Section 13.
All persons, except those charged with holddeparture order and the requirement that petitioner
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
YAP v. CA
F: The petitioner was convicted of ESTAFA for
misappropriating P5.5M. He was sentenced to 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prision mayor as maximum, in addition to 1 year for each
additional P10, 000.00 in excess of P22, 000.00 but in no case
shall it exceed 20 years.
- He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed
provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in
the proceedings. The trial court denied the motion.
- After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix
Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant
Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
- CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor General:
that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of
P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court
and private complainant.
- The CA ordered:
(1) He (accusedappellant) secures a certification/guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident
therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court;
(2) The Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) is
hereby directed to issue a hold departure order against
accusedappellant; and
(3) The accusedappellant shall forthwith surrender his
passport to the Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping until
the court orders its return;
(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the
forfeiture of accusedappellants bail bond, the dismissal of
appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement in jail.
- Petitioner challenges the legal basis for fixing the bail at 5.5M
because in essence, it denies him of the right to bail.
I: W/N 5.5M was excessive bail for ESTAFA, considering
how the maximum is 40K.
H: NO. Although an increase in bail is appropriate
because Yap is a flight risk, 5.5M is unreasonable and
excessive.
- In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left
the country several times while the case was pending, the
Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and
the issuance of a hold departure order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate
conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the
inform the court of any change of residence and of his
whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while
the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the
setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners
right to bail.
- Petitioners case falls within the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.Upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court,
on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to
continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond
during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted
shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist,
quasirecidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
a (b) That the accused is found to have previously
escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or has violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while
on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his
case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
- At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider
the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
- Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail.
Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is certainly
not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the
same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an
appropriate level, or requiring the person to report
periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his
movements.
- To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of
which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to
permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we
cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor
as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await
the judgment of the appellate court.
- True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular
of the Department of Justice for the guidance of state
prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts,
merits attention, being in a sense an expression of policy of
the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in
the enforcement of criminal laws. Thus, courts are advised
that they must not only be aware but should also consider the
Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of
criminal justice.
- Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared
guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC, and due to the
serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment
for twenty yearsthe maximum penalty for estafa by false
pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal
Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of
Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the
possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner
bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5, 500, 000.00 is
unjustified as having no legal nor factual basis. Guided by the
penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the
evidence against petitioner, we believe that the amount of
P200, 000.00 is more reasonable.
GOVT of HK v. HON. OLALIA
F: The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for
the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons."
Private Respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong
Court with 3 counts of bribery, 7 counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him.
- On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional
arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the
request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in
turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
- The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.
- Muoz filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
-CA rendered the order of arrest void, DOJ filed with this
Court a petition for review on certiorari, praying that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
- This Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the
DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against
private respondent. The Decision became final and executory.
- Meanwhile, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent.
- In the same case, a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner.
- After a change of judge, bail was granted. Petitioner Hong
Kong wanted the decision vacated.
I: W/N a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
H:
-US v. PURGANAN CASE QUOTED: As suggested by the
use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
ENAGE CASE: Moreover, the constitutional right to bail
"flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt"
- At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private
respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the
following trends in international law:
(1) The growing importance of the individual person in public
international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually
attained global recognition;
(2) The higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere;
(3) The corresponding duty of countries to observe these
universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) The duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the
law on extradition, on the other.
- The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person
and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition
that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine
that the subjects of international law are limited only to states
was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past
century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World
War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.
Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders
have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a
valid subject of international law.
- The principles contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the
international community.
- Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that
under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that
Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are
the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
- The Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in
Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various international
treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
- Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with
any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government."
- Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial
jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not
punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition.
- Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer
to the demanding state following theproceedings.
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process
of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
- He had been detained for over two (2) years without
having been convicted of any crime. By any standard,
such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation
of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty, which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
- An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard
of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply
given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard
which he termed "clear and convincing evidence"
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
F: In 2014, the ombudsman file plunder cases against those
named by Benhur Luy for their involvement in the PDAF
scam. Enrile filed a motion to post bail should probable cause
be found against him. Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying Enriles motion, on the same day that the
warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.
- Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail , which were
heard by the Sandiganbayan. In support of the motions, Enrile
argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the
penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
- Sandiganbayan denied bail.
I: W/N Enrile can post bail
H: YES. Due to his health.
- We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail
the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70
years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and
that he voluntarily surrendered.
- Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not
Enriles averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua,
simply because the determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
-Since the principal purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required
by the court, the Court is further mindful of the Philippines
responsibility in the international community arising from the
national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to: uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
- In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal
or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the
legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of
his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his
solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and historys judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.
- The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize: the PNP Hospital is ill-
equipped to take care of Enrile and it will endanger his life.
- It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid
in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,
and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose
any punishment on the accused.
- It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the
accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of
bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds
interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and
the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
- This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule
11424 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an
offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death.
- The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
- Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim
the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights,
and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt
is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.
- The granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of
the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
- For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the
trial court.
- Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed
when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial
court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the
Prosecution.
-Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not
the accused is under bond in other cases.
- In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral, to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
DE LA CAMARA v. ENAGE
F: Mayor De la Camara was charged with multiple counts of
frustrated murder and multiple counts of murder for killing 14
and wounding 12 laborers of the Tirador Logging Co. He was
arrested and detained and applied for bail. The judge fixed the
bail at P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for
the offense of multiple frustrated murder.
- There was a motion for reconsideration but it was not
granted by the respondent judge. Hence the petition.
- During the hearing, neither petitioner nor respondent judge
showed up. They were asked for a memorandum Instead of a
reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a
supplemental answer wherein he alleged that petitioner
escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had
since then remained at large. There was a reiteration then of
the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, to which
petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and
filed with this Court the next day with this plea: "The
undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose
opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for
dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue
in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la
Camara. The issue in the present petition that calls for the
resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless
other Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-
cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in
regard to the fixing of bail."
I: W/N it should be considered excessive bail
H: YES. BUT Petitioners subsequent escape cannot be
condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed
for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for
repudiation from this Court.
- Villaseor v. Abao:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at
trial in other cases.
- Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive
consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion:
Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on
the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would
amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our
supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
- What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge
would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental
law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution was an a purely verbal level.
- In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out,
the excessive amount required could only mean that
provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
US v. LULING
F: That on or about May 10, 1915, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said accused, being a wharf watchman
employed in such capacity in the customs service of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, did, willfully, directly,
unlawfully, and criminally, solicit of and receive from one
Rufino Elorz or Rufino Elord the sum of P100, in order that
he might secure through customs brokers, the importation and
delivery to the said Rufino Elorz or Elord, of certain rolls of
paper in which a large quantity of opium was hidden; an act
committed with violation of law."
- Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested,
arraigned, tried, found guilty and sentenced by the Honorable
James A. Ostrand to pay a fine of P1,000, and in default of
such payment to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed six months, and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
- In this court the appellant alleges that the provisions of
Section 316 of Act No. 355, in so far as it requires the accused
to prove his innocence, is unconstitutional, and further that the
evidence adduced during the trial of the cause does not show
that he is guilty of the crime charged. He alleges that said
section (316) is unconstitutional in that the state is without
right or authority to enact a law by virtue of the terms of
which certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of
guilt.
I: W/N provisions on constitution of prima facie guilt based
on certain facts are valid
H: NO. We are of the opinion that said section 316 does not
violate any of the provisions of the Act of Congress.
- No rule has been better established .in criminal law than that
every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In a criminal prosecution,
therefore, the burden is upon the state to prove every fact and
circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose
of showing the guilt of the accused.
- While that is the rule, many of the States have established
a different rule and have provided that certain facts only shall
constitute prima facie evidence, and that then the burden is
put upon the defendant to show or to explain that such facts or
acts are not criminal.
- In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what
are known as common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands
no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state
having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within
certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act
or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute prima f acie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon
the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are
innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or
intention.
- It was in fact proven that he accepted money to import
opium.
DUMLAO v. COMELEC
F: Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and
a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a
qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special DisqualificationIn addition to violation
of section 10 of Art. XIIC of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are
hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city or municipal
official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for
the same elective local office from which he has
retired.
- Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is
directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.
- For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the
validity of the following statutory provisions:
Sec. 7. Term of OfficeUnless sooner removed for cause,
all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold
office for a term of 6 years, which shall commence on the
first Monday of March 1980.
Sec. 4. Any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes,
shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices
covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence
of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact.
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officialsx x x The
election shall be held on January 30, 1980.
Section 6. Election and Campaign PeriodThe election
period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in
accordance with Section 6, Art. XIIC of the Constitution.
The period of campaign shall commence on December 29,
1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980.
- In addition to the abovecited provisions, petitioners Igot and
Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some political
parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section
9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a
bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.
The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case
but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. (G.R.
No. L52232) where the issue has been squarely raised.
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have
challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.
I: W/N the statutory provisions are unconstitutional
H: SEC 4 p.1: YES; SEC 4 p. 2: NO.
- Procedural mistake: Petitioner Dumlao does not join
petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their
complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They,
respectively, contest completely different statutory provisions.
Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual
capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayers suit.
ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY:
-Dumlao hasnt been affected by section 4 of BP 52. No one
has filed a motion to disqualify him.
- Jurisdiction of Court: This being a question posed in the
abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an
advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the
benefit of a detailed factual record, the court that has
jurisdiction over this case is the COMELEC.
- Locus standi: In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan,
it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is
said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be
denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with
acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being
candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has
been alleged to have been adversely affected by the operation
of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional.
Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate
interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial
redress. They filed as tax payers and it would have been valid,
but since BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do
not directly involve the disbursement of public funds, they do
not have locus standi.
- Lis Mota: The constitutionality must be the main issue. But
here because none of the petitioners have locus standi and that
this is not the appropriate case, its should be dismissed.
-Substantive:
1. Petitioner Dumlaos contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52
is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact
that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged
provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as
listed in p. 15, respondents Comment). This tellingly
overthrows Dumlaos contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the
safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of
public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while
those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
- In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be more than
65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification
although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy
of the law would be to promote the emergency of younger
blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it
might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
- Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from
government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there
can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below
65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65,
for a 65year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
- But, in the case of a 65year old elective local official, who
has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is
reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged
provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.
- The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present,
and what is emphatically significant is that the retired
employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this
very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision
does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such
denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons
similarly situated are similarly treated.
-IMPORTANT: In so far as the petition of Igot and
Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which
they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence
of such fact x x x x
-The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal
principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute, of the well settled principle
that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
constitutionality, and that Courts will not set aside a statute as
constitutionally defective except in a clear case.
- Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution).
- An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes
the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone
that charges have been filed against him before a civil or
military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction
is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and
one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as
both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that
charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted of a crime with
the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory
penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the
term of the sentence.
- And although the filing of charges is considered as but
prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet,
there is clear and present danger that because of the
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one
charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to
overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
- Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of
disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible
conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the
extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be
avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted
for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial
declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which can
stand by itself.
DISPOSITIVE: 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph
reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification.In addition to violation
of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby
declared as disqualifications for any of the elective officials
enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that x x x the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact, is hereby declared null and void,
for being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to an accused.
PEOPLE v. HOLGADO
F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain
one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of
her personal liberty."
During trial:
Q. Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?
A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
Q. Arraign the accused.
Note:
"Interpreter read the information to the accused in
the local dialect after which he was asked this
question.
"Q. What do you plead?
A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
"Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name?
A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
Court. "The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate
that man. "
Fiscal: "I have investigated this case and found out that this
Ocampo has nothing to do with this case and I found no
evidence against this Ocampo.
Court: "Sentence reserved."
- It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears
in the judgment above quoted, the offense charged is named
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the
judgment it is said that the accused "stands charged with the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the,
information filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he
"accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal
detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear
as to whether the offense charged is merely "slight illegal
detention" as the offense is named therein or the capital
offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found
by the trial judge in his judgment. Since the accusedappellant
pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced
the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.
I: W/N there was due process
H: NO.
- Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea
given by the accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was not
prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a
serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense,
and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and
one day of prisin mayor to twenty years, without absolutely
any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
- Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial
court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the
accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he
desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether
or not the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him
reasonable time to procure one or to assign an attorney de
oficio.
- The question asked by the court to the accused was "Do you
have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only
did such a question fail to inform the accused that it was his
right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is
worse, the question was so framed that it could have been
construed by the accused as a suggestion f from the court that
he plead guilty if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of
fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in
our Constitution.
- One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our
Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself, and
counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel.
- It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who
was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following
qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The
trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this
qualification. The record does not show whether the supposed
instruction was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea of
guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter
in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good
defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with. the fiscal's
information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found
that the same had nothing to do with this case.
- Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason
that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to
overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the
court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by
counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him
and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the
court.
PEOPLE v. REGALA
F: Regala and a co-conspirator were charged with the crime of
murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
- Erlinda Tidon witness account: She was at the Magallanes
Gate, Masbate, because she wanted to get inside to participate
and dance in the fiesta. At the well- lighted gate, she saw Sgt.
Juan Desilos, Jr. in uniform attending to the exit door named
as such. While Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. was guarding the
Magallanes Gate and trying to clear the exit gate of people.
Accused Rudy Regala, with coaccused Delfin Flores who had
his arm on the shoulder of Regala, arrived. Thereafter, she
tried her best to get inside the Magallanes Gate and Delfin
Flores and Rudy Regala were there at the Magallanes Gate in
front of her. She said, I was at their back when Regala and
Flores reached the exit gate where Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. was
stationed. Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. pushed accused Rudy Regala
and told him not to get through this entrance because this is
for the exit. The person pushed by Sgt. Desilos was Flores,
while Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. was pushing Flores, accused Rudy
Regala became angry, got his knife from his waist and stabbed
Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. After Stabbing Desilos, Regala and
Flores ran away. She was able to see their faces because of the
light and the fact that it was crowded in the area that it took
some time before the accused could run away. She was also
oblique to the direction of the incident. She was also a few
meters away only.
- Evangelista witness account: He was inside the gate but also
beside the spot the body of Desilos fell into after it was
stabbed. He saw the faces of the accused but did not know
their names.
- Dr. Orlando delos Santos was the medical examiner and
confirmed that Desilos died of a stab wound.
- Technical Sergeant Modesto Taleon saw Chief Salvacion
take the microphone from the singer and call for a doctor as
the soldier assigned at the Magallanes Gate had been stabbed.
When he heard the announcement, he immediately rushed to
the scene of the crime and found that there were already many
men in uniform at the scene, and Sgt. Juan Desilos, Jr. was no
longer there as he had already been brought to the Masbate
Provincial Hospital.
- He found the knife 5 meters away from the gate.
- Thereafter, counsel for accused asked the court for the recall
of prosecution witness Juanito Evangelista for further
crossexamination on the ground that there were vital matters
overlooked by said defense counsel who earlier, in obedience
to the order of the court, had to enter trial without having first
consulted the accused. The prosecuting fiscal objected on the
ground that prosecution witness Juanito Evangelista who had
earlier informed him of his fears of reprisal, was not in the
courtroom. Defense counsel, in insisting on the recall of said
witness, informed the court that it has come to his knowledge
that x x x the first suspect of the PC was Evangelista. His
clothes were found with blood stains as well as his hands x x.
Nevertheless, the court denied the motion to recall but advised
defense counsel to establish that fact as a defense of the
accused.
- The accused presented witness accounts which are
corroborative to the idea that Rudy Regala was with his band
of friends including his so called co-conspirator the whole
night where they danced with the beauty queen and later on
ended up in the bar a priest owned, drinking beer, and they
heard the shouts about Desilos getting stabbed while having a
drinking session.
- A guard was also interrogated because he claimed that he
was on duty until midnight of June 13 and that the stabbing
incident took place after his duty. This is one of the issues
presented by the accuseds counsel, for the said witness
accounts had differences in the time of the event.
Regala also presented his own witness account, where he
stated the same facts given by the witnesses for his side. He
also stated that neither he nor his family had a grudge on the
PC, but that they have had some quarrels. He has been
previously convicted or slight physical injuries.
- He also notes that he was tortured and detained illegally to
admit to the crime.
- In the course of his crossexamination, accused Rudy Regala
was caught smiling by the trial judge who warned him of his
act and behavior and not to take the trial lightly as the trial is
not a joke, nor was there anything funny, and advised him to
be serious as he is fighting for his life.
- Delfin Flores, a delinquent who finished only 6th grade and
was charged with murder in Masbate, also testified for the
accused.
- Before Us therefore by way of review is only the death
penalty imposed on accused Rudy Regala; because Delfin
Flores did not interpose any appeal from his conviction as an
accessory after the fact, and was accordingly released on June
11, 1973 after the expiration of his sentence as certified by the
Director of the NBP.
- Counsel de officio contends that the trial court erred in
failing to give the two accused a fair trial; in holding Rudy
Regala responsible for the killing of Juan Desilos, Jr.; in
convicting Rudy Regala, assuming arguendo that he was the
man who stabbed the victim, of the crime of murder with
assault upon an agent of a person of authority; and in holding
Delfin Flores, under the alleged facts of the case, liable as
accessory after the fact of the crime of murder with assault
against an agent of a person in authority.
I: W/N the 2 accused were given a fair trial
H:
1. On the impartiality of the judge: NO ERROR, NO
PREJUDICE. As a matter of fact, appellants previous
conviction of the crimes of malicious mischief and slight
physical injuries was testified to only by the witness last
presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. And the
trial Judge, contrary to the claim of the appellant, gave due
consideration to his evidence as shown by the fact that in the
decision of conviction, the trial Judge examined extensively the
testimonies of all the eight witnesses for the defense.
- Consequently, while the quoted portions of the judgment of
conviction are interspersed with statements and phrases which
properly should not have been made as they may be wrongly
interpreted as indicative of bias and prejudice, such aforestated
statements and phrases in the judgment of conviction do not
per se constitute evidence of bias and impartiality in the
conduct of the trial by the trial Judge as to violate appellants
right to an impartial trial.
Our Constitution does indeed go far in throwing the
mantle of its protection on the one who is caught in
the meshes of criminal law. The proceeding must
neither be arbitrary nor unjust. It is to underscore the
importance of a trial judge being detached and
objective, free from bias either for or against the
prosecution or for the person indicted. As was so
aptly put by Justice Dizon: It has been said, in fact,
that due process of law requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal and that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Earlier in People
vs. Castaeda, Justice Laurel made clear the
necessity for a trial before an impartial judge. If it
were otherwise, the pledge of due process becomes a
myth. The trial is reduced to nothing but a useless
formality, and idle ceremony. If a judge had made up
his mind to convict, even innocence would not suffice
as a defense.
- An impartial trial necessarily requires an impartial judge to
conduct the same. In other words, absent an impartial judge,
there can be no fair and impartial trial. Appellant impugns the
impartiality of the trial judge, who was allegedly prejudiced
against the appellant.
2. On the rejection of the alibi and denial: MUST BE
REJECTED. Alibi, to be convincing must preclude any
possibility that the accused could have been physically present
at the place of the crime nor its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission.
- The witnesses against the accused did not know him but were
able to positively identify Regala. The place was well-lit
because of the celebration. Which lends to the idea that
misidentifying Regala is quite far fetched.
- It is a recognized principle that on the matter of credibility of
witnesses, the observation of the trial court must be accorded
respect and great weight in view of its special opportunity to
observe closely the demeanor of the individual witnesses. As a
matter of fact, the trial court gave its observations on the
witnesses conduct and candor on the witness stand.
- Consequently, the inconsistencies and incredibilities in the
testimonies of the material witnesses of the prosecution as
pointed out by the appellant are better left to the appreciation
of the trial court, which has not found the same sufficient to
destroy the probity of said witnesses.
3. On the killing being qualified by treachery and
evident pre-meditation: ONLY HOMICIDE. Neither
treachery nor evident premeditation can be properly
appreciated and considered in this instance case so as to
characterize the killing as murder. So appellant contends and
the Solicitor General agrees. WE find the aforesaid common
stand correct as the evidence supports the same.
Treachery is never presumed; it must be proven as
conclusively as the act itself. It must be shown that the accused
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution
without risks to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
By prosecutions own evidence, appellant was enraged because
the deceased pushed his companion Delfin Flores and
admonished him not to get in through the exit gate, then
pulled out his knife and stabbed the victim in the abdomen.
Treachery cannot therefore be appreciated as the attack made
by appellant Rudy Regala was merely an immediate
retaliation for the pushing made by the deceased, which act
placed him on his guard. Moreover, deceased Juan Desilos Jr.
at the time had a sidearm (p. 97, Vol. III, rec.) and was free to
defend himself with it. If appellants design was to be safe from
a possible defense that the victim might make, he could have
disarmed the victim first before stabbing him. This he did not
do. Certainly, these circumstances negate treachery.
- With respect to the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, it is wellsettled that the essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment. Consequently, it must be clearly
established by evidence the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, and a sufficient interval of
time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Neither the record nor the appealed decision intimates the
existence of the foregoing circumstances which are essential for
a positive finding of evident premeditation. On the contrary,
the circumstances of the case rule out premeditation.
- Appellant can therefore be convicted only of the crime of
homicide, aggravated by the circumstance of in contempt or
with insult to the public authorities.
PEOPLE v. BEGINO
F: This is another rape case because the world is horrible that
way.
- Begino is the common law husband of BBB. One of BBBs
children AAA, at the time of the first offense, was 8 years and
4 months old. The first incident happened while they were in
their home. BBB left the house and Begino was sharpening his
bolo. AAA was also there. She did not know that Begino
closed the door and he started toward her and undressed her.
He also took off his own clothes and then and there raped her
with his bolo beside them. He threatened AAA that if she were
to squeal, he will kill her and her mother. When she was 12
she finally told her mother about the instances she was raped.
- AAA claimed appellant raped her four times - when she was
still eight years old, then when she was in Grade III, in Grade
IV and in Grade V. BBB brought her daughter to the DSWD
where AAA was interviewed and assisted in executing her
sworn statement before the Philippine National Police of YYY.
- She was medically examined and the doctor confirmed the
rape based on the lacerations on her hymen.
- AAA testified that she stopped studying since 1998. She felt
ashamed of what happened to her that she even transferred to
Daet because she was scorned by people.
- The defense presented appellant himself, Camilo Begino
(Camilo) and Reynaldo Esturas (Reynaldo) as witnesses.
- Appellant denied the accusation and asserted that he treated
AAA and her siblings as his own children since he started
living with their mother in 1991. He claimed BBB wanted to
get rid of him as she was already romantically linked with the
Chief of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Daet.
- RTC decision: finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable of
the crime of statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the
victim is below eighteen (18) years old and that the offender is
the common law husband of BBB. Appellant was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death. He was likewise ordered to pay the
victim P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages,
and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
- The trial court found inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
defense witnesses. Camilo testified that he owned the coconut
plantation where appellant worked but he was not certain as to
the exact date appellant went to work at the coconut
plantation. Reynaldo testified that appellant worked at the
coconut plantation of Apolinario and not in the alleged
coconut plantation of Camilo.
- The trial court further rejected appellants defense of alibi.
The trial court found that it took only 30 minutes to walk
going to appellants house from the coconut plantation where
he was husking. The trial court ruled that it was not physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction but reduced the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346)
proscribing the imposition of the death penalty.
I: W/N Begino should be convicted for qualified rape
H: NO. Because the aggravating cirucmstance was not alleged
in the information and therefore, cannot qualify the crime.
- We agree with the findings and conclusion of the trial court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, that, as the evidence
undoubtedly proved, rape was committed by appellant against
AAA.
- The trial court found appellant guilty of statutory rape
aggravated by the fact that the victim is below eighteen (18)
years old and the offender is the common law husband of the
mother of the victim. Thus, it imposed the death penalty
pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 266-B. The appellate court
agreed with the trial court but reduced the penalty imposed
from death to reclusion perpetua. However, we hold that
appellant could not be indicted for qualified rape and
penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B.
While the death penalty is no longer imposable in view of RA
9346, the technical flaw committed by the lower courts is a
matter that cannot be ignored.
Article 266-A and Article 266-B provide:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. -
Rape is committed -1. By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:a. Through force, threat or intimidation;b.
When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;c. By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; andd. When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above is present;
 ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
- It is sufficiently proven that AAA was below 18 when the
rape happened. However, the Information stated that
appellant is the stepfather of AAA.
- A stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of a
marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is
the offspring. It presupposes a legitimate relationship between
the appellant and the victims mother. The evidence adduced
by the prosecution showed that appellant is not the stepfather
of AAA but the common law spouse of BBB, mother of AAA.
- In fact, the trial court itself, in its decision, found that
appellant and BBB were not married and therefore he is not
the stepfather of AAA. During the trial, AAA, when asked why
she kept calling appellant Tiyo, testified that appellant is the
third husband of her mother and that the name of her real
father is CCC, who at that time was in Manila. She explained
that her mother lived separately from CCC since she was eight
months old and on 2 August 1994, her mother was living with
appellant. Her birth certificate and the Social Case Study
Report likewise showed that her father is CCC, not appellant.
CCC was married to BBB and appellant was never married to
BBB. There was no proof of marriage between BBB and
appellant.
- Since appellant is not the stepfather of AAA, the prosecutions
failure to prove the qualifying circumstance bars conviction for
rape in its qualified form.
- What the prosecution clearly proved was that appellant was
the common law spouse of BBB, but such circumstance was
not alleged in the Information. And as we have ruled in
People v. Garcia, qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not
pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of
proof even if not pleaded. It would be a denial of the right of
the accused to be informed of the charges against him and
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with
simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although
the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting
in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on
which he was arraigned.
- Consequently, since the qualifying circumstance of common
law spouse was not alleged in the Information for rape against
appellant, he could not be convicted of rape in the qualified
form as he was not properly informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is a
fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged
must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main
purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to
properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
PEOPLE v. CHING
F: There are 3 separate informations filed against appellant:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q9987053; CRIMINAL CASE
NO. Q9987054; CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q9987055
That in or about the month of May, 1998, in XXX,
Philippines, the said accused by means of force and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drag said AAA, his own daughter, 12 years of
age, minor, inside a bedroom and undressed her and put
himself on top of her and thereafter have carnal knowledge
with said AAA against her will and without her consent.
- The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, AAAs mother,
BBB, PO3 Jesus Deduque, PO3 Melba Baldeswis, and Dr.
Angel Cordero. Their testimonies, taken together, present the
following narrative:
- AAA is the third child in a brood of eight children born to
appellant and BBB. She was 12 years of age in the year 1996
when the alleged incidents of rape took place.
Sometime in the year 1996, at around 5:00 in the afternoon,
she and her younger siblings, namely, CCC, DDD, EEE and
FFF, were left at their house with appellant, while BBB was at
the market buying food. Appellant told CCC, DDD and EEE
to play outside the house. AAA was then cooking rice when
appellant instructed her to go inside the bedroom.
When AAA was already inside the room, appellant ordered
her to lie down on the cemented floor. When she did,
appellant placed himself on top of her and removed her shorts
and panty. She screamed Tulungan po ninyo ako! and
resisted, but to no avail because appellant pressed his feet
against hers. Appellant then removed his shorts and brief and
thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain but
she could not move because appellant held both her hands
above her head. Appellant told her, Wag kang maingay,
papatayin kita.
After satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and left the
bedroom. AAA proceeded to the house of BBBs kumare,
Aling Leony, to forget and recover from the incident. She did
not inform BBB of the incident because of her fear that
appellant would make good his threats to kill her.
- For the second time, one evening of May 1998, AAA and
her younger siblings were sleeping on the cemented floor
inside the bedroom when appellant entered and lay down
beside her. Appellant pulled her left arm and made her lie in a
straight body position. He removed his shorts and placed
himself on top of her. He then pulled down her shorts and
panty, and again inserted his penis into her vagina. Despite the
pain, AAA did not shout because
- For the third time, in the evening of May 1998, while AAA
and her younger siblings were sleeping inside the bedroom,
appellant lay down beside her. Appellant pulled her left arm
and made her face him. Appellant placed himself on top of her
and removed her shorts and panty. Thereafter, he had carnal
knowledge of her. She did not shout out of fear. Afterwards,
appellant stood up and warned her not to tell anyone of the
incident or he would kill her.
From June 1998 to February 1999, appellant was arrested
and detained for drug pushing. In the meantime, AAA was
employed as a house helper. After his release from jail,
appellant would go to see AAA at her employers house
demanding money and creating a scene when AAA refused to
give him any. Fed up, AAA sneaked out of her employers
house and proceeded to the nearby barangay hall to report,
not just the commotion caused by appellant in front of her
employers house when she did not give him money, but also
that appellant previously raped her several times. Hence,
appellant was arrested by PO3 Deduque and PO3
Baldeswis, and charged with rape.
- BBB was not able to accompany AAA in filing the instant
case against appellant because she was also detained for drug
pushing and was released only on 5 December 1999. Upon
her release from jail, she immediately sought AAA and, when
informed of the incident, she fully supported AAA in the
instant case against appellant.
- Dr. Belgira from the PNP Hospital, examined AAA:
CONCLUSION: Subject is in nonvirgin state physically.
There are no 8external signs of application of any form of
physical trauma.
- However, in view of the unavailability of Dr. Belgira to
personally appear before the trial court, it was Dr. Cordero,
another physician at the PNP crime laboratory, who appeared
in court for the purpose of producing and interpreting the
medical records of AAA and confirming that the same was
conducted in accordance with the protocol of the PNP.
- On 27 July 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting
appellant of three counts of rape. In Criminal Case No.
Q9987055, the Court imposed on appellant the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. In Criminal Cases No. Q99 870 53
and Q9987054, appellant was sentenced to death.
- In view of the penalty imposed upon appellant, the RTC
elevated the records of the case directly to the Court of
Appeals for review. CA reduced it to reclusion perpetua in lieu
of death penalty, by reason of Republic Act No. 9346, and
that pursuant to said law, accusedappellant shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
- Appellant maintains that the approximate time of the
commission of the offense must be stated in the complaint or
information which makes it defective.
I: W/N apellants constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated.
H: NO. The elements of rape were satisfied withouth the
identification of the specific time and date.
- An information is an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with
the court.
- To be considered as valid and sufficient, an information must
state:
1. the name of the accused;
2. the designation of the offense given by the statute;
3. the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense;
4. the name of the offended party;
5. the approximate date of the commission of the
offense;
6. and the place where the offense was committed.
- The purpose of the requirement for the informations validity
and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for
his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
- With respect to the date of the commission of the offense,
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to
state in the information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.
- In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when
the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information
defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time
of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the
said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge
of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time
when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its
commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with
absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or
information states that the crime has been committed at any
time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
CONDE v. RIVERA
F: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena,
Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than five
informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has
appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less
than on eight different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than
one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as
she was when originally charged.
I: W/N Conde was deprived of her constitutional right
H: YES. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all
other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order
that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of
that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while
investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her
consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment
to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the
prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate
information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
- The accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he
be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom.
- The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of
Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute the
accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set
forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending
before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered
dismissed, with costs against the respondent fiscal.
MATEO Jr. v. VILLALUZ
F: The novel issue presented in this prohibition proceeding
arose from the gnawing fear that the prized ideal of "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" implicit in the due process
guarantee may be set at naught.
- Petitioners are among those being tried by respondent Judge
for the offense of robbery in band with homicide: on or about
June 4, 1971, the American Express Bank at Sangley Point,
Cavite, was robbed and an American serviceman was killed. In
connection with that robbery, and the death of the
serviceman, four (4) criminal actions were filed against
petitioners.
- Petitioner Manuel Mateo filed an Opposition to the
prosecution's Motion to Present Additional Evidence on the
ground that 'to allow the prosecution to present additional
evidence in favor of the State after the prosecution has rested,
while the accused has a pending motion to dismiss under
consideration would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of
herein accused because it would effectively deprive him of a
fair trial.
-Thereafter, an extrajudicial statement by one Rolando Reyes,
who was later on likewise indicted for the same offense,
implicating petitioners, was subscribed before respondent
Judge. That was the background of a motion for his
disqualification, as the aforesaid Rolando Reyes, when called
upon to testify as an additional witness for the prosecution
impugned his written declaration stating that it was executed
as a result of a threat by a government agent. It is now
contended that such a repudiation would not sit well with
respondent Judge, who had thus placed himself in a position of
being unable to pass on such question with that degree of
objectivity required by due process, although admittedly, such
a move did not fall squarely within one of the specific grounds
to inhibit judges. Respondent Judge turned down this plea for
disqualification, hence this petition.
I: W/N circumstance of a party having subscribed before
respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to
describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later
on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the
course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners,
would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the
Constitution requires
H: YES.
Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought. Respondent
Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was
asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover,
it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the
affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was
intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was
hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only that. His
sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be
blunted. The absence of the requisite due process element is
thus noticeable.
- There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he who
attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein
Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in
addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for
dismissal of the charges against them was pending; its
resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the
prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against
affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same
offense, but in a separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted
then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-
judicial statement was executed freely. With its repudiation on
the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into
the picture there is apparent the situation of a judge having to
pass on a question that by implication had already been
answered by him.
1. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied
in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being
just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the
facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him,
the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice
Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law
requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." He should, to quote
from another decision "at all times manifest depth of
commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to
legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check
the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices
which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."
2. Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in
Gutierrez as the fundamental requisite of impartiality for due
process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision on
disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains
this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that
outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there
may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of
objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense
of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or
predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if
any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to
resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself.
That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for
probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even more
important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is
lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated.
- A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might
be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his
mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of justice against him.
3. In 1969, this Court, through Justice Sanchez, could
categorically rule: "All suitors, we must say, are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent,
whollyfree, disinterested and impartial tribunal. It has been
said that 'next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will
beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.'
Let it not be said that the administration of justice in this
country suffers from too many human imperfections. To our
mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has
become apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871
would not be in the best interest of justice, which he is bound
to serve."
IN RE: OLIVER
F: A Michigan circuit judge summarily sent the petitioner to
jail for contempt of court. We must determine whether he was
denied the procedural due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In obedience to a subpoena, the petitioner appeared as a
witness before a Michigan circuit judge who was then
conducting, in accordance with Michigan law, a "one-man
grand jury" investigation into alleged gambling and official
corruption. The investigation presumably took place in the
judge's chambers, though that is not certain.
Two other circuit judges were present in an advisory capacity.
A prosecutor may have been present. A stenographer was
most likely there. The record does not show what other
members, if any, of the judge's investigatorial staff participated
in the proceedings. It is certain, however, that the public was
excluded -- the questioning was secret in accordance with the
traditional grand jury method.
- After petitioner had given certain testimony, the judge-grand
jury, still in secret session, told petitioner that neither he nor
his advisors believed petitioner's story -- that it did not "jell."
This belief of the judge-grand jury was not based entirely on
what the petitioner had testified. As will later be seen, it rested
in part on beliefs or suspicions of the judge-jury derived from
the testimony of at least one other witness who had previously
given evidence in secret. Petitioner had not been present when
that witness testified, and, so far as appears, was not even
aware that he had testified. Based on its beliefs thus formed --
that petitioner's story did not "jell" -- the judge-grand jury
immediately charged him with contempt, immediately
convicted him, and immediately sentenced him to sixty days in
jail. Under these circumstances of haste and secrecy,
petitioner, of course, had no chance to enjoy the benefits of
counsel, no chance to prepare his defense, and no opportunity
either to cross examine the other grand jury witness or to
summon witnesses to refute the charge against him.
- Three days later, a lawyer filed on petitioner's behalf in the
Michigan Supreme Court -- the petition for habeas corpus
now under consideration. It alleged, among other things, that
the petitioner's attorney had not been allowed to confer with
him and that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, the
petitioner was not held in jail under any judgment, decree or
execution, and was "not confined by virtue of any legal
commitment directed to the sheriff, as required by law." An
order was then entered, signed by the circuit judge, that he
had, while "sitting as a One-Man Grand Jury," convicted the
petitioner of contempt of court because petitioner had testified
"evasively" and had given "contradictory answers" to
questions.
I: W/N the summary manner in which he had been sentenced
to jail in the secrecy of the grand jury chamber had deprived
him of his liberty without affording him the kind of notice,
opportunity to defend himself, and trial which the due process
clause
H: YES.
- The case requires a brief explanation of Michigan's unique
one-man grand jury system. That state's first constitution
(1835), like the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
required that most criminal prosecutions be begun by
presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Art. I, 11. This
compulsory provision was left out of the 1850 constitution and
from the present constitution (1908). However, Michigan
judges may still, in their discretion, summon grand juries, but
we are told by the attorney general that this discretion is rarely
exercised, and that the "One-Man Grand Jury" has taken the
place of the old Michigan 16 to 23-member grand jury,
particularly in probes of alleged misconduct of public officials.
- The one-man grand jury law was passed in 1917 following a
recommendation of the State Bar Association that, in the
interest of more rigorous law enforcement, greater emphasis
should be put upon the "investigative procedure" for "probing"
and for "detecting" crime.
- Whenever this judge-grand jury may summon a witness to
appear, it is his duty to go and to answer all material questions
that do not incriminate him. Should he fail to appear, fail to
answer material questions, or should the judge-grand jury
believe his evidence false and evasive, or deliberately
contradictory, he may be found guilty of contempt.
- A witness may be asked questions on all subjects, and need
not be advised of his privilege against self-incrimination, even
though the questioning is in secret. And these secret
interrogations can be carried on day or night, in a public place
or a "hideout," a courthouse, an office building, a hotel room,
a home, or a place of business; so well is this ambulatory
power understood in Michigan that the one-man grand jury is
also popularly referred to as the "portable grand jury."
- It has long been recognized in this country, however, that the
traditional 12- to 23-member grand juries may examine
witnesses in secret sessions. Oaths of secrecy are ordinarily
taken both by the members of such grand juries and by
witnesses before them.
- Grand juries investigate, and the usual end of their
investigation is either a report, a "no-bill" or an indictment.
- They do not try, and they do not convict. They render no
judgment. When their work is finished by the return of an
indictment, it cannot be used as evidence against the person
indicted. Nor may he be fined or sentenced to jail until he has
been tried and convicted after having been afforded the
procedural safeguards required by due process of law. Even
when witnesses before grand juries refuse to answer proper
questions, the grand juries do not adjudge the witnesses guilty
of contempt of court in secret or in public or at all.
- Counsel have not cited, and we have been unable to find, a
single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any
federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this
country. Nor have we found any record of even one such
secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of
Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted
people secretly is in dispute. Summary trials for alleged
misconduct called contempt of court have not been regarded
as an exception to this universal rule against secret trials unless
some other Michigan one-man grand jury case may represent
such an exception.
- Today, almost without exception, every state, by constitution,
statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be
open to the public.
- The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has
been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by
the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of
Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the
lettre de cachet.
- In giving content to the constitutional and statutory
commands that an accused be given a public trial, the state
and federal courts have differed over what groups of
spectators, if any, could properly be excluded from a criminal
trial.
- But, unless in Michigan and in one-man grand jury contempt
cases, no court in this country has ever before held, so far as
we can find, that an accused can be tried, convicted, and sent
to jail when everybody else is denied entrance to the court
except the judge and his attaches.
- In Gaines v. Washington, this Court assumed that a
criminal trial conducted in secret would violate the procedural
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause, although its actual holding there was that no violation
had in fact occurred, since the trial court's order barring the
general public had not been enforced. Certain proceedings in
a judge's chambers, including convictions for contempt of
court, have occasionally been countenanced by state courts,
but there has never been any intimation that all of the public,
including the accused's relatives, friends, and counsel, were
barred from the trial chamber.
- In the case before us, the petitioner was called as a witness to
testify in secret before a one-man grand jury conducting a
grand jury investigation. In the midst of petitioner's testimony,
the proceedings abruptly changed. The investigation became a
"trial," the grand jury became a judge, and the witness became
an accused charged with contempt of court -- all in secret.
Following a charge, conviction and sentence, the petitioner
was led away to prison -- still without any break in the secrecy.
Even in jail, according to undenied allegations, his lawyer was
denied an opportunity to see and confer with him. And that
was not the end of secrecy. His lawyer filed in the State
Supreme Court this habeas corpus proceeding. Even there, the
mantle of secrecy enveloped the transaction, and the State
Supreme Court ordered him sent back to jail without ever
having seen a record of his testimony, and without knowing all
that took place in the secrecy of the judge's chambers. In view
of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their
inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of
our federal and state governments that criminal trials be
public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one
shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law
means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to
prison.
- We further hold that failure to afford the petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of
false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law.
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense -- a right to his
day in court -- are basic in our system of jurisprudence, and
these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel.
- Except for a narrowly limited category of contempts, due
process of law as explained in the Cooke case requires that
one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges
against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by
way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented
by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other
witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation.
The narrow exception to these due process requirements
includes only charges of misconduct, in open court, in the
presence of the judge, which disturbs the court's business,
where all of the essential elements of the misconduct are under
the eye of the court, are actually observed by the court, and
where immediate punishment is essential to prevent
"demoralization of the court's authority . . . before the public."
- Nothing in the petitioner's testimony as reported could have
remotely justified the judge-jury in drawing such a conclusion.
The judge-jury was obviously appraising the truth of Oliver's
testimony in light of testimony given the same day in
petitioner's absence by Hartley, and possibly by other
witnesses. The Terry case and others like it provide no
support for sustaining petitioner's conviction of contempt of
court upon testimony given in petitioner's absence. This case
would be like the Terry case only if the judge there has not
personally witnessed Terry's assault upon the marshal, but had
nevertheless sent him to jail for contempt of court after hearing
the testimony of witnesses against Terry in Terry's absence. It
may be conceivable, as is here urged, that a judge can under
some circumstances correctly detect falsity and evasiveness
from simply listening to a witness testify. But this is plainly not
a case in which the finding of falsity rested on an exercise of
this alleged power. For this reason, we need not pass on the
question argued in the briefs whether a judge can, consistently
with procedural due process, convict a witness of testifying
falsely and evasively solely on the judge's ability to detect it
from merely observing a witness and hearing him testify.
TAMPAR v. USMAN
F: This petition for certiorari involves a dispute over the
correct application of the unique Islamic rule of procedure
known as the oath (yamin).
The record of the case shows that petitioners filed a complaint
against respondents for Annulment of Sale in an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale and Delivery of
Certificates of Title and Damages before the Sharia District
Court, 5th Sharia District, Cotabato City.
- Petitioners allege ownership over a parcel of land located in
Kalanganan, Cotabato (now Bagua, Cotabato City), claiming
that they inherited the property from their ancestor, Tuan
Kali Dimalen, who left his property to his two daughters,
namely Remoreng Dimalen and Dominga Dimalen Tampar.
The latter in turn divided the property equally between them.
- Due to the loss of the aforementioned title, TCT No.
(T893)217 was issued on October 26, 1950 by the Register of
Deeds of Cotabato City in the names of herein petitioners
Remoreng Dimalen and the heirs of Dominga Dimalen, the
latter having died in the interim.
- The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous
Sale sought to be annulled was purportedly executed on June
11, 1947 between petitioners and respondent Esmael Usman,
whereby ownership of the land was conveyed to the latter for
the sum of P1,000.00. The land was subsequently sold by
respondent Usman to his co respondents Mohammad
Datumanong and Hadji Salik Nur.
- Petitioners denied that they ever entered into such an
agreement with respondent Usman, and claimed that their
signatures in the document of sale were forged, and that the
transaction is null and void for not having been approved by
the Provincial Governor, as required by law.
- The Court thereafter directed the parties to submit the
statements (shuhud) of at least two witnesses to prove their
claims. The sole witness of petitioners withdrew, prompting
them to manifest to the Court that they have no witnesses.
Consequently, they challenged respondent Usman to take an
oath (yamin) declaring that there is no truth to the claim of
forgery brought against him. The challenge was grounded on
Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure in Sharia Courts
(IjraatalMahakim al Sharia), which provides as follows:
The plaintiff (muddai) has the burden of proof, and the
taking of an oath (yamin) rests upon the defendant
(muddaaalai). If the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his
claim, the defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be
rendered in his favor by the Court. Should the defendant
refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall affirm his claim under
oath in which case, judgment shall be rendered in his favor.
Should the plaintiff refuse to affirm his claim under oath, the
case shall be dismissed.
- Respondent Usman opposed the challenge of petitioners,
arguing that before he may be required to take the oath,
petitioners, as the muddai, should first take the oath, since
they have no witnesses at all.6 He contended that the plaintiffs
should be required to present some basis for their claim against
him, in accordance with the elementary rules of evidence.
- The Court overruled the opposition of respondent Usman.
- Usman took the oath: I, Esmael Usman, swear in the name
of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful and upon the Holy
Quran, that I bought the land in question from the plaintiffs;
that I have not forged or falsified the signatures of the
plaintiffs; and that God will curse me if I am not telling the
truth.
- Having taken the oath as demanded by petitioners, judgment
was rendered in favor of respondents, and the complaint
against them was dismissed.
Petitioners now assail the decision of the Sharia court as
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They
contend that the cognizance by the court of the yamin of
respondent Usman is not only unprocedural, but likewise
amounts to a deprivation of their constitutional right to be
heard.
I: W/N the Sharia court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioners by virtue
of the yamin taken by the defendant, namely, respondent
Usman.
H: NO. The dismissal of the complaint by the Sharia court in
this case should be upheld, but not because of the yamin
taken by the respondent Usman.
The Court shares the concern of petitioners in the use of the
yamin in this proceeding, and for that matter, before
Philippine Sharia courts. Section 7 of the Special Rules of
Procedure prescribed for Sharia courts aforecited provides
that if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the
defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered
in his favor by the Court. On the other hand, should
defendant refuse to take an oath, plaintiff may affirm his claim
under oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered in his
favor.
- The Court shares the concern of petitioners in the use of the
yamin in this proceeding, and for that matter, before
Philippine Sharia courts. Section 7 of the Special Rules of
Procedure prescribed for Sharia courts aforecited provides
that if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the
defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered
in his favor by the Court. On the other hand, should
defendant refuse to take an oath, plaintiff may affirm his claim
under oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered in his
favor.
- Said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his
constitutional right to due process. It denies a party his right to
confront the witnesses against him and to cross examine
them. It should have no place even in the Special Rules of
Procedure of the Sharia courts of the country.
CARREDO v. PEOPLE
F: Petitioner was charged with malicious mischief before the
Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu. He deposited a
cash bond for his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he
entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter he filed a written
waiver of appearance dated May 14, 1984 which reads as
follows:
IN COMPLIANCE with the Letter of Instruction No. 40,
dated November 10, 1972, the undersigned accused hereby
waives his appearance during the trial or any stage thereof and
he agrees that in case he fails to appear for trial despite due
notice, his absence will be deemed as express waiver of his
right to be present, and the Honorable Court may proceed
with the trial of his case as if he were present. In this
connection, he admits that he could be identified by witnesses
who are testifying at the time that said accused was not
present. SO ORDERED.
- At the hearing on August 14, 1985 the prosecution moved
for the recall of its principal witness for the purpose of
identifying the accusedpetitioner who was not then present.
Hence, the hearing was rescheduled on October 9, 1985 and
a subpoena was issued to petitioner who failed to appear on
said date. The defense counsel justified petitioners absence in
that the latters presence can no longer be required as he
already filed a written waiver of appearance. Nevertheless, the
municipal judge issued an order dated May 27, 1986 ordering
the arrest of petitioner, the confiscation of the cash bond, and
at the same time ordering the bondsman, who is the petitioner
himself, to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against the bondsman.
- A motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied,
petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC. Denied as well.
I: W/N petitioner can be compelled, on pain of being arrested
and his cash bond getting confiscated, to be present during the
trial for purposes of his identification by the prosecution
witnesses in a complaint for malicious mischief despite his
written waiver of appearance.
H:
- Section 19, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution which was then
in force provides as follows:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he1has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.
-Aquino Jr. v. Military Commission: The result was that the
order of the respondent military commission requiring his
presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be
modified in the sense that petitioners presence shall be
required only in the instance just indicated.
- People v. Presiding Judge: it was held that [r]espondent
Judge unfortunately assumed that thereby a defendant was
thus conferred a fundamental right to ignore the terms of the
bond posted by him in accordance with his constitutional right
to bail. The present Constitution certainly has not made a dent
on the traditional and correct concept of a bail as given to
allow the release of a person in the custody of the law on
condition that he would appear before any court whenever so
required. Upon failure to do so, the warrant of arrest
previously issued can be a sufficient justification for his
confinement.
- the accused may waive his presence in the criminal
proceedings except at the stages where identification
of his person by the prosecution witnesses provision is
necessary.
- Stated differently, the 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly
permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that
after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the
purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or
provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his
arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in
the case on trial. The reason for requiring the presence of the
accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the
stages of the proceedings without giving the Peoples witnesses
the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense
say that he was never identified as the person charged in the
information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal.
Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the
name of the culprit but can identify him if he sees him again,
in which case the latters presence in court is necessary.
- The rule in Aquino that the accused may waive his presence
at the trial of the case his presence may be compelled when he
is to be identified.
- Petitioner, however, argues that he should not be ordered
arrested for nonappearance since he filed a written waiver
stating that he admits that he could be identified by witnesses
who have testified at the time that said accused was not
present following the ruling of this Court in People vs.
Presiding Judge. The aforestated statement in the waiver of
appearance of petitioner that he admits he could be identified
by the witnesses for the prosecution even in his absence is not
such unqualified admission contemplated in Presiding Judge.
What is stated in Presiding Judge as an exception is when the
accused unqualifiedly admits in open court after his
arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the
case on trial, no more no less. In the present case petitioner
only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution
witnesses in his absence. He did not admit that he is the very
person named as defendant in the case on trial. His admission
is vague and far from unqualified. He cannot therefore seek
the benefit of the exception recognized in Presiding Judge.
- It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution
authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused in case of his
nonappearance after arraignment despite due notice simply
means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses
face to face among others. An express waiver of appearance
after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same effect.
However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does
not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right
to require the presence of the accused for purposes of
identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction
of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not
mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the
bond to appear in court whenever so required.
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.
BINAY v. SANDIGANBAYAN
F: 1999, There are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 12068183
- Then Makati Mayor Binay was charged with the
violation of Art. 220 of the RPC and Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. The informations, which were subsequently
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a
municipality of Metro Manila.
- Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations.
He contended that the sixyear delay from the time the
charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on
July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in
the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a
violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the
accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of
this motion.
- Motion to quash denied. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution,
was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan.
- Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari, to set aside the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due
process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension
pendente lite before he could file a reply to the
prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration
of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a
Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the
Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner
to file said reply.
- After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the
Sandiganbayan just denied the same.
- Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.
- On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the
Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper
court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two
Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the
AntiGraft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the
subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated
July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are
classified as Grade 27 under the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of
1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the
offenses charged in the aboveentitled cases, the
accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or
interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under
Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases
therein filed against him. The allegation that
Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a
salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at
the time of the commission of the offenses
charged he was paid a salary which merits a
grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold
water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were
committed by the accused, the Compensation &
Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet
in existence. From the very definition of the very
Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed
and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade
classification of a public officer, whether at the
time of the commission of the offense or
thereafter, is determined by his classification
under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the
accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission
of the offenses and the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal
Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond
cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758
took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay
had begun receiving a monthly salary of
P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28
under the salary scale provided for in Section 27
of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational
Services, the position titles and salary grades of
the Compensation & Position classification
system prepared by the Department of Budget
and Management pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of
Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade
27.
- The present petition for certiorari filed by Binay,
questioned the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over his case,
his motions for reconsideration prayed to set aside the
resolutions which denied the motion to quash and
suspend the petitioner pendente lite. And an addendum
followed which asked for alternative reliefs: that if the
Sandiganbayan does have jurisdiction over the case, have
it dismissed that the long delay of the preliminary
investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of
the informations, deprived him of his right to due process
and that there was no probable cause for filing.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the
Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner
Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays
copetitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then
ViceMayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners
along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido
H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
- The complaint charged the respondent municipal
officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR
Construction for the landscaping project of the San
Pascual Central School.
- In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation
Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an
information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
Sandiganbayan.
- Ombudsman approved and filed the case with Batangas
RTC.
-Meanwhile, Concerned Citizens filed a complaint before
the Ombudsman against the same petitioners for the
violation of R.A. 3019 because of the overpriced
landscaping. On February 9, 1996, another Information
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing
of the landscaping project, this time before the
Sandiganbayan.
- The information was subsequently amended on May 17,
1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was
committed, the information charged essentially the same
inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC.
- The accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the
following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged
with the same offense in two informations; and that the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose
petitioners to double jeopardy.
- The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to
quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court,
however, suspended proceedings in the case until the
Supreme Court resolved the question of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay
petition.
I: 1. W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction (YES)
2. W/N Binays right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated. (NO)
3. W/N there is double jeopardy (NO)
H: 1. YES.
- Binay case was filed in 1994, where the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over RA 3019 cases has
not yet been classified.
- RA 7975 took effect in May 1995, when Binay had
not yet been arraigned.
- The Magsaysay case was filed in June 1995 which
means the law has already been in effect.
- The interpretation of salary grade is not based on
the amount but it is actually defined by law based on
the position and responsibility of the government
official. Clearly stated R.A. No. 6758 and the 1989
and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades List,
Mayors fall under Salary Grade 27, their actual
salaries may be subject to variation due to the funds
and said responsibilities.
- The law is clear that they are in fact included, so
there is no need for statutory construction. (Binay
used what is not included in the enumeration is
deemed excluded rule).
- The resort to congressional records to determine the
proper application of the law in this case is
unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the
resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio
alterius is inappropriate.
- On RA 7975s retroactive effect(?)
- The rule is that where a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. The exception
to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before
its enactment. Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect,
it cannot be applied to a case that was pending
prior to the enactment of the statute.
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has
already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975,
R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not
begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A.
No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it,
then the case shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before
it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
- HOWEVER, it has been superseded by RA 8249:
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may
be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court
has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has
not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then
said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, the case shall be referred to the regular
courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
pending before a regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction
and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending
before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429,
the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over
said cases.
2. NO. In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there
was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases.
- The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to
all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases,
and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.
- However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
- Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which
(a) the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as:
(b) the length of the delay,
(c) the reasons for such delay,
(d) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and
(e) the prejudice caused by the delay.
- The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
- A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
therefore, would not be sufficient.
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar
Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson
Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan,
Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo
Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John
Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of
Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of Public Documents;
(c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election
Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial
findings and observations of the COA on the
examination of the cash and accounts covering
transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988
and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last
quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati
contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The
COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report
on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of
the report, the Tanodbayan was informed that this
COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet
released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty
days within which to explain/clarify the findings in
the report and is subject to change or modification
depending upon the explanation/clarification to be
submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this
 information from the COA the preliminary
investigation was held in abeyance until the
submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final
Report on Audit of Makati was received by the Office
of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes
of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the
Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22,
1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the
fifteen (15) adverse findings, above elsewhere stated as
the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the
documentation and analysis of its findings and
preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by
a Supplemental Report on Findings No. 1 and 3.
This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents
supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio,
Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the
corresponding subpoena directing the respondents to submit
their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor
Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-affidavit on May
18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor
Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on
June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990,
Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990.Feliciano Bascon
submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November
22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were
conducted on September 27, 1990, October 26,
1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a
copy of this Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which
he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme
Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the
Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition
is submitted to support Binays stand as regard COA Finding
No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an
affidavit containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992
affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his
comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the
Deputy Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the
preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was
approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded
the same and the entire records to the Office of the
Ombudsman for review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the
Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review action
for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved
some of the recommendations of the Review Panel
and directed the preparation and filing of the
informations.[50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the
findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must
rely on its own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the
prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the
COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find
that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus
justifying the length of time for their resolution. As
held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution,
unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit
in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of
thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents
considering that no less than the Chairman of the Commission
on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members
had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of
evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw
reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and
factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of
time for preliminary investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was
resolved close to three (3) years from the time all the counter-
affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding
the fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence
were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the preliminary
investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two
(2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed
his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since
the informations charging him were not valid. This
contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement
that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in
violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the
informations in question are valid an petitioners suspension
pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the
filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion
of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such
discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise
thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any
such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
3. NO. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did
not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had
already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in
the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place,
the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction.