G.R. No.

3070 February 11, 1907

THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUAN CABILING,Defendant-Appellant.

WILLARD, J.:

The defendant was charged in the court below with the murder of Clarence T. Allen on the 22d of November, 1905. He
was convicted of that crime and sentenced to life imprisonment. From this judgment he appealed.

The evidence in the court below was contradictory. The substance of the testimony of Levina F. Allen, widow of the
deceased, and a witness for the Government, as stated in the Attorney-General's brief, is as follows:

The defendant, Juan Cabiling, was a student of the Government school at Ormoc, and the deceased was the principal
of said school. On the morning of November 22, 1905, a normal school was opened at Ormoc for the training of
teachers from the various towns on the western coast of Leyte. Mr. Allen was authorized to select from the students
those who were to be promoted to said school. The defendant was one of those who desired to attend said school, and
on the morning in question as soon as the class under the direction of Mrs. Allen assembled the defendant, who was
one of the students of said class, inquired of Mrs. Allen if he was not going to be in said normal class, and upon being
answered 'no' he stated that he was not satisfied. Mrs. Allen went on with the recitation with which she was then
engaged, and while she was thus engaged the defendant kept talking in a very rude manner, grumbled and refused to
study, wherefore she told him two or three times to stop because she must hear the recitation; a little later, as soon as
the recitation in class four was over, and Mrs. Allen, desired to turn back to part second of the book for review,
because they had no other books, the defendant told her that grammars must be available and that he was not
satisfied, as there arrived of supply of same, and upon being answered that the grammars were for the normal school
teachers, the defendant got up and said to Mrs. Allen that she had told a lie by telling him that he could go into the
normal school and now he was held back in the lower grade. In view of this behavior of the defendant, Mrs. Allen said
that she would go to talk with Mr. Allen and have him settle the matter. Mrs. Allen left the room in the direction of the
library, where Mr. Allen was, and told him that it would be better to send the defendant home and tell him to come
back at 2 p. m. The deceased gave his assent and followed Mrs. Allen into the room, where the defendant was, and
coming to the place where the latter sat, Mr. Allen said to him: "What is the matter with you this morning, Juan? If you
are not satisfied here you may go away." The defendant upon hearing these words, rushed upon the deceased and
stabbed him in the stomach; the deceased pushed him back a distance of about 4 feet, and then the defendant gave
deceased a second blow in the same place, whereupon the deceased caught the defendant by the right hand wherein
he had the knife, and by the neck. At this stage of the struggle the lieutenant of the municipal police arrived and
pointing his revolver at the defendant separated them and took the knife away from the defendant.

Her evidence is corroborated by that of Wilbur Chamberlain, another eyewitness, and by that of James F. Godward, who
witnessed the termination of the struggle.

The fact which the evidence for the defense tended to establish are stated in the brief of the Attorney-General as
follows:

. . . That on the morning in question, after Mrs. Allen had distributed some paper for the lesson in arithmetic, she left
the room and shortly afterwards the deceased came and, taking the defendant by one ear, caused him to stand up and
then kicked him, took him by the arms with both hands and shook him against a table, which fell down, and again
advancing to where the defendant was standing took him by the neck and tried to throw him upon the floor; then the
police arrived and took Cabiling to the municipal building. All the witnesses for the defendant admitted that when the
deceased arrived the defendant had a knife in his hands and was sharpening a pencil with it, but they stated positively
that they had not seen him assail the deceased nor strike him with said knife. The defendant himself flatly denied this
fact.

The substance of the evidence on both sides is correctly stated in the quotations above made. Allen died as a result of
these wounds.

After a careful and somewhat lengthy analysis of the testimony of the witnesses on both sides, the Attorney General
says:

We find in the records sufficient data to lead us to the belief that the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is
more reliable than that of the witnesses for the defense. Upon the apparent improbability of the testimony of the
witnesses for the defense, we have stated that there was a marked sign of conspiracy between them. We need only to
add, at this time, that the testimony of the defendant lends strength to our belief in this matter. He emphatically
denied having inflicted, either designedly or undesignedly any of the wounds shown in the body of the deceased, and
asserted that he could not possibly have inflicted such wounds, nor did he know how they were inflicted. We can not
believe the truth of this testimony of the defendant, for to do so it would be necessary to presume that he was
unconscious at the time in question. The absolute denial made by the defendant clearly shows his well-planned and
decided purpose of concealing everything that might be damaging to him. . . . He and the deceased were the only
parties to the difficulty, the defendant alone carried a knife and no one except the latter could have inflicted the
wounds on the deceased. If said wounds were caused as he alleged while he defended himself against assault, there
was no reason whatever for attempting to conceal such fact, because the circumstance would be a sufficient ground
for finding him not guilty; but behind an absurd and incredible denial, there arises in the mind the conviction that he is
in fact guilty of the crime in question, and that he perpetrated the same in the manner testified to by the witnesses for
the prosecution. As against such a lack of veracity on the part of the defendant and his witnesses, we have to admit as
legal truth the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution given with evident frankness and sincerity to the effect
that said defendant assailed the deceased in the manner recited by them, and inflicted the wounds that caused his
death.

Our examination of the evidence has lead us to the same conclusion which the Attorney-General has reached, and we
are satisfied beyond any doubt that the testimony of the Government's witnesses is true; that there was no aggression
on the part of the deceased, and that the first attack came from the defendant. He is accordingly criminally liable for
the death of Allen.

The next question to be considered is whether the crime committed was that of homicide or murder. In order to raise
the guilt of a person to the grade of murder it is necessary that one of the elements specified in article 403 of the
Penal Code be proven. The Attorney-General is of the opinion that no one of these requisites was proven, and that the
crime committed was homicide. With this conclusion we can not agree. Among the circumstances which qualify the
act, there is mentioned in article 403 "treachery" ( alevosia). The killing was done with a pocketknife. It is very
apparent from the evidence that Allen had no suspicion that the defendant intended to make any attack upon him, and
there is nothing to show that Allen knew that the defendant had this knife in his possession; in fact, Mrs. Allen, who
was standing near her husband, testified that she did not see the knife until the second blow was struck. It has been
held in the supreme court of Spain that a sudden and unexpected attack upon another is proof of treachery, and we
have repeatedly made the same ruling In the case of the United States, vs. Babasa (2 Phil. Rep., 102) the following
statement is made in the syllabus:

One who kills another by suddenly and unexpectedly inflicting a mortal wound with a knife is guilty of murder, as the
means used in the commission of the crime constitute alevosia.

The punishment for the crime of murder consists of three degrees. The minimum degree, which is the maximum
degree of the penalty known as cadena temporal, is imprisonment from seventeen years four months and one day to
twenty years, the medium degree is life imprisonment, and the maximum degree is death.

In the case at bar it was proven that the defendant was born of the 12th day of September, 1888, and was, therefore,
at the time of the offense was committed 17 years and 2 months old. The penalty above mentioned for the crime of
murder is, by the terms of the Penal Code, inflicted only upon those persons who are more than 18 years old. By the
provisions of article 85 of the said code, if the defendant is more that 15 years and less than 18 years of age, the
penalty provided in article 403 can not be inflicted, but in its place there must be inflicted the penalty immediately
inferior to the one indicated by that article. The highest of the common crimes known to our law are parricide and
robbery with homicide, but if the person who commits either one of these crimes is under 18 years of age, the greatest
punishment which can be inflicted upon him is imprisonment for twenty years. In this case the punishment to be
imposed upon the defendant is the penalty immediately inferior to that provided in article 403. That penalty consists
of two indivisible penalties, namely, death and life imprisonment; and the maximum degree of a divisible penalty,
namely, cadena temporal. By article 75, paragraph 3, of the Penal Code it is provided, that the penalty immediately
inferior to such penalty, as the one named in article 403 shall be the medium and minimum degrees of the divisible
penalty and the maximum degree of the penalty which follows the divisible penalty in the general scale. Applying that
article to the case at bar, it results that the penalty applicable is the maximum degree of presidio mayor to the
medium degree of cadena temporal; that is to say, imprisonment from ten years and one day to seventeen years and
four months.

If none of the extenuating circumstances mentioned in article 9 of the Penal Code, nor any of the aggravating
circumstances mentioned in article 10 are proven, the penalty should be inflicted in the medium degree, that is from
twelve years and one day to fourteen years and eight months.
The attorney-General is of the opinion that article 11 of the Penal Code should be considered as an extenuating
circumstance. That article is as follows:

The circumstance of the culprit being a native, mestizo, or Chinese shall be taken into consideration by the judges and
courts for the purpose of increasing or reducing the penalties according to the degree of respective intention, the
nature of the act, and the conditions of the person offended, which shall be left to the judgment of the former.

We can not agree with this conclusion. The evidence shows that the defendant, so far from being an ignorant boy, was
one of the most, if not the most, intelligent in his class, and in such cases we have never considered article 11 as an
extenuating circumstance.

As to the aggravating circumstance, we agree with the Attorney-General that of known premeditation was not proven,
and that circumstance 20 of article 10 was proven. That provision of article 10 is as follows:

When the act is committed with insult or in disregard for the respect which may be due the aggrieved party on account
of his rank, age, or sex, or when it is committed in his dwelling, if he has not given provocation.

It is applicable to this case because the person attacked was the teacher and the person attacking was the pupil.

There being one aggravating circumstance and no extenuating circumstance, the penalty must according to the law,
be imposed in the maximum degree and we fix it at fourteen years eight months and one day of imprisonment
( cadena temporal).

The judgment of the court below is modified by imposing instead of life imprisonment the penalty of fourteen years
eight months and one day of cadena temporal, and the payment of 1,000 pesos, Philippine currency, to the heirs of
the deceased as indemnity. In all other respects the judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and
ten days thereafter the case remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014, FELINA ROSALDES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Michael Ryan, a Grade 1 pupil at a public elementary school in Lambunao, Iloilo, was in a hurry to enter
his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, Felina, who was then sleeping in a
bamboo sofa. Instead of apologizing, Michael proceeded to his seat, where upon, Felina pinched him on
his thigh, held him up by the armpits, and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael hit a desk, and he
lost consciousness. Even so, Felina picked him up by the ear and repeatedly slammed him on the floor.
Felina then proceeded to teach class. Michael went home crying and reported the incident to his mother,
who, accompanied by her sister reported the incident to the Barangay Captain. A medical examination
was conducted on Michael, and corresponding medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador.
Thereafter, Felina was charged with violation of Republic Act 7610. Felina was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act 7610, duly affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
hence she elevated her case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction
of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the
violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family
Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis),
viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioners physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr.
Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who
examined the victim at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from
the time the boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 12 cm. and 11 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 11 and 11 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr.
Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the
extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim
could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level
of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter
felt pain when she put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or
contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victims left inner thigh. According to her this
could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part
of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:
xxxx
(b) Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of
his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds
or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh
and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit
the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-
appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor. On her part, the trial
judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma
that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to
transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such established circumstances proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryans physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or
only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she
had also experienced the petitioners cruelty. The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City
(Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada. Such
previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had a propensity for violence, as the trial judge
stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.
XXX
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form
and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein;
and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of law was consequently violated.
The petitioners submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the
context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra,
and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioners challenge against the sufficiency of the
information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she
pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in
her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delicto because no evidence had been
adduced thereon. The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The explanation
tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however, because even without proof of the
actual expenses, or testimony on the victims feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define
and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely
inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied
that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain
error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People, it was
imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine
the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to
recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery, explaining the reason for doing so in the following
manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived. Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest
the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time
a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of
the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their
rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is
what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex
delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them.
The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and in
that respect the Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled
to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at
least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by
the petitioner was aggravated her being a public schoolteacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its
maximum period pursuant to Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a deterrent to
other public schoolteachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra,
against the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The
lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victims treatment should not hinder the granting of a
measure of compensation in the form of temperate damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty. There being no question about the injuries sustained requiring medical treatment,
temperate damages of at least P20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize
the need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil
liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abuse committed by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the RTC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the
maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.
It cited Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act
shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee. Her being a
public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as admitted by
her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three
periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight
months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four
months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate
sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four
months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from
prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years,
four months and one day of prision mayor.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011, AQUINAS SCHOOL, PETITIONER, VS. SPS. JOSE
INTON AND MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, ON THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD, JOSE
LUIS S. INTON, AND SR. MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP, RESPONDENTS.

Jose Luis was a grade three student at the Aquinas School, while Sister Margarita was a religion teacher
who started teaching at the school only that year. On July 14, 1998m while Sister Margarita was writing
on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went to a classmate to play a prank on the latter.
Despite Sister Margaritas instruction for him to go back to his seat, Jose Luis kept on going back again.
Unable to tolerate anymore the childs behavior, Sister Margarita approached Jose Luis and kicked him on
the leg several times; pulled and shoved his head on his classmates seat, and told him to stay in on the
floor and finish copying the notes on the board while seated on the floor. Because of this, Jose Luiss
parents, Jose and Ma. Victoria, filed a case for damages against Aquinas School and Sister Margarita.
They also filed a separate criminal case for violation of Republic Act 7610 against Sister Margarita, to
which she pleaded guilty. The RTC held Sister Margarita liable for damages but absolved the school. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the RTC judgment but found the school liable for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, finding that an employer-employee relationship existed
between it and Sister Margarita. Both parties appealed the CA decision. On one hand, the school
contended that it cannot be held liable, insisting that it was the congregation who selected Sister
Margarita to catechise its grade three students, pursuant to the schools agreement with the
congregation for the latter to send sisters so it can fulfil its ministry of catechising students. On the
other hand, the spouses sought to increase the amount of damages awarded by the courts.
The Supreme Court:
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test to determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has
power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is the element of
control. Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control
the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters
under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to
provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious
congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the
way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins teaching
methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it
was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no
steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach
religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious
congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she
would behave properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the
standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was
allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was really
catechizing the students.
And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation.Unfortunately,
since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity
to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the
school learned of the incident. It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater amounts of damages, the Court finds no justification
for this since they did not appeal from the decision of the CA. The Intons prayed for the increase only in
their comment to the petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any affirmative relief other than
those that the CA already granted them in its decision.

G.R. No. 211362 Political Law Constitutional Law Academic Freedom

Remedial Law Mandamus Ministrant vs Discretionary Function

Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14,
2013, Cudias class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was
from 1:30pm to 3pm.

However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia
to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher
reported Cudia for being late.

In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer
(TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late
because the OR teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring
hours because of said infraction.

Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia
said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write
his appeal.

In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while
his English class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the
teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at
3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed
from said class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that
it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class, each
student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered
by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by
Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that time
querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a class; Cudia could just have stated all that instead of
saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.

Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly,
Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next
class.

The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof
may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.

Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an
investigation. After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC
reconvened and the members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia.
Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice
of chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the
tyranny of the minority. After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial not guilty vote was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside
PMAs holding center.

Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the
dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.

Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-investigation.
It was their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case
of Cudia was referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).

Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that
PMAs sham investigation violated Cudias rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.

Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the
CHR found in favor of Cudia.

PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamusbefore the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a
matter of policy and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cudias petitions is proper.

2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

HELD:

I.

Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudias prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to
give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do
so because the act of restoring Cudias rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act.
Mandamus cannot be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMAs
academic freedom as an educational institution and such performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.

Certiorari is allowed

The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide
actual controversies and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse
of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy.
Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.

On the civil liberties of PMA cadets

One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their
civil and political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the
same, much less, question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.

On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to
subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with
a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private
interests are at stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due
process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not
exempt from such strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the
PMA, such controversy may be inquired upon by the courts.

(Authors note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in
dismissing a cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact,
complied with.)

II. Yes. It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the
institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded
due process. In this case, the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and
existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case
would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written
explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation
to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the
chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough
discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG
(Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate
the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the
CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally,
he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no
reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.

Academic freedom of the PMA

Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications
for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts
investigation of Honor Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from
service.

Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to
administratively dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to
dismiss cadets. Such power by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.

Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be
precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the
Constitution.

The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;

a. the right to determine who may teach;

b. the right to determine what may be taught;

c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;

d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates
it, then it has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a violation of the
Honor Code.

But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?

The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not
have a gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia
enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be
severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering
that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.

Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center

GRN 141994 January 17, 2005
Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program Expose. Respondent Ago was the owner of the Medical & Educational
center, subject of the radio program Expose. AMEC claimed that the broadcasts were defamatory and owner Ago and
school AMEC claimed for damages. The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With
the supposed expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious imputations and as such, destroyed plaintiffs
reputation. FBNI was included as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The trial court found Rimas statements to be within the bounds of freedom of speech
and ruled that the broadcast was libelous. It ordered the defendants Alegre and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for moral
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.

RULING:

A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
Nevertheless, AMECs claim, or moral damages fall under item 7 of Art 2219 of the NCC.

This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral
damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implied damages. In such a case, evidence of an
honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. In this
case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However, we find the award
P500,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous, per se,
AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral
damages to P150k.

v JOIN TORT FEASORS are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advice countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, as who approve of it after it is done, for its benefit.