1. KMU v.
GARCIA One of the policy reforms and measures that is in line with the thrusts and the priorities set out in the Medium-Term Philippine
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Potenciano A. Flores for petitioner.
Robert Anthony C. Sison, Cesar B. Brillantes and Jose Z. Galsim for private respondent.
Jose F. Miravite for movants
KAPUNAN, J.:
Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to the general public. They are enterprises which
specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce to their comfort and convenience. As such, public utility services are impressed
with public interest and concern. The same is true with respect to the business of common carrier which holds such a peculiar relation to
the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation when private properties are affected with public interest,
hence, they cease to be juris privati only. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in
effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to the control by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created. 1
An abdication of the licensing and regulatory government agencies of their functions as the instant petition seeks to show, is indeed
lamentable. Not only is it an unsound administrative policy but it is inimical to public trust and public interest as well.
The instant petition for certiorari assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department
of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board LTFRB) 2 which, among
others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application
therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth Act No.
146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and reasonable
fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of
public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent
violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be "just and
reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own affirmative
allegations. 3 The offending provisions contained in the questioned issuances pointed out by petitioner, have resulted in the introduction
into our highways and thoroughfares thousands of old and smoke-belching buses, many of which are right-hand driven, and have
exposed our consumers to the burden of spiraling costs of public transportation without hearing and due process.
The following memoranda, circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant petition, viz: (a) DOTC Memorandum Order 90-
395, dated June 26, 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme for provincial bus services in the country; (b) DOTC
Department Order No.
92-587, dated March 30, 1992, defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services; (c) DOTC Memorandum dated
October 8, 1992, laying down rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587; (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No.
92-009, providing implementing guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. 92-587; and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24, 1994 in
Case No. 94-3112.
The relevant antecedents are as follows:
On June 26, 1990; then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman,
Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. The text of the memorandum order reads in full:
Development Plan (MTPDP) 1987 1992) is the liberalization of regulations in the transport sector. Along this line, the Government
intends to move away gradually from regulatory policies and make progress towards greater reliance on free market forces.
Based on several surveys and observations, bus companies are already charging passenger rates above and below the official fare
declared by LTFRB on many provincial routes. It is in this context that some form of liberalization on public transport fares is to be tested
on a pilot basis.
In view thereof, the LTFRB is hereby directed to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in country (except
those operating within Metro Manila). Transport Operators shall be allowed to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%)
above and fifteen percent (15%) below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year.
Guidelines and procedures for the said scheme shall be prepared by LTFRB in coordination with the DOTC Planning Service.
The implementation of the said fare range scheme shall start on 6 August 1990.
For compliance. (Emphasis ours.)
Finding the implementation of the fare range scheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the following
memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit:
With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received on 19 July 1990, directing the
Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in the country (except those operating within Metro
Manila)" that will allow operators "to charge passengers within a range of fifteen percent (15%) above and fifteen percent (15%) below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of one year" the undersigned is respectfully adverting the Secretary's attention to the following for his
consideration:
1. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act prescribes the following for the fixing and determination of rates (a) the rates to be
approved should be proposed by public service operators; (b) there should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected parties in
the territory affected; (c) a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare range
scheme on August 6 without complying with the requirements of the Public Service Act may not be legally feasible.
2. To allow bus operators in the country to charge fares fifteen (15%) above the present LTFRB fares in the wake of the
devastation, death and suffering caused by the July 16 earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be politically unsound; most
likely public criticism against the DOTC and the LTFRB will be triggered by the untimely motu propio implementation of the proposal by
the mere expedient of publicizing the fare range scheme without calling a public hearing, which scheme many as early as during the
Secretary's predecessor know through newspaper reports and columnists' comments to be Asian Development Bank and World Bank
inspired.
3. More than inducing a reduction in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) the implementation of the proposal will instead trigger an
upward adjustment in bus fares by fifteen percent (15%) at a time when hundreds of thousands of people in Central and Northern Luzon,
particularly in Central Pangasinan, La Union, Baguio City, Nueva Ecija, and the Cagayan Valley are suffering from the devastation and
havoc caused by the recent earthquake.
4. In lieu of the said proposal, the DOTC with its agencies involved in public transportation can consider measures and reforms in
the industry that will be socially uplifting, especially for the people in the areas devastated by the recent earthquake.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned respectfully suggests that the implementation of the proposed fare range scheme
this year be further studied and evaluated.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for
fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses with a
minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and below the proposed basic per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-
maximum fare range applying only to ordinary, first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer 1. Entry into and exit out of the industry. Following the Constitutional dictum against monopoly, no franchise holder shall be
fare for aircon buses, was sought. permitted to maintain a monopoly on any route. A minimum of two franchise holders shall be permitted to operate on any route.

On December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of six and a half The requirements to grant a certificate to operate, or certificate of public convenience, shall be: proof of Filipino citizenship, financial
(P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to the drop in the expected price of diesel. capability, public need, and sufficient insurance cover to protect the riding public.

The application was opposed by the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were In determining public need, the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. The burden of proving that
exorbitant and unreasonable and that the application contained no allegation on the rate of return of the proposed increase in rates. there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the oppositor(s).

On December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase in accordance with the following In the interest of providing efficient public transport services, the use of the "prior operator" and the "priority of filing" rules shall be
schedule of fares on a straight computation method, viz: discontinued. The route measured capacity test or other similar tests of demand for vehicle/vessel fleet on any route shall be used only as
a guide in weighing the merits of each franchise application and not as a limit to the services offered.
AUTHORIZED FARES
Where there are limitations in facilities, such as congested road space in urban areas, or at airports and ports, the use of demand
LUZON management measures in conformity with market principles may be considered.
MIN. OF 5 KMS. SUCCEEDING KM.
The right of an operator to leave the industry is recognized as a business decision, subject only to the filing of appropriate notice and
REGULARP1.50 P0.37 following a phase-out period, to inform the public and to minimize disruption of services.
STUDENT P1.15 P0.28
2. Rate and Fare Setting. Freight rates shall be freed gradually from government controls. Passenger fares shall also be
VISAYAS/MINDANAO deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service (normally third class passenger transport) for which the government will fix
indicative or reference fares. Operators of particular services may fix their own fares within a range 15% above and below the indicative
REGULARP1.60 P0.375 or reference rate.
STUDENT P1.20 P0.285
FIRST CLASS (PER KM.) Where there is lack of effective competition for services, or on specific routes, or for the transport of particular commodities, maximum
LUZON P0.385 mandatory freight rates or passenger fares shall be set temporarily by the government pending actions to increase the level of
VISAYAS/ competition.
MINDANAO P0.395
PREMIERE CLASS (PER KM.) For unserved or single operator routes, the government shall contract such services in the most advantageous terms to the public and the
LUZON P0.395 government, following public bids for the services. The advisability of bidding out the services or using other kinds of incentives on such
VISAYAS/ routes shall be studied by the government.
MINDANAO P0.405
3. Special Incentives and Financing for Fleet Acquisition. As a matter of policy, the government shall not engage in special
AIRCON (PER KM.) P0.415. 4 financing and incentive programs, including direct subsidies for fleet acquisition and expansion. Only when the market situation warrants
government intervention shall programs of this type be considered. Existing programs shall be phased out gradually.
On March 30, 1992, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Pete Nicomedes Prado issued Department
Order No. The Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Maritime Industry Authority are hereby
92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. The full text of the said order is reproduced below in view of directed to submit to the Office of the Secretary, within forty-five (45) days of this Order, the detailed rules and procedures for the
the importance of the provisions contained therein: Implementation of the policies herein set forth. In the formulation of such rules, the concerned agencies shall be guided by the most
recent studies on the subjects, such as the Provincial Road Passenger Transport Study, the Civil Aviation Master Plan, the Presidential
WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 125 as amended, designates the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as the Task Force on the Inter-island Shipping Industry, and the Inter-island Liner Shipping Rate Rationalization Study.
primary policy, planning, regulating and implementing agency on transportation;
For the compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREAS, to achieve the objective of a viable, efficient, and dependable transportation system, the transportation regulatory agencies
under or attached to the DOTC have to harmonize their decisions and adopt a common philosophy and direction; On October 8, 1992, public respondent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued a
memorandum to the Acting Chairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action on the adoption of rules and procedures to implement above-
WHEREAS, the government proposes to build on the successful liberalization measures pursued over the last five years and bring the quoted Department Order No. 92-587 that laid down deregulation and other liberalization policies for the transport sector. Attached to the
transport sector nearer to a balanced longer term regulatory framework; said memorandum was a revised draft of the required rules and procedures covering (i) Entry Into and Exit Out of the Industry and (ii)
Rate and Fare Setting, with comments and suggestions from the World Bank incorporated therein. Likewise, resplendent from the said
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers granted by laws to the DOTC, the following policies and principles in the economic memorandum is the statement of the DOTC Secretary that the adoption of the rules and procedures is a pre-requisite to the approval of
regulation of land, air, and water transportation services are hereby adopted: the Economic Integration Loan from the World Bank. 5
On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular Petitioner KMU anchors its claim on two (2) grounds. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a
No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587. The Circular provides, among fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and
others, the following challenged portions: above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the
establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public
xxx xxx xxx necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court.

IV. Policy Guidelines on the Issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience. In its Comment, private respondent PBOAP, while not actually touching upon the issues raised by the petitioner, questions the wisdom
and the manner by which the instant petition was filed. It asserts that the petitioner has no legal standing to sue or has no real interest in
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of public need for a service shall be the case at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for.
deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor'(s).
In their Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, public respondents DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB
xxx xxx xxx asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and
LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public
V. Rate and Fare Setting convenience.

The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the quality of service, subject to prior notice We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without public hearing.
At the outset, the threshold issue of locus standi must be struck. Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue.
A. On the General Structure of Rates
The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power. Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
1. The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to
20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare xxx xxx xxx
range.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
2. Fare systems for aircon buses are liberalized to cover first class and premier services. enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
xxx xxx xxx
In Lamb v. Phipps, 7 we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who have the right to
(Emphasis ours). sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected
by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires that a party
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. 8
benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be
made effective on March 16, 1994. In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the
implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use
of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are
On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion reads: part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Board after considering the arguments of the parties, hereby DISMISSES FOR LACK OF MERIT the
petition filed in the above-entitled case. This petition in this case was resolved with dispatch at the request of petitioner to enable it to
immediately avail of the legal remedies or options it is entitled under existing laws.
SO ORDERED. 6
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural
infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of
liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived
the requirement of proper party. In the recent case of Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al., 9 we ruled in the same lines
and enumerated some of the cases where the same policy was adopted, viz:

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with an urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing
the bus fare rate increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This meant that provincial bus fares were rolled
back to the levels duly authorized by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on the issuance of
franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.
. . . A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, [G.R. No. L-2044 (Araneta v. Dinglasan); G.R. No. L-2756
(Araneta
v. Angeles); G.R. No. L-3054 (Rodriguez v. Tesorero de Filipinas); G.R. No. L-3055 (Guerrero v. Commissioner of Customs); and G.R. No.
L-3056 (Barredo v. Commission on Elections), 84 Phil. 368 (1949)], this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2621)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had declared that it "is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained," (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 [1972]) or that it "enjoys an
open discretion to entertain the same or not." [Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)].
xxx xxx xxx
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters,
and
non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of
laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. Among such cases were those assailing the
constitutionality of (a) R.A. No. 3836 insofar as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives and to elective officials of both Houses of Congress (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479
[1965]); (b) Executive Order No. 284, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on 25 July 1987, which allowed members of the cabinet,
their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]); (c) the automatic appropriation for debt service in the General Appropriations Act (Guingona v.
Carague, 196 SCRA 221 [1991]; (d) R.A. No. 7056 on the holding of desynchronized elections (Osmea v. Commission on Elections, 199
SCRA 750 [1991]); (e) P.D. No. 1869 (the charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation) on the ground that it is contrary
to morals, public policy, and order (Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp., 197 SCRA 52 [1991]); and (f) R.A. No. 6975,
establishing the Philippine National Police. (Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 [1992]).
Other cases where we have followed a liberal policy regarding locus standi include those attacking the validity or legality of (a) an order
allowing the importation of rice in the light of the prohibition imposed by R.A. No. 3452 (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v.
Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]; (b) P.D. Nos. 991 and 1033 insofar as they proposed amendments to the Constitution and P.D. No. 1031
insofar as it directed the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976 (Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections, supra); (c) the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan
(Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 [1990]); (d) the approval without hearing by the Board of Investments of the amended application of the
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation to transfer the site of its plant from Bataan to Batangas and the validity of such transfer and the shift of
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (Garcia v. Board of Investments, 177 SCRA 374 [1989]; Garcia v.
Board of Investments, 191 SCRA 288 [1990]); (e) the decisions, orders, rulings, and resolutions of the Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Finance, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, and the Fiscal Incentives Review Board exempting the National
Power Corporation from indirect tax and duties (Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 [1991]); (f) the orders of the Energy Regulatory
Board of 5 and 6 December 1990 on the ground that the hearings conducted on the second provisional increase in oil prices did not allow
the petitioner substantial cross-examination; (Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 199 SCRA 454 [1991]); (g) Executive Order No. 478
which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported oil products (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 [1992]); (h)
resolutions of the Commission on Elections concerning the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of Sanggunians
(De Guia vs. Commission on Elections, 208 SCRA 420 [1992]); and (i) memorandum orders issued by a Mayor affecting the Chief of
Police of Pasay City (Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. v. Cuneta, 101 SCRA 662 [1980]).
In the 1975 case of Aquino v. Commission on Elections (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), this Court, despite its unequivocal ruling that the
petitioners therein had no personality to file the petition, resolved nevertheless to pass upon the issues raised because of the far-reaching
implications of the petition. We did no less in De Guia v. COMELEC (Supra) where, although we declared that De Guia "does not appear
to have locus standi, a standing in law, a personal or substantial interest," we brushed aside the procedural infirmity "considering the
importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and
petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent."
Now on the merits of the case.
On the fare range scheme.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and
hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions
to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation,
mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided,
That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing;
but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory
affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of
a private business, the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the
purpose of fixing the rates. (Emphasis ours).
xxx xxx xxx
Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public
services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated
June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and
adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life.
As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as
route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate
legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid
provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport
operator, or other public service.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized
existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest.
What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another. 10 A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in
the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. 11 The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at
will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever
they deem it "necessary" to do so. In Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co., 12 where respondent Philippine Railway Co. was
granted by the Public Service Commission the authority to change its freight rates at will, this Court categorically declared that:
In our opinion, the Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine Railway Co. the power of altering
its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so in order to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change
its freight rates at will, or to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the opinion of the Philippine
Railway Co. it would be to its advantage to do so.
The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show that it is untenable. The Legislature
has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public
Service Commission to delegate that power to a common carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like the Philippine
Railway Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission, and any change in such rates must be authorized or
approved by the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may, of course,
propose new rates, as the Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new rates effective without the
approval of the Public Service Commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce new
rates without the prior approval of said rates by the commission. The commission must approve new rates when they are submitted to it, if
the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable, otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the commission cannot determine in
advance whether or not the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co. will be just and reasonable, because it does not know what those
rates will be.
In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight rates at will. It may change them every
day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its
advantage. Such a procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of the public service law.
13 (Emphasis ours).
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will be authorized to impose
and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a
commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates.
Picture this situation. On December 14, 1990, the LTFRB authorized provincial bus operators to collect a thirty-seven (P0.37) centavo per
kilometer fare for ordinary buses. At the same time, they were allowed to impose and collect a fare range of plus or minus 15% over the
authorized rate. Thus P0.37 centavo per kilometer authorized fare plus P0.05 centavos (which is 15% of P0.37 centavos) is equivalent to
P0.42 centavos, the allowed rate in 1990. Supposing the LTFRB grants another five (P0.05) centavo increase per kilometer in 1994, then,
the base or reference for computation would have to be P0.47 centavos (which is P0.42 + P0.05 centavos). If bus operators will exercise
their authority to impose an additional 20% over and above the authorized fare, then the fare to be collected shall amount to P0.56 (that
is, P0.47 authorized LTFRB rate plus 20% of P0.47 which is P0.29). In effect, commuters will be continuously subjected, not only to a
double fare adjustment but to a compounding fare as well. On their part, transport operators shall enjoy a bigger chunk of the pie. Aside
from fare increase applied for, they can still collect an additional amount by virtue of the authorized fare range. Mathematically, the
situation translates into the following:
Year** LTFRB authorized Fare Range Fare to be
rate*** collected per
kilometer
1990 P0.37 15% (P0.05) P0.42
1994 P0.42 + 0.05 = 0.47 20% (P0.09) P0.56
1998 P0.56 + 0.05 = 0.61 20% (P0.12) P0.73
2002 P0.73 + 0.05 = 0.78 20% (P0.16) P0.94
Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of
judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both the public utility and the
public. Several factors, in fact, have to be taken into consideration before a balance could be achieved. A rate should not be confiscatory
as would place an operator in a situation where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to
generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate
which is too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must be
affordable to the end user who will utilize the services.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not
relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and
hearing be done away with. The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their
opposition to any fare increase.
The present administrative procedure, 14 to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To
do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will undermine
the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. 15
Discarding such procedural and constitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.
On the presumption of public need.
A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation services for
public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended, the following requirements must be met
before a CPC may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or co-partnership, association
or joint-stock company constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its stock or paid-up capital
must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and
meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed
and the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. It is understood that there must be
proper notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC.
While adopting in toto the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part IV, provides for
yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. The guidelines states:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption of public need for a service shall be
deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's.
(Emphasis ours).
The above-quoted provision is entirely incompatible and inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that
before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will
promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline states that the presumption of public need
for a public service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former
must prevail.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. 16 As one of the basic
requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable
want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or
non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence, real and/or
testimonial; empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and
purpose of such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and protect, the interests of both the public and the existing transport
operators.
Verily, the power of a regulatory body to issue a CPC is founded on the condition that after full-dress hearing and investigation, it shall
find, as a fact, that the proposed operation is for the convenience of the public. 17 Basic convenience is the primary consideration for
which a CPC is issued, and that fact alone must be consistently borne in mind. Also, existing operators in subject routes must be given an
opportunity to offer proof and oppose the application. Therefore, an applicant must, at all times, be required to prove his capacity and
capability to furnish the service which he has undertaken to
render. 18 And all this will be possible only if a public hearing were conducted for that purpose.
Otherwise stated, the establishment of public need in favor of an applicant reverses well-settled and institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial
and administrative procedures. It allows the party who initiates the proceedings to prove, by mere application, his affirmative allegations.
Moreover, the offending provisions of the LTFRB memorandum circular in question would in effect amend the Rules of Court by adding
another disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37 presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Such usurpation
of this Court's authority cannot be countenanced as only this Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure. 19
Deregulation, while it may be ideal in certain situations, may not be ideal at all in our country given the present circumstances. Advocacy
of liberalized franchising and regulatory process is tantamount to an abdication by the government of its inherent right to exercise police
power, that is, the right of government to regulate public utilities for protection of the public and the utilities themselves.
While we recognize the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the transport sector, we find that
they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order
No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009
promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, the said administrative issuances being amendatory
and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Consequently, we rule that the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase
imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force
and effect. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 and DOTC
Memorandum dated October 8, 1992, the same being merely internal communications between administrative officers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged administrative issuances and orders,
namely: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar
as they affect provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly
prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of
public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate
increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 2. PASEI v. TORRES I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992 An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the various
operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs. The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned:
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents. 1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies

De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner. 2. Manpower Pooling

3. Worker Training and Briefing

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: 4. Processing and Deployment

This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), 5. Welfare Programs
to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or Principals
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or
such workers. through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.

PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to xxx xxx xxx
engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
X. Interim Arrangement
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE
Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.
business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their accepted applicants in
In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting
recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.
through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household
workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)

In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment
coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis. contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.

For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing
GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong
Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong.
TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong
Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers
(DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30
June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which
requires prior accreditation which the POEA.

Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government processing and Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a
deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the
agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy. POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be
allowed.
Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of
workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and
to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to
take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment
functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty:
"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and
placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13, Rollo.)
2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:
3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government
arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13, Rollo.)
3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for
overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith.
(Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It
has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and
more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or
the courts of justice" (Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino
landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall
within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs.
Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power
(City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to
"regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business
operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the
"mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and
other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement
and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic
helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment
and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and
expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspended effective July 1, 1991."
The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the
scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for
employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis
supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule
in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
(Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Once, more we advert to our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:

. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation. (p. 447.)

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p.
448.)

For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the
statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.

SO ORDERED.
 3. SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the Peoples Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI),
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except
perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original
proponent[1] and the main sponsor[2] of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system
as innovative.[3] Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision
of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.[4] For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter,
COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition)[5]
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of
general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing
stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples Initiative,[6] a group of citizens desirous to avail of
the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise
the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who
shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which
the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,[7] Section 4 of Article VII,
[8] and Section 8 of Article X[9] of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution[10]
embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits,
and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of
the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its
Chairman, issued an Order[11] (a) directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing
in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for
hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the
Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other
lawyers; and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).[12] Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda
within five days.[13]
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed
this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional
Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws
and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes
a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department,
agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the
Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of
voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this
petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayers and legislators suit.[14] Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from
notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent
COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature
drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment[15] on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC.
THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS
DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT
IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS
A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY
THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND
LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC
THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF
THIS ACT. (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-
413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment[16] which starts off with an assertion that the instant
petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6
December 1996 was an Initiatory Pleading or Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the
petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few
specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the
entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the
COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any
event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of
the people.
In the Comment[17] for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms,
recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the
Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions
initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that system of
initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent
provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The
rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and
the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation
stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in
Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later
replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J.,[18] it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure;
and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and
on the State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.[19] A revision
cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on
the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper
empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a
fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as
a premium for good performance.[20]
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the peoples initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is
to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the
role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the
COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without
authority to legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a
sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention.[21] He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that
implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent
Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required
number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and
resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELECs role in an initiative on the
Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if
warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention.[22]
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP,
as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and
the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days
their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a
nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from
receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of
the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and
requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It
further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the
Commissions failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives
relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral
Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco,
DIK and MABINI, and IBP.[23] The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda.[24]
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural
question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this
Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is
the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for
the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84).
In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of
the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can
save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.[25]
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.[26] The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard
the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.[27] Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin
Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and
the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure to act on Rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence to
hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition
is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:[28]
A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,[29] Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain
entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No.
332).[30] That section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the Constitution.[31]
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative
which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.[32]
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on
this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the
date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative
power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the
appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried out - is it possible that, in effect, what will
be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that
possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment,
maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and
submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of
the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written.
Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates
and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that would
specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations.[33]
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the
Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.[34]
xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c)
of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.[35]
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee
accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
xxx
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by the
sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.[36]
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which
must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the
initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.[37]
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of --
the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the
word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is
concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."[38]
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and
difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention
would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National
Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating
an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing
the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting
as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions.[39]
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved by
a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.[40]
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986.[41] Thereafter, upon his
motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.[42]
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing percent to per centum and thereof
to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress[43] shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.[44] This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section
2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the
private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or
legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress[45] shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The
rules means the details on how [the right] is to be carried out.[46]
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is
a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,[47] which dealt with
the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,[48] which dealt
with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government)
and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17[49] solely dealt with initiative and referendum
concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17
and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate[50] and by the House of
Representatives.[51] This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance
with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section,
which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent
as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely
referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve or
reject and in whole or in part.[52]
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as
one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of
the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for
the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said
paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of
every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed only strengthens the conclusion
that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation
of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative
and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local
Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its
nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress
can pass. It is local initiative if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative
bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of
initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms --
xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
[53]
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the
House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition
for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced,[54] since the
provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition
approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and
referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.[55]
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence
thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the required
number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be
within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.[56]
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a)
mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three
systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may
be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the
petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.[57]
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured
by empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.[58]
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
[59] The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[60]
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[61] A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.[62]
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements
in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE
ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate
constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be
signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he
has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.
Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing
of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition;[63] (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;[64] (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations;[65] and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters
affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.[66]
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter knew that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence,
the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and
the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of the elective national and local
officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should
be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to
provide for the implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is
LIFTED against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.
 4. US v. ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of,
and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing
the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures
for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or
sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that
the industrial or merchant may demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the
purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this Act, but does not specify
the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith
shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall consider that the public interest requires the
application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall
from then on be temporarily suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall
again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor
the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as
follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st
of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act
No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he
appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General
issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the
proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at
which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left
to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what
reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to
what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also
left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is
authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act." It does not
specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined
any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause,"
and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the
carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the
minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may
not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the
Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive
and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the
law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the
Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding,
that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was
that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the
Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no
2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations
to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if
the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:
Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are
subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freights and passengers
on the different railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had power to
establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law,
providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of
this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case
of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the
railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property
by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and
published by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus given to the commission to determine, in the exercise
of their discretion and judgement, what are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be equal and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a
just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a
civil proceeding. It was there held
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to require either argument or citation of
authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and
determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these
rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be, which would not be allowable,
but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of
it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is
intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single provision of law. It is merely
charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The
opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made."
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in
use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in
use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it
was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid
constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such
service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon
from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture
merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is
not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized
agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is altogether different from
governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and
regulations, not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could
confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to
those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of administrative rules and
regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or
measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in
violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves
liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make
provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve
the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the
Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted that in the "Granger
Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons,
the legislature had the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the
facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a
delegation of legislative power.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . .
wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, executive or judicial,
is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the
constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only
upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by
special permission of the president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and
allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated; second, because
the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot
delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be
suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. In the present case the
ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall
close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-
General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would
be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it
was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-
General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the
proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as follows:
In Manila
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.
Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price less the cost of transportation from the
source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum price shall be the authorized price at the
place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary handling
expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the
Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a
general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the
Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here,
then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial
treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of
Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub
delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one price of rice in Manila and
another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and
uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the
Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will
take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a wide range in the
price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the
proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or
63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law
is confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many other
things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the Islands is not general or
uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by
proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature
of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights,
which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a
proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to
grade or quality.
 This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-General, upon the terms and
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act
proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.
to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be
enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-
General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by
Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to
issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in
violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe hardship on the poorer
classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and
none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the
poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this
case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of government. We make the broad
statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868,
has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can never be delegated
under a republican form of government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government property. It was dealing with
private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and
for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine
Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be suspended. But the
Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect,
such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the
United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There,
the United States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in
doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual
or constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this
case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had
not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private
property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken on
solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions.
Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the
conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of any
court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in
question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested
exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the
authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of
the organic law.
 5. YNOT v. IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO
and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the
petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial
movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial
movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and
carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the
merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before
us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according
the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure
should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative
power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there was the
necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the
requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be
rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the
hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more
deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss of
favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely
implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed
but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there
existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any
matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary
power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the
grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the
more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule
was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill
of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to
make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal
straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they
have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and
exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example,
would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed
against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won
for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King
John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base,
that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also
be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not
from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of
power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because
they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence
of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We
have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel
Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn
and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances
when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a
mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people.
Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport
of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy
restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process.
The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable
and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a
member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead
from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often
unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the
police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex
and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order
No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as
expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of
the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening
energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss,
indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having
slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law
was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An
epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output,
which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their
price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The
Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners,
tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a
direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is
also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male
and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that
"no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the
carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged
measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to
produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the
urgency of the need to correct it.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached
us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend
him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished
rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored
or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must
be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright
and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by
the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the
violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority
to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as
the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers
must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they
alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide
and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation
of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in
damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to
declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the
Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
 6. DAR v. SUTTON On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2] this Court ruled that lands devoted to
livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain
EN BANC provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was
devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070
REFORM, represented by SECRETARY On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was
JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present: devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
Petitioner, Davide, C.J.,
Puno, On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers
Panganiban, they submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request.
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for
Sandoval-Gutierrez, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area
Carpio, of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal
- versus - Austria-Martinez, shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
Corona, excluded from the operations of the CARL.
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their
Azcuna,
VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6]
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario and
Garcia, JJ. On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order[7] partially granting the application of respondents for
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of
SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated: respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
HARRY T. SUTTON, respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents. October 19, 2005
x-----------------------------------x Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to
cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the
reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land
area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which
DECISION
declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.

PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993,
null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf
breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary
offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10] It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993,
does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being
used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the
sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the
intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed
order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that
petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for
owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of
livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the
coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have
converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program. Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an
implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an
Petitioners arguments fail to impress. earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain
provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21] With this significant modification,
granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly
challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or
committed by the administrative body concerned. extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an
administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.[13] The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to
abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19,
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.[14]
SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms
by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and
do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors,
exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester
plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.[15]

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of
agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that
industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657
provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are
arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified
as residential lands.

A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been
classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned
A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural
lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The
undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents
family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly
known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on
record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL
that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the
conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business
interest in the case of respondents.
 7. SOL. GEN v. MMA mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February
28, 1991.
G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, confiscation of driver's licenses.
petitioners
vs. On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents. plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:

The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
providing inter alia that:
CRUZ, J.:p
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is
authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held
of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the
violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for
Court has received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which
reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in
sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court resolved to require the Metropolitan
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in
light of the said decision.
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation,
his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers
conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the
others of:
decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should
file their complaints.
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services
driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver's license
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and
by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.
not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid
law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also
collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the
confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a
delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of
impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He
Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to
District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.
remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its
contention that the incidents in question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office had never
authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct
action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under
exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of
the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the
Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's
license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the
top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are
lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than
dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural
rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts." 2 In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which
otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on
the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
(Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the
case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them
present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass
up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the
question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these
procedural matters, since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not
in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited
in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as
G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the
substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to
the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file
the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important
substantive issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is
not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic
problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such
delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient
standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will
have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall
be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It
is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable
sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of
these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we
apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must
be general and consistent with public policy. 7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not
conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and
operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and
under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of
Transportation under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila
Commission. When the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience,
the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked
driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation
Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, reckoned from
the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and
offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's
license for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for
violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately
issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of
fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was
committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of
the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-
enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the
case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's license shall not be renewed
until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations,
or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose
fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the
decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the
Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated."
These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan
Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate
only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power
of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will
of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted
by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the
Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said
ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City
Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands
as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the
latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the
ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by
the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a
penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon
a subdivision owner additional conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the
government. But as already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it
shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of
implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent
bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,
would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and
in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the
general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in
the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public
for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties
upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of
such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory
authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a
statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605
remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI
43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when
authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.
 8. BOIE-TAKEDA v. DELA SERNA xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 92174 December 10, 1993 c) Employers already paying their employers a 13-month pay or more in calendar year or is equivalent at the time of this
issuance;
BOIE-TAKEDA CHEMICALS, INC., petitioner,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
HON. DIONISIO DE LA SERNA, Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, respondent.
e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount for
G.R. No. L-102552 December 10, 1993 performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid on piece-
rate basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance insofar as such workers are concerned.
PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX CORP., petitioner,
vs. xxx xxx xxx
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX
EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents. The term "its equivalent" as used in paragraph (c) shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payments and other cash
bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances
Herrera, Laurel, De los Reyes, Roxas & Teehankee for Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. and Phil Xerox Corp. and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th
of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Supplementary Rules and Regulations implementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople which inter alia set out items of
NARVASA, C.J.: compensation not included in the computation of the 13th month pay, viz.:

What items or items of employee remuneration should go into the computation of thirteenth month pay is the basic issue presented in Sec. 4. Overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation
these consolidated petitions. Otherwise stated, the question is whether or not the respondent labor officials in computing said benefit, of the 13th month pay.
committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction," by giving effect to Section 5 of the Revised Guidelines on the
implementation of the Thirteenth Month Pay (Presidential Decree No. 851) promulgated by then Secretary of Labor and Employment, On August 13, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Memorandum Order No. 28, which contained a single provision modifying
Hon. Franklin Drilon, and overruling petitioner's contention that said provision constituted a usurpation of legislative power because not Presidential Decree No. 851 by removing the salary ceiling of P1,000.00 a month set by the latter, as follows:
justified by or within the authority of the law sought to be implemented besides being violative of the equal protection of the law clause of
the Constitution. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modified to the extent that all employers are hereby required to pay all their rank-and-
file employees a 13th month pay not later than December 24, of every year.
Resolution of the issue entails, first, a review of the pertinent provisions of the laws and implementing regulations.
Slightly more than a year later, on November 16, 1987, Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law were
Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 851, the Thirteenth Month Pay Law, read as follows: promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon which, among other things, defined with particularity what remunerative items were
and were not embraced in the concept of 13th month pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage
Sec 1. All employees are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, plus commission. The relevant provisions read:
regardless of the nature of the employment, a 13th month pay not later than December 24 of every year.
4. Amount and payment of 13th Month Pay.
Sec. 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
The Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 promulgated by then Labor Minister Blas Ople on December 22, 1975 contained the
following relevant provisions relative to the concept of "thirteenth month pay" and the employers exempted from giving it, to wit: The basic salary of an employee for the purpose of computing the 13th month pay shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by the
employer for services rendered but does not include allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of
Sec. 2. Definition of certain terms. . . . the regular or basic salary, such as the cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave credits, overtime, premium, night differential
and holiday pay, and cost-of-living allowances. However, these salary-related benefits should be included as part of the basic salary in the
a) "Thirteenth month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year; computation of the 13th month pay if by individual or collective agreement, company practice or policy, the same are treated as part of the
basic salary of the employees.
b) "Basic Salary" shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but may
not include cost of living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. 174, profit sharing xxx xxx xxx
payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary of the
employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975. 5. 13th Month Pay for Certain Types of Employees.

Sec. 3. Employers covered. . . . (The law applies) to all employers except to: (a) Employees Paid by Results. Employees who are paid on piece work basis are by law entitled to the 13th month pay.
Employees who are paid a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission are also entitled to the mandated 13th month pay based on their
total earnings during the calendar year, i.e., on both their fixed or guaranteed wage and commission.
This was the state of the law when the controversies at bar arose out of the following antecedents:
(RE G.R. No. 92174) A routine inspection was conducted on May 2, 1989 in the premises of petitioner Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. by
Labor
and Development Officer Reynaldo B. Ramos under Inspection Authority
No. 4-209-89. Finding that Boie-Takeda had not been including the commissions earned by its medical representatives in the computation
of their 13th month pay, Ramos served a Notice of Inspection Results 1 on Boie-Takeda through its president, Mr. Benito Araneta,
requiring Boie-Takeda within ten (10) calendar days from notice to effect restitution or correction of "the underpayment of 13th month pay
for the year(s) 1986, 1987 and 1988 of Med Rep (Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of 13th month pay # 5) in the total amount of
P558,810.89."
Boie-Takeda wrote the Labor Department contesting the Notice of Inspection Results, and expressing the view "that the commission paid
to our medical representatives are not to be included in the computation of the 13th month pay . . . (since the) law and its implementing
rules speak of REGULAR or BASIC salary and therefore exclude all other remunerations which are not part of the REGULAR salary." It
pointed out that, "if no sales is (sic) made under the effort of a particular representative, there is no commission during the period when no
sale was transacted, so that commissions are not and cannot be legally defined as regular in nature. 2
Regional Director Luna C. Piezas directed Boie-Takeda to appear before his Office on June 9 and 16, 1989. On the appointed dates,
however, and despite due notice, no one appeared for Boie-Takeda, and the matter had perforce to be resolved on the basis of the
evidence at hand. On July 24, 1989, Director Piezas issued an Order 3 directing Boie-Takeda:
. . . to pay . . . (its) medical representatives and its managers the total amount of FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY SIX AND FORTY SEVEN CENTAVOS (P565,746.47) representing underpayment of thirteenth (13th) month pay for
the years 1986, 1987, 1988, inclusive, pursuant to the . . . revised guidelines within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
A motion for reconsideration 4 was seasonably filed by Boie-Takeda under date of August 3, 1989. Treated as an appeal, it was resolved
on
January 17, 1990 by then Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio de la Serna, who affirmed the July 24, 1989 Order with modification that the
sales commissions earned by Boie-Takeda's medical representatives before August 13, 1989, the effectivity date of Memorandum Order
No. 28 and its Implementing Guidelines, shall be excluded in the computation of their 13th month pay. 5
Hence the petition docketed as G.R. No. 92174.
(RE G.R. No. 102552) A similar Routine Inspection was conducted in the premises of Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. on September 7, 1989
pursuant to Routine Inspection Authority No. NCR-LSED-RI-494-89. In his Notice of Inspection Results, 6 addressed to the Manager, Mr.
Nicolas O. Katigbak, Senior Labor and Employment Officer Nicanor M. Torres noted the following violation committed by Philippine Fuji
Xerox Corp., to wit:
Underpayment of 13th month pay of 62 employees, more or less pursuant to Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th
month pay law for the period covering 1986, 1987 and 1988.
Philippine Fuji Xerox was requested to effect rectification and/or restitution of the noted violation within five (5) working days from notice.
No action having been taken thereon by Philippine Fuji Xerox,
Mr. Eduardo G. Gonzales, President of the Philxerox Employee Union, wrote then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon requesting a follow-up
of the inspection findings. Messrs. Nicolas and Gonzales were summoned to appear before Labor Employment and Development Officer
Mario F. Santos, NCR Office, Department of Labor for a conciliation conference. When no amicable settlement was reached, the parties
were required to file their position papers.
Subsequently, Regional Director Luna C. Piezas issued an Order dated August 23, 1990, 7 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Respondent PHILIPPINE FUJI XEROX is hereby ordered to restitute to its salesmen the portion of
the 13th month pay which arose out of the non-implementation of the said revised guidelines, ten (10) days from receipt hereof,
otherwise,
MR. NICANOR TORRES, the SR. LABOR EMPLOYMENT OFFICER is hereby Ordered to proceed to the premises of the Respondent for
the purpose of computing the said deficiency (sic) should respondent fail to heed his Order.
Philippine Fuji Xerox appealed the aforequoted Order to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. In an Order dated October 120, 1991,
Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano denied the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 102552, which was ordered
consolidated with G.R. No. 92174 as involving the same issue.
In their almost identically-worded petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attribute grave abuse of discretion to respondent labor
officials
Hon. Dionisio dela Serna and Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano in issuing the questioned Orders of January 17, 1990 and October
10, 1991, respectively. They maintain that under P.D. 851, the 13th month pay is based solely on basic salary. As defined by the law itself
and clarified by the implementing and Supplementary Rules as well as by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, remunerations
which do not form part of the basic or regular salary of an employee, such as commissions, should not be considered in the computation
of the 13th month pay. This being the case, the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then
Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of commissions in the 13th month pay, were issued in excess of the statutory authority
conferred by P.D. 851. According to petitioners, this conclusion becomes even more evident when considered in light of the opinion
rendered by Labor Secretary Drilon himself in "In Re: Labor Dispute at the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company" which affirmed
the contemporaneous interpretation by then Secretary Ople that commissions are excluded from the basic salary. Petitioners further
contend that assuming that Secretary Drilon did not exceed the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851, still the Revised Guidelines are
null and void as they violate the equal protection of the law clause.
Respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General question the propriety of petitioners' attack on the constitutionality of the Revised
Guidelines in a petition for certiorari which, they contend, should be confined purely to the correction of errors and/or defects of
jurisdiction, including matters of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not extend to a collateral attack
on the validity and/or constitutionality of a law or statute. They aver that the petitions do not advance any cogent reason or state any valid
ground to sustain the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, and that at any rate, P.D. No. 851, otherwise known as the 13th Month Pay
Law has already been amended by Memorandum Order No. 28 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 13, 1986 so that
commissions are now imputed into the computation of the 13th Month Pay. They add that the Revised Guidelines issued by then Labor
Secretary Drilon merely clarified a gray area occasioned by the silence of the law as to the nature of commissions; and worked no
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, said Guidelines being based on reasonable classification. Respondents point
to the case of Songco vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 610, wherein the Court declared that Article 97(f) of the Labor
Code is explicit that commission is included in the definition of the term "wage".
We rule for the petitioners.
Contrary to respondents' contention, Memorandum Order No. 28 did not repeal, supersede or abrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from
the language of the Memorandum Order No. 28, it merely "modified" Section 1 of the decree by removing the P1,000.00 salary ceiling.
The concept of 13th Month Pay as envisioned, defined and implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and while entitlement to
said benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basic salary of not more than P1,000.00, said benefit was, and still is,
to be computed on the basic salary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the interpretation given to the term "basic
salary" as defined in P.D. 851 applies equally to "basic salary" under Memorandum Order No. 28.
In the case of San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139, this Court delineated the coverage of the term "basic salary" as used in P.D.
851. We said at some length:
Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing rules, the basic salary of an employee is used as the basis in the determination of
his 13th month pay. Any compensations or remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay is excluded as basis in the
computation of the mandatory bonus.
Under the Rules and Regulations implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following compensations are deemed not part of the basic
salary:
a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions No. 174;
b) Profit-sharing payments;
c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the
employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.
Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 Presidential Decree 851 issued by then
Labor Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in the
computation of the 13th month pay.
The exclusion of the cost-of-living allowances under Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of Instructions No. 174, and profit-sharing
payments indicate the intention to strip basic salary of other payments which are properly considered as "fringe" benefits. Likewise, the
catch-all exclusionary phrase "all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the basic salary"
shows also the intention to strip basic salary of any and all additions which may be in the form of allowances or "fringe" benefits.
Moreover, the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is even more emphatic in declaring that
earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13th-month pay.
While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary
to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling
Supplementary Rules and Regulations which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary earnings and other remunerations
paid by an employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a
broad inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure the seeming tendency of the former
rules to include all remunerations and earnings within the definition of basic salary.
The all embracing phrase "earnings and other remunerations" which are deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning
payments for sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays, pays for regular
holidays and night differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered in the computation of
the 13th-month pay. If they were not excluded, it is hard to find any "earnings and other remunerations" expressly excluded in the
computation of the 13th month pay. Then the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
This conclusion finds strong support under the Labor Code of the Philippines. To cite a few provisions:
Art. 87. Overtime Work. Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime
work, additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five (25%) percent thereof.
It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular wage or basic salary, for reason of which
such is categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary under the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851.
In Article 93 of the same Code, paragraph
c) work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the regular
wage of the employee.
It is likewise clear the premiums for special holiday which is at least 30% of the regular wage is an additional pay other than and added to
the regular wage or basic salary. For similar reason, it shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th month pay.
Quite obvious from the foregoing is that the term "basic salary" is to be understood in its common, generally-accepted meaning, i.e., as a
rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments as bonuses and overtime. 8 This is how the term was also
understood in the case of Pless v. Franks, 308 S.W. 2nd. 402, 403, 202 Tenn. 630, which held that in statutes providing that pension
should not less than 50 percent of "basic salary" at the time of retirement, the quoted words meant the salary that an employee (e.g., a
policeman) was receiving at the time he retired without taking into consideration any extra compensation to which he might be entitled for
extra work. 9
In remunerative schemes consisting of a fixed or guaranteed wage plus commission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the "basic
salary" for this is what the employee receives for a standard work period. Commissions are given for extra efforts exerted in
consummating sales or other related transactions. They are, as such, additional pay, which this Court has made clear do not form part of
the "basic salary."
Respondents would do well to distinguish this case from Songco vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, upon which they rely
so heavily. What was involved therein was the term "salary" without the restrictive adjective "basic". Thus, in said case, we construed the
term in its generic sense to refer to all types of "direct remunerations for services rendered," including commissions. In the same case, we
also took judicial notice of the fact "that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or
commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists," which statement is quite significant in that it speaks of a "basic
salary" apart and distinct from "commissions" and "allowances". Instead of supporting respondents' stand, it would appear that Songco
itself recognizes that commissions are not part of "basic salary."
In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on
the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental
rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry
into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 10
Having reached this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section 5 (a) of the Revised Guidelines on
the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued on November 126, 1987 by then Labor Secretary Franklin M. Drilon is declared null
and void as being violative of the law said Guidelines were issued to implement, hence issued with grave abuse of discretion correctible
by the writ of prohibition and certiorari. The assailed Orders of January 17, 1990 and October 10, 1991 based thereon are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
 9. UNITED BFHA v. BF HOMES
[G.R. No. 124873. July 14, 1999]
UNITED BF HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BF HOMES,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision[1] and resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals granting respondent BFHIs
petition for prohibition, and ordering Atty. Roberto C. Abrajano, hearing officer of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation, to refrain
from hearing HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027 and to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (UBFHAI) is the umbrella organization and sole representative of all homeowners in
the BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, a seven hundred sixty five (765) hectare subdivision located in the south of Manila. Respondent BF
Homes, Inc. (BFHI) is the owner-developer of the said subdivision, which first opened in 1968.[3]
In 1988, because of financial difficulties, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) placed respondent BFHI under receivership to
undergo a ten-year (10) rehabilitation program, and appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain receiver. The program was composed of two
stages: (1) payment of obligations to external creditors; and (2) payment of obligations to Banco Filipino.[4]
When Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI in 1988, several things were not in order in the subdivision.
[5] Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major homeowners associations, the BF
Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation
of a single, representative homeowners association and the setting up of an integrated security program that would cover the eight (8)
entry and exit points to and from the subdivision. On December 20, 1988, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of
agreement, and amended on March 1989.
Pursuant to these agreements, on May 18, 1989, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC),[6] and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners association inside the subdivision.
Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the subdivisions clubhouse
at #37 Pilar Banzon Street,[7] and a strip of open space in Concha Cruz Garden Row,[8] on June 23, 1989 and May, 1993, respectively.
On November 7, 1994, the first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHIs eleven (11)
members of the board of directors was appointed.[9]
On April 7, 1995, based on BFHIs title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the different
homeowners association in the subdivision informing them that as a basic requirement for BFHIs rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would
be responsible for the security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of squatters.[10]
On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI.[11]
In substance, petitioner UBFHAI alleged that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous
receiver. They complained that even prior to said date, the new committee of receivers committed the following acts: (1) deferred
petitioner UBFHAIs purchase of additional pumps; (2) terminated the collection agreement for the community assessment forged by the
petitioner UBFHAI with the first receiver; (3) terminated the administration and maintenance of the Concha Cruz Garden Row; (4) sent a
letter to petitioner UBFHAI stating that it recognized BFPHAI[12] only, and that the subdivisions clubhouse was to be administered by it
only; and (5) took over the administration of security in the main avenues in the subdivision.
On April 11, 1995, the HIGC issued ex parte a temporary restraining order. Particularly, respondent BFHI was enjoined from:
taking over the Clubhouse located at 37 Pilar Banzon St., BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila, taking over security in all the entry and exit
points and main avenues of BF Homes Paraaque Subdivision, impeding or preventing the execution and sale at auction of the properties
of BF Paraaque Homeowners Association, Inc., in HIGC HOA-90-138 and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement
of petitioner with the former receiver/BFHI concerning funding or delivery of community services to the homeowners represented by the
latter.[13]
On April 24, 1995, without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAIs petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for prohibition for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with
the case.[14]
On May 2, 1995, the HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAIs application for preliminary injunction, until such
time that respondent BFHIs application for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of
the temporary restraining order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the status quo.[15]
Meanwhile, on November 27, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision[16] granting respondent BFHIs petition for prohibition,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED, prohibiting the public respondent Roberto C. Abrajano from
proceeding with the hearing of HIGC CASE NO. HOA-95-027. Consequently, the public respondent is hereby ordered to DISMISS HIGC
CASE NO. HOA-95-027 for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[17]
On April 24, 1996, the appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[18]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner UBFHAI raises two issues: (1) whether or not the Rules of procedure promulgated by the HIGC, specifically Section 1(b), Rule
II of the Rules of Procedure in the Settlement of Homeowners Disputes is valid; (2) whether or not the acts committed by the respondent
constitute an attack on petitioners corporate existence.[19] Corollary to these, petitioner questions the appellate courts jurisdiction over
the subject case.
Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners associations was vested by law with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On May 3, 1979, pursuant to Executive Order 535,[20] this function was delegated to the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation
(HIGC).[21] Section 2 of Executive Order 535 provides:
2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following
additional powers;
(a) To require submission of and register articles of incorporation of homeowners associations and issue certificates of
incorporation/registration, upon compliance by the registering associations with the duly promulgated rules and regulations thereon;
maintain a registry thereof; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange
Commission with respect to homeowners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P. D. 902-A, to the contrary
notwithstanding;
By virtue of this amendatory law, the HIGC not only assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners
associations, but also the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates;
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates
respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or
right to exist as such entity.[22]
On December 21, 1989, the HIGC adopted its rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners disputes. Section 1(b), Rule II
enumerated the types of disputes over which the HIGC has jurisdiction, and these include:
Section 1. Types of Disputes- The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board, or committee duly designated or created by it shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
xxx
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among members of the association, between any and/or all of them
and the association of which they are members, and insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association
and the state/general public or other entity. [emphasis supplied]
Therefore, in relation to Section 5 (b), Presidential Decree 902-A, the HIGCs jurisdiction over homeowners disputes is limited to
controversies that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between
any or all of them and the association of which they are members or associates; and (3) between such association and the state, insofar
as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. (Emphasis supplied.)
Though it would seem that Section 1(b), Rule II of the HIGCs revised rules of procedure is just a reproduction of Section 5 (b),
Presidential Decree 902-A, the rules deviated from the provisions of the latter. If the provisions of the law would be followed to the letter,
the third type of dispute over which the HIGC has jurisdiction should be limited only to a dispute between the state and the association,
insofar as it concerns the associations franchise or corporate existence. However, under the HIGCs revised rules of procedure, the
phrase general public or other entity[23] was added.
It was on this third type of dispute, as provided in Section 1 (b), Rule II of the HIGCs revised rules of procedure that petitioner UBFHAI
anchors its claim that the HIGC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In the comment filed by the HIGC with the appellate
court, it maintained that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to the power and authority granted it in the
revised rules of procedure. Respondent BFHI disputes this, contending that the rules of procedure relied upon by petitioner are not valid
implementation of Executive Order No. 535, as amended, in relation to Presidential Decree 902-A.
The question now is whether HIGC, in promulgating the above-mentioned rules of procedure, went beyond the authority delegated to it
and unduly expanded the provisions of the delegating law. In relation to this, the question is whether or not the revised rules of procedure
are valid.
As early as 1970, in the case of Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators (PVA),[24] we ruled that the power to promulgate
rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. Its terms must be
followed for an administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress.[25] The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.[26] If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.[27]
In the present case, the HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There
was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. As provided in the law, insofar as the associations
franchise or corporate existence is involved, it is only the State, not the general public or other entity that could question this. The
appellate court correctly held that: The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot
legally do x x x.[28] The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to
abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and
statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are
subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.[29]
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry
out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict
with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate.[30] A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for
their just and reasonable execution.[31] It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of
the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid.[32]
Thus, we hold that Rule II, Section 1(b) of HIGCs Revised Rules of Procedure in the Hearing of Homeowners Disputes is void, without
ruling on the validity of the rest of the rules.
Neither can the HIGC claim original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petition for mandamus under the two other types of disputes
enumerated in Presidential Decree 902-A and in the revised rules. The dispute is not one involving the members of the homeowners
association nor it is one between any and/or all of the members and the associations of which they are members. The parties are the
homeowners association and the owner-developer, acting at the same time as the corporations committee of receivers.
To reiterate, the HIGC exercises a very limited jurisdiction over homeowners disputes. The law confined this authority to controversies
that arise out of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between any and/or all of
them and the association of which they are members; and (3) insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the
association and the state. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed.[33]
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by the Constitution or by law. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. That power is a matter of
legislative enactment which none by the legislature may change.[34]
In light of the foregoing, we do not see the need to discuss the second issue. Whether or not the acts committed or threatened to be
committed by the respondent against the petitioner would constitute an attack on the latters corporate existence would be immaterial. The
HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear and resolve the dispute.
Having dispensed with the question of jurisdiction, there is no need for the HIGC to proceed with the hearing of HIGC-HOA 95-027. It
would just be an exercise in futility since it has no jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it was apparent that the board of directors of respondent BFHI, acting as the committee of receivers, was only trying to find
ways and means to rehabilitate the corporation so that it can pay off its creditors. The revocation of the security agreements and the
removal of administration and maintenance of certain property that are still under the name of respondent BFHI, were acts done in
pursuance of the rehabilitation program. All the security agreements and undertakings were contractual in nature, which respondent BFHI,
acting as a committee of receivers and being the successor of the former receiver, could very well alter or modify.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, for lack of merit. The decision and resolution appealed from in CA-
G. R. SP. NO. 37072 are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 10. LUPANGCO v. CA
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO
V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the
administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout
materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition
for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null
and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled "
Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission."
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its
"Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The
resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material,
or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of
any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including
examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October
25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to
enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case
and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above
Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by
respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for
want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the
enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional
Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and
co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda
vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the
orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First
Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In
Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as
amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission,
his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed
that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission
itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange
Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies.
On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the
same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the
procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next
course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth
Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation
Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court.
Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional
Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the
Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President
for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be
reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to
wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the
residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The
following rulings buttress this conclusion:

The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of
government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme
within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied
therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not
because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to
interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil
Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same
principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of
Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this
case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the
circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the
Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the
memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held:
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked
the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might
run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968,
which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee
employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and
statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction
over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended).
12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of
a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation
Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has
jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129,
there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-
judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication
would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14 This
does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative
policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or
not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a
private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards,
judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of
certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and
the enforcement of election laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among
various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly
appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal
controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was
issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In
short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely
as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as
a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the
COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from
said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like
respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to
the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards"
whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional
Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law
prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the
respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105
so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and SO ORDERED.
purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be
readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive
any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be
barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become
public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to
enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States
Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one
may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of
his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest
enjoyment. 23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC
cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the
standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be
inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this
juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24
regarding academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how
best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those
last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing
their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What
is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel
should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the
powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and
another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
 11. PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil.
(Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have
vs. any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant. be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession
thereof.
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee. But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in
this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the
MONTEMAYOR, J.: court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the
question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no
20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money
orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of
such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is
contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an
order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930
do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and
effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein
mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely
enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of
the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special
provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is
not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according
to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and
regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents
and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws
shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the
termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include
regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo
asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su
 12. TANADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326,
337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599,
644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193,
199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291,
293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726,
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742,
1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918,
1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538,
543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind
the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which
surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no
other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court
has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but
not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1
of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability;
[3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this
time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have
no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall"
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in
the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question
as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it
was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit
said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by
the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter
of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some
other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
 13. PEOPLE v. MACEREN
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO
AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:t.hqw
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San
Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo
colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or
other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or
equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of
the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of
Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under
Republic Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as
contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by
substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance"
in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than
five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: +.wph!1 Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS +.wph!1
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the
prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.+.wph!
1
SECTION 1. Definition. Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as follows:
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t
between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of
November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
(b) Electro Fishing. Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The equipment used are of many
electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current.
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in
any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. Penalty. Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five
hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the Court.
SEC. 4. Repealing Provisions. All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order
are hereby revoked.
SEC. 5. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days after its publication in the Office Gazette.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing
to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in
fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the
Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person
engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing
which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a
sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno,
L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that
municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the
Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's
order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See
People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law
which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken
because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing
by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of
the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the
provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the
purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3)
the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section
83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder "shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both, in the discretion of the court."
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under
Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words,
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3)
unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish
caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not
contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing
is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the
same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize
the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11
Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh
water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine
waters. That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized
merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh
water and salt water areas.
That decree provides: +.wph!1
SEC. 33. Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take
or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3
hereof: ...
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and
all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that
point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided
for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment
from two (2) to four (4) years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not
more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his
authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Mu;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko
vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil.
119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception
to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osme;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot
be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil.
419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-
28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12
C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March
vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law
provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and
proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised
Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the
development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he
may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working
and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict
enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or
orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and
Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the
rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the
statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a
surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a
public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to
outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58
SCRA 493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said
rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of technical men in the executive
departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend
to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a
statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions
of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the
authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature,
and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation
was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative
Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish
within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations
authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon
recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of
the Federal Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to
fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of
islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the
Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly
reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but
also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect".
Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law
already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only
the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58
Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an
express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the
authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the
authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and
enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or
compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof."

Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his
store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State
Game Commission.

It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking
body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or
modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered
by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 14. US v. PANLILIO
G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADRIANO PANLILIO, defendant-appellant.
Pedro Abad Santos for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga convicting the accused of a violation of the
law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
The information charges: "That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to the above-named accused
having been exposed to the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-
authorized agent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a corral in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Province of
Pampanga, P. I.; that, on said place, the said accused, Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to do, and
while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which
they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to another; that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and
agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them."
The defendant demurred to this information on the ground that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime. The demurrer was
overruled and the defendant duly excepted and pleaded not guilty.
From the evidence introduced by the prosecution on the trial of the cause it appears that the defendant was notified in writing on February
22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of
Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly
declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain
there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture.
It further appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them, from the quarantine in which
they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven
from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been quarantined.
The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No.
1760 or any portion thereof.
We are forced to agree with this contention.1awphil.net
The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed by the accused in that he ordered
and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on
his hacienda. An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been violated,
evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial.
The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of
them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into
the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the effects
pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it
shall be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or transport from one island, province,
municipality, township, or settlement to another any domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseased or to expose
such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come in contact with other domestic animals. Section 5
provides that whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island,
province, municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by shipping, driving or otherwise
transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality, township, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful
for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified from such locality except when
accompanied by a certificate issued by authority of the Director of Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be shipped,
driven, taken or transported, their destination, manner in which they are authorized to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their
brands and distinguishing marks.
A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within any of them. There is no question here of
importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in question were suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that
the Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said animals from
one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable
disease and that they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine,
had taken them from the corral and worked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one
municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there worked by the
servants of the accused.
The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable to the case at bar and also admits that
section 7 of said Act is not applicable. This section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in
quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at the place designated for
the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance. Should the owner or his agent fail to comply with this
requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and
attendance shall be collectible from the owner or his agent."
We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section, as we are with his opinion as to sections
3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so
phrased as to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which the refusal of
the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of
that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does
not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be
inflicted are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared unlawful by
the law.
The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar. Section 6 simply authorizes the
Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous
communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by
him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any
person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders
of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and
a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in
any way therein.
Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense stated in the information and proved upon the trial does not constitute a
violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It provides:

A fine of not less than fifteen and not more than seventy pesetas and censure shall be imposed upon: . . .

2. Any person who shall violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issued with reference to any epedemic disease
among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar plague.1awphil.net

It alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of agriculture had ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the
time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that
the accused, in violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated, broke the quarantine,
removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his plantation. We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the
Penal Code as above quoted. The fact that the information in its preamble charged a violation of act No. 1760 does not prevent us from
finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as follows: "The undersigned accuses
Adriano Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as follows:" Then follows the body of the information already quoted in this
opinion. We would not permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another, if the change
from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required of the defendant a different defense or surprised him in
any other way. The allegations required under Act No. 1760 include those required under article 581. The accused could have defended
himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581.

In the case of United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. Rep., 740), the information stating the facts upon which the charge was founded terminated
with his expression: "In violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission, in effect on the 6th of February, 1902."

In the resolution of this case the Supreme Court found that the facts set forth in the information and proved on the trial did not constitute a
violation of section 315 of Act No. 355 as alleged in the information, but did constitute a violation of article 387 in connection with article
383 of the Penal Code, and accordingly convicted the accused under those articles and sentenced him to the corresponding penalty.

In that case the court said: "The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible witnesses who heard and saw
everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection
with article 383 of the Penal Code, has been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of Act
No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same recites facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute
the crime of bribery as defined and punished in the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code." (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. vs.
Jeffrey, 15 Phil. Rep., 391; U. S. vs. Guzman, 25 Phil. Rep., 22.)

The accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of
seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered.
 15. PEOPLE v. SANTOS
28. Prohibited fishing areas. No boats licensed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 4003 and this order to catch, collect,
G.R. No. L-44291 August 15, 1936 gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of
the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of the United States,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles
vs. Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance:
AUGUSTO A. SANTOS, defendant-appellee. Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above only upon
receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellant. recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned.
Arsenio Santos for appellee.
A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The above quoted provisions of Administrative, Order No. 2 were issued by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, now
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the prosecuting attorney from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 which reads as follows:
which reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall from time to time issue
ORDER such instructions, orders, rules and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions
thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions.
When this case was called for trial for the arraignment, counsel for the accused appeared stating that in view of the ruling laid down by
this court in criminal case No. 6785 of this court, holding that the penalty applicable is under section 83 of Act No. 4003 which falls within The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor
the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court he requests that the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Cavite launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the
which conducted the preliminary investigation, so that the latter may try it, being within its original jurisdiction. Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
We agree that it falls within the jurisdiction of the corresponding justice of the peace court, but it being alleged in the information that the
infraction was committed within the waters of the Island of Corregidor, the competent justice of the peace court is that of Corregidor, not These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above quoted, which reads as follows:
Cavite.
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above (within 3
Wherefore, we decree the dismissal of this case, cancelling the bond filed by the accused, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to the kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United
filing by the prosecuting attorney of a new information in the justice of the peace court of Corregidor, if he so deems convenient. It is so States, particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of
ordered. Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities of concerned. (Emphasis supplied.)

In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the sole alleged error committed by the court a quo its having dismissed the case on the
ground that it does not fall within its original jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1930, the provincial fiscal of Cavite filed against the accused -appellee Augusta A. Santos an information which reads as
follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Augusta A. Santos of violation of section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 and
penalized by section 29 thereof committed as follows:
That on or about April 29, 1935, within 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point, Corregidor Island, Province of Cavite, P.I., the said accused
Augusta A. Santos, the registered owner of two fishing motor boats Malabon II and Malabon III, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally have his said boats, manned and operated by his fishermen, fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce within three (3) kilometers from the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which the naval and military
authorities of the United States exercise jurisdiction.
Contrary to law.
Cavite, Cavite, June 18, 1935.
Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of
islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only
authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such
instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions
thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no
provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional
clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been
and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National
Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said
conditional clause is null and void and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; U.S. vs.
Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2.
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory
power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be
delegated to him.

Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, provides as
follows:
Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of
some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.
 16. SEC v. LPG REFILLERS
1st Offense - Reprimand
G.R. No. 159149 June 26, 2006
2nd Offense - Fine of P500.00
The HONORABLE SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Energy, Petitioner,
vs. 3rd Offense - Fine of P1,000.00
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT
DECISION SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CIRCULAR)

QUISUMBING, J.: A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision1 and Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, 1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, which nullified Circular No. 2000-06-010 of the Department of Energy (DOE).
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
The facts are undisputed.
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of
petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) B. Dealer
cylinders.3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4
1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to implement B.P. Blg. 33, thus:
2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
SECTION 4. NO PRICE DISPLAY BOARD
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
LPG Marketer/LPG Dealer/LPG Retail Outlet
C. LPG Retail Outlet
1st Offense - Reprimand/warning letter
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Recommend suspension of business operation to the proper local government unit
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit and initiate criminal proceedings
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 5. NO WEIGHING SCALE
SECTION 7. NO APPROPRIATE OR AUTHORIZED LPG SEAL
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer
1st Offense - Fine of P5,000
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000
2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
B. Dealer
B. Dealer
1st Offense - Fine of P3,000
1st Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
2nd Offense - Fine of P7,000
2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
C. LPG Retail Outlet
C. LPG Retail Outlet
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
C. LPG RETAIL OUTLET
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder
3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder
SECTION 8. NO TRADE NAME, UNBRANDED LPG CYLINDERS, NO SERIAL NUMBER, NO DISTINGUISHING COLOR, NO
EMBOSSED IDENTIFYING MARKINGS ON CYLINDER OR DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN (REQUIREMENT ON SERIAL 3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
NUMBER AND DISTINCTIVE COLLAR OR DESIGN SHALL TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS
CIRCULAR) SECTION 10. TAMPERING, ALTERING, OR MODIFYING OF LPG CYLINDER THRU ANY MEANS SUCH AS BUT NOT LIMITED TO
CHANGING THE VALVE, REPAINTING, AND RELABELLING BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE LEGITIMATE AND
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SAME. FOR THIS PURPOSE, LPG REFILLER, MARKETER, DEALER, OR RETAIL OUTLET, AS THE
CASE MAY BE, WHO HAS POSSESSION OF SUCH ILLEGALLY TAMPERED, ALTERED, OR OTHERWISE MODIFIED LPG
1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder CYLINDER SHALL BE HELD LIABLE FOR THIS OFFENSE

2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder A. LPG Refiller/Marketer

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit 1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

B. Dealer 2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder 3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder B. Dealer

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit 1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

C. LPG Retail Outlet 2nd Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

1st Offense - Fine of P1,000 for each cylinder 3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

2nd Offense - Fine of P2,000 for each cylinder C. LPG Retail Outlet

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit 1st Offense - Fine of P1,500 for each cylinder

SECTION 9. UNDERFILLED LPG CYLINDERS 2nd Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder

A. LPG REFILLER/MARKETER 3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

1st Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder SECTION 11. UNAUTHORIZED DECANTING OR REFILLING OF LPG CYLINDERS

2nd Offense - Fine of P6,000 for each cylinder 1st Offense - Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder

3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit 2nd Offense - Fine of P10,000 for each cylinder

B. DEALER 3rd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit

1st Offense - Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder SECTION 12. HOARDING OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS INCLUDING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS

2nd Offense - Fine of P4,000 for each cylinder 1st Offense - Fine of P10,000 per cylinder

2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit plus the filing of appropriate criminal action
SECTION 13. REFUSAL TO ALLOW OR COOPERATE WITH DULY AUTHORIZED INSPECTORS OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY
ADMINISTRATION BUREAU (EIAB) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR
INSPECTION/INVESTIGATION, WHETHER REGULAR AND ROUTINARY OR COMPLAINT-INITIATED
1st Offense - Fine of P10,000
2nd Offense - Recommend business closure to the proper local government unit
SECTION 14. REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PAY FINE The Department of Energy shall recommend to the proper local government unit
the closure of business of a respondent who refuses or fails to pay any administrative fine without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate
criminal action if warranted.5
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE,
however, denied the request for lack of merit.
Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the trial court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law.6 The
court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty
under the law. The decretal part of its Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular No. 2000-06-010 null and void and prohibits the
respondent from implementing the same.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition, raising the following issues:
I We resolve to grant the petition.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "A CLOSE SCRUTINY OF BP 33, PD 1865 AND R.A.
NO. 8479 SHOWS THAT OFFENSES LIKE NO PRICE DISPLAY [BOARD], NO WEIGHING SCALE, ETC. SET FORTH IN THE
CIRCULAR ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR IN ANY OF THE THREE (3) LAWS".
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "A SCRUTINY OF THE NEW SET OF PENALTIES
PROVIDED BY THE CIRCULAR SHOWS THAT THE PENALTIES THIS TIME ARE BASED ON PER CYLINDER BASIS"; THAT "BEING
SUCH, NO CEILING WAS PROVIDED FOR AS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINES"; THAT "AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE PETITIONER,
FOR JUST ONE LPG CYLINDER FOUND VIOLATING AT LEAST SEC[TIONS] 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 AND 11 OF THE [CIRCULAR], A FINE OF
P24,000.00 IS IMPOSED;" AND THAT "THIS WILL CLEARLY BE BEYOND THE P10,000.00 PROVIDED BY THE LAWS."
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 16 OF PETITIONERS CIRCULAR WHICH
AUTHORIZES THE IMPOSITION OF PECUNIARY PENALTIES WITH THE TOTAL FINE NOT EXCEEDING P20,000.00 FOR RETAIL
OUTLETS VIOLATES THE PENALTY CEILING OF P10,000.00 SET UNDER BP BLG. 33, AS AMENDED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE SECTION 5(g) OF R.A. 7638 FINDS NO
REFERENCE IN DOE CIRCULAR NO. 2000-06-010, THE SAME SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "ON THE NEW OFFENSES INTRODUCED IN THE
CIRCULAR SUCH AS SECTIONS 4, 5, 10, 13 AND 14 AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE GRADUATED PENALTIES ON A PER
CYLINDER BASIS, THIS COURT FINDS [NO] REASON TO DISTURB ITS FINDINGS THAT RESPONDENT-MOVANT EXCEEDED ITS
AUTHORITY. X X X IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT BP BLG. 33 AS AMENDED AND P.D. 1865 ARE CRIMINAL STATUTES AND
MUST BE CONSTRUED WITH SUCH STRICTNESS AS TO CAREFULLY SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT."
VI
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE ASSAILED CIRCULAR SETS NO MAXIMUM LIMIT AS TO
THE FINE THAT MAY BE IMPOSED ON AN ERRING PERSON OR ENTITY TO WHICH FACT MOVANT CONCEDES. FOR ONE (1)
CYLINDER ALONE, NOT ONLY DOES THE CIRCULAR MAKE THE FINE EXCESSIVE TO THE EXTENT OF BEING CONFISCATORY,
BUT IT EVEN IMPOSES A PENALTY WHICH MAY EVEN GO BEYOND THAT MAXIMUM IMPOSABLE FINE OF P50,000.00 SET BY
P.D. 1865 IN ITS SEC. 4 AFTER A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING."8
To our mind, the issue raised by petitioner may be reduced to the sole issue of whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasig erred in
declaring the provisions of the Circular null and void, and prohibiting the Circulars implementation.
Petitioner argues that the penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by Sections 19 and 3-A10 of
B.P. Blg. 33 and Section 2311 of Republic Act No. 8479.12 Petitioner adds that Sections 5(g)13 and 2114 of Republic Act No. 763815 also
authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular.
Respondent counters that the enabling laws, B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479, do not expressly penalize the acts and omissions
enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638, respondent claims, since the said law does not pertain to
LPG traders. Respondent maintains that the Circular is not in conformity with the law it seeks to implement.
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative
regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute
itself.16
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and
overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the
Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing
scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial
number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and
unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which
seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty
for any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the
Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000,17 an amount within the range allowed by law. However, for the
refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not
amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder
basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of DOE is declared valid. The Decision and Order of the
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and prohibiting its implementation are
minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative
and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum SO ORDERED.
products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to protect
the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.