BONIFACIO BROS., INC. V. MORA G.R. NO.
L-20853 that the contracting parties have clearly and
MAY 29, 1967
FACTS:
Enrique Mora, owner of Oldsmobile sedan model 1956,
mortgaged it to H.S. Reyes, Inc., with the condition that they
would be the beneficiary of its insurance
June 23, 1959: The sedan was insured with State Bonding &
Insurance Co., Inc
During the period of effectivity, the sedan met an accident
and it was appraised by Bayne Adjustment Co. and repaired it
with Bonifacio Bros. and the parts were supplied by Ayala
Auto Parts Co. This was all done without the knowledge of
H.S. Reyes. Enrique was billed P2,102.73 through Bayne.
The insurance company drew a check deducting P100 for
franchise and entrusted it to Bayne payable to Enrique or
H.S. Reyes.
Still unpaid, the sedan was delivered to Enrique without the
Knowledge of H.S. Reyes
Bonifacio Bros and Ayala Auto filed in the MTC on the theory
that the insurance proceeds should be paid directly to them
CFI affirmed MTC: H.S. Reyes, Inc. as having a better right
ISSUE: W/N there is privity between Bonifacio Bro and Ayala
Auto against the insurance company
HELD: NO. Judgment affirmed
GR: contracts take effect only between the parties thereto
EX: some specific instances provided by law where the
contract contains some stipulation in favor of a third person -
stipulation pour autrui
Provision in favor of a third person not a party to the
contract
third person is allowed to avail himself of a benefit
granted to him by the terms of the contract, provided
deliberately conferred a favor upon such person
stipulation pour autrui must be clearly expressed -
none here
"loss payable" clause of the insurance policy stipulates
that "Loss, if any, is payable to H.S. Reyes, Inc."
indicating that it was only the H.S. Reyes, Inc. which
they intended to benefit.
stipulation merely establishes the procedure that the
insured has to follow in order to be entitled to
indemnity for repair
a policy of insurance is a distinct and independent
contract between the insured and insurer, and third
persons have no right either in a court of equity, or in
a court of law, to the proceeds of it, unless there be
some contract of trust, expressed or implied between
the insured and third person
"loss" in insurance law embraces injury or damage
The injury or damage sustained by the insured in
consequence of the happening of one or more of the
accidents or misfortune against which the insurer, in
consideration of the premium, has undertaken to
indemnify the insured
VDA. CONSUEGRA V GSIS G.R. NO. L-28093 JANUARY
30, 1971
FACTS:
The late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman in
the province of Surigao del Norte. He contracted two
marriages, the first with Rosario Diaz and the second, which
was contracted in good faith while the first marriage was
subsisting, with Basilia Berdin.
Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance
were paid to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children who
were the beneficiaries named in the policy. They received
Php 6,000.
Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would
receive the retirement insurance benefits due to him.
Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage,
filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement
insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of
Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate
any beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance
benefits.
Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar
claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries
named in the life insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the
only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance
benefits due the deceased Consuegra.
The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra
were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is
entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance
benefits, on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by
the second marriage and their seven children, on the other
hand, who are entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16.
Basilia Berdin didnt agree. She filed a petition declaring her
and her children to be the legal heirs and exclusive
beneficiaries of the retirement insurance.
The trial court affirmed stating that: "when two women
innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy
matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of
said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and
each family be entitled to one half of the estate.
Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin and her children.
ISSUE:
To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of Jose
Consuegra be paid, because he did not designate the
beneficiary of his retirement insurance?
HELD:
Both families are entitled to half of the retirement benefits.
The beneficiary named in the life insurance does NOT
automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement
insurance. When Consuegra, during the early part of 1943,
or before 1943, designated his beneficiaries in his life
insurance, he could NOT have intended those beneficiaries of
his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement
insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance
under the GSIS came about only when CA 186 was amended
by RA 660 on June 18, 1951.Sec. 11(b) clearly indicates that
there is need for the employee to file an application for
retirement insurance benefits when he becomes a GSIS
member and to state his beneficiary. The life insurance and
the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct
systems of benefits paid out from 2 separate and distinct
funds.
In case of failure to name a beneficiary in an insurance
policy, the proceeds will accrue to the estate of the insured.
And when there exists two marriages, each family will be
entitled to one-half of the estate.
VDA. DE GABRIEL V. CA G.R. NO. 103883 NOVEMBER
14, 1996
FACTS:
Marcelino Gabriel was employed by Emerald Construction &
Development Corporation (Emerald Construction for brevity)
at its construction project in Iraq. He was covered by a
personal accident insurance in the amount of P100,000.00
under a group policy procured from Fortune Insurance &
Surety Company (Fortune Insurance for brevity) by Emerald
Construction for its overseas workers. The insured risk was
for bodily injury caused by violent accidental external and
visible means which injury would solely and independently of
any other cause result in death or disability.
On 22 May 1982, within the life of the policy, Gabriel died in
Iraq. On 12 July 1983, Emerald Construction reported
Gabriels death to Fortune Insurance by telephone. Among
the documents thereafter submitted to Fortune Insurance
were a copy of the death certificate issued by the Ministry of
Health of the Republic of Iraq which stated that an autopsy
report by the National Bureau of Investigation was conducted
to the effect that due to advanced state of postmortem
decomposition, the cause of death of Gabriel could not be
determined (emphasis added).
Because of this development Fortune Insurance ultimately
denied the claim of Emerald Construction on the ground of
prescription. Gabriels widow, Jacqueline Jimenez, went to the
to the lower court. In her complaint against Emerald
Construction and Fortune Insurance, she averred that her
husband died of electrocution while in the performance of his
work.
Fortune Insurance alleged that since both the death
certificate issued by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and the
autopsy report of the NBI failed to disclose the cause of
Gabriels death, it denied liability under the policy. In
addition, private respondent raised the defense of
prescription, invoking Section 384 of the Insurance Code.
ISSUE:
WON Jacqueline Jimenez vda. de Gabriels claim against
Fortune Insurance should be denied on the ground of
prescription
HELD:
Yes. Section 384 of the Insurance Code provides:
Sec. 384. Any person having any claim upon the policy issued
pursuant to this chapter shall, without any unnecessary
delay, present to the insurance company concerned a written
notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration
of the injuries sustained as certified by a duly licensed
physician. Notice of claim must be filed within six months
from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be
deemed waived. Action or suit for recovery of damage due to
loss or injury must be brought, in proper cases, with the
Commissioner or the Courts within one year from denial of
the claim, otherwise, the claimants right of action shall
prescribe.
The notice of death was given to Fortune Insurance,
concededly, more than a year after the death of vda. de
Gabriels husband. Fortune Insurance, in invoking
prescription, was not referring to the one-year period from
the denial of the claim within which to file an action against
an insurer but obviously to the written notice of claim that
had to be submitted within six months from the time of the
accident.
Vda. de Gabriel argues that Fortune Insurance must be
deemed to have waived its right to show that the cause of
death is an excepted peril, by failing to have its answers duly
verified. It is true that a matter of which a written request for
admission is made shall be deemed impliedly admitted
unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall
not be less than 10 days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters; however, the
verification, like in most cases required by the rules of
procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and
mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which
are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and
not of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings
or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in
order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. In the
case of answers to written requests for admission
particularly, the court can allow the party making the
admission, whether made expressly or deemed to have been
made impliedly, to withdraw or amend it upon such terms as
may be just.
The insurance policy expressly provided that to be
compensable, the injury or death should be caused by violent
accidental external and visible means. In attempting to prove
the cause of her husbands death, all that vda. de Gabriel
could submit were a letter sent to her by her husbands co-
worker, stating that Gabriel died when he tried to haul water
out of a tank while its submerged motor was still functioning,
and vda. de Gabriels sworn affidavit. The said affidavit,
however, suffers from procedural infirmity as it was not even
testified to or identified by vda. de Gabriel herself. This
affidavit therefore is a mere hearsay under the law.
In like manner, the letter allegedly written by the deceaseds
co-worker which was never identified to in court by the
supposed author, suffers from the same defect as the
affidavit of vda. de Gabriel. Not one of the other documents
submitted, to wit, the POEA decision, the death certificate
issued by the Ministry of Health of Iraq and the NBI autopsy
report, could give any probative value to vda. de Gabriels
claim. The POEA decision did not make any categorical
holding on the specific cause of Gabriels death.
In summary, evidence is utterly wanting to establish that the
insured suffered from an accidental death, the risk covered
by the policy.
TIU VS. ARRIESGADO G.R. NO. 138060, SEPTEMBER 1,
2004
FACTS:
At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck
marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise"
bearing plate number GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in
Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a
bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio
Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national
highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized
at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away. Pedrano left his
helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled
vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six
fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning
for oncoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on.
It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate
number PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising
along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion,
Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also bound for
Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado
and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right
side of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) places from the
front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the
stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away. He
applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid
hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the
trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus
and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost
consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His
wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was
later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where
she died shortly thereafter.
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for
breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20,
against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William
Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias on May 27, 1987. The
respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was
cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and
that petitioner Laspias did not take precautionary measures
to avoid the accident.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint
against the following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety
and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tius insurer;
respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the
cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the
truck. They alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating
the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It
was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted
manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway,
and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner
Laspias promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left
to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to
avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the
passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo
trucks left rear.
HELD:
The rules which common carriers should observe as to the
safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code,
Articles 1733, 1755and 1756. It is undisputed that the
respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the
destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract,
only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that
need to be proved. This is because under the said contract of
carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to
transport the respondent and his wife to their destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard
for all circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers
in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the
negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and
it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest
possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in
creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While
evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption
of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the
required extraordinary diligence, which means that the
carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or
that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. As
correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to
conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of
petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus,
binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger
bus engaged as a common carrier.