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Trace W. Rakestraw*
Abstract: Curt Jones, the owner of Dippin Dots, Inc., invented an ice cream
product called Dippin Dots and obtained a patent on the invention. After a
few years of marketing and selling this popular product, Dippin Dots, Inc.
brought an action for patent infringement against a handful of Dippin Dots,
Inc.s prior distributors and manufacturersnamely, Mini Melts, Inc. and
Frosty Bites Distribution (collectively, MMI). MMI used the patent
infringement defense of inequitable conduct and counterclaimed under
section 2 of the Sherman Act due to the fact that Mr. Jones had
misrepresented crucial patent application informationthe date that Mr.
Jones first started selling his invention before he had obtained a patent.
Under 35 U.S.C. 102 (b) (2006), an inventor is barred from obtaining a
patent if the product was on sale . . . more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent . . . . Curt Jones did just that; he sold his invention
prior to the critical date. Even worse, he lied about this fact while trying to
obtain a patent. The patent system is based on furthering the science and
useful arts, but the system has been carefully constructed so as to prevent
inventors from benefiting from a longer than statutorily allowable time frame
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention. These policy
considerations both promote ingenuity and act as a safeguard against unfair
monopolies. Specific to this case, Mr. Jones should be liable under MMIs
Sherman Act section 2 counterclaimtypically called a Walker Process
counterclaim in patent lawfor using prior sales to his advantage in
obtaining a patent and then subsequently denying the sales in order to protect
the validity of his patent during litigation. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the District Courts holding as to
MMIs inequitable conduct defense, however, the Federal Circuit reversed a
jury finding of Walker Process liability for treble damages. The Federal
Circuit reasoned that the requisite intent to defraud the United States Patent
and Trademark Office under the Sherman Act was not present. This
967
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Comment analyzes how the Federal Circuit erred in reversing the Walker
Process counterclaim by disregarding important policy considerations
behind the on-sale bar and the experimental use doctrine. Further, this
Comment analyzes the history of Walker Process counterclaims to identify
exactly where the Federal Circuit strayed from the facts of the case and
controlling precedent.
INTRODUCTION
From the time the Constitution was drafted, there has been tension
between intellectual property laws and antitrust laws. 1 In Dippin Dots, Inc.
v. Mosey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
CAFC) applied both sets of laws. 2 In this patent infringement lawsuit,
the CAFC held that the patentee, Dippin Dots, Inc. (DDI), demonstrated
conduct which would subject itself to liability under intellectual property
laws, but not antitrust laws. 3 The CAFC was created to promote
uniformity, 4 yet its holding in this case undermines the purpose of its
creation. 5
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England School of Law (2009). B.S., Industrial and
Systems Engineering; Minor, Business, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
(Virginia Tech) (2005). I would like to thank my family and friends for their continued
support. I would also like to thank the New England Law Review Staff for all of their hard
work.
1. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 34-35 (2007) [hereinafter ABA HANDBOOK] (explaining the debate
over which set of lawsintellectual property laws or antitrust lawsare more appropriate
for intellectual property-based lawsuits). While both sets of laws seek to increase consumer
welfare through greater competition and innovation, intellectual property laws promote
innovation by awarding inventors with an exclusionary period in which to practice their
invention. Id. at 1. Antitrust laws promote innovation in a different way. See id. Antitrust
laws limit the monopolistic powers of competitors by restricting exclusionary behavior and
limiting rivals ability to coordinate their conduct. Id. at 1-2.
2. See 476 F.3d 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
3. Id.
4. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (The
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in
this area of the law.).
5. See infra Part IV.
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Dippin Dots are a unique ice cream product. 6 The novelty ice
cream is cryogenically prepared. 7 Dippin Dots come in many different
flavors and it is a favorite among adults and children of all ages. 8
Currently, Dippin Dots are packaged and shipped all around the world. 9
Curt D. Jones (Jones) is the inventor of Dippin Dots ice cream and, at
the initiation of this lawsuit, held the patent for the process of creating
Dippin Dots ice cream. 10
DDI brought suit against the alleged patent infringers, Mini Melts,
Inc. and Frosty Bites Distribution (collectively, MMI), for violating
DDIs patent rights. 11 MMI denied the claims of infringement and
defended on the grounds that DDI fraudulently acquired the Dippin Dots
patent and was thus liable for inequitable conduct. 12 In addition, MMI
counterclaimed under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 13 Specifically, section
2 states that [e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty
of a felony. 14
The sale of an invention, made prior to the critical date, 15 can be
grounds for patent application rejection. 16 As a basis for unenforceability,
MMI argued that DDI misrepresented information in front of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (the PTO) relating to when the initial
6. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1339. Dippin Dots are made from super-cold freezing
methods to make little beads of ice cream. Dippin Dots, About Dippin Dots . . .,
http://www.dippindots.com/company/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
7. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340. The mixture is frozen almost instantly in liquid
nitrogen, a common element in the atmosphere used commercially for flash freezing.
Dippin Dots, supra note 6. This type of flash-freezing . . . lock[s] in flavor and freshness.
Id.
8. Dippin Dots, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. U.S. Patent No. 5,126,156 (filed Sept. 18, 1991); Dippin Dots, supra note 6.
11. See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341 & n.1.
12. Id. A patent may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct if an applicant,
with intent to mislead or deceive the examiner, fails to disclose material information or
submits materially false information to the PTO during prosecution. Digital Control, Inc. v.
Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
13. 15 U.S.C. 2 (2006); Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341.
14. 15 U.S.C. 2.
15. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
336 (3d ed., Found. Press 2004). The critical date is marked at exactly one year before the
patent application is filed. Id.
16. See 35 U.S.C. 102(b), 132(a) (2006).
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product sales took place. 17 Jones told the PTO, during prosecution, 18 that
[t]he initial sales were in March of 1988 when it was undisputed that the
product, or some form thereof, was first sold on July 24, 1987. 19
A jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas found that the patent was unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct. 20 In addition, the jury found that DDI was liable for MMIs
antitrust counterclaim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 21 On appeal, the
CAFC affirmed the jurys finding of inequitable conduct but reversed the
Sherman Act counterclaim, 22 reasoning that the requisite intent to defraud
the PTO under the Sherman Act was not present. 23 The CAFC should not
have made this reversal.
This Comment will analyze the level of intent needed for antitrust
liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act and why the CAFC reasoned
that the level of intent was not sufficient in Dippin Dots. This Comment
will further discuss how the CAFC erred in its reversal of MMIs antitrust
counterclaim. In this context, this Comment will argue that DDI did in fact
have the requisite intent required under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Part I of this Comment will provide a modern perspective on the law
of inequitable conduct and antitrust liability. Part II will lay out the
procedural posture, facts, and holding of Dippin Dots. Part III will
examine what is actually needed to prove deceptive intentunder the
second prong of the test in a Walker Process claim 24 and why the CAFC
reasoned that the misrepresentation and omission of facts in this case were
not enough. 25 Finally, Part IV will analyze how the CAFC erred. 26
ANALYSIS
27. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (The new court . . . hears patent appeals from
United States District Courts and from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).).
28. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 15, at 72-73 ([Patent] [e]xamination is conducted to
ensure that the claimed invention is adequately disclosed, new, nonobvious, useful, and
within at least one of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter.) (internal citations
omitted).
29. Id. at 363 ([35 U.S.C.] 102(b) prevents one from obtaining a patent on an
invention that was on sale for more than one year before the patent application filing
date.).
30. 35 U.S.C. 102(b) (2000). The fact pattern in Dippin Dots deals with the on-sale
bar in 35 U.S.C. 102(b) (2000). See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341.
31. See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346 (The concealment of sales information can be
particularly egregious because, unlike the applicants failure to disclose, for example, a
material patent reference, the examiner has no way of securing the information on his
own.). The material patent reference is also called prior art, which can prohibit a patent
from being granted. See id.; 35 U.S.C. 102(b), 301 (2007).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 ([t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries).
33. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (Inequitable conduct in fact is a lesser offense than common law fraud, and includes
types of conduct less serious than knowing and willful fraud.).
34. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
A patent may be rendered unenforceable for inequitable conduct if an applicant, with intent
to mislead or deceive the examiner, fails to disclose material information or submits
materially false information to the PTO during prosecution. Id. The future of fraudulent
patent procurement is changing with pending legislation. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (as
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passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007). If made into law, this legislation will insert an inequitable
conduct provision into 35 U.S.C. 282. Compare H.R. 1908, with 35 U.S.C. 282 (2000).
35. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346 (Proof that a patentee has obtained the patent by
knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office . . . [is] sufficient to strip
[the patentee] of its exemption from the antitrust laws.) (quoting Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)); Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at
1070 ([O]missions, as well as misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances support a
finding of Walker Process fraud.).
36. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174 (holding that fraudulent patent procurement can be
a basis for antitrust liability).
37. WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 239 (1973) (emphasis added).
As with other legal obligations, the effectiveness of patent law and
antitrust law, or the effectiveness of the resolutions of conflict between
these laws, depends in very large measure upon the sanctions imposed
for their violation. Clarity, coherence, and consistency of the legal rules
to which these sanctions are applied are of course preconditions to
effective relief. This is so whether the relief is meant to undo existing
violations, prevent future specific violations, or deter violations which
are difficult to detect.
Id.
38. See supra note 31.
39. See Digital Control, Inc., 437 F.3d at 1313 (stating that inequitable conduct is
proven by balancing the levels of materiality and intent).
40. Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(quoting Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted)).
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41. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir.
1993) ([S]moking gun evidence is not required in order to establish an intent to deceive . .
. . Rather, this element of inequitable conduct, must generally be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the applicants overall conduct.).
42. Digital Control, Inc., 437 F.3d at 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (The court must . . .
determine whether the questioned conduct amounts to inequitable conduct by balancing the
levels of materiality and intent, with a greater showing of one factor allowing a lesser
showing of the other.) (quoting Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236
F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
43. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070-71 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Simply put, Walker Process fraud is a more serious offense than inequitable
conduct.); see 15 U.S.C. 2 (2006).
44. Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
A party who asserts such a fraudulently obtained patent may be subject
to an antitrust claim. If a patentee asserts a patent claim and the
defendant can demonstrate the required fraud on the PTO, as well as
show that the other elements necessary to a 2 case are present, the
defendant-counterclaimant is entitled to treble damages under the
antitrust laws.
Id. (quoting Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965)).
45. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070 (Inequitable conduct is thus an equitable
defense in a patent infringement action and serves as a shield, while a more serious finding
of fraud potentially exposes a patentee to antitrust liability and thus serves as a sword.).
46. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 325. The first element that must be proven in a
Walker Process claim, is that the patentee intentionally committed fraud on the PTO by
misrepresenting or omitting material facts in the course of prosecuting the patent
application. Id.
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under the Clayton Act, 47 the claimant must prove elements other than
materiality and deceptive intent. The remaining elements that must be
proven in a Walker Process claim are:
(2) [T]he patentee utilized the fraudulently procured patent to
exercise monopoly power in a properly defined relevant antitrust
market; (3) the party asserting the Walker Process fraud claim
suffered or is threatened with injury to its business or property,
and otherwise has standing to sue under Section 4 or 16 of the
Clayton Act; and (4) the party asserting the claim suffered
reasonably quantifiable damages. 48
The first elementwhich is comprised of the two sub-elements, deceptive
intent and materialityis only the beginning, not the end, of the
inquiry. 49
47. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1345 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
Private antitrust suits, including this one, technically proceed under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which states, again in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in . . .
district court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorneys fee.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. 15(a) (2000)); see Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 176; see infra note
124.
48. ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 325-26.
49.See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1348.
50. U.S. Patent No. 5,126,156 (filed Sept. 18, 1991).
51. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340; Dippin Dots, Inc., supra note 6.
52. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341.
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liability, 53 arguing that DDI fraudulently acquired its patent. 54 MMI argued
that Jones sold and gave out free samples of Dippin Dots before the
critical date and misrepresented this information to the PTO. 55
Jones testified that when he sold the ice cream prior to one year
before the critical date, he was only practicing the first three steps in claim
one of the patented method. 56 Further, Jones stated that his purpose in
selling his product was to get . . . test-marketing information from the
Festival Market, and not to further develop technical aspects of his
product such as particular temperature ranges for storage and service. 57
Initially, Joness patent application did not include the serving step
the last step in the claimed method. 58 Because of this, the initial patent
application was rejected. 59 The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the
rejection and in response, Jones amended his application to include the
serving step. 60
After a jury trial, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that DDIs patent was invalid for obviousness,
unenforceable due to DDIs inequitable conduct, and that DDI was liable
under MMIs Walker Process liability counterclaim. 61 The CAFC upheld
the jurys invalidity for obviousness and unenforceability due to inequitable
conduct findings; however, the CAFC reversed the jurys finding of Walker
Process liability. 62 As reasoning for its reversal regarding Walker Process
liability, the CAFC noted its disagreement with the district courts finding
that there was a high level of intent. 63
53. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965).
54. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341.
55. Id. at 1340, 1342.
56. Id. at 1341. The issued patent included six steps in claim one: (1) preparing
composition; (2) dripping composition into chamber; (3) freezing into beads; (4) storing; (5)
bringing beads to edible temperature; and (6) serving beads. Id. at 1340; see also U.S. Patent
No. 5,126,156 (filed Sept. 18, 1991).
57. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340.
58. Answer to Petition for Rehearing of Defendants-Cross Appellants at 2, Dippin
Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 05-1330, -1582), 2007 WL
928767 (Mar. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Defendants-Cross Appellants Answer]; see 156 Patent.
59. Defendants-Cross Appellants Answer, supra note 58, at 2.
60. Id.; see 156 Patent.
61. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1342; see Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, No. Civ.A.3:96-
CV-1959L, 2005 WL 475262, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2005), revd, 476 F.3d 1337 (2007).
62. See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346, 1348.
63. Id. at 1346 & n.4.
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92. Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosley, 476 F.3d 1337, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ([T]he
defendants submitted no evidence of their ownaside from the absence of the Festival
Market sales from the prosecution recordwhich affirmatively shows DDIs fraudulent
intent . . . . There is no similarly strong evidence that the omission in this case was
fraudulent.).
93. Id.
94. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-71.
95. Id. at 1071.
96. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347.
97. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2004); see also ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 325-26.
98. See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.
99. Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosley, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
100. See cases cited supra note 69.
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court said that for the omission of the Festival Market sales to rise to the
level of Walker Process fraud, there must have been separate evidence
proving this intent. 101
Sometimes, omissions and misrepresentations satisfy the level of
intent required for Walker Process fraud. 102 The CAFC, in Dippin Dots
explains that [a] false or clearly misleading prosecution statement may
permit an inference that the statement was made with deceptive intent. 103
There are many cases in which a misrepresentation was of the requisite
caliber to prove fraud. 104 The CAFC, in Dippin Dots, distinguished Walker
Process, Nobelpharma, and other cases, holding that the level of intent was
not sufficient. 105
1340-41.
109. See Defendants-Cross Appellants Answer, supra note 58, at 4 (Jones thus
knowingly made an affirmative, highly material false statement to the patent examiner in a
sworn declaration during the prosecution of DDIs patent.). Silence itself does not
constitute fraud, although one who misrepresents a material fact is guilty of fraudulent
concealment. 37 C.J.S. Fraud 218 (1943).
110. See Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosley, 476 F.3d 1337, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
It is undisputed that the Festival Market sales were never disclosed to
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") during prosecution of the
156 patent. The declaration of commercial success which ultimately
persuaded the examiner to grant the patent contained a sworn statement
by Jones that [t]he initial sales were in March of 1988, which was on
or after the critical date.
Id.
111. Answer to the Petitions for Rehearing of Appellee Frosty Bites Distribution LLC
and Defendants-Cross Appellants Thomas R. Mosey, Dots of Fun, Intl Laser Expressions,
Inc. (Also Known as I.L.E., Inc.), Defendant/Counterclaimant-Cross Appellant Nicholas
Angus, and Counterclaim Defendant-Cross Appellant Frosty Bites, Inc. (Now Known as
Mini Melts, Inc.) by Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (Nos. 2005-1330, -1582), 2007 WL 928768 [hereinafter Plaintiffs-
Appellants Answer]. [S]ome inventors may commercially exploit their inventions
relatively early in the development process by advertising or arranging to sell a new
invention even before it is ready to appear on the market. Patrick J. Barrett, Note, New
Guidelines for Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REV. 730, 745 (1972).
112. Plaintiffs-Appellants Answer, supra note 111, at 3; see U.S. Patent No. 5,126,156
(filed Sept. 18, 1991).
113. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 62 (1998).
The law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to get a
patent for a process, must have succeeded in bringing his art to the
highest degree of perfection. It is enough if he describes his method
with sufficient clearness and precision to enable those skilled in the
matter to understand what the process is, and if he points out some
practicable way of putting it into operation.
Id. (quoting The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888)). There are six total steps in claim
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one of the patent. Storing, bringing, and serving are the last three. See U.S. Patent No.
5,126,156 (filed Sept 18, 1991).
114. See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340.
115. Plaintiffs-Appellants Answer, supra note 111, at 3. [S]ome inventors may
commercially exploit their inventions relatively early in the development process by
advertising or arranging to sell a new invention even before it is ready to appear on the
market. Barrett, supra note 111, at 745.
116. Under Pfaff:
the on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the
critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer
for sale. . . . Second, the invention must be ready for patenting. Th[e
ready for patenting] condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by
proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that
prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other
descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a
person skilled in the art to practice the invention.
525 U.S. at 67-68. The first method of proving ready for patenting is what Dippin Dots
concerns. A process is reduced to practice when it is successfully performed. Id. at 57 n.2
(quoting Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383 (1928)).
117. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64-65 (quoting Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137
(1877)).
118. Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346-48 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The omission
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and misrepresentation combination was enough intent for inequitable conduct, but not
enough intent for Walker Process liability. Id.
119. Id. at 1347.
120. See id. at 1346.
121. Id. at 1341, 1346. [F]raudulent misrepresentation is defined as [a] false statement
that is known to be false or is made recklessly . . . and that is intended to induce a party to
detrimentally rely on it. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 838-39 (8th ed. 2005).
122. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1341 (The declaration of commercial success . . .
ultimately persuaded the examiner to grant the patent . . . .).
123. Id. at 1346. Proof that a patentee has obtained the patent by knowingly and
willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office . . . [is] sufficient to strip [the patentee]
of its exemption from the antitrust laws. A party who asserts such a fraudulently obtained
patent may be subject to an antitrust claim. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Walker Process
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)).
124. See ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 325-26. The remaining elements that must be
proven in a Walker Process claim are:
(2) [T]he patentee utilized the fraudulently procured patent to exercise
monopoly power in a properly defined relevant antitrust market; (3) the
party asserting the Walker Process fraud claim suffered or is threatened
with injury to its business or property, and otherwise has standing to sue
under Section 4 or 16 of the Clayton Act; and (4) the party asserting the
claim suffered reasonably quantifiable damages.
Id. Fraudulent acquisition of the asserted patent strips the Walker Process defendant of its
antitrust immunity, but that is the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry. Dippin Dots, 476
F.3d at 1348.
125. See generally ABA HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 342-51 (explaining situations
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an example of such a case. The rest of the Walker Process antitrust liability
inquiry would provide a perfect medium to distinguish cases that should
and should not be decided under the theories of antitrust law. 126 The
CAFCs reversal has the effect of prohibiting fact patterns, such as the type
in Dippin Dots, from ever reaching the rest of the antitrust inquiry. 127
The other elements in a Walker Process claim would appraise the
exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant
market for the product involved. 128 In other words, the true test of whether
there should be antitrust liabilityassuming materiality and fraudulent
intent have been establishedis to analyze such a fact pattern under the
entire Walker Process paradigm, not just the first part. Allowing this case
to pass the initial two-pronged test of a Walker Process claim would
subject it to the types of inquiries that should govern antitrust claims. 129
These inquiries are rooted in the policy behind restricting unfair
monopolies. 130
the invention. 139 At first glance, the value of the fourth policy outweighs
the first three in terms of value to the patentee; however, in Dippin Dots
that was not the case. 140
139. Barrett, supra note 111, at 736. The 1-year grace period provided for by Congress
in [35 U.S.C.] 102(b) represents a balance between these competing interests. Gen. Elec.
Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
140. See infra notes 141-153 and accompanying text. The fourth policy would be the
inventors strongest argument because, in the end, developing and perfecting the invention
promotes the progress of the science and arts. See Barrett, supra note 111, at 733; see also
U.S. CONST. art. I, 8.
141. Dippin Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
142. CHISUM, supra note 15, at 349. The experimental use doctrine provides an exception
to the on-sale bar implications. Id. This exception provides that, [s]o long as [the inventor]
does not voluntarily allow others to make it and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for
general use, he keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a
patent. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877). This was not the case in
Dippin Dots.
143. See Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340.
144. See Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135.
145. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340.
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This type of conduct was not experimental. 146 As such, the Festival Market
sales did not further the science and useful arts, 147 but rather, they extended
the period that Jones could enjoy his patent rights. 148 In doing so, the
holding of Dippin Dots does not align with the goals of the United States
patent system: To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. 149
Not only did the Festival Market sales go against the thrust of the
U.S. patent system, 150 but they also violated the theory behind the
restriction of unfair monopolies. 151 The policy behind restricting the time
period that inventors can exclude others from making, using, or selling 152
the patented product is to eliminate the creation of unfair monopolies. 153
Patent laws are designed to give the inventor the exclusive right to
make, use, and sell 154 the patented product for a period starting on the
patent issue date and ending twenty years after the filing date. 155 By
wrongfully extending the period of exclusive patent rightsby
misrepresenting the Festival Market salesJones ensured that he was able
to exclusively sell Dippin Dots for longer than the allowable time. 156
The CAFC should not have reversed the jurys Walker Process
finding because misrepresenting this type of sales information during
patent prosecution, like Jones did, is the exact type of conduct that Walker
Process claims were designed to protect against. 157
CONCLUSION
The CAFC erred in their reversal of MMIs Walker Process
counterclaim. The court, in justifying the affirmation of the inequitable
conduct defense, said that the combination of action and omission 158 was
at a sufficient level of intent for inequitable conduct, but failed to see that
this action was really a misrepresentation. In reversing MMIs Walker
Process counterclaim, the court opined that this conduct, as analyzed under
Walker Process, did not satisfy the level of intent needed for an antitrust
claim. 159 The courts analysis had no basis because Joness statement did
satisfy the level of intent needed for Walker Process claims. 160 By
reversing MMIs counterclaim, the court is opposing the purpose of the
patent law system and antitrust laws. The CAFCs reversal restricts similar
fact patterns from ever reaching an antitrust inquiry. 161
Further, the court disregarded important policy considerations behind
the on-sale bar and the experimental use doctrine, instead favoring the
affirmation of the Walker Process counterclaim. DDI should not have been
allowed to use the Festival Market sales to its advantage 162 and then
lawsuit was never brought, and MMI or another party never brought an antitrust lawsuit or
declaratory judgment alleging that the Dippin Dots patent was invalid, then DDI would
have been able to sell his product for 227 daysalmost two-thirds of an entire year
longer, than if this information was disclosed. See id. While the author understands the
approach discussed in this Comment is a bright-line approach to enforcement of patent
rights, a clear, defined approach is necessary for consistency and integrity of the patent
system.
157. See id. The alleged infringer in the Walker Process case claimedand wonbased
on the idea that the patentee misrepresented information in front of the PTO and thus,
should be subject to the liability under section 4 of the Clayton Act for any monopolistic
action taken under the fraudulent patent claim. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
& Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965).
158. Dippin Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346.
159. Id. at 1348.
160. Id. at 1347 ([E]vidence may establish that a patent applicant knew one fact and
presented another, thus allowing the factfinder to conclude that the applicant intended by the
misrepresentation to deceive the examiner.); see supra Part I.
161. See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
162. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). A frequently
invoked method of proving nonobviousness, which is an element that must be proven in
order to successfully prosecute a patent, is to show commercial success. Id. ([C]ommercial
success . . . might be utilized . . . [a]s indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness.).
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subsequently deny that disclosure of the sales was required. 163 The patent
system is based on furthering the science and useful arts, 164 but the system
has been carefully constructed so as to prevent inventors from benefiting
from a longer than statutorily allowable time frame to exclude others from
making, using, or selling 165 their product. 166 These policy considerations
both promote ingenuity and act as a safeguard against unfair monopolies.
In this situation, the antitrust law inquiry begins with the two-pronged
testdeceptive intent and materialitybut, by no means does it end
there. 167 To prove Walker Process liability, a claimant must prove the other
elements of the antitrust inquiry. 168 DDI misrepresented the Festival
Market sales, and thus, the CAFC should have allowed MMI the chance to
prove these other elements of fraud. That was where the real inquiry should
have been.