Every publication must be read as a whole.

F) Defamation
Tony N. Figueroa and Rogelio J. Flaviano v. People of the Philippines (2006)
Facts:
The city prosecutor of Davao, at the instance of one Rivera, filed Information for libel
against herein petitioners, Figueroa and Flaviano. The information states that Figueroa, a writer
under the column entitled Footprints of the People's Daily Forum, conspiring, confederating
and helping one another with his co-accused Flaviano, Publisher-Editor of the same magazine,
with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, integrity, character as well as the reputation
and the social standing of Rivera and with intent to cast dishonor, discredit and contempt upon
said Rivera, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously published in the People's Daily Forum, a news
publication against Figueroa who was said to be backed by powerful city government hooligans
who have direct hand in the planned manipulation in the distribution of stalls to privileged
applicants in the Bangkerohan public market in the city of Davao, which newspaper was read by
the people throughout Davao City, to the dishonor, discredit and contempt upon said Aproniano
Rivera.
RTC rendered its decision finding both petitioners guilty. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
Issue: Whether or not the column entitled Footprints of the People s Daily Forum is
libelous or defamatory to private complainant Rivera Yes!
Decision: Petition DENIED.
In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass off the subject published article as
one that portrays the condition of the Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v.
Reyes, they challenge the finding of the two courts below on the libelous or defamatory nature
of the same article which, to them, must be read and construed in its entirety. It is their
posture that the article was not directed at the private character of complainant Rivera but on
the sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.
While it is true that a publication's libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive
taken in their entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention of private
complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that the article was a mere general
commentary on the alleged existing state of affairs at the aforementioned
public market because Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein but
was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this name-calling was, as correctly found
by the two courts below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.
If, as argued, the published article was indeed merely intended to innocently present the
current condition of the Bankerohan Public Market, there would then be no place in the
article for the needless name-calling which it is wrought full of. It is beyond comprehension how
calling Rivera a leech, a paper tiger, a non-Visayan pseudobully with the arrogance of
a tribal chieftain save for his speaking in some strange Luzon lingo and twang and who
has no business being in Davao orBankerohan can ever be regarded or viewed as
comments free of malice. As it is, the tag and description thus given Rivera have no place in a
general account of the situation in the public market, and cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be construed to be anything other than what they really are: defamatory and
libelous in nature, and definitely directed at the private character of complainant Rivera. For
indeed, no logical connection can possibly be made between Rivera's Luzon origin and the
conditions of the Bankerohan Public Market. Doubtless, the words used in the article reek of
venom towards the very person of Rivera.
 Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the complainant or to excite derogatory
feelings or opinions about him. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.
In the light of the numerable defamatory imputations made against complainant Rivera as
a person, the article in dispute, even taken, as urged, in its totality, undeniably caused serious
damage to his character and person and clearly injurious to his reputation.
At any rate, in libel cases, the question is not what the writer of the libelous
material means, but what the words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of the
words used by the petitioners is shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article.
Publication Tiburcio Guita vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Luz Soriano Haguisan & Cesar Benedicto
must be Haguisan (1985)
read as a Facts:
whole. Haguisan was employed as security guard of the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). Before 1970, the MMIC general manager was shot and killed by one of the Company
security guards. As an aftermath of this accident, all MMIC security guards were subjected to
psychiatric examination.
The psychiatric examination of Haguisan was conducted by Dr. Nora, who made the following
findings:
... He has admitted to frequent "absent minded spells" in the last few years. ...
Calculating ability is poor, indicating poor concentration and memory. ... With
memory for design test, he made six mistakes which is interpreted as borderline
for motor-perceptual skill impairment ... . His profile shows that of a poorly
adjusted individual both in his personal adjustments and his social adjustment ...
Impression: Borderline mental capacity with mild to moderate memory
impairment and poor calculating ability...
Most of above factors noted were not in satisfactory levels and tests also
indicated significant impairment of mental functioning.
Dr. Nora concluded that Haguisan was
psychiatrically unfit for the job position of security guard at the time he was
examined (1970), and that he cannot be recommended for the job position of
security guard, but that he may be gainfully employed in other departments that
require less mental alertness and jobs that do not require evening shifts.
Based on the foregoing psychiatric report, the services of Haguisan were terminated.
Subsequently, Haguisan requested from Guita, MMIC Administrative Officer, a certification
regarding his MMIC service, as he was then looking for another job. Guita gave this certification
to Haguisan:
This is to certify that Mr. Cesar B. Haguisan has been employed by Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation as Security Guard in its Sipalay Mine, Negros
Occidental, from August 21, 1956, up to the date of his separation on February 23,
1971, with a monthly rate of P371.06, after he was found mentally unfit to work.
In 1973, Haguisan and his wife filed a complaint for damages against Guita, Dr. Nora, Santos
(MMIC Sipalay general manager) and Abendao (MMIC chief security guard). The suit was
based on the allegedly false and derogatory statements regarding Haguisan's mental state
which, according to plaintiffs, were not only designed to ease Haguisan out of MMIC but also to
ruin his chances of obtaining employment elsewhere.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding no malice in preparation of the psychiatric report
on Haguisan or the certification subsequently issued on the basis thereof. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal except as to herein petitioner Guita, who was ordered to pay Haguisan
the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and costs upon the finding that it was "mean and
malicious on the part of Guita to unqualifiedly certify that Haguisan was 'mentally unfit to work',
without clarifying, as Dr. Nora had done in her report, that Haguisan was 'psychiatrically unfit for
the job position of security guard at the time he was examined (1970)' but that 'he may be
gainfully employed in other departments that require less mental alertness and jobs that do not
require evening shifts'. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, assailing the
decision of the appellate court for lack of basis.
Issue: Whether or not Guita was motivated by malice or bad faith when he made the
certification.

Decision: NO.
Going to the certification itself, private respondents' claim for damages is based on the
statement in Guita's certification that Haguisan was "employed by MMIC as security guard ...
from August 21, 1956 up to the date of his separation on February 23, 1971 ..., after he was
found mentally unfit to work. "It would seem that the underlined portion is a reasonably fair
statement based on the professional findings in the psychiatric report.
As to the generality of the statement of mental unfitness to work, suffice it to say that the
certification should be read and construed as a whole. So viewed, it is clear that the statement
can refer only to unfitness to work as security guard, for it was that position, and no other, from
which Haguisan was separated. The said position was the only subject matter of the certification.
Finally, the certification was made by Guita upon the request of Haguisan himself and was given
to no one but the latter. Thus, the court finds petitioner Guita not guilty of any wrongful act. It
follows also that he cannot be liable for moral damages.
Catalino Arafiles vs. Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy Morales, Max Buan, Jr., and
Manuel Villareal, Jr. (2004)
Facts:
At about 2 a.m. while respondent Morales a reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight was at the
Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters, Emelita Despuig, an employee of the National
Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director,
for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. In the presence of
Morales, Emelita executed a sworn statement narrating the events surrounding the reported
offenses committed against her by petitioner. It was later on written in the police blotter and
perused by Morales. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Emelita for the purpose of
reporting the same in the next issue of Peoples Journal Tonight. By his claim, he, after the
interview, tried to contact Arafiles at the NIAS office to verify Emelitas story but failed, the office
having already closed.
Morales then wrote an account about Emelitas complaint and submitted it to his editor. That
same day, Morales report appeared as headline on Peoples Journal Tonight reading: GOVT
EXEC RAPES COED, By ROMY MORALES. About a year following the publication, petitioner
instituted a complaint before the RTC against respondents for damages. Petitioner alleged on
account of the grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item
aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the (PAGASA)
was injured; he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-
crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the position of
Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.
In their Answer respondents prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, they alleging that the
news item, having been sourced from the Police Blotter which is an official public document and
bolstered by a personal interview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the
protective constitutional provision of freedom of the press. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA
reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and dismissed petitioners complaint.

ISSSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended
with malice to thus freeing respondents from liability for damages. No, the news item was
not attended with malice.
DECISION: Petition DENIED.

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be construed as an entirety
including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or
strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope,
spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety.
A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the
readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So, the whole item, including
display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus
determined.
In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be
considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The headlines
of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the
headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director
of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding
paragraphs sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an
account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but the court do not consider
that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused
the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In
the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines;
and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

MVRS vs Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils.2003

 ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than
seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T.
LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and
IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in
their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS,
JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar , a daily tabloid. The
article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na angmgababoy at kahitanonguringhayopsa Mindanao ay hindikinakainngmga Muslim?
Para sakanilaangmgaito ay isangsagradongbagay. Hindi nilaitokailangangkaininkahitnasila pa
ay magutom at mawalanngulamsatuwingsila ay kakain. GinagawanilaitongDiyos at sinasamba
pa nilaitosatuwingarawngkanilangpangingilinlalung-lalonasaarawnatinatawagnilang Ramadan."
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement wasinsulting and damaging to the Muslims;
not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these libelous wordsBulgar insulted not
only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC.,
and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the article did not mention
respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that
the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor
intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.
RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically
identified
CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamicfaith. The suit for
damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious
status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it therequisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all
Muslims.

ISSUES:

1. WON Islamic DaWah has a cause of action for libel.NO.

2. WON in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional tort and notlibel.NO.

HELD:

1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel. DOCTRINES:

Defamation - which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements.It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the
esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the
plaintiff.It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to
bring him into disrepute.Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others
in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse
however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not
make it actionable by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of
such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression,
as well as of the press.

APPLICATION:
There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by theBulgar article. Since the persons allegedly
defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot
sue for a class allegedly disparaged. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct
in the community. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an
opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the
reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel.
Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common
reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

DOCTRINE:
If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to anyone
in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. As the size of these groups increases, the chances for
members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace
two (2) important public policies: First, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume that no reasonable
reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual member.Second, the limitation on
liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a
sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases.

APPLICATION:

The Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed.
CASES/AUTHORITY CITED:
i.)
Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court : Associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental filed
against Newsweek over an article "Island of Fear" allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by
exploitative wealthy landowners and sugar planters who also brutalized and killed underpaid planters.SC
dismissed complaint on the ground that no allegation in the complaint that the article complained of specifically
referred to any of them. Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.
ii.)
Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company
: US CA held that the one guiding principle of group libel is thatdefamation of a large group does not give rise to a
cause of action on the part of an individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
iii.)
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Punos opinion:Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel (written) and slander (oral).
In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a "relationalinterest"
since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff. The law of
defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring,retaining and enjoying one's reputation as
good as one's character and conduct warrant.Defamation requires that something be communicated to a third
person that may affect theopinion others may have of the plaintiff. It must be shown that this communication
wouldtend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing in the community.
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of adefamation action is upon the
allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictableeffect upon third persons.
The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that "tends to so harmthe reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deterthird persons from associating or dealing with him."
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove: (1)published a statement that
was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff. The rulein libel is that the action must be brought by the
person against whom the defamatorycharge has been made. Plaintiff must be the person with reference to
whom the statement was made.
If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, theyapplied to any member of
the group, and an individual member could maintain an action fordefamation. In contrast, if defamatory words are
used broadly in respect to a large class orgroup of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper
colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a
right of action for libel or slander. A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group
and whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member.

2.
Regarding the argument that the present case is an intentional tortious act causingmental distressand not an
action for libel.InvokingChaplinsky v. New Hampshirewhere the U.S. SC held that profanity, intended merely to
incite hostility, have no social value and do not enjoy protection; andBeauharnais v. Illinoiswhere it was also ruled
that hate speech against a group (based on religion, ethnicity, etc.) may validly be prohibited.

COURT: NO. "Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by anindividualto
assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.

APPLICATION:No particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Here, it isrelational harm
which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the
principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of aninfliction of
emotional distress
.
DOCTRINES:

Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must
show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.
 "Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
civilized society.

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and
chagrin.

"Severe emotional distress," - he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person
could be expected to endure it;severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of
damages.

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell:A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring ReverendFalwell depicting him in
an inebriated state having an incestuous, sexual liaison with his mother. US Court held that it was not libelous,
because no reasonable reader would have understood it as a factual assertion. But still $200,000 awarded on a
separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional distress," a cause of action that did not require a false
statement of fact to be made. Here, an intentional tort causing emotional distress gives way to the fundamental
right to free speech.

People v APPLICATION: The conduct of petitioners was not extreme or outrageous. Neither was theemotional distress
aquino, 18 allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable personcould be expected to endure it. There is
scra 555
no evidence on record that points to that result.
Privileged
Doctrine of privileged communication
communication: NAVARRETE VS CA and GENEROSO[G.R. No. 124245. February 15, 2000]
Facts:
On senate, Petitioner Atty. Antonio Navarrete is one of the defendants in a civil case filed byprivate respondent
absolute no
liability. LeonilaGeneroso for the annulment of a deed of sale executed over her property on the ground that her
purported signature therein was forged. Accordingly, the aforecited Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase was
On prepared and notarized by petitioner. Petitioner claims that the statements made by private respondent in
lawyers/pleadinher amended complaint and her testimonies in the course of the trial falsely and maliciously slandered him.
gs, insulting
remarks in the Petitioner likewise insists that private respondent Generoso alluded to him when she said the words "stupid",
pleadings are "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" while testifying on the Deed of Sale. Hence, in his counterclaim,
not actionable petitioner prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorneys fees by private respondent. The RTC
for as long as it dismissed the case against petitioner and granted his prayer for the award of damages. Nevertheless, when the
is not libelous,
meaning, you case was appealed to the CA, it modified the decision and deleted said award of damages. Petitioner now assails
are intentionallythe denial of his right to recover moral damages and attorneys fees from private respondent.
attacking the Issue:
personality of WON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral damages and attorneys fees to petitioner No!
the other
counsel. Held:
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in revoking the award of moral
damages and attorneys fees to petitioner. It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the
defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in hand
or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the person making these statements such as a judge, lawyer or witness does not
The only remedy for the aggrieved is an order that the insulting words be stricken off the pleadings.
thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the
recovery of damages.[19]The doctrine that statements made during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy the
shield of absolute privilege was first categorically established in the case of Sisonvs. David. In said case, the
petition allegedly contained libelous allegations, implying that the complainant was incompetent to manage the
affairs of a corporation and that he was converting his wifes paraphernal properties into conjugal properties. This
Court ruled in that case that the allegations in the pleadings were absolutely privileged and went further by saying
that:" Also, sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that
should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues"
We have adopted the same ruling in several cases wherein statements made during judicial
proceedings were sued upon for libel or damages. The lone requirement imposed to maintain
the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy
The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. As enunciated in the case
of Deles vs. Aragona, Jr
"The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service
and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of public welfare, the
purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses
may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of
a criminal prosecution or an action for damages.
The allegations made by private respondent in her Amended Complaint stand the test of
relevancy. The words "forging", "malicious and fraudulent" and "falsified" are clearly pertinent to
the cause of action of private respondent, which is to annul the Deed of Sale with Right of
Repurchase wherein private respondents signature was forged by an impostor, and to recover
damages resulting from such forgery.
With respect to the words "swindlers", "plunderers" "stupid" and "bastards" uttered by private
respondent in the course of her testimony, we are inclined to agree that such language is too
ignominious and degrading and is out of place in a courtroom. Understandably, private
respondent has no love lost for the people she accused of illegally depriving her of her property,
but her indignation does not give her the right to use contumacious language with impunity in a
courtroom.
Court finds that the terms used by the private respondent in her pleading and in her testimony
cannot be the basis for an award of moral damages and attorney s fees in favor of petitioner. As
stated earlier, the words "forging", "falsified", "malicious" and "fraudulent" in the Amended
Complaint are unmistakably relevant to private respondents cause of action which is to annul
the Deed of Sale where her signature was forged. The words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers",
and "plunderers" uttered by private respondent did not specifically pertain to petitioner to
sufficiently identify him as the object of defamation, such identifiability being an element of a
libelous imputation. We believe that neither petitioners good name and reputation nor his high
standing in the profession have been damaged by these utterances.
g) Fraud or misrepresentation
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005
Facts
Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to RubylusGaa on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996
when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married
through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage.
In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact
already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with
Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and
that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of
imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for
moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there
was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family
Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.
No. CAs decsion is correct!
RULINGS:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense
negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantialegisneminemexcusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the
good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be
convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after
his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as
they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and
general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be
just and reasonable.
i) Seduction
Apolonio Tanjanco vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Araceli Santos (1966)

FACTS:
From December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein) Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff,
Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying
love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in
consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's
pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love
and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result
of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM
Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable
to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised,
the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support
and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.

The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case,
holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child
as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the
court of origin to proceed with the case. Tanjanco, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that
actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether Santos is entitled to damages No.

Whether Santos was seduced to have carnal knowledge by the promise of marriage of
Tanjanco

DECISION: We find this appeal meritorious. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked
that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor
who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise
or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction.

The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed
by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this
Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.

Teofisto I. Verceles Vs. Maria Clarissa Posada, In Her Own Behalf, And As Mother Of
Minor Verna Aiza Posada, Constantino Posada And Francisca Posada(2007)

FACTS: Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor
of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.

Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayors office
starting on September 1, 1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to
attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.

On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brothers
Place" where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have
lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the place
her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where she
stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.

On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes
Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They
met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the
restaurant at the upper floor.

Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her,
as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also
claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his
advances. But again she kept the incident to herself.

Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner
that she feared she was pregnant. In another letter in February 1987, she told him she was
pregnant. In a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:

My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no regret, because I love you
and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall take care of it and let him/her see the
light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her as "Chris," probably
because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap.

Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter
and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA
review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her
another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July,
her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987,7 she gave birth
to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.

The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the
RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987. The trial court issued a
judgment in their favor. Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment
with modification, specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded.

ISSUE: Whether respondents are entitled to damages No.

DECISION: We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 of
the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is
inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair
with petitioner.

Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is nothing in law or
jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages.
Respondents Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to
justify awarding damages to them.

Cecilio Pe, Et Al.,vs. Alfonso Pe (1962)

FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance
on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works
as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in
the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts
not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school.
They exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their
infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The
rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since
then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The
plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The
affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-
B Espaa Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said
note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:

Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a
date on the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.

Reply

Love

The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.

Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Defendant, after denying some allegations contained
in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not constitute
a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita
Pe, an unmarried woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held
liable for moral damages it appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware
of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered
decision dismissing the complaint.1wph1.t

Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved
are purely of law.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages

DECISION: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead,
to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced
the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free
access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in
Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about
their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to
their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn
from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with
her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact
that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil
Code.

Erlinda Estopa vs Loreto Piansay, Jr. (1960)

Facts: The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in Bago, Negros
Occidental, with her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, fell in love and submitted herself
completely to the defendant Loreto Piansay, Jr. Sometime in September, 1957, after a courtship
that lasted for a couple of months during which period the defendant consistently promised and
succeeded to make her believe in him that he was going to marry her. Sometime in December,
1957, the plaintiff was informed reliably that defendant was backing out from his promise of
marriage so she demanded defendants compliance to his promise in order to vindicate her
honor, and plaintiff went to the extent of asking the help of defendants parents, but all her
efforts were in vain. Realizing that her efforts were futile but knowing that her cause was not
completely lost, she decided to file her complaint, not to compel defendant to marry her, but to
demand from him a compensation for the damages that she sustained. Her complaint merely
 alleged "social humiliation, mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and moral
shock

Issue:
Whether plaintiff Estopa is entitled to moral damages.

Decision:
NO. Under the New Civil Code, the mere breach of a promise to marry is not actionable. Loreto
Piansay, Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral damages. Now, as plaintiff has no right to
moral damages, she may not demand exemplary damages. (She lays no claim to temperate or
compensatory damages.)

While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he
is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.

Therefore, as plaintiff is not entitled to any damages at all, there is no reason to require Piansay,
Jr. to satisfy attorney s fees.
j) Unjust Dismissal
If an ee is Jovito Quisaba vs Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc. (1974)
unjustly
dismissd, there Facts:
will always be
award of moral On February 5, 1973 the petitioner Jovito N. Quisaba filed with the CFI of Davao a complaint for
damages. moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees against the Sta. Ines-
Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc. and its vice-president Robert Hyde. The complaint avers that
Quisaba, for eighteen years prior to his dismissal, was in the employ of the defendant
corporation; that on January 11, 1973 the respondent Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase
logs for the company's plant; that he refused on the ground that the work of purchasing logs is
inconsistent with his position as internal auditor; that on the following day Hyde informed him of
his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately the instructions
thus given, and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a ground for his
dismissal; that on January 16, 1973 he responded with a plea for fairness and mercy as he
would be without a job during an economic crisis; that he was demoted from a position of dignity
to a servile and menial job; that the defendants did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial
dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a "constructive discharge;" and that because
of the said acts of the defendants, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social humiliate on. The complaint does not pray
for reinstatement or payment of backwages.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of CFI
Davao, asserting that the proper forum is the National Labor Relations Commission established
by PD No. 21. Quisaba opposed the motion and at the same time informed the court that in
response to a "consults" presented by his counsel, the NLRC's authorized representative in
Davao City opined NLRC has no jurisdiction over claims or suits for damages arising out of
employee-employer relationship.
The NLRC's disclaimer of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the court a quo granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer relation.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's
fees, arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively
cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the NLRC. Regular courts!

Decision:
Under Section 2 of PD No. 21, NLRC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
following.
(1) All matters involving employee employer relations including all disputes and grievances
which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. 875;
(2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081; and
(3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-
employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-
employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not
ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent
effects of such dismissal.

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in
which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-
socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of
the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and
article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by
way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cages:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....

The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute; it has to do with an
alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve an existing
employee-employer relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of PD No. 21. The complaint is
thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by the NLRC.

Singapore Airlines, Limited vs Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano (1983)

Facts:
On August 21, 1974, Carlos E. Cruz was offered employment as Engineer Officer with the
opportunity to undergo a B-707 I conversion training course," which he accepted on August 30,
1974 An express stipulation in the letter-offer required him to enter into a bond with SIA for a
period of 5 years. Twenty six days thereafter, Cruz entered into an "Agreement for a Course of
Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines Limited. Cruz signed the Agreement
with his co-respondent, B. E. Villanueva, as surety.
Claiming that Cruz had applied for "leave without pay" and had gone on leave without
approval of the application during the second year, petitioner filed suit for damages against Cruz
and his surety, Villanueva, for violation of the terms and conditions. Petitioner sought the
payment of liquidated damages, overpayment in salary, cost of uniforms and accessories
supplied by the company, cost of a flight manual, vacation leave he had availed of but to which
he was no longer entitled; exemplary damages attorney's fees; and costs.
In his Answer, Cruz denied any breach of contract and because of petitioner-plaintiff's
alleged ungrounded causes of action, Cruz counterclaimed for attorney's fees of P7,000.00.
The surety, Villanueva, in his own Answer, contended that his undertaking was merely
that of one of two guarantors not that of surety. He then filed a cross-claim against Cruz for
damages and for whatever amount he may be held liable, and a counterclaim for actual,
exemplary, moral and other damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against
petitioner-plaintiff.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction

Issue:
Whether this case is properly cognizable by courts of justice or by the Labor Arbiters of the
NLRC.
Regular courts have jurisdiction!
Ruling:
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to
belong to the civil Courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-
employee relations, and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No.
1691 and BP Blg. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship
are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the
"wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty
despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of
absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with
bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the
damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and
brings it within the purview of Civil Law.
Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private
respondent Cruz of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work
but on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of
the damages which petitioner had to suffer.
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under
the labor Code. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual
obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally
taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or
separation pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an
obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
Additionally, there is a secondary issue involved that is outside the pale of competence of Labor
Arbiters. Is the liability of Villanueva one of suretyship or one of guaranty? Unquestionably, this
question is beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
k) Violation of rights committed by Public Officers
LIM v. PONCE DE LEON (1975)
FACTS:
A complaint for damages was filed against Fiscal Ponce De Leon of Palawan and
Orlando Maddela for the alleged violation of Delfin Lims constitutional rights when Maddela
unlawfully entered his premises without a search warrant and there took away the hull of the
motor launch without his consent by virtue of the order issued by Fiscal De Leon to seize the
motor vehicle in question, which he bought from JikilTaha. On the other hand, Fiscal De Leon
contended that the said motor vehicle in question is the subject of criminal action for robbery
filed by Timbangcaya against JikilTaha. That De Leon, acting as provinvial fiscal of Palawan,
upon being informed about the location of the said motor vehicle in question, ordered Maddela
to seize and impound the motor launch for being the corpus delicti of the robbery. In which the
latter obeyed. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision, which upheld the validity of the
said seizure. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Fiscal De Leon are liable for damages granting that the said seizure of the motor
vehicle was unlawful
RULING:
YES. Fiscal De Leon are liable for damages.
There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has
the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and
seizure. And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a
warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable
search and seizure.
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim
for damages on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
 Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee
responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded.
In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim claimed that he purchased the motor
launch from JikilTaha in consideration of P3,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as advanced
payment; that since or seizure on July 6, 1962 the motor launch had been moored at Balabac
Bay and because of exposure to the elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing of
the present action; that because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he suffered
moral damages in the sum of P1,000.00; and that because of the violation of their constitutional
rights they were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer whom they have paid P1,500.00
for attorney's fees. We find these claims of Delfin Lim amply supported by the evidence and
therefore should be awarded the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as moral
damages and P750.00 for attorney's fees. However, with respect co plaintiff JikilTaha, he is not
entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of
the motor launch inasmuch as he had already transferred the ownership and possession of the
motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has no legal standing to
question the validity of the seizure. Well settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to
an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee, or lawful occupant of the premise searched
cannot raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.JikilTaha is not without recourse
though. He can still collect from his co-plaintiff, Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he
impounded the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer
may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain
circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that
after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15,
1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his
superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de
Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of
the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin
Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, that he impounded the motor
launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela
was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came
the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. Faced
with a possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but
to seize the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold
Maddela answerable for damages.
SISON v. COURT OF APPEALS (2006)
FACTS:
A Petition for Mandamus and damages were filed by Lim-Tan against Sison on his
capacity as deputy administrator of SSS in Cebu City before the RTC due to the latters refusal
to pay the medicare claims of the former incurred by persons represented themselves as SSS
members or dependents of the SSS members and availed the medical services of the former s
hospital. Claims in behalf of LLMH amounted to P1,654,345 while claims for PLMH amounted to
P765,861.95.
Lim-Tan wanted Sisonto pay not only the medicare claims but also included interest on
the claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees and costs of the suit. As a
defense, Sison avers that the SSS Cebu Regional Office found that several of these claim by
Lim were systematically tampered. Thus, the trial court ruled that Lim is entitled for payment. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the lower court decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is liable for moral and exemplary damages
RULING:
NO. The petitioner is only liable for actual damages representing the actual claim which
is P1,654,345 for the claims of LLMH and P765,861.95 for the claims of PLMH. Payment must
include the prevailing bank rate of interest thereon reckoned from demand of payment until fully
paid. However, this is without prejudice to any claim which may have been extinguished by
disallowance or by payment. In view of this, the trial court should be allowed to admit evidence
of such new facts and circumstances, and thereafter modify the amounts to harmonize the
same with justice and the facts.
We affirm the appellate courts deletion of the trial courts award of moral damages as
we disagree with the trial courts finding of bad faith on the part of petitioner. However, we
recognize the damage caused by his inordinate delay in resolving respondents claims.
Although this delay may be explained by petitioners desire to prevent dissipation of government
funds, petitioners acts only serve to perpetuate the negative image of corruption in the
government bureaucracy. He gave cause for respondent to set a personal meeting with him for
a possible negotiation of the claims and even became an open target for allegations of
maliciously persecuting respondent. As a public official, petitioner ought to have acted with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. Petitioner is thus liable, in
his personal capacity, for exemplary damages of P20,000. His liability should serve as a
reminder for other public officials that they should serve the public with utmost efficiency.
Javellana v Tayo 6 SCRA 1042
FACTS:
The petitioners are duly elected and qualified members of the Municipal Council of the
Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below
complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the
Municipality.
The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously approved Resolution No. 5,
Series of 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Council and which resolution was duly
approved by the respondent. At the time and place set for the regular session of the Council, the
Mayor, Vice-Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who are
the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a
temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus
elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do
business. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors and
Secretary were still not around. When the Minutes of the Proceeding was presented to the
Mayor, the latter refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the
resolution as approved by the Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as
null and void and not in accordance with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sessions held by the Council were valid
DECISION :
The SC affirmed the decision of the trial court, after perusal of all the records of this case
has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the
respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential
to the validity of the session as long as there is quorum constituted in accordance with law. To
declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant
public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest
will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or attend a
session, because the Council is controlled by another political group.
We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according
to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of
appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, notwithstanding the action taken by the Provincial
Fiscal an the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question.
C. Interference with Relations
1.Family Relations
Tenchavez v Escano 15 SCRA 355
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and
ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of
the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita
Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with
Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying.
Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by
Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a
new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to
work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left
for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for
the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran,
an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
DECISION:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be
a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens
who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her
American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the
eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between
Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee
entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Esca o;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Silva v Peralta 110 Phil 57
FACTS:
Appellants spouses Saturnino Silva and Elenita Ledesma Silva pray for reconsideration
of this Court's decision of November 25, 1960, claiming that
(1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther Peralta's unauthorized
use of the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva";
(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by the
facts and the law.
It is contended that the prohibition imposed upon appellee Esther Peralta from representing
herself, directly or indirectly, as the wife of Saturnino Silva should result in an award of moral
damages in favor of appellant Elenita Ledesma, whose exclusive right to the appellation is
recognized by the decision.
This argument misapprehends the bias of the decision. Esther Peralta was forbidden
from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva for the reason that it was proved in this case
that she was not legally married to him, and because he is now lawfully married to Elenita
Ledesma. But an award of damages in the latter's favor would require a further finding that the
assumption of the disputed status by Esther Peralta was made in bad faith or through culpable
negligence and no such finding has been made in the decision. The facts are that the Esther in
good faith regarded herself as Saturnino's lawful wife, and that the man himself led her into this
belief prior to his desertion. That later on, unknown to Esther, Silva should have married his co-
appellant in the United States is not sufficient to impose upon Esther any liability for damages or
to destroy her original good faith, there being no proof that the existence of a valid marriage
between Saturnino and Elenita was adequately driven home to Esther before this case was
instituted. That the two appellants Silva were living together as husband and wife was certainly
not sufficient proof, considering Saturnino Silva's past history and conduct. How was appellee to
know that Saturnino's connection with Elenita Ledesma was any more legitimate than his
previous one with appellee herself?
ISSUE:
WON Saturnino Silva is liable for damages based on quasi-delict? Yes
WON Elenita Peralta Silva should be held liable for using the appellation Silva?No

DECISION
 As to the award of damages against Saturnino Silva, it is to be noted that while the
latter's liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under the Civil Code of 1889, the damages
resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual debtor
in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he had foreseen them or not, just
as he must indemnify not only for dumnum emergens but also for lucrum cessans, as required
by Article 1106. Article 1902 of the 1889 Civil Code of Spain formulated no standard for
measuring quasidelictual damages, the article merely prescribing that the guilty party "shall be
liable for the damages so done".
Esther Silva Peralta was in good faith when she regarded herself as Saturnino's lawful wife.
Saturnino made Esther believe that they were really married. Under Art. 378 CC - The
unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
Esther should not be liable for the unauthorized use of the surname of Saturnino because she
was in good faith when she used such. Therefore, she should not be liable for damages.
Petition is denied.

Antonio Geluz, vs. The Hon.Court Of Appeals And Oscar Lazo (1961)
Facts:
Nita Villanueva became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by
petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. After her marriage with the Oscar, she again became
pregnant. Her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient; she had herself aborted again by Geluz.
Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. She again repaired to the Geluzs clinic.
Nita was again aborted, of a two month old foetus. Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva,
was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board;
he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
Oscar commenced an action to recover damages against petitioner Antonio Geluz. It is
the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing this action and award of
damages.
Issue:
Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

Decision: No.

The CA and the TC predicated the award of damages in the sum of 3,000.00 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the NCC. The SC held such to be an error,
for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not
cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of
an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its prenatal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place
from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born
alive: provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article. In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mothers womb.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mothers womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation
of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not
expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal act, and neither the
consent of the woman nor that of the husband would excuse it.
Spouses Francisco M. Hernandez and Aniceta Abel Hernandez and Juan Gonzales vs.
Spouses Lorenzo Dolor and Margarita Dolor, et, al. (2004)
Facts:
Lorenzo Menard Boyet Dolor, Jr. was driving an ownertype jeepney owned by her
mother, Margarita, towards Anilao, Batangas. As he was traversing the road at Barangay Anilao
East, Mabini, Batangas, his vehicle collided with a passenger jeepney, driven by petitioner Juan
Gonzales and owned by his copetitioner Francisco Hernandez, which was travelling towards
Batangas City. Boyet Dolor and his passenger, Oscar Valmocina, died as a result of the
collision. Fred Panopio, Rene Castillo and Joseph Sandoval, who were also on board the
ownertype jeep, which was totally wrecked, suffered physical injuries. The collision also
damaged the passenger jeepney of Francisco Hernandez and caused physical injuries to its
passengers, namely, Virgie Cadavida, Fiscal Artemio Reyes and Francisca Corona.
Consequently, respondents commenced an action for damages against petitioners
before the RTC of Batangas City, alleging that driver Juan Gonzales was guilty of negligence
and lack of care and that the Hernandez spouses were guilty of negligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
Petitioners countered that the proximate cause of the death and injuries sustained by the
passengers of both vehicles was the recklessness of Boyet Dolor, the driver of the ownertype
jeepney, who was driving in a zigzagging manner under the influence of alcohol. Petitioners also
alleged that Gonzales was not the driveremployee of the Hernandez spouses as the former only
leased the passenger jeepney on a daily basis. The Hernandez spouses further claimed that
even if an employeremployee relationship is found to exist between them, they cannot be held
liable because as employers they exercised due care in the selection and supervision of their
employee. During the trial of the case, it was established that the drivers of the two vehicles
were duly licensed to drive and that the road where the collision occurred was asphalted and in
fairly good condition. The ownertype jeep was travelling uphill while the passenger jeepney was
going downhill. It was further established that the ownertype jeep was moderately moving and
had just passed a road bend when its passengers, private respondents Joseph Sandoval and
Rene Castillo, saw the passenger jeepney at a distance of three meters away. The passenger
jeepney was traveling fast when it bumped the owner type jeep. Moreover, the evidence
presented by respondents before the trial court showed that petitioner Juan Gonzales obtained
his professional drivers license only on September 24, 1986, or three months before the
accident. Prior to this, he was holder of a student drivers permit issued on April 10, 1986.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondents.
Issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct when it pronounced the Hernandez spouses
as solidarily liable with Juan Gonzales, although it is of record that they were not in the
passenger jeepney driven by latter when the accident occurred; YES

2. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in awarding temperate damages to private
respondents namely the Spouses Dolor, Spouses Valmocina and Spouses Panopio and
to Joseph Sandoval, although the grant of temperate damages is not provided for in
decision of the court a quo; YES

3. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in increasing the award of moral damages to
respondents, Spouses Dolor, Spouses Valmocina and Fred Panopio; YES

4. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the grant of attorney s fees to
Spouses Dolor and to Spouses Valmocina although the lower court did not specify the
fact and the law on which it is based. NO
Decision:

1. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer may be held solidary liable for the
negligent act of his employee. While the above provisions of law do not expressly
provide for solidary liability, the same can be inferred from the wordings of the first
paragraph of Article 2180 which states that the obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with Article 2194 of the
same Code, which categorically states that the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for quasidelict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is
solidary. Verily, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer may be held solidarily
liable for the negligent act of his employee.

To exempt from liability the owner of a public vehicle who operates it under the
boundary system on the ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to abet
flagrant violations of the Public Service Law, but also to place the riding public at the
mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers.

2. Temperate or moderate damages are damages which are more than nominal but less
than compensatory which may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty. Temperate damages are awarded for those cases where, from the nature
of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is
convinced that there has been such loss. A judge should be empowered to calculate
moderate damages in such cases, rather than the plaintiff should suffer, without redress,
 from the defendants wrongful act. The assessment of temperate damages is left to the
sound discretion of the court provided that such an award is reasonable under the
circumstances.

3. Under Article 2206, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish for the death of the
deceased. The reason for the grant of moral damages has been explained, thus: . . . the
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the
intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means
of the offender. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant. They are awarded to allow the former to obtain means,
diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone due to the defendants culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional to
the offspring, especially of a son who was in the prime of his youth, and who holds so
much promise waiting to be fulfilled is indeed a wellspring of intense pain which no
parent should be made to suffer. While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform
rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be
arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, we hold that the Court of Appeals
award of moral damages of P100,000.00 each to the Spouses Dolor and Spouses
Valmocina for the death of their respective sons, Boyet Dolor and Oscar Valmocina, is in
full accord with prevailing jurisprudence.

4. It is well settled that attorneys fees should not be awarded in the absence of stipulation
except under the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorneys fees to be awarded by a court when its
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought.
While judicial discretion is here extant, an award thereof demands, nevertheless, a
factual, legal or equitable justification. The matter cannot and should not be left to
speculation and conjecture

In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for sustaining the award for
attorneys fees and to adjudge its payment by petitioner. x x x. Likewise, this Court held
in Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that: In Abrogar v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57], the Court
had occasion to state that [t]he reason for the award of attorney s fees must be stated in
the text of the courts decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of
the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.
Jerome Castro vs. People of the Philippines (2008)

Facts:
 Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tans son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12
student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary probation.Upon Tans request, RIS
reconsidered its decision but imposed nonappealable conditions such as excluding Justin
Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies.
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the DepEd for violation of the Manual of Regulation
of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code against RIS. He
alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident
premeditation. After investigation, the DepEd found that RIS code violation point system
allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in
law). The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the DepEd nullified it.
DepEd ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. Thus, he was able to
graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies. After the graduation
ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of their
conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant headmaster.
Ching telephoned petitioner and told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS
in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], thats dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said talking to him was
dangerous. Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner. Petitioner was charged with grave oral
defamation.
MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. However, it found
petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City almost five months from discovery, the RTC ruled
that prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground.

The OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the CA assailing the decision of the RTC. It
contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners
offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated the antecedents which
provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory statement against Tan. The CA found that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it misapprehended the totality of the
circumstances and found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated
the MeTC decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari inasmuch as the
OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the evidence presented by the
parties) but failed to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double
jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
Decision:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. This
constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his

Criminal conversation, simply means adultery the husband may sue for damages.
This may be filed if you do not want to file a criminal case of adultery. This is a civil
law concept of adultery.

Note, there is no civil law equivalent of concubinage.

express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. x x x x x x x x
x Under this provision, double jeopardy after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been
entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether
ordered by the trial or
appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy.

The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or when
there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for
certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void.
Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

The OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the nature of petitioners statement, that
is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of
grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs erroneous evaluation and assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties. What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those
involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a petition for
certiorari, cannot review the public respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.
Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct
errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion). Because
the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its
petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC. We therefore reinstate
the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.

***An educator can be held liable for damages for intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends. An educator is supposed to be a role model for the youth he
should always act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: x x x
x x x x x x (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; x x x x x x x x x
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As
such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.
3. Economic Relations
a. Interference with contractual relations
HerminioTayag, petitioner, vs. AmanciaLacson, RosendoLacson, AntonionLacson, Juan
Lacson, TeodisiaLacson-Espinosa and the CA (2004)

Facts:
Herminio Tayag, herein plaintiff entered into a Deed of Assignment with herein
defendant-tenants without the knowledge of the respondents, the registered owners of three
parcels of land located in Mabalacat, Pampanga which were tenanted agricultural lands.
Petitioner's Argument: That the defendant-tenants individually executed in his favor
separate Deeds of Assignment in which the assignees assigned to the petitioner their respective
rights as tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled by them for and in consideration
of P50.00 per square meter. The said amount was made payable "when the legal impediments
to the sale of the property to the petitioner no longer existed." He was also granted the exclusive
right to buy the property if and when the respondents, with the concurrence of the defendants-
tenants, agreed to sell the property. In the interim, the petitioner gave varied sums of money to
the tenants as partial payments, and the latter issued receipts. Eventually, he called a meeting
of the defendants-tenants to work out the implementation of the terms of their separate
agreements. However, defendants-tenants, through Joven Mariano, wrote him stating that they
were not attending the meeting and instead gave notice of their collective decision to sell all
their rights and interests, as tenants/lessees, over the landholding to the respondents.
Explaining their reasons for their collective decision, they wrote as follows:
Kami ay nagtiwala sa inyo, nagging tapat at nanindigan sa lahat ng ating
napagkasunduan, hindi tumanggap ng ibang buyer o ahente, pero sinira ninyo ang aming
pagtitiwala sa pamamagitan ng demanda ninyo at pagbibigay ng problema sa amin na hindi
naman nagbenta ng lupa.
Thus, the petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44,
against the defendants-tenants, as well as the respondents with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendants and the respondents therein. He averred in his complaint that
the defendants TIAMSON, et. al. (defendant-tenants), have no right to deal with the defendants
LACSON or with any third persons while their contracts with the plaintiff are subsisting; that the
LACSONS are inducing or have induced the defendant-tenants to violate their contracts with the
plaintiff; and that by reason of the malicious acts of all the defendants, plaintiff suffered moral
damages in the forms of mental anguish, mental torture and serious anxiety. In his plea for
injunctive relief, he prayed that the defendant-tenants be prohibited from rescinding their
contracts with the plaintiff and from alienating their rights and interest over the aforementioned
properties in favor of respondents or any other third persons. Also, he asked that the period
within which plaintiff shall pay the balance of the purchase price to the defendants-tenants be
fixed after the lapse of legal impediment, if any.
Respondents argument: that they are the registered owners of the lands involved in this
case and that they never induced the defendants-tenants to violate their contracts with the
petitioner; and, that being merely tenants-tillers, the defendants-tenants had no right to enter
into any transactions involving their properties without their knowledge and consent. They also
averred that the said transfers or assignments of leasehold rights is contrary to PD No. 27 and
RA. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
 Defendants-tenants argument: they insisted that that the money each of them received
from the petitioner were in the form of loans, and that they were deceived into signing the deeds
of assignment. Also, that the said deeds were signed through the employment of fraud, deceit
and false pretenses of plaintiff and made the defendants believe that what they signed was a
mere receipt for amounts received by way of loans. They argued that they were made to sign
blank documents and the completion and accomplishment of such were made without their
presence. Furthermore, as completed, the deed reflected that they are assigning all their rights
and interests in the properties or landholdings. However, they admitted that they have no right
whatsoever in the landholdings, as those belong to their co-defendants, Lacson, et al., and
therefore, the contract is null and void;
The lower court denied the respondents motion to dismiss petitioners plea for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issues: 1) WON the Deed of Assignment is valid
2) WON the respondents can be held liable for violation of Art. 1314
Decision:
1). Invalid. In this case, the defendants-tenants-subtenants, under the deeds of
assignment, granted to the petitioner not only an option but the exclusive right to buy the
landholding. But the grantors were merely the defendants-tenants, and not the respondents, the
registered owners of the property. Not being the registered owners of the property, the
defendants-tenants could not legally grant to the petitioner the option, much less the "exclusive
right"to buy the property. As the Latin saying goes, "NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET."
Furthermore, by assigning their rights and interests on the landholding in favor of the
petitioner, the defendants-tenants thereby waived, in favor of the petitioner, who is not a
beneficiary under Section 22 of Rep. Act No. 6657, their rights of preemption or redemption
under Rep. Act No. 3844. The defendants-tenants would then have to vacate the property in
favor of the petitioner upon full payment of the purchase price. Instead of acquiring ownership of
the portions of the landholding respectively tilled by them, the defendants-tenants would again
become landless for a measly sum of P50.00 per square meter. The petitioners scheme is
subversive, not only of public policy, but also of the letter and spirit of the agrarian laws.
2) Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable
for damages to the other contracting party.
In So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, we held that for the said law to apply, the pleader is
burdened to prove the following: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge by the third
person of the existence of the contract; and (3) interference by the third person in the
contractual relation without legal justification.
Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind
ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot
be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest
motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
In fine, one who is not a party to a contract and who interferes thereon is not necessarily
an officious or malicious intermeddler. The only evidence adduced by the petitioner to prove his
claim is the letter from the defendants-tenants informing him that they had decided to sell their
rights and interests over the landholding to the respondents, instead of honoring their obligation
under the deeds of assignment because, according to them, the petitioner harassed those
tenants who did not want to execute deeds of assignment in his favor, and because the said
defendants-tenants did not want to have any problem with the respondents who could cause
their eviction for executing with the petitioner the deeds of assignment as the said deeds are in
violation of P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657.The defendants-tenants did not allege therein
that the respondents induced them to breach their contracts with the petitioner. The petitioner
himself admitted when he testified that his claim that the respondents induced the defendants-
assignees to violate contracts with him was based merely on what he heard.
Jose V. Lagon vs CA and MenandroLapuz (2005)

Facts:
The petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of BaiToninaSepi, through an
intestate court, two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the
sale, private respondent MenandroLapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against
petitioner before the RTC of Sultan Kudarat. Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of
lease with the late BaiToninaSepiMengelenGuiabar over three parcels of land (the "property") in
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for him to
put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be
paid by those tenants would answer for the rent he was obligated to pay BaiToninaSepi for the
lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
When BaiToninaSepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-
appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting
rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that Lagon, representing
himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing him of inducing the heirs of BaiToninaSepi to sell
the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Lagon for his part denied the
alleged inducement and argued that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the
obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondent's leasehold
rights as there was no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his
personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.
He claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the
lawyer who allegedly notarized the lease contract between private respondent and
BaiToninaSepi, to verify if the parties indeed renewed the lease contract. However, upon inquiry,
he was shown 4 copies of the unsigned lease renewal. He insisted that he only learned of the
alleged lease contract when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from
the tenants of the building. Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted,
petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed for the payment of actual and moral damages.
The lower court ruled in favor of the private respondent.
Issue:
whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed
existence of private respondent's lease contract with the late BaiToninaSepi, constituted
tortuous interference for which petitioner should be held liable for damages
Decision:
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals , laid down the elements of
tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge
 on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c)interference of the third
person without legal justification or excuse.
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established.
To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease
renewal. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a
notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its
execution and delivery. Thus, though a duly notarized contract only attests to its due execution
and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny
of petitioner's counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the
notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that
private respondent and the late BaiToninaSepi actually renewed their lease contract.
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of
the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an
essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.A defendant in such a case
cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware of.While it is not necessary to
prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a
reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of
the parties in the contract. In the case at bar, the said element is wanting. He conducted his own
personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have
made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property.
An examination of the entire property's title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private
respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same.
In relation to the third element, assuming ex gratia argumentithat petitioner knew of the
contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous
interference.According to the landmark case of So Ping Bun, petitioner maybe held liable only
when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by
a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted
with maliceor must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In the case
at bar,the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the
heirs of BaiToninaSepi to sell the property to him. The word "induce" refers to situations where a
person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.The
records show that the decision of the heirs of the late BaiToninaSepi to sell the property was
completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their
judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short,
even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with
BaiToninaSepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never
established.
In our view, petitioner's purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of
his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives.
In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a malicious
interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or
profit motivationwill not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as
long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
This case is one of damnun absqu einjuria or damage without injury.

Business interruption damages, in these cases

consider your losses as bad debts. Also, because
of general welfare clause. There can be no action
for damages here. This is absolute.
 No unfair competition if the establishments are not registered. I.e, karinderia

C. Unfair competition
The United States vs Vicente Manuel (1906)

Facts:
On the 30th day of September, and for many years prior thereto. A. S. Watson, and Co.,
limited, a corporation duly organized under the laws of Great Britain and registered in the
Mercantile Register of the Philippine Islands, was extensively engaged in the city of Manila and
the Philippine Islands in the business of manufacturing and selling soda water, lemonade,
ginger ale, and other aerated waters. On August 14, 1903, registered with the Bureau of Patents,
Copyrights, and Trade marks of the Philippine Islands a trade mark consisting of the words "A.
S. Watson and Company, Limited," together with the figure of a unicorn and dragon on either
side of a Chinese pagoda, which had been adopted and appropriated by said A. S. Watson and
Co., Limited. as their trade mark for many years prior to its registry. Its products were sold in
bottles, specially made for the purpose, with their trade mark blown on the side in large raised
letters and figures, these letters and figures being so strikingly and prominently displayed that
they forcibly attract the attention of the eye and arouse the sense of touch on the most
superficial examination. On these bottles labels were pasted also bearing the said trade mark,
and in addition the name of the particular variety of aerated water contained therein.It was the
custom of the said company, to give the purchaser of its aerated waters what was called a
deposit slip with each case of such goods sold, obligating themselves to refund a stipulated
amount on the return of the empty bottles together with this deposit slip.
On and about the 30th of September, 1903, the defendant, Vicente Manuel,
manufactured and sold a number of bottles of aerated waters in bottles identical in form and
appearance with those used by the said company, with the trade mark of that firm blown on the
side in the same manner in which it is blown on their bottles, there being no reasonable doubt
that the bottles used by the defendant were bottles which had been formerly used by A. S.
Watson and Co., Limited in their business as manufacturers and vendors of aerated waters. On
the bottles sold by the defendant there were pasted labels with his name and the kind of aerated
water contained therein, the printed matter contained in these labels being different from that
contained in the bottles sold by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, and the general appearance of
the respective labels not being strikingly similar or dissimilar, though a comparative examination
develops a number of points of difference in size, shape, and color. It does not expressly appear
on either label whether the name printed thereon is that of the manufacturer of the aerated
water contained therein or that of a dealer engaged in the business of buying and selling such
waters.
Evidently, the aerated waters sold by S. Watson and Co., Limited, have a wide
reputation for excellence of the Philippine Islands, and that great care and attention to detail are
exercised in their manufacture while those of defendant were unwholesome and of inferior
quality.
The trial court convicted the accused of unfair competition.
Issue:
WON the accused can be held liable for unfair competition
Decision:
The true test of unfair competition is whether certain goods have been intentionally
clothed with an appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchases exercising ordinary
care, and not whether a certain limited class of purchasers with special knowledge not
possessed by the ordinary purchases could avoid mistake by the exercise of this special
knowledge. In short, the criterion of unfair competition is whether ordinary purchasers, as
distinguished from members of the particular trade, are deceived.
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, in selling his aerated
waters in bottle with the design blown on the side as described above, gave his goods the
general appearance of aerated waters manufactured by A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, in the
devices and words used on the bottles in which they were contained, in a way that the goods
offered were those of A. S. Watson and Co., Limited; and that the similarity in appearance of the
goods offered for sale by the defendant to those of A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, was such as
to justify the inference that the defendant actually intended to deceive the public and defraud the
said A. S. Watson and Co., Limited.
As to the contention that since A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, sold the bottles containing
their aerated waters, these bottles became the property of the purchaser, who could not be
deprived of the privilege of doing what he pleased with his own property, does not carry with it
the right to use the thing owned for the purpose of deceiving the public and defrauding third
parties.We have no doubt that the purchasers of aerated waters from A. S. Watson and Co.,
Limited, who paid the so-called "deposit" but never demanded or received the refund
guaranteed in the deposit slip, became the absolute, unconditional owners of such bottles.
However, the defendant has no moral or lawful right to use them as he did.

Per TORRES, J., dissenting:

In order to maintain an action for unfair competition under section 7 of Act No. 666, it is
necessary that the intent on the part of the competitor to deceive the public shall be proven
beyond any doubt.
It being proven that the accused had acquired bottles, with the mark incrusted in the
glass, a long time before Watson & Co. had registered the said mark in accordance with the
said act, and taking into consideration the fact that the registration provided for the use of the
mark for carbonated waters (aguas gaseosas), and not for the use of marked bottles, and the
fact that the accused was accustomed to put his own labels on the bottles containing the
various classes of waters sold by him, it can not be said that he has violated the law and
committed the alleged offense.

NBI Microsoft Corporation vs. Hwang (2005)

Facts:
Petitioner Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft), a Delaware, United States Corporation,
owns the copyright and trademark to several computer software. In May 1993, Microsoft
Corporation and Beltron Computer Philippines, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement. Under
Section 2(a) of the Agreement, Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to: (i) Reproduce and
install no more than one copy of Windows on each Customer System hard disk; and (ii)
Distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of Windows (reproduced as per Section 2 of
the Agreement and/or acquired from an Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor.
Their agreement allowed either party to terminate if one fails to comply with their
respective obligations. Microsoft terminated the Agreement in June 1995 by reason of Beltrons
non-payment of royalties. Later, Microsoft learned that Beltron was illegally copying and selling
copies of Windows. Microsoft then sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation.
NBI agents made some purchase from Beltron where they acquired a computer unit pre-
installed with Windows, 12 windows installer CDs packed as Microsoft products. The agents
were not given the end-user license agreements, user manuals, and certificates of authenticity
for the products purchased. They were given a receipt which has a header of T.M.T.C. (Phils)
Inc. BELTRON COMPUTER. TMTC stands for Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade Center.
A search warrant was subsequently issued where 2,831 CDs of Windows installers,
among others, were seized. Based on the items seized from Beltron, Microsoft filed a case of
copyright infringement against Beltron and TMTC as well as their officers (Judy Hwang et al)
before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beltron, in its counter-affidavit, argued the following: (1)
That Microsofts issue with Beltron was really just to have leverage in forcing Beltron to pay the
unpaid royalties; and that Microsoft should have filed a collection suit; (2) That the computer unit
allegedly purchased by the NBI agents from them cannot be decisively traced as coming from
Beltron because the receipt issued to the agents did not list the computer unit as one of the
items bought; (3) That the 12 installers purchased by the agents which are actually listed in the
receipt were not manufactured by Beltron but rather they were genuine copies purchased by
TMTC from an authorized Microsoft seller in Singapore. (4) That the 2,831 installers seized from
them were not a property of Beltron but rather they were left to them by someone for
safekeeping.
The DOJ secretary agreed with Beltron and dismissed the case. The DOJ held that
Beltron had no intent to defraud the public as the software products seized came from an
alleged Microsoft licensee in Singapore, and that it did not manufacture the seized software
products. Microsoft appealed the decision of the DOJ secretary before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to
charge respondents with copyright infringement and unfair competition.
Decision:YES
Section 5 of PD 49 (Section 5) enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the
copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJs ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not
merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized
performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of
the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself
civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement.
Significantly, under Section 5(A), a copyright owner is vested with the exclusive right to copy,
distribute, multiply, and sell his intellectual works. On the other hand, the elements of unfair
competition under Article 189(1) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another
manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2)
wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other
feature of their appearance;
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or
opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.
 The element of intent to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods or their
appearance.
Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its
rights in filing the complaint before DOJ on the incriminating evidence obtained from Beltron.
Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold that Microsoft sought the issuance of the
search warrants and the filing of the complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue
royalties to Microsoft.
There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior resolution from
the proper court of whether or not the Agreement is still binding between the parties. Beltron
has not filed any suit to question Microsofts termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither
be expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue before Microsoft can seek
remedies for violation of its intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not
(and could not have authorized anyone to) produce such CD installers The copying of the
genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CDs and their distribution are illegal even if
the copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are
concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of its termination) is
immaterial to the determination of Beltrons liability for copyright infringement and unfair
competition. Beltrons defense that the box of CD installers found in their possession was only
left to them for safekeeping is not tenable.
Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of Appeals(1990)
Facts:
Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United
States and not engaged in business in the Philippines. Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack)
is a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. Del Monte granted
Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural
products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark and logo. Del Monte authorized
Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle configuration,
for which it was granted Certificate of Trademark Registration No. SR-913 by the Philippine
Patent Office under the Supplemental Register. Del Monte also obtained two registration
certificates for its trademark "DEL MONTE" and its logo.
Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of
Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade to engage in the manufacture, packing,
distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. The
product itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, which the
private respondent bought from the junk shops for recycling.
Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively designed
bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack and Del Monte filed a complaint
against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair competition.Sunshine
alleged that its logo was substantially different from the Del Monte logo and would not confuse
the buying public to the detriment of the petitioners.
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. It held that there were substantial
differences between the logos or trademarks of the parties. On appeal, decision was affirmed in
toto by the respondent court.
Issue:
 Whether or not there was infringement of trademark and unfair competition.
Decision:
Section 22 of R.A. No. 166, otherwise known as the Trademark Law, provides:
Any person who shall use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, or advertising of any goods, business or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to
the source or origin of such goods or services or identity of such business...
Sec. 29 of the same law states as follows:
Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he
shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services
for those of the one having established such goodwill..
To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is important to bear in mind the following
distinctions between infringement of trademark and unfair competition.
(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair
competition is the passing off of one's goods as those of another.
(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary whereas in unfair competition
fraudulent intent is essential.
(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the
action, whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary.
While the Court does recognize these distinctions, it does not agree with the conclusion that
there was no infringement or unfair competition. Even if the labels were analyzed together it is
not difficult to see that the Sunshine label is a colorable imitation of the Del Monte trademark.
The predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are green and red-orange, the same
with Sunshine. The word "catsup" in both bottles is printed in white and the style of the
print/letter is the same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure nevertheless
approximates that of a tomato.
When as in this case, Sunshine chose, without a reasonable explanation, to use the
same colors and letters as those used by Del Monte though the field of its selection was so
broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to deceive.
As to the second issue, the Court finds that the private respondent is not guilty of
infringement for having used the Del Monte bottle.The reason is that the configuration of the
said bottle was merely registered in the Supplemental Register.
In the case of Lorenzana v. Macagba , the court declared that:
(1) Registration in the Principal Register gives rise to a presumption of the validity of the
registration, the registrants ownership of the mark and his right to the exclusive use thereof.
There is no such presumption in the registration in the Supplemental Register.
(2) Registration in the Principal Register is limited to the actual owner of the trademark and
proceedings therein on the issue of ownership which may be contested through opposition or
interference proceedings or, after registration, in a petition for cancellation. Registration in the
Principal Register is constructive notice of the registrants claim of ownership, while registration
in the Supplemental Register is merely proof of actual use of the trademark and notice that the
registrant has used orappropriated it. It is not subject to opposition although it may becancelled
after the issuance. Corollarily, registration in thePrincipal Register is a basis for an action for
infringement while registration in the Supplemental Register is not.
(3) In applications for registration in the Principal Register, publication of the application is
necessary. This is not so in applications for registrations in the Supplemental Register.
Though Del Monte has actual use of the bottle's configuration, the petitioners cannot claim
exclusive use thereof because it has not been registered in the Principal Register. However, we
find that Sunshine, despite the many choices available to it and notwithstanding that the caution
"Del Monte Corporation, Not to be Refilled" was embossed on the bottle, still opted to use the
petitioners' bottle to market its product which Philpack also produces. This clearly shows the
private respondent's bad faith and its intention to capitalize on the latter's reputation and
goodwill and pass off its own product as that of Del Monte
As Sunshine's label is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law and equity call for the
cancellation of the private respondent's registration and withdrawal of all its products bearing
the questioned label from the market. With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same
constitutes unfair competition; hence, the respondent should be permanently enjoined from the
use of such bottles.
La Sociedad "germinal," vs. Nubla(1908)
Facts:
The complaint is for illegal and fraudulent competition, and was filed against Chan-
Chuico and Manuel Nubla. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant with the costs against
the plaintiff.
The judgment contains the following conclusions of facts:
1. The evidence adduced shows that the plaintiff has been using a certain trade-
mark and drawing, under which to place on the market and sell his cigarettes;
that it had the exclusive right to the use of said trade-mark and drawing; that
some time before this action was commenced there appeared for sale on the
market certain cigarettes manufactured by the cigarette factory "La Intimidad,"
presented in a like-form, and with a trade-mark and drawing similar to that used
by the plaintiff, and that the manner in which they were offered, the trade-mark,
and drawings were so nearly like those of the plaintiff that the public was almost
deceived on buying them.
2. It is evident that the plaintiff had the exclusive right the use of the drawing and
the trade-mark used by it, and that the trade-mark in question, "La Intimidad", is a
violation of the rights of the plaintiff.
3. There was also some evidence, not very satisfactory, tending to show that this
defendant had sold some cigarettes in the manner above described, but this was
positively denied by the defendant, and he was not contradicted.
4. Whatever may be the case in this respect, no loss on account of such sale has
been proven, nor have the profits thereby obtained by the defendant been shown.
Of the said conclusions the third alone has been argued as erroneous in the appellant's brief.
Issue:
Whether the appellant is entitled to an award for the loss suffered by reason of the illegal
and fraudulent acts of competition carried out by the defendant?
Decision:
The appellant maintains that the judge erred when not allowing it to offer as evidence its
own account books in order to prove the loss caused to it through the cigarettes of "La
Intimidad" appearing on the market.
 The complaint charges that the defendant Nubla made and sold the cigarettes. In his
decision the judge held that the interest which Nubla had in the sale thereof was not proven,
while nothing was said as to their manufacture. No error has been assigned by the appellant
based on such omission; it simply limits itself to pointing out as erroneous the opinion of the
court that Nubla had no interest in the sale. As a matter of fact, it states nothing in its brief
regarding the interest which Nubla might have in the manufacture of the said cigarettes; its
claim in connection with this matter must therefore be considered as abandoned. Under these
circumstances the is no way to hold Nubla liable for the loss which, on account of the
manufacture of such cigarettes, the appellant may have suffered, but only that caused by his
proven interest in the sale thereof, and even this should be limited to such sales as he actually
made as shown by the evidence. The loss which such sales, of very little importance, indeed,
may have caused the appellant can not be determined by its own account books, which were
offered for the sole purpose of showing a decrease in the sale of its own cigarettes, without
previously establishing by evidence of another sort, which has not been attempted nor even
offered, that such decrease in the sale was entirely and necessarily due to the express acts of
the defendant the only ones for which he should be held liable under the law. Therefore, the
judge committed no error by refusing to admit in evidence the books in question.
Inasmuch as the amount of the loss suffered by the appellant by reason of the illegal and
fraudulent acts of competition carried out by the defendant has not been proven, no amount can
be awarded.
The judgement appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant Nubla is directed to
abstain from hereafter selling cigarettes made up in packages resembling or similar to those
used by the plaintiff, and with the costs of the first instance against the said defendant. So
ordered.
Del Rosario vsQuiogue (1910)
Facts:
Petronillodel Rosario is the owner of La Funeraria Paz, an undertakers establishment.
The original establishment is located at alzada de Bilibid, now Nos. 533 and 535 Calle Paz, in
the district of Santa Cruz, for nine years previous to the entry or registration of said name.
At the present time the main establishment on the Calzada de Bilibid is located upon
other premises on the same street, now named Paz. The original premises is now occupied by
Vicente Quiogue, operating a similar undertakers establishment named, La Nueva Funenaria
Paz.
These facts have actually deceived those who, intending to send their orders to "La Funeraria
Paz" of Petronilodel Rosario, inadvertently employed "La Nueva Funeraria Paz" of Vicente
Quiogue, and the said establishment thus succeeded in obtaining benefits which should have
gone to the real establishment whose services were sought.
Petronilo del Rosario filed and actionfor the issuance of a preliminary injunction and
another final one, prohibiting Vicente Quiogue from using the name "Funeraria Paz" in his
above-mentioned establishment, and in addition asked that the latter be adjudged to pay P500
as losses and damages, and the costs.
The court below granted the two injunctions with the costs against the defendant, but dismissed
the claim for an indemnity for losses and damages, for the reason that they were not proven.
Issue:
Whether or not Del Rosario is entitled to damages
Ruling:
In accordance with the above provision, the defendant can not be prevented from using
the word "Funeraria," a generic name of the trade. As the name "Paz," it does not appear that it
is a "geographical name of the place of production or origin of an article". Paz" is a name which
has been used by the plaintiff to designate his establishment, not necessarily taken from the
name of the street on which it is situated at the present time
The trial court correctly concluded that the use of the words "Funeraria Paz" answered
no other purpose than that of making it easy to mistake the defendant's establishment for that of
the plaintiff formerly located in the same place. The addition of "La Nueva" was nothing more
than a trick employed by the defendant in order to covertly appropriate the trade name of the
plaintiff; that the very fact of adding "La Nueva" to the prominent words "Funeraria Paz" on the
sign shows how fully convinced he was that, without such an addition, he could not use the said
sign which he now considers as a "generic name of the place of production or origin" referred to
in said Act No. 666; that the lowering of rates, together with all the circumstances set forth,
tended to establish a competition in bad faith; and that the results are as shown by the
defendant in his claim for damages by reason of the preliminary injunction, which prevented him
for obtaining such beneficial results.
Universal Rubber Products vs CA (1984)
Facts:
Converse Rubber Corporation and Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation filed an unfair
competition case against Universal Rubber Products. In view of this, they prayed to the Judge
for the issuance of subpoena deuces tecum to compel Universal Rubber to produce to court 4
sales invoices, sales books and ledgers where are recorded the sales from the time the
corporation started manufacturing and selling shoes.
Universal Rubber contends that the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive. It also shows no
good cause because the books and documents are not relevant to the case of unfair
competition.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of the "subpoena ducestecum" is proper in a suit for unfair
competition
Ruling:
Yes. It is proper.
As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark,
complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the goods sold
under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and this rule applies in cases of
unfair competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for
and yield up his gains.
In recovering the loss suffered by the aggrieved party due to unfair competition," Sec. 23 of R.A.
166 grants the complainant three options within which to ascertain the amount of damages
recoverable, either (1) the reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had
the defendant not infringed his said rights; or (2) the profit which the defendant actually made
out of the infringement; or (3) the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based
upon the amount of gross sales of the defendant of the value of the services in connection with
which the mark or tradename was issued in the infringement of the rights of the complaining
party.
 In giving life to this remedial statute, We must uphold the order of the court a quo
denying the motion. of the petitioner to quash the "subpoena ducestecum" previously issued
against the petitioner. In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the
questioned "subpoena ducestecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of
redress.
Start 4. Political Relations
United States vs Roman Valero (1910)
Facts:
It appears that during the month of July, 1907, the accused, who was then municipal
president of Jamindan, made an inspection of the barrio of San Juan, situated in said
municipality, accompanied by two policemen armed with rifles. On that inspection he entered
the house of Gregorio Maximo, with whom he spoke concerning the election which was to be
held during that month. During the course of the conversation he requested Maximo to vote for
Jose Altavas for member of the Assembly. Maximo answered that he could not do so because
he had already promised to vote for Hugo Vidal. At this the accused became furious and sought
to intimidate Maximo, threatening that if he voted for anybody but Altavas he would find himself
at the point of a gun, that he would learn that the accused was the one who governed in
Jamindan. He used other threatening language also. It further appears that some days after the
election Maximo was taken from his house by a couple of Constabulary and another man by the
name of Biloy, a cousin of the accused, at the instigation of the accused. The accused ordered
the Constabulary to punish Maximo, and after they had bound him to a tree, they proceeded to
maltreat and beat him.
Issue:
Whether or not the threats proved were sufficient under the law to justify a conviction
Ruling:
Yes. The circumstances are sufficient to justify conviction.
We do not deem argument necessary to demonstrate that the court was right in his conclusions
of law. We simply call attention to the language of section 30 of Act No. 1582, the terms of which
are too clear to require comment:
Any person who, by any wrongful means, shall prevent or attempt to prevent any
voter from freely and fully exercising his right to vote, . . . shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by a fine of
not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five hundred pesos, or both, in
the discretion of the court.
Rogelio Aberca et al.v.Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver et al (1988)
Facts:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the
rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the AFP, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
known communist-terrorist underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila, Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party
confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest,
they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of
their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were
part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral
damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's
fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to
them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can
entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants. The RTC granted the motion.
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs. The judge issued an order voluntarily inhibiting
himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside
the order of dismissal to another judge who held that the order has become final by failure of the
plaintiffs to file a motion to set aside the order within the reglementary period.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
respondent court's dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the superior officer be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with
his subordinates Yes!
Held: We find the petition meritorious.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code. Its message is clear;
no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.The respondents postulate the
view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts
done in the performance of official duties or function. We find respondents' invocation of the
doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders
any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the
Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task
or carrying out their mission with vigor. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out
this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very
fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the
mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in
the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means
of obtaining his liberty.
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case.
We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to
principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.Be that as it
may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of
the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily
be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
MHP Garments, Inc.v.The Honorable Court of Appeals (1994)
Facts:
MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the exclusive
franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias and
was given the authority to undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all
illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.
In October 1983, petitioner corporation received information that private respondents
Agnes Villa Cruz, MirasolLugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items
and paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of MHP, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine
Constabulary.De Guzman and constabulary men went to the stores of respondents and, without
any warrant, seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at respondents'
stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private respondents.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents but the
fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized items. However, the seized
items were not immediately returned despite demands. Eventually, some but not all the seized
items were returned and the other items returned were of inferior quality.
Private respondents filed an action against the petitioners for sums of money and
damages which the trial court granted and affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erredin imputing liability for damages to the petitioners who did
not effect the seizure of the subject merchandise.
2. Whether or not the manner with which the confiscation of private respondent was
tortious
Held: We affirm.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private
respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were
illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time
are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. They reported to the Philippine
Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents
and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the
information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for
petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time,
they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they
took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search
and seizure were clearly illegal.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the
complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will not
exculpate petitioners.In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual.
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible,viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32.
The law speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly
granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing
the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they
instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies.
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman
did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by
and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers
themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods
unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for
quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Also, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party
complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents'
claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the
defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. Conformably
with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at
bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious
anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents'
avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were
supported by their testimonies.
Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of
exemplary damages. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a
mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly done
both by government and indirectly by private entities.
Eli Lui and Leo Rojas vs. Spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano
(G.R. No. 141176; May 27, 2004)
Facts:
Sometime in September 1987, then 17-year-old ElenitoLariosa visited his aunt, , Paulina
LariosaMatillano, at Davao del Sur.Lariosawas employed as a laborer at the Davao United
Products Enterprise store. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao. Aside from
Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.Lariosa chose to live in the
house of Kiao. There were occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang
and left some of his things with them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao Savings
Bank.Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. Lariosa reported for work the
day after,but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary
for the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of
Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiaos
house.Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from Ben in the
amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank. He bought a
radio cassette forP2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses for P900.00. Ben informed his
nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported the matter to NBI
and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosas employment was
terminated on the sam day, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00.
He suspected that Larios because he, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United
Products Enterprise Store.Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to retrieve his things.
The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, they borrowed Luis Ford Fierra for their
transportation. The vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall where Pagsa alighted on the pretext
that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife remained in the Fierra. Pagsa
contacted Lui and informed the latter that Lariosa was with him, Lui arrived on board a vehicle.
With him were Pagsa and two others, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan.Pagsa urged Lariosa to go
along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Luis vehicle. The car stopped in front of Luis house,
when Lui returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with the weapon.
Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Bens money. Lariosa
refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face
into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused
to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to thePNP. Sgt. Alberto Genise issued
Mission Order directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from
12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. A police car
arrived at the store with two policemen, one of them handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and
ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as ordered,
one of Luis companions took his picture. Another picture was taken as Lariosa held the door
knob to open the door.
Lui once more mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he
stole P45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal what he did with the money. Luis companions,
Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.
With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house. They
then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosas aunt, Paulina Matillano. Paulina was
shocked. Rojas told Paulina, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something." Lui
poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something might happen.
Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the
second floor where her aparador was located. Lui and his two companions then took two mats
and two pairs of ladies shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather
shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to the latters children. They also ordered
Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his companions took her old Bulova
wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins.EulogioMatillano made an entry in the Bansalan police
blotter that earlier that day, at 4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts;
two t-shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1
necklace; one ring; and, old coins, without his and his wifes consent and without a search
warrant. Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he
stole P40,000.00from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of the money to buy
appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies shoes, a Seiko wristwatch, two
pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.An Information was filed in the RTC,
charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The trial court rendered judgment
acquitting Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui
procured Lariosas confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police
authorities. Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John
Doe and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court. The court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. The
Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated recommending that the case be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence, but that the charges be forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals
Office for possible administrative sanctions against Rojas.
CHR: The Regional Office of the Commission recommended, 1.) To indict Eli Lui for unlawful
arrest as defined 2.) To indict both Eli Lui and Pat.Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile.
RTC: The spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint for damages in the RTC
against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. The RTC rendered judgment,
ordering the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs failure to prove their claims. The trial court
gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano
voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the
subject items to them.
CA: The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally liable. The appellate court denied the
appellees motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The appellees Mendoza and Tan no
longer appealed the decision.
Issues:
(a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners entry into
her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and
her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondents; and, (c)
if so, the extent of the petitioners liability to the respondents. Yes, petitioners are liable for damages
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.We agree with the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have
an open hand in the prosecution of accused. He was the one who called the police to arrest him,
even without a warrant of arrest. Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied on him in
the investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode in a car of Eli Lui,
in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the establishment of complainant during the re-
enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by accused out of the
money allegedly stolen; Petitioner Rojas reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to
him by Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely
tasked in the said order to "follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the
Metrodiscom, Davao City." Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts
to the second floor of the respondents house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed
them to search the premises without a warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not
authorized to conduct a search in the house of the respondents, much less divest the latter of
their personal belongings. As a police officer, it was petitioner Rojas duty to prevent the
commission of crimes in his presence, and to arrest the persons committing such crimes.
The petitioners contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable." This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also
those who appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial
warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the context of
the constitutional provision because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions.The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot
be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish
the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a)
that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. The waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges
every reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. The fact
that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into her house by the police officers does
not amount to a permission to make a search therein. A peaceful submission to search and
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and
seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina
Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal
properties. However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her
right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns;
petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent EulogioMatillano, her husband, was
out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He
could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the
respondents for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it.
Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns,
gained entry into the respondents house, and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina
Matillano. Although petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he assented thereto by
allowing petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the respondents of
their belongings. The petitioners even left together after the incident.
Atty. Lolito g. Apariciovs.Hon.Ermelindo c. Andal (G.R. Nos. 86587-93; July 25, 1989)
Facts:
Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari , prohibition, and mandamus are the
orders of the respondent judge in various Criminal Casesand Civil Cases, denying the
petitioner's Motion for Inhibition, Textually, the Motion for Inhibition reads:
That the Movant has just received the letter from the Supreme Court, issued in
connection with my Petition for inhibition. In view of the letter of the Deputy Court Administrator
of the Honorable Supreme Court, undersigned Attorney is compelled to request the Honorable
Presiding Judge of this Court to inhibit himself from trying, hearing or in any manner acting in
any of the cases in which the undersigned Attorney is involved and is handling or will be
involved, either as Complainant or otherwise.
Considering the aforecited motion, Judge Andal issued the substantially identical orders
assailed herein.
Issue:
1.)Whether or not Judge Andal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he denied the petitioner's Motion for Inhibition in the several criminal and civil
cases subject thereof and in thereafter continuing to take cognizance of said cases and all the
other cases pending before him.
2.) Whether or not Judge Andal can be held civilly liable for damages under Art. 32 of the
Civil Code in relation to the constitutional provision that all public officers must at all times be
accountable to the people
Ruling:
The petitioner maintains that there is between him and Judge Andal an existing state of
hostility sparked off by the filing by him of petitions for certiorari and administrative cases
against the latter before this Court, prior to the filing of the Motion for Inhibition, which was, as
earlier stated, denied by Judge Andal. He theorizes that the Judge in refusing to inhibit himself
from the cases subject of the Motion for Inhibition and in all the other cases pending before him
in which the petitioner is acting either as counsel or a party litigant, Judge Andal violated his
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of the law, access to the court and speedy
disposition of cases, making Judge Andal civilly liable under Art. 32 of the new Civil Code. He
asserts that because of Judge Andal's refusal to inhibit himself, he and his family suffered
mental anguish and incurred expenses for which they must be compensated. In this score, he
asseverates that he does not normally resent the filing of certiorari cases against him as he has
neither the reason nor the luxury of time to entertain such a feeling. Moreover, he is so
preoccupied with his case load to even think of it.He further stresses that he has nothing
personal against petitioner, as he does not know the latter personally.A judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting ill a case for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned under the Rules of Court.
It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated by Judge Andal in
his orders denying the same, cited no valid ground, which fact was confirmed by the prosecuting
 fiscal and the counsel for the accused in the criminal cases and the defendants in the civil cases.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said motion was not whimsical or capricious
nor was the said denial intended to spite the petitioner, as the petitioner would want this Court to
believe, but was done in the valid and judicious exercise of his function and duty as judge.
And having denied the Motion for Inhibition, Judge Andal acted within his jurisdiction
when he continued to take cognizance of all the cases pending before him, there being no writ
of injunction or a restraining order issued, enjoining him to cease and desist from acting on the
said cases. It must be noted that it was only on February 16, 1989 that a restraining order was
issued by this Court. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or
partial, and on this regard the petitioner failed.
On his claim for damages against Judge Andal in these same proceedings, the
petitioner-lawyer invokes Art. 32 of the Civil.The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
from the judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal statute.
DISMISSED for lack of merit.Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby REPRIMANDED for
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely.
5. The 9 Major Defenses to intentional torts
The United States vs. EstanislaoAnaban, et al. (G.R. No. 4380; March 31, 1909)
Facts:
Consent That on the night of Thursday October 4, 1906, the six defendants, accompanied by
other persons, invaded the dwelling house of one Guiled, located in the sitio of Selpang, Baguio,
Recapture said Guiled being a councilor for the barrio of Taloy of the municipality of Baguio; that the
of chattels defendants demanded from Guiled the payment of a fine of P20 because they found a horse in
the vicinity of his house, and the payment of said fine being refused, Maniguay and Bombon,
two of the defendants, bound him, while the other defendants, who had remained on the ground
floor of the house, in obedience to the orders give by the former, seized and carried away three
pigs. Cimbay, the wife of Guiled, on seeing her husband bound and fearing that they would all
be killed, jumped out of the window and proceeded to the house of Lateng, ex-councilor of the
same barrio. Ogues, who lived nearest to the house of Guiled, having heard the squealing of the
pigs, had left his own house, and had seen the events as they occurred at Guileds house, also
went to the house of ex-councilor Lateng and confirmed the statement of Cimbay. These three,
Lateng, Cimbay and Ogues, the same night or at daybreak of the following morning, proceeded
to the house of Guiled. This defendant says that, from the month of January of that year, he was
the president of the settlement (rancheria) of Pugo.
"We went there in search of a horse that was lost. At noon we arrived at the house of Guiled
and thought it better that we first see the councilor of the barrio. This we did; we went to see
Guiled and I asked him to help us in the search. In the company of Palos, we endeavored to find
the horse and followed its tracks, and, after a while, we found the animal tied near the house of
Guiled; we then untied ist; from there we led the horse to the house of Guiled and requested
him to furnish us with a certificate showing that the animal was found at his place. He
replied: How can I furnish you with the certificate? No one here knows how to write. After a
while our said companion returned and told us that there were three pigs in a pen. We went to
the place where the pigs were and I recognized one of them as being my own and the other two
as the property of Capitan Bayasang and Sabong, respectively. Having made this discovery I
went to Guiled and asked him from whom he obtained the animals and he replied that he had
acquired them from one Martin, and asked him to allow me to take the animals to my house, he
assented.
And said, moreover, that he would come along with us to the town in order to see Martin
and recover from him the money he had paid for the pigs, and besides that he had also to
collect P9 that Martin owed him.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants recovery of the property constitutes an offense.

Ruling:
Peaceful Recovery of Property Not an Offense. The peaceful recovery of property by
the owners, from one not entitled to continue in possession thereof, and with the consent of the
possessor, does not constitute a criminal offense.
There is one very important point in the case. Lateng sent Licao, an Igorot, to Baguio to
give information as to what had happened in the house of Guiled. Licao testified that he was
sent by Lateng, Cimbay, and Ogues. Licao left Taloy on Friday morning and reached Baguio in
the afternoon. Licao testified that he left Baguio on Friday night, spent the night at Atab, and
then proceeded to Pugo, in compliance with the instructions he received from Sales. To judge
by the inconsistencies found in his answers, while testifying during the taking of the evidence in
rebuttal, this witness must have been greatly harassed. It appears that his testimony was
controlled by the dominant idea that he did not go farther than Atab, in which place, it first
appears he slept twice, but later he says he remained there only once, on Friday night; it must
have been another controlling idea in his testimony that he did not reach Pugo until Sunday, and
that he slept in his house on Saturday night, not taking into account the serious happening at
the house of his councilor and not taking any pains in delivering at once the letter to Guiled.
The letter and the testimony of the witness throw much light on the two versions which
appear from the records in regard to the facts which really happened, on Thursday and Friday,
the 4th and the 5th of October, 1906. If the defendants are really guilty, if they have committed
the crime of robbery encuadrilla, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity being present.
The letter shows that the defendants went to Selpang for the purpose of looking for something,
not to steal, and this is what was communicated to the secretary. It is unnatural and improbable
that Guiled, after having been abused by the people from Pugo, should have sent to them the
very letter which is the reply to the complaint he made against them. Guiled must have been
really present at Pugo on Saturday; he must have received Sales letter there, and from thence
he must have left for Baguio, perhaps for fear of being complained of. On arrival at Baguio, and
if he had made any complaint of that abuse and robbery encuadrilla with arms, the municipal
would have necessarily referred him to the court of the justice of the peace for the preliminary
investigation. Said proceeding could not have lasted until 18th day of October.
The justice of the peace stated that he remembered that the defendants testified that
they had gone to Selpang to look for some horses, and the testimony of Anaban during the
preliminary investigation having been produced by the defense, it appears in every way
consistent with the testimony which, in regard to their trip to Selpang, he and his companions
have so uniformly given. The innocence of the defendants is evident.
 United States vs Brobst (1909)

Facts:
James L. Brobst and another American named Mann were engaged in work on a mine
located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native
laborers. Mann discharged one of the laborers, named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to
come back on the premises and told Brobst not to employ Salidvar again as he was a thief. A
few days afterwards, Saldivar went to the mine to look for work. Brobst, when he caught sight of
Salidvar, ordered him off the place. As Saldivar made no move to leave, Brobst became
enraged and struck Salidvar with a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over
the lower ribs. On being struck, Salidvar threw up his hands, staggered, and without saying a
word, went away in the direction of his sisters house, which stood about 200 yards away.
Saldivar died as he reached the door of the house.
A criminal complaint for homicide was filed against Brobst. Brobst argues that since he
had a perfect right to eject the deceased from the mining property, he cannot be held criminally
liable for unintentional injuries inflicted in the lawful exercise of his right.
Issue:
Whether Brobst is criminally liable

Decision:
Yes. We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt
that the defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that whatever
authority the defendant may have had to eject the deceased from the mining property and to
use physical force to that end in case of need, the blow thus struck was far in excess of such
authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and can not be excused or justified as an exercise of
necessary force in the exercise of a right. The defendant's own testimony does not indicate that
there was any danger to be apprehended from Saldivar, and there is nothing in the record which
would indicate that the defendant had reasonable ground to believe that he would offer a violent
or even a substantial resistance to an attempt to expel him from the mining property.
We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his death as a result of the blow
inflicted by the defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a laborer in
defendant's mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he left her house in
apparent good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short time afterwards he
received a violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the body where many of the vital
organs are located; and immediately thereafter, he stared up the short trail leading to his sister's
house, and died as he reached the door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening cause,
we think there can be no reasonable doubt that his death resulted from the blow.
(Syllabus: The right to use force or violence in the expulsion of an intruder upon ones premises,
when it exists, is strictly limited to the use of such a degree of force as may be necessary under
all the circumstances, to obtain the end in view; and the use of excessive force is unlawful.)

Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs Espino, Jr. (1979)

Facts:
 Jose J. Espino,Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines,
Inc., and his wife and their two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket in Makati. Espino,
finding a cylindrical Rat tail file which he needed in his hobby, picked up said item and he
stuck it into his front breast pocket of his shirt thinking that it might get lost if he placed it in the
grocery cart. At the check-out counter, Espino payed for his wifes grocery items but failed to
pay for the rat tail file. As he was leaving by the exit, Espino was approached by a guard
informing him of the file. Espino apologized and turned towards the cashier but the guard
stopped him and led him toward the rear of the supermarket, which was witnessed by a crowd
of customers who thought Espino was a shoplifter. Espino protested but the guard was
persistent. The chain of circumstances led Espino to file a complaint against Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, praying
for moral damages, exemplary damages, and the like. The Court of First Instance (CFI)
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the ruling of the CFI.

Issue: Whether Espino is entitled to damages

Decision:
Yes. We likewise concur with the Court of Appeals that "(u)pon the facts and under the
law, plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for damages against the defendants.
Defendants wilfully caused loss or injury to plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under Articles 19 and 21 in
relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code."

The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and
interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected,
shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and
hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21
in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar,
petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to
humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil
Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith (Article 19, Civil Code).