St V7 Delay f\ Operator

orActivityV^lnspection| | ~ V ' U (Fulltime)
Operatior^Activity with Inspection
: * ' '
Transportation ^. (PartTime)^)
I985-I9W ilu ilrind nistiwilcw. Iw

Figuie IV.2 Example Process Flow Diagram

72
 Chapter IV Process Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

)
Other Tools and Information Sources
Othei sources of infoimation that aie useful in pioviding the
team with ways to focus and captuie discussions on the
ieuirements of the piocess include:
DFMEA
Diawings and design recoids
Bill of Process
Inteiielationship (Characteiistic) matiix
Intemal and extemal (customer) nonconfoimances (i e , known
failute modes based on histoiical data)
Quality and Reliability Histoty

Research Information
Aftei establishing the scope of the analysis effoit, the team
should begin by ieviewing histoiical information. The areas to
ievie\v should include:
Lessons that have been learned from pievious product and
| piocess design implementation, and
Any information available that establishes best piactices
including items such as guidelines and standards, standard pait
identification, or enor-pioofiiig methods
Quality peifoimance infoimation available from similar,
pievious product and process designs, including items such as:
process yield7, first time capability (both end of lin and at each
opeiation), Paits pei Million (PPM), piocess capability indices
(Cpi; and PPk), and wananty metiics
The infoimation can be useful input for deteimination of
seveiity, occunence and detection rankings
After consideiing these pieiequisites, siait filling out the form
f Table IV 1 below)

7
Fiist Time Qualiry (f TQ); First Time Ihiough (FTT)

73
 POTENTIAL
A
FAILURE MOD AND EFFECTS ANALYS1S
(PROCESS FMEA)
FMEANwtm

Piae_ of
-I
B C h
Het,,. PflJCBS ft5p0fl!*IW Pretora) Bv:

F
3
Wodd Vat(&JiPfOflfany*. 3 KwDate FMEAOswiOiio.i

" i _ G
Prcwas C u r r e n l Process V;'M-.
Potential Poteniial Polential RB8poisibilIiv
RfrcotnmeiKled
Roinnii*^nl
Failure E f f e c t l s i of Cause(s) of Aclions Taken
Controis Conlrols "'/' i
& Targ i
Mod Failure Failure Pwvnl">n V i . ' .,1 Comj^boo Data
"indlori

k-eitttacrii w c I,::.. A i k l po-Jl.ic

Mttij C 0 V O K M OW * f * a v n&a ud l-0X01S
haOitO UntrtaJbr

UiKtrecs
Ccmx)B4 ***<
.... ' i i . , n
com;tr-MW<il
^icitmolEd Kart
* T * I * V COOre *i
dra fcottag K>
tnowinn ''i

scecowice Ou* i"|

ScfailwM T a n ip*av ai AiUctoi dwoi '.... 1. I I n u jjn G 9 tit^uwnig a t tfl Pli
tkocttae. UctJM -ts--unan3 lar tiir> i t a t n & t UfnUHSfS
' lr"(}Klrt luhJai ^ t w M * perto* 0 X ' 0 01
ul winili c i V t > w 4 t t l e o nigh autt pievrrfai).<t
1'trnai c h e t iiteooiv>s tnKM'*ilia.a
notnra l iW i t k U l r U M j -
kM CORltd i > r - m
W * gumst BII
3?
conkM Cpk-i *S
8
;'.

aokiroaa ODA I O
preflranjw
V ) al dvMK

ki(ovaAfo.

OpBSIor -.
llMIll* M.ii I i , i . . n : o A...-.",, .,(...
;,.. cl ifcr*. K a U t o D -
cifoloi a m i Ci
101 t a n i p i n g *piay.tunar
:veut*i w ::,. |> - i : . i i (
'.-
SAM PLE 1 1 . 1 ; , . : , s M w p C T I* id
artrol-Cffc-3.06

a1 a2 b h 9 m
-:

n " . ^ " i ^ ^ , -
Chapter IV Piocess Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Example PFMEA Form

The foim used in the examples in this refeience manua is a
guide to document the team*s discussions and analysis ot the
PFMEA elements It contains the minimum content that is
noimally expected by the OEMs
Column oider can be modified and columns can be added to this
foim depending on the oiganization and customer needs and
expectations. In any case, any form submitted must be
acceptable to the customci.

Headerof the Process FMEA Form (fields A-H)

The following desciibes the infoimation to be entered on the
foim
The PFMEA headei should cleaily identify the focus of the
PFMEA as well as infoimation telated to the document
development and contiol process This should inelude an FMEA
number, identification of the scope, design iesponsibility,
completion dates, etc The headei should contain the following
elements8:

FMEA Number (A)

Entei an alphanumeiic stiing which is used to identify the
PFMEA document This is used foi document control

Itern (B)
Entei the name and number of the system, subsystem 01
component for which the piocess is being analyzed.

Process Responsibility (C)

Entei the OEM, oiganization, and depaitment 01 gioup who is
piocess design lesponsible Also entei the supply oiganization
name, if applicabte

Model Year(s)/Program(s) (D)

Entei the intended model year(s) and progiam(s) that will use 01
be atfected by the process being analyzed (if known)

The letters at the end oi each heading indicate the aiea refeired to on the sample foim

75
 -1 POTENTIAL
FAILURE MOOt ANO EFFECTS ANALYSIS FUEANdltier-
(PROCESS FMEA1

lm. C (repai^d Bv:. H

Mmet YssilsyPiograinis). D KevDale fU6ADale(Owj.!-

Co-e Teatr G
Currenl Procsss ACIO- Nasilili
Polential Potentlal Potential
ReGonwifinded
Rwtwieniistl Feiluro Effectfs) of Cause(s) ot Acbons Taken
Conlrols Contrds pr-\
r
Mod vli:Ll-f: Failure Pfevwttto<i
FuftCWill CompkUofiDale ConipleKiA Oate

Cb'0: Cowtf In nor *U". Mig B t f n i a t n g Stp acual, a

".(.'.H W I J <:'. v nm I W A M I Uy CX 10 1S
Minwnia . , - . , . . - II--.. merterflu'
AHTMIH
Co*rod wlaior
KMW Docr pum
"Hi Eiflif iMiUifl
DV0X 12 IS
GiiW*?:: IIOD

UoiWUiit*<v

a cnertmt.
in>paid wonni,
., .... : .- IBSJ>SV
ilart-MG * - d
Ot* Mo w*lf
i y fint otosiow
.,:
*H*n1ainiii; W
1>uf> oiut P r o s
i- - : : i . "

ot itieitoi 0oo> UHI rtrtt w i t

IW
ws.* ant
I * COCflfllt
C o * ni don*
K d . ..-r<.i.i: c
h'cw Burwi i In 3
CglHjl C i " " i t
OMlUIBKU
; - - lic a Pr*nirt*iM*
dfvttwl * * miiilan*"<e lutim.aicmM
umili jV0Qra*t ID
VnHti CMClt

i S AMPLE
Blll*WI KtfUrtlKO

0.-*&i3*oi
I.. . , i ;
In-JatSpf*,
iw*'.
'...;.- : ' i i ,|:i.'v

*.|H*raciMm
ipiay. titni
^UrtHek iniit-oi:
'HiUCOiJif
r-

owa - C&-? OS
m

i
S1
-Jypr?gp-Cvrf
' : . " . , ...U...

al a2 b a 9 h m

.r^-.
 Chaptei IV Process Fjriluie Mod and Effects Analysis

Key Dat (E)

Enter the initial PFMEA due dat, which should not exceed the
scheduled start of production dat In case of a supply
oiganization, this dat should not exceed the customer reuiied
Production Pait Approval Process (PPAP) submission dat

FMEA Dat (Original) (F)

Entei the dat the original PFMEA was completed and the (atest
revision dat

Core Team (G)

Enter the team members responsible for developing the PFMEA
Contact information ( e g , name, organization, telephone
number, and email) may be included in a referenced
supplemental document

Prepared By (H)
Enter the name and contact information inciuding the
organization (company) of the engineei/team leader responsible
for pieparing the PFMEA

Body of the PFMEA Form (fields a n)

Ihe body of the PFMEA contains the analysis of risks related to
the potential failures and impiovement action being taken 9

Process Step / Process Function /

Requirements (a)
Process Step/Function can be sepaiated rnio two (or mor)
columns or combined rnto a single, biidged column which
encompasses these elements Piocess Steps may be listed in the
Piocess Step/Function column ot additional column(s) may be
added containing the functions 01 iequiiements of that piocess
step "Process Step", "Function", and "Requirements" are
desciibedbelow:

9
The letters al ihe end of each heading indicate the area releiied to on the sample fbim
 POTENTtAl
f A1LURE MOC* AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS fttefl N jnfter.

SI IPROCESS FMEA1

Horn:, B. Ptwtm Resitoratilliy H

Key D a l e
MoflH Ye(syPiogram(sL
D F|.1EAD3iOrtg._

3
Crmnl I''<:;::;;,;; AtfOnResuUs
"a Polenllal Potenlial Potential Respon&fcility
Re*iin>ende<l
T Rqncmenl Failure Effect(s) of Cause(s) ot Acttons TaKen
Conlrols Conlrols . 'N
& Targei
Failure Failure
g Ul .1l--
Pre*Mlon ,vl,.:l.:.
C a r J r l i c o Dale CompleUon D a l e

.L.7. & l i f t e m - a . .'... . : . i i ' - ; i . i-.. .. i i .-. i

uwiai Dat: turistrs EtMdt Dl m e r *pinstae<o
cpposoncJ l i t Mit u> f w i e i t tai
fcnltiKUue kfraicr chcOicd
i c >>

3 u-i---, '.-.i:. .':.

5
uniptt>4i0i
EtetEiwrWoB i Insi

I
tttttewdoorcuii
iloof h w * * 9 l a
-UjBjlcijraoY

ruit UwCjjh p j r t S U &V l i i i ! Teilmar*

- . '.-.

DO C~Ui linii. t t W K j iiifl IM

^ Incnitrd lurrwin IDOElon 0XV)01 <h4miK4ind
t * L't'H*iH n a - immilut "o I m cunuit l * v a
- '( Dan n&aioa-
P^sujie Ko O - pro^am to CeMtci O n t t
o * I I I r^jos i i psi * n
MttlOl C f * l - 5 J

I SpJBV llMUf

......
iw**anl<Ml)
- 1
"( y.
w
-Tl

I
I
Ra SAM
Spr^y U- i
I m i r u ; IWra

U4iamt*rg

YWtgSOI
;<-. i . ' . I ..i '.-, HtManMa AUantflcipw

. . . . . li--. .
c u f t t f t OM-ofl
tttirtul clmna
U N W p c w a a ID
(onite - CpW.OS
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ao

I
rr

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7

E
a1 a2 h ni - ^ ' ~
 Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

ProcessStep (a1)
Entet the identiiicalion of the piocess step ot opetation being
analyzed, based on the numbering piocess and teiminology Foi
example, entei the numbei and identifier (eg., name) Piocess
numbei ing scheme, seuencing, and teiminology used should be
consistent with those used in the process flow diagiam to ensure
tiaceability and lelationships to othei documents (Control Plans,
operator instiuctions, etc) Repaii and iewotk opeiations should
also be included.

Process Function (a1)

List the piocess function that coiresponds to each piocess step 01
opeiation being analyzed. The piocess function desciibes the
puipose ot intent of the opeiation A lisk analysis is
recommended in oidei to limit the numbei of steps to be
included to only those that add value 01 othei wise aie seen as
likely to have a negative impact on the pioduct If theie aie
multiple process functions being analyzed with iespect to a given
opeiation, each should be aligned on the foim with its iespective
"Requiiements" to aid in the development of the associated
failuie modes

Process Function becomes a2 if Process Step and Process

Function are split

Requirements (a2)
List the ieuiiements foi each piocess function of the piocess
step ot operation being analyzed Reuiiements aie the inputs to
the process specified to meet design intent and othei customei
iequirements If theie aie multiple ieuiiements with iespect to a
given ninction, each should be aligned on the foim with the
respective associated failuie modes in oidei to facilitate the
analysis

Requirements become a3 if Process Step and Process Function

are split into separate columns, e g , a1 and a2

79
 poreNriAL
FAILURE MOD AND Eff ECTS ANALYSIS FW-AhuniMf. o
(PROCESS FMEA)

H r
Iient. B Piocess ResoorwJitl^
PrepsrW Bv;

Model Y#siiWtaQiom{s) D Ke.Dae FMEA Dato (Ortfl.j.

Cuncnl Proccss Acfton ResuiC?

Potential Potential Potentlal ;,.,,-, : m : < rot. -i
Resposibiltly

jur^meu Failure Effecl(s) of Cause(s) ot Controls Aclion Acbons Taken

Conlrols \u-a STargel
Moce Failure Fallute Descttc Conipleton Date Contpleton Dale
FutKUon

WCflrlty A - M <yi>l><*
CV 7 1
Mdittut aersulKM nwa-ojBow Mcoch Ol IlWf itaayhesa not
utfst* d n a
;-> b > Q X 1 0 IS
SUpSOWtA

pitej w c * sera.*

1'uuoi ciioefc
'. i i . 1 : .] { i: '.I ..- . . .

AJKIKI^I M f B E f i^ita-ratg fil*"J I t l l Ki

l./.-::. - I I , s
DV 0X12 1!) o*Qte>v<*
aiinart D i en
Qul#il;t-M4 Itdtf
LU l i f c ka

a R t e a m c e I*JO I O

U S I ttliQOQtl o i . . . 11 .-.! .i.. .:. : l a m p a ud P r a u
ovaune. r ip~k^ UnSWWB
Wuperod t u r c l b i - V t l & A * T i c o n Mh aiiefKieiWai* :t i-: : . i ax IOOI rMaamtud M U !

Tompcaturc Itf" ann prsuaiUf<o W a m i diadc

Im*cofftrcls?tavo
irewmancc lam IN. uli* . i .
ptogiamn
ProiUB D i K" Dtsiure C w i r w Otfrt!
3
....... i * K f | f c n * a i et i i
conkol C p l - 1 W

i.-IM I"-: n m i i i i i M 7.:

tiHMilaFi * m 4 5 ES-
B
a
S f J i ino Operafe* " V i .: -a-. '.I.II.-II.I: : -:-j.

mrtuomrn
i m i r HiiatJ-
2
o
Lot e a m p i i i
Vgmr
|vauan (IkKK

S AMPLE -:"";,.' ol
U u w L i s ^ i i , In
reniioi - Crt-?.US

- ' : i : Wie " " . "

jpodtod Bunin-

al a2 e h g h m -II- "Si
Chaptei IV Piocess Failure Mod and Effecls Analysis

Potential Failure Mod (b)

Potential failure mod is defined as Ihe manner in which the
piocess could potentially fail to meet the piocess icuiiements
(including the design intent)
In prepaiing the FMEA, assume that the incoming
part(s)/mateiial(s) aie correct Exceptions can be mad by the
FMEA team where histoiical data indicate deficiencies in
incoming part uality The team should also assume that the
basie design of the product is coirect; howevet, if there are
design issues which result in ptocess conceins, those issues
shouid be communicated to the design team foi resolution
List the potential failuie mode(s) foi the patticular opeiation in
teims of the piocess iequiiement(s) ( e g , as documented in the
piocess flow diagiam) Assume that the failure could occui but
may not necessarily oceur Potential failure modes should be
desciibed in technical teirns, not as a symptom noticeable by the
customer See the example table below.

Process
Requirement Potential Failure Mod
Step/Function
Operation 20: Four sciews Fewer than four sciews
Specified screws Wiong screw used (laiger dia)
Artach seat cushion
to track using a Assembly sequence: Fiist Sctew placed in any othei hole
toique gun screw in right front hole
Sciews fully seated Screw not fully seated
Screws torued to dynamie Screw toiqued too high
toique specification
Screw toiqued too Iow
*& ; wm::. . : ; , ' : ; ;

Table IV.2 Example of Ptocess Step/Fu nction/Req u irements Columns on PFMEA Form
including Potential Failure Modes

If the requirements have been well defined, then the potential

failure mod is ieadily identifiable by deteimining the condition
when a specific leuiiement is not met Each iequirement may
have multiple failure modes A laige number of failure modes
identified foi a single iequirement usually indicates that the
iequirement is not weil defined
The assumption is mad that the failure could oceur but may not
necessarily oceur - consequent!y the use of the woid "potential".
Veiification of completeness of the potential failuie modes can
be mad thiough a review of past things-gone-wTong, concerns,

81
 POTINTIAL
FA1LURE MOOE AND EFFECTC ANALYSli FfcifcANturtw. A f
(PROCESS FMEAJ

':'.. B P f o c c r a RetpoitiibJKy C PiwaI M BK. H

M o d e l Y e a ^ & J f r ogram<s)_
D KeyDate FMEAOaisIOrtjt.

CceTeam

Current Procuss Adian P a *

Potential Potenlial Potenlial ResponsibillIV
RecommenCed
Rai(ueii*<u Failure Eflecl(s) of Cause(s) ol AcbonsTakeo
Conlrols Conlrols 1PK Acbon Slargel
Failure Fgilure CftrnplaOn P a w Coin|UeCan D a l e
Funciiofi

opro cnie* i nnor da: !:. ii:tti-: .... ' ., i ...lv ManuUifinsaM M:l. -II:: fUMpo-llp S^paiHiil.
Uiul : w r l i t JM 9 a v hisd u l 6JIH 'luft la iptBwt ehccfcM
dx<iuiui Ol i m Hk'iH
HHttttiM W prave> - In
ai f a m
!:;
OlDiKC
1:1.- : .
::...:(crr.< :.,-.,-
Mi L ' G ; " I 'p- Rc&ttUt O j * I *
(DOipFMaol
Dolacraied Ho W OGwtt
tolwfc^lu Itio u m s liw
LVamtlaaci>

r.'.: : - ' i - i . sci.hBaa i.- .- ; J . .: I' . : .

k" lim Itimre&i e<i>jiiie"lt Dv 1 t l i Ib IMTB

i Imparad u . l t " MaitaBMiUr; (ooeicn WWO! OcUwnwMl oJ
c l atlctKu itooi - t p r e r a n e iao m d l o w i d o Mve
31* l- '-" r' Lttnpertfur* n t c e l i ralElea-
rWiH.fi". -- : . . fWnmto ereatuo Cc-nlrd * " >
U r a (UOLifci i a
Camel C p C I - B l

' A r t * * * (*>:.
P-BlWLUlll!
lltf filii l | W ) V .'. >..:.-.-.
U W
'. . . . i; :
CL
E
, i. . OporBItH 11 :.:.-. i : . . . ; , II... r.i . . , VlXHtaflc spray 'i
UflUM iw
OpWBIlH SlBIta

i>BWOclW(K u o m u B K * oA

SAMPLE <xa*cl (hanu

8to<r (roese C n
(UOiul-C)-?iS

a1 a2 9 m --ii 'r
 Piocess Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

reject 01 scrap lepoils, and group biainstoiming Souices for this

should aiso include a compaiison of similai pfocesses and a
review of customei (End Usei and subseuent opeiation) claims
relating to similar components

Potential Effect(s) o f Failure (c)

Potential effects of failure are defined as the effects of the failure
mod as peiceived by the customer(s)
The effects of the failure should be desciibed in teims of what
the customei might notice or expetience, iemembeiing that the
customei may be an inteinal customei as wdl as the ultimate
End Usei The customei(s) in this context could be the next
opeiation, subsequent opeiations oi locations, the dealer, and/or
the vehicle owner Each must be consideied when assessing the
potential effect of a failure The pioduct effects in the PFMEA
should be consistent with those in the coiresponding DFMEA

If the failure mod could impact safety oi cause noncompliance

to regularions, this should be cleaiiy identifled in the PFMEA
For the End Usei, the effects should be stated in teims of pioduct
or system performance If the customei is the next opeiation or
subsequent operation(s) / Iocation(s), the effects should be stated
in terms of piocess / operation peifoimance See Table IV 3
Example ot Effects
In ordei to determine the Potential Effect(s), the following
questions should be asked:
1. Does the Potential Failure Mod physically prevent
downstteam processing or cause potential harm to
equipment or operator s?
This includes an inability to assemble or join to a mating
component at any subseuent customeis facility If so, then
assess the manufacturing impact No further analysis is iequired
If not, then go to uestion 2 Examples could include:
Unable to assemble at opeiation x
Unable to attach at customei facility
Unable to connect at customei facility
Cannot bor at operation x
Causes excessive tool weai at opeiation x
Damages equipment at opeiation x
Endangeis opeiator at customei facility

S3
 Piocess Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

!
3 Not: The location, station or operation at which the effect occurs
] should be identified. (f at a customer's facility, this should be
i stated.

2. What is the potential impact on the End Usei ?

Independent of any controls planned or implemented including
error 01 mistake-proofing, consider what the End User would
notice 01 expeiience This infbimation may be available within
the DFMEA. Once determined, go to uestion 3 Examples
could include:
Noise
High effoit
Unpleasant odoi
Intermittent opei ation
Watei leak
Rough idle
Unable to adjust
Difficult to contiol
Poor appeaiance

3. What would happen if an effect was detected prior to

reaching the End User?
The potential effect at the cunent oi receiving locations also
needs to be consideied Examples could include:
Lin shutdown
Stop shipment
Yaidhold
100% of product sciapped
Decreased lin speed
Added manpower to maintain reuiied lin iate

I
i Not: If mor than one potential effect is identified when
| considering questions 2 and 3, all may be listed, but for purposes
i of the analysis, only consider the worst case when documenting
: the resulting Severity ranking

84
 Piocess Failute Mod and Effects Analysis

Example of Effects

Reuirement Failure Mod Effect

Fotu screws Fewer than foui sciews EndUuser Loose seat
cushion and noise
Afanufacturing and
A$sembly Stop shipment
and additional soit and
rework due to affected
portion.
Specified screws Wrong sciew used Afanufacturing and
(largei dia) Assembly Unableto
install sciew in station
Assembly seuence: Screw placed in any othei Afanufactur ing and
Fiist sciew iitright hole Assembly Difficult to
fiont hole install iemaining screws
in station
Screws fully seated Screw not fully seated End User Loose seat
cushion and noise
Afanufacturing and
Assembly Soitand
rewoik due to affected
poition.
Sciews toiqued to Sciew torqued too high End User Loose seat
dynamie toiue cushion due to subseuent
specification fmctuie of sciew and
noise
Afanufacturing and
Assembly Sottand
rewoik due to affected
poition.
Screw torqued too Iow End User Loose seat
cushion due to giadual
loosening of screw and
noise
Afanufacturing and
Assembly Soit and
iewoik due to affected
portion.
' < ' " ' ' ' * ''** * * * ! * "

Table IV.3 Example of Effects

85
 POTENTIAL

FAILURE MOD A N D EFF ECTS ANAlYSiS A nr

Ti
IPROCESS f MEA1
Pt a> ... FS
Hem. Pfocs RospanaUrilif w Piopaiwl 8y: . H
MtxJel YeaftBj/Prociram(s)_ D K.N n.! E FMEADale (Ofia.l- F
G
! Current Process Acllci Resuim
Potenlial Potential Polentia! ResponsiMKy
Fiecoinniendod
ReouHfanenl Failure Effect(s) of Cause{s) of Conltols Controls --VI A-:i!;- Aclions Taken
& Targa
..urr.ii
Failure pfewntlco Oeiecuon Coirftfatiai Dali? CoflwIsKn Dat

C OpK Coirf t/not a a . '!--- I-<(;I!>.' i., i . , K*J Engnccrtnj oco*t

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 Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Severity (S) (d)

Severity is Ihe value associated with the most seiious effect for a
given failuie mod Seveiily is a ie!ative lanking within the
scope of the individual PMEA
Suggested Evaluation Criteria
The team should agree on evaluation ciiteiia and a lanking
system and apply them consistently, even if modified fot
individual piocess analysis (See Table O l fot criteria
guidelines)

It is not recommended to modify criteria for ranking values 9 and

10. Failure modes with a rank of 1 should not be analyzed
further.

S7
Chaptei IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

1 U l_
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t
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labie Crl Suggested PFMEA Severity EvaIuation Ciiteiia

>N
 Chapter IV Process Faiiure Mod and Effects Analysis

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Chaptei IV Process Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

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Table IV 1 Sample PFMEA Fotm with Minima) Information Elcmcnts & Example Entries

90
Chaptet IV Process Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Classification (e)

This column may be used to highlight high piiority faiiute modes

ot causes that may teuire additional engineering assessment
Ihis column may also be used to classiry any special pioduct oi
piocess chaiacteristics ( e g , critical, key, major, significant) foi
components, subsystems, or systems that may require additionaf
ptocess controls

i Customer specific requirements may identify special product or

| process characteristic symbols and their usage

Wheie a special characteiistic is identified with a seveiity of 9 or

10 in the PFMEA, the design lesponsibie engineer should be
notified sice this may affect the engineering documents.

Potential Cause(s) of Failure Moda (f)

Potential cause of failure is defined as an indication of how the
failure could occur, and is described in teims of something that
can be coirected 01 can be conttolled Potential cause of failuie
may be an indication of a design or piocess weakness, the
conseuence of which is the failure mod
To the extent possible, identify and document eveiy potential
cause for each failure mod The cause should be detailed as
concisely and completely as possible Sepaiating the causes will
result in a focused analysis for each and may yield different
measurement, controls, and action plans There may be one ot
moie causes that can result in the failure mod being analyzed
This tesults in multiple lines for each cause in the table or
form.10

In preparing the PFMEA, the team should assume that the

incoming pait(s)/material(s) ate correct. Exceptions can be
mad at the team's discietion wheie histoiical data indicate
deficiencies in incoming part quality
Only specific enors ot maltunctions ( e g , seal not installed oi
seal installed inveited) should be listed Ambiguous phiases
( e g , opeiatoi enoi oi seal mis-installed, etc) should not be
used See Table TV 4 Example of Causes and Controls

In preparing the PFMEA, the team needs to ensure that any limitations of the design that may iesult in a
potential process failure mod aie communicated to the design function

0;
Chapter IV Process Failure Mod and Eiiects Analysis

Occurrence (O) (g)

OccuueDce is the likelihood that a specific cause of failuie will
occui. The likelihood of occunence ianking numbei has a
relative meaning iathei tham an absolute vaiue (See Table Cr2)
Estimate ihe likelihood of occunence of a polential cause of
failuie on a 1 lo 10 scal A consistent occunence ianking
system should be used to ensuie continuity The occunence
ianking numbei1 is a ielative ianking within the scope of the
FMEA and may not leflect the actual likelihood of occunence
The "Incident pei items/vehicles" is used to indicate the numbei
of failuies thal aie anticipated duiing the piocess execution. If
statistical data aie available ftom a similat piocess, the data
should be used to deteimine the occunence ianking In othei
cases, a subjeciive assessment can be mad by using the woid
desciiptions in the left hand column of the table, along with input
ftom the appropiiate process knowledge souice to estimate the
ianking
Suggested EvaIuation Ctiteria
The team should agree on eva!uation criteiia and a ianking
system and appiy them consistently, even it modified for
individual piocess analysis Occunence should be estimated
using a 1 to 10 scal based upon Table Ci2 as a guideline.

92
 Chapler IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

i
Likelihood Criteria: Occurrence of C a u s e - PFMEA
of Failure (Incidents per items/vehicles) 1

> lOOperthousand
Very High 10
a 1 in 10
50 per thousand
9
l i n 20
20 per thousand
High 8
1 in50
lOpei thousand
7
1 in 100
2 per thousand i 6
1 in 500 ''.

5 pei thousand '.

Moderate 5 ;
l i n 2,000
1 per thousand
4 :
1 in 10,000 -;

.01 per thousand

'
3
Low 1 in 100,000
.001 per thousand
' ' ' '1 2
;
l i n 1,000,000 .'-

Very Low Failuie is eliminated thiough pieventive control 1

Table Cr2 Suggested PFMEA Occuirence Evaluation Ciiteria

93
 POTENTIAL
A
I FAILURE MODC ANO EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEANumlwi
(PROCFSS f MEAI P^l"

IW". B Proces RnponsIWtif H

D K c y Dala _ ^ _ _ _ Fi*ADalDiOfig) F
G
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CiUrtTBWii .

Piocess Currenl Piocess - -'|;,i

Potential Potential Potential Respois*llity
Reconwiiended

3 I'.. :- : ' i
':.,i ,.>' i'
Failure
Mad';
Effec(s) of
Failure
Cause(s) or
Failure
Contros
PfOVeilltl]
Controls
Oetedlwi
Rh Acton & Tatgel
C o m p t e l u o Dat
ACUOIB Taken

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Chapter IV Process Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Current Process Controls (h)

Cunent Process Conti ols are desciiptions of the contiols that can
either prevent to the ex.tent possible, the cause of failure fiom
occuning oi detect the failuie mod or cause of failuie should it
occui
Thete aie two types of Piocess Contiols to consider:
Prevention:
Eliminate (pievent) the cause of the failure oi the failuie mod
fiom occutring, oi leduce its tat of occurrence
Detection:
Identify (detect) the cause of failure ot the failure mod, leading
to the development of associated corrective action(s) oi counter-
measuies.

J The preferred approach is to first use prevention controls, if

j possible The initial occurrence rankings will be affected by the
i prevention controls provlded they are integrated as part of the
j process The initial detection rankings will be based on process
] controls that either detect the cause of failure, or detect the
\ failure mod

j Because statistical charting methods ( i e , Statistical Process

| Control)11 typically use sampling to assess process stability and
| detect out-of-control conditions they should not be considered
;! when evaluating the effectiveness of specific Detection Controls
i SPC may, however, be considered as a Prevention Control for
j specific causes whose trends are identifiable in advance of an
| actual non-conformance being produced, such as tool wear

The example PFMBA form in this manua has two sepaiate

columns foi Pievention Contiols and Detection Contiols to assist
the team in cleaily disttnguishing between these two types of
contiols This allows foi a quick visual determination that both
types of piocess contiols have been considered
If a one-column (foi piocess contiols) foim is used, then the
following piefixes should be used For prevention contiols, place
a 'P' befoie or aftei each pievention contiol listed Foi detection
contiols, place a 'D' before oi aftei each detection contiol listed
(see labie IV 4 Example of Causes and Contiols)

See Chryslei, Foid, GM; SPC Manua, AIAG

95
Chaptei IV" Piocess Failute Mod and hffects Analysis

Failute Pievention
Reuirement Cause Detection Conti oi
Mod Conti ul
Screws torued Screw not Nut runner not Operator training Angle sensor included in nut
until fuLly seated fiilly scated held perpendiculai iunner to detect cross-threading
to work surface by not allowing part to be removed
opetatoi fiom fixture until value is
satisfied

Screws torued Screw Toruc setting set Password Torque validation box included
io dynamie torqucd ioo ioo high by non- protected contiol in set-up procedur to validate
torue high set-up personnel panel (only set-up setting por to running
specification peisonnel have
access)
Torue setting set Training of set-up Torue validation box included
too high by set-up personnel in set-up piocedure to validate
personnel setting pnoi to running
Senings added to
set-up instructions

Screw Torue setting set Password Torue validation box included

toiued too Ioo Iow by non- piotected contro! in set-up procedur to validate
Iow set-up personnel panel (only set-up setting piioi to running
personnel have
access)

Torue setting sel Training of set-up Torue validation box included

too Iow by set-up personne! in set-up procedur to validate
peisonnel setting piior to running
Settings added to
set-up instructions

: v . ':
" " " ' - ' - ' : ' - - ' '

labie IV4 Esamples of Causes and Conti ols

96
 Chaptei IV Process Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

This page inientionaly left blank

97
Chapiei TV Piocess Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

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Table IV..l Sample PFMEA Form wih Minfmal Information Elements & Exarnple Eotries

98
 Piocess Faituie Mod and Effecis Analysis

Detection (D) (i)

Detection is the rank associated with the best detection control
listed in the Detection Conttols column Detection is a telative
ranking within the scope of the individual FMEA In oidei to
achieve a lower ranking, geneially the planned detection control
has to be improved
When mor than one control is identified, it is recommended that
the detection ranking of each control be included as part of the
desciiption of the control Record the Iowest ranking value in the
Detection column.
Assume the failure has occirrred and then assess the capabilities
of all "Cunent Process Controls" to pievent shipment of the part
having this failure mod Do not automatically presume that the
detection ranking is low because the occurrence is low, but do
assess the ability of the process controls to detect low fiequency
failure modes or prevent them from going further in the piocess

j Random qualily checks are unlikely to detect the existencs of an

i isolated problem and should not influence the detection ranking

Suggested Evaluation Cnteria

The team should agree on evaluation criteria and a ranking
system and apply them consistently, even if modified for
individual product analysis Detection should be estimated using
Table Ci 3 as a guideline
a

I The ranking value of one (1) is reserved for failure prevention

j through proven process design solutions

99
 Chapter IV Process Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

.
1 O p p o r t u n i t y for Criteria: Ukelhood
Rank
Detection Likelihood of Detection by P r o c e s s C o n t r o l of D e t e c t i o n

No detection
opportunity
No cuirent process contiol; Cannot detect or is not
analyzed
10 ^ZL
9
Not likely to detect
at any stage

Problem Detection
Failure Mod and/oi Error (Cause) is not easily detected
( e g , iandom audits)

Failure Mod detection post-piocessing by

1
i s
-Very Rcnifte

Re.no,
Post Piocessing opeiator through visual/tactile/audible means.

Failure Mod detection in-station by operator through

Problem Detection visual/tactile/audible means or post-piocessing through
l - Y e n t L o w
at Souice use of ataibute gauging (go/no-go, manua toiue
check/clicker wiench, etc)

Problem Detection
Failure Mod detection post-processing by operator
through use ot vaiiable gauging oi in-station by operator
I 6
,;', ^::;^../:;v,::'

Post Processing through use of ataibute gauging (go/no-go, manua >%%'* -:/ >

toiue check/clicker wiench, etc).

Failure Mod or Error (Cause) detection in-station by

operator through use of variable gauging or by
1
Problem Detection automated controls in-station that will detect disciepant 1
part and notiiy operator (light, buzzer, etc) Gauging 5 Modcrati*
at Souice
performed on setup and first-piece check (for set-up
causesonly) j
Failute Mod detection post-piocessing by automated
Pioblem Detection Moderatcly;
controls that will detect discrepant part and lock part to 4 ''"> o i* ''*
Post Processing
prevent iurthei processing
Failute Mod detection in-station by automated controls -
Pioblem Detection 1
at Souice
that will detect discrepant pait and automatically lock
pait in station to pievent turther processing 3 f" $$&.
Eitor Detection Enor (Cause) detection in-station by automated controls _- i
and/oi Pioblem that will detect enor and pievent disciepant pait fiom 2 > ery High.
Pievention being mad
Error (Cause) pievention as a result of fixture design,
Detection not
machin design or pait design Disciepant paits cannot be '% ; AimOStr;;
applicable; Enor mad because item has been enor-proofed by 1
C&rtai' '- ""-
Pievention piocess/product design

Table Cr3 Suggested Process FMEA Detection Evaluation Criteria

100
 Chaptei IV Process Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

i This page intentionaly lett blank

I
101
 POTENTIAL
FAILURE MOD AND EFFECTS ANALYSlS PM6ANi*er, A
(PROCESS FMEA1

5 Kem Piep*r Bv H
D Key D a l e ^ _ _ _ FMEADs>o(Oiig.)_

I CcreTam.

Redurentertl
G
Polential
Failure
Potential
EffGCl(S) of
Potenlial
Causeis) of Controls
Current Process

Controls ![ \
Recommendod
RespowfcilHv

& TUfgel
Acbons T a k e t i
AdooRssus

Mod Failure Preveni>oi C o o i p W W n Dat Comttelion Dala

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 Piocess Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Determining Action Priorities

Once the team has corapleted the initial identification of failure
modes and effects, causes and contiols, including rankings for
sevetity, occuiieoce and detection, they must decide if further
efforts aie needed to icduce the iisk Due to the inherent
limitations on resouices, time, technology, and other factors,
they must choose how to best piioiitize these efforts
The initial focus of the team should be oiiented towards failure
modes with the highest sevetity rankings When the seveiity is 9
oi 10, it is imperative that the team ensuie that the iisk is
addressed through exisring design controls or tecommended
actions (as documented in the FMEA)
For failure modes with seveiities of 8 oi below the team should
consider causes having ihe highest occurrence or detection
iankings It is the team's lesponsibility to look at the
infoimation, decide upon an approach, and determine how to
best prioritize their iisk leduction effoils which best seive their
organization and customers

Risk Evaluation;
Risk Priority Number (RPN) (j)
One approach to assist in action piioiitization has been to use the
Risk Prioiity Numbei:
RPN - Seveiity (S) x Occuirence (O) x Detection (D)
Within the scope of the individual FMEA, this value can rang
between 1 and 1000
The use of an RP>\ thtes/toid is NOT a tecommendedpractice
fot determining the need for actions
Applying thresholds assumcs that RPNs are a measuie of ielative
risk (which they often aie not) and that continuous improvement
is not requiied (which it is)
For example, if the customei applied an aibitraiy thieshold of
100 to the following, the supplier would be requiied to take
action on the characteiistic B with the RPN of 112

Item Severity Occunence Detection RPN

A 9 2 5 90
B 7 4 4 112

In this example, the RPN is higher for characteiistic B than

chaiacteiistic A. Howevei, the piioiity should be lo woik on A
with the higher severity of 9, although its RPN is 90 which is
lower and below the threshold

103
 POTENTIAL
f AILURE MOD AND EFf ECTS ANALYSlS FW,AN.im&i_ o
IPROCESS FMEA1 '-

IWlK. B Procais RaajwneiNlliF P<epaiM B Y : H 1

Modal Yaat<s|>fogran>ls)_ D Kv Dole FMCA Dale ( O l g . ; .

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ftajmenteiit
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Potentia)
Failure
Potenlial
Effect(s) of
Failure
Potentlal
Cause(s) ot
Failure
Controls
Currenl Proces$

Controls
D:-:::::U:>-
(PN
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Achon
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 ITBTC

Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Another concem with using the Ihieshold approach is that there

is no specific RPN value ihat requires mandatory action
Unfoitunately, establishing such thiesholds may piomote rhe
wiong behavioi causing team members to spend time tiying to
justify a lower occunence ot detection lanking value to teduce
the RPN This type of behavioi avoids addressing the ieal
problem that underlies the cause of the failure mod and meiely
keeps the RPN belo w the thieshold. It is impoitant to recognize
that while deteimining "acceptable" risk at a particular program
milestone (e g , vehicle launch) is desiiable, it shouid be based
on an analysis of seveiity, occunence and detection and not
thiough the application of RPN thiesholds

Use of the RPN index in the discussions of the team can be a

1 useful tool The limitalions of the use of RPN need to be
1 understood However, the use of RPN thresholds to determine
action priorfty is not recommended

Recommended Action(s) (k)

In genera, pievention actions (i.e , reducing the occunence) are
piefetable to detection actions An example of this is the use of
piocess design enoi pioofing tather than landom uality checks
oi associated inspection
The intent of any recommended action is to reduce iankings in
the following order: seveiity, occunence, and detection.
Example approaches to icduce these are explained below:
To Reduce Sevetity (S) Ranking; Only a design or process
ievision can bring about a reduction in the severity ranking

j A product/process design change, in and of itself, does not imply

j that the severity will be reduced Any product/process design
I change shouid be reviewed by the team to determine the effect
| on the product functionality and process
j For maximum effectiveness and efficiency of this approach,
J changes to the product and process design shouid be
I implemented eatly in the development process For example,
I process technology needs to be considered very early in the
j process development if severity is to be reduced

To Reduce Occunence (O) Ranking: To reduce occunence,

process and design tevisions may be reuired A reduction in
the occunence lanking can be effected by iemovrng or
contiolling one oi mor of the causes of the failuie mod
through a product oi process design revision
Studies to undeistand the souices of vaiiation of the piocess
using statistical methods may be implemented These studies

105
 H
BD
POTENTtAL
FAILURE MOD A N D FFFECT5 ANALYSIS FMEA N U i t i M f - A
(PROCESS FMEA)
Pag.

Hem. B Proce- Re?ponikify :'!i -u:- t V . H

D to Data . fwEAD^iiaia.)-

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Controls Controls ?."!.
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 Chapter IV Process Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

may lesult in aclions that reduce occunence Fuither, the

knowledge gained may assist in the identification of suitable
contiols including ongoing feedback of infbrmation to the
appropiiate operations for continuous improvement and problem
ptevention

To Reduce Detection (D) Ranking: The prefened method is

the use of enor/mistake proofing A redesign of the
detection methodology may result in a reduction of the
detection ranking In sonie cases, a design change to a
process step may be requiied to increase the likelihood of
detection (i.e, ieduce the detection ranking) Generally,
improving detection contiols iequires the knowledge and
undeistanding of the dominant causes of process vaiiation
and any special causes Incieasing the fiequency of
inspection is usually not an effective action and should only
be used as a tempoiaiy measuie to collect additional
infoimation on the piocess so that peimanent
preventive/conective action can be implemented12

If the assessment leads to no recommended actions fot a specific

failure mode/cause/contioi combination, indicate this by enteiing
"Non" in this column It may be useful to also include a
rationale if "Non" is enteied, especially in case of high severity
For ptocess actions, the evaluation may include but is not limited
to a rt:view of:
Results of piocess DOE 01 othei testing when applicable
Modified process flow diagram, flooi plan, work instiuctions
or preventive maintenance plan
Review of equipment, fixtuies or machineiy specifications
New or modified sensing/detection device

Table IV 5 below provides an example of the application of

causes (Column f), controls (Column h) and iecommended
actions (Column k)

Responsibility & Target Complstion Dat (I)

Enter the name of the indvidual and oiganization responsible foi
completing each iecommended action including the target
completion dat The piocess-tesponsible engineei/team leader is
responsible for ensuiing that all actions recommended have been
implemented or adequately addressed

)
12
See Chiysier, Ford, GM; SPC Manua, AlAG

107
 POTENTIAl
FAJLUftE M0D6 AND EFFECTS ANALYSlS A n
er IPROCSS FMEA1

B Pto&as Rnpoiii C H a
Ihm.

Kev Dale FtEADaWOtkn F 3

Caro T - G
Cunei)! Piocess .''..' Al K t i . . -
Polentlal Potenlial Potenlial ResponsibillIv
*~,V. i-mci; F!-econifnr)odetl
Failute Effecf(s) o t Cause(s) of A c t i o n s Tefcen
Contros Controls R- . A..:i' i
STatgel
Modo Failure r a i ure Ccmptaoon D&e Comp*e&dr> D a m
Preveiiln)ii
F^dw

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Process Failure Mod and Effects Analysis

Action Results (m-n)

I his section identifies the results of any completed actions and
their effect on S, O, D lankings and RPN

Action(s) Taken and Compietion Dat (rn)

After the action has beea implemented, enter a biief desctiption
of the action taken and actual compietion dat

Severity, Occurrence, Detection and RPN (n)

After the pieventive/coirective action has been completed,
deteimine and tecord the lesulting seveiity, occurrence, and
detection iankings
Calculate and recoid the lesulting action (iisk) piioiity indicatoi
( e g , RPN)
AU revised iankings should be reviewed Actions alone do not
guaiantee that the problem was so!ved (i e , cause addressed),
thus an appropriate analysis 01 test should be completed as
verification If furthei action is considered necessary, repeat the
analysis The focus should always be on continuous
improvement
Chaptei IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

Process Failuie Prcvention Detection Recommended

Step/Function Reuiiemem Cause
Mode Conti ols Contiols Actfons
Op 20(attach Four screws Fewer than Too few Visual aids Visual In-station torue
seat cushion to foui screws screws illusttating Inspection monitoiing;
tiack using a inadvertently correct in station Linelockout if
torue gun) installed uantity fewei dian foui
Sclect four
screws Operator
training

Specified Wrong Similar Visual aids Visual In-station torue

screws screw used screws illustiating inspection angie monitoring;
(latgct dia) availab!e at correcl in slation L irrc lockout if
station screw angle not met
Operator
iraining Erroi proof by
design: use one
type screw for
-i-.i -::/riL.iLac:
iili
llll
Op 20(attach Assembly Visuai aids Visuai Add posifion
seat cushion to seuence: identifying inspection sensor to nut
track using a First screw location of in station runner not
tOique gun) in nght front first screw aliowing too! to
Bcginning with bole opciate unless
right fiont hole, Operator runner is aligned
lorue cach sctcw training with correct hole
to thereuired
torue

labie I V 5 Esamples oiCauses, Contr ols and Actions

Maintaining PFIVlEAs
The PFMEA is a living document and should be ieviewed
whenevei theie is a pioduct oi piocess design change and
updated, as iequiied.
Anothei element of on-going maintenance of PFMEAs should
include a peiiodic revie\v Specific focus should be given to
Occuirence and Detection iankings This is particulaity
impoitant wheie theie have been pioduct oi process changes oi
impiovements in process conttols Additionaily, in cases wheie
either field issues oi pioduction issues, such as dismptions, have
occuned, the iankings shoitld be ievised accordingly

Lyraging PFMEAs
The use of a fundamentally sound PFMEA is the staiting point
that provides the gieatest oppoitunity to !everage the use ofj>ast
expeiience and knowledge

110
Chaplei IV Piocess Failuie Mod and Effects Analysis

If a new project or application is functionally similar to the

existing pioduct and the piocess to be used is similar; a single
PFMEA may be used with customer concunence If there are
differences, the team should identify and focus on the effects of
these diffeiences

Linkages
Ihe PFMEA is not a "stand-alone" document Figur IV 5 shows
some common linkages

DFMEA, Process Flow

Diagram, etc.

Process Control Plans

Figur IV.5 PFMEA Infbrmaiion Inteirelationship Flow

To DFMEA
In the development of a PFMEA it is impoitant to utilize the
infoimation and knowledge gained in the creation of me
DFMEA However, the link between the two documents is not
always obvious The difftculty occuis because the focus of each
FMEA is diffeient The DFMEA focuses on pait function
whereas the PFMEA focuses on the manufactuiing steps 01
process Infoimation in the columns of each foim is not directly
aligned For example, Item/Function-Design does not equal
Piocess Functions/Reuirements; potential design failure mod
does not equal potential piocess failure mod; potential design
cause of failuie does not e^ual potential process cause of failure
However, by comparing the oveiall analysis ol design and
process, a connection can be mad. One such connection is
between the chaiacteiistics identified duiing the DFMEA and
PFMEA analysis

Another connection is the lelationship between potential design

cause of failure (DFMEA) and potential process failuie mod
(PFMEA) For example, the design of a feature such as a hole
can cause a particular failuie mod The conesponding piocess

lii
 Chaptei IV Piocess Faiiuie Mod and Effects Analysis

faiiuie mod is rhe inability of the piocess to manufacture the

same featuie as designed In this example, the potential design
cause of faiiuie (hole diameter designed too laige) would appeai
to be similai to the potential piocess faiiuie mod (hole drilled
too laige) The potential effect of the failure mod foi both
design and process may be identical if' theie weie no additional
piocess ielated effects In other words, the end iesult (effect) of
the failure mod is the same, but there are rwo distinct causes

While developing the PFMEA, it is the team's iesponsibiliry to

ensure that all piocess reJated potential faiiuie modes which Iead
to pioduct ielated effects are consistent between the DFMEA
and the PFMEA
To Control Plan
In addition to the list of Recommended Actions and their
subsequent follow-up as a iesult of the PFMEA activity, a
Control Plan should be developed13 Some organizations may
elect not to specifically identify the ielated pioduct and piocess
charactetistics" in the PFMEA In this siruation, the "Pioduct
Chaiacteiistics" poition of the Control Plan may be deiived fiorn
the "Reuirements" poition of the "Piocess
Function/Requiiements" column and the "Piocess
Chaiacteiistics" poition may be derived ftom the "Potential
Cause(s) of Failure Mod" column

When the team develops the Control Plan, they need to assuie
that the PFMEA cunent controls aie consistent with the connol
methods specified in the Control Plan

13
Guidelines for Conttol Plan developmem aie included in Chiyslei, Foid, GM; Advanted P>oduct Quality
Planning and Conttol Plan (APQP), AIAG.

112
I APPENDICES

113
Appendix A Saraple Forms

Appendix A: Sample Forms

DFMEA Forms
Foim A: Basic form (with minimal information)14
o With Ptevention and Detection Contiols as sepaiate
columns15
Foim B: Foim with. Item/Function and Reuirements in
sepaiate columns
o To assist in the deteimination of failure modes
Foim C: Form A with Pievention Contiols column to the left
of the Occunence column
o To better show the relationship between pievention
contiols and occurrence ianking
Form D: Fotm B and C combined
Form E: Form D with sepaiate columns for Cunent
Detection Design Contiols (Cause and Failuie Mod)
o To highlight the need to consider cause-ielated
contiols
Form F: Foim B with separate columns foi Responsibility
and Taiget Complelion Dat and Actions Taken and
Completion Dat
o To allow soiting by dates

Ihis form was provided in the Chiyslei, Ford, and GM; FMA Manua 3* Ediiton, AIAG
15
Pieventive and Detective Contiols may be in the same column if each control is identified with a "P"
oi "D" iespectively

114
 Appendix A Sample Foims

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115
Appendix A Sample Forms

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116
Appendix A Sample Foirtis

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ixA Sample Foims

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118
Appendix A
Sample Borms

DFMEA Form E

119
Appendix A Sample Foims

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120
 Appendix A Sample Forms

PFMEA Forms
Foim A: Basic form (with minima! information)16
o With Prevention and Detection Contiols as sepaiate
columns'7
Foim B: Foim A with Process Step/Function and
Requiiements as sepaiate columns
o To assist in the deteimination of failure modes
Foim C: Form A with Prevention Contiols Column to the
left ot the Occurrence column
o To better show the telationship between pievention
conttols to occunence ianking
FoimD: Form B and C combined
Foim E: Foim D with sepaiate columns for Cunent
Detection Piocess Contiols (Cause and Failure Mod)
o To highlight the need to consider cause ielated
controls
Form F: Foim B with sepaiate columns for Responsibility
and Taiget Complerion Dat and Actions Taken and
Completion Dat
o To allow soiting by dates
Form G: Form B with ID, Product and Piocess within a
bridged Reuiieroents column
o To piovide consistency among the Piocess Flow,
PFMEA and Contiol Plan
Form H: Foim D and G combined

16
This foim was adapted from that provided in ihe Chiyslei, Foid, and GM; FMEA Manua .$"* Edition, AlAG.
17
Preventive and Deiective Contiols may be in the same column if each control is identified with a "P" 01 "D"
respectively

121
 r

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Appendix A Sample Fonns

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127
Appendix A Sample Forms

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128
Appendix A Sampie Foims

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129
Appendix B System Level FMEA

Appendix B: System Level

The piocess for a System FMEA is geneially the same as the
deveIopment of other FMEAs The majoi differences between
System level FMEAs and other types of FMEAs is the focus on
functions and relationships that are unique to the system as a
whole (i.e, do not exist at lowei levels) The System level
FMEA includes failure modes associated with inteifaces and
interactions in addition to consideiing single point failuies which
is the primaiy focus of product level FMEAs

Io help illustiate the meaning of System, Subsystem, and

Component FMEAs, two examples have been constiucted below
in Figuie B 1 (for Inteifaces and Interactions) and in Figur B 2
(foi Item, Function, and Failure Modes.)

:_- '

IYIIIIUI
Subsystems Indirect interface with
i
other subsystems

** Jr
D
*- / - '

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Major
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'-.":''.'':.: , , , ' . - , " :
' . i ' ' ; '

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- - Interface with the
Minor *
Environment
Si. hcvctorn<:

Figur B.l Interfaces and Interactions

The FMEA team is responsible for specifying the scope of its

respective FMEAs The example in Figur B i shows that the
team has specified Subsystems A, B, C, and D along with the
suiiounding enviionment as compiising the System that must be
considered while completing the System FMEA.

130
Appendix B System L evel FMEA

interfaces
In Figur B 1, intetiaces between subsystems aie shown where
Subsystem A touches and (connects with) Subsystem B, B
touches or connects with C, and a clearance between D and B,
signified by the dashed lin The Enviionment also touches each
of the subsystems listed in Figuie B 1, which reuires the
"Environmental Inteifaces" be consideied when completing the
FMEA Also, the inteifaces to major and minoi subsystems,
whethei direct or indiiect, should be included

The interfaces which are identified in the System FMEA should

be included in the respective Subsystem FMEA

Figur B.2 shows a system and its intenelationships in a

"haidware" oriented appioach

Interactions
A change in one subsystem or component may cause a change in
anothei subsystem or component
In Figuie B I , inteiactions between subsystems and components
can occui among any of the interfacing systems For example,
Subsystem A heats up, lesulting in Subsystem B and D gaining
heat through their respective inteifaces, as well as Subsystem A
giving ot? heat to the enviionment Interactions might also occur
among 'nofl-contacting' systems via transfer through the
'ero/iionmenl' For example, if the environment is composed of
high humidity and Subsystems A and C are dissimilai metals
sepaiated by a non-metal composing Subsystem B, Subsystem A
and C can still have an electrolytic reaction due to the moisture
ftom the enviionment. Thus, inteiactions among non-contacting
subsystems can be ielatively difficult to piedict but aie impoitant
and should be consideied

131
 System Level Subsystem Level Component Levei
Frame Upper Frame
i
cc

Function: Function:
-Provide slabie attachmenl for -Provides structural support
Design Objscllvos- seat support
1) Minimum 3000 hours of rlding Potential Failure Mode(s):
wilhoul Ihe need (oc mamtenance Potential Failure Mode(s): -Structural failure
and 10,000 hours o l rkJing i w Ihe -Structural failure of seat support -Excessive deflection
design Hfe.
-Excesstve ceflection ot seat
I 2} Accommodales mae adidls
comtortably h) Ihe 99.5lh
percentile ,
support Function:
-Provides dimensional control (or
3) ...etc.... Function: correct firushed frame geometry

r Bicycie
-Provides pleasing appearance

Potential Failure Mode(s):

-Finish (shlne) detenorates
Potential Failure Mode(s):
-Length of frame mounling poinls
toolong

I
OJ
-Paint chips -length of frame mounling points
to Function:
too short
-Ease of use

Potuntial Failure Mode(s|:

-DifflcuU lo sleer
Handle Bar
I Diflicufl lo peda

Function:
Lower Front Tub
Front Wheel Assembly
I -PfOYide reliable Iransportalion

Potential Failure Modelsj: \ i Rear Wheei Assembly

Lower Rear Tub
Chan breaks ffequenUy \'
Tires require freuent Mamlenance Sprocket Tub
Sprocket
Function:
-Provide comtortabie Iransportation
Seat
Poiential Failure Mode{s)
-Sealing posrlion is not comfortabte
Cham Assembly
Appendix B Sys(em L e v d F M E A

Relationships
Multiple Levels of Design FMEAs
Moie likely than not, the focus of a DFMEA is an item which is
a subset of a larger system The FMEAs at the different levels of
the design hieiarchy (i e , system, subsystem and component) aie
linked tbiough the cause -> failure mod -> effect ot failure
lelationships This is a two way linkage (see Figuie B 3):
Ftom Lower to ffighei Levei: The effect of a failure mod at a
given level is a failure mod at the next highei level
Fot example, the effect of a part 2 failuie mod would be a
failure mod of module 3 eithei diiectly or indirectly by causing
another pajt to fail The effect of a module 4 failure mod is a
failuie mod of subsystem 4 Conseuently, the effect of a
failure mod at any sublevel may ultimately become a system
tailure mod with its customer/ user related effects.
Ftom Highei to Lower level: The linkage ftom a higher level to
the next lowet Ievel is iclated to the physics of failure lather than
a pure cause and effect relationship sice in the development of a
DFMEA, the causes identified at any level deal with the design
piocess and only indirectly with the failure mechanisms.
Undeistanding these relationships will piovide a consistency of
analysis and an economy of etfoit in the development of
DFMEAs

133
B System Level f MEA

Effect on the end user

System

Subsystem
5

4 The effect of a
! Subsystem 4 Failure Mod is a
V System Failure Mod

j ; SubsystemJ|

.Module Module Module

1 2

The effect of a
r The effect of a sublevel Failure Mod
Module 3 Failure Mod is a is ultimately a
- Subsystem 4 Failure Mod System Failure Mod
and its customer effect

Design Process Causes Y1, Y2, ..... Yn

Figuie B 3 DFMEA Effects Linkages

134
 HJa^ESI^^SEEfflffW

Appendk C Altemative Risk Assessments

Appendix G: A!ternative Risk Assessments

Alternatives to RPN
The risk piiority numbei is the product of the severity (S),
occuirence (O), and detection (D) iankings

(S) x (O) x (D) = RPN

Wirhin the scope of the individual FMEA, this value (between 1
and 1000) can be used to assist the team in ianking the concems
in the design of the pioduct and process.
Ihe table below, however, illustiates how differenl Seveiity (S),
Occuiience (O) & Detection (D) scenaiios result in eual RPN
values 18
Upon ieview of each scenario, priorities would not be
established by the team based on the RPN alone

Fifteen Different Situations with an RPN=360

Severity of Likelihood of Likelihood of
Problem Ccci; rrerice Detection
1 Hazardous 1C High 9 Moderate 4
2 Hazardous 1C Moderate 6 Low 6
3 Hazardous 1C Moderate 4 V97 Rcr^o:o 9
4 Hazardous 9 Very High 10 Mod High 4
5 Hazardous 9 High 8 Moderate 5
6 Hazardous 9 Moderate 5 Remote 8
7 Hazardous 9 Moderate 4 fmpossible '0
3 High 8 High 9 Moderate 5
9 High 8 Moderate 5 Very Remote 9
10 Moderate 6 Very High 10 Low 6
-1 Moderate 6 Moderate 6 Impossible 10
12 Moderate 5 High 9 Remote 8
:3 Moderate 5 High s Very Remote 9
14 Moderate 4 Very High 1C \Zery Remote 9
15 Moderate 4 High 9 Impossible 10

The ease of calculation and soiting of this index has led many to
use it exclusively and without consideiation to what may be a
more appioptiate means of piioiitizing Examples of some such
altematives follow

Used wilh peimission ftom Whiilpool Coipoialion, 2005, 2006

135
Appendbc C Altemative Risk Assessmenls

Alternative: SO (S x O)
Some organizations may choose to piimaiily focus on Seveiity
and Occurrence The SO index is the pioduct of the Seveiity, and
Occuirence rankings In using this index, the otganization may
focus on how to ieduce SO by leducing the value of "O" thiough
preventive actions Fuitheimoie this may lead to subseuent
detection impiovements for those with the highest SO value

Alternatfoe: SOD, SD
Some organizations have chosen to use SOD 01 SD as a
piioiitization tool SOD is the non-arithmetic combination of the
Seveiity, Occunence and Detection iankings SD is the non-
arithmetic combination of the Seveiity and Detection rankings
Example (SOD):
Severity, S=7
Occunence, O- 3
Detection, D=5
The resulting SOD is 735

Esample (SD):
Seveiity, S =7
Detection, D=5
The resulting SD is 75

The SOD, when soited in numeiical, descending oidet, will

piioiitize the scenaiios fitst by severity, second by occunence
and lastly by detection

s O D RPN SOD SD ,
7 7 3 147 773 73
Veiy
7 3 7 147 737 77 Diffeient
al
3 7 7 147 377 37 Scenaiios
Equal RPN Values

Table C l Contrast among RPN, SOD and SD

1 Just as with RPN. use of the SOD/SD index should be used in
1 context of team discussion Defining priorities simply based on
j the SOD has limitations just as with the RPN For example, a
i failure mod with a SOD of 711 would be ranked higher (i.e.,
j have to be considered before) a failure mod with 599

136
 Appendix D Alteinative Analysis Techniues

Appendix D: AIternative Analyses Techniques

Failure Mod and EfFects Analysis is one of many lechniques
used to evaluate and analyze design risk Other methods have
beeii deve!oped fot specillc aieas and can be used to complement
the analysis in the FMEA piocess They raay be used as a
ieplacement foi an FMEA with authoiization by the customei
These aie only a few of the examples.
Failure Mod, Effect
and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA)
FMCA is similar to FMEA The C in FMECA indicates that the
ciiticality (01 sevetity) of the various failuie effects aie
consideied and ianked Today, FMEA is often used as a
synonym foi FMECA
Design Review Based
on Failure Modes
(DRBFIM)
Design Review Based on Failuie Modes is a cause and effect
analysis of conceins related to a design change It is a tool used
to guide and manage good discussion in relation to the change
DRBFM fbcuses on the impact of the change on design,
evaluation piocedures, and manufactuiing systems with the
intent of anticipating and preventing problems A design ieview
by subject mattei expeits to evaluate the change{s) and related
impiovements is an integial pait of DRBFM. (Reference Figuie
Dl)
Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA)
FTA is a techniue fot system analysis wheie system faults are
analyzed 6om a single potential failuie to identily all possible
causes FTA consideis combinations of inteidependent as well as
independent causes In addition to the structute of the fault tree
and all of the logie inteidependencies, the FTA noimally
inciudes the failuie piobabilities identification This allows the
calculation of system reliability given the component
leliabilities [9 (Reference Figuie D 2).

19
References: IEC 61025; QICID (ASQ-20352)

137
Appendix D AIteinative Anaiysis Techniques

Action Status
'"'riap.".: .- - I! "'
Target Cwrptlon
Dato

3 _ Manufacturing K
o OJ
3
8 Targe Compelion c_
LI
CO ii
r; cc
Data

Evaluation cc
O a s
s o o .
Responsib*ty a
() Taccjet Complelion ;.r.
"O i? Dale

o 8S
a: Design ci
<y

Design Actions to
elimtnate concerns
(provitfe deaits and
c best practices used)

o Severity r^

Effect Cody Li
"O _^2
fc u)
Customer and
V) go System or
co Subsystem Effeci a
E
CO co
Other Causes
5 ia (Review)
QL
II
a U
<
C;'
;ro
o:
c
.??
"w
6
Other Concerns
(Review)

L e s s o f Functlon
CC

or Va)ue o
Q to Customer

Part Function I
Change to Design
or Environment
I
n

I-Iguie D-! Example of DRBFM Elements

138
Appendix D Alternative Analysis lechniues

CODECand
anatog m t 8 2 not
oparaflooal

I '
One or Bom 1
IC Faisd: No er
analog tnputs r.ot | noisy yffliage
avaitebe s:.ppy

Comocnents Voltjge nas high

&iling - any fajre 5V analog not
or tow freuertey
awfciaHo n.oise

CD
ICfatlsd i * to
IC (Ms due to
manufacTunog
random faiiure

Cne or mora pins Ccnnecton(s) Cold or insufnaent One or mor pins IC damaged t y
snerted du to IC erackad Cunnp
shorted due to openofshortt sodsr on ora er ESD dunng
CeDns on bcord mor pins cxcessve scJdcr assemblyor test assemWy
du to m(g defect

T
[ Solder A
[Brc*en_C13 j
l short_G13 J

Figur D.2 FTA Tree S t i u c t u r e

139
Refeiences and Suggested Readings

References and Suggested Readings

IEC 60300-3-1, Dependability management - Pan 3-1 Apphcatlon guide - Analysis techniues for
dependabiity - Guide on merhodology
LEC 60812, Edilion 2; Failure modes andeffects analysis, lanuaiy 2006
IEC 61025, Edition 2; Fault ttee analysis, lanuary 2007
QICID (ASQ-20352) "System Reliability Thtough Fault Ttee Analysis"
SAE ARP 5580, Recommended Faiute Modes and Ejfects Analysis (FMEA) Practices for Non-
Automotive AppHcations (Repiaceraent for MIL-SID-1629A, 1998 (withdrawn))
SAE 11739:2002, Potential Failure Mod and Ejfects Analysis in Design (Design FMEA) and Potentia
Failure Mod andEffects Analysis in Manufactutmg and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA)
Alfledo, H S Ang and Wilson, H Tang (1990). "Ptobability Concepts in EngineeringPlanningand
Design, Volume II ~ Decision Risk and Reliability", WUey Publications
Bowles, J (2003) "An Assessment of RPN Piioritization in a Failure Modes Effects and Ciiticality
Analysis", Ptoceedings Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, pp 380-386; aiso in Joutnal oj
the IEST, Imtitute ofEnvitonmental Sciences and Technology, Vol47, 2004, pp 51-56
Krasich, M (2007) "Physics of Failure Appioach to FMEA", Tutorial Ptoteedings Reliability and
Maintainability Symposium
Kjasich, M (2005) "Fault Tree Analysis in Pioduct Reliability Improvernent", Tutonal Ptoceedings
Reliability and Maintainability Symposium
0'Connei, PD.T,(2002) Piactical Reliability Engineeiing 4thedition, (Wiley)
Shu-Ho Dai and Ming-0 Wang (1992), Reliability Analysis m Engmeetmg Apphcations, Van Nostiand
Reinhold
Wheelei, D J (2005) The SixSigma Ptactitioner'% Guide to Data Analysis, SPC Piess, Knoxvi!le, pp 311-
315
Rausand, M (2004) System Reliability Theoty (2nd ed), Wiley, 2004

140
 Ind es
lnex
APQP (Advanced Pioduct Quality Planning), 2,
5 64,68, 69, 92, 93,95,99,103, 105,107,109,
bock diagiam, 18, 19,29
classification, 39, 91
continuous impiovement, 6, 57,63, 103,107,
109
contro! plans, 6,13,111
cioss-functional, 2, 9,17, 69,71
cunent design contiols, 49, 53
design improvements, 16
design intent, 11,12,22,29,41,49, 68, 79
design life, 45
detection, 13, 18,49, 51, 57-64, 68,73,95,99-
110,135,136
detection contiols, 49,66,99,107
DFMEA (Design Failure Mod and Effccts
Analysis), 5, 16-19,22,25,29, 39,41, 64-66,
70,73,83,84,111,133
DOE (Design of Expeiiments), 61, 107
DRBFM (Design Review by Failure Mod), 137,
enoi proofing, 73,105
evaluation critetia, 37,45, 53, 87,92,99
flow diagiam, 70, 71,81, 107
FMECA (Failuie Mod, Effect and Ciitical
Analysis), 3,137
Follow-up, 6
F1A (Fauli Ilee Analysis), 137,139
iunction, 16,18,19,21 , 29 ,31, 35, 71, 79,111
fiinctional requiiements, 8,16,18,25
inteiactions.3,10,130, 131
inteifaces, 10, 11,29, 130,131
item,73, 75, Ul, 133
linkages, 65,111,134
mistake pioofmg, 61, 107
141
occunence 3 13,45,46,49,53,57,59,61,63,
110,135,136
OEM (GM, Foid, Chrysler), 11, 17,27, 75
PFMEA (Process Failure Mod and Effects
Analysis), 5, 17,66, 68-71, 75, 77, 83, 91,95.
110,111
potential cause, 12,39,41,91,92
potential failuie mod, 11,16-18, 31, 61, 70-71,
81, 112
preventive contiols, 45
process step, 77, 79, 107
recommended actions, 6, 13,18, 57, 59, 61,103,
L07
responsible engineei, 17, 63, 69, 70,91,107
RPN (Risk Priority Numbei), 57,59,63,103,
105,109,135,136
scope, 3,4, 8,10,11,18,25,68,70,71, 73, 75,
130
SD (Ranking by Seveiity and Detection), 136
Seveiity, 13, 37, 57, 59,63, 84, 87,103,109,
135,136
SO (Ranking by Seveiity and Occunence), 136
SOD (Ranking based on Seveiity, Occunence
and Detection), 136
SPC (Statistical Piocess Contiol), 95, 107
special chaiacteristic, 39, 91
specification, 11,13, 61,107
team, 2,4,5, 8, 9,10,14,17,18,21,22,27, 29,
35, 37,41,45,49,53,57,59,69, 71, 73,81,
87,91,95,99,103,105,11!
team leadei, 6, 9, 69, 70,107
thresholds, 57, 59,103,105
va!idation, 16, 31,49,59,61