LORENZA C.
ONGCO, PETITIONER, actual possession of the subject land in an earlier case filed before the
vs.
VALERIANA UNGCO DALISAY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure asking the Court to rule whether petitioner may
intervene in a land registration case.
The Petition seeks to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolutions1 dated 30 September 2009 and 11 November 2009 (assailed
Resolutions), which denied petitioner's Motion for Leave to Intervene dated
23 June 2009.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 15 October 2007, respondent Valeriana Ungco Dalisay (Dalisay) applied
for registration of a parcel of land designated as Lot 1792, Cad-609-D, by
filing an Application for Land Registration before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Binangonan, Branch 2.2 At the hearings, no oppositor aside from
the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) came. Neither was there any
written opposition filed in court. Thus, an Order of General Default was
issued against the whole world except the Republic. Consequently, on 15
October 2008, the court found respondent Dalisay to have clearly shown a
registrable right over the subject property and ordered that a decree of
registration be issued by the Land Registration Authority once the Decision
had become final.3 Herein petitioner Lorenza C. Ongco (Ongco) never
intervened in the proceedings in the trial court.
The Republic filed an appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
92046.4 While the case was pending appeal, petitioner Ongco filed a "Motion
for Leave to Intervene" dated 23 June 2009 with an attached Answer-in-
Intervention.5
The Answer-in-Intervention sought the dismissal of respondent Dalisay's
Application for Land Registration on the ground that, contrary to the
allegations of Dalisay, the subject property was not free from any adverse
claim. In fact, petitioner Ongco had allegedly been previously found to be in
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when she
applied for a free patent on the land.6
In her Comment/Objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene, Dalisay
contended that Ongco did not have a legal interest over the
property.7 Moreover, the intervention would unduly delay the registration
proceeding, which was now on appeal. Besides, petitioner's interest, if any,
may be fully protected in a separate and direct proceeding. Additionally,
Dalisay pointed out that Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court was clear
that intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court, but not at any other time. The Republic, on the other hand, said
that it was interposing no objection to the Motion for Leave to Intervene.8
On 30 September 2009, the CA issued its first assailed Resolution 9 denying
the Motion for Intervention for having been filed beyond the period allowed
by law. It said:
Lorenza C. Ongco's prayer to be allowed to intervene in the instant
"MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE XXX" is DENIED[,] said motion
having been filed beyond the period allowed by law.
Manalo vs. Court of Appeals is emphatic:
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only
when the statutory conditions for the right to intervene [are] shown. Thus, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. In determining the propriety of letting a party
intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring whether "a
person (1) has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success
of either of the parties; (3) or an interest against both; (4) or when is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof." Just as
important, as (the Supreme Court had) stated in Big Country Ranch
Corporation v. Court of Appeals [227 SCRA 161{1993}], is the function to
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2,
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:
"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court, x x x."
After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is
because, basically, intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary
and supplemental to an existing litigation.
Here, the subject motion was filed only on June 23, 2009, way beyond the
rendition of the Decision dated October 15, 2008 (subject of the instant
appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General) by the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Branch 2. As a necessary consequence, the prayed for
admission of the instant "ANSWER-IN-INTERVENTION could only be
denied, x x x. (Emphases in the original)
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,10 which was also denied in a
Resolution dated 11 November 2009.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In her three-page Comment11 on the Petition, respondent Dalisay briefly
argues that the CA did not commit any error, because it properly applied the
technical rules of procedure in denying the Motion for Intervention. She also
argues that the issues being presented are factual and, as such, not
reviewable in a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In her Reply,12 petitioner asserts that the issues to be resolved in her Petition
are questions of law: whether the requisites for intervention are present, and
whether the intervention she is seeking is an exception to the general rule
that intervention must be filed before judgment is rendered by the trial court.
Issue for Resolution and the Ruling of the Court
The issue for resolution in the instant case is whether the CA committed
reversible error in denying the Motion for Intervention of petitioner.
We rule to deny the Petition.
DISCUSSION
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in
the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable
the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings.13 This remedy, however, is not a right. The rules on
intervention are set forth clearly in Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-
intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original
parties. (Emphasis supplied)
It can be readily seen that intervention is not a matter of right, but is left to
the trial court's sound discretion. The trial court must not only determine if
the requisite legal interest is present, but also take into consideration the
delay and the consequent prejudice to the original parties that the
intervention will cause. Both requirements must concur, as the first
requirement on legal interest is not more important than the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. 14 To help ensure that
delay does not result from the granting of a motion to intervene, the Rules
also explicitly say that intervention may be allowed only before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.
In Executive Secretary v. Northeast Freight,15 this Court explained
intervention in this wise:
Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the
court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a
person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both;
or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that
such interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the
judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more
than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be
indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or
collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a legal interest,
permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the
exercise of which is limited by considering "whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding." (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, Ongco may not be allowed
to intervene.
Petitioner has not shown any legal interest of such nature that she "will
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment." On the
contrary, her interest is indirect and contingent. She has not been granted a
free patent over the subject land, as she in fact admits being only in the
process of applying for one.16 Her interest is at best inchoate. In Firestone
Ceramics v. CA,17 the Court held that the petitioner who anchored his motion
to intervene on his legal interest arising from his pending application for a
free patent over a portion of the subject land merely had a collateral interest
in the subject matter of the litigation. His collateral interest could not have
justified intervention.
In any event, the Motion for Intervention was filed only with the CA after the
MTC had rendered judgment. By itself, this inexcusable delay is a sufficient
ground for denying the motion. To recall, the motion should be filed "any
time before rendition of judgment." The history and rationale of this rule has
been explained thusly:
1. The former rule as to when intervention may be allowed was
expressed in Sec. 2, Rule 12 as "before or during a trial," and this
ambiguity also gave rise to indecisive doctrines. Thus, inceptively it
was held that a motion for leave to intervene may be filed "before or
during a trial" even on the day when the case is submitted for
decision (Falcasantos vs. Falcasantos, L-4627, May 13, 1952) as
long as it will not unduly delay the disposition of the case. The term
"trial" was used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period for the
introduction for intervention was filed after the case had already
been submitted for decision, the denial thereof is proper (Vigan
Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Arciaga, L-29207 and L-29222, July 31,
1974). However, it has also been held that intervention may be
allowed at any time before the rendition of final judgment
(Linchauco vs. CA, et al, L-23842, Mar. 13, 1975). Further, in the
exceptional case of Director of Lands vs. CA, et al. (L-45168, Sept.
25, 1979), the Supreme Court permitted intervention in a case
pending before it on appeal in order to avoid injustice and in
consideration of the number of parties who may be affected by the
dispute involving overlapping of numerous land titles.
2. The uncertainty in these ruling has been eliminated by the
present Sec. 2 of this amended Rule which permits the filing of the
motion to intervene at any time before the rendition of the judgment
in the case, in line with the doctrine in Lichauco above cited. The
justification advanced for this is that before judgment is rendered,
the court, for good cause shown, may still allow the introduction of
additional evidence and that is still within a liberal interpretation of
the period for trial. Also, since no judgment has yet been rendered,
the matter subject of the intervention may still be readily resolved
and integrated in the judgment disposing of all claims in the case,
and would not require an overall reassessment of said claims as
would be the case if the judgment had already been
rendered.18 (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, in Manalo v. CA,19 the Court said:
The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2,
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires:
"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before the rendition of judgment by the trial court x x x."
After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is
because, basically, intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary
and supplemental to an existing litigation. (Emphases supplied)
There is wisdom in strictly enforcing the period set by Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court for the filing of a motion for intervention. Otherwise, undue delay would
result from many belated filings of motions for intervention after judgment
has already been rendered, because a reassessment of claims would have
to be done. Thus, those who slept on their lawfully granted privilege to
intervene will be rewarded, while the original parties will be unduly
prejudiced. This rule should apply more strictly to land registration cases, in
which there is a possibility that a great number of claimant-oppositors may
cause a delay in the proceedings by filing motions to intervene after the trial
court sitting as a land registration court has rendered judgment.
Also, it must be noted that a land registration proceeding is an action in
rem.1wphi1 Thus, only a general notice to the public is required, and not a
personal one. Its publication already binds the whole world, including those
who will be adversely affected. This, according to this Court, is the only way
to give meaning to the finality and indefeasibility of the Torrens title to be
issued as against the argument that the said rule could result in actual
injustice.20 In the present case, the MTC found that the required publication
was made by respondent Dalisay when she applied for land registration.
That publication was sufficient notice to petitioner Ongco. Thus, petitioner
only had herself to blame when she failed to intervene as soon as she could
before the rendition of judgment.
We also note that, had petitioner learned of the trial court proceedings in
time, and had she wanted to oppose the application, the proper procedure
would have been to ask for the lifting of the order of default and then to file
the opposition.21 It would be an error of procedure to file a motion to
intervene. This is because, as discussed above, proceedings in land
registration are in rem and not in personam.22
Aware of her fatal shortcoming, petitioner Ongco would now like the Court to
exceptionally allow intervention even after judgment has been rendered by
the MTC in the land registration case. She cites instances in which this Court
allowed intervention on appeal. However, the cases she cited are
inapplicable to the present case, because the movants therein who wanted
to intervene were found by the Court to be indispensable parties. Thus,
under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they had to be joined
because, without them, there could be no final determination of the actions.
Indeed, if indispensable parties are not impleaded, any judgment would have
no effect.
In Galicia v. Manliquez,23 the first case cited by petitioner, the Court found
that the defendant-intervenors were indispensable parties, being the
indisputable compulsory co-heirs of the original defendants in the case for
recovery of possession and ownership, and annulment of title. Thus, without
them, there could be no final determination of the action. Moreover, they
certainly stood to be affected by any judgment in the case, considering their
"ostensible ownership of the property."
In Mago v. CA,24 the intervenor was the rightful awardee of a piece of land
that was mistakenly awarded by the NHA to another awardee. Thus, the
latter was given title to land with an area that was more than that intended to
be awarded to him. The NHA then cancelled the title mistakenly awarded
and ordered the subdivision of the lot into two. The recipient of the
mistakenly awarded title filed a Petition for injunction to enjoin the NHA from
cancelling the title awarded. The Petition was granted and the judgment
became final. The other awardee filed a Motion to Intervene, as well as a
Petition for Relief from Judgment, which were both denied by the trial court.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the court a quo. This Court, however, found
that the intervention should have been granted, considering the indisputable
admission of the NHA, the grantor-agency itself, that the intervenor was the
rightful awardee of half of the lot mistakenly awarded. Thus, the intervenor
stood to be deprived of his rightful award when the trial court enjoined the
cancellation of the mistakenly awarded title and the subdivision of the lot
covered by the title. The intervenor's legal interest, in other words, was
directly affected.
In the present case, petitioner Ongco is not an indispensable party. As
already noted, her interests are inchoate and merely collateral, as she is
only in the process of applying for a free patent. Also, the action for land
registration may proceed and be carried to judgment without joining her. This
is because the issues to be threshed out in a land registration proceeding
such as whether the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and whether the applicant or her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
said land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or
earlier can be threshed out without joining petitioner.
True, the evidence to be adduced by petitioner Ongco - to prove that she,
not Dalisay, has been in possession of the land subject of the application for
registration of respondent has a bearing on the determination of the
latter's right to register her title to the land. In particular, this evidence will
help debunk the claim of respondent that she has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcel of land. In fact, this
same evidence must have been the reason why the Republic did not
interpose any objection to the Motion for Intervention. None of these facts,
however, makes petitioner an indispensable party; for there are many other
ways of establishing the fact of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject parcel of land or the lack thereof.
If any, the only indispensable party to a land registration case is the
Republic. Against it, no order of default would be effective, because the
Regalian doctrine presumes that all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.25
In any case, we note that petitioner is not left without any remedy in case
respondent succeeds in getting a decree of registration. Under Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, there is
a remedy available to any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein - through an adjudication or a confirmation of title obtained
by actual fraud. The person may file, in the proper court, a petition for
reopening and reviewing the decree of registration within one year from the
date of entry thereof. This Court has ruled that actual fraud is committed by
a registration applicant's failure or intentional omission to disclose the fact of
actual physical possession of the premises by the party seeking a review of
the decree. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact from which benefit
is obtained, to the prejudice of a third person. 26 Thus, if he is so minded,
petitioner can still file for a petition to review the decree of registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The

Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 30 September 2009 and 11 November
2009, which denied petitioner's Motion for Leave to Intervene in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92046, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND
CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF
BIRTH,
EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K.
LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K.
LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN,
HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL,
VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad
testificandum and a parents right not to testify in a case against his children.
The Facts and the Case
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad
Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh
children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children
believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of
Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius
children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they,
too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to
request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter.
After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.
Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is
in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform
with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate
children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure
their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been
necessary had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the
8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.1
The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the
Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of
Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38
years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was
born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and
so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children,
Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she
supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate
her true mothers name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees
presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege,
she being Emma Lees stepmother.3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed
the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering
that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena
was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother.
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration,
they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision,4 setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that
only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be
quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius advanced age
alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash
the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.
Since the CA denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by resolution of
May 8, 2007,5 she filed the present petition with this Court.
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry
case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the
certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs
daughter.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena
ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable
and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on
oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory that she had illicit
relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and
oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production
of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that
has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4,
Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena
duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the
time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy
of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose
behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the
production thereof.
Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of
Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for
correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children, Emma
Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to
establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus:
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents
for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was
impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to
the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually
actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing
to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng
and petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action,
obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of
Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so
could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-
Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony
and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the
attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come
to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would
subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate
her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.
1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be
inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to
come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this
claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have
passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a
subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would
have to update itself and determine if Tius current physical
condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and
being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued
to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject
her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is to
 protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner
and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age. 8

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against
her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule
130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to

testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil
Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of
Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other
direct ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites
the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a
person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.

SO ORDERED.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE
GO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE
COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the
prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case
despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to
prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused
of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, petitioners seek to nullify and set aside the February 19, 2008
Decision1 and November 28, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 99383, which reversed the September 12, 2006
Order3 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil
Case No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of the prosecutions motion to
take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos, Cambodia.
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) docketed as Criminal Case
No. 396447. The Information4 dated September 24, 2003, later amended5 on
September 14, 2004, reads:
"That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone
Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following manner, to wit:
all said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they
have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials
installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory
located in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan,
executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the amount of
$464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor
of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said
deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well
knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and
foreclosed by CHINA BANK CORPORATION as early as September 1994
thereby causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY
LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 more or less."
Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman
from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back to the
Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to
Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for
lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by
reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition,7 the MeTC granted8 the motion after
the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of
Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC
denied,9 prompting petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari10 before the
RTC.
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the
MeTC Orders null and void.11 The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the
taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to
the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect
to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which
is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to
meet the witness against him face to face.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order
dated March 5, 2006,12 the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held
that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for
allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping
because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in
criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every
opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely
objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the
witness.
On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition alleging that
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT INFRINGED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO A PUBLIC
TRIAL IN ALLOWING THE TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA.
II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE DEPOSITION TAKING OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN
LAOS, CAMBODIA IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS TO
CONFRONT THE SAID WITNESS FACE TO FACE.
III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION COMMITTED BY THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT IN APPLYING THE RULES ON DEPOSITION-
TAKING IN CIVIL CASES TO CRIMINAL CASES.
IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING THE
TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, OVERLOOKING THE ESTABLISHED RULE THAT
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW OR
JURISPRUDENCE SIMILARLY COMES WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution
Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court.13 This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess
against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the
witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. 14 It is
not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as
well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra
v. Risos15 explicitly states that
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or
as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense
and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)16
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of
depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement
except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.17
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly
of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before
the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at
the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before
the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of
the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place
at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly
nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We
quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age
falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court
concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live
witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge
presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the
said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the
deponent is sick or not.18 (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and
not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the
accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de
Manguerra19 where we further declared that
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its
witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are
designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The
giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as
such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.20 (Underscoring supplied)
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly
applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special proceedings,
the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23
should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial
examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically
ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules
of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in
the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or
otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the
Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases
and overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution
secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to
confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their
constitutional rights to a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that
petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent
witness and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same
manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face
confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge
and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the
courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v.
Estenzo,21 the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness
testifying in open court, thus:
"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify
orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-
examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands
confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being
gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot
be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining
immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the
judge, and it is this it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the
elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the
witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a
true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or
detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of
the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory,
and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character.
These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in
court. x x x"22 (Underscoring supplied)1wphi1
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to
criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-
examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses.23 The Court explained in People v. Seneris24that the
constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing
falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the
demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility." 25
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to
be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the
trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination,"26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee
against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American
case of Crawford v. Washington,27 the US Supreme Court had expounded
on the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement, thus:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's right to confront witness face to face
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds
with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to
ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the
desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little
dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined." (Underscoring
supplied)
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as
sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the
deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb 28 that
the taking of an unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a
discovery procedure the use of which is within the trial court's sound
discretion which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law.29
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the
factual settings are not similar.1wphi1 The accused in the Webb case had
sought to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a
Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses,
alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be
compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion
of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When
the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial court's
disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no
necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of
deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the
defense.30
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the
complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under
Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional
rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had
managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on
September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile
constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or
testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony
at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident alien
who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return.
Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the court's
jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to preserve the
testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to no other
party.

Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination

before the MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the
prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal
application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while the
prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the
deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid
charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the
State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against
accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses
against him face to face. Great care must be observed in the taking and use
of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no conviction of an
accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and deposition. 31

Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness
when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the deposition of prosecution
witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the court where the
case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court which disallowed the deposition-taking
in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
REY LAADA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ, respondents.
x-----------------------x
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS
SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA
HEMEDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
May the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is
addressed under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer such
request for his client? This is the question posed for resolution in these two
(2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 24, 19912 that resolved the issue in the
negative.
The facts attending the tragic incident that triggered the filing in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laguna of Civil Case No. B-2762, an action for
damages, by the spouses Rogelio Hemedez and Eliza Garcia Hemedez, are
as follows:
The Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) declared a strike on account of
alleged unfair labor practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc. (Nestle)
and put up a picket line in front of the companys factory in Niugan,
Cabuyao, Laguna. On October 27, 1987, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining
the UFE, its sympathizers and agents to desist from "blocking, barricading
and obstructing the points of ingress and egress" from Nestles Cabuyao
plant. To enforce the TRO, Nestle sought the assistance of both the 224th
Philippine Constabulary (PC) Company in Camp Eldridge, Los Baos,
Laguna, under the command of PC/Capt. Rey Laada, and the members of
the Cabuyao police department under the command of P/Maj. Lorenzo T.
Malaga, as well as the fire brigade of Cabuyao. In order that it could transfer
its products from the Cabuyao factory to its warehouse in Taguig, Metro
Manila during the strike, Nestle hired the trucks of the Alimagno brothers,
Constancio, Jr., who was then the Officer-in-Charge of Cabuyao, and Jesus.
On October 29, 1987, Alexander Asinas of the UFE and Francis Santos of
Nestle agreed to constitute a panel to discuss about the said trucks and the
scabs allowed to sneak into the Cabuyao plant, as the matter did not appear
to have been covered by the TRO. However, in apparent bad faith, Santos
signaled both the PC contingent to disperse the strikers at the barricades in
front of the plant gate, and the overloaded cargo trucks waiting inside the
compound to proceed with getting out of the plant. Thus, the PC contingent,
both in uniform and in plain clothes, and armed with armalites, began hitting
the strikers with truncheons as water cannons from fire trucks assisted them
in the dispersal operation that resulted in the arrest of fourteen (14) strikers
and injuries to many others. With gate cleared, the cargo trucks began
leaving the compound with some turning to the right and others to the left
into the national road. Although stones thrown by some strikers broke the
windshields of some trucks, all five (5) trucks succeeded in leaving the
compound.
That was the situation in the dispersal operation when Dr. Vied Vemir Garcia
Hemedez arrived in the area on board his car, a Ford Escort 4-door sedan,
model 1975, with plate No. DOG-689, on his way home from his masteral
class at the University of the Philippines College of Public Health. He
stopped his car not knowing that the sixth ten-wheeler truck owned by Jesus
Alimagno and driven by Pacifico Galasao, was then leaving the Nestle
compound in full speed. To avoid stones being thrown at his direction,
Galasao was driving in a crouching position. However, considering the
length of the truck that was also overloaded, Galasao lost control of it. After
turning left to the national road, the truck zigzagged northward until it
reached the soft shoulder on the right side of the national road where
Galasao abruptly swerved the truck to the left to avoid the strikers. However,
he was not able to swerve the truck back to the right to stay on course on
the road. Because Galasao did not stop nor slow it down, the truck went
diagonally across to the left side of the road, bumped the car of Dr.
Hemedez, and dragged it until the car turned upside down. In Galasaos
attempt to straighten his course, he also side-swept a house off the road,
rammed down a beauty parlor, and run over and killed two (2) persons
sitting on a bench near the parlor facing the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel. The
truck stopped as it crashed into the chapels reinforced concrete wall and
post. Galasao rose from his seat, got off the truck, and, apparently
anticipating an attack, proceeded to the chapel with a lead pipe in hand
while his helpers armed themselves with stones.
Pinned down by his overturned car, Dr. Hemedez mustered strength to ask
someone to inform his parents, through a doctor friend, about the incident as
he pleaded with people around to extricate him from under the truck. Capt.
Laada and some PC soldiers immediately rushed to the truck to prevent
people from looting it. At that moment, the brothers of Dr. Hemedez, namely,
Roel, Emeterio and Rogelio, Jr., followed by their mother, Mrs. Eliza
Hemedez, and her daughter, Andora, arrived. Roel and Emeterio tried to pull
Dr. Hemedez out of his car to no avail. Roel cut the ropes holding the
canvass covering the load of the truck in preparation for its being lifted, and
asked the PC soldiers to unload or allow them to unload the trucks cargo.
The soldiers referred Roel to Capt. Laada who, however, refused to unload
the cargo of the truck for fear that the cargo might be looted. Mrs. Hemedez
made the same plea to Capt. Laada and Jesus Alimagno who had arrived
in the area, but she was met with the same adamant refusal to unload the
cargo for fear that there might be looting, notwithstanding that Dr. Hemedez
was the godson of Constancio Alimagno, Sr. It was two (2) hours later when
the cargo was finally unloaded to other trucks that Dr. Hemedez was finally
pulled out from under Galasaos truck, and brought to the Perpetual Help
Hospital in Bian, Laguna where he died shortly after arrival thereat. He died
due to "Intra-thoracic hemorrhage, massive, due to severe impact (Vehicular
Accident)." Mrs. Hemedez witnessed in pain the agony of her helpless son
as a consequence of the refusal of Capt. Laada and the PC soldiers to help
them save his life. The Hemedez family tried to pay Funeraria Dionicio for
the funeral services rendered for Dr. Hemedez but its owner, Dionicio
Hemedez, refused to accept payment on the ground that Miguela Alimagno,
the mother of Jesus, undertook to pay for it.3
On December 8, 1987, the spouses Rogelio and Eliza Hemedez, parents of
Dr. Hemedez, filed Civil Case No. B-2762 in the RTC of Laguna against
Nestle, Jesus Alimagno, Francis Santos, Pacifico Galasao, and PC/Capt.
Rey Laada, praying for the award of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
as indemnity for Dr. Hemedez death, Eleven Million Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P11,400,000.00) representing loss of earnings of the
deceased, Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00) as actual compensation for
the destruction of his car, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys
fees.
In their answer to the complaint, Nestle and Santos denied liability for the
death of Dr. Hemedez. They interposed as special and affirmative defenses
that Nestle and Belltown Transport Services, Inc., an independent
contractor, had a "trucking and hauling agreement" whereby Belltown
agreed to "make deliveries of the products of Nestle" and assumed "liability
for any injuries or damages to properties" that would arise from the
agreement. They alleged that the accident happened in the course of an
illegal strike and hence, the proximate cause of Dr. Hemedez death "was
the violent assault by the strikers against the truck." They averred that the
complaint should be dismissed for failure to implead UFE, its officers and
striking members, as indispensable parties. They alleged further that the
incident happened outside of Nestles premises and that when they came to
know about it, they ordered the lifting of the truck by Nestles own forklift.
The delayed unloading of the cargo from the truck thus rested upon
Belltowns "sole judgment." They set up a cross-claim against Galasao in
order that he could reimburse them should they be adjudged liable, and a
counterclaim for attorneys fees for what they called an unfounded suit.
For his part, Capt. Laada dismissed the claims for his liability. He asserted
that the unruly mobs attack on the trucks that built up a "monstrous traffic
jam" caused the incident. While he and his men exerted all efforts to save all
casualties and not just Dr. Hemedez, the plaintiffs misconstrued his acts "as
refusal in their obsessive and hysterical desire to extricate their stricken
relative from the place of the accident without regard to the welfare and well-
being of the larger throng of persons some of whom were also injured who
were just as well entitled to or deserving protection from the contingent of
PC soldiers." He interposed a counterclaim for moral damages and
attorneys fees arising from the plaintiffs having unjustly impleaded him in
the "baseless suit" designed to be a speculative monetary claim against
Nestle.
Thereafter, the Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for
admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the
genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their
respective counsel, Nestle and Santos, Capt. Laada, and Alimagno and
Galasao filed their verified answer to the request for admission.
Contending that under Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties
themselves and not their counsel should personally answer the request for
admission and hence the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf was
"by nature based on hearsay," they sought the striking out of said answers.
On the other hand, the defendants asserted that they observed the rules in
filing their answers, through their lawyers, to the request for admission.
Hence, the trial court4 issued an Order dated April 10, 1989 denying for lack
of merit the Hemedez spouses motion to strike out the defendants answers
and/or declare the matters sought to be admitted as impliedly admitted. It
held that the grounds relied upon by plaintiffs counsel in his motion were
"more formal than substantial" for several reasons. First, by signing and
verifying the answer to the request for admission, the counsel of a defendant
or defendants "reposed upon himself the same undertaking the defendant
would have undertaken had he been the one who verified" the
answer. Second, since the purpose of verification is merely to serve as an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not
the product of imagination, and that the pleading is filed in good faith, the
absence of verification is formal and not jurisdictional. Third, the defendants
were bound by the acts of the counsel of their choice. Fourth, the
generalizations made in the answer were expected because the plaintiffs
requests for admission were substantially identical with the allegations in
their complaint. The lower court concluded:
A cursory reading of the adverted answers to the complaint would show that
defendants have substantially complied with the requirements of the rules by
so specifically denying the matters which they could not admit and indicating
the reasons why they could not admit or deny the specific matters sought to
be admitted, thus leaving such matter controverted. The veracity, therefore,
of their denial or uncommitted stand, is a matter that could be determined
only in a full blown trial on the merit where parties could amply support their
respective claim.
The Hemedez spouses sought a reconsideration of that Order through an
omnibus motion (a) asserting that the matters sought to be admitted were
"decisive on the respective liabilities of all defendants"; (b) stressing the
need to resolve the relevancy and materiality of the specific matters
requested to be admitted and which were neither admitted nor denied by the
defendants; and (c) seeking permission to amend the complaint to implead
as indispensable parties-defendants Belltown Transport Services, Inc.,
Magnolia Freight Services, and Constancio Alimagno, Jr.
Nestle, Santos and Capt. Laada opposed the omnibus motion on the
grounds that: (a) it was filed out of time, (b) it raised no new matters not
already taken up in the questioned Order, and (c) to allow amendment of the
complaint would result in delay in the proceedings.
On July 24, 1989, the lower court denied the omnibus motion except the
prayer to amend the complaint. It stressed that in that particular stage of the
proceedings, the court could not "make a categorical ruling as to the veracity
of the denials made by defendants of certain facts based on immateriality,
irrelevancy or for lack of information until after it has considered in a full
blown trial all the evidence presented and pertinent to the issue of the case."
Refusing to budge from their stand, the Hemedez spouses sought the review
of both Orders of the lower court via a petition for certiorari that was filed on
August 16, 1989 and docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 89399. The First
Division of this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 18894. On July 24, 1991, the Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision annulling the lower courts Orders of April 10,
1989 and July 24, 1989, granting the motions to strike out the answers
subject of the requests for admission and declaring each of the matters
requested to be impliedly admitted, and remanding the case to the court a
quo for proper proceedings.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review on certiorari. As earlier
stated, the petitioners offer for resolution the principal issue of whether or not
an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by the counsel of
the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 26
of the Rules of Court. In other words, should a person to whom a request for
admission is addressed personally answer the request? Two (2) other
collateral issues need resolution: (a) whether or not each answer of the
requested party-defendant to the statements sought to be admitted is a
specific denial in accordance with the rules, and (b) whether or not the
motion for reconsideration of the questioned Order of April 10, 1989 was
timely filed.
The provision of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the matrix upon which the
resolution of these petitions rests, state:
SEC. 2. Implied admission. Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in
the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof,
or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the
party to whom the request is directedserves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter
requested shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution."
(Underscoring supplied.)5
The issue for resolution thus calls for an interpretation of the phrase "the
party to whom the request is directed." This is not the first time that the Court
is faced with the issue of whether a party requested to make admissions
may reply or answer through his counsel. In PSCFC Financial Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,6 the petitioner therein served upon the Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, a written request for admission of the truth of
certain factual matters. Through Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, who was not yet a
lawyer when Banco Filipino inaugurated its financing plan in 1968, Banco
Filipino made the requested admissions but denied that the financing
corporation had availed of the Home Financing Plan subject of controversy.
Obviously objecting to the reply, the petitioner therein made a second
request for admission. In resolving the issue of whether or not the answer to
the request for admission under Rule 26 "should be made by the party
himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer," the Court issued a Resolution
stating as follows:
The argument is untenable. Section 21 of Rule 138 states
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client x x x .
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the
recognized exceptions as found in Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which
enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary,
or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their
attorneys are both directed to appear before the court for a conference; so
that for counsel to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his client, he must
clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power of
attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their
clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and
in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure x x x ."
Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for
admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may
not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his
behalf.Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously;
otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as
Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun
overstepped his authority, it is only his client, respondent Banco Filipino,
which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not petitioner, the adverse
party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by
its counsel in its behalf. (Italics supplied.)7
In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and
Santos did not authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the
respective answers requested of them by private respondents in the latters
written request for admission. As this Court has said, there is no reason to
strictly construe the phrase "the party to whom the request is directed" to
refer solely or personally to the petitioners themselves.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the subject matters of
the request for admission are the same as the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint for which private respondents have filed their respective answers.
Private respondents thus desired the petitioners to admit once again the
very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers. In Po v. Court
of Appeals, this Court said:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by
his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d,
752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a
second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A
request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the
request, whose purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or
defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the
Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy." 8
The Court reiterated that ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals9 and
in Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals.10 In the latter case,
the Court emphasized that the rule on admission as a mode of discovery is
intended "to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts
which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained
by reasonable inquiry." Thus, if the request for admission only serves to
delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended
purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.
Moreover, as the Court has observed in Briboneria, Sec. 1 of Rule 26
requires that the request for admission must be served directly upon the
party requested. Otherwise, that party cannot be deemed to have admitted
the genuineness of any relevant matters of fact set forth therein on account
of failure to answer the request for admission. It is thus unfair and
unreasonable for private respondents to expect the petitioners to answer the
requests for admission that they in fact did not personally receive. Private SO ORDERED.
respondents failure to serve copies of the request for admission directly
upon the petitioners themselves suffices to warrant denial of the motion to
strike out petitioners responses to said request.

The application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound
discretion of the court.1wphi1 In the same vein, the determination of the
sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply with the modes of
discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion.11 It is the duty of the
courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to
determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in mind
the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice. 12 It need not be
emphasized that upon the courts shoulders likewise rests the burden of
determining whether the response of the requested party is a specific denial
of the matters requested for admission.

While the Court upholds the petitioners contention on the propriety of an

answer to a request for admission being filed by counsel, there is no merit in
their contention on the late filing of private respondents omnibus motion. It is
indeed a fact that private respondents received a copy of the questioned
Order of April 10, 1989 on April 26, 1989 and that they filed the omnibus
motion by registered mail only on June 21, 1989 or fifty-six (56) days
thereafter. Petitioners contend that the omnibus motion should have been
filed within the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 39 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Suffice it to state that the Order sought
to be reconsidered by the lower court did not finally dispose of the merits of
the case so that it should be covered by the reglementary period stated in
Section 39. That section speaks of "final orders"13 and not interlocutory ones
or those that leave "something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits."14 By denying the motion to strike out the
answers of private respondents to petitioners request for admission, the
lower court did not terminate the proceedings. When it ruled on the omnibus
motion which petitioners believe was filed out of time, the lower court simply
disposed of a matter that was, in a manner of speaking, getting in the way of
the expeditious disposition of the case. Private respondents who should be
most interested in the speedy disposition of the case unfortunately and
unwittingly caused its delay by a request for admission that only achieved
nothing but further delay in the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are

GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,
1991 is SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court of Laguna is ordered to
proceed with dispatch in the resolution of Civil Case No. B-2762.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSALINDA
CANADALLA-GO, represented by her Attorney-in-fact
BENITO A. CANADALLA, Respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:
Once again, we are confronted with the issue of whether matters requested
to be admitted under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court which are mere
reiterations of the allegations in the complaint and are specifically denied in
the answer may be deemed impliedly admitted on the ground that the
response thereto is not under oath.
The controversy stemmed in January 1977 when Irene Canadalla obtained a
loan of P100,000 from petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
for purposes of financing her piggery business. As security, Canadalla
executed on 19 January 1977 a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two
parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-7609 and OCT No. P-4226 of the
Registry of Deeds of Infanta, Quezon. On 10 August 1979, Canadalla
procured another loan in the amount of P150,000, which was secured by a
mortgage over the same two parcels of land and a third parcel covered by
OCT No. P-6679 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Quezon.
Since the piggery business allegedly suffered strong reverses, compounded
by devastating typhoons, the prevalence of diseases, and destruction of her
store by fire, Canadalla failed to comply with her obligations to the DBP.
Subsequently, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. On 5
September 1989, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the
DBP, which emerged as the only bidder. The sale was evidenced by a
Certificate of Sale and registered on 17 January 1990.
Canadalla was able to redeem the foreclosed property covered by TCT No.
T-7609 within the redemption period of one year from 17 January 1990. As
to the properties covered by OCT Nos. P-4226 and P-6679, she had six
years from 17 January 1990 to redeem the same, they being free patent
titles. On 5 October 1995, she offered to redeem the properties for a
redemption price of P1.5 million. But the DBP countered that the redemption
price under its 1986 Revised Chapter must be based on its total claim, which
was P1,927,729.50 as of 30 September 1995. Subsequently, she allegedly
assigned her right to redeem her properties to her daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalinda A. Canadalla-Go.
In January 1996, Go offered to redeem the properties for P526,882.40. In
response, the DBP advised Go that the acceptable redemption price
was P1,814,700.58 representing its total claim as of 17 January 1996. When
Go failed to redeem the properties, the DBP consolidated its titles over the
subject properties and new certificates of title were issued in its name.
On 8 July 1996, Go filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a
Supplemental Complaint1 for the "Exercise of Right of Redemption and
Determination of Redemption Price, Nullification of Consolidation,
Annulment of Titles, with Damages, Plus Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order." The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-483 in
Branch 148 of said court. After the DBP filed its Answer2 but before the
parties could proceed to trial, Go filed a Request for Admission by Adverse
Party.3 Thereafter, the DBP filed its Comment.4
During the hearing on 20 May 1997, Go objected to the Comment reasoning
that it was not under oath as required by Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court, and that it failed to state the reasons for the admission or denial of
matters for which an admission was requested. For its part, the DBP
manifested that, first, the statements, allegations, and documents contained
in the Request for Admission are substantially the same as those in the
Supplemental Complaint; second, they had already been either specifically
denied or admitted by the DBP in its Answer; and third, the reasons for the
denial or admission had already been specifically stated therein.
On 22 May 1997, the DBP filed a manifestation5 incorporating its response
to Gos objections during the 20 May 1997 hearing, attaching therewith an
affidavit6 executed by its officer and counsel Atty. Perla Melanie Caraan.
On 9 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order7 granting the motion of Go to
consider as impliedly admitted the matters sought to be admitted in the
Request for Admission and all those denied by the DBP in its Comment.
Its motion for reconsideration8 having been denied,9 the DBP filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari,10 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
62142, attributing to the court a quo grave abuse of discretion in granting the
Request for Admission despite the fact that (1) some of the matters assigned
in the Request for Admission had already been specifically denied in its
Answer to the Supplemental Complaint; (2) the sworn statement of Atty.
Caraan had sufficiently cured the alleged defect of the Comment; and (3)
some of the matters in the Request for Admission involved questions of law,
conclusions of facts, and matters of opinion which are improper subjects of
such a request.
On 6 August 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.11 It held that since DBPs answer was not under oath, it could not be
considered as having substantially complied with the requirements of
Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. The affidavit of Atty. Caraan, one
of the legal counsels of the DBP, failed to cure the defect because it was
submitted after the motion for the declaration of implied admission had been
made and the hearing of the same had been terminated. Moreover, in the
hearing of 20 May 1997, the DBP only made a manifestation that the matters
sought for admission had already been covered in the Answer without
objecting to the propriety of some of the matters sought to be admitted.
Thus, the DBP failed to timely raise its objections on the ground of
impropriety.
The DBPs Motion for Reconsideration12 was denied by the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution13 dated 16 April 2002. Hence, the DBP is now before this
Court by way of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
We find for petitioner DBP.
Indeed, as pointed out by the DBP, the matters stated in Gos Request for
Admission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint.
Besides, they had already been either specifically denied or admitted in
DBPs Answer to the Supplemental Complaint. To require the DBP to admit
these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and
superfluous. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26, before their amendment took
effect on 1 July 1997, read:
SECTION 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been
joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2. Implied admission. Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in
the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof,
or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which
an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter
requested shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution.
We have held in Po v. Court of Appeals14 that "[a] party should not be
compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and to
make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint."
The Po doctrine was brought a step further in Concrete Aggregates Co. v.
Court of Appeals,15 where we ruled that if the factual allegations in the
complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the request for
admission and have already been specifically denied or otherwise dealt with
in the answer, a response to the request is no longer required. It becomes,
therefore, unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an unsworn
response to the request for admission. The reason is obvious. A request for
admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is
inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a mode of
discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed
light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not
refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the
pleadings.16
Hence, the DBP did not even have to file its Comment on Gos Request for
Admission, which merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. DBPs
Answer itself controverts the averments in the complaint and those recopied
in the request for admission.
Even assuming that a reply to the request is needed, it is undisputed that the
DBP filed its Comment either admitting or specifically denying again the
matters sought to be admitted and stating the reasons therefor. That the
Comment was not under oath is not a substantive, but merely a formal,
defect which can be excused in the interest of justice conformably to the
well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed as
to do substantial justice.17 The filing of such Comment substantially complied
with Rule 26. Consequently, the DBP cannot be deemed to have impliedly
admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission for the mere
reason that its Comment was not under oath.
At any rate, the petitioner submitted a Manifestation, together with an
affidavit incorporating its specific denials of Gos factual allegations,
immediately after it filed its Comment on the Request for Admission and
before the RTC issued the questioned 9 June 1997 Order, with a view "to
avoid any technicalities" on the matter. The filing of the affidavit amounted
also to a substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court.
Moreover, some of the matters sought to be admitted in the Request for
Admission were matters of law or opinions, to wit:
20. Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, recognizes the right of
redemption, just as it provides the amount to be paid by a redemptioner. On
the other hand, Section 30, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court specifically
defines the amount which a redemptioner must pay.
21. Accordingly, plaintiffs offer to redeem two subject properties[,] as earlier
mentioned, were in accord with the said provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended, and Rule 39 of the Revised R[u]les of Court and such offer to
redeem should be well-placed in law and procedure.
22. Plaintiff exercised the right of redemption on January 11, 1996, within the
prescribed period of six (6) years, two subject properties being redeemed
are covered by Free Patent titles. She made a tender of the offer. A
substantial compliance with the requisites in law was met.
Under Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the scope of matters that a
party may request the adversary to admit are (1) the genuineness of any
material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request;
and (2) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the
request. The rule authorizing a party to call on the other party to make an
admission implies the making of demands for admission of relevant and
material matters of facts18 and not for admission of matters of
law,19 conclusions,20 or opinions.21
Since the afore-quoted allegations are matters of law or opinion, they are
improper matters and cannot therefore be deemed impliedly admitted under
Rule 26.
Finally, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DBP failed to timely
raise its objections to the impropriety of the matters requested for admission.
At the time Go made use of discovery proceedings under Rule 26, the
governing rule before its amendment took effect on 1 July 1997 read:
"Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter
requested shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution."
Petitioner DBPs objection to the impropriety of some of the matters
requested was promptly made as early as the filing of its comment on the
request for admission. DBPs comment consistently averred that it had
already dealt with the matters in question in its answer, either admitting or
specifically denying them. Moreover, during the 20 May 1997 hearing, the
counsel for DBP manifested the foregoing in open court. In so doing, the
DBP, in effect, argued that the matters in question are redundant and,
therefore, improper subjects for admission.
It must be stressed that the rule on admission as a mode of discovery is
intended "to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts
which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained
by reasonable inquiry."22 Thus, if a request for admission would only serve to
delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended
purpose for the rule would certainly be defeated.23 After all, rules of
procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and
should not therefore be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition
is GRANTED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6
August 2001 and its Resolution dated 16 April 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
62142 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 148, is directed to proceed with reasonable dispatch with the
trial of Civil Case No. 96-483.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.