Jenna Campbell

Professor Esposito

10/15/2016

Tito and the Timeline of Non-Alignment

Non-Alignment has been a powerful force in the world since its inception in 1961.

However, not much has been written on its formation or the leaders in its formation. Also, unlike

other international agreements throughout the world, the non-alignment movement developed

out of unforeseen circumstances. The entire non-alignment movement began because Joseph

Stalin of Soviet Russia did not agree with the critiques and changes made to communism by

Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. This paper intends to show how a major setback for this leader

and his young but relatively powerful country set an entire legacy into motion and helped form

one of the most influential forces in the world today.

Josip Tito became Yugoslavia's first president through his own tenacity. In 1913 he was

drafted into the military. He performed well during his time and many of his commanders

thought he would be a good candidate for promotion. 1 After returning home from his service

much had changed in his home nation of Croatia. It was now part of what would officially be

called in 1929 Yugoslavia. 2 Tito joined in with the communist party of Yugoslavia which

commonly went by the acronym KPJ. He quickly moved up the ranks of this political party and

was even promoted to secretary of the Balkans. Once World War 2 began in 1939, there was

much resistance in Yugoslavia to the Nazi regime. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia founded

1 Steven Povlowitch, Slovenias Great Dictator Tito (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992) 12.

2 Povlowitch, Great Dictator, 15.

the National Liberation Army, which also went by the name Partisans. Tito was placed in charge

of this group and he led his people to a hard fought victory against Nazi Germany. His success in

this role is what ultimately led him to become the first president of Yugoslavia in 1945.

To understand how non-alignment first began it is imperative to analyze the turmoil and

split between Stalin's Soviet Union and Tito's Yugoslavia. During World War II, many eastern

European countries were struggling to fight off the war machines of the Axis Powers. Most of

these countries relied heavily on assistance from the Soviet Union and its leader Joseph Stalin.

However, Yugoslavia was not one of these countries. They fought off their invaders without

much assistance if any at all from the USSR. Therefore, after becoming a communist nation in

1946 they expected to receive a well-earned respect from Stalin. Yugoslavia and Tito did not

receive this earned respect, however. Often Stalin criticized Yugoslavia's leader Tito and his

generals. He often played mind games with them and would accuse them of not being a devoted

follower of the USSR. In one instance Tito's general Djilas was berated for drinking beer instead

of vodka as customary in Russia. Stalin shouted at him, "He drinks beer like the Germans! He is

a German, by God, a German!"3 This understandably made both Djilas and Tito incredibly

uncomfortable and weary of Stalin. Time and again Stalin reinforced the idea that Yugoslavia

meant almost nothing to him, that they should be just another follower in his idea of

communism.

Tito believed himself to be a powerful influence in the world of Communism and did not

want to be another pawn in Stalin's regime. Tito then came up with his own version of

communism, which allowed for certain deviations from the Soviet implementation depending on

3 Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Carrol and Graf Publishers, 1994), 220.
the case of each country. This irritated Stalin greatly and made him more suspicious of Tito and

his plans. Tito started talking about possibly absorbing Albania and several other smaller

territories to create a larger Balkan federation. This changed Stalin's mood from irritation to

worry. Stalin did not want any trouble in his communist sphere. If Tito managed to pull off this

federation, it would create a strong communist region that could break free from his control.

To address this problem Stalin called in Tito's trusted general Djilas and discussed what

was going to happen. Realistically, Stalin was probably trying to persuade Djilas to his side, but

when he failed he settled for a cease and desist order. Steven Pavlowitch wrote, "They were told

to stop all other federation plans, and then to implement them forthwith, as the Yugoslavs, in

particular, were rebuked for taking important foreign policy decisions without consulting

Moscow."4 This was another test for Tito and Yugoslavia, it was meant to gauge their loyalty. If

he did not absorb Albania he would still be loyal, but if he proceeded he would be a traitor. It

was customary for Stalin to implement tests of loyalty like this, especially with Yugoslavia and

its leaders.

The EU powers eventually caught wind of the bubbling turmoil between Tito and Stalin.

The West then tried to form a wedge between these two powerful nations and their leaders. They

offered Tito and his country assistance that Russia was withholding. Western countries, of

course, did not support Tito, but they did respect how Yugoslavia refused to be a satellite state to

the USSR. They thought that Tito and Yugoslavia could be that hindrance to the success of the

USSR that the west needed. Tito did not want any part of this in the beginning for fear it would

4 Povlowitch, Great Dictator, 55.

further complicate his relations with Stalin and the Soviets. However, Stalin still saw Tito as a

potential enemy.

This fear of rebellion even drove Stalin so far as to send assassins after Tito. Stalin went

to great lengths to give his assassins access to Tito. For instance, Stalin hired an assassin that

went by the name of "Max." To ensure there would be no suspicions Max was ordered to visit

Belgrade several times and to form bonds. After he was received happily, it was time to strike.

Tito armed Max with a vial that contained the pulmonary plague bacteria. He was to arrange a

private meeting with Tito and release the virus killing Tito and everyone else in the room.5 Of

course, Tito was no fool and miraculously evaded these assassins. There were upwards of 20

attempts on Tito's life ordered by Stalin. Finally, Josip Tito had had enough and, in a moment of

pure bravery Tito sent a letter to Moscow. The letter said, "Comrade Stalin, stop sending your

agents to Yugoslavia with the order to kill me. We have already captured seven of your men who

had the intention of killing me. If this does not stop, I will be forced to send a man to Moscow

and if I do that, it will not be necessary for me to send another.6

The final disagreement between the two powers was involvement in the Greek Civil War.

This civil war involved two parties, the nationalist, and the communists. Tito openly supported

the communists and their attempt to gain independence and control of the country. However,

Stalin did not like these vocal opinions on the matter. This was because, in attempts to placate

Winston Churchill, Stalin had agreed not to interfere. This was no matter to Tito, so he continued

his open vocalization of support, and even went so far as to shame Stalin for his lack thereof. In

5 "Soviet Plan to Assassinate Tito," January 01, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
Dmitri Volkogonov, Izvestiia (11 June 1993). Translated for CWIHP by Natasha Shur.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112973
6 "Tito Threatened to Assassinate Stalin." Daljecom English All News at Portal Daljecom RSS.
response to this Stalin called a Comintern meeting on June 28, 1948. Tito refused to attend this

meeting because he feared his nation would be attacked. He knew fighting was of no use but he

said, "To die on one's own soil! At least a memory remains."7

Although Tito was not in fact physically attacked, arguably something much worse

happened. Stalin and his fellow members of the Comintern denounced and cut all ties to

Yugoslavia. Tito then called a meeting of the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist party

and said, " The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has to date honorably fulfilled its historical

mission and will prove through its unshakeable loyalty to the science of Marx-Engels-Lenin-

Stalin that it has not strayed from the road of science."8 It is worth mentioning that Tito still

included Stalin in this quote, showing perhaps that he was still willing to return to an alliance

with the USSR. This would never take place, however.

To prove that the split was indeed real Stalin places a blockade on Yugoslavia's goods.

Without Russia's support in buying exports, Yugoslavia might fall into extreme poverty. This

was because Yugoslavia was a mostly rural country, and it did not have much in the way of

industry. If Stalin did not buy their exports the country had little to no money to buy the goods

that it could not produce itself. Stalin also engaged in a propaganda war against Tito. He ordered

remaining publications that had Tito portrayed in a good light taken down, and had anti-Tito

sentiments advertised across the Soviet nations.

The West again tried to persuade Tito to accept aid, and this time they were successful.

Although Tito was weary of the Western countries, he understood that accepting Western

assistance was his best plan to keep his people alive. On November 14, 1951, President of the

7 West, Tito, 232.

8 West, Tito, 232.
United States Harry Truman formally asks congress for permission to aid Yugoslavia.

Permission was granted, mainly because Tito was a thorn in the side of Stalin, that never seemed

to go away.9 Tito received 700 million in economic aid and almost a billion in military aid across

the five-year span from 1950 to 1955.10 Another motivation was the hopes that Tito would be

willing to tweak his beliefs to conform more to western ideology. Pavlovich said, "The Yugoslav

example had failed to attract imitators, but in the wake of the Korean War, the Western powers

were keen to draw Tito's country into their camp, with the British in particular entertaining hopes

for the liberalization his regime."11

However, it was not long before the Soviet Union in 1953 was now headed by Nikita

Khrushchev and the Western Allies fought over Tito and Yugoslavia. Khrushchev assumed that

after the death of Joseph Stalin in March of 1953, that Tito and Yugoslavia would be willing to

return to the Soviet Bloc and brush the matter off like it never happened. Khrushchev even made

a visit to Yugoslavia in 1953. He noticed that even with the aid Yugoslavia was receiving from

the United States there was still great poverty. This was because of the bread shortage that was

wreaking havoc. Khrushchev offered to trade with Yugoslavia to help end the famine.12 Tito

accepted the aid from the USSR, and thus was straddling a dangerous line.

The western countries were understandably upset by this, considering they were the ones

giving aid when Yugoslavia had been left by Stalin to wither and die. Tito feared that the sole

goal of both of the powers was to change and absorb his country. Tito knew that Yugoslavia

9Rajak Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment
(the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014) 150.
10 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 152.
11Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 152.
12 "Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav leaders in Belgrade,"

October 06, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, Fond 52, Opis 1, Delo 349, List 64-113.
Published in "Istochnik" Translated by Gary Goldberg.
would never be safe allying himself with either bloc because both of them had ulterior motives.

He understood that both power blocs wanted him, simply so the other would not have its hooks

in the Balkans. He then decided that he would choose neither the Soviets nor the Western allies.

He had originally quarreled with Stalin over not having a sense of autonomy, so choosing

between these powers would just subject his country further to foreign influence.

Tito still had to ensure the protection of his nation and people, so he in a sense hedged his

bet. He refused to join NATO because he wanted his fellow countrymen to remember who they

were and what their ideals were. He also refused to rejoin or have more than basic

communication with Khrushchev and the USSR. However, he was not opposed to milking the

West for all of the power and resources they were willing to give, especially if this protected

Yugoslavia against Soviet attacks. The security he needed came in the form of the Balkan Pact

which was signed officially on August 9, 1954. This treaty involved Greece, Turkey, and

Yugoslavia. It provided the guaranteed protection against the Soviet regime, that Tito so

desperately needed, without forcing him to join NATO. Tito hedging his bet definitely worked

out in the favor of Yugoslavia in this instance.

Tito began to have the desire to seek allies. However, this was not an option for several

years after the idea was seeded in Tito's mind. This was because currently the United States was

providing the only protection Yugoslavia had against the Soviet Union. If he was to burn this

bridge himself and his people would be at the mercy of Khrushchev and his colossal army. So to

reassure his alliance he told the United States that Yugoslavia was in no way considering

neutralism or isolationism and that the ideas made him cringe. 13 It was only several years later

13 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 55.

that he was finally able to start putting his plan into action. This started with his search for others

to join in a non-aligned movement.

It is important to understand what the goals and ideologies of non-alignment are. George

Liska writes: " Non-aligned countries avoid alliances, refusing to add their power to that of

others."14Non-alignment seeks to provide countries with an alternative option to super blocs. Tito

started this movement at the right time because the tensions between the Soviet Union and

NATO were constantly on the rise. Many feared a World War III was about to begin in the early

1950s, so there was a need for a strong alternative. It is also important to note that the non-

alignment movement is different from historic neutralism. Historic neutralism is maintained by

countries like Switzerland. The mentality of these countries is to simply not get involved in

warfare, and be a mediator if absolutely necessary. However, non-alignment is the commitment

to world peace. The members of this movement would purposefully promote world peace, and

voice their opinions rather than remaining aloof.

Josip Tito's search for allies for his nation began in 1953. At this time Tito had an

unrealistic expectation of who would join his movement. His ego was evident in his search, and

it included going after prominent European countries. He gained support from European

socialists, but there was a limit to their situation. While they expressed vocal support most would

never consider breaking from their national alliance, in pursuit of Tito's then pipe-dream. It was

then that Tito realized that he would have to define more achievable goals. For him, this meant

going after countries in the so-called Third World, and those just now breaking free from the

chains of colonialism.

14 Laurence Martin, Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) 80.
 The first ally that Tito determined was achievable was India. This was because while the

Korean War was raging, it gave this country the option of not choosing the best of the two evils.

After India, Burma and Indonesia were targeted. 15 He used the same passionate ideology to

persuade these countries to join in his grand vision. To further gain a grasp of where these

countries stood, Tito sent his most trust advisor Dijalas to the Rangoon Conference in 1953. This

conference was about forming Asian socialism and was almost a precursor to the incredibly

important Bandung Conference.

After this Tito decided to make his first overseas journey to one of his newly discovered

allies. The destination of convenience was Burma, simply because Burma had formally extended

an invitation for Tito to visit twice. However, Tito was not willing to commit himself fully to

Burma being his first stop in the quest for non-alignment. So instead, he sent a letter saying that

"a visit would not be possible until late 1955" this gave him time to develop other plans. 16 India

was Tito's country of choice for his first visit. This was difficult, however, because of the tension

around this country in the world. Eventually, tensions subsided and Tito was free to start his tour

of Asia and spread his philosophy.

Tito officially began his journey November 30, 1954, and he set out to the capital of

India, New Delhi. 17 There he was to meet Jawaharlal Nehru, who became a close ally and friend

to Tito. They spent a significant amount of time together socializing during Tito's stay, and from

this Tito gained one of his most significant and vital partners in the quest for non-alignment. This

relationship was not so easily gained at first, though. Convincing someone to join a non-aligned

movement when your country has ties to both power blocs was a difficult task. Tito had to

15 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 164.

16 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 164.
17 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 164.
painstakingly explain his motives behind correspondence with the Soviet Union, and his signing

of the Balkan Pact. Also, his correspondence with the Soviet Union was at that time I secret, by

releasing that information to Nehru he formed a bond of trust. He wanted Nehru to see

Yugoslavia as a friend to India and join in the creation of the non-aligned movement. He then

had to explain his relations with the Western World. Rather than admit those relations were for

self-preservation, Tito explained that they were to increase social and economic ties for

Yugoslavia.18 He explained that he did not want everything to be about military strength. He also

had to reiterate several times that signing the Balkan Pact in no way aligned him with NATO,

because it might be interpreted in that way,

Discussing the country's alliances was not a one-way street, however. Nehru also had to

explain to Tito his own political and economic alliances. This was to ensure that the partnership

would be cohesive. Tito was particularly interested in his correspondence with China, and its

representative Zhou Enlai. This was because after the communist party of China won its civil

war in 1949 against the nationalists, it remained heavily allied itself with the Soviets. Nehru

assured Tito that this was no matter and that Sino-Soviet relations were stable. After further

prodding, Nehru said that China and India were willing to live cooperatively despite ideological

differences and that India was dedicated to non-alignment and its allies. 19

However, Tito was still skeptical of the Chinese and their relations with India. This lead

to having an entire meeting dedicated to this conversation. Tito was worried that control of Tibet

might cause strained relationships between India and China, who were definitely a heavy force to

be reckoned with. Nehru was convinced that Chinese influence and certain privileged positions

18 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 164.

19 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 165.
in Tibet that were then inherited by India but which India, from the very beginning, was aware it

was not in a position to maintain control, and that there would be no cause for war. Nehru stated,

"certain privileged positions in Tibet that were then inherited by India but which India, from the

very beginning, was aware it was not in a position to maintain." 20

At the final meeting in India, Tito held an unofficial press conference and discussed his

non-alignment policy in great detail. He outlined the beliefs, and what he believed would be the

driving forces behind its success. Tito also stated, "the policy of non-alignment with blocs, which

they pursue, does not represent neutrality' or neutralism'; neither does it represent passivity as is

sometimes alleged. It represents the positive, active and constructive policy that, as its goal, has

collective peace as the foundation of collective security."21 This statement was important because

without the non-alignment movement could be perceived as weak and fragile. It was imported to

state that they were not passive in any way and that they would make it their mission to protect

those of their movement at any cost while also trying to promote world peace. In this conference,
22
it was also stressed that they would not become the third bloc of the world. This point was

made vocally because it was imperative to Tito and Nehru that those countries that would be

open to this movement understood that they were not a force of negative in the world. They did

not want to force their ideas on other nations, they just wanted peace and to take care of each

other.

Tito ultimately made a great partner in Nehru of India and began his search for more

allies. The next stop on his journey was finally Burma. Burma did not seem phased that Tito had

20 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 165.

21 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 168.
22 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 167.
chosen to visit India first and welcomed him warmly to the country. The leader of Burma at this

time was U Nu. Rather than discuss non-alignment itself with U Nu that focus of many of their

conversations was China and The United States. U Nu aligned himself more with the

communists of the USSR than the western countries like the United States. Tito warned U Nu

that there were no pure ideological distinctions because both power blocs sought power and their
23
own regimes. Tito also warned that the United States had imperialist goals for Asia. This was a

very important statement from Tito because at his core he held the same beliefs as his communist

opponents, and to compare them to the United States the words must have left a very bitter taste

in his mouth.

Throughout his visit to Burma, Tito frequently warned U Nu that he could not be

comfortable in his association with China. China seemed to be playing a game with Burma to

which U Nu was unaware. This was evidenced by U Nu's blind faith in the explanation Zhou

Enlai had given for their actions. Zhou Enlai stated that China had no knowledge of the issues

that U Nu had brought up, and stated that China had no interest in the internal affairs of China. U

Nu's acceptance of this explanation drew the statement from Tito, "As if the left-hand does not

know what the right is doing."24 This highlighted Tito's complete distrust of China and his

skepticism that Burma had the capability to look out for itself. In response to this Tito offered to

supply Burma with weapons, this was to further solidify the belief of activism in neutralism

rather than pacifism.

The next part of Tito's journey involved traveling through much of Asia. He was gone for

several months and visited many countries of importance. His journey in Asia taught him much

23 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 167.

24 Svetozar, No Bargaining Chips, 172.
about the approach that should be taken with countries afraid that they would be overtaken by

one of the other major power blocs. He also learned a great deal about China and whether they

would be deemed a threat or a noncombatant of the movement. His time there was well spent

because he met some of his most important and influential comrades of the non-alignment

movement, several of whom helped him in the official founding of the Non-alignment movement

and its policies.

The Bandung Conference was a major milestone for Tito in the quest for non-alignment.

It was organized not by Tito but by the leaders of Afro-Asian countries. Josip Tito was a given a

great honor of being asked to attend the Bandung conference, because of his strong associations

with Nehru of India. This conference took place on April 18-24, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia.

Attending the conference were 29 countries whose population made up a large percentage of the

world's population. The majority of those who attended this country were representatives of

African or Asian countries, making it the largest Afro-Asian conference to take place in the

world. Nearly all of the countries attending were newly free from the grip of colonialism, with

the exception of countries only observing such as Yugoslavia and China. China was a strange

attendant considering how heavily Mao Zedong his people were aligned with the Soviet Union.

This possibly gave Tito the insight that this alliance could achieve power if a country as strong

and large as China was willing to observe and question it.

The conference, in general, intrigued Josip Tito because he was given the opportunity to

see how his potential allies would work together if they were to join the non-alignment

movement. Richard Wright wrote, "As I watched the dark-faced delegates work at the

conference, I saw a strange thing happen. Before Bandung, most of these men had been

strangers, and on the first day, they were constrained with one another, bristling with charge and
countercharge against America and/or Russia. But, as the days passed, they slowly cooled off,

and another and different mood set in. What was happening? As they came to know one another

better, their fear and distrust evaporated. 25 It is most likely that Josip Tito observed the same sort

of occurrence. This furthered his faith in the movement, and due to this, there was an even

greater push in the recruitment of non-aligned countries.

Another factor of the Bandung Conference that helped Tito in his development of the

non-alignment movement was that during the conference many issues were put forth that were

not necessarily of concern to Josip Tito and his home nation. However, they issues were of

definite concern to his potential allies. He saw how swiftly and civilly things were managed, and

looked on with much appreciation for their tactfulness. He observed intently to learn how to

better help those willing to join the movement and seek refuge in the non-aligned movement.

Tito said this during an interview discussing the conference:

I must admit that the results of the first Afro-Asian Conference have come as a pleasant

surprise to me. For, although I expected that the Conference would be of enormous

importance, I did not anticipate that so many problems would be dealt with and that in the

majority of cases agreement would be reached. The number of Asian and African

countries which took part in the Conference and the tremendous interest in the

Conference prevailing among Asian and African countries show that matters have

reached a historical turning-point, in that the people of the two continents are determined

to decide their own future for themselves, as far as this is possible. It goes without saying

that the results of the Conference can only inspire all friends of peace and international

25 Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, 175.

 co-operation with fresh hope and confidence that the front of peace in the world today

constitutes a powerful factor in the struggle to avoid another war and achieve

international co-operation. We, Yugoslavs, are particularly delighted with these results,

for the conception which prevailed at the Conference is completely in harmony with our

conceptions, both in respect of international co-operation and the strengthening of peace

and also in respect of the right of Asian and African countries to settle their own

problems. 26

It is very easy to make the assumption that the Bandung Conference was the first major

stepping stone in the official founding of the Non alignment movement. However, without the

insistence and determination of Tito things most likely would have never progressed beyond an

unstable alliance of Afro-Asian countries. Tito became the driving force behind much of the

movement whether that be in organization or recruitment.

Tito then began to plan for the future. He wanted his own system, without allying himself

with the power blocs in any shape or form. Although the idea was already in mind, perhaps the

conversation with Khrushchev furthered his determination. In Belgrade on October 1956 when

Nikita Khrushchev was making his visit to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev said, "It is obvious to

everyone that there are two systems in the world, the camp of imperialism and the camp of

socialism, although you don't like it when we talk this way."27 Tito did not accept this statement,

and he argued that everything is not as black and white as it seems, that there is another concept.

Tito's colleagues were quick to jump into this conversation as well. Kardelj said, "It is better to

26 Tito: Selected Speeches and Articles, 1941-1961 pp. 175-176; originally published in Book X, p. 757-152.
27 "Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU" October 06, 1956.
say socialist countries."28 Then Popovich replied saying, "But it is impossible to divide into the

pure and impure."29 Lastly, Khrushchev replied to this saying, "You will not deny that socialist

and capitalist countries exist. This division exists"30 This short conversation could have played a

large role in shaping Tito's determination and ideas about non-alignment. Simply saying that

there was no other option was enough to spark Tito's desire to prove Khrushchev wrong, and be

a leader of his own movement, much like Khrushchev was the Soviets and Churchill and

Eisenhower was of the capitalist West.

The official founding of the Non Alignment movement occurred in Belgrade at a

conference which lasted from September 1 st through September 4th, 1961, directly due to the

efforts of Tito. The meeting in Belgrade initially occurred because there were talks of another

Bandung Conference. This threatened Tito because if China were to attend again its

representatives could encroach on the process he had made in the movement. So instead he

created a meeting that would take place in his country, which gave him home field advantage,

and invited dozens of his fellow believers in non-alignment. The meeting was called The

Conference of Unaligned States in Belgrade.

The Conference was attended by 25 heads of state and government, which demonstrated

the respect many countries held for Tito. To open the procession of the conference Tito and

Nehru stood before their non-alignment counterparts and made the statement that the conference

was being held to increase and improve international relations, but was to solidify the resistance

28"Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU" October 06, 1956.

29 "Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU" October 06, 1956. Wilson Center Archive.
30 "Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU" October 06, 1956. Wilson Center Archive.
of forced settlement and imperialist views.31 The ultimate goal was to officially form a non-

alignment movement, because of the increasing threat of the two power blocs.

During the conference, many countries were given the opportunity to speak their minds.

Most importantly negotiations with power blocks were of grave importance to many of those

attending. Nehru said, negotiations must take place. Should they fail we must try again!

Negotiations are the only safe way in the present dark atmosphere" 32 Negotiations were such an

important aspect of non-alignment success, because if they were to keep themselves completely

cut off from the power blocs, those in power would likely feel threatened, and assume they were

aligned with the other bloc. That could have caused major hostility and armed action which those

attending the conference wanted to avoid if possible. Tito continued to hear what others had to

say on the topics at hand, during the conference. This helped further the faith that many countries

had in Tito and his movement.

On September 1st the first day of the conference Tito stood in front of his guests at the

conference and highlighted all of the things that for so long he had announced to the world. Tito

in his address to the conference attendees stressed the fear that many of them held, and that was

the imminent threat of war. "The fact that this danger has reached its climax is clearly shown by

all the preparations which are now being undertaken. Overt preparations for war are being made,

mobilization is taking place the manufacture of the most modern weapons is being

intensified."33This speech was to encourage those that had not fully committed themselves to his

movement to do so immediately or there would be severe repercussions. Tito continued his

31 "History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement - Mea.gov.in." Ministry of External Affairs.

32 "Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum. NN 28 7.
33 "Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &

Museum. NN 12.
speech and once again announced that the non-aligned movement was not going to be the third

bloc. Josip Tito said, "This conference should adopt a negative attitude towards bloc

exclusiveness, which not only constitutes a threat to world peace but also prevents other

countries from participating as equal partners in solving outstanding international issues."34 This

was important for Tito to stress because, he did not want those attending to believe they were just

choosing a weaker bloc, rather than aligning with the then more powerful EU and Soviet Union.

Throughout the conference, Tito and several of his partners made impassioned speeches

hoping to create an official alignment, which would finally band them all together against the

threats of other world powers. Tito gave speeches on September 3rd which was the third day of

the conference, urging everyone to cooperate no matter the size or economic capabilities of their

countries. Tito openly attacked the policies of such groups as the United Nations and denounced

them for helping to keep undeveloped countries in a position of subservience, instead of giving

them equal participation and helping them to move past their inadequacies. Tito said, "Such

outdated practices must be discarded, that non-aligned countries can no longer reconcile

themselves with the status of observers."35 This once again reiterated his firm belief in the

participation of every country.

Tito at the very core of his speech wanted those attending the conference to understand

that they were not alone in this ideal way of thinking, in fact Tito stated, "I can state without

exaggeration that the countries represented at this conference, as well as many others which did

34"Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum. NN 13.
35Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &

Museum. NN 13.
not belong to any grouping, represent the great majority of the public opinion" 36 This was

perhaps to reinvigorate the belief that the movement could be successful in both recruitment and

ideologically. This speech likely helped to push those still undecided over the edge towards

finally accepting non alignment and helping to create an official founding.

Josip Tito on September 4, 1961, officially founded the Non-aligned movement. No

longer was their idealism and passion just a pipe dream. It was now a full blown reality,

especially considering the acknowledgment they were receiving in western countries. The

recognition is largely due to the political prowess of Tito. He was well known in the first world,

and due to this, the agenda of the non-alignment movement was successfully achieved.

It became important to them to outline the rules of the movement, just as those attending

the Bandung Conference over five years prior had. There were 10 rules that stated,

1. Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the Charter

of the United Nations.

2. Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.

3. Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations, both

large and small.

4. Non-intervention or non-interference into the internal affairs of another -country.

5. Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively, in

conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

36
"Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum.
 6. A. Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great

powers.

B. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries.

7. Refraining from carrying out or threatening to carry out aggression, or from using force

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Peaceful solution of all international conflicts in conformity with the Charter of the

United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interests and of cooperation.

10.Respect of justice and of international obligations. 37

At this time the movement was still small, but thanks to Tito and his fellow members the

non-alignment movement was gaining international momentum and recognition. John F.

Kennedy the then president of the United States was instructed by his associate that he should

probably address what had occurred at the conference. On an unknown date in 1961, John F.

Kennedy wrote, "We know that those that are gathering in Belgrade are committed to finding a

way to halt the waste of the Earth's resources in the building of implements of death and

destruction."38 This statement itself gave credit to what Tito had been trying to achieve all along

and that was international recognition and respect. It also highlights why Tito felt the needs to

reinforce constantly that the United States was also an evil in the world, and that there were no

good sides to choose in this battle other than non-alignment.

37
History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement. Ministry of External Affairs India.
38
"Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum.
 Tito, Nasser of Egypt, Nehru of India, and Sukarno of Indonesia, ultimately became the

official founders of the non-alignment movement. However, this would have been possible

without the great influence of Josip Tito. He began to push the idea through much of the world

and did not confine his search for allies to any one region. After the official founding of the Non-

Alignment movement, Tito's recruitment of allies grew. Keep going about how many countries

joined and the importance of the countries. Africa, Latin America, Asia. In 1961 he had only

managed to attract around 25 members, but by 1965 he had almost 50 countries join, this is a

testament to the influence the Non Aligned movement had gained due to the efforts of Tito.

The surge in members mainly occurred because, after The Bandung Conference and The

Conference of Unaligned States in Belgrade, Tito had more access to recruitment. Africa played

a large role in the Bandung Conference, but Tito began to pay special attention to the countries

of Latin America during 1962. He was particularly interested in Brazil. This was due to the

respect Brazil garnered in Latin America. Tito thought that by recruiting Brazil and its people

that soon other Latin American countries would follow. Tito also had great respect for Brazil and

its leader President Goulart39. Tito demonstrated this respect by asking Goulart's opinion on the

most immedite and important issue at the time which was the Cuban Missile Crisis. 40 This

comradery eventually opened the door for Latin American countries to join the movement in the

following years.

Tito's belief that he was a force in the world, was finally coming to fruition. The success

of the non-alignment movement not only gained respect and recognition from the United States

39"Letter from Yugoslav President Tito to Brazilian President Goulart," October 26, 1962, History and Public Policy
Program Digital Archive, Archivo Histrico Diplomtico Genaro Estrada, Secretara de Relaciones Exteriores,
Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.
40 "Letter from Yugoslav President Tito to Brazilian President Goulart," October 26, 1962.
and its western allies but the Soviet Union as well. Pavolitch writes that "In the 1960's, Yugoslav

foreign policy was occasionally as close to the Soviet as that of any Warsaw Pact ally-when their

interests coincided."41 This was a great testament that Tito once hedging his bets between

western and Soviet support, was now in most ways considered their equal.

Tito and his founding members then held a second conference on October 5, 1964.

However, as a demonstration that everyone had an equal partnership in this movement Tito

allowed it to be hosted in Cairo the capital city of another founding member Nasser. The second

conference also shifted the focus of the conference from fear of armament and nuclear war and

more toward the unfairness of economic conditions in the worlds. Yugoslavia itself was not

economically stable, but it was faring well compared to other member nations. Tito had touched

on this in the previous meeting, but now this issue had his full attention. It was mentioned by

Tito during a previous session said, Is it not tragic that so much should be spent on armaments

when it has been estimated that one-tenth of this huge rate of expenditure involved would be

enough to raise the whole of the less developed world to the level of the self-sustaining

economy. "42 This statement highlighted the struggle of many of the countries Tito had recruited

and helped further the disconnect between those nations and the power blocs.

In 1968 Yugoslavia entered what is commonly referred to as "The Great Fear of 1968." 43

This was one of the most serious tests of Tito's commitment to the non-alignment movement

during his lifetime. Tito was once again, unlike most his non-alignment counterparts, torn

between giving his support to the West or the Soviets. All of his countries personal problems put

41Pavlowtich, Great Dictator, 70.

4242"Non-Aligned Nations Summit Meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library &
Museum.
43 Pavlowitch, Great Dictator, 72.
a halt on the next convention that was to take place in Belgrade. This conference was of dire

importance because the influence of the movement was steadily declining even though there

were over several dozen countries officially dedicated to it at this time. So at 77 years old Tito

personally travels to Lusaka to speak with President Kaunda and hold another official meeting on

non-alignment."44 Tito did this in attempts of reinvigorating the importance of the movement. In

doing this Tito showed his dedication to the prolonged success, and ultimately kept the

movement fresh in the minds of the world.

Josip Tito died May 4, 1980. Yugoslavia would soon be in chaos due to their leaders of

over 40 years' death. Josip Tito had led Yugoslavia through some of its harshest times, so the

government sought to uphold his legacy of non-alignment after his death. However, Yugoslavia

would soon have more to worry about than non-alignment simply. There began to be unrest

among the different ethnicities of Yugoslavia. Each seeking something different. On June 5,

1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia officially

disbanded in 2003.

Non-Alignment changed after the death of Josip Tito, with his death and the breakup of

Yugoslavia no longer would European countries be involved in the movement. The only

remnants that remain are Bosnia, Serbia, and Herzegovina who have observer status but have

shown no interest in ever truly joining non-alignment once more. However, the movement

continued to spread through the world, particularly in the Middle East and now almost the

entirety of Africa.

44 Pavlowtich, Great Dictator, 72.

 In the world today Josip Tito's legacy of non-alignment lives on. Although the movement

has struggled since the end of the Cold War there are still a significant amount of members that

command respect. The members of this movement occupy almost half of the world's population!

However, the movement has remained almost the same in terms of economic levels of member

countries. They are all third world countries, which upholds Tito's belief that everyone should be

involved, without being forced to be pawns in larger countries game. Overall, Josip Tito

achieved his goal in creating a new political path for countries, where they would not be

subservient to those larger and more powerful than themselves.

 Bibliography

Secondary Sources

Martin Laurence, Neutralism and Nonalignment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) 80

Povlowitch Steven, Slovenias Great Dictator Tito (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,

1992)

History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement. Ministry of External Affairs India.

Svetozar Rajak, No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold

War Non-Alignment (the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts In

Tito Threatened to Assassinate Stalin." Daljecom English All News at Portal Daljecom RSS

stitute of Technology, 2014)

West Richard, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Carrol and Graf Publishers,

1994)

Primary Sources

"Soviet Plan to Assassinate Tito," January 01, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital

Archive, Dmitrii Volkogonov, Izvestiia (11 June 1993). Translated for CWIHP by Natasha Shur.

"Note from N. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium regarding conversations with Yugoslav

leaders in Belgrade," October 06, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,

APRF, Fond 52, Opis 1, Delo 349, List 64-113. Published in "Istochnik" Translated by Gary

Goldberg.
"Letter from Yugoslav President Tito to Brazilian President Goulart," October 26, 1962, History

and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archivo Histrico Diplomtico Genaro Estrada,

Secretara de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. Obtained by James Hershberg, translated by

Eduardo Baudet and Tanya Harmer.

Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. Presidents Office Files. Subjects. Non-Aligned

Nations summit meeting, Belgrade, 1 September 1961

Wright Richard, The Color Curtain (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956)