LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

COMELEC

Facts:

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on
24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution
reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills
containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo failed to sign them.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local
Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Held: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause

Ratio:

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locallygenerated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance,
of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.

The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time
of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income.
 Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption
from the increased income requirement.

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to
all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities,
while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if
it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause.

[G. R. No. 154614. November 25, 2004]

THE CITY OF ILOILO, Represented by HON. JERRY P. TREAS, City Mayor, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE EMILIO
LEGASPI, Presiding Judge, RTC, Iloilo City, Branch 22, and HEIRS OF MANUELA YUSAY, Represented by
SYLVIA YUSAY DEL ROSARIO and ENRIQUE YUSAY, JR., respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order, the City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas, seeks the nullification and/or modification of the
Order dated 05 June 2002 of Honorable Emilio Legaspi, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Iloilo City,
denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the courts Order dated 15 April 2002, holding in abeyance the resolution of the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession until after it shall have rested its case.
The factual antecedents are the following:
On 07 March 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037
granting authority to its City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of
Manuela Yusay, located at Barangay Sto. Nio Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City. The regulation ordinance was approved by then
City Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor.[1]
On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario,
Administratrix of the estate of Manuela Yusay, making a formal offer to purchase their property known as Cadastral Lot
No. 935 with an area of 85,320 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-67506 of the Registry of
Deeds of Iloilo City for P250 per square meter for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor
and landless residents of the city in line with the citys housing development program. [2]
In a letter dated 26 June 2001, Mayor Malabor informed Administrators Sylvia Y. del Rosario and Enrique Yusay, Jr.
that their counter-proposal to the Citys proposal to purchase Lot No. 935 was not acceptable to the City Government,
particularly to the City Council, which insisted that an expropriation case be filed per SP Resolution No. 01-445. With their
apparent refusal to sell the property, the City terminated further proceedings on the matter. [3]
Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas, filed an Amended Complaint [4] for Eminent Domain
against private respondents Heirs of Manuela Yusay, represented by Sylvia Yusay del Rosario and Enrique Yusay, Jr.
[5]
The subject of the same is Lot No. 935 of the Cadastral Survey of Arevalo covered by TCT No. T-67506.
Private respondents filed an Answer,[6] dated 25 September 2001, to which petitioner filed a Reply,[7] dated 19
October 2001.
On 23 October 2001, private respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and
Affirmative Defenses they have raised in the Answer.[8] Petitioner opposed[9] the motion to which private respondents filed
a Reply.[10]
In an Order dated 04 February 2002, public respondent Hon. Emilio B. Legaspi, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, found the motion to be in order and meritorious, and the grounds of the opposition to be
untenable; thus, he set the case for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses. [11]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration[12] of the order which private respondents opposed.[13]
On 01 April 2002, public respondent set the case for Pre-Trial after Atty. Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, counsel for
private respondents, manifested she was withdrawing the Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
Defenses. Petitioner did not interpose any objection. [14]
On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has deposited with
the Court the amount of P2,809,696.50 representing fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property sought
to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration, it may immediately take possession of the property in accordance
with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160.[15]
 On 15 April 2002, public respondent issued an Order with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Benedicto is given ten (10) days from today within which to file an
Opposition to the pending Motion For Issuance of Writ of Possession, furnishing copy of the same to plaintiffs counsel
who has the same period to file a Reply.

Parties agreed that the Court will resolve the Motion For Issuance of Writ of Possession after the plaintiffs shall have
rested their case after the trial on the merits.[16]

Private respondents filed their Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession [17] to which petitioner filed
a Reply.[18]
On 09 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the lower court reconsider its order of 15
April 2002, and to consider its Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession submitted for resolution after the filing of its Reply
to private respondents Opposition to the motion. Citing the case of Robern Development Corp. v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain,
et al.,[19] it maintains there is no need for a hearing before the Honorable Court can grant [its] Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Possession.[20]
Private respondents filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Rejoinder to Reply to Opposition.
They vehemently opposed the motion arguing that counsels of the parties had agreed that the lower court will resolve the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession after petitioner shall have rested its case after trial on the merits. They added
that in view of the defects as to form and substance of the amended complaint, the issuance of a writ of possession
ceases to be a ministerial duty on the court; hence, there is a need for a court hearing. [21]
On 05 June 2002, the assailed order was issued, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and resolution of the Motion for Writ of
Possession is hereby held in abeyance until further orders from this Court. [22]

Hence, this petition.

The petition raises the following alleged errors of the lower court:

A. THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED MAY 9, 2002 AS CONTAINED IN ITS
ORDER OF JUNE 5, 2002, AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF
POSSESSION BE RESOLVED AFTER HEREIN PETITIONER HAS CONVINCED THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAS A
MERITORIOUS CASE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, DESPITE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2, RULE 67 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND DESPITE THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ROBERN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, ET AL.

B. THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ORDER OF JUNE 5, 2002 WHICH IN EFFECT UPHELD THE CONTENTION OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION FILED BY HEREIN
PETITIONER IS NOT SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE, HENCE THE LATTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION.[23]

As to its Amended Complaint, petitioner maintains that the same is sufficient in form and substance since it has
complied with Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code) and Section 1, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. It explains that since public respondent has ordered the parties to proceed with the Pre-Trial
Conference and trial of the case, it can be concluded that the Amended Complaint is sufficient in form and substance.
In compliance with Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code, petitioner says it deposited the amount of
P2,809,696.50 with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, which is equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of
the property sought to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. It further argues that in the cases of Robern
Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus Quitain, et al.,[24] and Salvador Biglang-Awa v. Hon. Judge Marciano I. Bacalla,
et al.,[25] the duty to issue a Writ of Possession becomes a ministerial duty upon the trial court without necessity of a
hearing once the provisional deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 [26] has been complied with.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that there was nothing for the lower court to reconsider because the
order dated 15 April 2002 which was dictated in open court, and which petitioner sought to be reconsidered, was already
final (on 30 April 2002) when the latter filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 09 May 2002. Second, they insist that
petitioner is estopped to change its position with respect to the immediate issuance of the writ of possession. The
agreement entered into is binding and is the law between the parties and should be accorded respect since it was
approved by public respondent. Third, they claim there is waiver on the part of petitioner to ask for the immediate
possession of Lot No. 935 since it took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended
Complaint, and nine (9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of the Original Complaint before it filed the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession. Moreover, they assert that there is a need for a court hearing before a writ of possession
can be issued, because the amended complaint is being assailed before the lower court for not being sufficient in form
and substance. Finally, they aver that the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ministerial when the complaint
for expropriation fails to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for purposes of socialized housing as interpreted in the cases ofFilstream International Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals, et al.[27]
 In its Reply, petitioner avers that the order of 15 April 2002 became final only after fifteen (15) days from the time the
same was received by it on 26 April 2002, and not fifteen (15) days from the time the order was made in open court on 15
April 2002.
Petitioner argues that there is nothing in the rules which prohibits it from reversing its position with respect to the
issuance of the writ of possession in light of Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which allows taking
immediate possession of property sought to be expropriated upon compliance with said section. Further, it adds that its
stand to seek immediate possession of the property is supported by the Robern and Biglang-awa cases.
It insists that there is no waiver or estoppel on its part. There is no provision of law which sets a time limit within
which to file a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. It reiterated that the sufficiency of the form and substance of
the Amended Complaint can be determined and resolved by the lower court through an examination of the allegations
contained therein and if the same complies with the requisites set forth in Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 and Section 1
of Rule 67.[28] Thus, there is no necessity of a trial before the lower court can resolve the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
Finally, it argues that the Filstream[29] cases are not applicable. It adds that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7279 which
private respondents allege as not to have been complied with are not conditions precedent for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain.
We first rule on the issue of whether the Order dated 15 April 2002, which was dictated in open court, was already
final when petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 09 May 2002. Petitioner maintains that the motion for
reconsideration was filed before the order became final fifteen (15) days from the time it received a copy thereof in writing,
and not from the time the same was dictated in open court as claimed by private respondents.
Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order, whether final or interlocutory,
has juridical existence until and unless it is set in writing, signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the
Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not
bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so
even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up
and signed and/or a copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party.[30]
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was filed before the 15 April 2002 order became
final. The order dictated in open court had no juridical existence before it is set in writing, signed, promulgated and served
on the parties. Since the order orally pronounced in court had no juridical existence yet, the period within which to file a
motion for reconsideration cannot be reckoned therefrom, but from the time the same was received in writing. Petitioner
had fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the written order on 26 April 2002 within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, when it filed the motion for reconsideration on 09 May 2002, the said motion was timely filed.
Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being a local government unit, the basis
for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit:

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined
by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. [31] Upon compliance with these requirements, the
issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial.[32]
In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the Amended Complaint it filed complies with both requisites, thus entitling it
to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance thereof becoming ministerial on the part of the lower court
even without any hearing. On the other hand, private respondents allege that the Amended Complaint is not sufficient in
form and substance since it failed to allege compliance with the mandatory requirements for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain for purposes of socialized housing.
Section 1 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure reads:

Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall
state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be
expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part hereof or interest
therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be
expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners,
averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint.

The Court finds the Amended Complaint sufficient in form and substance, and the amount of P2,809,696.50
deposited with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo is equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) [33] of the fair market value of the
property sought to be expropriated per current tax declaration.
 On the averment of private respondents that the Amended Complaint failed to allege compliance with the mandatory
requirements[34] for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for purposes of socialized housing as interpreted in
the Filstream cases, it appears that the Amended Complaint did contain allegations showing compliance therewith.
[35]
However, whether there is, indeed, compliance with these requirements, the Court deems it not proper to resolve the
issue at this time. Hearing must be held to establish compliance.
In City of Manila v. Serrano,[36] this Court ruled that hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner
indeed complied with the requirements provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination of this question must await
the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be
expropriated. From the foregoing, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance with the
requirements for socialized housing has been made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to determine if a writ of
possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the requirements for socialized housing.
For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of the
complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The
sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere examination of the
allegations of the complaint. In this case, the sufficiency of the Amended Complaint was further confirmed by public
respondent when he set the case for pre-trial and hearing.
We likewise find private respondents claim that petitioner cannot change its position regarding the immediate
issuance of the writ of possession on the ground of estoppel, to be untenable.
First, estoppel may be successfully invoked only if the party fails to raise the question in the early stages of the
proceedings.[37] In the case before us, petitioner, through its counsel, undeniably committed a mistake when it agreed that
the resolution of its Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession be made by public respondent after a hearing is conducted
and after it has adduced its evidence. To remedy this, petitioner immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The filing
thereof was precisely for the purpose of rectifying the error it committed. With the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration, petitioner cannot be held in estoppel because it right away asked the court to nullify the agreement it
entered into. The filing of the motion for reconsideration which was done at the earliest possible time clearly negates the
presence of estoppel.
Second, under the facts of the case, estoppel should not apply because petitioner is simply following the procedure
laid down by the rules and jurisprudence. Under Section 19 [38] of Rep. Act No. 7160 (law governing exercise of eminent
domain by local government units [LGU]) and Section 2 [39] of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (law
governing exercise of eminent domain by entities other than LGUs), and in the cases of Robern Development Corporation
v. Quitain, et al., and Biglang-awa v. Bacalla, et al., a prior hearing is not required before a writ of possession can be
issued. As above discussed, a complaint, sufficient in form and substance, and the required deposit, are the only
requirements before a writ of possession can be issued. Thus, petitioner should not be prevented from changing and
correcting its position when the same is in accord with the rules and jurisprudence.
Private respondents argue that petitioner waived its right to ask for the immediate possession of Lot No. 935 since it
took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine (9) months and
thirteen (13) days from the filing of the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.
Petitioner did not waive its right. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time limit as to when a local
government may immediately take possession of the real property. Said section provides that the local government unit
may take immediate possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its current tax declaration. As
long as the expropriation proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local government unit
cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of possession.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of respondent judge in Civil Case No. 01-
26801 dated 05 June 2002 and 15 April 2002 are set aside. Respondent Judge is directed to issue the writ of possession
prayed for and to continue hearing the case. No costs.

VIRGILIO S. VELAZCO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CAVITE,Petitioners, vs. EMILIA S. BLAS, CONRADO
SAYAS and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH IV, TAGAYTAY CITY, respondents.

Francisco Carreon and Renato E. Taada for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
Martin D. Pantaleon and Mario C. Lorenzo for respondents.ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, penned by then Judge, now Court of Appeals
Justice Jose C. Colayco. The appeal involves purely questions of law and was filed pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.
5440.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts gathered from the decision sought to be reviewed are the following chanrobles virtual law library

Resolution No. 3, series of 1968, of the Municipal Council of Silang, Cavite, authorized Emilia S. Blas to operate a
cinema. Because the cinema would be near the medical clinic of Dr. Virgilio S. Velazco, the resolution expressly prohibited
the installation and use of any loudspeaker or any similar device that would make the sound audible outside the theater.
The resolution also stipulated that violation of the prohibition or other conditions imposed for the operation of the cinema
would constitute sufficient ground for the revocation of the permit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After receiving official advice of the resolution and having paid the building permit, Blas started construction of the cinema
on March 3, 1968. However, on March 14, 1968, the Provincial Board of Cavite, upon representations made by Dr.
Velazco, approved Resolution No. 68 which declared Resolution No. 3 aforementioned null and void on the ground that it
was contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 1224.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Blas asked the Provincial Board to reconsider Resolution No. 68 but her request was denied. And because Blas continued
with the construction of the cinema notwithstanding the action of the Provincial Board, it passed Resolution No. 80
advising the Mayor of Silang to stop the construction. He did not succeed so Dr. Velazco filed an action in the trial court to
declare the operation of the cinema illegal and to stop its construction because (1) the noise produced by the construction
was harmful to the patients of the clinic and (2) the operation of the cinema contravenes the provisions of R.A. No.
1224.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After holding that the operation of the cinema does not contravene R.A. No. 1224, that the failure of Blas to appeal the
action of the Provincial Board to the Office of the President of the Philippines did not make it final and binding upon her,
and that the noise from the construction was not a nuisance, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, the present
appeal which poses questions of law only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant claims that the trial court committed the following errors: chanrobles virtual law library

1. In holding that a movie theater is not a place of amusement similar to those enumerated in R.A. No. 1224 and is
consequently not a nuisance; chanrobles virtual law library

2. In holding that Resolution No. 68 was ultra vires and so it was not necessary for private respondents to exhaust
administrative remedies; chanrobles virtual law library

3. In declaring Resolution No. 3 valid even after the provincial board had declared it void and despite private respondents'
failure to appeal to the Office of the President; and chanrobles virtual law library

4. In not ordering private respondents to pay attorney's fees and the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The appeal has no merit and must perforce be dismiss.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The first assignment of error deserves scant consideration. With regard thereto, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1224 provides the
following: chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 1. The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city and the municipal council of each municipality and
municipal district shall have the power to regulate or prohibit by ordinance the establishment, maintenance or operation of
night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar
places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction; Provided, however, that no such places of amusement mentioned
herein shall be established, maintained and/or operated within a radius of two hundred lineal meters in the case of night
clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places, and fifty lineal meters in the case of dancing schools, bars, saloons,
billard pools, bowling alleys, or other similar places, ... from any public building, schools, hospitals and churches ...

We agree with the trial court for the reasons it has given that the cinema of the private respondents which is about 40
meters away from the petitioner's clinic, does not fall within the ambit of the above-quoted statute. Thus the trial court
said: chanrobles virtual law library

The reason of the law in regulating the establishment of the places enumerated in section 1, above, may be deduced from
the nature of the activities taking place therein. Admittedly, they detract from the quiet and sober atmosphere which is
expected to prevail around public buildings, schools, hospitals and churches. The night clubs, cabarets, bars and saloons
are known sources of boisterous behavior because of the drinks dispensed in such places, while the dancing schools,
cockpits and bowling alleys are open places of noisy amusement because of the loud music in the case of dancing halls,
the roar -and the shouting in the cockpits and the continuous rumble in the bowling alleys. None of these conditions are
present in the case of a movie-house. To include this form of entertainment by analogy would constitute an unreasonable
extension of the context and intent of the law. Movies have been one of the most, if not the most, popular forms of public
entertainment in this country for more than thirty years. It is safe to assume therefore that if the legislators intended to
include them among the regulated forms, they would have done so expressly.

The trial court held that Resolution No. 68 of the Provincial Board of Cavite is null and void because it is beyond the
powers granted to the board by Sec. 2233 of the Revised Administrative Code which reads: chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 2233. Provincial board to pass on legality of municipal proceedings. - Upon receiving copies or resolutions and
ordinances passed by municipal councils and of executive orders promulgated by mayors, the provincial board shall
examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial fiscal, whose duty it shall thereupon become to examine the
same promptly and inform the provincial board of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein, and make
such other comment or criticism as shag appear to him pro. per.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If the board should in any case find that any resolution, ordinance, or order, as aforesaid, is beyond the powers conferred
upon the council or mayor making the same, it shall declare such resolution, ordinance, or order invalid, entering its action
upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such action shall be to annul the
resolution, ordinance, or order in question, subject to action by the Secretary of the Interior as hereinafter provided.

We agree with the trial court that the resolution of the Provincial Board in question suffers from a fatal legal infirmity. For it
is manifest that the municipal council has the power to authorize and regulate the operation of cinemas, not by virtue of
R.A. No. 1224 but pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by Chapter 57, Article IX of the Revised Administrative Code.
Upon the other hand, the only power granted to the provincial board by Sec. 2233 of the same Code is to declare a
municipal council issuance void on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the municipal council to issue. Thus this
Court has held.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when
such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same."
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its
consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or
order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal
powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal
council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority (Opinions Attorney-General Wilfley
[1905], II Op. Atty. Gen. 557, 642; Opinion Attorney-General Villamor [1910], V Op. Atty. Gen. 382; Opinion Attorney-
General Villa- Real, November 22, 1922; Opinion Attorney-General Jaranilla, August 9, 1926; Provincial Circular Executive
Bureau, September 16, 1918). (Gabriel vs- Provincial Board of Pampanga, 50 Phil. 686, 692-3 [1927]; see also Carino vs.
Jamoralne, 56 Phil. 188 [1931] and Manantan vs. Municipality of Luna, 82 Phil. 844 [1949].)

Viewed in the light of the foregoing doctrine, Resolution No. 68 is indeedultra vires.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The petitioner contends that the private respondents should have exhausted admynistrative remedies by appealing the
action of the provincial board to the Office of the President. This argument can be briefly dismissed as follows:chanrobles
virtual law library

(1) Sec. 2233 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for an appeal to the Office of the President from an
action of the provincial board is one that is available to the municipal council but not to the private respondents as in the
case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition before a litigant may resort to the courts is inapplicable in this
case because it is the petitioner and not the private respondents who initiated the
litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(3) The issue before the trial court, as before Us, is a purely legal one in which case there is no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. (Tapales vs. President, L-17523, march 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 553; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-
21897, 9 SCRA 230.) chanrobles virtual law library

(4) Resolution No. 68 is patently illegal because it was passed in excess of jurisdiction and in such a case exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not necessary. (Gonzales vs. Hechanova, supra.) chanrobles virtual law library

In his third assignment of error, the petitioner claims that the trial court erred in declaring Resolution No. 3 valid even after
the provincial board had it void and despite private respondents' failure to appeal to the Office of the President. The
petitioner has not correctly understood the decision under review; the trial court did not declare Resolution No. 3 valid.
This is what the trial court said: chanrobles virtual law library

The plaintiff argues however that the court has no power to declare the municipal resolution in question valid, after it has
been declared invalid by the Provincial Board, relying on section 2236 of the Rev. Administrative Code. The argument
misses the point. The issue in this aspect of the case is not the validity of the resolution of the municipal council of Silang,
but the validity of the resolution of the Provincial Board. The Court has already ruled that the Board resolution is null and
void because it is ultra vires. The law does not require the approval of the Provincial Board for the validity of municipal
ordinances or resolutions. It only authorizes the Board to declare them invalid if in excess of its powers (Mendoza, Santos,
& Co. v. Municipality of Meycawayan, G. R. No. L-6069, April 30, 1954; Suarez v. Santos, 51 O.G. 132). Having declared
the action of the Board null and void, therefore, the Court does not have to declare the municipal-council resolution valid.
It is valid by operation of law. (Suarez vs. Santos, 51 O.G. 132).
On a purely legal point of view, the courts are vested with the power to determine the validity of municipal proceedings
despite a previous determination by the provincial board. Thus Sec. 2236 of the Revised Administrative Code
stipulates: chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 2236. Judicial authority to determine validity of municipal proceedings. - Nothing contained in either of the three last
preceding sections hereof shag be construed to deprive any judicial tribunal to hold void for want of statutory authority any
act, ordinance, or resolution of a municipal council or executive order of a mayor the validity of which shall be involved in
any cause arising before such tribunal, without respect to the decision of the executive authorities.

This Court in the Gabriel and Cario cases, supra, validated municipal ordinances which had been annulled by the
provincial board.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The last assignment of error which is merely resultant of the previous ones has to
fail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismiss for lack of merit. No special pronouncement as to

costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez,
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Makasiar, J., concur in the result.

chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. A cine or motion picture theater is not among the places of amusement subject to the distance requirements
specified in Republic Act No. 938, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 979 and 1224. That law mentions nightclubs,
cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys and billiard pools as places of amusement
which should not be operated in close proximity to any public building, schools,hospitals and churches.chanrobles virtual
law library

Consequently, the operation of the moviehouse of Emilia S. Blas near a medical clinic is not covered by Republic Act No.
938.chanrobles virtual law library

The provincial board resolution advising the town mayor to stop the construction of the said cine is illegal. The resolution
of the municipal council authorizing such construction is lawful although unnecessary.

G.R. No. L-4060 August 29, 1952

DR. ESTEBAN MEDINA, DR. JOSE DE LA ROSA, MR. ENRIQUE SANTAMARIA, and BENGUET DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
CITY OF BAGUIO, defendant-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Baguio seeking to nullify Ordinances Nos. 62, 99 and 100 of
the City Council of Baguio on the ground that they were enacted without authority or power, and are oppressive, unjust
and unreasonable, and to recover the taxes and fees they had paid as itemized in the complaint.

Esteban Medina is the owner and operator of Pines Theater, a duly licensed movie houses in the City of Baguio. Jose Y.
de la Rosa is the owner and operator of Plaza Theater, another duly licensed movie house in the city. Enrique Santamaria
is the owner and operator under a contract of lease of Session Theater, also a duly licensed movie houses in said city,
while Benguet Development Co., Inc., is an operator of a gasoline station engaged in selling gasoline, petroleum and
imported oil products within the city.

Under Ordinance No. 99, Esteban Medina paid under protest a municipal license for 1949 for two quarters in the amount
of P1,200, and Jose Y. de la Rosa paid under protest a municipal license for the same year in the amount of P1,800 for
three quarters. Under Ordinance No. 62, Esteban Medina paid an additional tax of P4,896.60 during the months of July,
August, September and November, 1949. Enrique Santamaria also paid an additional tax of P1,855.05 during the months
of July and August of the same year. The Benguet Development Co., Inc., on the other hand, paid under Ordinance No.
100 the amount of P3,554.44 as specific tax for gasoline and oil sold from September 20, 1948, to November 17, 1949.

After trial, the court rendered decision declaring Ordinances Nos. 99 and 100 valid and legal but rendering Ordinance No.
62 null and void while denying the claim of the plaintiffs for reimbursement of the different amounts paid by them under
protest to the City of Baguio, without special pronouncement as to costs. From this decision only the plaintiffs appealed
assigning from errors as committed by the lower court.
The first question to be determined refers to the validity of Ordinance No. 99 which fixes the license fees to be paid by
persons, entities or corporations which may engage in business within the city of Baguio. This ordinance fixes a license
fee of P120 a year for every gasoline station installed in the city, and a fee of P2,400 for theaters which come under class
"A", P1,800 for those coming under class "B", and P1,200 for those coming under class "C". Plaintiffs paid the fees
required by this Ordinance, but now dispute the power of the city to enact it, contending that it only has the power to
impose a license fee but not to levy a tax upon theaters and gasoline stations which are operated within its limits. They
contend that, while this ordinance expressly recites that its purpose is to fix ore impose a license fee on the business or
trade therein specified, in fact its purpose is to levy a tax for purposes of revenue under the guise of a license fee. This,
they contend, defendants cannot do.

This contention has no merit. Appellants apparently have in mind section 2553, paragraph (c) of the revised Administrative
Code, which empowers the city of Baguio merely to impose a license fee for purpose of regulating the business that may
be established in the city. The power as thus conferred is indeed limited, as it does not include the power to levy a tax. But
on July 15, 1948, Republic Act No. 329 was enacted amending the charter of said city and adding to its power to license
the power to tax and to regulate. And it is precisely having in view this amendment that Ordinance No. 99 was approved in
order to increase the revenues of the city. In our opinion, the amendment above adverted to empowers the city council not
only to impose a license fee but also to levy a tax for purposes of revenue, more on when in amending section 2553(b),
the phrase "as provided by law" has been removed by section 2 of Republic Act No. 329. The city council of Baguio
therefore, has now the power to tax, to license and to regulate provided that the subjects affected be one of those
included in the charter, In this sense, the ordinance under consideration cannot be considered ultra vires whether its
purpose to be levy a tax or impose a license fee. The terminology used as if no consequence.

Coming now to Ordinance No. 100, we find that its validity is assailed not only because of lack of power to enact it but
also because of lack of power to enact it but also because it impose a specific tax on some articles which, it is claimed, is
not contemplated by law.

We have already stated that under its charter, as amended, the city of Baguio has now the power not only to levy it also a
specific tax on items or articles covered by the business of the taxpayer? After an examination of section 2553 of the
revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 329, we are inclined to uphold the negative view.

It is settled that a municipal corporation, unlike a sovereign state, is clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The
charter or statue must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. And the power
when granted is to be construed strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that
power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions all these have no place in the
interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation (Joseph Icard vs. City Council of Baguio and the City of
Baguio, 83 Phil., 870).

An examination of section 2553 (c), of the revised Administrative Code, as amended, will reveal that the power given to
the city of Baguio to tax, to license and to regulate only refers to the business of the taxpayer and not to the articles used
in said business. This is clearly inferred from a reading of said section and from the concluding sentence appearing
therein, to wit, "and such other businesses, trade and occupations as may be established or practised in the city". One
reason for this undoubtedly is the fact that under section 142 of the Internal Revenue Code (Commonwealth Act No. 466,
as amended by Republic Act No. 39), most of the products mentioned in the charter, particularly gasoline and oil, are
already specifically taxed, and under section 361 of said code, the city of Baguio gets a share of 20 per cent of the
amount of specific tax collected. At any rate, the charter of the city of Baguio does not show plainly an intent to confer that
power upon the city of Baguio and, following the rule already adverted to, this doubt or ambiguity must be resolved
against the city. An indication of the legislative intent on this matter is Commonwealth Act No. 472 which confers general
authority upon municipal councils to levy taxes, subjects to certain limitations, wherein it was specifically provided that the
general authority so conferred shall not include "percentage taxes and taxes on specified articles". In other words, the
power to levy a percentage tax or a specific tax has been expressly withheld. It is, therefore, our considered opinion that
Ordinance No. 100 is ultra vires and has no force and effect.

With respect to Ordinance No. 62, the lower court declared it null and void and from this part of the decision no appeal
has been taken. That finding should be left undisturbed. As to whether appellants can collect the additional amounts they
charged the public under the ordinance, the lower court said: "The amount collected from the theater goers as additional
price of admission tickets is not the property of plaintiffs or any of them. It is paid by the public. If anybody has the right to
claim it, it is those who paid it. Only owners of property has the right to claim said property. The cine owners acted as
mere against agent of the city in collecting the additional price charged in the sale of admission tickets." Consequently, the
court denied the claim of appellants for reimbursement. We find no error in this respect.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the only modification as to Ordinance No. 100, which is
hereby declared null and void. Defendant is hereby ordered to return to the Benguet Development Co., Inc., the amount of
P3,544.44 it has paid as specific tax. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.CRUZ, J.:

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as follows:
 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance
No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution
and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice
of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution
and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. 2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local
Government Code had indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor
General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision. 3 However, on motion for reconsideration
with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the
issues raised therein.

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the
proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation
of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be
prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before
declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional
insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the
familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control and not
of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not
only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the
policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that
in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As
we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the
act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down
such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere
supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction claimed by the
Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the
Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall
provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the
effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if,
in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or
when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this
authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of
thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the
objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or
the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local
legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension
thereof shall have ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had
been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before
this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to
do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the
Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another
matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila
Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had
been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with
Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog
and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary
only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25
exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it
of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as
evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and
C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,
respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the
July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering
that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not
been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not been raised in
issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar
as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119172 March 25, 1999

BELEN C. FIGUERRES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF ASSESSORS OF MANDALUYONG CITY TREASURER OF MANDALUYONG, and
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MANDALUYONG, respondents. MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 8, 1995, dismissing a
prohibition suit brought by petitioner against the respondent officials of the Municipality, now City, of Mandaluyong to
prevent them from enforcing certain ordinances revising the schedule of fair market values of the various classes of real
property in that municipality and the assessment levels applicable thereto.

Petitioner Belen C. Figuerres is the owner of a parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413305, and
located at Amarillo Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong. In 1993, she received a notice of assessment, dated
October 20, 1993, from the municipal assessor of the then Municipality of Mandaluyong, containing the following specifics:

TYPE AREA BASE VALUE MARKET ASSESSMENTS ASSESSED PER SQ.M VALUE LEVEL VALUE

1
Residential 530sq.m. P2,500.00 P1,325,000.00 20 P265,006.00

The assessment, effective in the year 1994, was based on Ordinance Nos. 119 and 125, series of 1993, and Ordinance
No. 135, series of 1994, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaluyong. Ordinance No. 119, series of 1993, which was
promulgated on April 22, 1993, contains a schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the
municipality. 2 Ordinance No. 125, series of 1993, which was promulgated on November 11, 1993, on the other hand, fixes
the assessment levels applicable to such classes of real property. 3 Finally, Ordinance No. 135, series of 1994, which was
promulgated on February 24, 1994, amended Ordinance No. 119, 6 by providing that only one third (1/3) of the increase
in the market values applicable to residential lands pursuant to the said ordinance shall be implemented in the years
1994, 1995, and 1996. 4

Petitioner brought a prohibition suit in the Court of Appeals against the Assessor, the Treasurer, and the Sangguniang
Bayan to stop them from enforcing the ordinances in question on the ground that the ordinances were invalid for having
been adopted allegedly without public hearings and prior publication or posting and without complying with the
implementing rules yet to be issued by the Department of Finance. 5

In its decision, dated February 8, 1995, 6 the Court of Appeals threw out the petition. The appellate court said in part:

Petitioner's claim that Ordinance Nos. 119, 125 and 135 are null and void since they were prepared
without the approval and determination of the Department of Finance is without merit.

The approval and determination by the Department of Finance is not needed under the Local Government
Code of 1991, since it is now the city council of Mandaluyong that is empowered to determine and
approve the aforecited ordinances. Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioner that the Department of
Finance "has not promulgated the necessary rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal and
assessment of real property as prescribed by the 1991 Local Government Code," Department of Finance
Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92 dated October 6, 1992, which is addressed to provincial, city, and
municipal assessors and others concerned with the proper implementation of Section 219 of R.A. No.
7160, provides for the rules relative to the conduct of general revisions of real property assessment
pursuant to Sections 201 and 219 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Regarding petitioner's claim that there is need for municipal ordinances to be published in the Official
Gazette for their effectivity, the same is also without merit.

Sec. 511 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that

The secretary to the Sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such
ordinances to the chief executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days
following the approval of the said ordinances for publication purposes. The Official
Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and reference
purposes.
 Thus, the posting and publication in the Official Gazette of ordinances with penal sanctions is not a
prerequisite for their effectivity. This finds support in the case of Taada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446),
wherein the Supreme Court declared that municipal ordinances are covered by the Local Government
Code.

Moreover, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him as provided for under
Section 187 of R.A. No. 7160, before filing the instant petition with this Court.

In fact, aside from filing an appeal to the Secretary of Justice as provided under Section 187 of R.A. No.
7160, the petitioner . . . could have appealed to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, the decision of
which is in turn appealable to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals as provided under Sections 226
and 230 of the said law. According to current jurisprudence, administrative remedies must be exhausted
before seeking judicial intervention. (Gonzales v. Secretary of Education, 5 SCRA 657). If a litigant goes
to court without first pursuing the available administrative remedies, his action is considered premature
and not yet ripe for judicial determination (Allied Brokerage Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, 40
SCRA 555).

As the petitioner has not pursued the administrative remedies available to him, his petition for prohibition
cannot prosper (Gonzales v. Provincial Auditor of Iloilo, 12 SCRA 711).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. 7

Petitioner Figuerres assails the above decision. She contends that

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN FINDING LACK OF

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ON THE PART OF HEREIN
PETITIONER WHEN UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED BY LAW AND WOULD HAVE BEEN
A USELESS FORMALITY.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT STATED THAT THE

CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG IS EMPOWERED TO DETERMINE AND
APPROVE THE AFORECITED ORDINANCES WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
MANDATORY PUBLIC HEARINGS REQUIRED BY R.A. No. 7160.

3. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED

IN STATING THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR PUBLICATION OF TAX ORDINANCES.

4. THERE IS NON COMPLIANCE BY PUBLIC RESPONDENTS OF ASSESSMENT

REGULATION No. 1-92 DATED OCTOBER 6, 1992, EVEN IF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS MENTIONED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SAID ASSESSMENT
REGULATIONS. 8

On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong contends:

(1) the present case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies;

(2) apart from her bare allegations, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings
were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question;

(3) although an ordinance concerning the imposition of real property taxes is not required to be published in the Official
Gazette in order to be valid, still the subject ordinances were disseminated before their effectivity in accordance with the
relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7160; and

(4) the Municipality of Mandaluyong complied with the regulations of the Department of Finance in enacting the
ordinances.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

In Lopez v. City of Manila, 9 we recently held:

. . . Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. . . .

With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are
provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of R.A. 7160.

Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 provides, that the taxpayer may question the constitutionality or legality of a tax
ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days from effectivity thereof, to the Secretary of Justice. The
 petitioner after finding that his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, may bring the case before
the Secretary of Justice for questions of legality or constitutionality of the city ordinance.

Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who is not satisfied with the assessment of his
property may, within sixty (60) days from notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment
Appeals.

Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due,
in accordance with Section 252 of R.A. No. 7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase
"paid under protest" and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a petition under
oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits or documents to support his appeal.

Although cases raising purely legal questions are excepted from the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies
before a party may resort to the courts, in the case at bar, the legal questions raised by petitioner require, as will presently
be shown, proof of facts for their resolution. Therefore, the petitioner's action in the Court of Appeals was premature, and
the appellate court correctly dismissed her action on the ground that she failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies as above stated.

Petitioner argues that resort to the Secretary of Justice is not mandatory but only directory because R.A. No. 7160, 187
provides that "any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures" may be appealed to
the Secretary of Justice. Precisely, the Secretary of Justice can take cognizance of a case involving the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances where, as in this case, there are factual issues involved.

There need be no fear that compliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies will unduly delay resort to
the courts to the detriment of taxpayers. Although R.A. No. 7160, 187 provides that an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
"shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein," it likewise requires the Secretary of Justice to "render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal," after which "the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction."

Public hearings on tax ordinance.

Petitioner is right in contending that public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance
imposing real property taxes. R.A. No. 7160, 186 provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges "shall not be
enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose."

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to
show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the
Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were
adopted, 10 although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In an analogous
case, United States v. Cristobal, 11 it was alleged that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways
had not been submitted by the provincial board as required by 2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this
contention, the Court held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that
the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore
unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause
showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of
law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the
municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that the law has been complied with. We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the
law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary. 12

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present
case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. 13 Since petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings
were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality.

Publication and posting of schedule of fair market values

Petitioner is also right that publication or posting of the proposed schedule of fair market values of the difference classes
of real property in a local government unit is required pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, 212 which in part states:

. . . The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, city, or municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the provincial
capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public places therein.

In Ty v. Trampe, 14 it was held that, if the local government unit is part of Metro Manila, the abovequoted portion of 212
must be understood to refer to the schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in the district to
which the city or municipality belongs, as prepared jointly by the local assessors concerned.
In addition, an ordinance imposing real property taxes (such as Ordinance Nos. 119 and 135) must be posted or published
as required by R.A. No. 7160, 188 which provides:

Sec. 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. Within ten (10) days after their
approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures
shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local
circulation:Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there no newspapers of
local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.

Hence, after the proposed schedule of fair market values of the different classes of real property in a local government
unit within Metro Manila, as prepared jointly by the local assessors of the district to which the city or municipality belongs,
has been published or posted in accordance with 212 of R.A. No. 7160 and enacted into ordinances by the sanggunians
of the municipalities and cities concerned, the ordinances containing the schedule of fair market values must themselves
be published or posted in the manner provided by 188 of R.A. No. 7160.

With respect to ordinances which fix the assessment levels (such as Ordinance No. 125), being in the nature of a tax
ordinance, 188 likewise applies. Moreover, as, Ordinance No. 125, 7 provides for a penal sanction for violations thereof
by means of a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00, or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month
nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court, not only 188 but 511(a) also must be observed:

Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city,
municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks.
Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances.
Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or
at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.

In view of 188 and 511(a) of R.A. No. 7160, an ordinance fixing the assessment levels applicable to the different
classes of real property in a local government unit and imposing penal sanctions for violations thereof (such as Ordinance
No. 125) should be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation, where available,
within ten (10) days of its approval, and posted in at least two (2) prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal,
or barangay hall for a minimum of three (3) consecutive weeks.

Apart from her allegations, petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that the subject ordinances were nor
disseminated in accordance with these provisions of R.A. No. 7160. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong
presented a certificate, dated November 12, 1993, of Williard S. Wong, Sanggunian Secretary of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong that "Ordinance No. 125, S-1993 . . . has been posted in accordance with 59(b) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991." 15 Thus, considering the presumption of validity in favor of the
ordinances and the failure of petitioner to rebut such presumption, we are constrained to dismiss the petition in this case.

Compliance with regulations issued by the

Department of Finance

Also without merit is the contention of petitioner that Ordinance No, 119 and Ordinance No. 135 are void for not having
been enacted in accordance with Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, dated October 6, 1992, of the Department of
Finance, which provides guidelines for the preparation of proposed schedules of fair market values of the different classes
of real property in a local government unit, such as time tables for obtaining information from owners of affected lands and
buildings regarding the value thereof. As in the case of the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances
and revenue measures, however, petitioner has not shown that the ordinances in this case were enacted in accordance
with the applicable regulations of the Department of Finance. The Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that, although the
regulations are merely directory, it has complied with them. 16 Hence, in the absence of proof that the ordinances were not
enacted in accordance with such regulations, said ordinances presumed to have been enacted in accordance with such
regulations.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168289 March 22, 2010

THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, represented by the HON. FELIX V. OPLE, Municipal Mayor, and
FELIX V. OPLE, in his personal capacity, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
7, CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of CEBU CITY;
HON. CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of BULACAN and his
DEPUTIES; and EMILY ROSE GO KO LIM CHAO, doing business under the name and style KD
SURPLUS, Respondents. PERALTA, J.:
This is a Joint Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court brought by the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its
former chief executive, Mayor Felix V. Ople in his official and personal capacity, from the January 31, 2005 Decision 2 and
the May 23, 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81888. The assailed decision affirmed the
October 20, 2003 Order4 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7 in Civil Case No. CEB-28587 denying
petitioners motion to dismiss and motion to discharge/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment previously issued in the
case. The assailed resolution denied reconsideration.

The case stems from a Complaint5 filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao against herein
petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople (Ople) for collection of a sum of
money and damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD
Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related
supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople. Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality
through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in the municipality. Respondent claimed that because of Oples earnest representation that funds had
already been allocated for the project, she agreed to deliver from her principal place of business in Cebu City twenty-one
motor vehicles whose value totaled P5,820,000.00. To prove this, she attached to the complaint copies of the bills of
lading showing that the items were consigned, delivered to and received by petitioner municipality on different
dates.6 However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents claim for payment. As
of the filing of the complaint, the total obligation of petitioner had already totaled P10,026,060.13 exclusive of penalties
and damages. Thus, respondent prayed for full payment of the said amount, with interest at not less than 2% per month,
plus P500,000.00 as damages for business losses, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, attorneys fees of P100,000.00
and the costs of the suit.

On February 13, 2003, the trial court issued an Order 7 granting respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment
conditioned upon the posting of a bond equivalent to the amount of the claim. On March 20, 2003, the trial court issued
the Writ of Preliminary Attachment8 directing the sheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of petitioners.

Instead of addressing private respondents allegations, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 9 on the ground that the claim
on which the action had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing out that there was no
written contract or document that would evince the supposed agreement they entered into with respondent. They averred
that contracts of this nature, before being undertaken by the municipality, would ordinarily be subject to several
preconditions such as a public bidding and prior approval of the municipal council which, in this case, did not obtain. From
this, petitioners impress upon us the notion that no contract was ever entered into by the local government with
respondent.10 To address the claim that respondent had made the deliveries under the agreement, they advanced that the
bills of lading attached to the complaint were hardly probative, inasmuch as these documents had been accomplished and
handled exclusively by respondent herself as well as by her employees and agents. 11

Petitioners also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment Already Issued, 12invoking
immunity of the state from suit, unenforceability of the contract, and failure to substantiate the allegation of fraud. 13

On October 20, 2003, the trial court issued an Order14 denying the two motions. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but
they were denied in an Order15 dated December 29, 2003.

Believing that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the two orders, petitioners elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In it, they faulted the trial court for not dismissing
the complaint despite the fact that the alleged contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, as well as for
ordering the filing of an answer and in effect allowing private respondent to prove that she did make several deliveries of
the subject motor vehicles. Additionally, it was likewise asserted that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
not discharging/dissolving the writ of preliminary attachment, as prayed for in the motion, and in effect disregarding the
rule that the local government is immune from suit.

On January 31, 2005, following assessment of the parties arguments, the Court of Appeals, finding no merit in the
petition, upheld private respondents claim and affirmed the trial courts order.16 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but
the same was likewise denied for lack of merit and for being a mere scrap of paper for having been filed by an
unauthorized counsel.17 Hence, this petition.

In their present recourse, which raises no matter different from those passed upon by the Court of Appeals, petitioners
ascribe error to the Court of Appeals for dismissing their challenge against the trial courts October 20 and December 29,
2003 Orders. Again, they reason that the complaint should have been dismissed at the first instance based on
unenforceability and that the motion to dissolve/discharge the preliminary attachment should have been granted. 18

Commenting on the petition, private respondent notes that with respect to the Court of Appeals denial of
thecertiorari petition, the same was rightly done, as the fact of delivery may be properly and adequately addressed at the
trial of the case on the merits; and that the dissolution of the writ of preliminary attachment was not proper under the
premises inasmuch as the application for the writ sufficiently alleged fraud on the part of petitioners. In the same breath,
respondent laments that the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration was rightly done by the Court of Appeals,
because it raised no new matter that had not yet been addressed. 19

After the filing of the parties respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

We now rule on the petition.

To begin with, the Statute of Frauds found in paragraph (2), Article 1403 of the Civil Code, 20 requires for enforceability
certain contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or memorandum. The term "Statute of Frauds" is
descriptive of statutes that require certain classes of contracts to be in writing; and that do not deprive the parties of the
right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulate the formalities of the contract necessary
to render it enforceable.21

In other words, the Statute of Frauds only lays down the method by which the enumerated contracts may be proved. But it
does not declare them invalid because they are not reduced to writing inasmuch as, by law, contracts are obligatory in
whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. 22 The
object is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending, for evidence thereof, on the unassisted
memory of witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by
the party to be charged.23 The effect of noncompliance with this requirement is simply that no action can be enforced
under the given contracts.24 If an action is nevertheless filed in court, it shall warrant a dismissal under Section 1(i), 25 Rule
16 of the Rules of Court, unless there has been, among others, total or partial performance of the obligation on the part of
either party.26

It has been private respondents consistent stand, since the inception of the instant case that she has entered into a
contract with petitioners. As far as she is concerned, she has already performed her part of the obligation under the
agreement by undertaking the delivery of the 21 motor vehicles contracted for by Ople in the name of petitioner
municipality. This claim is well substantiated at least for the initial purpose of setting out a valid cause of action against
petitioners by copies of the bills of lading attached to the complaint, naming petitioner municipality as consignee of the
shipment. Petitioners have not at any time expressly denied this allegation and, hence, the same is binding on the trial
court for the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss. In other words, since there exists an indication by way of
allegation that there has been performance of the obligation on the part of respondent, the case is excluded from the
coverage of the rule on dismissals based on unenforceability under the statute of frauds, and either party may then
enforce its claims against the other.

No other principle in remedial law is more settled than that when a motion to dismiss is filed, the material allegations of the
complaint are deemed to be hypothetically admitted. 27 This hypothetical admission, according to Viewmaster Construction
Corporation v. Roxas28 and Navoa v. Court of Appeals,29 extends not only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in
the complaint, but also to inferences that may be fairly deduced from them. Thus, where it appears that the allegations in
the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the defendants. 30 Stated differently, where the motion to dismiss is
predicated on grounds that are not indubitable, the better policy is to deny the motion without prejudice to taking such
measures as may be proper to assure that the ends of justice may be served. 31

It is interesting to note at this point that in their bid to have the case dismissed, petitioners theorize that there could not
have been a contract by which the municipality agreed to be bound, because it was not shown that there had been
compliance with the required bidding or that the municipal council had approved the contract. The argument is flawed. By
invoking unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds, petitioners are in effect acknowledging the existence of a contract
between them and private respondent only, the said contract cannot be enforced by action for being non-compliant with
the legal requisite that it be reduced into writing. Suffice it to say that while this assertion might be a viable defense
against respondents claim, it is principally a matter of evidence that may be properly ventilated at the trial of the case on
the merits.

Verily, no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the trial court in denying petitioners motion to dismiss this
case. The Court of Appeals is thus correct in affirming the same.

We now address the question of whether there is a valid reason to deny petitioners motion to discharge the writ of
preliminary attachment.

Petitioners, advocating a negative stance on this issue, posit that as a municipal corporation, the Municipality of Hagonoy
is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment. Hence, they submit that
not only was there an error committed by the trial court in denying their motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary
attachment; they also advance that it should not have been issued in the first place. Nevertheless, they believe that
respondent has not been able to substantiate her allegations of fraud necessary for the issuance of the writ. 32

Private respondent, for her part, counters that, contrary to petitioners claim, she has amply discussed the basis for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment in her affidavit; and that petitioners claim of immunity from suit is negated
by Section 22 of the Local Government Code, which vests municipal corporations with the power to sue and be sued.
Further, she contends that the arguments offered by petitioners against the writ of preliminary attachment clearly touch on
matters that when ruled upon in the hearing for the motion to discharge, would amount to a trial of the case on the
merits.33

The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may
not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is
implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the other contracting
party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law34 such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powers one of them is the
power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, 35 where the
suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-
suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only
convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction.
Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant
verdict on the action before execution of the judgment. 36

Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,37 citing Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego,38 is
instructive on this point. In that case which involved a suit on a contract entered into by an entity supervised by the Office
of the President, the Court held that while the said entity opened itself to suit by entering into the subject contract with a
private entity; still, the trial court was in error in ordering the garnishment of its funds, which were public in nature and,
hence, beyond the reach of garnishment and attachment proceedings. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the writ of
preliminary attachment issued in that case be lifted, and that the parties be allowed to prove their respective claims at the
trial on the merits. There, the Court highlighted the reason for the rule, to wit:

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimants action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs
of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects. x x x39

With this in mind, the Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment must be dissolved and, indeed, it must not have
been issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private respondents position that she, by affidavit, was able to
substantiate the allegation of fraud in the same way that the fraud attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the
complaint and, hence, the issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this case would
only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event
that respondents claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution and garnishment unless, of course, there has
been a corresponding appropriation provided by law.401avvphi1

Anent the other issues raised by petitioners relative to the denial of their motion to dissolve the writ of attachment, i.e.,
unenforceability of the contract and the veracity of private respondents allegation of fraud, suffice it to say that these
pertain to the merits of the main action. Hence, these issues are not to be taken up in resolving the motion to discharge,
lest we run the risk of deciding or prejudging the main case and force a trial on the merits at this stage of the
proceedings.41

There is one final concern raised by petitioners relative to the denial of their motion for reconsideration. They complain
that it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have denied the motion on the ground that the same was filed by an
unauthorized counsel and, hence, must be treated as a mere scrap of paper.42

It can be derived from the records that petitioner Ople, in his personal capacity, filed his Rule 65 petition with the Court of
Appeals through the representation of the law firm Chan Robles & Associates. Later on, municipal legal officer Joselito
Reyes, counsel for petitioner Ople, in his official capacity and for petitioner municipality, filed with the Court of Appeals a
Manifestation with Entry of Appearance43 to the effect that he, as counsel, was "adopting all the pleadings filed for and in
behalf of [Oples personal representation] relative to this case." 44

It appears, however, that after the issuance of the Court of Appeals decision, only Oples personal representation signed
the motion for reconsideration. There is no showing that the municipal legal officer made the same manifestation, as he
previously did upon the filing of the petition.45 From this, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was as if petitioner
municipality and petitioner Ople, in his official capacity, had never moved for reconsideration of the assailed decision, and
adverts to the ruling in Ramos v. Court of Appeals46 and Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals 47 that only under
well-defined exceptions may a private counsel be engaged in lawsuits involving a municipality, none of which exceptions
obtains in this case.48

The Court of Appeals is mistaken. As can be seen from the manner in which the Manifestation with Entry of Appearance is
worded, it is clear that petitioner municipalitys legal officer was intent on adopting, for both the municipality and Mayor
Ople, not only the certiorari petition filed with the Court of Appeals, but also all other pleadings that may be filed thereafter
by Oples personal representation, including the motion for reconsideration subject of this case. In any event, however, the
said motion for reconsideration would warrant a denial, because there seems to be no matter raised therein that has not
yet been previously addressed in the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as in the proceedings below, and
that would have otherwise warranted a different treatment of the issues involved.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The January 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 81888 is AFFIRMED insofar as it affirmed the October 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 7 denying petitioners motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. CEB-28587. The assailed decision
is REVERSED insofar as it affirmed the said trial courts denial of petitioners motion to discharge the writ of preliminary
attachment issued in that case. Accordingly, the August 4, 2003 Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued in Civil Case No.
CEB-28587 is ordered lifted.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987

FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO,
FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO CASTAEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III,
VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondents. CRUZ, J.:

There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring
12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as
a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct
business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents
deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners' behest, we
have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quobetween the parties pending our decision. 1 Now we
shall rule on the merits.

This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218
authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags
and sell in the above-mentioned place. 2 The action was protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants
from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. 3 On January 18, 1964, while this case was
pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961.
Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land
occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy. 5 The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. 6

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place; in fact, according to then
they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or space allotments therein for which they paid daily
fees to the municipal government. 7 The problem appears to have festered for some more years under a presumably
uneasy truce among the protagonists, none of whom made any move, for some reason that does not appear in the
record. Then, on January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a
petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and
customary use as a public plaza. 8

Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, 9 respondent Vicente A. Macalino, as officer-in-
charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued on June 14, 1982, a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer
and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the subject place beginning July 1, 1982. 10 The reaction of the
petitioners was to file a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No.
6470, on June 26, 1982. The respondent judge denied the petition on July 19, 1982, 11 and the motion for reconsideration
on August 5, 1982, 12 prompting the petitioners to come to this Court on certiorari to challenge his decision. 13

As required, respondent Macalino filed his comment 14 on the petition, and the petitioners countered with their reply. 15 In
compliance with our resolution of February 2, 1983, the petitioners submitted their memorandum 16 and respondent
Macalino, for his part, asked that his comment be considered his memorandum. 17 On July 28, 1986, the new officer-in-
charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, Paterno S. Guevarra, was impleaded in lieu of Virgilio Sanchez, who
had himself earlier replaced the original respondent Macalino. 18

After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties in their respective pleadings, we rule for the
respondents. The petition must be dismissed.

There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a public
plaza, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. 2040. This finding was made after consideration of the antecedent facts
as especially established by the testimony of former San Fernando Mayor Rodolfo Hizon, who later became governor of
Pampanga, that the National Planning Commission had reserved the area for a public plaza as early as 1951. This
intention was reiterated in 1964 through the adoption of Resolution No. 29. 19

It does not appear that the decision in this case was appealed or has been reversed. In Civil Case G.R. No. 6740, which
is the subject of this petition, the respondent judge saw no reason to disturb the finding in Civil Case No. 2040 and indeed
used it as a basis for his own decision sustaining the questioned order. 20

The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they had
entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and later with
them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they saw they are
paying daily fees. 21 The municipal government has denied making such agreements. In any case, they argue, since the
fees were collected daily, the leases, assuming their validity, could be terminated at will, or any day, as the claimed rentals
indicated that the period of the leases was from day to day. 22

The parties belabor this argument needlessly.

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual
undertaking. This is elementary. Indeed, this point was settled as early as in Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 23decided in
1915, where the Court declared as null and void the lease of a public plaza of the said municipality in favor of a private
person.

Justice Torres said in that case:

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not in
1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private use
the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a
thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be
the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the
supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895, which says: "communal things that cannot be
sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the
plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."

Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to
Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is
contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a was held that the City of contract.

In Muyot vs. de la Fuente, 24 it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta.
Cruz, being likewise beyond the commerce of man.

Echoing Rojas, the decision said:

Appellants claim that they had obtained permit from the present of the City of Manila, to connect booths
Nos. 1 and 2, along the premises in question, and for the use of spaces where the booths were
constructed, they had paid and continued paying the corresponding rentals. Granting this claim to be true,
one should not entertain any doubt that such permit was not legal, because the City of Manila does not
have any power or authority at all to lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question,
forming part of the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper subject matter of the contract, as it
was not within the commerce of man (Article 1347, new Civil Code, and article 1271, old Civil Code). Any
contract entered into by the City of Manila in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra
vires. (Municipality of Cavite vs. Roxas, et a1, 30 Phil. 603.) The sidewalk in question was intended for
and was used by the public, in going from one place to another. "The streets and public places of the city
shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians,
and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purpose as provided by ordinance or regulation; ..."
(Sec. 1119, Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila.) The booths in question served as fruit stands for
their owners and often, if not always, blocked the fire passage of pedestrians who had to take the plaza
itself which used to be clogged with vehicular traffic.

Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 25 where the Supreme Court declared:

There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls,
specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to
law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available
to the public in general They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased
by the municipality to private parties.

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have
realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the municipalcouncil of
San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public
plaza of the municipality.

It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent
Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-
in-charge of the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place
and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the aforementioned orders from the court and the
council. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in issuing his
order.

Neither can it be said that he acted whimsically in exercising his authority for it has been established that he directed the
demolition of the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an investigation, to look into
the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando. 26 There is evidence that
the petitioners were notified of this hearing, 27which they chose to disregard. Photographs of the disputed area, 28 which
does look congested and ugly, show that the complaint was valid and that the area really needed to be cleared, as
recommended by the municipal attorney.

The Court observes that even without such investigation and recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in
ordering the area cleared on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative
authorities. In calling first for the investigation (which the petitioner saw fit to boycott), he was just scrupulously paying
deference to the requirements of due process, to remove an taint of arbitrariness in the action he was caged upon to take.

Since the occupation of the place in question in 1961 by the original 24 stallholders (whose number later ballooned to
almost 200), it has deteriorated increasingly to the great prejudice of the community in general. The proliferation of stags
therein, most of them makeshift and of flammable materials, has converted it into a veritable fire trap, which, added to the
fact that it obstructs access to and from the public market itself, has seriously endangered public safety. The filthy
condition of the talipapa, where fish and other wet items are sold, has aggravated health and sanitation problems, besides
pervading the place with a foul odor that has spread into the surrounding areas. The entire place is unsightly, to the
dismay and embarrassment of the inhabitants, who want it converted into a showcase of the town of which they can all be
proud. The vendors in the talipapa have also spilled into the street and obstruct the flow of traffic, thereby impairing the
convenience of motorists and pedestrians alike. The regular stallholders in the public market, who pay substantial rentals
to the municipality, are deprived of a sizable volume of business from prospective customers who are intercepted by
the talipapa vendors before they can reach the market proper. On top of all these, the people are denied the proper use of
the place as a public plaza, where they may spend their leisure in a relaxed and even beautiful environment and civic and
other communal activities of the town can be held.

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to
the municipality under the general welfare clause. 29 This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and
make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this casethrough the
adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for
it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. 30 In fact,
every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the
police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. 31 This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions
of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. 32

We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. On the
contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed
area and clear it of an the structures illegally constructed therein.

The Court feels that it would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves, recognizing their own civic duty,
had at the outset desisted from their original stance and withdrawn in good grace from the disputed area to permit its
peaceful restoration as a public plaza and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality. They owned this little
sacrifice to the community in general which has suffered all these many years because of their intransigence. Regrettably,
they have refused to recognize that in the truly democratic society, the interests of the few should yield to those of the
greater number in deference to the principles that the welfare of the people is the supreme law and overriding purpose.
We do not see any altruism here. The traditional ties of sharing are absent here. What we find, sad to say, is a cynical
disdaining of the spirit of "bayanihan," a selfish rejection of the cordial virtues of "pakikisama " and "pagbibigayan" which
are the hallmarks of our people.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision dated July 19, 1982, and the order-dated August 5, 1982, are
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order dated August 9, 1982, is LIFTED. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.