4 What Cases and Claims Are Removable

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Cal. Prac. Guide Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 2D-4
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Rutter Group Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, Calif. & 9th
Cir. Editions
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William W Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima, and James M. Wagstaffe; Contributing Ed
itors: Hon. Andrew J. Guilford, Hon. Gerald E. Rosen, Hon. Roslyn O. Silver, Hon
. Andrew J. Wistrich, Atty. Steven J. Adamski, Atty. Ivo Labar and Atty. Susan B
. Gray
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Chapter 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
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D. Removal Jurisdiction
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4. What Cases And Claims Are Removable
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4. [2:2295] What CASES and CLAIMS are Removable:
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b. [2:2310] Diversity of citizenship cases
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(c) [2:2314] Unincorporated associations and partnerships
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(4) [2:2356] Diversity must exist both when action filed and removed
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(b) [2:2358] Must be alleged in removal notice
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{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2362] Compare\u8212\'3fpostremoval dismissal of nondiverse defendant:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2363] How diversity determined in removal cases:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2364] Where complaint uncertain as to diversity:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2365] Defendant\rquote s burden to allege diversity
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2366] Cross-refer\u8212\'3fremoval procedure
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2367] Burden of proof
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2368] Effect of plaintiff\rquote s failure to challenge facts stated in re
moval notice:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2375] Determining amount in controversy
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2376] Aggregation rules:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2377] Effect of state court counterclaims?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2378] Effect of postfiling amendments
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2379] Actual amendment increasing demand:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2380] Possibility of amendment insufficient:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2384] Amount demanded in good faith in initial complaint:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2385] State court complaint for
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
less than $75,000
}
}
{\super \f2 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i0
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2389] State court complaint for
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
more
}
}
than $75,000
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2393] State pleading practices rendering monetary amount unclear:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2394] Standard of proof:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2395] Defendant\rquote s burden of proof
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2396] \u8220\'3fFacially apparent\u8221\'3f allegations in complaint:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2397] State court discovery:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3/ [2:2398] Defendant\rquote s removal notice:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4/ [2:2399] Settlement demands
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2402] Discovery and findings:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:2405] State court complaint seeking nonmonetary relief:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2406] Value of injunctive relief:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2407] Proof; discovery:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2417] Later developments creating diversity:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2419] Compare\u8212\'3fgrounds must also exist at time of removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2420] Compare\u8212\'3fdefendant cannot create removability
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2421] Compare\u8212\'3fprior basis for removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(6) [2:2422] Realignment of parties
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(7) [2:2423] \u8220\'3fSham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulent\u8221\'3f joinder
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2424] What constitutes \u8220\'3ffraudulent joinder\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2425] Types of \u8220\'3ffraudulent\u8221\'3f joinder
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2425.1] Fraudulent
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
misjoinder?
}
}
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2426] Possibility of recovery as test
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2427] No disputed facts:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2428] Defenses generally not considered
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2429] Compare\u8212\'3fstatute of limitations:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2430] Compare\u8212\'3fmerits of claim not considered:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2430.1] Absence of jurisdiction:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) Application\u8212\'3ffraudulent joinder found
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2450] Collusive joinder of coplaintiff
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2453] Compare\u8212\'3fcollusive assignments to CREATE diversity
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2454] Factual question
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2455] Burden on defendant seeking removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2456] Evidence considered:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2457] \u8220\'3fClear and convincing\u8221\'3f standard
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2458] Disputed facts resolved in plaintiff\rquote s favor:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2465] Hearing limited to jurisdictional issue
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2466] Presumption against fraudulent joinder
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2467] Weak case vs. sham
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2469] Compare\u8212\'3finvoluntary dismissal in state court
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(8) [2:2471] \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants disregarded
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2472] Rule:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2473] Effect on removability:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2474] Compare\u8212\'3fdefendants described sufficiently to identify:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2476] Status of \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants after removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2477] Postremoval dismissal of \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
{\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2478] Postremoval service of new defendants; statute of limitations proble
m?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\fi-360 \li {\*\pn \pnlvlblt \ilvl0 \ls100 \pnindent2700 \pnf1 {\f2 \pntxtb \u
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2479] Compare\u8212\'3fpostremoval substitution of nondiverse \u8220\'3fDo
e\u8221\'3f defendant
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c. Federal question cases
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2490] Statute:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2491] Effect
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2492] Exceptions
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2493] Compare\u8212\'3fcases in which federal courts have
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
exclusive
}
}
jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2494] Applicable to all removals?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2495] Compare\u8212\'3fconcurrent jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2496] Compare\u8212\'3fsupplemental jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2500] Compare\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fexclusive\u8221\'3f state court jurisdic
tion:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2501] Removability determined from face of complaint\u8212\'3fthe \u8220\
'3fwell-pleaded complaint rule\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2502] Federal law governs construction of complaint
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2503] Complaint at time of removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2504] Validity of federal claim immaterial
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2505] Effect of postremoval amendment dropping federal claim:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2506] Compare\u8212\'3famendment
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
adding
}
}
valid federal claim
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2510] What constitutes \u8220\'3fcivil action\u8221\'3f for removal purpo
ses:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2511] Defensive matters not considered
}}}
\par {\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2515] Includes federal preemption defense (defensive preemption)
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2516] Compare\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2517] Includes defenses anticipated in complaint
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2518] Compare\u8212\'3freview of administrative ruling upholding federal d
efense
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2525] Counterclaims, cross-claims, third party claims not considered:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2526] Removal by third party defendant?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2526.1] Compare\u8212\'3fpatent and copyright counterclaims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2527] Incidental federal issue not sufficient
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2535] No removal based on supplemental jurisdiction only:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(h) [2:2536] Federal law as element of state claim
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(i) [2:2542] Enforcing or challenging federal judgment insufficient:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2543] Compare\u8212\'3fwhere federal court retains continuing jurisdiction
:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(j) [2:2551] Compare\u8212\'3findependent jurisdictional grant
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2552] Effect
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2553] Certain federally-chartered corporations
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2554] \u8220\'3fFederal enclave\u8221\'3f jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2555] Other statutes \u8220\'3ffederalizing\u8221\'3f actions
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2556] 1934 Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b\u8211\'3f5:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(k) [2:2560] Compare\u8212\'3fclaims under federal common law:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2561] Plaintiff the \u8220\'3fmaster of the claim\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2565] Compare\u8212\'3fstatutory basis for claim uncertain
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2566] Limitation\u8212\'3ffederal claims cannot be disguised by \u8220\'3
fartful pleading\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2567] Not \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f where plaintiffhas alternat
ive state law claim
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2568] \u8220\'3fArtful pleading\u8221\'3f where state law claim completel
y preempted
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2569] Other applications of \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2570] State court claim undermining federal court judgment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2571] Compare\u8212\'3fstate court claim
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
barred
}
}
by res judicata:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2572] State court claims involving federal tax laws:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2580] Ascertaining nature of claim
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(6) [2:2583] \u8220\'3fComplete preemption\u8221\'3f doctrine\u8212\'3fgeneral c
onsiderations
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2584] Federal claim required:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2585] Compare\u8212\'3ffederal claim barred or unenforceable:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2588] Effect
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2589] Complete preemption limited to certain federal claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2590] Compare\u8212\'3fmost federal claims
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
not
}
}
preemptive:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2591] Most federal preemption
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
not
}
}
\u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2593] Effect of joining completely preempted claim with other preempted cl
aims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2600] \u8220\'3fComplete preemption\u8221\'3f vs. \u8220\'3fexclusive fed
eral jurisdiction\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2603] Compare\u8212\'3ffailure of claim within exclusive federal jurisdict
ion:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2606] Comment\u8212\'3favoiding complete preemption by \u8220\'3fartful\u
8221\'3f pleading
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(7) [2:2615] Complete preemption\u8212\'3ffederal labor law (LMRA \u167\'3f 301)
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2616] Statute
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2617] Federal common law
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2618] State law completely preempted
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2619] Rationale
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2620] Concurrent state court jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2621] Comment
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2622] Test for preemption:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2623] Plaintiff\rquote s characterization of claim not controlling:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2624] No preemption where matter not covered by CBA:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2625] Application\u8212\'3fstate law actions preempted by LMRA \u167\'3f
301:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2635] Application\u8212\'3fclaims not preempted
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(8) [2:2655] Compare\u8212\'3fNLRA preemption (\u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Garmon
}
}
preemption\u8221\'3f):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2666] Rationale:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2667] No federal question jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2668] No removal jurisdiction:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2669] Federal court must remand, not dismiss
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2670] State court must decide preemption issue
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(9) [2:2675] Complete preemption\u8212\'3fERISA claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2676] Statute:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2677] Purpose:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2678] \u8220\'3fComplete\u8221\'3f vs. \u8220\'3fdefensive\u8221\'3f pree
mption:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2679] Rationale for \u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f preemption:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2680] Impact on removal jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2682] Compare\u8212\'3fclaims not covered by ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a)
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2690] Parties to action:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2691] Who may assert ERISA claim
}}}
\par {\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2692] Compare\u8212\'3fformer employees:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2696] Claims by or against \u8220\'3foutsiders\u8221\'3f not preempted:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2697] Malpractice claims against plan advisers:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2698] Claims by health care providers:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2699] Claims by assignees, subrogees of plan participants?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2700] Compare\u8212\'3fstate laws subject to \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
defensive preemption
}
}
\u8221\'3f (conflict preemption):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2705] State laws subject to \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
complete preemption\u8221\'3f (jurisdictional preemption)
}
}
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2706] Test for \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2707] Scope of \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2708] Nature of state law claim or remedy immaterial:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2709] Lack of ERISA remedy immaterial:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2710] Rationale:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2711] Application:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2719] Claims based on
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
administration
}
}
of benefits completely preempted?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2720] Test for \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) Application\u8212\'3fremovable claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2725] Claims for covered benefits
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) Breach of promise re benefits
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2726] Breach of oral promise to pay additional benefits:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2727] Breach of written promise to maintain benefits:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3/ [2:2728] Compare\u8212\'3fpromises made by or to \u8220\'3foutsiders\u8221\'3
f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2729] Claims against ERISA fiduciary:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2730] Subrogation claims by ERISA fiduciary against third parties
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:2735] Application\u8212\'3fnonremovable claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2736] Wrongful termination claims unrelated to plan benefits:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2737] Fraud claims relating to retirement
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2737.1] ERISA plan incidental to claim:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2738] Claims against health plan based on doctor\rquote s negligence:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2739] Compare\u8212\'3fdoctor acting as plan administrator:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2740] Compare\u8212\'3fclaims against plan for
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
negligent administration
}
}
of benefits:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
e) [2:2741] Medical providers\rquote contract claims against plan:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2742] Compare\u8212\'3fassigned claims for plan benefits:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
f) [2:2743] Independent employment agreement
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(10) [2:2745] Complete preemption\u8212\'3fNational Bank Act usury provisions:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(11) [2:2750] Other federal statutes completely preempting state law?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2751] Copyright infringement:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2752] Test
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2760] Compare\u8212\'3ftrademark claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2761] Federal Communications Act:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2762] Complete preemption:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2763] Medical Device Act:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2764] Complete preemption?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2765] Railroad Safety Standards:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2766] Railway Labor Act (RLA):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2767] Arbitral process:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2768]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lingle
}
}
standard applies:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2776] Airline Deregulation Act:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2777] Scope of preemption:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2785] Comment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2786] Compare\u8212\'3fclaims against airlines under Warsaw Convention:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2787] Bankruptcy Act:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2788] Damage claims based on involuntary bankruptcy:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2789] Recovery by third parties also barred:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(h) [2:2790] Defense contracts and subcontracts
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(i) [2:2791] Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA)
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(j) [2:2794] Compare\u8212\'3fSecurities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA
):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(k) [2:2800] Compare\u8212\'3fFederal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(m) [2:2805] Interstate Commerce Act, Carmack Amendment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2806] Rationale:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(n) [2:2810] Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d. Unrelated state law or nonremovable claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2811] Statute:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2812] Limited to federal question cases joining unrelated or nonremovable
claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2813] Rationale:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2814] Compare\u8212\'3fsupplemental jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2816] Constitutionality:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2817] Includes expressly nonremovable claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2818] No severance and remand of nonremovable claim in diversity action:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2819] Requirements for removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2820] Transactionally unrelated claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2821] Separate wrongs:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2822] How determined:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2830] Determined from counterclaim?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2831] Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2833] Action against single defendant
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2834] Action against several defendants
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2839] Procedural distinction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2850] Severing and remanding unrelated and/or nonremovable claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2853] Compare\u8212\'3fstate and federal claims based on same facts:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2854] Comment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
e. [2:2860] Special statutes authorizing removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2861] Removal by federal officers and agencies
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2862] Purpose
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2863] Effect:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2864] Does not assure remedy:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2865] Jurisdiction as to nonfederal parties and claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2866] Effect of dismissing federal officer:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2867] Limitation\u8212\'3fjurisdiction derivative of state court?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2875] Parties entitled to remove:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2877] \u8220\'3fPerson acting under\u8221\'3f federal officer:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2878] \u8220\'3fActing under\u8221\'3f federal officer
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2879] Government contractors
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2880] Compare\u8212\'3fcomplying with detailed federal regulations not eno
ugh:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2881] Federal officer as defendant
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2882] Third party defendant:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2883] Federal officer as nonparty witness:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2890] Removal of entire action:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2891] Contempt proceeding not required:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2892] Federal officer as garnishee
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2893] Requirements for removal:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2894] \u8220\'3fAct under color of office\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2895] Purpose:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2897] Includes future acts:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2898] Compare\u8212\'3fdeclaratory relief actions not removable:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2905] \u8220\'3fColorable\u8221\'3f federal defense:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2909] Compare\u8212\'3ftort claims against federal employees
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2910] Removal upon Attorney General certification
}}}
\par {\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2912] Government may deny incident occurred:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2913] Effect of finding employee acted outside scope of employment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2914] District court retains jurisdiction:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2920] Removal after Attorney General
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
refuses
}
}
certification:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2921] Certain civil rights cases
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2922] Purpose
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2923] Requirements:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2924] Compare\u8212\'3fcivil rights action
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2925] Actions against foreign nations
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2926] Includes claims against codefendants
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2927] Entity majority-owned by foreign state may remove:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2928] Removal eliminates right to jury trial
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2929] Extended time for removal:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2930] Remand of nonforeign state portion of action?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2931] No waiver of sovereign immunity
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2935] Foreclosure actions against United States
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2952] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2953] Time for FDIC removal:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2954] Removal before substitution?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2954.1] Timing of substitution:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2954.2] Substitution vs. intervention
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2955] New right of removal when FDIC joined in different capacity?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2960] Right to appeal remand order
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(6) [2:2961] Bankruptcy matters
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2962] Actions within bankruptcy jurisdiction
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2963] State law claims \u8220\'3farising in\u8221\'3f bankruptcy:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2965] Certain state law claims \u8220\'3fcompletely preempted\u8221\'3f by
Title 11:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2966] Limitation\u8212\'3fmandatory abstention
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2967] Example
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2968] Compare\u8212\'3ftort actions
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2975] No removal jurisdiction where abstention mandatory
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2976] Compare\u8212\'3fdiscretionary abstention and remand
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2977] Procedure for bankruptcy removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2978] Content of notice:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2979] Time for removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2980] Where civil action filed first
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2981] Where bankruptcy filed first
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2982] Response to removal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2983] Grounds for remand
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2984] Relevant factors
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2985] After dismissal of bankruptcy
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2986] Review and appeal
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(7) [2:2987] Arbitration agreements with foreign nationals:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(8) [2:2995] Securities fraud class actions; SLUSA removals:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2996] Independent basis for removal jurisdiction:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2997] Preclusion, not complete preemption:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2998] Including nonprecluded claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2999] Remand of nonprecluded claims; no supplemental jurisdiction:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:3000] Which claims precluded:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3002] \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In connection with
}
}
purchase or sale of security\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3007] Limitation\u8212\'3fmore than tangential relationship required:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3008] \u8220\'3fMaterial\u8221\'3f misrepresentations required:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:3011] Exception\u8212\'3fcertain state law actions preserved (\u8220\'3fD
elaware carve-out\u8221\'3f):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3012] Burden on removing defendant
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) Procedural matters
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3013] Determining removability:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3014] Effect of plaintiff\rquote s postremoval amendment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(9) [2:3015] Multiparty, multiforum cases (mass disasters):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
0 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) Application
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:3020] No mandatory abstention:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li1700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(10) [2:3021] \u8220\'3fMinimal diversity\u8221\'3f class actions (Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA)):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:3022] Determining \u8220\'3fminimal diversity\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:3026] Determining \u8220\'3fclass action\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:3027] Includes \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
mass actions
}
}
\u8221\'3f (100 or more plaintiffs):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) Limitations on removal of \u8220\'3fmass actions\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3028] \u8220\'3fEvent or occurrence\u8221\'3f exclusion
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:3028.1] State\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
parens patriae
}
}
action not removable as mass action
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3029] Limitation on transfer of \u8220\'3fmass actions\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3030] Original federal jurisdiction?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3031] Effect of individual class members\rquote claims of less than $75,0
00?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:3032] Effect of remands?
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:3040] Aggregation of claims:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3041] Valuation of amount in controversy:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3042] Effect of state court complaint for less than $5 million
}}}
\par {\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3043] Stipulation to seek less than $5 million not binding:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:3043.5] No artificial \u8220\'3fsplintering\u8221\'3f
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
8 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:3044] Nonremovable claims (CAFA \u8220\'3fcarve-outs\u8221\'3f)
}}}
\par {\pntext }
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3045] Covered securities
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3046] Internal affairs or corporate governance:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3047] Rights created by any security
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3047.1] Comment:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3048] State agency primary defendant
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:3055] \u8220\'3fHome state\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3flocal controversy\u8221
\'3f exception (mandatory abstention):
}}}
\par {\pntext }
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
6 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3057] Burden of proof on plaintiff
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3058] Defendant\rquote s citizenship at time of removal:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3059] \u8220\'3fPrincipal injuries\u8221\'3f incurred locally:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:3061] Defendant\rquote s conduct as \u8220\'3fsignificant basis\u8221\'3f
for class claims
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
6) [2:3062] How to determine a \u8220\'3fprimary defendant\u8221\'3f:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
1 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
7) [2:3070] \u8220\'3fSignificant relief\u8221\'3f sought against local defendan
t:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
2 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
8) [2:3070.1] Not jurisdictional
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:3071] Discretionary abstention
}}}
\par {\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3072] Factors considered:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
6 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(h) [2:3074] Procedural considerations:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
7 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3075] Consent of all defendants not required:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
8 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3076] No removal by third party defendants:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
9 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3078] Time for removal:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
0 {\pntext }
{\li2700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3085] Evidentiary burdens on remand motion:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
1 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3086] Amount in controversy
}}}
\par {\pntext }
2 {\pntext }
{\li3700 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:3089.1] Compare\u8212\'3fstandard of proof in non-CAFA cases:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
3 {\pntext }
{\li3200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:3090] Compare\u8212\'3fCAFA exceptions
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
4 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(i) [2:3095] Attorney fees award:
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
5 {\pntext }
{\li2200 \f2 \qj \b1 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(j) [2:3096] Appellate review of remand orders
}}}
\par {\pntext }
}
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
}{\pntext }
}
}
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_OUT3_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_OUT3_1}
\par
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4. [2:2295]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
What CASES and CLAIMS are Removable:
}
}
\u8220\'3fAny civil action\u8221\'3f commenced in state court is removable if it
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
might have been brought
}
}
originally in federal court. [
}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?fin
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1441&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
6ec74e0e&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(a)
}}}
; see
}
dType=Y&serNum=2006844939&pubNum=0000708&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aa
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_2623&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=
cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_708_2623" }
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.
}
}
(2005) 545 US 546, 563, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2623
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fdistrict court has original jurisdiction of a civil action f
or purposes of
}
\u167\'3f 1441(a)
}}}
as long as it has original jurisdiction over a subset of the claims constitutin
g the action\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Therefore, the first step in determining removability is to consider whether the
action could have been brought in federal court\u8212\'3fi.e., whether either \
u8220\'3fdiversity\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffederal question\u8221\'3f jurisdictio
n can be established. [
}
dType=Y&serNum=1987071665&pubNum=708&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6ec
74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_708_2429&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_708_2429" }{\fl
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
}
}
(1987) 482 US 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect: Odd as it may seem, removability is analyzed as if plaintiff\u8212\'3fwh
o chose
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
to sue in federal court\u8212\'3fhad been trying to get into federal court all
along! [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust
}
}
(1983) 463 US 1, 19, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2851]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Moreover, plaintiff may be able to defeat removal by raising
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Article III limitations
}
}
on federal subject matter jurisdiction\u8212\'3fstanding, mootness, ripeness, a
bstention doctrines, etc. (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:4100 ff.
}
}
). [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Toxic Injuries Corp. v. Safety\u8211\'3fKleen Corp.
}
}
(CD CA 1999) 57 F.Supp.2d 947, 951\u8211\'3f955
}}}
\u8212\'3fdiversity-based
}
{\f2 \b1 \chcbpat25 \fs20 \cf19 \i0
removal
}
}
}
improper where plaintiffs were suing on behalf of general public (as permitted
by state law) and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
lacked standing
}
}
to proceed in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
because they had suffered no personal or associational injury (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:4150 ff.
}
}
)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a. [2:2296]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fCivil action\u8221\'3f:
}
}
The term \u8220\'3fcivil action\u8221\'3f as used in the removal statute is broa
dly construed. Thus,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
provided there is a basis for original federal jurisdiction
}
}
(i.e., diversity of citizenship or a federal question), the following types of
proceedings are removable:
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2297]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Garnishment proceedings:
}
}
State court garnishment of funds held by a federal officer to satisfy a debt ow
ed by a federal employee is a \u8220\'3fcivil action\u8221\'3f for removal purpo
ses (under \u167\'3f 1442(a), the federal officer removal statute). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Nationwide Investors v. Miller
}
}
(9th Cir. 1986) 793 F2d 1044, 1045;
}}}
but see
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_505&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=c
blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_505" }{\
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ohio v. Doe
}
}
(6th Cir. 2006) 433 F3d 502, 505
}}}
\u8212\'3ffor federal officer removal, \u8220\'3fcivil action\u8221\'3f requires
a separate suit,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
proceedings ancillary or auxiliary to state court action]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2298]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Mechanic\rquote s lien foreclosure proceedings:
}
}
[See
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_345_17&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_345_17" }{\fl
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rosciti Const., Inc. v. Lot 10 of East Greenwich Town Assessor\rquote s Plat 14
}
}
(D RI 1991) 754 F.Supp. 14, 17
}}}
(under statute allowing federal agency to remove a \u8220\'3fsuit of civil natu
re\u8221\'3f to federal court)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2299]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Eminent domain proceedings:
}
}
[See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co.
}
}
(1905) 196 US 239, 249, 25 S.Ct. 251, 255
}}}
(construing \u8220\'3fsuit of civil nature\u8221\'3f in former removal statute)
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2300]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Wage penalty proceedings:
}
}
Summary proceedings provided by Louisiana law for imposition of penalties for n
onpayment of wages are removable to federal court. [
}
dType=Y&serNum=2006604726&pubNum=4637&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6e
c74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_4637_843&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4637_843" }{\f
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
McDowell v. Perkinelmer Las, Inc.
}
}
(MD LA 2005) 369 F.Supp.2d 839, 843]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2301]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Compare\u8212\'3fprelawsuit discovery proceedings:
}
}
State court petitions for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
prelawsuit
}
}
discovery are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
\u8220\'3fcivil actions\u8221\'3f for removal purposes. [
}
c74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_4637_1254&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4637_1254" }{
\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Young v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC
}
}
(MD AL 2008) 575 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1254]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2302]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Review of administrative agency decisions: See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3165.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2303\u8211\'3f2309]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b. [2:2310]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Diversity of citizenship cases:
}
}
Except as noted below, any case that could have been commenced in federal court
based on diversity of citizenship can be removed from state court on this groun
d. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(a)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer: See detailed discussion of diversity requirements at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1130 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2311]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Determining \u8220\'3fcitizenship\u8221\'3f of defendants:
}
}
The discussion relating to \u8220\'3fcitizenship\u8221\'3f of parties for origi
nal federal jurisdiction (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1210 ff.
}
}
) also applies on removal.
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2312]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Corporations:
}
}
Thus, a corporation is a \u8220\'3fcitizen\u8221\'3f both of the state in which
it was incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of busine
ss (see
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4b24000003ba5" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(c)
}}}
, \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1270 ff.
}
}
). Actions brought in the courts of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
either
}
}
state cannot be removed to federal court. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Co-Efficient Energy Systems v. CSL Industries, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 812 F2d 556, 559\u8211\'3f560
}}}
\u8212\'3foriginal jurisdiction case]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If the corporation\rquote s \u8220\'3fprincipal place of business\u8221\'3f is o
utside the U.S., it shall be considered a citizen of that foreign state (as well
as any state and foreign state in which it is incorporated). [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(c) (1)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1301
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2313]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Aliens:
}
}
Just as with actions filed originally in federal court, an action can be removed
if it is between a citizen and an alien (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1490 ff.
}
}
), unless the citizen is subject to the \u8220\'3fno-local defendant\u8221\'3f l
imitation of
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_c0ae00006c482" }{\fldrslt
\u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
. [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Infuturia Global Ltd. v. Sequus Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2011) 631 F3d 1133, 1137; \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
2
}
}}}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
:2320
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, if the action is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
solely
}
}
between aliens (including resident aliens) or if there are aliens on both sides
of the action and there is not otherwise complete diversity between citizens on
both sides, there is no removal jurisdiction. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_d86d0000be040" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(a)(2)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1510, 2:1525
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Moreover, there is no removal jurisdiction in actions between citizens of a stat
e and aliens who are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
lawfully admitted
}
}
into the United States for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
permanent residence
}
}
and are domiciled in the same State. Aliens lawfully admitted in the U.S. are t
reated as aliens, except they may not sue or be sued by citizens of the same sta
te in which they reside. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(a)(2)
}}}
; see
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_4637_1258&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs
=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_4637_1258"
}{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp. v. Andersen, LLP
}
}
(D CO 1998) 11 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1258
}}}
\u8212\'3fno jurisdiction when alien sues partnership that included alien partne
rs admitted to permanent residence in U.S.; \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1514 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2314]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Unincorporated associations and partnerships:
}
}
The citizenship of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
each member
}
}
of an unincorporated association or partnership must be considered in determini
ng diversity (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1353
}
}
). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Carden v. Arkoma Associates
}
}
(1990) 494 US 185, 195, 110 S.Ct. 1015, 1021;
}}}
}
74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_350_304&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1
.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_350_304" }{\fldr
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rockwell Int\rquote l Credit Corp. v. United States Aircraft Ins. Group
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 823 F2d 302, 304]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This includes so-called multi-tiered partnerships in which one of the partners i
s itself a partnership. In such cases, the citizenship of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
partners at all levels must be considered in determining if there is complete d
iversity.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1355.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2315]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limited liability companies:
}
}
The citizenship of a limited liability company for diversity purposes is determi
ned by examining the citizenship of each member of the company (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1372
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. Mehrotra
}
}
(1st Cir. 2011) 661 F3d 124, 125\u8211\'3f126;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings, L.L.C.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2004) 374 F3d 1020, 1021\u8211\'3f1022]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2316]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Representative parties:
}
}
The legal representative of a decedent\rquote s estate (administrator or executo
r) is deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent; and a guardian o
r conservator for a minor or incompetent is deemed to be a citizen of the same s
tate as the minor or incompetent. In both cases, the representative\rquote s act
ual citizenship is disregarded for diversity jurisdiction purposes. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_fcf30000ea9c4" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(c)(2)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1260
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2317]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTERS:
}
}
}
The simplest way to determine whether diversity exists to permit removal is to w
rite down the states of citizenship of all plaintiffs on one side of a paper and
the states of citizenship of all defendants on the other side. If the same stat
e is on both sides, complete diversity is lacking!
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Where a partnership is involved, be sure to determine the states of citizenship
of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
partners (at all levels of the partnership). Don\rquote t assume that all partn
ers are citizens of the same state.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Finally, if you represent a party that has been in federal court before,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
make sure that no inconsistent allegations
}
}
regarding citizenship were made in the prior litigation.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2318\u8211\'3f2319]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2320]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation\u8212\'3fno \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendants:
}
}
There is a major limitation on removal jurisdiction in diversity cases: Even if
there is complete diversity, removal is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
allowed if \u8220\'3fany of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.\u8221\'
3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Spencer v. United States Dist. Ct. for Northern Dist. of Calif. (Altec Industrie
s, Inc.)
}
}
(9th Cir. 2004) 393 F3d 867, 870;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Republic Western Ins. Co. v. International Ins. Co.
}
}
(ND CA 1991) 765 F.Supp. 628, 629
}}}
(citing text)]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2321]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect:
}
}
Even if there is complete diversity, removal can be effected only by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
nonresident defendants
}
}
. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Getty Oil Corp., a Div. of Texaco, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America
}
}
(5th Cir. 1988) 841 F2d 1254, 1258]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Further, once
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any
}
}
\u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant has been properly
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
served
}
}
, the action cannot be removed on diversity grounds by that defendant
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or any other defendant
}
}
. (I.e., where a \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant is named, nonresidents must
remove
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
before
}
}
that defendant is served!)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2322]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Voluntary appearance by local defendant before service?
}
}
There is a wide split among the district courts whether the \u8220\'3fproperly j
oined and served\u8221\'3f prerequisite bars a local defendant from removing if
that defendant makes a voluntary appearance
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
before formal service.
}
}
[See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc.
}
}
(D MA 2013) 934 F.Supp.2d 313, 317\u8211\'3f318
}}}
(collecting cases)]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2322.1]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
View prohibiting removal:
}
}
Many courts hold that local defendant removal of an action on diversity grounds
before service (e.g., by scanning filings and voluntarily appearing) is not all
owed because it would defeat the purpose of the prohibition\u8212\'3fi.e., barri
ng removal for local parties who do not need removal to prevent \u8220\'3flocal\
u8221\'3f prejudice in state court. [
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sullivan v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.
}
}
(D NJ 2008) 575 F.Supp.2d 640, 647;
}}}
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ethington v. General Elec. Co.
}
}
(ND OH 2008) 575 F.Supp.2d 855, 861\u8211\'3f863;
}}}
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 934 F.Supp.2d at 319\u8211\'3f323]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2322.2]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
View allowing removal:
}
}
Other courts treat the \u8220\'3fproperly joined and served\u8221\'3f language
literally, thus allowing removal if the defendant removes the action before form
al service. [
}
74e0e&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Terry v. J.D. Street & Co., Inc.
}
}
(ED MO 2010) 2010 WL 3829201, *1\u8211\'3f2;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Munchel v. Wyeth LLC
}
}
(D DE 2012) 2012 WL 4050072, *3]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2322.3]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
View requiring at least one defendant to be served:
}
}
Still, other courts apply a different test, allowing removal as long as one of
the removing defendants (who is not local) was served prior to removal. [
}
}{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hawkins v. Cottrell, Inc.
}
}
(ND GA 2011) 785 F.Supp.2d 1361, 1363
}}}
\u8212\'3fno removal if only one defendant (who is local) in the action;
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionTyp
e=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Howard v. Genentech, Inc.
}
}
(D MA 2013) 2013 WL 680200, *1
}}}
(same)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2322.4]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
Since the removal statutes are strictly construed (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2225 ff.
}
}
), the better view would seem to be that local defendants should not be able to
avoid the statutory bar against such removal in diversity actions by volunteerin
g an appearance before formal service. While there is no circuit authority on po
int, the district courts have widely split in multiple published and unpublished
opinions on the subject.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2323]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Entity defendants:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fno-local defendant\u8221\'3f rule can pose particular problems for
removal in actions involving corporate and other entity defendants because of t
heir
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
multiple
}
}
citizenships (e.g., in an action against a partnership, removal is barred if an
y partner in the partnership is a citizen of the forum state). [See
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2324]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Example:
}
}
P (Nevada citizen) has a claim for $100,000 against D (California citizen). Sin
ce diversity is present and the amount in controversy is sufficient, P could fil
e either in state or federal court\u8212\'3fin either California or Nevada (assu
ming D is subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If P sues in Nevada state court, D\rquote s right to remove to federal court is
clear.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But if P files in California state court, D, being a citizen of California,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot
}
}
remove to federal court.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
And note:
}
}
Once D is served, an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Arizona codefendant
}
}
, X, cannot remove the case either ... because
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_a83b000018c76" }{\fldrslt
\u167\'3f 1441(b) (above)
}}}
states that \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
none
}
}
of the defendants joined
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and served
}
}
\u8221\'3f may be a local citizen.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, if P (Nevada Citizen) sues D\u8211\'3f1 (Oregon Citizen) and D\u8211\'3
f2 (California Citizen) in a California state court for an amount in excess of $
75,000, D\u8211\'3f1 can remove the action to federal court on diversity grounds
as long as D\u8211\'3f2 has not yet been
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
served
}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3456
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2325]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Purpose:
}
}
Removal jurisdiction in diversity cases exists to protect \u8220\'3fstranger\u8
221\'3f litigants (nonresidents) against prejudice they might encounter in state
courts (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2191
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But federal court jurisdiction is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unnecessary
}
}
where there is a \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant \u8220\'3fbecause there is
less reason to fear state court prejudice against the defendants if one or more
of them is from the forum state.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
s, Inc.)
}
}
(9th Cir. 2004) 393 F3d 867, 870
}}}
(internal quotes omitted)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2326]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No need to negate potential local defendants:
}
}
Defendants may remove an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if ther
e is complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants, a
nd no defendant is a citizen of the forum state. \u8220\'3fIt is not incumbent o
n the named defendants to negate the existence of a potential defendant whose pr
esence in the action would destroy diversity.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche
}
}
(2005) 546 US 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 606, 609]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
As long as the removing defendant has a real interest in the case (i.e., not a s
ham or nominal party), it is error for the court to inquire whether some other p
erson might have been joined as an additional or substitute defendant. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche
}
}
, supra, 546 US at 93, 126 S.Ct. at 615]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2327]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Postremoval joinder:
}
}
The court may, however, sua sponte order a postremoval joinder of parties whose
presence may be \u8220\'3fnecessary for a just adjudication\u8221\'3f under
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR19&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6e
c74e0e&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D
ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
FRCP 19
}}}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
7:54 ff.
}
}
). If such joinder destroys diversity, remand may be required (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3655
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2327.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fimproper joinder:
}
}
If, on the other hand, a local defendant, who would otherwise defeat removal, i
s not properly joined as a party to the lawsuit, that defendant is not considere
d when determining removability. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2423 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2328]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation can be waived:
}
}
Most courts hold that the \u8220\'3fno-local-defendant\u8221\'3f limitation of
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
is not jurisdictional. If plaintiff fails to make a timely motion for remand on
this ground, the defect is waived (as long as there is complete diversity). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Shell Oil Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1991) 932 F2d 1518, 1522;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Korea Exchange Bank v. Trackwise Sales Corp.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1995) 66 F3d 46, 50
}}}
(citing text);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3506;
}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
WRS Motion Picture & Video Laboratory v. Post Modern Edit, Inc.
}
}
(CD CA 1999) 33 F.Supp.2d 876, 878
}}}
(citing text)] (As to \u8220\'3ftimeliness\u8221\'3f of motion for remand,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3720
}
}
.)
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2329] On the other hand, some courts hold that the presence of a l
ocal defendant is a \u8220\'3fjurisdictional\u8221\'3f defect that can be raised
at any time. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co.
}
}
(8th Cir. 1992) 963 F2d 1142, 1145;
}}}
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
WRS Motion Picture & Video Laboratory v. Post Modern Edit, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 33 F.Supp.2d at 878]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2330] Comment: The latter view seems incorrect. Diversity jurisdic
tion exists and a judgment could not be challenged on this ground. The \u8220\'3
fno-local-defendant\u8221\'3f limitation is merely a ground for remand and there
fore can be waived. [See
}
74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_28&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.
0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_28" }{\fldrsl
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp.
}
}
(1st Cir. 2012) 670 F3d 21, 28]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2331]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
CAUTION:
}
}
}
Remember that the \u8220\'3fno local defendant\u8221\'3f rule applies only if (1
) removal is based exclusively on diversity jurisdiction, (2) the local defendan
t has been properly served at the time of removal, and (3) the case has been fil
ed by out-of-state plaintiffs (necessarily true since complete diversity otherwi
se would not exist).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2332\u8211\'3f2334]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2335]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Time at which \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f citizenship measured:
}
}
If removal was proper when the notice of removal was filed, subsequent events no
rmally do not destroy removal jurisdiction. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
s, Inc.)
}
}
, supra, 393 F3d at 871]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2336]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Postremoval joinder of \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant disregarded:
}
}
Removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction is not affected where a \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f diverse defendan
t is joined
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
after
}
}
the action was removed to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
: \u8220\'3fThe forum defendant rule of
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
is only applicable at the time a notice is filed.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
s, Inc.)
}
}
, supra, 393 F3d at 871]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2337]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant relocates before action rem
oved:
}
}
It is unclear whether the no-local-defendant rule applies to persons who
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
were
}
}
citizens of the forum state when the state court action was filed but who moved
to a different state (which is also different from plaintiff\rquote s state so
there is complete diversity) before the action was removed to federal court.
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Example: P (Nevada) files suit in California state court against \u8220\'3flocal
\u8221\'3f D1 (California) and D2 (Nevada). D1 later moves to Oregon. Still late
r, P settles with D2 (creating complete diversity). Can D1 now remove the Califo
rnia state court action to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
on diversity grounds, or is
}
removal
}
}
}
barred by the fact that D1 was a California citizen when the state court action
was filed?
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
There is no known case law on point. However, the removal statutes are strictly
construed (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2225
}
}
). Thus, federal courts may hold that a \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant\rquo
te s change of citizenship after the litigation commences does not avoid the no-
local-defendant limitation of
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2338]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTERS:
}
}
}
The \u8220\'3fno-local-defendant\u8221\'3f limitation of
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
creates strategy possibilities for each party:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2339]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
FOR PLAINTIFF:
}
}
}
Whenever there is diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and defendant, and
plaintiff wants to file in state court, it is a good idea to join and serve a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
local
}
}
codefendant wherever possible. (However, such joinder cannot be \u8220\'3fsham\
u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fmotivated
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
solely
}
}
for the purpose of defeating diversity\u8221\'3f;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2423
}
}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2340]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
FOR DEFENDANT:
}
}
}
A nonresident defendant, on the other hand, may be able to avoid the
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
limitation by removing the action
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
before
}
}
service on the local codefendant (because
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
applies only if the local defendant has been \u8220\'3fjoined
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and served
}
}
\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But the nonresident defendant should act
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
immediately
}
}
rather than waiting until near the end of the 30\u8211\'3fday period after serv
ice. Reason: Removal will be improper if the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
local defendant is served before removal
}
}
(even if after service on the nonresident;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:625
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2341]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fdiversity required as to ALL defendants, including those unserv
ed:
}
}
Remember, however, that the citizenship of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
defendants\u8212\'3fboth served and unserved\u8212\'3fdetermines diversity juri
sdiction. The case is not removable on diversity grounds in the first place if a
ny plaintiff and any defendant are citizens of the same state. It makes no diffe
rence whether the \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendant has been served. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pecherski v. General Motors Corp.
}
}
(8th Cir. 1981) 636 F2d 1156, 1160;
}}}
see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Zaini v. Shell Oil Co.
}
}
(SD TX 1994) 853 F.Supp. 960, 963\u8211\'3f964]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2342]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Example:
}
}
P (California citizen) files a state court action against D1 (Utah citizen) and
D2 (another California citizen). P serves D1, but has not yet served D2, when D
1 removes the case to federal court. The case must be remanded ... but
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
because removal is barred by the no-local-citizen limitation of
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
. Rather, removal is barred because there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no diversity between P and D2
}
}
. The federal court must consider the citizenship both of served and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unserved
}
}
defendants in determining diversity jurisdiction.
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2343]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Court may dismiss nondiverse defendant:
}
}
The court has power to dismiss nondiverse parties (if they are not indispensabl
e) and retain jurisdiction (
}
FRCP 21
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1571 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, this power belongs to the court and is exercised sparingly (usually on
appeal). I.e., the defendant who improperly removed the action has no right to i
nsist upon such dismissal to preserve federal jurisdiction. [See
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sweeney v. Westvaco Co.
}
}
(1st Cir. 1991) 926 F2d 29, 41]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2344]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Result:
}
}
The
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
limitation against \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendants comes into play only wh
ere
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiff
}
}
is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
a citizen of the forum state. If plaintiff and any defendant are citizens of th
e forum state, the case could not be removed on diversity grounds in the first p
lace!
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2345]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
When local defendants ignored for purposes of removal:
}
}
Even if a state court complaint that presents diversity jurisdiction (i.e., an o
ut-of-state plaintiff suing diverse defendants) includes a local defendant (one
who is a citizen of the forum state), the local defendant can be ignored and rem
oval can take place on diversity grounds where:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2345.1] Plaintiff has voluntarily abandoned the case against the u
nserved defendants (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2417
}
}
); or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2345.2] The complaint fails to state a \u8220\'3fcolorable\u8221\'
3f claim against them, and therefore they are treated as \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3
f defendants (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2423
}
}
); or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2345.3] The local defendant is named in a class action under the C
lass Action Fairness Act (
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_5ba1000067d06" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 1332(d)
}}}
,
}
1453(b)
}}}
) in which his or her presence does not defeat removal if there is otherwise min
imal diversity under the statute (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1420 ff, 2:3021 ff.
}
}
); or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2345.4] The local defendant has not been served and has not appear
ed in the action such that removal by the other served defendant(s) is proper as
long as there is complete diversity among all parties (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2320
}
}
); or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2345.5] Under the holding of some courts, even if the local defend
ant has voluntarily appeared in the case and joined the removal, as long as it a
ll takes place before service (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2322.2
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2346\u8211\'3f2347]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2348]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fremoval based on federal question:
}
}
Removal predicated on federal question jurisdiction is permitted even where a \
u8220\'3fnonremovable claim\u8221\'3f is joined with the removable claim (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2201, 2:2811
}
}
). But no such exception exists for diversity-based removals: i.e., diversity as
to a single claim is never enough; it must exist between
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
plaintiffs and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
defendants. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht
}
}
(1998) 524 US 381, 388, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 2052;
}}}
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
California v. Steelcase, Inc.
}
}
(CD CA 1992) 792 F.Supp. 84, 86\u8211\'3f87]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2349]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fnondiverse coplaintiffs as \u8220\'3fsupplemental\u8221\'3f par
ties:
}
}
As long as federal subject matter jurisdiction exists for claims between a sing
le plaintiff and all defendants, \u8220\'3fsupplemental\u8221\'3f jurisdiction a
rguably exists for a coplaintiff\rquote s transactionally-related claims as to w
hich federal jurisdiction is otherwise lacking (e.g., because of nondiverse part
y or insufficient jurisdictional amount). Under this approach, removal could be
authorized as well. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 1996) 77 F3d 928, 932]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2350\u8211\'3f2354]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2355]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstatutes authorizing removal without complete diversity:
}
}
In certain cases, however, statutes allow removal of state court actions
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
without
}
}
diversity of citizenship between the parties or with only \u8220\'3fminimal div
ersity.\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2860 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2356]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Diversity must exist both when action filed and removed:
}
}
For removal purposes, diversity must exist
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
both
}
}
at the time the action was commenced in state court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
at the time of removal. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 919, AFL\u8211\'3fCIO v. CenterMar
k Properties Meriden Square, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1994) 30 F3d 298, 301;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat\rquote l Carriers, Inc.
}
}
(8th Cir. 2001) 263 F3d 816, 819;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Strotek Corp. v. Air Transport Ass\rquote n of America
}
}
(9th Cir. 2002) 300 F3d 1129, 1131]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This rule may be invoked where the original parties have changed domicile or ass
igned the cause of action in the intervening period. It also applies if new part
ies (nondiverse) have been added or have intervened after commencement but befor
e removal. [See
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Eighmy
}
}
(D KS 1994) 849 F.Supp. 40, 42]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2357]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
If diversity did not exist when plaintiff filed suit, defendants should not be
able to \u8220\'3fcreate\u8221\'3f federal jurisdiction later by moving to a new
domicile. And, diversity should also exist when the notice of removal is filed,
because that is the point at which federal jurisdiction is actually invoked. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kilpatrick v. Arrow Co.
}
}
(WD LA 1977) 425 F.Supp. 1378, 1380;
}}}
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Unanue v. Caribbean Canneries, Inc.
}
}
(D DE 1971) 323 F.Supp. 63, 67]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2358]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Must be alleged in removal notice:
}
}
The existence of diversity jurisdiction at both points must be alleged in the r
emoval notice. [
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wenger v. Western Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio
}
}
(MD TN 1983) 570 F.Supp. 8, 10;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hubbard v. Tripp
}
}
(ED VA 1985) 611 F.Supp. 895, 896]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2359]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Exception:
}
}
Diversity at the time of removal is sufficient if all nondiverse defendants hav
e been voluntarily dismissed or abandoned by the plaintiff before the removal no
tice is filed (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2417
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2360]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fno-local-defendant\u8221\'3f limitation:
}
}
It is not clear whether the
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)(2)
}}}
limitation against removal where \u8220\'3flocal\u8221\'3f defendants are named
and served would be applied in the same way. Logic would suggest, however, that
whether a local defendant has been named and served should likewise be ascertai
ned as of the time of removal.
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2361]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fpostremoval joinder of nondiverse party:
}
}
As discussed later, if a nondiverse party is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
added
}
}
after removal, diversity jurisdiction is defeated.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3615
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2362]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fpostremoval dismissal of nondiverse defendant:
}
}
As discussed later, if plaintiff dismisses a nondiverse defendant from the case,
removability depends on whether the dismissal was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
voluntary
}
}
or
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
involuntary. See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3354
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2363]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
How diversity determined in removal cases:
}
}
A case is removable on diversity grounds if diversity of citizenship can be asce
rtained from the face of plaintiff\rquote s complaint. [See
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_3fed000053a85" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b)(1),(3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2364]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Where complaint uncertain as to diversity:
}
}
If the existence of diversity is not ascertainable from the face of the original
complaint, \u8220\'3fa notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after rece
ipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or ot
her paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is o
r has become removable.\u8221\'3f [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_d801000002763" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b)(3)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and see discussion of timing of removal from uncertain complaints at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3315 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court complaints rarely allege the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
citizenship
}
}
of each party (as opposed to residence). It is even rarer that they allege fact
s showing diversity exists at the time removal is sought. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Keller v. Carr
}
}
(WD AR 1981) 534 F.Supp. 100, 102]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2365]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defendant\rquote s burden to allege diversity:
}
}
Where the complaint does not disclose the citizenship of each party and the amo
unt in controversy, these jurisdictional facts must be set forth in defendant\rq
uote s notice of removal. [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings, L.L.C.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2004) 374 F3d 1020, 1021\u8211\'3f1022
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval notice must allege citizenship of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
each member
}
}
of limited liability company;
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionTyp
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Barnhill v. Insurance Co. of North America
}
}
(D SC 1990) 130 FRD 46
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval notice must allege corporation\rquote s state(s) of incorporat
ion and principal place of business]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2366]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Cross-refer\u8212\'3fremoval procedure:
}
}
Form and content of the removal notice are discussed at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3428 ff
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2367]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Burden of proof:
}
}
After removal, plaintiff may challenge the allegations of the removal notice. T
he burden is on defendant to prove the existence of jurisdictional facts (comple
te diversity, etc.). [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gaus v. Miles, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1992) 980 F2d 564, 566; \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
2
}
}}}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
:3739
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2368]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of plaintiff\rquote s failure to challenge facts stated in removal notice
:
}
}
Plaintiff\rquote s failure to challenge the factual allegations in the removal n
otice regarding the basis for removal jurisdiction does not affect the court\rqu
ote s obligation to satisfy itself as to removal jurisdiction. Lack of removal j
urisdiction can be raised by the court or any party at any time (even for the fi
rst time on appeal). [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2004) 372 F3d 1115, 1116]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2369]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
This makes it essential for plaintiffs to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
verify
}
}
the existence of federal removal jurisdiction even if they are not opposed to t
he removal. Otherwise, a successful outcome in federal court could be wiped out
by a remand to state court, initiated by the court or the losing party!
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2370\u8211\'3f2374]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2375]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Determining amount in controversy:
}
}
Likewise, to be removable on diversity grounds, it must be ascertainable that t
he amount in controversy exceeds minimum federal jurisdiction. The amount is tes
ted
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
at the time of removal,
}
}
not as increased or decreased due to later events. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1999) 166 F3d 214, 217\u8211\'3f218
}}}
\u8212\'3ffederal judgment set aside where it was subsequently shown that requis
ite amount was never present;
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3245
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
To establish the jurisdictional amount, the removing defendant
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
need not concede liability
}
}
for the entire amount. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lewis v. Verizon Communications, Inc
}
}
. (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F3d 395, 400]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
Rules for determining the amount in controversy are discussed in greater detail
at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1750 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2376]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Aggregation rules:
}
}
The rules for original diversity actions that permit aggregation of claims to sa
tisfy the jurisdictional minimum, and uphold supplemental jurisdiction over smal
ler claims, apply equally to actions removed from state court. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Stromberg MetalWorks, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 1996) 77 F3d 928, 932;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1885 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2377]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of state court counterclaims?
}
}
The amount in controversy is determined without regard to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
permissive
}
}
counterclaims or cross-complaints filed in the state court action prior to remo
val. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Independent Machine Co. v. International Tray Pads & Packaging, Inc
}
}
. (D NJ 1998) 991 F.Supp. 687, 691]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But courts are split where such counterclaim or cross-complaint was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
compulsory
}
}
under state law. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Swallow & Assocs. v. Henry Molded Products, Inc.
}
}
(ED MI 1992) 794 F.Supp. 660, 663
}}}
\u8212\'3fpermitting removal based on dollar amount of compulsory counterclaim;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Independent Machine Co. v. International Tray Pads & Packaging, Inc
}
}
., supra, 991 F.Supp. at 693
}}}
\u8212\'3fcase
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot
}
}
be removed based upon damages pled in compulsory counterclaim;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1769
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2378]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of postfiling amendments:
}
}
If the initial complaint does not seek relief in excess of the jurisdictional m
inimum amount in controversy, but events subsequent to that filing then provide
the requisite amount in controversy, removal may take place within 30 days of th
at change. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b)(3)
}}}
&
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_b1b5000051ac5" }{\fldrslt
(c)(3) (A)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tokarz v. Texaco Pipeline, Inc.
}
}
(ND IL 1993) 856 F.Supp. 403, 404;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2346
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2379]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Actual amendment increasing demand:
}
}
If plaintiff amends the state court complaint to then seek more than the jurisdi
ctional minimum, the action becomes removable . . . subject to this limitation:
If the amendment occurs more than one year after commencement and plaintiff did
not deliberately fail to disclose the requisite amount to prevent removal, remov
al on the basis of diversity would not be timely in any event. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_10c0000001331" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(1),(3)(B)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3335 ff., 2:3401 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2380]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Possibility of amendment insufficient:
}
}
Removal cannot be based on the mere fact plaintiff \u8220\'3fmight\u8221\'3f ask
for more than the federal minimum in the state court action. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1994) 31 F3d 1092, 1097]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2381\u8211\'3f2383]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2384]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Amount demanded in good faith in initial complaint:
}
}
When removal is sought on diversity grounds, generally \u8220\'3fthe sum demande
d in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in cont
roversy.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2385]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court complaint for
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
less
}
}
than $75,000:
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
}
If the state court complaint specifically seeks \u8220\'3fless\u8221\'3f than $7
5,000, removal on the basis of diversity will not be allowed unless the amount s
ought was stated in bad faith (or if it includes nonmonetary relief that would a
dd to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2405 ff.
}
}
)
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
.
}
}
Defendant would have a particularly heavy burden in such situations, likely nee
ding to show the amount pleaded was falsely or incompetently set forth. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c) (2)
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co.,
}
}
supra, 31 F3d at 1095;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rogers v. Wal\u8211\'3fMart Stores, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 2000) 230 F3d 868, 81;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
De Aguilar v. Boeing Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 47 F3d 1404, 1409\u8211\'3f1410]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2386]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
Defendant faces an uphill battle to avoid remand where plaintiff sues for less t
han $75,000. Therefore, it generally may be better to conduct discovery in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state court
}
}
before removal, and remove upon receipt of a pleading, discovery response or ot
her paper now disclosing the basis for a removable claim. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_773400008cd46" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(3)(A)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2007) 506 F3d 696, 699;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see also
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3230
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2387\u8211\'3f2388]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2389]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court complaint for
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
more
}
}
than $75,000:
}
}
Similarly, if the state court complaint expressly seeks
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
more
}
}
than $75,000, removal on the basis of diversity will be allowed unless the amou
nt set forth in the initial complaint was stated in bad faith. Because plaintiff
instituted the case in state court, there is a strong presumption plaintiff did
not inflate the claim to support removal. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.
}
}
(1938) 303 US 283, 290, 58 S.Ct. 586, 591;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1996) 102 F3d 398, 402]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
Since, upon removal, it will now be plaintiff who is alleging the amount in con
troversy is less than the higher amount sought in the complaint, some courts req
uire plaintiff to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
stipulate
}
}
that any recovery in state court will not exceed $75,000.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2390\u8211\'3f2392]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2393]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State pleading practices rendering monetary amount unclear:
}
}
If the initial complaint seeks a monetary judgment but the state practice \u8220
\'3feither does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits recovery of dama
ges in excess of the amount demanded,\u8221\'3f the notice of removal may assert
the jurisdictional minimum. For example, some state laws prohibit complaints fr
om stating the amount demanded in personal injury and wrongful death cases (see
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000201&cite=CACPS425.10&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
6ec74e0e&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Calif. CCP \u167\'3f 425.10(b)
}}}
). [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_0f8c000072663" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gaus v. Miles, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1992) 980 F2d 564, 567]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2394]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Standard of proof:
}
}
If state law does not permit a specific demand in a complaint or permits recover
y in excess of the amount set forth therein that is below $75,000, removal will
be upheld if the court finds by a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
preponderance of the evidence
}
}
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_5ef30000a42f1" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)(B)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.
}
}
, supra, 102 F3d at 403\u8211\'3f404;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
McPhail v. Deere & Co.
}
}
(10th Cir. 2008) 529 F3d 947, 954\u8211\'3f955]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2395]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defendant\rquote s burden of proof:
}
}
The burden in such situations is on the removing defendant to show by a prepond
erance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is satisfied. Thus, a remo
ving defendant in such a situation need not prove to a legal certainty that the
amount in controversy requirement has been met; rather, defendant may simply all
ege in its notice of removal that the jurisdictional threshold has been met and
discovery may be taken with regard to that question. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 529 F3d at 954]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2396]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fFacially apparent\u8221\'3f allegations in complaint:
}
}
The removing defendant can meet this burden by showing that the \u8220\'3ffacial
ly apparent\u8221\'3f allegations in the complaint demonstrate the amount in con
troversy. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1999) 171 F3d 295, 298
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3ffacially apparent\u8221\'3f from complaint amount satisfied
due to allegations of property damage, travel expenses, pain and suffering, etc.
;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
White v. FCI USA, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2003) 319 F3d 672, 674
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3ffacially apparent\u8221\'3f from wrongful termination allega
tions showing \u8220\'3flengthy list of compensatory and punitive damages\u8221\
'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2397]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court discovery:
}
}
A case becomes removable when plaintiff\rquote s state court deposition testimon
y discloses the claim exceeds $75,000. The deposition is treated as a \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
paper
}
}
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has bec
ome removable\u8221\'3f (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b) (3)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discussed at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3353
}
}
). [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. Partnership
}
}
(10th Cir. 1999) 194 F3d 1072, 1078
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval more than 30 days after plaintiff\rquote s deposition was unti
mely because plaintiff\rquote s deposition testimony put defendant on notice tha
t plaintiff\rquote s claim exceeded $75,000;
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c) (3)(A)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3/ [2:2398]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defendant\rquote s removal notice:
}
}
Courts may consider factual statements in defendant\rquote s notice of removal i
n assessing removal jurisdiction. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2001) 269 F3d 1316, 1319;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gaus v. Miles, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 980 F2d at 566
}}}
\u8212\'3fconclusory allegations in notice of removal insufficient]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4/ [2:2399]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Settlement demands:
}
}
Courts will allow examination of settlement demands to determine if they provid
e a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
candid assessment
}
}
of the amount likely to be recovered at trial. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rising-Moore v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2006) 435 F3d 813, 816;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jackson v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla.
}
}
(SD AL 1997) 976 F.Supp. 1450, 1454
}}}
\u8212\'3f$70,000 demand shows plaintiffs expected to receive considerably more
at trial;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3322
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2400\u8211\'3f2401]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2402]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Discovery and findings:
}
}
In the case of a dispute as to the amount in controversy in actions in which the
state court is unclear, the district court is authorized to allow jurisdictiona
l discovery with regard to the question and must make findings of jurisdictional
facts as to which the preponderance standard applies. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2006) 443 F3d 676, 691;
}}}
see H.R. Report 112\u8211\'3f10 to Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarif
ication Act of 2011 (FCJVCA) at p. 16;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and further discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3760
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2403\u8211\'3f2404]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:2405]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court complaint seeking nonmonetary relief:
}
}
If the initial state court complaint seeks nonmonetary relief (e.g., injunction)
, the amount sought in good faith also is subject to proof at the preponderance
level from defendant that the full amount in controversy actually exceeds $75,00
0 supporting removal. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_d3820000d2db6" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)(A)(i)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2406]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Value of injunctive relief:
}
}
In cases seeking injunctive relief, the amount in controversy may be the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cost to defendant
}
}
if such relief is granted. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2002) 301 F3d 548, 553;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1850 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2407]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Proof; discovery:
}
}
Since defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence tha
t the value of the nonmonetary relief (combined with the value of the other reli
ef) exceeds $75,000, courts will also allow discovery. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_5ef30000a42f1" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)(B)
}}}
; see H.R. Report 112\u8211\'3f10 on FCJVCA at p. 16]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2408]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2409]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
It is incumbent upon defense counsel to conduct a reasonable good-faith investig
ation as to the case\rquote s value
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
before
}
}
removal. Failure to do so exposes defense counsel to Rule 11 sanctions (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3824
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
To meet this burden, defense counsel should make an independent effort to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
verify
}
}
the nature and amount of damages claimed (e.g., reviewing client\rquote s inves
tigations, comparable jury verdicts, etc.).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Alternatively,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defendant might ask plaintiff for a stipulation
}
}
that damages do
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
exceed $75,000. If plaintiff refuses (as expected), a federal judge is not like
ly to impose sanctions for an insufficient amount in controversy!
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If the complaint actually is uncertain as to the amount in controversy, use
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discovery requests in state court
}
}
to plaintiff concerning damages sought. If the responses indicate that more tha
n $75,000 is at issue, removal can then take place.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2410\u8211\'3f2416]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2417]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Later developments creating diversity:
}
}
A case not removable under the original complaint may become removable by later
amendments to the complaint, or other \u8220\'3fvoluntary\u8221\'3f actions by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiff
}
}
creating diversity (e.g., voluntarily dismissing the nondiverse defendants). In
such event, defendant\rquote s right to remove arises
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
when first put on notice
}
}
that diversity exists: i.e., upon receipt of \u8220\'3fan amended pleading, mot
ion, order or other paper (e.g., discovery responses)
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
from which it may first be ascertained
}
}
that the case is ... removable.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b)(3)
}}}
(emphasis and parentheses added)]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2418]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation:
}
}
Removal on diversity grounds must be effected
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
within one year
}
}
after the action was filed in any event. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(1)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3401 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2419]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fgrounds must also exist at time of removal:
}
}
Conversely, amendments to the complaint made
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
after
}
}
removal do
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
confer federal jurisdiction where no \u8220\'3ffederal question\u8221\'3f or \u
8220\'3fdiversity\u8221\'3f claim was present at the time of removal. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1979) 592 F2d 1062, 1065]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2420]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fdefendant cannot create removability:
}
}
Although plaintiff may restructure the action so as to make it removable (above
), defendant cannot: E.g., if there was no diversity when the complaint was file
d, defendant cannot change his or her citizenship to create diversity (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2356
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2421]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fprior basis for removal:
}
}
If the original complaint was removable on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
federal question
}
}
grounds, later developments creating diversity do
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
retrigger the right to remove. Removal must take place when the case was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
first removable
}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3389
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
Time for removal is discussed further at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3230 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(6) [2:2422]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Realignment of parties:
}
}
As with original diversity jurisdiction, in determining whether diversity exist
s in cases removed from state court, the federal court has the power to align th
e parties according to their real interests. The alignment in the complaint is n
ot controlling. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fidelity Ins. Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2012) 676 F3d 1310, 1313\u8211\'3f1314]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Thus, for example, parties joined as \u8220\'3fdefendants\u8221\'3f in the state
court action may be found aligned in interest with the plaintiff and treated as
such in testing whether diversity of citizenship exists. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
City of Vestavia Hills v. General Fidelity Ins. Co.
}
}
, supra, 676 F3d at 1314
}}}
\u8212\'3fdenial of remand proper after realignment of parties according to thei
r true interests gave rise to diversity jurisdiction;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Glenmede Trust Co. v. Dow Chemical Co.
}
}
(ED PA 1974) 384 F.Supp. 423, 427]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(7) [2:2423]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fSham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulent\u8221\'3f joinder:
}
}
A nondiverse party (plaintiff or defendant) named in the state court action may
be disregarded if the federal court determines that party\rquote s joinder is a
\u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulent\u8221\'3f so that no possible
cause of action has been stated against that party. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2001) 236 F3d 1061, 1067;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2011) 663 F3d 1329, 1333]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The most common situation is where plaintiff names as a codefendant someone domi
ciled in the same state as plaintiff, thus defeating diversity of citizenship. (
It also applies in multi-plaintiff cases where one of the plaintiffs is domicile
d in the same state as defendant.) [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Yellen v. Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.
}
}
(ED PA 2011) 832 F.Supp.2d 490, 501
}}}
\u8212\'3ffraudulent joinder utilized to ignore presence of \u8220\'3flocal defe
ndant\u8221\'3f who otherwise would preclude removal (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2320 ff.
}
}
)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Compare\u8212\'3fpostremoval joinder:
}
}
The fraudulent joinder doctrine does not apply to joinder of a nondiverse defen
dant
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
after
}
}
removal because court approval is required. (If the court permits joinder of a
nondiverse defendant, however, the action must be remanded to state court;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3642
}
}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2424]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
What constitutes \u8220\'3ffraudulent joinder\u8221\'3f:
}
}
\u8220\'3fFraudulent joinder\u8221\'3f is a term of art. It does not reflect on
the integrity of plaintiff or counsel. It is \u8220\'3fmerely the rubric applied
when a court finds either that no cause of action is stated against the nondive
rse defendant, or in fact no cause of action exists. In other words, a joinder i
s fraudulent if there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no real intention to get a joint judgment, and . . . there is no colorable groun
d for so claiming
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc.
}
}
(4th Cir. 1990) 903 F2d 1000, 1003
}}}
(emphasis added; internal quotes and parentheses omitted); see also
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
McCabe v. General Foods Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 811 F2d 1336, 1339]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2425]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Types of \u8220\'3ffraudulent\u8221\'3f joinder:
}
}
Courts have applied the fraudulent joinder doctrine in two situations:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fwhere there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no possibility that plaintiff can prove a cause of action
}
}
against the resident (nondiverse) defendant;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fwhere there is outright
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
fraud in pleading jurisdictional facts
}
}
(e.g., false statements regarding party\rquote s citizenship). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 663 F3d at 1332\u8211\'3f1333;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 139 F3d 1313, 1318\u8211\'3f1319]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2425.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Fraudulent
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
misjoinder?
}
}
}
}
Some courts find \u8220\'3ffraudulent joinder\u8221\'3f where plaintiff joins bo
th diverse and nondiverse defendants, and the claim against the diverse defendan
t has
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no real connection
}
}
to the claim against the nondiverse defendant. This \u8220\'3fegregious misjoin
der\u8221\'3f of parties allows the court to ignore the nondiverse parties upon
removal. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1998) 154 F3d 1284, 1287;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Benjamin Moore & Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2002) 318 F3d 626, 630\u8211\'3f631]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Other courts reject this extension of the \u8220\'3ffraudulent joinder\u8221\'3f
doctrine. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Prempro Products Liability Litig.
}
}
(8th Cir. 2010) 591 F3d 613, 621\u8211\'3f622;
}}}
}
}{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Osborn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
}
}
(ED CA 2004) 341 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1127
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fthe last thing the federal courts need is more procedural co
mplexity\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2425.2] Misjoinder of plaintiff\rquote s products liability claim
against the manufacturer of a hernia patch with malpractice claims against the d
octor who implanted the patch could not be used to prevent removal. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sutton v. Davol, Inc.
}
}
(ED CA 2008) 251 FRD 500, 505]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2426]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Possibility of recovery as test:
}
}
It does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
have to be shown that the joinder was for the purpose of preventing removal. Ra
ther, the question is simply whether there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any possibility
}
}
that plaintiff will be able to establish liability against the party in questio
n. [
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1992) 951 F2d 40, 42;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 139 F3d 1313, 1318\u8211\'3f1319;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc.
}
}
(4th Cir. 1999) 187 F3d 422, 426
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fslight\u8221\'3f possibility of recovery ends jurisdictional
inquiry]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2427]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No disputed facts:
}
}
In determining fraudulent joinder, a trial judge may \u8220\'3fpierce the pleadi
ngs\u8221\'3f and consider summary judgment-type evidence in the record. Any amb
iguities or contested issues of fact must be resolved in plaintiff\rquote s favo
r. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Travis v. Irby
}
}
(5th Cir. 2003) 326 F3d 644, 649;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Casias v. Wal\u8211\'3fMart Stores, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 2012) 695 F3d 428, 433]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2428]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defenses generally not considered:
}
}
Ordinarily, courts do not consider a nondiverse defendant\rquote s defenses on
the merits in determining whether that defendant\rquote s joinder was \u8220\'3f
fraudulent.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hunter v. Philip Morris USA
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 582 F3d 1039, 1044
}}}
\u8212\'3ffraudulent joinder not established by showing claim preempted by feder
al law (federal preemption defense goes to merits, not whether defendant fraudul
ently joined);
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Riverdale Baptist Church v. Certainteed Corp.
}
}
(D MD 2004) 349 F.Supp.2d 943, 950
}}}
(citing text)]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2429]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstatute of limitations:
}
}
The result is different where under state law the defense is a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
procedural bar
}
}
to the action regardless of its merits (e.g., the statute of limitations under
California law). Such a defense may be considered for \u8220\'3ffraudulent joind
er\u8221\'3f purposes whether it appears on the face of the pleadings or from ma
tters subject to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
judicial notice
}
}
(e.g., the date a lawsuit was filed may be judicially noted for statute of limi
tations purposes). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 139 F3d at 1319\u8211\'3f1320;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Riverdale Baptist Church v. Certainteed Corp.
}
}
, supra, 349 F.Supp.2d at 950
}}}
(citing text)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2430]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fmerits of claim not considered:
}
}
The fraudulent joinder rule does not apply where there is no reasonable possibil
ity of recovery against
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
either
}
}
the instate or nonresident defendants. This is not a fraudulent joinder problem
; \u8220\'3fthere is only a lawsuit lacking in merit.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Smallwood v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2004) 385 F3d 568, 574
}}}
(en banc)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2430.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Absence of jurisdiction:
}
}
If jurisdictional defects are plainly apparent as to the claims against a party,
that party\rquote s joinder is sham. \u8220\'3fAn otherwise colorable claim can
be considered meritless (and thus, disregarded for diversity purposes) if broug
ht in the absence of jurisdiction.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brazell v. Waite
}
}
(10th Cir. 2013) 525 Fed.Appx. 878, 882
}}}
(parentheses in original)\u8212\'3fclaim fails on ripeness grounds and party sh
ould be dismissed]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2431]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
A common practical problem is whether, in removing on behalf of a proper defenda
nt, the attorney should also appear on behalf of a defendant whose joinder is al
leged to be sham. While not required for removal purposes, such appearance may f
acilitate a subsequent motion to dismiss.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Another consideration is whether to raise the sham joinder argument at all. If t
he federal judge turns it down and remands, plaintiffs can argue that the federa
l judge has found merit in the claim, which could hurt your chances on a demurre
r or motion for summary judgment.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2432\u8211\'3f2439]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application\u8212\'3ffraudulent joinder found
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2440] Passenger sued Cruise Line for injuries suffered aboard ship
and joined a claim against nondiverse Travel Agent for \u8220\'3fnegligently mi
srepresenting\u8221\'3f that Passenger would be safely and adequately served by
Cruise Line. Travel Agent\rquote s joinder was deemed \u8220\'3ffraudulent\u8221
\'3f for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because, under applicable state law,
mere sales talk or \u8220\'3fpuffing\u8221\'3f did not constitute actionable ne
gligent misrepresentation. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2001) 236 F3d 1061, 1067\u8211\'3f1068]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2441] Joinder of a nondiverse defendant who was in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
bankruptcy
}
}
and protected by the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
automatic stay
}
}
(
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=11USCAS362&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6
ec74e0e&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4" }{\fldrslt
11 USC \u167\'3f 362(a)
}}}
) was treated as a fraudulent joinder and did not affect diversity of citizenshi
p for removal purposes. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brown v. Jevic
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2009) 575 F3d 322, 327]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2442]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2443] Employee sued Employer and non-diverse coworker for failing
to protect him from a third party\rquote s criminal attack. Under state law, the
coworker was immune absent proof of intentional misconduct. Because there was n
o such evidence, there was \u8220\'3fno possibility of recovery,\u8221\'3f and t
he coworker was \u8220\'3ffraudulently joined.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1990) 893 F2d 98, 101;
}}}
see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rodriguez v. Sabatino
}
}
(5th Cir. 1997) 120 F3d 589, 592]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2444] Louisiana plaintiffs sued several out-of-state corporations
and \u8220\'3fBaker Pipeline, Inc.,\u8221\'3f a Louisiana company. However, \u82
20\'3fBaker Pipeline, Inc.\u8221\'3f was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
a corporation; it was simply a division of one of the other defendants. Since t
here was no basis for a judgment against Baker, it could be ignored as \u8220\'3
ffraudulently\u8221\'3f joined. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 989 F2d 812, 816\u8211\'3f817]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2445] Insured sued out-of-state insurer and its local agents for n
egligence in failing to provide sufficient limits of insurance coverage. The age
nts were \u8220\'3ffraudulently joined\u8221\'3f because
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no cause of action was stated
}
}
against them (under applicable law, agents acting within the scope of their emp
loyment are not liable for losses resulting from negligent failure to insure). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 44 F3d 256, 260\u8211\'3f262;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Schwartz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
}
}
(7th Cir. 1999) 174 F3d 875, 878\u8211\'3f879;
}}}
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
}
}
(ND CA 1998) 5 F.Supp.2d 804, 807\u8211\'3f808]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2446]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Compare\u8212\'3fbases for agent liability:
}
}
The result may be different where an arguable basis for liability exists agains
t the agent. [
}
}{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Levine v. Allmerica Fin\rquote l Life Ins. & Annuity Co.
}
}
(CD CA 1999) 41 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1078\u8211\'3f1079
}}}
(citing text)\u8212\'3fnondiverse agent who allegedly
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
represented both insurer and insured
}
}
owed fiduciary duties to each, hence joinder not sham;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enterprises\u8211\'3fMississippi, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2004) 390 F3d 400, 410
}}}
\u8212\'3fnursing home resident\rquote s joinder of claim against manager not wi
thout merit under state law]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2447] Former Employee sued Employer (diverse) and Supervisor (nond
iverse) for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Supervisor was fraudul
ently joined to defeat diversity because he could not be held liable
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
as a matter of law
}
}
since there was no allegation or evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Burden v. General Dynamics Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 60 F3d 213, 218]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2448] Employee brought a wrongful termination claim against divers
e corporate Employer and nondiverse Manager. Because Manager did not actively pa
rticipate in the termination decision, he was not subject to liability under sta
te law. He thus was not to be counted for diversity purposes. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Casias v. Wal\u8211\'3fMart Stores, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 2012) 695 F3d 428, 433\u8211\'3f434]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2449]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2450]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Collusive joinder of coplaintiff:
}
}
Similar principles apply where a party is joined as a coplaintiff solely for th
e purpose of destroying diversity and preventing removal. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Grassi v. Ciba\u8211\'3fGeigy, Ltd.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1990) 894 F2d 181, 186;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gentle v. Lamb\u8211\'3fWeston, Inc.
}
}
(D ME 1969) 302 F.Supp. 161, 166]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2451] Maine P sued Oregon D for breach of contract, and joined an
Oregon citizen as plaintiff, assigning him 1% of the claim sued upon. Joinder of
the Oregon co-plaintiff was treated as a \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f and therefore
ignored in determining removability to federal court. [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Gentle v. Lamb\u8211\'3fWeston, Inc.
}
}
, supra; see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Smilgin v. New York Life Ins. Co.
}
}
(SD TX 1994) 854 F.Supp. 464, 466]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2452] Out-of-state plaintiffs whose
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
claims were entirely separate
}
}
from instate plaintiff\rquote s claims and involved no common question of law o
r fact were \u8220\'3ffraudulently misjoined\u8221\'3f for purposes of defeating
diversity jurisdiction. Whether their joinder was proper under state law is imm
aterial. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Coleman v. Conseco
}
}
(SD MS 2002) 238 F.Supp.2d 804, 819
}}}
\u8212\'3fout-of-state plaintiffs dismissed, motion to remand denied]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2453]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fcollusive assignments to CREATE diversity:
}
}
Similar principles apply where claims are assigned to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
create
}
}
diversity of citizenship. Collusive assignments are disregarded. [See
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1359
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.
}
}
(1969) 394 US 823, 828, 89 S.Ct. 1487, 1490;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discussed at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1645
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2454]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Factual question:
}
}
\u8220\'3f(T)he issue of whether the assignment was improperly or collusively m
ade is to be resolved as a simple question of fact,\u8221\'3f not by some higher
standard such as is utilized when analyzing fraudulent joinder. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Grassi v. Ciba\u8211\'3fGeigy, Ltd.
}
}
, supra, 894 F2d at 186;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2450
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2455]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Burden on defendant seeking removal:
}
}
The removing defendant has the heavy burden of alleging and proving the nondive
rse party\rquote s joinder is \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulent.\
u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 989 F2d 812, 815\u8211\'3f816;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Boyer v. Snapon Tools Corp.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1990) 913 F2d 108, 111]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fThe burden of proving a fraudulent joinder is a heavy one. The removin
g party must prove that there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
absolutely no possibility
}
}
that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action against the inst
ate defendant in state court, or that there has been outright fraud in the plain
tiff\rquote s pleadings of jurisdictional facts.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Green v. Amerada Hess Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1983) 707 F2d 201, 205
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2456]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Evidence considered:
}
}
In determining whether a defendant\rquote s joinder is \u8220\'3ffraudulent,\u82
21\'3f courts properly consider the allegations of the complaint and facts prese
nted by defendant in its notice of removal. [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See
}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 139 F3d 1313, 1318]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The district court may also consider
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
affidavits or other evidence
}
}
(presented by either party) on the issue of whether a particular defendant\rquo
te s joinder is \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulent.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
West America Corp. v. Vaughan\u8211\'3fBassett Furniture Co., Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1985) 765 F2d 932, 936, fn. 6;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 44 F3d 256, 263]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2457]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fClear and convincing\u8221\'3f standard:
}
}
Some cases state defendant must produce \u8220\'3fclear and convincing evidence
\u8221\'3f that the joinder is a \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulen
t.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1998) 138 F3d 459, 461]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2458]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Disputed facts resolved in plaintiff\rquote s favor:
}
}
The defendant seeking removal bears a heavy burden in proving fraudulent joinder
. All factual and legal issues must be resolved in favor of a plaintiff seeking
remand; i.e., a summary judgment standard applies. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Legg v. Wyeth
}
}
(11th Cir. 2005) 428 F3d 1317, 1322\u8211\'3f1323;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enterprises\u8211\'3fMississippi, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2004) 390 F3d 400, 405]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2459]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
If you represent the defendant, don\rquote t count on conducting discovery
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
after
}
}
removal to obtain facts to show \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3ffraudulen
t\u8221\'3f joinder. The federal judge may not permit you to conduct such discov
ery.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Diversity cases removed on fraudulent joinder grounds are much more likely to be
remanded than other cases,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exposing defendant to an award of costs and fees
}
}
under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1447 (c)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3800 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2460\u8211\'3f2464]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2465]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Hearing limited to jurisdictional issue:
}
}
Whether joinder of the instate defendant is \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f must be ca
pable of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
summary determination
}
}
. \u8220\'3f(D)istrict courts must not \u8216\'3fpretry\u8217\'3f substantive fa
ctual issues in order to answer the discrete threshold question of whether the j
oinder of an instate defendant is fraudulent ... The only issue that the court s
hould address is that of its own jurisdiction.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Green v. Amerada Hess Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1983) 707 F2d 201, 204]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2466]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Presumption against fraudulent joinder:
}
}
In making this determination, the court resolves \u8220\'3fall disputed questio
ns of fact and all ambiguities in the controlling state law in favor of the non-
removing party.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(5th Cir. 1992) 951 F2d 40, 42\u8211\'3f43
}}}
\u8212\'3feven \u8220\'3ftenuous proposition\u8221\'3f under state law sufficien
t since its \u8220\'3fmodicum of sturdiness\u8221\'3f passed possibility of reco
very test;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dutcher v. Matheson
}
}
(10th Cir. 2013) 733 F3d 980, 989
}}}
\u8212\'3fno fraudulent joinder where attorney defendants failed to show absolut
e immunity for acts taken on behalf of clients; see also
}
}{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Macey v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Co.
}
}
(ND CA 2002) 220 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1118
}}}
(citing text)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2467]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Weak case vs. sham:
}
}
Fraudulent joinder is not shown simply because the action is likely to be dismi
ssed against that defendant: \u8220\'3fWe do not decide whether the plaintiff wi
ll actually or even probably prevail on the merits, but look only for a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
possibility
}
}
that he may do so.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 951 F2d at 42\u8211\'3f43
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Courts do not apply even a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard in which the
claim must be \u8220\'3fplausible\u8221\'3f on its face. Rather, the standard i
s whether there is \u8220\'3fany possibility\u8221\'3f the complaint stated a ca
use of action. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(11th Cir. 2011) 663 F3d 1329, 1333
}}}
(possible claim against insurance agent for failure to obtain desired coverage)
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2468]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
}
Defendants relying on \u8220\'3ffraudulent joinder\u8221\'3f to support removal
often end up hurting their own case. The federal court will remand to state cour
t if there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any
}
}
possibility of establishing a valid claim against the nondiverse party. This ma
y expose defendants to sanctions for improper removal (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3826 ff.
}
}
). It may also have the incidental effect of emboldening plaintiffs and impeding
state court disposition of the otherwise weak claim. Bottom line: Don\rquote t
confuse
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
weak
}
}
claims with
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
\u8220\'3fspurious\u8221\'3f
}
}
ones.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2469]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3finvoluntary dismissal in state court:
}
}
Ordinarily, if the case was not removable originally because of a nondiverse de
fendant, it does not become removable when that defendant is eliminated \u8220\'
3finvoluntarily\u8221\'3f from the lawsuit (e.g., by involuntary dismissal or su
mmary judgment);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3354 ff.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But the result is different where the involuntarily-dismissed defendant was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
fraudulently joined
}
}
in the first instance so that his or her citizenship could be disregarded for d
iversity purposes. In such cases, removal will be upheld, so long as it is other
wise timely (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3230 ff.
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lane v. Champion Int\rquote l Corp.
}
}
(SD AL 1994) 844 F.Supp. 724, 729]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2470]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTERS:
}
}
}
If you represent the defendant, do
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
move to dismiss the \u8220\'3ffraudulently joined\u8221\'3f party in state cour
t. If the dismissal is granted, it may then be too late to remove if the court c
oncludes the \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f nature of the claim was clear at the outse
t, and some courts might view the dismissal order as an \u8220\'3finvoluntary ac
t\u8221\'3f that precludes removal!
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
After removal, remember that the \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f parties are not automa
tically eliminated from the suit. They remain part of the action until dismissed
; i.e., you have to serve them with copies of all notices and pleadings, etc. Th
e removing defendant should therefore move for an order under Rule 12(b)(6) dism
issing the action as to the \u8220\'3fsham\u8221\'3f party. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health
}
}
(5th Cir. 1991) 925 F2d 866, 872]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(8) [2:2471]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants disregarded:
}
}
Many states, including California, permit plaintiff to designate defendants by
fictitious names (\u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f or any other name) if ignorant of thei
r real names or the facts rendering them liable to plaintiff. [See
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000201&cite=CACPS474&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6ec
74e0e&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
Calif. CCP \u167\'3f 474
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(Compare: \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants may not be permitted in complaints
filed in original diversity actions because the citizenship of the \u8220\'3fDoe
\u8221\'3f cannot be ascertained;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1633
}
}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal of state court actions in which the complaint names \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\
'3f defendants raises a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
possible
}
}
risk of nondiversity: i.e.,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
if
}
}
a person is ultimately served as a \u8220\'3fDoe,\u8221\'3f he or she
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
may
}
}
turn out to be a citizen of the same state as plaintiff.
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2472]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rule:
}
}
For purposes of removal \u8220\'3fthe citizenship of defendants sued under ficti
tious names
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
shall be
}
}
disregarded.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(b)(1)
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2473]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect on removability:
}
}
Therefore, inclusion of \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants in a state court comp
laint has no effect on removability. In determining whether diversity of citizen
ship exists, only the named defendants are considered. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 157 F3d 686, 690\u8211\'3f691]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2474]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fdefendants described sufficiently to identify:
}
}
The citizenship of \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants might not be disregarded w
here the complaint describes them sufficiently to prevent any real question as t
o their identity. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Marshall v. CSX Transp. Co., Inc.
}
}
(MD AL 1995) 916 F.Supp. 1150, 1153
}}}
\u8212\'3fwhere complaint described \u8220\'3fFictitious Defendant B\u8221\'3f a
s \u8220\'3fthe engineer operating the train at the time of the accident,\u8221\
'3f his citizenship had to be considered in determining diversity jurisdiction]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2475]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2476]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Status of \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants after removal:
}
}
If state law allows inclusion of \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants, they remai
n as fictitious defendantsdespite removal. However, their status could beaffecte
d by procedural rulings and developmentsafter removal (see below).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2477]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Postremoval dismissal of \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f?
}
}
It is unclear whether the federal court can order dismissal of \u8220\'3fDoe\u82
21\'3f defendants in actions removed from state court on diversity grounds. (Pre
sumably, the court can treat \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f as
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unserved defendants
}
}
and eventually dismiss them for lack of service;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
5:254 ff.
}
}
)
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Comment:
}
}
Arguably, since the action is now in federal court, federal rules (that may pro
hibit \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f in original diversity actions) should apply. But
it may be error to dismiss the \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f if the \u8220\'3fDoe\u82
21\'3f pleading rules are regarded as \u8220\'3fsubstantive\u8221\'3f or as part
of the statute of limitations \u8220\'3frelation back\u8221\'3f doctrine (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:361 and 8:1606
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Also, the principal objection to \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f in original diversity
actions (i.e., that they might destroy diversity) does not apply in removal acti
ons because the citizenship of \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f is now ignored on remova
l (above). Consequently, there should be no problem with their continuing presen
ce.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If the plaintiff later attempts to substitute a named defendant for a \u8220\'3f
Doe\u8221\'3f (who is nondiverse), the court can analyze it like any other reque
st to join parties after removal. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_7fdd00001ca15" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1447(e)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3642 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2478]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Postremoval service of new defendants; statute of limitations problem?
}
}
If the \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f remain in the case, the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
may be faced with attempts to serve new defendants as \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f
after
}
removal
}
}
}
. This raises the issue whether an amendment substituting a named defendant for
a \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
relates back
}
}
to the date of the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes; i.e.
, whether the federal court must give the same effect to the \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221
\'3f allegations that the state court would have given if the action had not bee
n removed. [See
}
c74e0e&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D
ocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4b24000003ba5" }{\fldrslt
FRCP 15(c)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discussed at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3568 ff. & 8:1606 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2479]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fpostremoval substitution of nondiverse \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f
defendant:
}
}
Diversity jurisdiction is destroyed where, after removal, the court permits plai
ntiff to substitute a nondiverse person or entity for a \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f
defendant. The action must be remanded to state court. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(10th Cir. 2008) 529 F3d 947, 951;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Curry v. U.S. Bulk Transport, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 2006) 462 F3d 536, 540]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2480\u8211\'3f2488]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2489]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
If you represent plaintiff, be wary of requests by the federal judge that you
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
stipulate
}
}
to dismissal of the \u8220\'3fDoe\u8221\'3f defendants.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If there is any possibility that you may later need to join as defendants person
s who are presently unknown,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
avoid such stipulation!
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In addition,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
conduct immediate discovery
}
}
to identify and serve the intended defendants as soon as possible after removal
. Some judges will allow the \u8220\'3fDoes\u8221\'3f to remain in the complaint
but will dismiss them
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
if not served within 120 days
}
}
as required by
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR4&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6ec
74e0e&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_ea62000089cc6" }{\fldrslt
FRCP 4(m)
}}}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
5:254 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c.
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal question cases
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2490]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Statute:
}
}
\u8220\'3fExcept as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil a
ction brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants t
o the district court of the United States for the district and division embracin
g the place where such action is pending.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(a)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2491]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect:
}
}
Cases that could have been commenced originally in federal court on federal que
stion grounds can be removed from state court, subject to the rules discussed be
low. (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:587 ff.
}
}
for discussion of \u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f jurisdiction in general.) [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana
}
}
(1998) 522 US 470, 474, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1997) 117 F3d 922, 926
}}}
\u8212\'3fincludes claims \u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
federal common law; see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:465 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
What constitutes a \u8220\'3fsubstantial\u8221\'3f federal question is discusse
d in detail in Ch. 2B at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:671 ff
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2492]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Exceptions:
}
}
Statutes prohibit removal of certain types of federal claims from state court (
e.g., FELA claims;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3110 ff.
}
}
). These claims could have been filed originally in federal court; but if plaint
iff chooses to file in state court,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiff\rquote s choice of forum is protected
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2493]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fcases in which federal courts have
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive
}
}
jurisdiction:
}
}
It was formerly the rule that claims within the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive
}
}
jurisdiction of federal courts (e.g., copyright, patents), if improperly filed
in state court, could
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
be removed. The theory was that the federal court\rquote s jurisdiction \u8220\
'3fderived\u8221\'3f from the state court; and thus if the state court lacked su
bject matter jurisdiction, the federal court to which it was removed could \u822
0\'3fderive\u8221\'3f none. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
}
}
(1922) 258 US 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 351]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, the removal statute now expressly provides otherwise: Federal removal j
urisdiction is \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not precluded
}
}
... because the State court from which such civil action is removed did not hav
e jurisdiction over that claim.\u8221\'3f [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_ae0d0000c5150" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(f)
}}}
(emphasis added)] I.e., the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
can exercise
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction even if the state court lacked power to adjudicate the exclusively
federal claim. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hawkins v. National Ass\rquote n of Securities Dealers, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1998) 149 F3d 330, 332
}}}
\u8212\'3fsecurities law claims within exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts
(
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=15USCAS78AA&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
15 USC \u167\'3f 78aa
}}}
) nonetheless removable from state court]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2494]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Applicable to all removals?
}
}
By its terms,
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(f)
}}}
applies only to removals \u8220\'3funder this section\u8221\'3f (i.e.,
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441
}}}
). Courts therefore disagree whether the derivative jurisdiction concept applies
when removal is based on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
other statutes
}
}
; e.g., federal officer removal under \u167\'3f 1442.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2867 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2495]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fconcurrent jurisdiction:
}
}
Although an action may be removable on federal question grounds, removal is not
mandatory. There is a strong presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction
. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tafflin v. Levitt
}
}
(1990) 493 US 455, 466\u8211\'3f467, 110 S.Ct. 792, 799
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO actions;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:115
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(This is true even where federal law \u8220\'3fcompletely preempts\u8221\'3f alt
ernative state law claims;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2600 ff.
}
}
)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Conversely, concurrent jurisdiction of a federal statutory claim
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
does not preclude removal
}
}
of a state court action on the claim. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ullmo ex rel. Ullmo v. Gilmour Academy
}
}
(6th Cir. 2001) 273 F3d 671, 680]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2496]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fsupplemental jurisdiction:
}
}
Although one of several claims does not \u8220\'3farise under\u8221\'3f federal
law, removal is still appropriate if that claim is transactionally related (i.e
., \u8220\'3fsupplemental\u8221\'3f) to at least one substantial federal claim.
[
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Zuniga v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan
}
}
(6th Cir. 1995) 52 F3d 1395, 1399
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval upheld where claims not arising under federal law were related
to federal due process claim;
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1367
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:920, 2:2220, 2:2835 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The Supreme Court has noted that the supplemental jurisdiction statute (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1367(a)
}}}
) \u8220\'3fapplies with equal force to cases removed to federal court as to cas
es initially filed there; a removed case is necessarily one \u8216\'3fof which t
he district courts ... have original jurisdiction\u8217\'3f (within the meaning
of
}
\u167\'3f 1367(a)
}}}
).\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons
}
}
(1997) 522 US 156, 165, 118 S.Ct. 523, 530
}}}
(parentheses added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2497\u8211\'3f2499]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2500]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fexclusive\u8221\'3f state court jurisdiction:
}
}
If a federal statute vests jurisdiction
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
only
}
}
in state courts, an issue as to removability arises where there is no express b
ar on removal (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3146
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, a federal statute that gives states jurisdiction over federal claims do
es not mean such jurisdiction is vested
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusively
}
}
in state court. Rather, federal courts retain jurisdiction over federal claims
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unless
}
}
the federal statute \u8220\'3fexpressly or by fair implication, excludes federa
l-court adjudication.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Mims v. Arrow
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Fin\rquote l Services, LLC
}
}
(2012) 565 US,,
}
fldrslt
132 S.Ct. 740, 753, fn. 15
}}}
\u8212\'3fCongress did not render claims under Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_d801000002763" }{\fldrslt
47 USC \u167\'3f 227(b)(3)
}}}
) nonremovable;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:176
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2501]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removability determined from face of complaint\u8212\'3fthe \u8220\'3fwell-plead
ed complaint rule\u8221\'3f:
}
}
Whether the claim \u8220\'3farises under\u8221\'3f federal law for removal purp
oses is determined by the same \u8220\'3fwell-pleaded complaint rule\u8221\'3f t
hat determines original federal question jurisdiction (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:730 ff.
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1998) 522 US 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
I.e.,
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
have \u8220\'3fjurisdiction to hear, originally
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or by
}
removal
}
}
}
}
from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establis
hes either that federal law
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
creates
}
}
the cause of action
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or
}
}
that the plaintiff\rquote s right to relief
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
necessarily depends
}
}
on resolution of a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
substantial
}
}
question of federal law.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Franchise Tax Board of State of Calif. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust f
or Southern Calif.
}
}
(1983) 463 US 1, 27\u8211\'3f28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2855\u8211\'3f2856
}}}
(emphasis added);
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dennis v. Hart
}
}
(9th Cir. 2013) 724 F3d 1249, 1253;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:730 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Claim created by federal law:
}
}
Although courts in the past have been reluctant to uphold removability absent a
federal claim, \u8220\'3fthe
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
absence of a federal private right of action . . .
}
}
(is) relevant to, but
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not dispositive
}
}
of, the \u8216\'3fsensitive judgments about congressional intent\u8217\'3f that
\u167\'3f 1331 requires.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg.
}
}
(2005) 545 US 308, 318, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2370
}}}
(emphasis and parentheses added);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2536 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Right to relief depends on \u8220\'3fsubstantial federal question\u8221\'3f:
}
}
What constitutes a \u8220\'3fsubstantial\u8221\'3f federal question is discusse
d at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:671 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2502]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal law governs construction of complaint:
}
}
Since removability itself is a federal question, federal law governs constructi
on of the complaint in the state court action: e.g., the nature of the claims as
serted; and whether various claims are \u8220\'3fseparate and independent\u8221\
'3f (for purposes of
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2811
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Paxton v. Weaver
}
}
(5th Cir. 1977) 553 F2d 936, 940]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2503]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complaint at time of removal:
}
}
Removal jurisdiction based on a federal question is determined from the complai
nt as it existed at the time of removal, not as subsequently amended. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1979) 592 F2d 1062, 1065]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2504]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Validity of federal claim immaterial:
}
}
If plaintiff is asserting a federal claim (whether or not meritorious), defenda
nt has the right to a federal forum. Removal is therefore proper even if plainti
ff\rquote s federal claim is meritless: \u8220\'3fA plaintiff should not be perm
itted to effectuate remand by pointing out the flaws in her own complaint, in ef
fect arguing for dismissal of that claim.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Barraclough v. ADP Automotive Claims Services
}
}
(ND CA 1993) 818 F.Supp. 1310, 1312
}}}
(internal quotes omitted); see
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sarmiento v. Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners
}
}
(5th Cir. 1991) 939 F2d 1242, 1245]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2505]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of postremoval amendment dropping federal claim:
}
}
If federal claims existed at the time of
}
removal
}
}
}
, a later amendment deleting all federal claims does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
affect the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court\rquote s
}
}
}
subject matter jurisdiction, even though only state law claims remain (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3616 ff.
}
}
). [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass\rquote n of Securities Dealers, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 159 F3d 1209, 1213
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fplaintiff may not compel remand by amending a complaint to e
liminate the federal question upon which removal was based\u8221\'3f;
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ortiz-Bonilla v. Federaci\u243\'3fn de Ajedrez de Puerto Rico, Inc.
}
}
(1st Cir. 2013) 734 F3d 28, 35\u8211\'3f36]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But the court has
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discretion
}
}
in such cases as to whether to continue to exercise its jurisdiction. It may ch
oose either to dismiss the state law claims or remand the action to state court
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3616 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2506]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3famendment
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
adding
}
}
valid federal claim:
}
}
A postremoval amendment that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
adds
}
}
a valid federal claim does not cure lack of removal jurisdiction at time of rem
oval. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1979) 592 F2d 1062, 1065]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, if the case goes to trial on the merits without objection, the judgment
may be upheld based on the amended complaint. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
O\rquote Halloran v. University of Washington
}
}
(9th Cir. 1988) 856 F2d 1375, 1379, fn. 2,
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discussed at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3971;
}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Albert v. Smith\rquote s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc.
}
}
(10th Cir. 2004) 356 F3d 1242, 1428;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3885
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2507\u8211\'3f2509]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2510]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
What constitutes \u8220\'3fcivil action\u8221\'3f for removal purposes:
}
}
Removal of a \u8220\'3fcivil action\u8221\'3f does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
require that the entire action be within the court\rquote s original jurisdicti
on in order for the action to be removable. A federal question claim is removabl
e although joined with nonremovable state law claims. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2811 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2511]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defensive matters not considered:
}
}
It is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
enough for
}
removal
}
}
}
purposes that a federal question may arise during the course of the litigation
in connection with some defense or counterclaim: \u8220\'3fFor better or worse .
.. a defendant may not remove a case to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
unless the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiff\rquote s complaint
}
}
establishes that the case \u8216\'3farises under\u8217\'3f federal law.\u8221\'
3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
or Southern Calif.
}
}
(1983) 463 US 1, 10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2846
}}}
(emphasis in original);
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1998) 522 US 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This is true even if plaintiff anticipated the defense argument and both parties
concede the federal question is the only issue in the case.
}
[
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 482 US 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2512] A suit to enforce insurance policy pollution coverage provis
ions is not removable because the claim arises under state, not federal, law. Th
e fact federal law (CERCLA, 42 USC \u167\'3f 9601 et seq.) imposes the clean-up
obligation sought to be covered is \u8220\'3finsufficient to confer removal juri
sdiction because federal law would come into play only as a defense.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol Products, Inc.
}
}
(1st Cir. 1993) 989 F2d 1256, 1262, fn. 10]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2513] Employee brought state court action against Employer for age
discrimination. Employer asserted the claim was barred by a release given by Em
ployee in exchange for early retirement benefits. Employer removed, asserting th
at federal law (ERISA) governed the release and precluded the claim. Removal was
improper because federal law was raised only as a defense. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Warner v. Ford Motor Co.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1995) 46 F3d 531, 534\u8211\'3f535]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2514] Client\rquote s state law malpractice action against Attorne
y was not removable to federal court although the alleged malpractice occurred i
n a prior federal case and the claim required evaluation of applicable federal l
aw. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hays v. Bryan Cave LLP
}
}
(7th Cir. 2006) 446 F3d 712, 713]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2514.1] There was no removal jurisdiction over state law breach of
fiduciary claims where the director defendants sought to avoid liability by poi
nting to their compliance with the \u8220\'3fsay-on-pay\u8221\'3f shareholder vo
te provision of the Dodd\u8211\'3fFrank Act. This was a defense, despite the fac
t plaintiffs\rquote own complaint referred to the \u8220\'3fsay-on-pay\u8221\'3
f vote. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dennis v. Hart
}
}
(9th Cir. 2013) 724 F3d 1249, 1253]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2515]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Includes federal preemption defense (defensive preemption):
}
}
Thus, a state law action cannot be removed on the ground federal law
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
preempts
}
}
the claim ... even if federal preemption is the only real issue in the case: \u
8220\'3fBy unimpeachable authority, a suit brought upon a state statute does not
arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States because
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
prohibited
}
}
thereby.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gully v. First Nat\rquote l Bank in Meridian
}
}
(1936) 299 US 109, 116, 57 S.Ct. 96, 99
}}}
(emphasis added);
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:760, 2:2590
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2516]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f:
}
}
But if federal law
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
completely
}
}
preempts the entire subject matter, and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supplants
}
}
any state law claim with a federal claim, that federal claim may then be remove
d even though the complaint alleges only a purported state claim. No matter how
pleaded in the complaint, the only viable claim in such cases is the one created
under federal law.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2583 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2517]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Includes defenses anticipated in complaint:
}
}
Similarly, removal jurisdiction cannot be based on matters alleged in the compl
aint in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
anticipation or avoidance
}
}
of defenses it is thought the defendant may interpose. (E.g., allegations that
the contract sued upon is not void under federal law despite defendant\rquote s
claims to the contrary.) [
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley
}
}
(1908) 211 US 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 43;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:746
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2518]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3freview of administrative ruling upholding federal defense:
}
}
However, a state court complaint seeking judicial review of a state or local ag
ency ruling upholding a federal defense presents a claim \u8220\'3farising under
\u8221\'3f federal law. The well-pleaded complaint rule is no bar because the ag
ency ruling is grounded on federal law; the federal defense is \u8220\'3fno long
er merely a matter of speculation.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2000) 204 F3d 311, 318
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval of suit challenging local agency\rquote s decision that federa
l statute preempted its power to regulate local radio station]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
Removal jurisdiction over local administrative decisions is discussed further a
t \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3165 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2519\u8211\'3f2524]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2525]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Counterclaims, cross-claims, third party claims not considered:
}
}
For both removal and original jurisdiction, the federal question must be present
ed
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
by plaintiff\rquote s complaint
}
}
as it stands at the time of removal.
}
Removal
}
}
}
generally cannot be based on a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim r
aising a federal question, whether filed in state or
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
. Otherwise, defendants could \u8220\'3fmanipulate\u8221\'3f removal jurisdictio
n. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1998) 145 F3d 320, 327]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2526]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal by third party defendant?
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2256.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2526.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fpatent and copyright counterclaims:
}
}
By statute, a counterdefendant (the original plaintiff) can remove a counterclai
m to federal court if it is one \u8220\'3frelating to patents, plant variety pro
tection, or copyrights.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1454(a)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2255.1
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2527]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Incidental federal issue not sufficient:
}
}
Removal cannot be based simply on the fact that federal law may be referred to
in some context in the case. If the claim does not \u8220\'3farise under\u8221\'
3f federal law (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:586
}
}
), it is not removable on federal question grounds. Incidental federal issues ar
e not enough. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Berg v. Leason
}
}
(9th Cir. 1994) 32 F3d 422, 425\u8211\'3f426]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2528] P sued D in state court for malicious prosecution based on a
n earlier federal action tried in federal court. To prove malicious prosecution,
P had to show the earlier federal action was brought \u8220\'3fwithout probable
cause.\u8221\'3f This raised the issue whether the federal claim was \u8220\'3f
legally tenable.\u8221\'3f However, the \u8220\'3flow level of generality\u8221\
'3f required to determine whether an underlying claim is \u8220\'3flegally tenab
le\u8221\'3f does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
raise a substantial issue of federal law, and hence does not support removal. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Berg v. Leason
}
}
, supra, 32 F3d at 425]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2529] Patent Holder sued its Licensee for breach of contract in st
ate court. The case was not removable on federal question grounds. While the exi
stence of a valid patent was an issue, resolution of the breach of contract clai
m did
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
depend on a federal question of patent law
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
.
}
}
[
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Oximetrix, Inc.
}
}
(Fed. Cir. 1984) 748 F2d 637, 642;
}}}
see also
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
AT & T Co. v. Integrated Network
}
}
(Fed. Cir. 1992) 972 F2d 1321, 1324
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2530\u8211\'3f2534]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2535]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No
}
removal
}
}
}
based on supplemental jurisdiction only:
}
}
Supplemental jurisdiction on its own does not give
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
the power to remove a state court case that does not arise from a federal quest
ion or offer complete diversity of citizenship. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co
}
}
. (5th Cir. 2010) 603 F3d 290, 295
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate law claims could not sustain removal where no federal claim or d
iversity or citizenship]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(h) [2:2536]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal law as element of state claim:
}
}
That federal law provides an element (even a necessary one) of a state law caus
e of action does not necessarily mean the claim \u8220\'3farises under\u8221\'3f
federal law so as to allow removal.
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal on federal question grounds is not allowed unless federal law:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
creates the right to sue
}
}
and provides a right of action;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe state law claim necessarily raises a disputed and substantial issu
e that a federal court may entertain without disturbing federal/state comity pri
nciples. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg.
}
}
(2005) 545 US 308, 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2367\u8211\'3f2368;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson
}
}
(1986) 478 US 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3232;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:685 ff
}
}
.]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2537] Parents sued Drug Manufacturer in state court for their chil
dren\rquote s birth defects resulting from the mother ingesting the drug while p
regnant. The complaint alleged various state law claims (negligence, breach of w
arranty, strict liability, etc.). It also alleged the drug had been \u8220\'3fmi
sbranded\u8221\'3f in violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, creating a \
u8220\'3frebuttable presumption of negligence.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Violation of the federal Act was not ground for
}
removal
}
}
}
because the Act merely provided the standard of care in the state action, and t
o allow
}
removal
}
}
}
in such cases would shift traditional state law cases into
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson
}
}
, supra, 478 US at 817, 106 S.Ct. at 3237]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2538] P filed suit in state court alleging that his employment had
been terminated \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
in violation of public policy
}
}
.\u8221\'3f The complaint identified both state and federal statutes as the basi
s for the public policy. Removal was improper because, although a federal statut
e was referred to in the complaint, the claim sued upon (wrongful termination) d
id not \u8220\'3farise under\u8221\'3f the federal statute; it arose under state
law. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1996) 80 F3d 339, 343\u8211\'3f344
}}}
\u8212\'3freferences to Title VII in pleading state law claims \u8220\'3fdo not
make those claims into federal causes of action\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2539] Similarly, there was no removal jurisdiction where a sexual
harassment complaint referred to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the U.S.
Constitution but sought remedies available only under state law. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1997) 114 F3d 979, 982
}}}
\u8212\'3fplaintiffs also stipulated that they were not seeking any federal reme
dy]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2540] Plaintiff filed state court action under
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state\rquote s
}
}
RICO statute, alleging violations of federal mail and wire fraud statutes as pr
edicate offenses. Plaintiff\rquote s reference to and reliance upon the federal
statutes did not make the case removable: \u8220\'3fPlaintiff\rquote s election
to proceed exclusively under state law does not give rise to federal jurisdictio
n.\u8221\'3f [
}
\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Patterman v. Travelers, Inc
}
}
. (SD GA 1997) 11 F.Supp.2d 1382, 1388\u8211\'3f1389]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2541]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Compare\u8212\'3fremoval upheld:
}
}
Property Owner filed state court action challenging, on federal constitutional
grounds, City\rquote s denial of permission to redevelop historic buildings on h
is property. Inclusion of the federal constitutional claims meant that the actio
n \u8220\'3farose under\u8221\'3f federal law and was removable to federal court
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons
}
}
(1997) 522 US 156, 164, 118 S.Ct. 523, 529]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(i) [2:2542]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Enforcing or challenging federal judgment insufficient:
}
}
A state court action that attacks a prior federal judgment does not \u8220\'3far
ise under\u8221\'3f federal law so as to allow removal, because state courts are
bound to apply res judicata principles: \u8220\'3fThe prior federal judgment do
es not transform the plaintiff\rquote s state-law claims into federal claims but
rather extinguishes them ... \u8221\'3f[
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1998) 522 US 470, 476, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925\u8211\'3f926;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ultramar America, Ltd. v. Dwelle
}
}
(9th Cir. 1990) 900 F2d 1412, 1417;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2570
}
}
;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Palkow v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 2005) 431 F3d 543, 548
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate court action for damages resulting from
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
perjury
}
}
committed in prior federal action not removable on federal question grounds]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2543]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fwhere federal court retains continuing jurisdiction:
}
}
The result may be different, however, where the federal court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
retained continuing jurisdiction
}
}
over its judgment. In such cases, the state court action may be removable under
the \u8220\'3fAll Writs Act\u8221\'3f (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1651
}}}
), which empowers district courts \u8220\'3fto issue all writs necessary or appr
opriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
NAACP v. Metropolitan Council
}
}
(8th Cir. 1998) 144 F3d 1168, 1170;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Baccus v. Parrish
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 45 F3d 958, 960\u8211\'3f961
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval upheld where state court action sought to set aside court-appr
oved settlement in related federal case]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2544\u8211\'3f2549]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2550]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
In view of the complexities and limitations of the All Writs Act (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1651
}}}
), it seems better practice for defendants
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
to try to remove to federal court on the ground of res judicata (which would ra
rely succeed). Rather, they should
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
ask the state court to dismiss
}
}
on the ground of res judicata. They should also consider asking the federal jud
ge who rendered the judgment in question to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
enjoin the state proceedings
}
}
in order to \u8220\'3feffectuate\u8221\'3f the judgment. [See
}
22 USC \u167\'3f 2283
}}}
\u8212\'3ffederal courts may enjoin state court proceedings \u8220\'3f. . . wher
e necessary . . . to protect or effectuate its judgments\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(j) [2:2551]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3findependent jurisdictional grant:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fwell-pleaded complaint\u8221\'3f rule applies only to statutory \
u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f cases (see
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1331
}}}
). It does not apply when removal is based on an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
independent
}
}
jurisdictional grant. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Nat\rquote l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E.
}
}
(1992) 505 US 247, 258, 112 S.Ct. 2465, 2472;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:521
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2552]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect:
}
}
Under Article III, Congress can confer removal jurisdiction
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
even where the state court complaint does not include
}
}
a federal (or diversity) claim. In essence, Congress can \u8220\'3ffederalize\u
8221\'3f a cause of action otherwise cognizable only in state court. [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
, supra\u8212\'3ftort suit against federally chartered corporation;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:522
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2553]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Certain federally-chartered corporations:
}
}
Federal jurisdiction (and therefore
}
removal
}
}
}
) exists over a federally-chartered corporation if its federal charter
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
expressly authorizes
}
}
such jurisdiction or contains a \u8220\'3fsue and be sued\u8221\'3f clause that
specifically mentions the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
. [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
, supra\u8212\'3fjurisdiction authorized since charter refers to \u8220\'3fcourt
s of law and equity, State or Federal\u8221\'3f;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:520 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2554]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fFederal enclave\u8221\'3f jurisdiction:
}
}
If a person\rquote s injuries occurred on a \u8220\'3ffederal enclave\u8221\'3f
(e.g., at a military base, etc.), the action can be said to \u8220\'3farise und
er\u8221\'3f federal law and will support federal (removal) jurisdiction. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Willis v. Craig
}
}
(9th Cir. 1977) 555 F2d 724, 726;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Fung v. Abex Corp.
}
}
(ND CA 1992) 816 F.Supp. 569, 571;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Mater v. Holley
}
}
(5th Cir. 1952) 200 F2d 123, 125;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:533
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2555]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Other statutes \u8220\'3ffederalizing\u8221\'3f actions:
}
}
Congress continues to \u8220\'3ffederalize\u8221\'3f additional areas of appare
nt national concern, thus deeming certain actions to arise under federal law. [E
.g.,
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_1eca000045f07" }{\fldrslt
12 USC \u167\'3f 1819(b)(2)(A)
}}}
\u8212\'3factions in which FDIC a party;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2952 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2556]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1934 Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b\u8211\'3f5:
}
}
Federal courts have
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive
}
}
jurisdiction over actions based on violations of the 1934 Act (
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=15USCAS78AA&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
15 USC \u167\'3f 78aa
}}}
) or Rule 10b\u8211\'3f5 thereunder. Thus, even if only state law claims are ple
aded, the action is removable because the relief sought is \u8220\'3fpredicated
on a subject matter committed exclusively to federal jurisdiction.\u8221\'3f [Se
e
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2004) 375 F3d 831, 840
}}}
\u8212\'3fsame issue under Federal Power Act]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal in such cases is based on the exclusive jurisdiction statute, not
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1331
}}}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 375 F3d at 841]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2557\u8211\'3f2559]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(k) [2:2560]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fclaims under federal common law:
}
}
Removal jurisdiction may also exist where, although only state law claims are pl
eaded, the dispute actually arises under federal common law (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:465 ff.
}
}
). [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bryan v. BellSouth Communications, Inc.
}
}
(4th Cir. 2004) 377 F3d 424, 428\u8211\'3f429
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate court suit removable where plaintiff seeks to enforce or invalid
ate a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
federal tariff
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
Federal question jurisdiction based on federal common law is discussed at \u182
\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:465 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2561]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Plaintiff the \u8220\'3fmaster of the claim\u8221\'3f:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fwell pleaded\u8221\'3f complaint rule makes plaintiff the \u8220\
'3fmaster of the claim\u8221\'3f for purposes of removal jurisdiction. This mean
s that, absent diversity, a case is removable only where a federal question is p
resented on the face of plaintiff\rquote s complaint: \u8220\'3f(T)he party who
brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 482 US 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, fn. 7]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Thus, where plaintiff could maintain claims under both federal and state law, pl
aintiff can prevent removal by ignoring the federal claim and alleging only stat
e law claims. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1996) 80 F3d 339, 344;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indpt. School Dist.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 44 F3d 362, 366]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
However, a plaintiff choosing to assert only state law claims in state court ru
ns the risk that his or her federal claims may one day be precluded by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
collateral estoppel
}
}
. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines
}
}
(5th Cir. 2003) 343 F3d 769, 772]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2562] P filed state court action against defendants for illegally
fixing prices in violation of California\rquote s Cartwright Act (
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000199&cite=CABPS16700&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6
ec74e0e&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Calif. Bus. & Prof.C. \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 16700
}}}
ff.). The complaint made no mention of federal antitrust law (although the same
conduct was the subject of numerous pending federal suits). P\rquote s state la
w characterization was binding, and prevented removal. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1990) 908 F2d 477, 479;
}}}
see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
KVHP TV Partners, Ltd. v. Channel 12
}
}
(ED TX 1995) 874 F.Supp. 756, 760]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2563] P filed a state court action for invasion of privacy under t
he California Constitution. Notwithstanding that the action may have stated a fe
deral invasion of privacy claim, there was no removal jurisdiction. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brinkin v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.
}
}
(ND CA 1983) 572 F.Supp. 236, 238;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indpt. School Dist.
}
}
, supra, 44 F3d at 366]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2564] A state court action alleging violations of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state
}
}
securities laws could not be removed to federal court on grounds the actsallege
d also violated federal law (no claim of preemption was involved). [
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Baron v. Strassner
}
}
(SD TX 1998) 7 F.Supp.2d 871, 873\u8211\'3f876]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2565]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstatutory basis for claim uncertain:
}
}
Sometimes, a state court complaint may not set forth the statutory basis for a
particular claim (e.g., general allegation of \u8220\'3fage discrimination\u8221
\'3f without specifying whether the right derives from state or federal law). In
such circumstances, defendants are obliged to ascertain, through discovery or o
therwise, whether plaintiff intends to proceed under the alternative federal sta
tute and if so, may then remove.
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2566]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation\u8212\'3ffederal claims cannot be disguised by \u8220\'3fartful plead
ing\u8221\'3f:
}
}
The rule that plaintiff is the \u8220\'3fmaster of the claim\u8221\'3f is subje
ct to this limitation: Plaintiff cannot defeat removal of a federal claim by dis
guising or \u8220\'3fartfully pleading\u8221\'3f it as a state claim.
}
If the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
only
}
}
claim involved is one arising under federal law, the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
will \u8220\'3frecharacterize\u8221\'3f it accordingly, in order to uphold
}
removal
}
}
}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1998) 522 US 470, 475, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1983) 702 F2d 189, 191;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2005) 424 F3d 267, 271]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2567]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Not \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f where plaintiffhas alternative state law
claim:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f limitation refers to situations where p
laintiff\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
only
}
}
claim is a federal one. It does not apply where plaintiff has a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
viable state law claim
}
}
, as well as a federal claim, and simply chooses to sue on the state claim. Such
a case is not removable on federal question grounds. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Chaganti & Assocs., P.C. v. Nowotny
}
}
(8th Cir. 2006) 470 F3d 1215, 1220;
}}}
and
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1990) 908 F2d 477, 479]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2568]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fArtful pleading\u8221\'3f where state law claim completely preempted:
}
}
As a practical matter, the \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f doctrine applies
primarily in areas
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
completely preempted
}
}
by federal law; e.g., LMRA \u167\'3f 301 claims (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2616 ff
}
}
.) and ERISA claims (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2675 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(The \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fdisplacing preemption\
u8221\'3f doctrine is discussed at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2538 ff.
}
}
)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2569]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Other applications of \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f:
}
}
Other than in complete preemption cases, \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f is
rarely invoked ... because it \u8220\'3fraises difficult issues of state and fe
deral relationships and often yields unsatisfactory results.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 813 F2d 1368, 1372]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2570]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court claim undermining
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
judgment:
}
}
Federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
may look beyond the face of the state court complaint and uphold
}
removal
}
}
}
where the state court action amounts to a collateral attack on a settlement app
roved by a federal district court. For example, removal was upheld where the sta
te law claim sought to set aside a provision of a court-approved settlement agre
ement in a federal case. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Baccus v. Parrish
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 45 F3d 958, 960\u8211\'3f961]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2571]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstate court claim
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
barred
}
}
by res judicata:
}
}
Res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
affirmative defenses
}
}
that must be pleaded or are waived (see
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000600&cite=USFRCPR8&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6ec
74e0e&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4b24000003ba5" }{\fldrslt
FRCP 8(c)
}}}
).
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Unlike complete preemption
}
}
which
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
replaces
}
}
the state law claim with a federal claim (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2568
}
}
), \u8220\'3fpreclusion thus remains a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defensive plea
}
}
involving no recasting of the plaintiff\rquote s complaint, and is therefore
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not a proper basis for removal
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1998) 522 US 470, 477, 118 S.Ct. 921, 926
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2572]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court claims involving federal tax laws:
}
}
Another example of the \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f doctrine is found whe
re a state law complaint articulates a federal tax case in state law terms:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2573] Employee filed state court action against Employer for failu
re to pay the full wages agreed upon. Employer removed to federal court on the g
round that Employee had \u8220\'3fartfully pleaded\u8221\'3f what was in reality
a challenge to Employer\rquote s compliance with federal income tax withholding
laws. Removal was upheld; the artfully pleaded state law claim \u8220\'3farose
under\u8221\'3f federal law. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1986) 780 F2d 766, 769]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2574] Because the IRC provides the exclusive remedy for obtaining
a refund of federal taxes, a state court action that seeks a refund of excise ta
xes is removable from state court. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brennan v. Southwest Airlines Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 134 F3d 1405, 1409
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate court breach of contract suit against airlines was in effect sui
t for refund of excise taxes improperly collected by airlines and hence removabl
e to federal court]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2575] A suit for the balance due under a workers\rquote compensat
ion settlement agreement \u8220\'3farose under\u8221\'3f federal law where the c
omplaint alleged a dispute whether the defendant was obligated to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
withhold taxes
}
}
in compliance with federal income tax regulations. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Burda v. M. Ecker Co.
}
}
(7th Cir. 1992) 954 F2d 434, 438]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2576\u8211\'3f2579]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2580]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Ascertaining nature of claim:
}
}
Ordinarily, the federal court is limited to the face of the complaint in determ
ining removability (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2501
}
}
). But where \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u8221\'3f is asserted, the court may exam
ine defendant\rquote s removal notice and supporting affidavits \u8220\'3fto cla
rify whether the action plaintiff presents\u8221\'3f in fact arises under federa
l law. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Schroeder v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1983) 702 F2d 189, 191]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2581]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER FOR PLAINTIFF:
}
}
}
If you represent plaintiff and think defendant may attempt removal, familiarize
yourself with the \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f doctrine below ... an
d draft your complaint so as to set forth nonremovable claims!
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2582]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER FOR DEFENDANTS:
}
}
}
If you represent the defendant, be aware that the \u8220\'3fartful pleading\u82
21\'3f doctrine is narrowly applied ... primarily in (1) LMRA actions, and (2) E
RISA actions, both of which are discussed below under \u8220\'3fcomplete preempt
ion.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Where these claims do not appear on the face of the state court action (and they
usually do not),
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
explain the basis for complete preemption
}
}
in your Notice of Removal. Also, ask the court to order plaintiff to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
replead
}
}
the preempted claims properly after removal.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(6) [2:2583]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fComplete preemption\u8221\'3f doctrine\u8212\'3fgeneral considerations
:
}
}
In certain limited cases (below), the preemptive force of federal law is so pow
erful that it displaces any state law cause of action, and leaves room only for
a federal claim for purposes of the \u8220\'3fwell-pleaded complaint\u8221\'3f r
ule. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor
}
}
(1987) 481 US 58, 63\u8211\'3f64, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In effect, what is pleaded as a state law claim is \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
recharacterized
}
}
\u8221\'3f as a federal claim, and as such, is removable. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
or Southern Calif.
}
}
(1983) 463 US 1, 23\u8211\'3f24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2853\u8211\'3f2854]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fUnlike ordinary preemption, which would only arise as a federal defens
e to a state-law claim, complete preemption operates to confer original federal
subject matter jurisdiction
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on the face of the comp
laint
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1999) 193 F3d 151, 160
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
For discussion of federal preemption outside the removal context,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:570 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2584]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal claim required:
}
}
Plaintiff\rquote s state law claims must in fact be displaced by a federal claim
which, although not pleaded, is the basis for
}
removal
}
}
}
: \u8220\'3fIf the plaintiff could not have asserted a federal claim based on th
e allegations of her state law complaint, she could not have brought the case or
iginally in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
as required for
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction under
}
section 1441
}}}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Young v. Anthony\rquote s Fish Grottos, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 830 F2d 993, 997;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dennis v. Hart
}
}
(9th Cir. 2013) 724 F3d 1249, 1253;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lontz v. Tharp
}
}
(4th Cir. 2005) 413 F3d 435, 441]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2585]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3ffederal claim barred or unenforceable:
}
}
Removal may be upheld although the relief sought by plaintiff is unavailable und
er the federal claim: \u8220\'3fThe nature of the relief available after (remova
l) jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the question whether ther
e is (removal) jurisdiction
}
... \u8221\'3f[
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 482 US 386, 391, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, fn. 4
}}}
(parentheses added); see
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735
}
}
(1968) 390 US 557, 561, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 1237\u8211\'3f1238
}}}
\u8212\'3fLMRA \u167\'3f 301 claim properly removed even though remedy sought by
plaintiff not obtainable in \u167\'3f 301 action]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Thus, where federal law completely preempts a state law claim, the action may be
removed to federal court even if federal law fails to provide plaintiff with re
medies available under state law, or a nonjurisdictional
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defense completely bars
}
}
the federal claim. Under such circumstances, the district court should
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
dismiss
}
}
the federal claim (not remand to state court). [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 830 F2d 993, 999]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2586] Union Employee sued Employer in state court for wrongful dis
charge. The case was properly removed to federal court because her state law cla
ims were
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
by the claim provided under federal labor law (LMRA \u167\'3f 301,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2615 ff.
}
}
). The federal claim, however, was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
barred
}
}
by Employee\rquote s failure to exhaust the grievance procedure under the colle
ctive bargaining agreement or to assert her claim within the statute of limitati
ons period. Accordingly,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
summary judgment
}
}
in favor of Employer was proper. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Young v. Anthony\rquote s Fish Grottos, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 830 F2d at 999]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2587] Railroad suspended Locomotive Engineer\rquote s license for
safety violations. Engineer sued in state court for \u8220\'3fconversion\u8221\'
3f of his license. Removal was proper because any state law claim involving Rail
road\rquote s right to suspend Engineer\rquote s certificate was \u8220\'3ftotal
ly preempted\u8221\'3f by the Federal Railway Safety Act. Thereafter, the action
was properly
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
dismissed
}
}
when it was shown that Engineer had
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
failed to exhaust administrative remedies
}
}
under the FRSA, which is a prerequisite to judicial review. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
}
}
(8th Cir. 1996) 80 F3d 257, 262]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2588]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect:
}
}
Defendants can \u8220\'3ftow the ship into the federal harbor\u8221\'3f only to
\u8220\'3fsink\u8221\'3f it once it gets there! [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co.
}
}
(ND IL 1986) 644 F.Supp. 942, 948]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2589]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption limited to certain federal claims:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f doctrine is limited
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
primarily
}
}
to state law claims that are displaced by:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
ERISA
}
}
\u8212\'3fEmployee Retirement and Income Security Act (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2675 ff.
}
}
); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
LMRA \u167\'3f 301
}
}
\u8212\'3fLabor Management and Relations Act (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2616 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2590]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fmost federal claims
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
preemptive:
}
}
Most federal statutes do
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
involve the sort of pervasive regulation that precludes enforcement of state la
ws on the same subject. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hofler v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of Calif., Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2002) 296 F3d 764, 767
}}}
(citing text) (abrogated on other grounds in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.
}
}
(2005) 546 US 132, 126 S.Ct. 704)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2591]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Most federal preemption
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
\u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f:
}
}
Even where federal statutes
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
do
}
}
supersede state law, in most cases they do not completely preempt state law so
as to allow removal. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Magee v. Exxon Corp
}
}
. (8th Cir. 1998) 135 F3d 599, 601
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f applies only when a federal st
atute possesses \u8220\'3fextraordinary preemptive power . . . a conclusion cour
ts reach reluctantly\u8221\'3f;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hofler v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of Calif., Inc.
}
}
, supra, 296 F3d at 767
}}}
(citing text)]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rather, federal preemption is simply a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defense
}
}
to enforcement of state law. I.e., the federal law is simply a reason why an ot
herwise valid state law claim cannot go forward. \u8220\'3f(A) suit brought upon
a state statute does not arise under ... (federal law) because prohibited there
by.\u8221\'3f
}
[
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
or Southern Calif.
}
}
(1983) 463 US 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2848
}}}
(parentheses added) (quoting
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gully v. First Nat\rquote l Bank in Meridian
}
}
(1936) 299 US 109, 116, 57 S.Ct. 96, 99)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In such cases, the \u8220\'3fwell-pleaded complaint rule\u8221\'3f (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2501
}
}
) precludes removal: Removability is determined from the face of the complaint (
a state law claim),
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
by a preemption defense that may be raised in the answer. In such cases, the ca
se must be remanded to state court for want of federal subject matter jurisdicti
on. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 481 US 58, 65, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1999) 172 F3d 332, 337]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
For example:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2592] P\rquote s state court action sought declaratory relief that
Savings & Loan had violated state law prohibiting due-on-sale clauses. Savings
& Loan sought to remove to federal court on ground that federal law preempted an
d invalidated the state law. Removal was improper because the underlying claim w
as to enforce a lien (a state law claim). Federal law was merely a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defense
}
}
to plaintiff\rquote s claim, rather than a \u8220\'3fdirect and essential eleme
nt of plaintiff\rquote s cause of action.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Nalore v. San Diego Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\rquote n
}
}
(9th Cir. 1981) 663 F2d 841, 842;
}}}
see also
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Armstrong v. Armstrong
}
}
(9th Cir. 1983) 696 F2d 1237, 1238]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
Defensive preemption is discussed at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:761 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2593]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of joining completely preempted claim with other preempted claims:
}
}
Where a removed case contains both completely preempted claims and other state
law claims that are preempted
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defensively
}
}
(e.g., because in conflict with federal law), the district court may exercise r
emoval jurisdiction over the completely preempted claims and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
supplemental jurisdiction
}
}
over the other claims. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1999) 172 F3d 332, 337\u8211\'3f338
}}}
\u8212\'3fcomplaint against HMO contained claims completely preempted by ERISA a
nd claims to which ERISA preemption was merely a defense]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2594\u8211\'3f2599]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2600]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fComplete preemption\u8221\'3f vs. \u8220\'3fexclusive federal jurisdic
tion\u8221\'3f:
}
}
The fact that federal law \u8220\'3fcompletely preempts\u8221\'3f state law (pr
ecluding alternative state claims), does not mean the action
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
must
}
}
be litigated in federal court; with few exceptions, state courts have concurren
t jurisdiction over federal claims (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2620
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2601] For example, although state law is \u8220\'3fcompletely pree
mpted,\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
}
}
of LMRA \u167\'3f 301 claims (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2620
}
}
) and also certain ERISA claims. (ERISA \u167\'3f 502 specifically gives state c
ourts concurrent jurisdiction in actions to recover benefits due or to enforce o
r clarify rights under ERISA-covered plans; all other ERISA actions are within t
he exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. See
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_7b9b000044381" }{\fldrslt
29 USC \u167\'3f 1132(a)(1)
}}}
,
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_06a60000dfdc6" }{\fldrslt
(e)(1)
}}}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
While state courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the actions are of course
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
subject to removal
}
}
on federal question grounds.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2602] On the other hand, the fact that certain claims are within t
he federal court\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive jurisdiction
}
}
does not foreclose
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
alternative state remedies
}
}
. Cases asserting
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
only
}
}
the state law claims are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not subject
}
}
to removal (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2561
}
}
). [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1990) 908 F2d 477, 480\u8211\'3f481
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate antitrust claim may affect interstate commerce but does not trig
ger complete preemption]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2603]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3ffailure of claim within exclusive federal jurisdiction:
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Dismissal,
}
}
not remand, is appropriate where, after
}
removal
}
}
}
based on complete preemption, a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
fails. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dielsi v. Falk
}
}
(CD CA 1996) 916 F.Supp. 985, 993\u8211\'3f994;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(8th Cir. 1996) 80 F3d 257, 262
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaim preempted but dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2604] An action based on state law claims pertaining to intellectu
al property was properly removed to federal courts because those claims were \u8
220\'3fcompletely preempted\u8221\'3f by federal copyright law. But no copyright
infringement action would lie because the work had never been registered. The a
ction could not be remanded to state court because federal courts have
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive jurisdiction over copyright claims
}
}
. Under these circumstances, the action must be
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
dismissed
}
}
\u8220\'3ffor lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . the only result that ma
kes sense.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dielsi v. Falk,
}
}
supra, 916 F.Supp. at 994]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2605] Comment: Denying subject matter jurisdiction seems incorrect. Complete
preemption
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
establishes
}
}
the existence of a federal claim (here, copyright) so that upon
}
removal
}
}
}
the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
clearly
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
had
}
}
subject matter jurisdiction and remand would be improper. That an element of th
e federal claim may be lacking (here, copyright registration) is not truly a jur
isdictional defect and the action therefore should be dismissed
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
on the merits,
}
}
rather than \u8220\'3ffor lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2606]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Comment\u8212\'3favoiding complete preemption by \u8220\'3fartful\u8221\'3f plea
ding:
}
}
To some extent, the complete preemption doctrine
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
invites
}
}
subterfuge and circumvention. Plaintiffs can often avoid complete preemption by
artful pleading: e.g., a workplace dispute that should be preempted under feder
al labor law (below) may be camouflaged in a complaint simply for \u8220\'3fassa
ult and battery\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fsexual harassment.\u8221\'3f But the chec
k on artful pleading is the \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state court\rquote s
}
}
ability to weed out the delusive claims from the genuine.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Galvez v. Kuhn
}
}
(9th Cir. 1991) 933 F2d 773, 780
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2607\u8211\'3f2611]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2612]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTERS:
}
}
}
The requirement that removability appear on the face of the complaint raises st
rategic possibilities for each party:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2613]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
FOR PLAINTIFF:
}
}
}
To avoid removal, plead only nonfederal causes of action. If the same facts giv
e rise to both a federal and state law cause of action,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
allege the state statute
}
}
or other ground for your state cause of action, and avoid any allegations as to
the federal statute. If you are in the LMRA or ERISA area (i.e., you represent
a union employee or a case involving a covered benefits plan), see if you can al
lege claims beyond the preemptive force of the statute.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2614]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
FOR DEFENDANT:
}
}
}
If it cannot be determined from the face of the complaint whether the action is
removable, consider filing a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
demurrer
}
}
to the complaint in state court. You may be able to force plaintiff to plead th
e claim more specifically so that its federal character becomes apparent. (Demur
ring does not jeopardize your right to remove. The 30\u8211\'3fday period for re
moval does not begin to run until defendant receives a complaint \u8220\'3ffrom
which it may first be ascertained\u8221\'3f that the case is removable.) [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3353
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, if plaintiff is a union employee complaining about his or her employmen
t or termination, or is a benefit plan participant or beneficiary, this is a \u8
220\'3fred flag\u8221\'3f for jurisdictional preemption, and removal should be c
onsidered immediately.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(7) [2:2615]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption\u8212\'3ffederal labor law (LMRA \u167\'3f 301):
}
}
A common application of \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f is an action by
union employees (persons employed under a collective bargaining agreement) agai
nst their employers based on claims arising out of their employment relationship
.
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2616]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Statute:
}
}
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) \u167\'3f 301(a) states: \u8220\'3fSuits
for violation of (collective bargaining contracts) ... may be brought in any dis
trict court having jurisdiction of the parties without regard to the amount in c
ontroversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.\u8221\'3f [
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 185(a)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2617]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal common law:
}
}
Although the statute seemingly refers only to jurisdiction, it has been interpr
eted as authorizing federal courts to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
fashion a body of federal common law
}
}
for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills
}
}
(1957) 353 US 448, 455\u8211\'3f456, 77 S.Ct. 912, 917\u8211\'3f918]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2618]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State law completely preempted:
}
}
The body of federal common law authorized under LMRA \u167\'3f 301 completely p
reempts state law claims based on a collective bargaining agreement: \u8220\'3fA
ny such suit is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
purely a creature of federal law
}
}
, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the
absence of \u167\'3f 301.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
or Southern Calif.
}
}
(1983) 463 US 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2854]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2619]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
Complete preemption of state law is necessary for two reasons:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Uniformity:
}
}
First, it ensures uniform interpretation of labor agreements. Different interpr
etations of contract terms by state and federal courts would \u8220\'3finevitabl
y exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of c
ollective bargaining agreements ... (and) would tend to stimulate and prolong di
sputes as to (their) interpretation.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flo
ur Co.
}
}
(1962) 369 US 95, 103\u8211\'3f104, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576\u8211\'3f577
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Protects arbitration:
}
}
Also, since most labor contracts call for arbitration of grievances, preemption
assures the arbitration provisions will be given the same effect in federal and
state courts; i.e., so that labor law grievances \u8220\'3fremain firmly in the
arbitral realm.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef
}
}
(1988) 486 US 399, 411, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1884]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2620]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Concurrent state court jurisdiction:
}
}
Although federal common law under \u167\'3f 301 completely preempts state law,
federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of LMRA \u167\'3f 301 clai
ms. Thus, an action commenced in state court may remain there
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
if defendant does not remove
}
}
... but both federal and state courts are bound to apply federal law. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flo
ur Co.
}
}
, supra, 369 US at 103\u8211\'3f104, 82 S.Ct. at 576\u8211\'3f577]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If not removed to federal court, the federal claim may be adjudicated in state c
ourt but will be determined under federal law: \u8220\'3fState law is thus \u821
6\'3fpreempted\u8217\'3f by \u167\'3f 301 in that only (federal law) governs the
interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
United Steelworkers of America, AFL\u8211\'3fCIO\u8211\'3fCLC v. Rawson
}
}
(1990) 495 US 362, 368, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 1909]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2621]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Comment:
}
}
However, as a practical matter, the employer defendant almost always removes to
federal court. So, the notion of \u8220\'3fconcurrent\u8221\'3f jurisdiction in
this area is more academic than real!
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2622]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Test for preemption:
}
}
The key to determining the scope of LMRA preemption is whether resolution of the
state law claim
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
requires the court to construe a provision of the CBA
}
}
: \u8220\'3f(A)n application of state law is preempted by \u167\'3f 301 . . . on
ly if such application
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
requires the interpretation
}
}
of a collective bargaining agreement.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.
}
}
(1988) 486 US 399, 412, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1885
}}}
(emphasis added);
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
}
}
(1985) 471 US 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate law claim must be \u8220\'3finextricably intertwined with consid
eration of the terms of the labor contract\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
On the other hand, \u8220\'3fthe bare fact that a collective bargaining agreemen
t will be
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
consulted
}
}
in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be
extinguished.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Livadas v. Bradshaw
}
}
(1994) 512 US 107, 124, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2078;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 486 US at 413, 108 S.Ct. at 1885, fn. 12
}}}
\u8212\'3fnot every dispute \u8220\'3ftangentially involving a provision\u8221\'
3f of the CBA is preempted by \u167\'3f 301]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Plaintiff\rquote s claim is thus the touchstone for this analysis:
}
}
\u8220\'3fThe need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaint
iff\rquote s claim.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2001) 255 F3d 683, 691
}}}
(en banc);
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Garley v. Sandia Corp.
}
}
(10th Cir. 2001) 236 F3d 1200, 1208]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2623]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Plaintiff\rquote s characterization of claim not controlling:
}
}
Preemption is determined by the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
substance
}
}
of the claim, not its characterization in the complaint. Thus, causes of action
for \u8220\'3ffraud\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fdefamation\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fin
tentional infliction of emotional distress\u8221\'3f that all flow from an alleg
edly \u8220\'3fwrongful\u8221\'3f discharge are preempted if the wrongfulness of
the discharge
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
requires interpretation
}
}
of the CBA. [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.
}
}
(1972) 406 US 320, 323\u8211\'3f324, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1564\u8211\'3f1565
}}}
(dealing with Railway Labor Act preemption);
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_5&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_5" }{\fldr
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cavallaro v. UMass Mem. Healthcare, Inc.
}
}
(1st Cir. 2012) 678 F3d 1, 5
}}}
\u8212\'3fplaintiff\rquote s failure to identify in complaint did not prevent re
moval;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Stallcop v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 820 F2d 1044, 1049]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2624]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No preemption where matter not covered by CBA:
}
}
That the claim relates to a properly negotiable subject for collective bargainin
g is not enough for \u167\'3f 301 preemption. The relevant inquiry is whether re
solution of the state law claim
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
necessarily requires interpretation
}
}
of relevant provisions of the CBA: \u8220\'3fThat a claim involves an issue the
oretically subject to collective bargaining is irrelevant if the specific claim
at issue may be resolved without interpretation of the CBA.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 255 F3d at 696]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2625]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application\u8212\'3fstate law actions preempted by LMRA \u167\'3f 301:
}
}
The following claims may
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
require interpretation
}
}
of the applicable CBA and are thus preempted under LMRA \u167\'3f 301:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2626]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Contract claims related to CBA:
}
}
State law breach of contract claims are preempted if the subject matter of the
contract is covered by a CBA or the employee relies on a CBA in asserting the co
ntract claim. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 830 F2d 993, 997\u8211\'3f998;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(10th Cir. 2001) 236 F3d 1200, 1210
}}}
\u8212\'3fimplied contract claims \u8220\'3finextricably intertwined\u8221\'3f w
ith claims under CBA held preempted]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2627]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Claims by probationary employees:
}
}
Claims by probationary employees may be preempted under \u167\'3f 301 even thou
gh the CBA denies them access to the CBA\rquote s grievance procedure: \u8220\'3
f(B)y prohibiting resort to the grievance procedure by probationary employees .
. . the parties
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
intended to foreclose all contractual remedies
}
}
for such discharged probationary employees.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hollins v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1984) 727 F2d 823, 825
}}}
(emphasis added)\u8212\'3fto obtain job security for more senior employees unde
r a CBA, union can waive job security rights of probationary employees]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2628]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Fraud related to CBA:
}
}
State law fraud claims are preempted under \u167\'3f 301 if they require interp
retation of a CBA; e.g., claims that the employer fraudulently promised terms mo
re favorable than those provided in a CBA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bale v. General Tel. Co. of Calif.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1986) 795 F2d 775, 780]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2629]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Defamation:
}
}
State law defamation claims based on an employer\rquote s statements in grievan
ce proceedings or in communications required by the CBA (e.g., discharge notice)
are usually held preempted. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
DeCoe v. General Motors Corp.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1994) 32 F3d 212, 216\u8211\'3f217;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 236 F3d at 1211
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaim that employer\rquote s investigation of plaintiff for job-relate
d misconduct \u8220\'3fpublicly branded him as dishonest\u8221\'3f held preempte
d]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f[2:2630] But claims based on communications
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
outside
}
}
the grievance process or in communications
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not authorized by the CBA
}
}
are not preempted by \u167\'3f 301, since their resolution does not depend on t
he terms of the CBA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 817 F2d 536, 538]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2631]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Emotional distress:
}
}
State law claims for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
intentional infliction of emotional distress
}
}
may be held preempted if they require interpretation of a CBA. [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass\rquote n
}
}
(9th Cir. 1988) 854 F2d 1142, 1147
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of
implied covenant of good faith were incidental to wrongful discharge; whether di
scharge was \u8220\'3fwrongful\u8221\'3f depended on whether CBA provided ground
for discharge]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2632]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Claims for money had and received, unjust enrichment and conversion:
}
}
All of these claims essentially alleged that plaintiffs were owed unpaid wages.
Even if the claims were enlarged or altered by state law, they largely hinged o
n what the CBA provided and thus were removable under the complete preemption do
ctrine. [
}
74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_5&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0
&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_5" }{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cavallaro v. UMass Mem. Healthcare, Inc.
}
}
(1st Cir. 2012) 678 F3d 1, 5]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2633\u8211\'3f2634]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2635]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application\u8212\'3fclaims not preempted:
}
}
LMRA \u167\'3f 301 does not preempt state law claims that are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
independent
}
}
of the CBA. A claim is \u8220\'3findependent\u8221\'3f if it can be resolved
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
without interpreting
}
}
the CBA. In such cases, state law adjudication does not undermine the purposes
of LMRA \u167\'3f 301. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1988) 486 US 399, 410, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Nor does \u167\'3f 301 preempt claims based on the employer\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
illegal
}
}
conduct because even if the CBA purported to authorize such conduct, it would b
e unenforceable: \u8220\'3fClearly, \u167\'3f 301 does not grant the parties to
a collective bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal un
der state law.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
}
}
(1985) 471 US 202, 212, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2001) 255 F3d 683, 695
}}}
(en banc)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Likewise, \u167\'3f 301 does not preempt claims to vindicate
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
\u8220\'3fnonnegotiable\u8221\'3f (\u8220\'3fnonwaivable\u8221\'3f) state law ri
ghts
}
}
that cannot be bargained away in the CBA; e.g., where an employee is fired for
asserting rights under state workplace health and safety laws. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Miller v. AT & T Network Systems
}
}
(9th Cir. 1988) 850 F2d 543, 545\u8211\'3f547;
}}}
see
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Livadas v. Bradshaw
}
}
(1994) 512 US 107, 124, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2078
}}}
\u8212\'3ffact that right is \u8220\'3fnonnegotiable\u8221\'3f is good indicatio
n it is \u8220\'3findependent\u8221\'3f of the CBA] (Note, however, that even cl
aims based on \u8220\'3fnonnegotiable\u8221\'3f state law rights would be preemp
ted if they
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
require interpretation of the CBA.
}
}
See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 486 US at 407, 108 S.Ct. at 1882, fn. 7
}}}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2636]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Contract claims not based on CBA:
}
}
LMRA \u167\'3f 301 does not preempt fraud and breach of contract claims against
an employer by employees who were outside the bargaining unit.
}
Such claims do not require interpretation of the CBA. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 482 US 386, 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431
}}}
\u8212\'3fEmployer promised management-level Employee (not covered by CBA) that
he would not be demoted]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2637]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Fraud claim not dependent on terms of CBA:
}
}
Nor does \u167\'3f 301 preempt a fraud claim based on a state law independent o
f any rights conferred by the CBA; e.g., state law requiring employer to disclos
e health risks to its employees. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1989) 890 F2d 195, 198
}}}
\u8212\'3femployee\rquote s claim of fraud when employer ordered him to clean up
toxic chemical spill without warning of hazards was not preempted by LMRA \u167
\'3f 301]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2638]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Invasion of privacy claims:
}
}
Claims for invasions of employees\rquote constitutional right of privacy are n
ot preempted by \u167\'3f 301 where the CBA does not specifically authorize the
invasion; and any such waiver would have to be \u8220\'3fclear and unmistakable.
\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2001) 255 F3d 683, 692
}}}
(en banc)\u8212\'3fno preemption of claims that employer installed video camera
s in employees\rquote restrooms (ostensibly to monitor drug use) because CBA di
d
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
clearly and unmistakably authorize this type of surveillance; immaterial that C
BA authorized videotaping in other contexts (theft or dishonesty) and required m
andatory drug testing]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2639]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Physical force or threats:
}
}
Actions based on any level of physical force or threats by an employer are not
preempted even if the CBA gives the employer the right to direct and control the
employee\rquote s activity, and even if that activity interferes with company b
usiness. The employer\rquote s right to control the employee cannot sanction bat
tery. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2007) 473 F3d 994, 999]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2640]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Intentional infliction of emotional distress:
}
}
Intentional infliction claims are not preempted where the employer\rquote s con
duct was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unlawful
}
}
or where the CBA does not authorize the offending behavior (in which event, no
need to interpret the CBA). [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 255 F3d at 695
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaim based on employer\rquote s secret spying on employees in restroo
ms]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2641]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Retaliatory discharge:
}
}
A complaint alleging retaliatory discharge for filing a workers\rquote compens
ation claim is not preempted. Resolution of such claim depends on the employer\r
quote s motives, not the terms of the CBA. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1988) 486 US 399, 408, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Crosby v. Cooper B\u8211\'3fLine, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2013) 725 F3d 795, 801\u8211\'3f803
}}}
\u8212\'3fno removal jurisdiction over retaliation claim despite settlement of C
BA grievance stating employee\rquote s departure was \u8220\'3fvoluntary\u8221\'
3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2642]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Tortious discharge in violation of public policy:
}
}
The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy exists independent
ly of any contract right and is not preempted by \u167\'3f 301. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1995) 66 F3d 1514, 1524;
}}}
see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Deschene v. Pinole Point Steel Co.
}
}
(1999) 76 CA4th 33, 42, 90 CR2d 15, 23
}}}
\u8212\'3femployee allegedly fired for responding to subpoena and giving truthfu
l testimony adverse to employer]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2643]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Discrimination claims:
}
}
Claims based upon state laws prohibiting discrimination based on protected clas
sifications such as race, age, sex, disability, etc., are not preempted by LMRA
\u167\'3f 301. Even if it is necessary to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
refer
}
}
to a CBA to determine the terms and conditions of employment, state law discrim
ination claims can be resolved
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
without interpreting
}
}
the terms of the CBA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 1988) 850 F2d 543, 546]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f[2:2644]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
CBA anti-discrimination provision immaterial:
}
}
It makes no difference that the CBA contains remedies for such discrimination:
\u8220\'3fMere similarities between state law protections and (CBA) provisions .
. . does not require preemption.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 850 F2d at 546
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2645]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Duty of fair representation claims:
}
}
Where employees claim their union has breached its duty of fair representation
by arbitrarily refusing to take their grievances with the employer to arbitratio
n, the employees\rquote claims against the union and the companion claim agains
t the employer are not preempted (under the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Garmon
}
}
principle). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Vaca v. Sipes
}
}
(1967) 386 US 171, 187, 87 S.Ct. 903, 915]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2646]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Claims arising after CBA expired:
}
}
If the claim sued upon arose after the CBA expired, it is not preempted because
it is not subject to the CBA grievance procedures. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1989) 884 F2d 470, 474
}}}
\u8212\'3fwrongful discharge claim arose in interim between two CBAs; see also
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Litton Financial Printing Div., a Div. of Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. N.L.R
.B.
}
}
(1991) 501 US 190, 205, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 2225
}}}
\u8212\'3farbitration clause does not survive expiration of collective bargainin
g agreement]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f[2:2647] The result is different, however, if the claim is based on ri
ghts provided for in the CBA. [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL\u8
211\'3fCIO
}
}
(1977) 430 US 243, 252\u8211\'3f253, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 1073
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaim for severance pay arising after expiration of CBA held arbitrabl
e if based upon \u8220\'3faccrued\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3fvested\u8221\'3f rights
arising under the contract]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2648]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Workplace safety:
}
}
If a workplace safety claim depends on an independent and nonnegotiable state r
ight, it is not completely preempted. This may be true even if the CBA also spea
ks to safety standards, so long as the claim does not rely on construction of th
e CBA for recovery. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
McKnight v. Dresser, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2012) 676 F3d 426, 434]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2649\u8211\'3f2654]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(8) [2:2655]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fNLRA preemption (\u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Garmon
}
}
preemption\u8221\'3f):
}
}
The National Labor Relations Act (
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 151 et seq.
}}}
) protects the collective bargaining process between labor and management. It pr
ohibits \u8220\'3funfair labor practices\u8221\'3f and empowers the National Lab
or Relations Board to adjudicate disputes arising under the Act (
}
29 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 158(a)
}}}
,
}
160
}}}
).
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This provides another source of federal preemption of state law actions arising
out of labor-management disputes: State courts have no power to regulate activit
ies actually or \u8220\'3farguably\u8221\'3f protected by NLRA \u167\'3f 7 or \u
167\'3f 8 as part of the collective bargaining process. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
}
}
(1959) 359 US 236, 243\u8211\'3f244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 779\u8211\'3f780]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Also preempted are state laws or causes of action regulating matters
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
protected or regulated by the NLRA but which Congress in enacting the NLRA
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
intended to remain unregulated.
}
}
[
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lodge 76, Int\rquote l Ass\rquote n of Machinists et al. v. Wisconsin Emp. Relat
ions Comm\rquote n
}
}
(1976) 427 US 132, 138, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2552
}}}
\u8212\'3fso-called \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Machinists
}
}
preemption\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2656\u8211\'3f2665]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2666]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
The NLRA reflects congressional intent that states not interfere with the collec
tive bargaining relationship. To the extent that it is regulated, federal regula
tion is to be exclusive. Thus, state courts must defer to the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive competence of the NLRB.
}
}
[
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 359 US at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 779\u8211\'3f780]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2667]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No federal question jurisdiction:
}
}
Unlike LMRA preemption (above), NLRA preemption is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defensive
}
}
only. It does not confer original jurisdiction on federal courts; i.e., if the
action involves activities protected by the NLRA,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
it belongs in the NLRB,
}
}
not in federal court! [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 359 US at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 780]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2668]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction:
}
}
Because
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
lack original jurisdiction in such matters, they likewise lack
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction. Thus, NLRA preemption is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
ground for removal of state court actions. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant
}
}
(9th Cir. 1988) 861 F2d 1389, 1397;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lontz v. Tharp
}
}
(4th Cir. 2005) 413 F3d 435, 442
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fthe
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
sine qua non
}
}
of complete preemption is a pre-existing federal cause of action that can be br
ought in the district courts\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2669]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal court must remand, not dismiss:
}
}
To protect the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, a federal court may be tempt
ed to shortcut the process and dismiss actions improperly removed from state cou
rt on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Garmon
}
}
preemption grounds. But that is error. An action removed without jurisdiction m
ust be remanded to the state court from which it was improperly removed. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1447(c)
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant,
}
}
supra, 861 F2d at 1400]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2670]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State court must decide preemption issue:
}
}
Thus, it is the state courts, not the federal, that must decide in the first in
stance whether the state cause of action is preempted under
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Garmon.
}
}
That decision, of course, is subject to review on appeal by the U.S. Supreme Co
urt
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
.
}
}
[
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Ethridge v. Harbor House Restaurant,
}
}
supra]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2671\u8211\'3f2674]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(9) [2:2675]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption\u8212\'3fERISA claims:
}
}
Special rules govern removal jurisdiction of claims arising under the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA,
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 1001 et seq.
}}}
). [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kemp v. International Business Machines Corp.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1997) 109 F3d 708, 712
}}}
(citing text)]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2676]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Statute:
}
}
Except for state laws \u8220\'3fregulating insurance\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:601.30 ff.
}
}
), ERISA \u8220\'3fshall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may no
w or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.\u8221\'3f [ERISA \u167\'3f 5
14(a);
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 1144(a)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2677]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Purpose:
}
}
This \u8220\'3fextraordinary\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fvirtually unique\u8221\'3f
preemption provision was intended to clear away
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
state laws bearing on employee retirement plans, even those consistent with ERI
SA\rquote s substantive requirements. The purpose is to assure
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
nationally uniform administration
}
}
of such plans. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux
}
}
(1987) 481 US 41, 46, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co
.
}
}
(1995) 514 US 645, 657, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677\u8211\'3f1678]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2678]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fComplete\u8221\'3f vs. \u8220\'3fdefensive\u8221\'3f preemption:
}
}
Normally, federal preemption is merely a defense to enforcement of state law cla
ims,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
displacing
}
}
state law (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:761
}
}
). As such, it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and ther
efore does not provide federal question jurisdiction. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 481 US 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But ERISA\rquote s preemptive force is so strong that where state law claims
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
fall within the scope of ERISA\rquote s civil enforcement provisions
}
}
(ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a), below), federal preemption is \u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221
\'3f: i.e., the state law claim is not merely displaced, it is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
replaced
}
}
with an ERISA claim. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 481 US at 54\u8211\'3f55, 107 S.Ct. at 1556\u8211\'3f1557;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1995) 57 F3d 350, 355;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 581 F3d 941, 945]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
ERISA contains two separate provisions that may be relevant to the preemption an
alysis:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f ERISA \u167\'3f 514(a) (
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 1144(a)
}}}
)
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
expressly preempts
}
}
state laws that relate to employee benefit plans except for state laws \u8220\'
3fregulating insurance\u8221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:601.30
}
}
); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) (
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 1132(a)
}}}
) provides the exclusive cause of action for violations of ERISA,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
displacing
}
}
state law claims (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2705
}
}
). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
}
}
supra, 481 US at 60, 107 S.Ct. at 1544]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Supreme Court cases decided after
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Metropolitan Life
}
}
have made it clear that state law claims falling within ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a)
are completely preempted, creating removal jurisdiction, even though not conflic
t-preempted by ERISA \u167\'3f 514. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan
}
}
(5th Cir. 2003) 338 F3d 433, 439\u8211\'3f440
}}}
(en banc)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This is an important distinction for claims based on state laws regulating insur
ance. Such laws are \u8220\'3fsaved\u8221\'3f from preemption under \u167\'3f 51
4 (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:601.30
}
}
), but are still preempted if they provide remedies other than those provided by
\u167\'3f 502(a). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila
}
}
(2004) 542 US 200, 208, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2495]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2679]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale for \u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f preemption:
}
}
ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) provides a comprehensive set of remedies, including actio
ns:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
to recover benefits
}
}
due under an ERISA plan;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
to enforce rights
}
}
under the terms of an ERISA plan; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
to clarify rights
}
}
to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
future benefits
}
}
under the terms of an ERISA plan. [ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a);
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_50660000823d1" }{\fldrslt
29 USC \u167\'3f 1132(a)(1)(B)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Section 502(a) also authorizes plan participants and beneficiaries to sue:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3ffor relief
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
on behalf of the plan
}
}
against ERISA \u8220\'3ffiduciaries\u8221\'3f for losses resulting from their b
reach of duties imposed by ERISA;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fto enjoin acts violating ERISA or the terms of the plan; or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fto obtain \u8220\'3fappropriate equitable relief\u8221\'3f to redress
such violations or to enforce ERISA or the terms of the plan. [ERISA \u167\'3f 5
02(a),
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 1132(a)(2), (3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Because \u167\'3f 502(a) was modeled after LMRA \u167\'3f 301, Congress must hav
e intended that claims actionable under \u167\'3f 502(a) be remedied
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusively
}
}
under \u167\'3f 502(a) and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
under state law; and that federal common law would develop under ERISA as it ha
s under LMRA \u167\'3f 301. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 481 US at 54\u8211\'3f55, 107 S.Ct. at 1556\u8211\'3f1557;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 542 US at 208, 124 S.Ct. at 2495]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2680]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Impact on removal jurisdiction:
}
}
\u8220\'3fComplete preemption\u8221\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
creates federal removal jurisdiction.
}
}
I.e., state law claims covered by ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) are \u8220\'3frecharac
terized\u8221\'3f as claims \u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f federal law and th
us removable to federal court. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 481 US 58, 66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547;
}}}
see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 581 F3d 941, 945
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fComplete preemption under \u167\'3f 502(a) is really a juris
dictional rather than a preemption doctrine\u8221\'3f (internal quotes omitted)]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2681] For example, former Employee sued Employer and Insurer in state court,
asserting contract and tort claims for wrongful withholding of insurance benefit
s under an ERISA-covered plan.
}
Removal
}
}
}
to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
was upheld because
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) provides a remedy
}
}
for such violations and \u167\'3f 514 expressly supersedes state law, so that E
mployee\rquote s state law claims were recharacterized as claims \u8220\'3farisi
ng under\u8221\'3f ERISA. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 481 US at 66\u8211\'3f67, 107 S.Ct. at 1547]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2682]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fclaims not covered by ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a):
}
}
State law claims not enforceable under ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
subject to \u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f preemption. Such claims may still be pr
eempted
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defensively
}
}
if they \u8220\'3frelate to\u8221\'3f an ERISA plan (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2678
}
}
). But they are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
converted into a federal cause of action: \u8220\'3fERISA preemption, without m
ore, does not convert a state claim into an action arising under federal law.\u8
221\'3f
}
[
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 481 US at 64, 107 S.Ct. at 1547;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Warner v. Ford Motor Co.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1995) 46 F3d 531, 534;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rice v. Panchal
}
}
(7th Cir. 1995) 65 F3d 637, 640;
}}}
see also
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 581 F3d at 946
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fdefense of conflict preemption . . . does not confer federal
question jurisdiction on a federal district court\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fThe difference between preemption and complete preemption is important
. When the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the plaintiff\rqu
ote s state claim is arguably preempted under \u167\'3f 514(a), the district cou
rt, being without removal jurisdiction, cannot resolve the dispute regarding pre
emption.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
It lacks power to do anything other than remand
}
}
to the state court where the preemption issue can be addressed and resolved.\u8
221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1995) 57 F3d 350, 355
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2683] Decedent\rquote s estate sued ERISA plan administrator for d
istributing benefits in violation of state law requirements. Any state law liabi
lity was almost certainly preempted because the claim \u8220\'3frelated to\u8221
\'3f an ERISA plan (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:601.30
}
}
). But the claim was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
\u8220\'3fcompletely preempted\u8221\'3f because it arose
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
outside
}
}
ERISA (hence, no remedy under \u167\'3f 502(a)(3)). Thus, there was no basis fo
r
}
removal
}
}
}
to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lehmann v. Brown
}
}
(7th Cir. 2000) 230 F3d 916, 920]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2684] Employee claimed Employer was negligent and breached fiducia
ry duties in failing to disclose an upcoming merger that would have affected Emp
loyee\rquote s decision to liquidate his interest in an employee stock ownership
plan. Although ERISA might be a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defense
}
}
to Employee\rquote s state law claims, those claims were
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
completely preempted because he was not seeking remedies within the scope of \u
167\'3f 502(a). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ervast v. Flexible Products Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2003) 346 F3d 1007, 1015]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2685\u8211\'3f2689]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2690]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Parties to action:
}
}
Removability may depend on who is asserting the claim and against whom the claim
is being asserted:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2691]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Who may assert ERISA claim:
}
}
Only the following persons may sue to enforce ERISA:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fa plan participant;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fa designated beneficiary;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe plan fiduciary; or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe Secretary of Labor. [ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a),
}
29 USC \u167\'3f 1132(a)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No other person has standing to maintain an ERISA action. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Harris v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1994) 26 F3d 930, 933;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Alexander v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1994) 13 F3d 940, 947]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2692]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fformer employees:
}
}
A former employee is a plan participant only if he or she has \u8220\'3fa
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
reasonable expectation of returning
}
}
to covered employment or (has) a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
colorable claim to vested benefits
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch
}
}
(1989) 489 US 101, 117, 109 S.Ct. 948, 958
}}}
(emphasis and parentheses added; internal quotes omitted)]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Thus, where before filing suit, a former employee has received all of the benefi
ts owed under an ERISA plan, that person lacks standing for purposes of ERISA. H
ence, there is no basis for complete preemption or removal. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Alexander v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1994) 13 F3d 940, 947;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
}
}
(10th Cir. 2004) 387 F3d 1146, 1159]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2693\u8211\'3f2695]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2696]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims by or against \u8220\'3foutsiders\u8221\'3f not preempted:
}
}
Claims by or against outsiders\u8212\'3fso-called \u8220\'3fnon-ERISA entities\u
8221\'3f\u8212\'3fare
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
preempted by ERISA: \u8220\'3fThe key to distinguishing between what ERISA pree
mpts and what it does not lies in recognizing that the statute comprehensively r
egulates certain
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
relationships
}
}
(among ERISA principals) . . . State law is allowed to govern . . . relationshi
ps (with outsiders) because it\rquote s much less likely to disrupt the ERISA sc
heme.\u8221\'3f
}
[
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
General American Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay
}
}
(9th Cir. 1993) 984 F2d 1518, 1521
}}}
(emphasis in original; parentheses added); see also
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.
}
}
(1993) 508 US 248, 253, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2067
}}}
\u8212\'3fassuming without deciding that no remedy against nonfiduciaries is ava
ilable under ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a)(3)]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2697]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Malpractice claims against plan advisers:
}
}
Attorneys, accountants, etc. who advise the ERISA plan administrator are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
plan \u8220\'3ffiduciaries\u8221\'3f under ERISA. Hence, malpractice claims aga
inst such persons are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
completely preempted and not removable from state court. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Custer v. Sweeney
}
}
(4th Cir. 1996) 89 F3d 1156, 1166\u8211\'3f1167;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morstein v. National Ins. Services, Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1996) 93 F3d 715, 722
}}}
(en banc)\u8212\'3fsuit against independent insurance agency and agent not comp
letely preempted]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2698]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims by health care providers:
}
}
A health care provider\rquote s suit against an ERISA plan for payment is genera
lly
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
subject to removal because the provider is neither an ERISA \u8220\'3fbeneficia
ry\u8221\'3f nor a \u8220\'3fparticipant.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan
}
}
(5th Cir. 1988) 845 F2d 1286, 1288\u8211\'3f1289;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Blue Cross of Calif. v. Anesthesia Care Assocs. Med. Group, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1999) 187 F3d 1045, 1053
}}}
\u8212\'3fproviders\rquote claims did not affect relationship between plan and
its beneficiaries]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2699]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims by assignees, subrogees of plan participants?
}
}
Courts are split on whether claims by assignees or subrogees of a plan participa
nt are completely preempted by ERISA and hence removable (e.g., claims by Hospit
al as assignee or subrogee of plan participant). [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Allstate Ins. Co. v. 65 Security Plan
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1989) 879 F2d 90, 94
}}}
\u8212\'3fERISA does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
cover such nonenumerated parties as subrogees and assignees and therefore there
could be no complete preemption and no removal jurisdiction; but see
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2000) 208 F3d 1073, 1081
}}}
\u8212\'3fallowing health care providers to sue under ERISA assures their willin
gness to provide health care for ERISA beneficiaries; this does not apply, howev
er, to persons to whom health care providers have made further assignment of ben
eficiaries\rquote claims]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2700]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstate laws subject to \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defensive preemption
}
}
\u8221\'3f (conflict preemption):
}
}
An entirely different analysis applies in determining whether state laws are con
flict-preempted by ERISA. Unlike \u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f preemption (jurisd
ictional preemption), defensive preemption applies where a state law \u8220\'3fr
elates to\u8221\'3f an \u8220\'3fERISA plan\u8221\'3f and is not \u8220\'3fsaved
\u8221\'3f from preemption by a state law \u8220\'3fregulating\u8221\'3f insuran
ce.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:601 ff
}
}
.
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2701\u8211\'3f2704]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2705]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State laws subject to \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
complete preemption\u8221\'3f
}
}
(jurisdictional preemption):
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
}
Quite apart from conflict preemption, a state law claim that is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
covered by ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a)
}
}
is \u8220\'3fcompletely\u8221\'3f preempted and \u8220\'3frecharacterized\u8221
\'3f as a federal claim for removal purposes (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2680
}
}
): \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under
the laws of the United States
}
}
. . .\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 481 US 58, 65\u8211\'3f66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547
}}}
(emphasis in original; internal quotes omitted)]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2706]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Test for \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f:
}
}
A state law cause of action is completely preempted if:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f plaintiff, at some point in time,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
could have brought
}
}
the claim
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
under ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a)
}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2679
}
}
); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f the claim
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
is not
}
}
based on violation of a legal duty
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
independent
}
}
of ERISA. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(2004) 542 US 200, 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2496;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co
}
}
. (9th Cir. 2009) 581 F3d 941, 946]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2707]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Scope of \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f:
}
}
ERISA \u8220\'3fcompletely preempts\u8221\'3f any state law claim or remedy
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
based on wrongful withholding of benefits or denial of coverage
}
}
promised under an ERISA plan. E.g., claims for pain and suffering, wrongful dea
th, bad faith, fraud, loss of consortium, etc., resulting from denial of ERISA p
lan benefits. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 542 US at 220, 124 S.Ct. at 2502]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Exception\u8212\'3fno preemption of state laws regulating insurance:
}
}
State laws \u8220\'3fregulating insurance\u8221\'3f are expressly exempted from
ERISA preemption. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_1eca000045f07" }{\fldrslt
29 USC \u167\'3f 1144(b)(2)(A)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:601.30
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2708]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Nature of state law claim or remedy immaterial:
}
}
It is immaterial that plaintiffs assert tort rather than contract claims, or tha
t they seek personal injury damages rather than reimbursement for benefits denie
d. As long as the claim is based on an allegedly wrongful denial of benefits, ER
ISA provides the exclusive remedy. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
}
}
supra, 542 US at 214\u8211\'3f215, 124 S.Ct. at 2498\u8211\'3f2499
}}}
\u8212\'3fplaintiff claimed personal injury resulting from ERISA plan healthcare
provider\rquote s refusal to cover necessary medical services]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2709]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Lack of ERISA remedy immaterial:
}
}
A state law claim falling within the scope of ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) is complete
ly preempted
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
even if ERISA does not provide a remedy
}
}
for the matters asserted in the state law complaint: \u8220\'3fThe policy choic
es reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others un
der the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants
and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress re
jected in ERISA.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1987) 481 US 41, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1556]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2710]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
The effect of ERISA preemption is to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
eliminate
}
}
state law claims by plan beneficiaries,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
leaving them with only the causes of action and remedies
}
}
specified by ERISA. \u8220\'3fTo argue that Congress has created a \u8216\'3fga
p\u8217\'3f in the law does not undermine the reasoning on which a finding of pr
eemption is based.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1986) 799 F2d 1464, 1470;
}}}
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Romney v. Lin
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1996) 94 F3d 74, 81]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2711]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application:
}
}
Despite \u8220\'3ftragic circumstances,\u8221\'3f ERISA beneficiaries have been
denied relief on state law claims against ERISA plan administrators for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
pain and suffering, wrongful death, bad faith, fraud, loss of consortium,
}
}
etc. For example:
\par
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2712] Claim that ERISA plan administrator refused to authorize medical proced
ures necessary to save plan beneficiary\rquote s life. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cannon v. Group Health Service of Oklahoma, Inc.
}
}
(10th Cir. 1996) 77 F3d 1270, 1272;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Parrino v. FHP, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 146 F3d 699]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2713] Claim that ERISA plan administrator denied a hospital stay for woman du
ring final weeks of a high-risk pregnancy and the fetus died. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1992) 965 F2d 1321, 1333]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2714\u8211\'3f2718]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2719]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims based on
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
administration
}
}
of benefits completely preempted?
}
}
It is not clear whether the \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f doctrine ex
tends to state law claims based on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
administration
}
}
of ERISA plan benefits (e.g., ERISA plan administrator\rquote s negligence in r
eviewing claims or providing benefits).
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Several lower courts have held such claims preempted. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2001) 245 F3d 266, 273
}}}
(cited with apparent approval in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,
}
}
supra)\u8212\'3fclaims that ERISA plan healthcare provider was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
negligent in hiring, training and supervising its employees
}
}
\u8220\'3fto make thoughtful and reasonable decisions as to healthcare\u8221\'3
f held completely preempted under ERISA \u167\'3f 502 (a);
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Haynes v. Prudential Health Care
}
}
(5th Cir. 2002) 313 F3d 330, 337
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaim that ERISA plan healthcare provider
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
negligently failed to certify plaintiff\rquote s physician
}
}
as \u8220\'3fnetwork\u8221\'3f physician, resulting in denial of needed care]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
For further discussion of ERISA preemption of claims against healthcare provide
rs and insurers, see Croskey, Heeseman & Imre,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=0108109&cite=CAINSLCH.6F&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
6ec74e0e&refType=TS&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cal. Prac. Guide: Insurance Litigation
}
}
(TRG), Ch. 6F
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2720]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Test for \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f:
}
}
A claim is completely preempted if:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f plaintiff has
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
standing to sue under
}
}
that plan (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2691
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f defendant is an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
ERISA entity
}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2696
}
}
); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f the complaint seeks
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
compensatory relief akin to that available
}
}
under ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2679;
}
}
e.g., a claim for benefits due under the plan). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1999) 174 F3d 1207, 1212]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2721\u8211\'3f2724]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application\u8212\'3fremovable claims
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2725]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims for covered benefits:
}
}
ERISA completely preempts a beneficiary\rquote s state law claims based on an E
RISA plan administrator\rquote s delay or refusal to provide benefits covered by
the plan. Such claims fall squarely within ERISA\rquote s enforcement provision
, \u167\'3f 502(a). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(2004) 542 US 200, 210, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2496;
}}}
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_7&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_506_7" }{\fldr
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Negr\u243\'3fn-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions
}
}
(1st Cir. 2008) 532 F3d 1, 7
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Breach of promise re benefits
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2726]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Breach of oral promise to pay additional benefits:
}
}
ERISA completely preempts state law claims (fraud, breach of contract or neglige
nce) based on an employer\rquote s alleged oral promise to modify an ERISA plan
so as to increase plan benefits to plaintiff. Removal is proper because such cla
ims fall within the scope of ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a) (as a suit to clarify rights
to plan benefits). But there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no remedy
}
}
for oral promises under \u167\'3f 502(a) and therefore the action must be
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
dismissed
}
}
. [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Smith v. Dunham\u8211\'3fBush
}
}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1992) 959 F2d 6, 8\u8211\'3f12;
}}}
see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hubbard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass\rquote n
}
}
(5th Cir. 1995) 42 F3d 942, 946]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2727]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Breach of written promise to maintain benefits:
}
}
A written agreement promising early pension plan eligibility was not a promise s
eparate and independent from the plan itself. The agreement made clear that bene
fits arose from and were governed by the plan. Plaintiff\rquote s state law clai
ms thus were preempted by ERISA and properly removed to federal court (and becau
se the plan allowed for modification of benefits at any time, no cause of action
arose from a pension freeze). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Arditi v. Lighthouse Int\rquote l
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2012) 676 F3d 294, 300;
}}}
but see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern R.R. Corp. v. Schieffer
}
}
(8th Cir. 2013) 711 F3d 878, 882
}}}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discussed at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2743
}
}
)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3/ [2:2728]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fpromises made by or to \u8220\'3foutsiders\u8221\'3f:
}
}
State law claims based on promises made by or to persons who are not ERISA parti
es (participants, beneficiaries or fiduciary, etc.) are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
completely preempted. \u8220\'3fOutsiders\u8221\'3f lack standing to sue or be
sued under ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a). [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morstein v. National Ins. Servs., Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1996) 93 F3d 715, 722
}}}
\u8212\'3finsurance agent made promise;
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Equicor, Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1994) 32 F3d 1529, 1533
}}}
\u8212\'3fpromise made by plan administrator to outside health provider;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see further discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2690 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2729]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims against ERISA fiduciary:
}
}
An ERISA entity\rquote s claims against an ERISA fiduciary are limited to those
provided by ERISA\rquote s civil enforcement provisions. State law claims are co
mpletely preempted and are removable to federal court.
}
[
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kramer v. Smith Barney
}
}
(5th Cir. 1996) 80 F3d 1080, 1082\u8211\'3f1083
}}}
\u8212\'3fERISA Plan Trustee sued Brokerage Firm in state court for bad investme
nt advice; because Brokerage Firm was serving as ERISA plan fiduciary, state law
claims were completely preempted;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Smith v. Provident Bank
}
}
(6th Cir. 1999) 170 F3d 609, 613]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2730]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Subrogation claims by ERISA fiduciary against third parties:
}
}
An ERISA plan may give the plan administrator (fiduciary) a right of subrogatio
n for health care costs paid for a beneficiary injured by a third party. Because
ERISA \u167\'3f 502 (a)(3) provides a remedy, the plan fiduciary must sue under
ERISA; state law claims are completely preempted. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lyons v. Philip Morris Inc.
}
}
(8th Cir. 2000) 225 F3d 909, 912\u8211\'3f913]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2731\u8211\'3f2734]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:2735]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application\u8212\'3fnonremovable claims:
}
}
The following claims are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
removable on the ground of ERISA preemption because not within the scope of ERI
SA\rquote s civil enforcement provisions (\u167\'3f 502(a)) . . . even if they \
u8220\'3frelate to\u8221\'3f an ERISA plan (and therefore may be preempted
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defensively
}
}
under \u167\'3f 514):
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2736]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Wrongful termination claims unrelated to plan benefits:
}
}
Where the complaint alleges reasons for termination
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unrelated to ERISA plan benefits
}
}
(e.g., age discrimination), wrongful discharge claims based on such theories ar
e
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
completely preempted by ERISA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1987) 826 F2d 794, 800;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rokohl v. Texaco, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1996) 77 F3d 126, 130]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2737]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Fraud claims relating to retirement:
}
}
Former employees\rquote state law claims against their employer for inducing t
hem to accept early retirement are not covered by ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a)(3), and
thus not removable to federal court under the complete preemption doctrine. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.
}
}
(10th Cir. 2004) 387 F3d 1146, 1159]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2737.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
ERISA plan incidental to claim:
}
}
Where an ERISA plan merely needs to be referenced in order to affix damages, rat
her than interpreted to determine liability, the state law claim is based on an
independent agreement. [
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Stevenson v. Bank of New York Co., Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2010) 609 F3d 56, 61;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gardner v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LP
}
}
(6th Cir. 2013) 715 F3d 609, 614;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(8th Cir. 2013) 711 F3d 878, 882]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2738]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims against health plan based on doctor\rquote s negligence:
}
}
ERISA does not completely preempt an ERISA plan beneficiary\rquote s claims agai
nst the plan administrator based on medical decisions made in the course of trea
tment (e.g., medical malpractice by doctors provided by plan). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1995) 57 F3d 350, 357;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bui v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2002) 310 F3d 1143, 1147\u8211\'3f1148]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2739]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fdoctor acting as plan administrator:
}
}
But where a doctor also acts as an ERISA plan administrator, determining both el
igibility for medical treatment and the treatment to be given (so-called \u8220\
'3fmixed\u8221\'3f eligibility decisions), ERISA preempts claims based on withho
lding benefits as opposed to claims based on medical treatment decisions. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pegram v. Herdrich
}
}
(2000) 530 US 211, 228\u8211\'3f229, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 2154]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2740]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fclaims against plan for
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
negligent administration
}
}
of benefits:
}
}
According to some cases, claims for injuries suffered as the result of an ERISA
plan administrator\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
negligence in administration of plan benefits
}
}
(e.g., negligent supervision of health care providers) are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
completely
}
}
preempted and thus removable (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2719
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
This issue is discussed further in Croskey, Heeseman & Imre,
}
dType=Y&pubNum=0108109&cite=CAINSLCH.6F&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
6ec74e0e&refType=TS&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Cal. Prac. Guide: Insurance Litigation
}
}
(TRG), Ch. 6F
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
e) [2:2741]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Medical providers\rquote contract claims against plan:
}
}
Claims by doctors, hospitals, etc. against a health care plan for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
breach of their provider agreements
}
}
with the plan are not removable. The claims are not for benefits due under the
plan and thus could not be brought under ERISA \u167\'3f 502(a); and the plan\rq
uote s contractual duty to the providers is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
independent
}
}
of ERISA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
. (9th Cir. 2009) 581 F3d 941, 947\u8211\'3f948]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2742]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fassigned claims for plan benefits:
}
}
The result is different where medical providers sue as
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
assignees
}
}
of an ERISA plan beneficiary\rquote s claim for money owed under the ERISA plan
. Such claims are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
and thus removable to federal court. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
., supra, 581 F3d at 949]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
f) [2:2743]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Independent employment agreement:
}
}
Where severance benefit rights arose only under an employment agreement that re
ferenced an ERISA plan only to assign value to those benefits, the agreement was
independent of the ERISA plan. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(8th Cir. 2013) 711 F3d 878, 882;
}}}
see also
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gardner v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LP
}
}
(6th Cir. 2013) 715 F3d 609, 614
}}}
\u8212\'3ftortious interference with pension plan contract claim did not require
interpretation of ERISA plan\rquote s terms]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2744]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(10) [2:2745]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption\u8212\'3fNational Bank Act usury provisions:
}
}
The National Bank Act (
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=12USCAS85&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6e
12 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 85
}}}
\u8211\'3f
}
86
}}}
) provides the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive
}
}
cause of action against a national bank for usury, completely preempting (displ
acing) state law usury claims. Because the only claim available is a federal cla
im, state court actions against a national bank for usury are removable to feder
al court under
}
\u167\'3f 1441
}}}
. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Beneficial Nat\rquote l Bank v. Anderson
}
}
(2003) 539 US 1, 10, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 2064]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2746\u8211\'3f2749]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(11) [2:2750]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Other federal statutes completely preempting state law?
}
}
So far, the Supreme Court has limited complete preemption to LMRA, ERISA and Nat
ional Bank Act usury claims (see above).
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, there
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
may
}
}
be other federal statutes having such extraordinary preemptive force as to disp
lace state law claims involving the same subject matter, so as to create removal
jurisdiction on federal question grounds. The test is whether the federal statu
tes at issue provide \u8220\'3fthe
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive
}
}
cause of action for the claim asserted and also set forth procedures and remedi
es governing that cause of action.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Beneficial Nat\rquote l Bank v. Anderson
}
}
, supra, 539 US at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 2063
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2751]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Copyright infringement:
}
}
State court actions for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
copyright infringement
}
}
may be \u8220\'3fcompletely preempted\u8221\'3f by the Copyright Act, allowing
}
removal
}
}
}
to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
: \u8220\'3fThe grant of exclusive jurisdiction to federal district courts over
civil actions arising under the Copyright Act, combined with the preemptive forc
e of (the Act), compels the conclusion that Congress intended that state-law act
ions preempted by \u167\'3f 301(a) of the Copyright Act (
}
17 USC \u167\'3f 301(a)
}}}
) arise under federal law.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc.
}
}
(4th Cir. 1993) 1 F3d 225, 232
}}}
(parentheses added); see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2004) 373 F3d 296, 303\u8211\'3f304]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2752]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Test:
}
}
In determining whether a state law cause of action is equivalent to a copyright
infringement action, most circuits use an \u8220\'3fextra element test\u8221\'3
f; i.e., state claims that require an \u8220\'3fextra element,\u8221\'3f beyond
those required for copyright infringement, are not \u8220\'3fequivalent\u8221\'3
f and hence not preempted.
}
Conversely, If there is no \u8220\'3fextra element,\u8221\'3f or the \u8220\'3fe
xtra elements\u8221\'3f are \u8220\'3fillusory,\u8221\'3f the claim is equivalen
t to a copyright action, is preempted by the Copyright Act and federal courts ha
ve exclusive jurisdiction to hear it. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Ritchie v. Williams
}
}
(6th Cir. 2005) 395 F3d 283, 287, fn. 3;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.
}
}
(Fed. Cir. 2003) 320 F3d 1317, 1324]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2753] State law
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
contract
}
}
claims involving copyrighted works are not completely preempted unless
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
equivalent
}
}
to an infringement claim. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 320 F3d at 1324]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2754] Creator of children\rquote s wear sued in state court for \u
8220\'3fmisappropriation\u8221\'3f of its clothing through unauthorized copying
of its copyrighted designs. Although only state law claims were asserted, remova
l was proper because the federal Copyright Act completely preempts the cause of
action. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Aldridge v. The Gap, Inc.
}
}
(ND TX 1994) 866 F.Supp. 312, 313\u8211\'3f314]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2755] Plaintiff alleged unlawful \u8220\'3fconversion\u8221\'3f of
his television script. This state law claim was completely preempted because it
asserted rights equivalent to those protected under the Copyright Act, which pr
ovides the exclusive remedy for copyright infringement. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dielsi v. Falk
}
}
(CD CA 1996) 916 F.Supp. 985, 992;
}}}
see also
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc
}
}
. (CD CA 1997) 5 F.Supp.2d 816, 820\u8211\'3f822
}}}
\u8212\'3fcomplete copyright preemption of bad faith, conversion and interferenc
e claims based on screenwriter\rquote s suit against movie studio for alleged un
authorized use of screenplay]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2756\u8211\'3f2759]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2760]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3ftrademark claims:
}
}
Trademark infringement actions arise under federal law (see
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1338(a)
}}}
), but the Lanham Trademark Act (
}
15 USC \u167\'3f 1125(a)
}}}
) does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
provide the exclusive remedy so as to completely preempt state law regulation o
f trademarks. Plaintiffs may therefore prevent removal by asserting only alterna
tive state law claims. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Duncan v. Stuetzle
}
}
(9th Cir. 1996) 76 F3d 1480, 1486;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Emerson Power Transmission Corp. v. Roller Bearing Co. of America, Inc.
}
}
(ND IN 1996) 922 F.Supp. 1306, 1313]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2761]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal Communications Act:
}
}
The Federal Communications Act expressly preempts claims arising out of regulati
on of rates and services of interstate telecommunications providers. [
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_a83b000018c76" }{\fldrslt
47 USC \u167\'3f 201(b)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2762]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption:
}
}
Some cases hold the Act completely preempts state law contract and fraud claims
against interstate telecommunication service providers based on inadequate servi
ce regarding coverage areas and antenna power requirements because these are mat
ters regulated by the Federal Communications Commission. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bastien v. AT & T Wireless Services, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2000) 205 F3d 983, 988]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, other courts are contra, holding preemption is at most defensive becaus
e
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no federal cause of action is created
}
}
. Since there is no \u8220\'3fcomplete\u8221\'3f preemption, there is no basis f
or federal removal jurisdiction. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT & T
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1998) 138 F3d 479, 485;
}}}
see also
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Spielholz v. Sup.Ct. (Los Angeles Cellular)
}
}
(2001) 86 CA4th 1366, 1379, 104 CR2d 197, 208]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2763]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Medical Device Act:
}
}
The Federal Medical Device Act (
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=21USCAS360C&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
21 USC \u167\'3f 360c et seq.
}}}
) expressly preempts state law claims brought against medical device manufacture
rs relating to the \u8220\'3fsafety or effectiveness of a medical device.\u8221\
'3f
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2764]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption?
}
}
Some courts, without explanation, have upheld removal when a state law claim for
negligence or product liability is preempted under this Act. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Stamps v. Collagen Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 984 F2d 1416, 1420;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Richardson v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.
}
}
(ED LA 1994) 865 F.Supp. 1210, 1212]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But other courts read the Act much more narrowly because no federal claim is pro
vided to replace state law claims and there is no indication that Congress inten
ded to deprive injured persons from the right to seek redress against the manufa
cturers of defective products. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1995) 67 F3d 1453, 1456;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1996) 78 F3d 256, 259
}}}
\u8212\'3fpreemption is \u8220\'3fdefensive\u8221\'3f only;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:630
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2765]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Railroad Safety Standards:
}
}
Federal laws governing railroad safety are designed to provide uniform national
regulation (see
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=49USCAS20106&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aa
f6ec74e0e&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionTyp
49 USC \u167\'3f 20106
}}}
). These laws provide federal standards for licensing railroad engineers and a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
federal remedy
}
}
for reviewing a railroad\rquote s denial of such licenses (see
}
49 USC \u167\'3f 20135
}}}
). State laws pertaining to this subject matter are held \u8220\'3fcompletely pr
eempted\u8221\'3f and therefore removable to federal court. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(8th Cir. 1996) 80 F3d 257, 261
}}}
\u8212\'3faction under state law for \u8220\'3fconversion\u8221\'3f of engineer\
rquote s license held completely preempted]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2766]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Railway Labor Act (RLA):
}
}
The Railway Labor Act (RLA,
}
45 USC \u167\'3f 151 et seq.
}}}
) governs labor disputes in the transportation industry\u8212\'3fi.e., railways,
airlines and their union employees. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
}
}
(1994) 512 US 246, 248, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2241]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The RLA provides an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
arbitral process
}
}
for resolving labor disputes. It is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unclear
}
}
whether this arbitral process
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
completely
}
}
preempts state law actions (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2750
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2767]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Arbitral process:
}
}
The RLA provides a mandatory arbitration procedure to handle disputes \u8220\'3f
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreeme
nts covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.\u8221\'3f [
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=45USCAS151A&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
45 USC \u167\'3f 151a
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This arbitral mechanism applies both to:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fmajor\u8221\'3f disputes seeking to create contractual right
s (disputes concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fminor\u8221\'3f disputes seeking to enforce them (i.e., grie
vances based on interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agre
ements). [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
}
}
, supra, 512 US at 252, 114 S.Ct. at 2243\u8211\'3f2244]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2768]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Lingle
}
}
standard applies:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fmajor/minor\u8221\'3f dispute classification does not affect preem
ption. The approach used in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef
}
}
to determine the scope of LMRA preemption (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2622 ff
}
}
.) applies as well to RLA preemption:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3f(T)he common purposes of the two statutes . . . and the desirability o
f having a uniform common law of labor law preemption . . . support the applicat
ion of the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Lingle
}
}
standard in RLA cases as well.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
}
}
supra, 512 US at 263, 114 S.Ct. at 2249, fn. 9]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2769] An airline mechanic\rquote s state law wrongful discharge (t
ort) claim against an airline based on \u8220\'3fwhistleblowing\u8221\'3f activi
ties was not preempted by the RLA because
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no interpretation of the CBA
}
}
was required. The claims presented \u8220\'3fpurely factual questions\u8221\'3f
as to the employer\rquote s motives. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
}
}
supra, 512 US at 266, 114 S.Ct. at 2251]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2770\u8211\'3f2774]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2775]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Hawaiian Airlines,
}
}
supra, deals with ordinary (defensive) preemption and did not decide whether th
e RLA completely preempts state law claims so as to create removal jurisdiction.
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Most courts hold the RLA does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
completely preempt state law claims because it does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
provide an exclusive federal right of action; it merely provides for arbitratio
n of disputes.
}
[
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Geddes v. American Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2003) 321 F3d 1349, 1356;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2005) 424 F3d 267, 274\u8211\'3f276;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 553 F3d 1241, 1245\u8211\'3f1246]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2776]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Airline Deregulation Act:
}
}
The Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) expressly prohibits states from enacting or e
nforcing any law relating to \u8220\'3fprice, route, or service of an air carrie
r ... \u8221\'3f [
}
f6ec74e0e&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionTyp
e=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_3fed000053a85" }{\fldrslt
49 USC \u167\'3f 41713(b)(1)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
1:604
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
While this clearly preempts certain state laws (i.e., \u8220\'3fdefensive preemp
tion\u8221\'3f), it is not clear whether such preemption creates federal removal
jurisdiction:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2777]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Scope of preemption:
}
}
The ADA preempts
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state-imposed obligations
}
}
on air carriers; e.g., state laws regulating their \u8220\'3frates, routes or s
ervices.\u8221\'3f [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(1992) 504 US 374, 386\u8211\'3f387, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 2038
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate law regulating advertising of airline fares held preempted;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens
}
}
(1995) 513 US 219, 222, 115 S.Ct. 817, 821
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate consumer fraud law regulating airline business practices held pr
eempted]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But there is no preemption of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
obligations voluntarily assumed
}
}
by the airlines themselves. E.g., an airline\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
contracts
}
}
with its passengers are enforceable under state contract law. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
}
}
supra, 513 US at 230\u8211\'3f232, 115 S.Ct. at 824\u8211\'3f826
}}}
\u8212\'3fno preemption of state law in action to enforce frequent flyer awards]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2778]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
The cases cited above were not removal cases, and the Supreme Court has not addr
essed this issue. However, several lower courts have held the Act does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
transmute state law claims into federal claims so as to create
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction: i.e., there is no indication that Congress intended to \u8220\'3f
channel into
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
the business of resolving\u8221\'3f tort and contract claims relating to airlin
e rates, routes or services. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1996) 89 F3d 1244, 1251\u8211\'3f1252;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1997) 117 F3d 922, 925\u8211\'3f926]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2779] One view is that the preemption provision in the Airline Der
egulation Act is merely a defense to state regulation. It does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
transmute state common law claims into federal claims so as to create federal r
emoval jurisdiction. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp.
}
}
(6th Cir. 1996) 89 F3d 1244, 1251\u8211\'3f1252;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express
}
}
(9th Cir. 2002) 294 F3d 1179, 1184]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2780] Other courts uphold removal of state law personal injury cla
ims against airlines. Such claims are completely preempted by the ADA because th
ey affect the airlines\rquote \u8220\'3frates, routes or services.\u8221\'3f [S
ee
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Smith v. America West Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 4 F3d 356, 357
}}}
\u8212\'3fpassenger\rquote s claim that airline was negligent in permitting hija
cker to board plane]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2781] Even under this latter view, however, claims \u8220\'3ftoo r
emote\u8221\'3f to airline \u8220\'3frates, routes or services\u8221\'3f are not
completely preempted by the ADA, and hence not removable from state court. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 2 F3d 590, 597
}}}
\u8212\'3femployee\rquote s wrongful termination claim against airline;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1998) 164 F3d 186, 190
}}}
\u8212\'3fno preemption of defamation claim against airline]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2782\u8211\'3f2784]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2785]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Comment:
}
}
Cases applying the \u8220\'3fcomplete preemption\u8221\'3f doctrine to the Airli
ne Deregulation Act seem incorrect. Although not dealing with
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has noted: \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Nor is it plausible
}
}
that Congress
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
meant to channel into
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
}
the business of resolving . . . the range of contract claims relating to airlin
e rates, routes or services . . . In this regard, the ADA contrasts markedly wit
h the ERISA, which does channel civil actions into
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
}
}
supra, 513 US at 232, 115 S.Ct. at 825
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2786]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fclaims against airlines under Warsaw Convention:
}
}
In most cases, the sole remedy against an airline for personal injury, death or
property damage on international flights is under the Warsaw Convention (49 USC
App. \u167\'3f 1500 et seq.).
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Several courts hold the Warsaw Convention
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
completely
}
}
preempts state law claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of
incidents on international flights. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
}
}
(8th Cir. 1999) 169 F3d 1151, 1153;
}}}
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Shah v. Pan American World Serv., Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1998) 148 F3d 84, 97\u8211\'3f98;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1996) 98 F3d 881, 884]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This position seems supported by Supreme Court dictum: \u8220\'3f(R)ecovery for
personal injury suffered on board an aircraft . . . if not allowed under the Con
vention,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
is not available at all
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng
}
}
(1999) 525 US 155, 161, 119 S.Ct. 662, 668
}}}
(emphasis added) (dictum because removal jurisdiction existed on other grounds
and Court was discussing preemption as a defense)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2787]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Bankruptcy Act:
}
}
State law claims are completely preempted where Congress intended the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
remedies provided by the Bankruptcy Act
}
}
to be the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive cause of action
}
}
. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Miles
}
}
(9th Cir. 2005) 430 F3d 1083, 1089]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Complete preemption creates federal removal jurisdiction. In bankruptcy matters,
that jurisdiction is normally exercised by federal bankruptcy courts;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2961 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2788]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Damage claims based on involuntary bankruptcy:
}
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_17a3000024864" }{\fldrslt
11 USC \u167\'3f 303(i)
}}}
provides that upon dismissal of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrup
tcy court may order the petitioners to pay costs and fees to the debtor. This st
atute provides the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
for damages resulting from an involuntary bankruptcy petition, and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
completely preempts
}
}
state law damage claims against the petitioners (e.g., for malicious prosecutio
n, abuse of process, etc.): \u8220\'3fIt is for Congress and the federal courts,
not state courts, to decide what incentives and penalties are appropriate for u
se in connection with the bankruptcy process.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Miles
}
}
, supra, 430 F3d at 1090]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2789]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Recovery by third parties also barred:
}
}
Persons other than the debtor (e.g., debtor\rquote s relatives) have no standing
to seek costs and fees under
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_17a3000024864" }{\fldrslt
11 USC \u167\'3f 303(i)
}}}
. Even so, that does not allow them to pursue state law claims (e.g., for intent
ional infliction of emotional distress) based on involuntary bankruptcy proceedi
ngs because the Bankruptcy Act provides the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive cause of action.
}
}
[
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Miles
}
}
, supra, 430 F3d at 1091]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(h) [2:2790]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defense contracts and subcontracts:
}
}
According to the Ninth Circuit, state law is completely displaced by federal com
mon law on claims based on government contracts having to do with
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
national security
}
}
. The federal interest requires that the rule be uniform throughout the country.
Thus, state court actions asserting only state law claims can be removed to fed
eral court on the ground that the action \u8220\'3farises under\u8221\'3f federa
l law: \u8220\'3f(T)he entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts
and is replaced by federal rules.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
New SD, Inc. v. Rockwell Int\rquote l Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1996) 79 F3d 953, 955;
}}}
but see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Woodward Governor Co. v. Curtiss\u8211\'3fWright Flight Systems, Inc.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1999) 164 F3d 123, 128
}}}
\u8212\'3ffederal law controls only if United States exposed to potential loss o
r other uniquely federal interests implicated
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
there is \u8220\'3fsignificant conflict\u8221\'3f between federal policy or int
erest and state law]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(i) [2:2791]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA):
}
}
Claims against crop insurers are governed by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (
}
7 USC \u167\'3f 1501 et seq.
}}}
). Courts are split on whether this statute \u8220\'3fcompletely preempts\u8221\
'3f state law so as to authorize removal as under LMRA and ERISA.
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2792] Several district courts have upheld removal based on complet
e preemption under the FCIA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Owen v. Crop Hail Management
}
}
(WD MO 1994) 841 F.Supp. 297, 300\u8211\'3f301;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brown v. Crop Hail Management, Inc.
}
}
(SD TX 1993) 813 F.Supp. 519, 525]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2793] But the Ninth Circuit is contra, holding FCIA does not compl
etely preempt state law so as to allow removal jurisdiction. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Holman v. Laulo\u8211\'3fRowe Agency
}
}
(9th Cir. 1993) 994 F2d 666, 669]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(j) [2:2794]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fSecurities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA):
}
}
The SLUSA precludes state law class actions for securities fraud in either state
or
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
(
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=15USCAS77P&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf6
15 USC \u167\'3f 77p(b)
}}}
); and expressly provides for
}
removal
}
}
}
of state court actions to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
(
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4b24000003ba5" }{\fldrslt
15 USC \u167\'3f 77p(c)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2995
}
}
). Although the provision precluding state law actions is often called a \u8220\
'3fpreemption\u8221\'3f provision, the SLUSA does not itself displace state law
with federal law. It simply makes some state-law claims nonactionable through th
e class action device in federal as well as state court. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust
}
}
(2006) 547 US 633, 637, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 2151, fn. 1]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2795\u8211\'3f2799]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(k) [2:2800]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fFederal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA):
}
}
The FEHBA states that it \u8220\'3fshall supersede and preempt any State or loca
l law ... which relates to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
health insurance or plans
}
}
\u8221\'3f relating to coverage or benefits (
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_ea62000089cc6" }{\fldrslt
5 USC \u167\'3f 8902(m) (1)
}}}
(emphasis added)). This provision does not purport to render inoperative
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any and all
}
}
state laws that in some way bear on federal employee benefit plans; nor does it
displace every condition that state law may place on recovery. Therefore, it do
es
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
completely preempt state law so as to create removal jurisdiction. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh
}
}
(2006) 547 US 677, 698\u8211\'3f699, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 2136]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
l
}
}
) [2:2801]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA):
}
}
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA, 46 USC \u167\'3f 1300 et seq.) is deeme
d to be the exclusive remedy for loss or damage to goods carried in foreign trad
e by sea to or from ports in the U.S. [See 36 USC \u167\'3f 1312;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Talatala v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Corp
}
}
. (D HI 1997) 974 F.Supp. 1321, 1324, fn. 1]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Courts are split on whether state law claims for loss or damage covered by COGSA
are completely preempted so as to support
}
removal
}
}
}
to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Joe Boxer Corp. v. Fritz Transp. Int\rquote l
}
}
(CD CA 1998) 33 F.Supp.2d 851, 854
}}}
\u8212\'3fyes;
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Greenidge v. Mundo Shipping Corp.
}
}
(ED NY 1999) 41 F.Supp.2d 354, 358
}}}
\u8212\'3fno]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2802\u8211\'3f2804]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(m) [2:2805]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Interstate Commerce Act, Carmack Amendment:
}
}
Most cases hold that claims arising out of a moving company\rquote s failure to
perform an interstate moving contract are removable because \u8220\'3fcompletely
preempted\u8221\'3f under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.
[See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines
}
}
(5th Cir. 2003) 343 F3d 769, 778;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hall v. North American Van Lines, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2007) 476 F3d 683, 687]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2806]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
Congress intended the Carmack Amendment to provide the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
}
}
for loss of or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of t
hose goods by a common carrier. A claim for violation therefore \u8220\'3farises
under\u8221\'3f federal law and is removable under
}
\u167\'3f 1441
}}}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines,
}
}
supra, 343 F3d at 778;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hall v. North American Van Lines, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 476 F3d at 689]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2807\u8211\'3f2809]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(n) [2:2810]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act:
}
}
Some courts hold the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA,
}
25 USC \u167\'3f 2701 et seq.
}}}
) completely preempts the field of regulating gaming activities on Indian lands,
except as otherwise provided by the Act. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney
}
}
(8th Cir. 1996) 88 F3d 536, 543
}}}
\u8212\'3fcasino management companies\rquote claims for fraud and breach of fid
uciary duty arising out of licensing of tribal casino on Indian lands are comple
tely preempted and allow removal; compare
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State of Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D\rquote Alene Tribe
}
}
(8th Cir. 1999) 164 F3d 1102, 1108
}}}
\u8212\'3fno complete preemption where gambling activities not conducted on Indi
an lands (e.g., Internet lottery)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d.
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Unrelated state law or nonremovable claims
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2811]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Statute:
}
}
Whenever a claim or claims arising under federal law are joined with transaction
ally unrelated state law claims and/or with a claim or claims made nonremovable
by statute, \u8220\'3fthe entire action may be removed\u8221\'3f and the court s
hall sever and remand the claims not otherwise coming within the court\rquote s
federal question or supplemental jurisdiction. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441 (c)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
Under the wording of the prior statute and under long-standing case law, these
unrelated claims were labeled \u8220\'3fseparate and independent\u8221\'3f becau
se they necessarily arose under state law and were not transactionally related s
upplemental claims. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441 (c)(1)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2812]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limited to federal question cases joining unrelated or nonremovable claims:
}
}
Removal of the entire action under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
is limited to cases that include:
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fone or more claims that arise under federal law;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fone or more claims that are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the court or one or more th
at has been made nonremovable by statute (formerly the \u8220\'3fseparate and in
dependent\u8221\'3f claims). [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_73390000a9020" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)(1)(A),(B)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3110 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2813]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
A plaintiff in state court should not be permitted to prevent a defendant from r
emoving an otherwise properly removable federal question claim by joining
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unrelated
}
}
state law claims and asserting that the federal court lacks constitutional auth
ority to hear any part of the action. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)(1)
}}}
; see also H.R. Report 112\u8211\'3f10 on FCJVCA at p. 12]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2814]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fsupplemental jurisdiction:
}
}
There is no need for
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
where all claims are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
transactionally related
}
}
. I.e., where the claim \u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f federal law is transac
tionally related to the other nonremovable claims in the state law complaint, re
moval can be based on federal \u8220\'3fsupplemental jurisdiction\u8221\'3f (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1367
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2835 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2815]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2816]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Constitutionality:
}
}
Because
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
now requires the federal court to sever and remand the separate and nonremovabl
e claims, the federal court clearly has jurisdiction over the entirety of the ac
tion as it remains in federal court. Thus, the 2012 amendments cure any constitu
tional problems while preserving defendant\rquote s right to remove claims arisi
ng under federal law. [See H.R. Report 112\u8211\'3f10 on FCJVCA at p. 12]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2817]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Includes expressly nonremovable claims:
}
}
Removal under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
may take place if the action includes state claims unrelated to the federal que
stion claims
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or
}
}
if there are claims that have been made nonremovable by statute (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3149 ff.
}
}
). [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4d8a000011f17" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)(1)(B)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3110 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2818]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No severance and remand of nonremovable claim in diversity action:
}
}
The court cannot sever and remand the nonremovable claim with respect to an acti
on removed on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The court must remand the e
ntire action absent the presence of a federal question. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Vinson v. Schneider Nat\rquote l Carriers, Inc.
}
}
(ND TX 2013) 942 F.Supp.2d 630, 635
}}}
\u8212\'3fdiversity action including workers\rquote compensation claim remanded
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2819]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Requirements for removal:
}
}
}
Section 1441 (c)
}}}
allows removal where:
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
several claims
}
}
are joined in the state law complaint;
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fone or more of those claims is otherwise nonremovable (i.e., no divers
ity and not \u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f federal law); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fone or more claims is a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
federal
}
}
claim that is transactionally unrelated to the nonremovable claims. [See
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1998) 145 F3d 320, 327\u8211\'3f328]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2820]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Transactionally unrelated claims:
}
}
Claims are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
transactionally unrelated simply because they are asserted in different causes
of action. Rather, the claims must arise from
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
different wrongs inflicted
}
}
upon the plaintiff. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn
}
}
(1951) 341 US 6, 13, 71 S.Ct. 534, 539\u8211\'3f540;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Emrich v. Touche, Ross & Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1988) 846 F2d 1190, 1197;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re City of Mobile
}
}
(11th Cir. 1996) 75 F3d 605, 608]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2821]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Separate wrongs:
}
}
Claims arising from violation of a single \u8220\'3fprimary right\u8221\'3f (e.g
., right to bodily integrity, right to possession of property) cannot be conside
red transactionally unrelated despite multiple theories of liability against mul
tiple defendants. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn,
}
}
supra, 341 US at 14, 71 S.Ct. at 540]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2822]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
How determined:
}
}
Whether more than a single wrong to plaintiff is involved must be determined fro
m the complaint. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn
}
}
, supra, 341 US at 14, 71 S.Ct. at 540]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Of course, the mere fact that plaintiff pleads separate causes of action is not
enough, if all involve the same wrong or one depends on establishing liability u
nder the other. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1996) 97 F3d 100, 104]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2823] A claim alleging wrongful termination violating federal law
(in retaliation for taking family leave) is not \u8220\'3fseparate and independe
nt\u8221\'3f from a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional dist
ress
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
based on
}
}
such discharge. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 97 F3d at 104\u8211\'3f105]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2824] But a state law claim for interfering with the employee\rquo
te s obtaining a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
new
}
}
job is \u8220\'3fseparate and independent\u8221\'3f from the wrongful discharge
claim. \u8220\'3fFiring someone and preventing him from finding a new job are v
ery different wrongs.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 97 F3d at 105]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2825\u8211\'3f2829]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2830]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Determined from counterclaim?
}
}
Although
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Finn
}
}
, supra, focuses exclusively on the claims set forth in the complaint, some case
s uphold removal based on a transactionally unrelated claim set forth in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
defendant\rquote s counterclaim
}
}
. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State of Texas By & Through Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Texas System v. Walker
}
}
(5th Cir. 1998) 142 F3d 813, 817, fn. 4
}}}
\u8212\'3fState sued University Doctor for share of fees earned in private pract
ice; he counterclaimed for due process and equal protection violations under
}
42 USC \u167\'3f 1983
}}}
relating to his alleged improper termination]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2831]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application:
}
}
The following illustrate the application of
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
:
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2832]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
As a practical matter, defendant can remove any action that contains at least o
ne removable federal question claim. Either the state law claims are transaction
ally related (and hence within the court\rquote s supplemental jurisdiction) or
they are transactionally unrelated and can be removed (and later remanded) per
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2833]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Action against single defendant:
}
}
If the complaint asserts both state and federal claims against a single defenda
nt, the entire case can be removed under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
, but the transactionally unrelated claim(s) must be severed and remanded (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2850 ff.
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2834]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Action against several defendants:
}
}
Removal may also be based on
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
where the state court action is against
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
several
}
}
defendants, only some of whom are parties to the federal claim. As long as ther
e is a single federal claim against
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any
}
}
defendant, the action is removable in its entirety.
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2835]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2836] Investor sues Corporation in state court for breach of contr
act, fraud and RICO violation arising out of failed investment. The RICO claim m
akes the entire action removable under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
; the breach of contract and fraud claims fall within federal supplemental juris
diction.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2837] Employee sues Union and Employer for violation of the collec
tive bargaining agreement covering his employment (a federal claim), and joins v
arious state law tort claims against Supervisor and Coworkers. The federal and s
tate claims seek separate relief for distinct wrongs, permitting removal of the
action under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Moralez v. Meat Cutters Local 539
}
}
(ED MI 1991) 778 F.Supp. 368, 370]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2838]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2839]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Procedural distinction:
}
}
Certain of the procedural requirements for removal turn on whether the addition
al defendants are \u8220\'3fsupplemental parties\u8221\'3f or parties to a trans
actionally unrelated state law (or otherwise nonremovable) claim under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Where removal is based on
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fonly the defendants named in the removable claim need join in the remo
val notice (see
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)(2)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3461
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
time to remove
}
}
does not begin until the complaint is received by the defendant(s) to the feder
al claim (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3255
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fa remand order is generally not appealable or otherwise reviewable by
an appellate court (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1447(d)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3903
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But where removal jurisdiction is based on the court\rquote s supplemental juris
diction:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fall served defendants must join the removal notice (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3445
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fremoval must take place within 30 days after the complaint is first se
rved on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any
}
}
defendant (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3293
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fa remand order is reviewable on appeal (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3955
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2840]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Example:
}
}
P sues D\u8211\'3f1 on a federal civil rights claim and D\u8211\'3f2 on a state
law defamation claim. If the claims are transactionally unrelated to each other
, D\u8211\'3f1 can remove pursuant to
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
within 30 days of receiving the complaint even if D\u8211\'3f2 had been served
earlier and without obtaining the joinder of D\u8211\'3f2 to the removal.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In contrast, if the two claims are transactionally related, the defendants can r
emove under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
only if they both join in the removal notice and it is filed within 30 days aft
er the complaint was received by the first defendant. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Doe v. Kerwood
}
}
(5th Cir. 1992) 969 F2d 165, 168]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2841]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
If you represent a defendant to a federal question claim,
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
restarts the removal clock following service on your client ... provided the cl
aim against your client is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
transactionally related to claims against other defendants previously served wh
o have waived removal.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2842\u8211\'3f2849]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2850]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Severing and remanding unrelated and/or nonremovable claims:
}
}
Where an action is removed in its entirety under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
, the federal court is obligated to sever from the action all claims that are tr
ansactionally unrelated and/or otherwise nonremovable under statute, and to rema
nd them to state court. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(c)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2851\u8211\'3f2852]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2853]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstate and federal claims based on same facts:
}
}
Remand is improper, however, where the federal and state claims involve substant
ially the same facts. In such a case, there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no transactionally unrelated claim
}
}
under
}
\u167\'3f 1441 (c)
}}}
, and therefore the court has no discretion to remand. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Smith v. Amedisys Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2002) 298 F3d 434, 439
}}}
\u8212\'3fno discretion under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
to remand state law claims joined with federal claims based on same acts of sex
ual harassment and employment discrimination]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2854]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Comment:
}
}
As a practical matter,
}
removals
}
}
}
under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(c)
}}}
will always result in
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
two actions\u8212\'3f
}
}
one remaining in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
and the other remanded to state court. To prevent such a situation, parties may
well argue more forcefully that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all claims are transactionally related.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2855\u8211\'3f2859]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
e. [2:2860]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Special statutes authorizing removal:
}
}
In addition to cases in which original federal jurisdiction can be established,
there are a number of special statutes authorizing removal:
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(1) [2:2861]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal
}
}
}
by federal officers and agencies:
}
}
State court proceedings (civil or criminal) can be removed to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
by:
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f \u8220\'3fThe United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or
any person acting under that officer) . . . sued in an official or individual ca
pacity for any act under color of such office.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442 (a)(1)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f \u8220\'3fA property holder whose title is derived from any such offi
cer, where (the state court action) affects the validity of any law of the Unite
d States.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442(a)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f \u8220\'3fAny officer of the courts of the United States, for any
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
act under color of office
}
}
... \u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442(a) (3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f \u8220\'3fAny officer of ... Congress, for an act in the discharge of
his official duty ... \u8221\'3f [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_d40e000072291" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442(a)(4)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f \u8220\'3f(A) member of armed forces\u8221\'3f for \u8220\'3fan
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
act done under color of his office
}
}
... \u8221\'3f [
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1442A&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aa
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442a
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2862]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Purpose:
}
}
Federal officers or persons acting under their direction cannot be tried in sta
te courts against their will for acts done within the scope of their federal emp
loyment. The right to remove to federal court assures them a trial free from any
local prejudice against the federal government or its officers. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Arizona v. Manypenny
}
}
(1981) 451 US 232, 241\u8211\'3f242, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 1664;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co.
}
}
(10th Cir. 1998) 156 F3d 1030, 1034]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2863]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect:
}
}
The above statutes create
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction even as to cases that otherwise could not be commenced in or remov
ed to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
(e.g., common law negligence action against government driver who lives in same
state as plaintiff; hence no diversity). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker
}
}
(1999) 527 US 423, 431, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 2075;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Mir v. Fosburg
}
}
(9th Cir. 1980) 646 F2d 342, 344]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Moreover, unlike the usual rule that removability in federal question cases must
appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2501
}
}
), cases may be removable under
}
\u167\'3f 1442(a)
}}}
when a federal officer or agency raises a \u8220\'3fcolorable federal defense\u
8221\'3f (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2905
}
}
). [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker,
}
}
supra, 527 US at 431, 119 S.Ct. at 2075]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2864]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Does not assure remedy:
}
}
The defendant\rquote s power to remove a case to federal court does not assure t
he federal court\rquote s power to hear it.
}
Various federal statutes may bar the court from granting relief against the fede
ral officer or agency; in that event, after removal, the action must be dismisse
d. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State of Nebraska ex rel. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bentson
}
}
(9th Cir. 1998) 146 F3d 676, 678\u8211\'3f679
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate court action seeking to enjoin IRS from collecting child support
arrearages was removable but statute deprived court of subject matter jurisdict
ion to restrain collection]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2865]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Jurisdiction as to nonfederal parties and claims:
}
}
Federal officer
}
removal
}
}
}
results in transfer to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
of the entire state court action, even though it involves other (nonfederal) de
fendants and claims: \u8220\'3fit is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
the action
}
}
\u8212\'3fembracing all defendants\u8212\'3fthat is to be transferred to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dillon v. State of Mississippi Military Dept.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1994) 23 F3d 915, 919
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2866]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of dismissing federal officer:
}
}
Courts are split as to the jurisdictional impact of plaintiff\rquote s dismissin
g the claim against the federal officer:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fSome courts hold the district court retains
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
original federal jurisdiction
}
}
over the entire suit. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Adair v. Lease Partners, Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2009) 587 F3d 238, 245]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fOthers hold the district court retains
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discretionary supplemental
}
}
jurisdiction over state law claims. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1996) 101 F3d 1492, 1495\u8211\'3f1496
}}}
(involving former statute, now repealed, giving RTC special right of removal)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fThe difference, of course, is that if the claim is within the district
court\rquote s original jurisdiction, then it has no authority to remand, while
it has
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discretion to remand
}
}
if the claim falls within its supplemental jurisdiction.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Destfino v. Reiswig
}
}
(9th Cir. 2011) 630 F3d 952, 958
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2867]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation\u8212\'3fjurisdiction derivative of state court?
}
}
It is not clear whether the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court\rquote s
}
}
}
jurisdiction under the federal officer
}
removal
}
}
}
statute (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442
}}}
) is \u8220\'3fderivative\u8221\'3f of the state court . . . which would prevent
the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
from adjudicating cases the state court was incompetent to adjudicate, such as
cases within
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive federal jurisdiction
}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:118
}
}
).
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Although
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(f)
}}}
has abolished the \u8220\'3fderivative jurisdiction\u8221\'3f concept in action
s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
removed under
}
\u167\'3f 1441
}}}
}
(
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2493
}
}
), courts disagree whether it applies to federal officer removals under
}
\u167\'3f 1442
}}}
:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2868] One view is that if the state court lacked jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the parties, the federal court to which an action is remo
ved under
}
\u167\'3f 1442
}}}
also lacks jurisdiction. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Palmer v. City Nat\rquote l Bank, of West Virginia
}
}
(4th Cir. 2007) 498 F3d 236, 246
}}}
\u8212\'3fbecause state court action against federal agency was barred by federa
l sovereign immunity, district court to which action removed under
}
\u167\'3f 1442
}}}
inherited state court\rquote s lack of jurisdiction]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Comment:
}
}
The ironic result is to deprive a federal court of jurisdiction on an exclusive
ly federal claim simply because the case was initially filed in state court. (Pl
aintiff must file a new action in federal court, assuming the statute of limitat
ions has not run.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2869] But there is also authority contra, holding
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(f)
}}}
abolishes the derivative jurisdiction concept under
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
removal statutes. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State of North Dakota v. Fredericks
}
}
(8th Cir. 1991) 940 F2d 333, 337\u8211\'3f338]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2870\u8211\'3f2874]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2875]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Parties entitled to remove:
}
}
Officers of the United States or of any federal agency are authorized to remove
cases from state court. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442(a)(1)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2876]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2877]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fPerson acting under\u8221\'3f federal officer:
}
}
A nonfederal defendant may be entitled to remove under
}
\u167\'3f 1442(a)(1)
}}}
if it can show that:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fit is a \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
person
}
}
\u8221\'3f within the meaning of the statute;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fplaintiff\rquote s claims are based upon defendant\rquote s conduct \u
8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
acting under\u8221\'3f a federal officer
}
}
;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fa
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
causal nexus exists
}
}
between the claims and the conduct performed; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fa
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
colorable federal defense
}
}
is raised. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1999) 527 US 423, 431, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 2075;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2006) 445 F3d 1247, 1251]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2878]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fActing under\u8221\'3f federal officer:
}
}
This term refers to persons who
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
lawfully assist
}
}
a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
federal officer
}
}
in performance of his or her
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
official duties
}
}
. [See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc
}
}
. (2007) 551 US 142, 151\u8211\'3f152, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 2307]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:2879]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Government contractors:
}
}
Persons sued in state court for acts undertaken in performance of a contract wi
th a federal agency can remove the action under
}
\u167\'3f 1442(a)(1)
}}}
, at least when detailed supervision by the Government is involved. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1998) 149 F3d 387, 396\u8211\'3f397
}}}
\u8212\'3fgovernment contractor who supplied dangerous herbicide Government used
to conduct war could remove product liability actions pursuant to federal offic
er removal statute;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2008) 517 F3d 129, 140
}}}
(same);
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Arness v. Boeing North American, Inc.
}
}
(CD CA 1998) 997 F.Supp. 1268, 1271\u8211\'3f1275
}}}
\u8212\'3fgovernment contractor who followed federal specifications in flushing
out rocket engines with toxic substance could remove environmental pollution act
ion from state court]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2/ [2:2880]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fcomplying with detailed federal regulations not enough:
}
}
That a federal regulatory agency directs, supervises and monitors a private comp
any\rquote s activities in considerable detail does
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
mean the company is \u8220\'3facting under\u8221\'3f a federal officer so as to
permit removal jurisdiction. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc
}
}
., supra, 551 US at 152\u8211\'3f153, 127 S.Ct. at 2307
}}}
\u8212\'3ffalse advertising claim not removable on basis that cigarette manufact
urer advertised its products in accordance with exacting standards set by federa
l agency]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2881]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal officer as defendant:
}
}
The removal statute specifically provides that federal officers may remove a st
ate civil action or criminal prosecution
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
against
}
}
them. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442(a)
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1999) 527 US 423, 431, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 2075;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams
}
}
(DC Cir. 1995) 62 F3d 408, 413]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2882]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Third party defendant:
}
}
Removal jurisdiction also exists where a federal officer is joined as third part
y defendant in the state court action. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Johnson v. Showers
}
}
(8th Cir. 1984) 747 F2d 1228, 1229]
}}}
(But remember: Some courts do not allow removal by third party defendants gener
ally;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2256 ff.
}
}
)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2883]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal officer as nonparty witness:
}
}
Federal officers may remove state court proceedings that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
interfere with performance of their duties
}
}
even if they are not parties to the action; e.g., proceedings for enforcement o
f a subpoena that seek to prohibit or require future actions by the federal offi
cer. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 62 F3d at 413\u8211\'3f414]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2884] Members of Congress who were subpoenaed to testify and produ
ce documents relating to a congressional investigation in a state court civil ac
tion to which they were not parties, could remove the proceedings to federal cou
rt. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 62 F3d at 413]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2885\u8211\'3f2889]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2890]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal
}
}
}
of entire action:
}
}
As long as any defendant is a federal officer, the entire case is removable to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
, even if the other defendants could not have removed the case. [
}
ldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re \u8220\'3fAgent Orange\u8221\'3f Product Liab. Litig.
}
}
(ED NY 2004) 304 F.Supp.2d 442, 450\u8211\'3f451]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2891]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Contempt proceeding not required:
}
}
The proceedings to enforce the subpoena are removable even before a contempt pro
ceeding has been initiated. The removal statute contemplates a federal forum for
federal defenses and safeguarding officers acting under federal authority again
st peril of punishment for violation of state law. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 62 F3d at 413]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Of course, removal is also proper where a contempt proceeding has been initiated
against the officer. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State of Florida v. Cohen
}
}
(11th Cir. 1989) 887 F2d 1451, 1453]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Following
}
removal
}
}
}
, the
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
usually quashes the state court subpoena and dismisses any pending contempt pro
ceeding on the ground of federal sovereign immunity. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Edwards v. United States Department of Justice
}
}
(7th Cir. 1994) 43 F3d 312, 317;
}}}
see
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Elko County Grand Jury
}
}
(9th Cir. 1997) 109 F3d 554, 556]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:2892]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal officer as garnishee:
}
}
There is a split over whether federal officers may remove an action in which th
ey are merely the stakeholder in a garnishment action. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Nationwide Investors v. Miller
}
}
(9th Cir. 1986) 793 F2d 1044, 1046
}}}
\u8212\'3fyes;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hexamer v. Foreness
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 981 F2d 821, 823
}}}
\u8212\'3fno]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2893]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Requirements for removal:
}
}
To qualify for removal, a federal officer must
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
both:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
\u8212\'3f
}
}
raise a \u8220\'3fcolorable federal defense,\u8221\'3f and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3festablish that the suit is \u8220\'3ffor any act under color of office
.\u8221\'3f [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_28cc0000ccca6" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1442(a)(3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2894]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fAct under color of office\u8221\'3f:
}
}
The officer must show a \u8220\'3fnexus\u8221\'3f or
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
causal connection
}
}
between the charged conduct and asserted official authority. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(1999) 527 US 423, 431, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 2075]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2895]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Purpose:
}
}
Federal officer removal is predicated upon the existence of a federal
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
immunity defense
}
}
. Therefore, it must appear that the action or proceeding against the federal of
ficer arises from acts done under color of federal authority and in enforcement
of federal law. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Maryland v. Soper
}
}
(1926) 270 US 9, 22, 46 S.Ct. 185, 187]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2896] County imposed occupational tax on federal judges who were w
orking in that county. Judges properly removed the collection action because it
was based on their having engaged in their federal occupation. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 527 US at 431, 119 S.Ct. at 2075]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
c) [2:2897]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Includes future acts:
}
}
Federal officials may remove state court actions that seek to prohibit or requir
e certain official actions in the future. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State of Florida v. Cohen
}
}
(11th Cir. 1989) 887 F2d 1451, 1453;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Swett v. Schenk
}
}
(9th Cir. 1986) 792 F2d 1447, 1450]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
d) [2:2898]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fdeclaratory relief actions not removable:
}
}
A state court action seeking determination of abstract federal rights is not rem
ovable although a federal officer is named defendant. Such a suit is not one com
menced against the officer \u8220\'3ffor any act\u8221\'3f within the meaning of
}
\u167\'3f 1442(a)
}}}
. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
National Audobon Society v. Department of Water & Power of City of Los Angeles
}
}
(ED CA 1980) 496 F.Supp. 499, 505
}}}
\u8212\'3fsuit to determine federal government\rquote s right to take water not
removable where no actual taking asserted]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2899\u8211\'3f2904]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2905]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fColorable\u8221\'3f federal defense:
}
}
To qualify for removal, a federal officer must raise a \u8220\'3fcolorable\u8221
\'3f federal defense.
}
\u8220\'3fColorable\u8221\'3f is broadly interpreted because \u8220\'3fone of th
e most important reasons for
}
removal
}
}
}
is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tried in a
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 527 US at 431, 119 S.Ct. at 2075
}}}
\u8212\'3fupholding removal by federal judges sued by county to collect occupati
onal tax]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defenses
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
other than
}
}
official immunity may also qualify as a \u8220\'3fcolorable federal defense\u82
21\'3f (e.g., compliance with a federal statute). [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2008) 517 F3d 129, 139]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The federal officer
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
need not
}
}
show he or she will win in order to remove a case from state court. [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 527 US at 432, 119 S.Ct. at 2075
}}}
\u8212\'3fdefense \u8220\'3fneed not be clearly sustainable\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2906] Vending machine operator sued to enjoin Liquor Control Agent
from illegally seizing his video poker machines. Liquor Control Agent removed t
o federal court based on affidavits he was working for the FBI and was involved
in a federal \u8220\'3fsting\u8221\'3f operation and therefore entitled to a fed
eral immunity defense. Removal was upheld because the federal defendant asserted
a \u8220\'3fplausible\u8221\'3f federal defense. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Venezia v. Robinson
}
}
(7th Cir. 1994) 16 F3d 209, 211\u8211\'3f212]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2907]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Compare:
}
}
Postal mail truck drivers charged with
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
traffic
}
}
violations
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot
}
}
claim federal immunity as a defense and therefore cannot remove the state crimi
nal prosecutions to federal court. No \u8220\'3fcolorable\u8221\'3f claim to imm
unity exists for traffic violations. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Mesa v. California
}
}
(1989) 489 US 121, 133, 109 S.Ct. 959, 967]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2908] Courts are split on whether the defense that defendant was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
acting as a government contractor
}
}
and entitled to immunity is a \u8220\'3fcolorable federal defense\u8221\'3f for
removal purposes. [See
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 517 F3d at 139]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2909]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3ftort claims against federal employees:
}
}
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive remedy
}
}
for torts committed by federal employees within the course and scope of their e
mployment. Federal immunity is waived, but such actions must be brought
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
solely against the U.S.
}
}
(except for violations of the Constitution or statutes authorizing suit against
federal officers individually). [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 2679(b)(1)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(Federal courts have
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive jurisdiction
}
}
over actions against the U.S.;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:344
}
}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2910]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal upon Attorney General certification:
}
}
If government employees are sued individually in state court, the action \u8220
\'3fshall be removed
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
at any time, before trial
}
}
\u8221\'3f upon certification by the Attorney General that the employee was acti
ng in the course of his or her federal employment. In such cases, the action is
deemed one against the U.S., and the U.S. must be substituted as a defendant. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4be3000003be5" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 2679(d)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This rule applies even if the complaint alleges the employee was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
acting within scope of employment: \u8220\'3fSubstitution of the United States
is not improper simply because the Attorney General\rquote s certification rests
on an understanding of the facts that differs from the plaintiff\rquote s alleg
ations.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Osborn v. Haley
}
}
(2007) 549 US 225, 230, 127 S.Ct. 881, 888]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Once certification takes place, the action may be removed at any time prior to t
rial and the U.S. substituted as the proper defendant. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
McLaurin v. United States
}
}
(5th Cir. 2004) 392 F3d 774, 778]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2911]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Conclusiveness of certification:
}
}
The Attorney General\rquote s certification shall \u8220\'3fconclusively establ
ish scope of office or employment
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
for purposes of removal
}
}
.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 2679(d)(2)
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
However, that certification is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
conclusive for purposes of substituting the United States as a defendant.
}
(Plaintiff may wish to challenge the Attorney\rquote s General\rquote s certific
ation in order to avoid a governmental immunity defense.) It is then up to the d
istrict court to decide whether the federal officer was in fact acting within th
e scope of employment. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno
}
}
(1995) 515 US 417, 434, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2236;
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
7:18.1 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2912]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Government may deny incident occurred:
}
}
A Westfall Act certification is proper when a federal employee is charged with m
isconduct even if the employee asserts and the Government determines that the in
cident claimed by the plaintiff never occurred. The district court must decide t
he matter. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Osborn v. Haley,
}
}
supra, 549 US at 245\u8211\'3f246, 127 S.Ct. at 897]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2913]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of finding employee acted outside scope of employment:
}
}
The federal government remains as the defendant
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unless and until
}
}
the district court makes a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
factual determination
}
}
that the Attorney General\rquote s certification was incorrect; i.e., that the
employee\rquote s conduct was outside the scope of employment. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Osborn v. Haley,
}
}
supra, 549 US at 230, 127 S.Ct. at 888]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In such a case, the federal employee is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
resubstituted
}
}
as the defendant for purpose
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
of trial
}
}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Osborn v. Haley,
}
}
supra, 549 US at 240\u8211\'3f241, 127 S.Ct. at 894]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2914]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
District court retains jurisdiction:
}
}
The Westfall Act commands that a district court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
retain jurisdiction
}
}
over a case removed pursuant to
}
\u167\'3f 2679(d)(2)
}}}
even if the court finds the employee acted outside the scope of employment, and
even if the government
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
denies
}
}
the alleged incident ever happened. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Osborn v. Haley,
}
}
supra, 549 US at 244, 127 S.Ct. at 896]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer: See further discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
7:18.1a ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2915\u8211\'3f2919]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2920]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal
}
}
}
after Attorney General
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
refuses
}
}
certification:
}
}
If the Attorney General does not make a scope-of-employment certification, but t
he
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state court does,
}
}
}
removal
}
}
}
is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discretionary;
}
}
the Attorney General
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
may
}
}
then remove the case to
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_17df000040924" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 2679 (d)(3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
district court
}
}
has authority to review the Attorney General\rquote s noncertification decision
under
}
\u167\'3f 2679(d)(3)
}}}
. If it finds the Attorney General acted within his or her discretion, the court
must remand the case to state court. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Daniels v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2007) 484 F3d 884, 887]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2) [2:2921]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Certain civil rights cases:
}
}
A state civil or criminal action may be removed to federal court by a defendant
\u8220\'3fwho is denied or cannot enforce\u8221\'3f his or her civil rights in
state court. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_f1c50000821b0" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1443(1)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2006) 446 F3d 996, 999]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Likewise, defendants can remove state court actions charging them with acts unde
r color of authority derived from the civil rights laws (or for refusing to do a
n act on the ground it would be inconsistent with such laws). [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_58730000872b1" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1443(2)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Greenberg v. Veteran
}
}
(2nd Cir. 1989) 889 F2d 418, 421\u8211\'3f422]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2922]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Purpose:
}
}
These provisions were enacted when state court lawsuits were being used to thwa
rt enforcement of civil rights laws. In modern practice, removal under these pro
visions is rare. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Davis v. Glanton
}
}
(ED PA 1996) 921 F.Supp. 1421, 1423\u8211\'3f1424]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2923]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Requirements:
}
}
A notice of removal
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
under
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_f1c50000821b0" }{\fldrslt
\u167\'3f 1443(1)
}}}
}
must satisfy the following two-part test:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fFirst, it must appear that the removal notice is asserting a right und
er a federal law protecting civil rights stated in terms of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
racial equality
}
}
(rather than constitutional or statutory provisions of general applicability or
under statutes not protecting against racial discrimination); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fSecond, it must appear that the party seeking removal
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot enforce the specified federal right in the state courts
}
}
because of a state statute or constitutional provision that purports to command
the state courts to ignore the federal rights. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock
}
}
(1966) 384 US 808, 824\u8211\'3f828, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 1810\u8211\'3f1812;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Patel v. Del Taco, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 446 F3d at 999;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Miller v. Lambeth
}
}
(10th Cir. 2006) 443 F3d 757, 761]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
A removal notice
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
under
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_58730000872b1" }{\fldrslt
\u167\'3f 1443(2)
}}}
}
is proper only by federal officers or persons assisting such officers in perfor
ming their duties under federal civil rights laws. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock
}
}
, supra, 384 US at 828, 86 S.Ct. at 1812;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Miller v. Lambeth
}
}
, supra, 443 F3d at 761]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2924]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fcivil rights action:
}
}
If the complaint in the state court action asserts rights under federal civil r
ights laws, removal can be upheld under
}
\u167\'3f 1441(b)
}}}
(federal question). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education
}
}
(11th Cir. 1987) 817 F2d 1525, 1526]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(3) [2:2925]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Actions against foreign nations:
}
}
A state court civil action against a \u8220\'3fforeign state\u8221\'3f (as defi
ned in \u167\'3f 1603) may be removed by the foreign state to federal court. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(d)
}}}
; see
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jackson v. Resolution GGF Oy
}
}
(7th Cir. 1998) 136 F3d 1130, 1132]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This special
}
removal
}
}
}
statute is part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which was desig
ned to create a uniform body of law by establishing
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
as the preferred forum for cases against foreign states. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Davis v. McCourt
}
}
(6th Cir. 2000) 226 F3d 506, 509
}}}
\u8212\'3fremoval authorized even if foreign state named as third-party defendan
t]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
A foreign state may remove a state court action to federal court even though it
obtained its interest by an assignment during the course of the litigation and t
hen joined the state court action voluntarily. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2003) 322 F3d 635, 644]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2926]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Includes claims against codefendants:
}
}
The
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
entire
}
}
state action is removable by the foreign sovereign, including claims against ot
her defendants that otherwise could not be heard in federal court (no diversity
or federal question). Moreover, the foreign sovereign\rquote s removal right is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
unilateral
}
}
... so that it is immaterial that the other defendants prefer to stay in state
court! [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat\rquote l Bank
}
}
(9th Cir. 1990) 912 F2d 1095, 1098;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Nolan v. Boeing Co.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1990) 919 F2d 1058, 1065;
}}}
but see
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Schlumberger Indus., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp.
}
}
(4th Cir. 1994) 36 F3d 1274, 1284
}}}
(contra)\u8212\'3fno supplemental party jurisdiction]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2927]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Entity majority-owned by foreign state may remove:
}
}
The FSIA defines \u8220\'3fagency or instrumentality of a foreign state\u8221\'3
f to include a corporate or other entity where a majority of its shares are owne
d by a foreign state. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1603(a)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:381
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2928]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal
}
}
}
eliminates right to jury trial:
}
}
Even if there was a right to jury trial in state court, an action against a for
eign state is not jury triable in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
: \u8220\'3f ... Upon
}
removal
}
}
}
the action shall be tried by the court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
without
}
}
a jury.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(d)
}}}
; and see
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rex v. Cia. Pervana de Vapores, S.A.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 1981) 660 F2d 61, 64]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2929]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Extended time for removal:
}
}
When a foreign state removes a case, the normal time limits for removal may be e
nlarged at any time \u8220\'3ffor cause shown.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(d)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Courts consider the purpose of the removal statute, the extent of prior activity
in state court, prejudice to the parties and the \u8220\'3fequities.\u8221\'3f
[
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Refco, Inc. v. Galadari
}
}
(SD NY 1991) 755 F.Supp. 79, 82;
}}}
see
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Big Sky Network Canada, Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Government
}
}
(10th Cir. 2008) 533 F3d 1183, 1188\u8212\'3f3\u8211\'3f
}}}
week extension upheld where foreign government had never been haled into an Amer
ican court before, extension was sought in good faith, and neither state courts
nor plaintiff were prejudiced by delay]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2930]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Remand of nonforeign state portion of action?
}
}
Since the statute permits removal of the entire action against foreign states (
including claims against other defendants, see above), some decisions hold the c
ourt lacks discretion to remand or dismiss the remainder of the suit, at least u
ntil the action against the foreign state is resolved. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Surinam Airways Holding Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1992) 974 F2d 1255, 1260]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2931]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No waiver of sovereign immunity:
}
}
Unlike states of the United States (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:4875
}
}
), foreign sovereigns do not waive sovereign immunity upon removal. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Contour Spa at the Hard Rock, Inc. v. Seminole Tribe of Florida
}
}
(11th Cir. 2012) 692 F3d 1200, 1206]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2932\u8211\'3f2934]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(4) [2:2935]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Foreclosure actions against United States:
}
}
A state court action against the U.S. that seeks to quiet title to, or to forec
lose a mortgage or other lien upon, real or personal property on which the U.S.
claims a lien or mortgage, may be removed by the U.S. to federal court. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1444
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wilkinson v. United States
}
}
(WD NC 1989) 724 F.Supp. 1200, 1202]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2936\u8211\'3f2951]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(5) [2:2952]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC):
}
}
The FDIC is specifically authorized to remove any action to which it is a party
in any capacity (except when it is appointed as receiver exclusively by appointm
ent of state authorities and only interpretation of state law is involved). [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_424e0000ad683" }{\fldrslt
12 USC \u167\'3f 1819(b)(2)(B),(D)
}}}
; see
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Service Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 1989) 884 F2d 205, 207;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
FDIC v. S & I 85\u8211\'3f1, Ltd.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1994) 22 F3d 1070, 1072\u8211\'3f1073]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2953]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Time for FDIC removal:
}
}
The FDIC has 90 days to remove, measured from the date suit is filed against it
or from when it is \u8220\'3fsubstituted as a party.\u8221\'3f [
}
12 USC \u167\'3f 1819(b)(2)(B)
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
FDIC v. North Savannah Properties, LLC
}
}
(11th Cir. 2012) 686 F3d 1254, 1258]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2954]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Removal before substitution?
}
}
It is unclear whether removal may take place
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
before
}
}
formal substitution; and whether removal more than 90 days after appointment as
receiver (but within 90 days of formal intervention) is untimely. [
}
12 USC \u167\'3f 1819(b)(2)(B)
}}}
;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Woburn Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Robert M. Hicks, Inc.
}
}
(1st Cir. 1991) 930 F2d 965, 969
}}}
\u8212\'3fFDIC deemed a party from date appointed receiver;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Jackson v. American Sav. Mortgage Corp.
}
}
(11th Cir. 1991) 924 F2d 195, 196
}}}
(same);
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Diaz v. McAllen State Bank
}
}
(5th Cir. 1992) 975 F2d 1145, 1148
}}}
\u8212\'3fno removal until actual intervention;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Buczkowski v. FDIC
}
}
(7th Cir. 2005) 415 F3d 594, 596
}}}
(same)]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2954.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Timing of substitution:
}
}
Some courts hold that the FDIC is not actually substituted until it takes action
in state court beyond being appointed as receiver (such as filing a notice of s
ubstitution). Substitution then occurs automatically as a matter of law and the
case may be removed. The state court has no authority to deny substitution. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 686 F3d at 1258]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2954.2]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Substitution vs. intervention:
}
}
There is a difference between the FDIC\rquote s substitution for a failed bank,
which is essentially a ministerial matter, and the FDIC\rquote s intervention f
or other purposes. In the latter case, the state court has authority to deny the
motion to intervene, and the FDIC may not remove until (and if) it has been gra
nted party status.
}
[
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Allen v. FDIC
}
}
(9th Cir. 2013) 710 F3d 978, 982
}}}
\u8212\'3fFDIC\rquote s motion to intervene to protect interests in third party
discovery did not automatically trigger right of removal]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2955]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
New right of removal when FDIC joined in different capacity?
}
}
The FDIC has two different capacities, one as a corporation to administer depos
it insurance and the other as a receiver for insolvent state banks. There is a s
plit whether joinder in state court of the FDIC as a party in a new capacity
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
after
}
}
expiration of the time to remove in the earlier capacity renews the right to re
move. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Bullion Services, Inc. v. Valley State Bank
}
}
(9th Cir. 1995) 50 F3d 705, 709
}}}
\u8212\'3fyes;
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Dalton v. FDIC
}
}
(5th Cir. 1993) 987 F2d 1216, 1222
}}}
\u8212\'3fno]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2956\u8211\'3f2959]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2960]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Right to appeal remand order:
}
}
In contrast to the general rule denying appellate review of remand orders (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3875 ff.
}
}
), the FDIC may appeal an order of remand. [
}
12 USC \u167\'3f 1819(b) (2)(C)
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 686 F3d at 1257\u8211\'3f1258]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(6) [2:2961]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Bankruptcy matters:
}
}
Any state court cause of action or claim that falls within federal bankruptcy j
urisdiction may be removed to the district court (bankruptcy court) where the ba
nkruptcy case is pending. Likewise, federal actions pending in other federal dis
tricts may be \u8220\'3fremoved\u8221\'3f to that district. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1452(a)
}}}
;
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Moody v. Amoco Oil Co.
}
}
(7th Cir. 1984) 734 F2d 1200, 1207\u8211\'3f1209]
}}}
(Lawsuits pending in the district court cannot be \u8220\'3fremoved\u8221\'3f;
the proper procedure is a motion to refer the case to bankruptcy court. See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Mitchell
}
}
(BC CD CA 1997) 206 BR 204, 210
}}}
.)
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Most district courts have general orders automatically referring bankruptcy case
s to the bankruptcy judges of the district. Thus, in reality and in practice, re
moval is to the bankruptcy court. [
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000611&cite=USFRBPR9027&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
FRBP 9027
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If a bankruptcy case is already pending in another district, the district court
(bankruptcy court) to which the action has been removed may order a change of ve
nue to that other district under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1412
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2962]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Actions within bankruptcy jurisdiction:
}
}
The right to remove is limited to claims or causes of action as to which the di
strict court would have jurisdiction under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1334
}}}
. That statute creates nonexclusive federal jurisdiction over cases arising unde
r or related to bankruptcy cases. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1452(a)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State actions can
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
also
}
}
be removed under the general removal statute (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(a)
}}}
)\u8212\'3fe.g., on diversity or federal question grounds: \u8220\'3fThere is no
express indication in
}
\u167\'3f 1452
}}}
that Congress intended that statute to be the exclusive provision governing rem
ovals and remands in bankruptcy.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca
}
}
(1995) 516 US 124, 129, 116 S.Ct. 494, 497]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2963]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State law claims \u8220\'3farising in\u8221\'3f bankruptcy:
}
}
Removal jurisdiction extends to \u8220\'3fall civil proceedings arising under\u8
221\'3f bankruptcy law or \u8220\'3farising in or related to\u8221\'3f bankruptc
y cases. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1334(b)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The rules governing \u8220\'3farising under\u8221\'3f jurisdiction generally (\u
182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:585 ff.
}
}
) govern whether a state law claim or action \u8220\'3farises under\u8221\'3f ba
nkruptcy law. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Miles
}
}
(9th Cir. 2005) 430 F3d 1083, 1087\u8211\'3f1088]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Claims \u8220\'3farising in\u8221\'3f
}
Title 11
}}}
(bankruptcy) covers claims that, although not based on any right expressly crea
ted by
}
Title 11
}}}
, \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
would have no practical existence but for
}
}
the bankruptcy.\u8221\'3f [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Baker v. Simpson
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2010) 613 F3d 346, 351
}}}
(emphasis added; internal quotes omitted)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2964] State law tort actions for damages based on the filing and p
rosecution of involuntary bankruptcy petitions necessarily \u8220\'3farise under
}
title 11
}}}
\u8221\'3f (Bankruptcy Act) and thus were removable under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1452(a)
}}}
. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Miles
}
}
, supra, 430 F3d at 1093;
}}}
see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Repository Technologies, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2010) 601 F3d 710, 720
}}}
\u8212\'3fclaims for debtor\rquote s abuse of (bankruptcy) process \u8220\'3fari
se in\u8221\'3f bankruptcy]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:2964.1] Malpractice claims against an attorney who represented the
debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding \u8220\'3farise in\u8221\'3f bankruptcy and c
an be removed from state court because they fall within the bankruptcy court\rqu
ote s \u8220\'3foriginal but not exclusive jurisdiction\u8221\'3f (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1334(b)
}}}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Baker v. Simpson
}
}
, supra, 613 F3d at 348]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2965]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Certain state law claims \u8220\'3fcompletely preempted\u8221\'3f by
}
Title 11
}}}
:
}
}
Certain bankruptcy statutes are held to provide the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exclusive remedy
}
}
for particular claims related to bankruptcy so that any state law claim is \u82
20\'3fcompletely preempted\u8221\'3f; i.e., the only remedy available is a feder
al claim, creating removal jurisdiction.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2787 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2966]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation\u8212\'3fmandatory abstention:
}
}
On \u8220\'3ftimely motion\u8221\'3f by any party to the state court action, fe
deral courts
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
must abstain
}
}
from exercising jurisdiction under
}
\u167\'3f 1334
}}}
where all of the following are shown:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f The state court action is based on a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state law claim
}
}
or cause of action;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f That claim or cause of action is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
merely \u8220\'3frelated\u8221\'3f
}
}
to a bankruptcy case ... i.e., it is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not a \u8220\'3fcore\u8221\'3f proceeding
}
}
involving a cause of action created or determined by federal bankruptcy laws, a
nd does not \u8220\'3farise in\u8221\'3f a bankruptcy case (see
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Wood
}
}
(5th Cir. 1987) 825 F2d 90, 92);
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f Federal courts would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the state la
w claim (i.e., no diversity of citizenship between parties); and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f The matter can be \u8220\'3ftimely adjudicated\u8221\'3f in a state c
ourt of \u8220\'3fappropriate jurisdiction.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1334(c)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2967]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Example:
}
}
State court judicial foreclosure proceedings on property in a bankruptcy estate
are \u8220\'3fnoncore\u8221\'3f proceedings. They are merely \u8220\'3frelated\
u8221\'3f to the bankruptcy and therefore subject to mandatory abstention. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Mill\u8211\'3fCraft Bldg. Systems, Inc.
}
}
(BC ED WI 1986) 57 BR 531, 533\u8211\'3f534]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2968]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3ftort actions:
}
}
Mandatory abstention does not apply if the claim concerns personal injuries or
wrongful death. [
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_277b00009cfc7" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 157(b)(5)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2969\u8211\'3f2974]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:2975]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction where abstention mandatory:
}
}
Where
}
federal
}
}
}
}
courts
}
}
}
must abstain under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1334(c)(2)
}}}
, there is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
no
}
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction
}
}
. On \u8220\'3ftimely motion\u8221\'3f of any party to the state court action, a
case removed to federal court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
must
}
}
be
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
remanded
}
}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
State Bank of Lombard v. Chart House, Inc.
}
}
(ND IL 1985) 46 BR 468, 470\u8211\'3f471]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:2976]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fdiscretionary abstention and remand:
}
}
Quite apart from its obligation to abstain under
}
\u167\'3f 1334(c)(2)
}}}
, a federal court has
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discretionary
}
}
power to abstain \u8220\'3fin the interest of justice, or in the interest of co
mity with State courts or respect for State law\u8221\'3f (
}
\u167\'3f 1334(c)(1)
}}}
); and may
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
remand
}
}
\u8220\'3fon any equitable ground\u8221\'3f (
}
\u167\'3f 1452(b)
}}}
). [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Repository Technologies, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 601 F3d at 721
}}}
\u8212\'3fdiscretionary abstention and remand proper for claims not within origi
nal federal jurisdiction where Bankruptcy Code does not provide comprehensive cr
editor remedies]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
For example, abstention and remand may be ordered because state issues substanti
ally predominate, and the state court is thoroughly familiar with the matter (so
that judicial economy would be served by remand). The fact that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
nondebtor parties
}
}
are involved in the state court proceeding is another factor favoring abstentio
n and remand. [See
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Tucson Estates, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 1990) 912 F2d 1162, 1167
}}}
\u8212\'3fenumerating factors courts should consider in determining whether to e
xercise discretionary abstention]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(Compare: There is no discretionary basis for remand generally; see
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1447
}}}
, \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3770
}
}
.)
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:2977]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Procedure for bankruptcy
}
removal
}
}
}
:
}
}
A party seeking to remove an action to bankruptcy court must file a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
verified
}
}
\u8220\'3fNotice of
}
Removal
}
}
}
\u8221\'3f in the bankruptcy court and also in the state or
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
where the action is pending; and promptly serve copies of the notice on all par
ties to the action. [See
}
FRBP 9027(a)
}}}
-
}
6ec74e0e&refType=RE&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType
(c)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Unanimous consent of defendants not required:
}
}
Most courts hold the defendant unanimity requirement for removal generally does
not apply to removal under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1452
}}}
. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Anstine & Musgrove, Inc. v. Calcasieu Refining Co.
}
}
(D KS 2010) 436 BR 136, 138\u8211\'3f139
}}}
(collecting cases)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2978]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Content of notice:
}
}
The notice must include:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f \u8220\'3fa short and plain statement of the facts which entitle the
party to remove\u8221\'3f;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f a statement of whether the proceeding is \u8220\'3fcore\u8221\'3f or
\u8220\'3fnon-core,\u8221\'3f and if non-core, whether the applicant consents to
entry of final orders by the bankruptcy judge; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f a copy of all process and pleadings in the action. [
}
FRBP 9027(a)(1)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2979]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Time for removal:
}
}
The deadlines for filing the notice depend on whether the civil or bankruptcy a
ction was initiated first.
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:2980]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Where civil action filed first:
}
}
If the civil action was initiated first, the notice of removal must be filed be
fore the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
latest
}
}
of:
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f90 days after the order for relief in the bankruptcy action;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f30 days after the order terminating a stay, if the civil action has be
en stayed under the Bankruptcy Code; or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fin a Chapter 11 reorganization case, at least 30 days after a trustee
has been qualified but within 180 days after the order for relief. [
}
FRBP 9027(a)(2)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:2981]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Where bankruptcy filed first:
}
}
If the bankruptcy action was filed first, the notice of removal must be filed b
efore the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
earlier
}
}
of:
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f30 days after receipt of the initial pleading that contains the civil
claim or cause of action sought to be removed; or
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f30 days after receipt of summons, if the initial pleading was filed wi
th the court but not served with the summons. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_28cc0000ccca6" }{\fldrslt
FRBP 9027(a)(3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:2982]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Response to removal:
}
}
Any \u8220\'3fparty who has filed a pleading in connection with the removed cla
im or cause of action\u8221\'3f may file a verified statement within 14 days of
the filing of the removal notice with the district court.
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
The statement must:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f admit or deny \u8220\'3fany allegation in the notice of removal\u8221
\'3f relating to whether the removed proceeding will be core or non-core; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f give or withhold consent to entry of final orders by the bankruptcy j
udge. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4b250000f9dd6" }{\fldrslt
FRBP 9027 (e)(3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:2983]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Grounds for remand:
}
}
The court to which the cause is removed \u8220\'3fmay remand ... on any equitab
le ground.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1452(b)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This is not meant to revive the historical distinction between law and equity. R
ather, \u8220\'3fequitable\u8221\'3f simply means \u8220\'3fgeneral fairness.\u8
221\'3f [See J. Ginsburg concur.opn. in
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca
}
}
(1995) 516 US 124, 133, 116 S.Ct. 494, 499\u8211\'3f500]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2984]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Relevant factors:
}
}
The following factors are relevant: \u8220\'3fjudicial economy; comity and resp
ect for state court decision-making capabilities; the effect of remand upon the
administration of the related
}
title 11
}}}
estate; the effect of bifurcating the claims and parties to an action and the p
ossibilities of inconsistent results; the predominance of state law issues and n
on-debtor parties; and the prejudice to other parties to the action.\u8221\'3f [
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Western Helicopters, Inc. v. Hiller Aviation, Inc.
}
}
(ED CA 1988) 97 BR 1, 6]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:2985]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
After dismissal of bankruptcy:
}
}
The court has discretion to retain or remand related claims after dismissal of
the bankruptcy case. Ordinarily, such claims are remanded; but the court has pow
er to continue with them in appropriate cases (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:935
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Carraher
}
}
(9th Cir. 1992) 971 F2d 327, 328]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:2986]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Review and appeal:
}
}
The motion for remand may be made to the bankruptcy court under bankruptcy rule
s governing contested matters (
}
FRBP 9014
}}}
,
}
9027(d)
}}}
). The remand order may be reviewed by the district court, but is generally
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
reviewable by appeal. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1452(b)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(7) [2:2987]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Arbitration agreements with foreign nationals:
}
}
By treaty (\u8220\'3fConvention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar
bitral Awards,\u8221\'3f
}
9 USC \u167\'3f 201 et seq.
}}}
), arbitration provisions in contracts to which a foreign national is a party ar
e enforceable in federal court. Moreover, state court actions involving such arb
itration agreements or an award thereunder are removable to federal court any ti
me before trial. [
}
9 USC \u167\'3f 205
}}}
; see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Beiser v. Weyler
}
}
(5th Cir. 2002) 284 F3d 665, 669
}}}
\u8212\'3fwhenever an arbitration agreement falling under the Convention could
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
conceivably affect the outcome
}
}
of plaintiff\rquote s state court action, the agreement \u8220\'3frelates to\u8
221\'3f plaintiff\rquote s suit for removal purposes; see also
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Infuturia Global Ltd. v. Sequus Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2011) 631 F3d 1133, 1138]
}}}
\par
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
Procedures for enforcement of contractual arbitration generally are discussed a
t \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
16:53 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:2988\u8211\'3f2994]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(8) [2:2995]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Securities fraud class actions; SLUSA removals:
}
}
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) provides for the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
removal and dismissal
}
}
of \u8220\'3fcovered class actions\u8221\'3f in state court alleging federal or
state claims based on misrepresentations \u8220\'3fin connection with the purch
ase or sale of a covered security.\u8221\'3f [See
}
15 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 77p(b)
}}}
-
}
ec74e0e&refType=RE&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_4b24000003ba5" }{\fldrslt
(c)
}}}
,
}
dType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=15USCAS78BB&originatingDoc=I36920bc1eb2111da90bd8aaf
78bb(f)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discussed at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
10:491.1 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Unless the state court class actions fall within the \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Delaware carve-out
}
}
\u8221\'3f (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3011
}
}
) or other statutory exception, they must be
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
dismissed
}
}
by the district court. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_9daf00009de57" }{\fldrslt
15 USC \u167\'3f 78bb(f)(1)
}}}
; see
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Madden v. Cowen & Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 576 F3d 957, 961\u8211\'3f962]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(\u8220\'3fCovered class actions\u8221\'3f and \u8220\'3fcovered security\u8221\
'3f are defined at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
10:491.1 ff.
}
}
)
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:2996]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Independent basis for removal jurisdiction:
}
}
The SLUSA provides an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
independent
}
}
, constitutionally-sufficient basis for federal removal jurisdiction, apart from
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1331
}}}
(federal question jurisdiction). [
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 584 F3d 1208, 1220\u8211\'3f1221
}}}
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fthe separate provision for a preclusion defense requiring th
e dismissal of covered class actions . . . creates a federal question hook on wh
ich removal can hang\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2997]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Preclusion, not complete preemption:
}
}
The SLUSA does not displace state law with federal law. Rather, it makes state l
aw securities fraud claims \u8220\'3fnonactionable through the class action devi
ce in federal as well as state court.\u8221\'3f [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust
}
}
(2006) 547 US 633, 636, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 2151, fn. 1;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 584 F3d at 1219]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:2998]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Including nonprecluded claims:
}
}
The SLUSA provides for removal of a \u8220\'3fcovered class action,\u8221\'3f no
t just particular claims. Thus, it allows removal of the entire case if
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any
}
}
of plaintiff\rquote s claims are precluded by the SLUSA. This gives the distric
t court at least temporary jurisdiction over individual claims and nonprecluded
class claims. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 584 F3d at 1221]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:2999]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Remand of nonprecluded claims; no supplemental jurisdiction:
}
}
After the SLUSA-precluded claims have been dismissed, any nonprecluded state law
claims
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
must
}
}
be remanded to state court (
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_364700007f1f0" }{\fldrslt
15 USC \u167\'3f 78bb(f)(3)(D)
}}}
). The SLUSA\rquote s remand provision
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
precludes supplemental jurisdiction
}
}
in such cases. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 584 F3d at 1228, fn. 19]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:3000]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Which claims precluded:
}
}
Only claims alleging \u8220\'3fmisrepresentations or omissions of a material fac
t
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security
}
}
\u8221\'3f are precluded, including those alleging \u8220\'3fa manipulative or d
eceptive device or contrivance.\u8221\'3f [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_9daf00009de57" }{\fldrslt
15 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 78bb(f)(1)
}}}
,
}
77p(b)
}}}
(emphasis added); see
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Falkowski v. Imation Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2002) 309 F3d 1123, 1131
}}}
\u8212\'3fbreach of contract claims not removable or precluded by SLUSA]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3001] The SLUSA precluded minority shareholders\rquote class acti
on claims against majority shareholders
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
the corporation\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
accountants
}
}
for
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
breach of fiduciary duty
}
}
based on false statements in connection with a merger. (However, a similar shar
eholder\rquote s derivative action was
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
SLUSA precluded because it was not a class action.) [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 584 F3d at 1221]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3002]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
In connection with
}
}
purchase or sale of security\u8221\'3f:
}
}
This phrase is interpreted broadly, to include:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3003] State law securities fraud class action claims brought by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
holders
}
}
of securities (those who retain instead of selling), as well as by purchasers a
nd sellers. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit
}
}
(2006) 547 US 71, 85, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1513]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3004] Class action claims based on a stock-for-stock exchange in a
merger. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 576 F3d 957, 966]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3005]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3006]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
Broad interpretation of this provision makes it easier for defendants to remove
state court actions under SLUSA rather than under CAFA (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3021 ff
}
}
.), and thus
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
avoid the limitations on CAFA removal jurisdiction
}
}
(e.g., mandatory or discretionary abstention;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3055 ff
}
}
.).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3007]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation\u8212\'3fmore than tangential relationship required:
}
}
By the same token, \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
in connection with
}
}
\u8221\'3f is not unlimited. The phrase has been held to require misstatements t
hat are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
more than tangentially related
}
}
to transactions in covered securities. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 576 F3d 957, 966;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Roland v. Green
}
}
(5th Cir. 2012) 675 F3d 503, 521\u8211\'3f522
}}}
\u8212\'3fmisrepresentation that complex investment scheme was backed by covered
securities was one of many misstatements and not sufficiently connected with un
derlying fraud to make statement
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
more than tangentially related
}
}
to covered securities]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3008]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fMaterial\u8221\'3f misrepresentations required:
}
}
Materiality hinges on whether a reasonable investor would consider the informati
on important to the decision to buy or sell stock. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2012) 673 F3d 609, 617]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3008.1] Brokers\rquote alleged misstatements regarding inflation
of securities transaction fees were not considered
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
material
}
}
. Fee inflation of a few dollars was not sufficiently important to the decision
to purchase the security. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 673 F3d at 617]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3009\u8211\'3f3010]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:3011]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Exception\u8212\'3fcertain state law actions preserved (\u8220\'3fDelaware carve
-out\u8221\'3f):
}
}
The SLUSA provides an exception (known as the \u8220\'3fDelaware carve-out\u8221
\'3f) preserving state court jurisdiction in class actions:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fbrought under the law of the state in which defendant was incorporated
or organized;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthat involve a communication by the issuer to its shareholders with re
spect to sale of the issuer\rquote s securities, including tender and exchange o
ffers. [
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_e07e0000a9f57" }{\fldrslt
15 USC \u167\'3f 77p(d)(1)
}}}
; see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 576 F3d 957, 969\u8211\'3f970
}}}
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
limited to transactions involving \u8220\'3fcovered securities\u8221\'3f]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If the \u8220\'3fDelaware carve-out\u8221\'3f applies, the district court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
must remand
}
}
the action to state court. [
}
DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_20c3000034ad5" }{\fldrslt
15 USC \u167\'3f 77p(d)(4)
}}}
; see
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 576 F3d at 965]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3012]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Burden on removing defendant:
}
}
SLUSA removal jurisdiction depends on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
nonapplicability
}
}
of the \u8220\'3fDelaware carve-out.\u8221\'3f The burden is therefore on the r
emoving defendant to prove the \u8220\'3fDelaware carve-out\u8221\'3f does not a
pply to the state court action. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 576 F3d at 975\u8211\'3f976]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Procedural matters
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3013]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Determining removability:
}
}
Removal and dismissal under the SLUSA is generally based entirely on allegations
of the state court complaint. The court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
may
}
}
permit defendant to support removal by supplemental evidence showing SLUSA\rquo
te s applicability. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton
}
}
(9th Cir. 2007) 494 F3d 833, 842]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3014]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of plaintiff\rquote s postremoval amendment:
}
}
Plaintiff may seek leave to amend the complaint to avoid a SLUSA dismissal (e.g.
, by removing the securities fraud allegations). Although leave to amend is disc
retionary, the SLUSA does not prohibit postremoval amendments, particularly if t
he federal claim was inadvertently pleaded. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton
}
}
, supra, 494 F3d at 843]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Cross-refer:
}
}
SLUSA is discussed further at \u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
10:555 ff.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(9) [2:3015]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Multiparty, multiforum cases (mass disasters):
}
}
Any defendant may remove a state court action involving accidental deaths of 75
or more persons:
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fwhich could have been filed in federal court as a multiparty, multifor
um case under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1369
}}}
(i.e., \u8220\'3fminimal diversity\u8221\'3f and at least one defendant resides
in a different state than where the accident occurred, or any two defendants re
side or substantial parts of the accident occurred in different states;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1470 ff.
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f(\u8220\'3fpiggyback\u8221\'3f provision) \u8220\'3fthe defendant is a
party to an action which is or could have been brought, in whole or in part, un
der
}
\u167\'3f 1369
}}}
in a United States district court and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
arises from the same accident
}
}
as the action in State court, even if the action to be removed could not have b
een brought in a district court as an original matter.\u8221\'3f [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1441(e)(1)
}}}
(emphasis added)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Unlike removal generally, not all defendants need join.
}
Section 1441(e)(1)
}}}
states \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
a
}
}
defendant\u8221\'3f (i.e., any defendant) may remove a state court action that
could have been brought under
}
\u167\'3f 1369
}}}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Pettitt v. Boeing Co.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2010) 606 F3d 340, 343]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Application
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3016] Insurers who were defending insurance claims flowing from Hu
rricane Katrina in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
could seek
}
removal
}
}
}
under
}
\u167\'3f 1441 (e)(1)
}}}
of a state court action involving Hurricane Katrina claims, regardless of wheth
er the state court action could have been brought originally in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2006) 444 F3d 697, 700]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3017\u8211\'3f3019]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:3020]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No mandatory abstention:
}
}
A federal court must abstain from hearing an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
original jurisdiction
}
}
multiparty, multiforum case if most of the plaintiffs and defendants are citize
ns of the same state and its laws govern their claims (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1369(b)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1480
}
}
). This abstention rule, however, does not apply to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
removal
}
}
}
jurisdiction
}
}
because that would hamstring efforts to consolidate pending state court cases i
n
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp.
}
}
, supra, 444 F3d at 700]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(10) [2:3021]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fMinimal diversity\u8221\'3f class actions (Class Action Fairness Act (
CAFA)):
}
}
Although the complete diversity requirement applies to class actions generally (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1607
}
}
), it does not apply to class actions in which:
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthere are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
at least 100 class members
}
}
in all proposed plaintiff classes; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
the combined claims
}
}
of all class members
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exceed $5 million
}
}
exclusive of interest and costs; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any class member
}
}
(named or not) is a citizen of a different state than
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any defendant
}
}
(or any class member is a foreign citizen or foreign state and any defendant is
a foreign citizen). [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 1332(d)(2)
}}}
,
}
1332(d)(5)(B)
}}}
,
}
1453(a)
}}}
(part of Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA))]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
No limit on local defendants:
}
}
Removal is permitted in such cases without regard to whether any defendant is a
local citizen; i.e., the \u8220\'3fno local defendant\u8221\'3f limitation othe
rwise applicable to diversity cases (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2320
}
}
)
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
does not apply
}
}
. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(b)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(a) [2:3022]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Determining \u8220\'3fminimal diversity\u8221\'3f:
}
}
Special rules apply in determining \u8220\'3fminimal diversity\u8221\'3f for CA
FA purposes.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1420 ff.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3023]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Unincorporated associations:
}
}
The citizenship of individual members is disregarded in determining citizenship
of a partnership or unincorporated association for CAFA purposes.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1425.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3024]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Corporations:
}
}
It is unclear whether CAFA adopts the diversity jurisdiction rule that a corpora
tion has
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
dual
}
}
citizenship (state of incorporation and state of principal place of business).
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1427.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3025]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTERS FOR PLAIN\u8211\'3fTIFFS:
}
}
}
Plaintiffs can avoid federal removal jurisdiction by suing in state courts where
both the named plaintiff
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
the defendants are citizens and by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
limiting the class definition to citizens
}
}
of that state.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Doing so, however, poses a risk that a broader, nationwide class action will be
filed by someone else and the plaintiffs\rquote state court action stayed pendi
ng the outcome of that action.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(b) [2:3026]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Determining \u8220\'3fclass action\u8221\'3f:
}
}
For CAFA removal purposes, \u8220\'3fclass action\u8221\'3f means a civil action
filed under
}
FRCP 23
}}}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or similar state law.
}
}
[
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(1)(B)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Thus, an action that could be maintained as a class action under state law is re
movable even if the complaint fails to define a class under
}
FRCP 23
}}}
standards. [
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
College of Dental Surgeons of Puerto Rico v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
}
}
(1st Cir. 2009) 585 F3d 33, 40;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indem. Co.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2013) 722 F3d 154, 158]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Caution:
}
}
}
The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that may address the def
inition of a \u8220\'3fclass action\u8221\'3f in deciding whether a state filing
a lawsuit on behalf of its citizens is a class or mass action (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
}
}
Case No. 12\u8211\'3f1036, cert.grntd. 5/28/13).
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(c) [2:3027]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Includes \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
mass actions
}
}
\u8221\'3f (100 or more plaintiffs):
}
}
Federal jurisdiction under
}
\u167\'3f 1332(d)
}}}
extends beyond class actions to include \u8220\'3fmass actions\u8221\'3f\u8212\
'3fi.e., actions in which monetary claims by
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
100 or more plaintiffs
}
}
are proposed to be tried jointly because they involve
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
common questions of law or fact
}
}
(e.g., toxic tort claims)
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
.
}
}
[
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(11)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
There are, therefore, four threshold requirements for removal of a \u8220\'3fmas
s action\u8221\'3f:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
amount in controversy:
}
}
an aggregate of $5,000,000 in claims;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
diversity:
}
}
minimal diversity (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3021
}
}
);
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
numerosity:
}
}
100 or more plaintiffs; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
commonality:
}
}
plaintiffs\rquote claims involve common questions of law or fact. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co
}
}
. (11th Cir. 2007) 483 F3d 1184, 1203]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
100 or more plaintiffs:
}
}
Plaintiffs can avoid CAFA jurisdiction by filing separate lawsuits, each involv
ing fewer than 100 plaintiffs. Although the cases are similar, they are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
a \u8220\'3fmass action\u8221\'3f for CAFA purposes, even if they were ordered
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
consolidated
}
}
for trial
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
on defendant\rquote s motion
}
}
. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(11) (B)(ii)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Scimone v. Carnival Corp.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2013) 720 F3d 876, 884;
}}}
see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2009) 561 F3d 945, 953
}}}
(without motion for consolidation);
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Anderson v. Bayer Corp.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2010) 610 F3d 390, 393
}}}
(same)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Compare\u8212\'3fplaintiffs\rquote motion:
}
}
Although there is no known authority, the result should be different if separat
e state court lawsuits are consolidated on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiffs\rquote
}
}
motion; i.e., because the consolidation results from plaintiffs\rquote
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
voluntary act,
}
}
it should be treated as a \u8220\'3fmass action.\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1)
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitations on removal of \u8220\'3fmass actions\u8221\'3f
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3028]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fEvent or occurrence\u8221\'3f exclusion:
}
}
Federal jurisdiction
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot
}
}
be exercised in \u8220\'3fmass actions\u8221\'3f removed from state court when
all claims arise from a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
single event or occurrence
}
}
in the state where the action was filed and that resulted in injuries in that s
tate or contiguous states. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_63af0000d8e37" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
This \u8220\'3fevent or occurrence\u8221\'3f exclusion applies, however, only if
the mass action arises from a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
truly single
}
}
occurrence or event (such as an environmental accident). [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Nevada v. Bank of America Corp.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2012) 672 F3d 661, 668
}}}
\u8212\'3fsingle event or occurrence condition not satisfied where complaint all
eged widespread fraud involving thousands of borrower interactions]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
A single event or occurrence, however, need not be limited to a discrete inciden
t with a fixed duration of time. Circumstances that share some commonality and p
ersist over a period of time fall within the statute. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Abraham v. St. Croix Renaissance Group, L.L.L.P.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2013) 719 F3d 270, 279
}}}
\u8212\'3fplaintiffs\rquote unabated exposure to multiple hazardous substances
at a single worksite over many years was a single event or occurrence]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:3028.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
parens patriae
}
}
action not removable as mass action:
}
}
A state\rquote s
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
parens patriae
}
}
action is not removable as a mass action when, after examining the \u8220\'3fes
sential nature and effect\u8221\'3f of the proceeding, it is determined that the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state
}
}
is the real party in interest. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 672 F3d at 669\u8211\'3f672
}}}
(collecting cases and noting conflicting 5th Circuit authority);
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2013) 704 F3d 208, 216]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3028.2] State, not its citizens on whose behalf State was suing, w
as the real party in interest in a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
parens patriae
}
}
consumer protection suit against mortgage lenders, despite the possibility of r
estitution for thousands of state citizens. Consequently, the suit did not satis
fy CAFA\rquote s minimal diversity or numerosity requirements. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 672 F3d at 672;
}}}
see also
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
LG Display Co., Ltd. v. Madigan
}
}
(7th Cir. 2011) 665 F3d 768, 772]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3029]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Limitation on transfer of \u8220\'3fmass actions\u8221\'3f:
}
}
\u8220\'3fMass actions\u8221\'3f removed from state court may not be transferred
to another district under
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1407
}}}
(governing multidistrict litigation) unless a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
majority
}
}
of plaintiffs requests such transfer. This limitation does not apply, however,
to cases certified as a class action under
}
FRCP 23
}}}
or where plaintiffs propose such certification. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d) (11)(C)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3030]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Original federal jurisdiction?
}
}
It is presently unclear whether
}
\u167\'3f 1332(d)
}}}
confers original federal jurisdiction or only removal jurisdiction: \u8220\'3fC
ongress\rquote s use of the word \u8216\'3fremovable\u8217\'3f in the text of
}
\u167\'3f 1332
}}}
, a statute establishing original jurisdiction, blurs what had previously been a
clear distinction between jurisdiction and removal statutes, and thus obscures
the reach of jurisdiction over mass actions.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(9th Cir. 2006) 443 F3d 676, 682]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3031]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of individual class members\rquote claims of less than $75,000?
}
}
It is also unclear whether removal jurisdiction under
}
\u167\'3f 1332(d)(11)
}}}
is subject to the rule under
}
\u167\'3f 1332 (a)
}}}
limiting subject matter jurisdiction in diversity to claims by individual plain
tiffs of at least $75,000. (If
}
\u167\'3f 1332(a)
}}}
applies, all class members\rquote claims count in determining the 100\u8211\'3
fmember limit and the $5 million jurisdictional minimum, but claims under $75,00
0 would have to be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.) [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 443 F3d at 686\u8211\'3f687]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
While not resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
at least one class member\rquote s claim
}
}
must meet the jurisdictional minimum. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 443 F3d at 689]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Other courts specifically hold that as long as the aggregate exceeds $5 million,
some plaintiffs\rquote claims may be less than $75,000. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co
}
}
., supra, 483 F3d at 1205]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:3032]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of remands?
}
}
The statute does not explain the relationship between the 100 or more persons an
d the $5 million aggregate jurisdictional minimum: \u8220\'3fWhat happens if ind
ividual remands . . . bring the aggregate amount in controversy below $5,000,000
, or the number of plaintiffs below 100, or destroys minimal diversity?\u8221\'3
f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 443 F3d at 682]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3033\u8211\'3f3039]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(d) [2:3040]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Aggregation of claims:
}
}
The $5 million jurisdictional minimum may be based on aggregation of the claims
of all potential class members. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_701700008cf77" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(6)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3041]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Valuation of amount in controversy:
}
}
According to some cases, the amount in controversy may be based
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
either
}
}
on the aggregate value of the class members\rquote claims or on the costs to d
efendants of providing whatever relief is sought (analogizing to injunctive reli
ef cases,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1851
}
}
). [
}
\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Berry v. American Express Pub., Corp.
}
}
(CD CA 2005) 381 F.Supp.2d 1118, 1124]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3042]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Effect of state court complaint for less than $5 million:
}
}
Ordinarily, plaintiff as master of his or her claim may expressly limit the amo
unt in controversy to less than $5 million and avoid CAFA removal. However, remo
val may be upheld where the plaintiff\rquote s own compensatory and punitive dam
ages claims, along with attorney fees, multiplied by the number of class members
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
shows to a legal certainty
}
}
that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Frederico v. Home Depot
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2007) 507 F3d 188, 195\u8211\'3f196]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3043]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Stipulation to seek less than $5 million not binding:
}
}
A plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the
putative class before the class is certified. Thus, removal jurisdiction under
CAFA cannot be avoided by the named plaintiff\rquote s stipulation that he or sh
e will seek less than $5 million for the putative class. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles
}
}
(2013) US,, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1349]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3043.1\u8211\'3f3043.4]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:3043.5]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No artificial \u8220\'3fsplintering\u8221\'3f:
}
}
Claims divided solely to avoid CAFA\rquote s $5 million minimum may be aggregat
ed. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Products, Inc.
}
}
(6th Cir. 2008) 551 F3d 405, 407
}}}
\u8212\'3flandowners could not avoid removal of pollution claim by dividing it i
nto separate claims of $4.9 million covering different time periods]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(e) [2:3044]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Nonremovable claims (CAFA \u8220\'3fcarve-outs\u8221\'3f):
}
}
Certain claims dealing with securities and internal affairs or corporate govern
ance are excluded both from original jurisdiction (
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_6fbe00003afd7" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(9)
}}}
,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:1440
}
}
) and removal jurisdiction under CAFA. This includes:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3045]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Covered securities:
}
}
Claims involving
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
securities covered
}
}
under the 1933 Securities Act or 1934 Securities Exchange Act. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_e07e0000a9f57" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(d)(1)
}}}
;
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
(7th Cir. 2012) 673 F3d 609, 619
}}}
\u8212\'3fburden on party seeking remand to prove CAFA securities exception appl
ies]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3046]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Internal affairs or corporate governance:
}
}
Claims relating to the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
internal affairs or governance
}
}
of a corporation or other form of business enterprise under the law of the stat
e of its incorporation. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(d)(2)
}}}
; see
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Textainer Partnership Secur. Litig.
}
}
(ND CA 2005) 2005 WL 1791559]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3047]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rights created by any security:
}
}
Claims relating to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
rights and duties
}
}
(including fiduciary duties) relating to any security (as defined in the 1933 A
ct). [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(d)(3)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Rights and duties
}
}
are invoked by claims hinged on the terms of the instruments that create and de
fine securities or on the duties imposed on persons who administer securities. T
hey do
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
include claims based on rights arising from independent sources of state law. [
See
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2008) 527 F3d 25, 32
}}}
\u8212\'3fstate law consumer fraud class action involved unlisted securities but
did not \u8220\'3frelate to rights\u8221\'3f created in those securities and th
us was outside CAFA \u8220\'3fcarve-out\u8221\'3f (i.e., action removable under
CAFA)]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
If, however, state law creates duties as a result of the relationships surroundi
ng the security, claims based thereon fall within the carve-out statute, which e
xpressly references \u8220\'3fduties (including fiduciary duties)\u8221\'3f (
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(d)(3)
}}}
). [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
BlackRock Fin\rquote l Mgmt. Inc. v. Segregated Account of Ambac Assur. Corp.
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2012) 673 F3d 169, 176\u8211\'3f179
}}}
\u8212\'3frights and duties may be enumerated in instrument other than the secur
ity itself; see also
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 673 F3d at 619\u8211\'3f620
}}}
\u8212\'3fburden on party seeking remand to prove CAFA securities carve-out appl
ies]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3047.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Comment:
}
}
The above exceptions do not affect the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards A
ct (SLUSA), which
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
prohibits
}
}
securities fraud class actions based on
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
state law
}
}
in both federal and state court.
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
See
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2794
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3048]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
State agency primary defendant:
}
}
Class actions where the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
primary defendants
}
}
are state agencies or officials against whom relief in federal court is barred
by the 11th Amendment. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_ddda00006a1c0" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 1332(d)(5)(A)
}}}
,
}
1453 (a)
}}}
; see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Frazier v. Pioneer Americas LLC
}
}
(5th Cir. 2006) 455 F3d 542, 546
}}}
\u8212\'3fexception does not apply where state agency was only one of several co
defendants;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
primary defendants must be state entities]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3049\u8211\'3f3054]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(f) [2:3055]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fHome state\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3flocal controversy\u8221\'3f exceptio
n (mandatory abstention):
}
}
In cases removed from state court, a federal court
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot
}
}
exercise jurisdiction over a \u8220\'3fminimal diversity\u8221\'3f class action
if
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
either:
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
two-thirds or more of the class members
}
}
(aggregating all proposed plaintiff classes)
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
}
}
the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
primary defendants
}
}
are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f more than two-thirds of the class members and
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
at least one defendant
}
}
are \u8220\'3fcitizens\u8221\'3f of that state,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
\u8212\'3f
}
}
the \u8220\'3fprincipal injuries\u8221\'3f resulting from the alleged wrongdoin
g occurred there;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f\u8220\'3fsignificant relief\u8221\'3f is being sought from the local
defendant whose alleged conduct forms a \u8220\'3fsignificant basis\u8221\'3f fo
r plaintiffs\rquote claims;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
and
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
\u8212\'3f
}
}
no other class action has been filed within the past 3 years or behalf of the s
ame persons against any defendant asserting the same or similar factual allegati
ons. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_20c3000034ad5" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(4)
}}}
; see
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2006) 457 F3d 675, 680]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3056]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
This \u8220\'3fhome state\u8221\'3f exception to removal jurisdiction is based o
n principles of comity; i.e., state courts must be allowed to handle class actio
ns in which the transactions and most of the parties are local.
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3057]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Burden of proof on plaintiff:
}
}
Once CAFA removal jurisdiction has been established, the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
party seeking remand
}
}
(plaintiff) bears the burden of establishing that the \u8220\'3flocal controver
sy\u8221\'3f exception applies. [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2007) 478 F3d 1018, 1024;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2009) 561 F3d 144, 153]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3058]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defendant\rquote s citizenship at time of removal:
}
}
The \u8220\'3flocal controversy\u8221\'3f exception depends on citizenship of th
e defendants who remain in the action at the time of removal, not those named in
the original complaint. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 561 F3d at 153
}}}
\u8212\'3fnormal time-of-filing rule does not apply]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3059]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fPrincipal injuries\u8221\'3f incurred locally:
}
}
This provision is satisfied either:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fwhen principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct of each def
endant were incurred in the state in which the action was originally filed;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
or
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
\u8212\'3f
}
}
when principal injuries resulting from
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any related conduct
}
}
of each defendant were incurred in that state. [See
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_e3d800001e180" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332 (d)(4)(A)(i)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8226\'3f [2:3060] A remand was required where the putative class\rquote \u822
0\'3fprincipal injuries\u8221\'3f were sustained where the case was filed and re
sulted from the \u8220\'3falleged conduct\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3frelated conduct
\u8221\'3f of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
either
}
}
the local defendant or
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
the defendants. [See
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 561 F3d at 158
}}}
\u8212\'3fmeaning of \u8220\'3frelated conduct\u8221\'3f not decided]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
5) [2:3061]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Defendant\rquote s conduct as \u8220\'3fsignificant basis\u8221\'3f for class cl
aims:
}
}
The \u8220\'3fsignificant basis\u8221\'3f provision requires that the local def
endant\rquote s \u8220\'3falleged conduct\u8221\'3f be a \u8220\'3fsignificant\u
8221\'3f part of the alleged conduct of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
the defendants. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 561 F3d at 156
}}}
\u8212\'3flocal defendant\rquote s market share
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not
}
}
determinative]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
In addition, the local defendant\rquote s \u8220\'3falleged conduct\u8221\'3f mu
st be the basis for the claims of a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
significant number or percentage
}
}
of the putative class members, and must be an
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
important
}
}
ground for the asserted claims. But
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
not every
}
}
member of the putative class must have a claim against the local defendant. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
}
}
, supra, 561 F3d at 156;
}}}
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Westerfeld v. Independent Processing, LLC
}
}
(8th Cir. 2010) 621 F3d 819, 825
}}}
\u8212\'3flocal defendant\rquote s conduct must be
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
important
}
}
ground for claims of
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
class members, not just members of particular class]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
6) [2:3062]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
How to determine a \u8220\'3fprimary defendant\u8221\'3f:
}
}
In determining the \u8220\'3fprimary defendant,\u8221\'3f the court should first
assume liability. The court then asks whether the defendant will be directly li
able as opposed to vicariously or secondarily liable, and also whether the defen
dant will be liable to a significant portion of the class and suffer a substanti
al loss as compared with other defendants. [
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Vodenichar v. Halc\u243\'3fn Energy Properties, Inc.
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2013) 733 F3d 497, 504\u8211\'3f505
}}}
\u8212\'3fdefendant\rquote s denial of liability irrelevant to inquiry]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
For mandatory abstention to apply,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
all
}
}
primary defendants must be from the home state. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Vodenichar v. Halc\u243\'3fn Energy Properties, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 733 F3d at 506]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3063\u8211\'3f3069]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
7) [2:3070]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8220\'3fSignificant relief\u8221\'3f sought against local defendant:
}
}
The relief sought from the instate defendant must be a \u8220\'3fsignificant por
tion\u8221\'3f of the relief sought by the entire class against all defendants.
[
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2006) 449 F3d 1159, 1167;
}}}
see
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Coffey v. Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold
}
}
(10th Cir. 2009) 581 F3d 1240, 1245
}}}
\u8212\'3fnot dependent on whether defendant has financial ability
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
to pay
}
}
judgment]
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
8) [2:3070.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Not jurisdictional:
}
}
The home state exemption is not jurisdictional because the \u8220\'3fdecline to
exercise\u8221\'3f language of
}
\u167\'3f 1332(d)
}}}
inherently recognizes that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction.
[
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Gold v. New York Life Ins. Co
}
}
. (2nd Cir. 2013) 730 F3d 137, 141\u8211\'3f142;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morrison v. YTB Int\rquote l, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2011) 649 F3d 533, 536]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(g) [2:3071]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Discretionary abstention:
}
}
The federal court may \u8220\'3fin the interests of justice\u8221\'3f decline t
o exercise jurisdiction in cases removed from state court where
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
more than one-third
}
}
(but less than two-thirds) of the class members and the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
primary defendants
}
}
are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(3)
}}}
; see
}
fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem. Med. Ctr., Inc.
}
}
(5th Cir. 2007) 485 F3d 804, 812
}}}
\u8212\'3f
}
\u167\'3f 1332(d)(3)
}}}
allows district courts \u8220\'3fto ferret out the controversy that uniquely af
fects a particular locality to the exclusion of all others\u8221\'3f (internal q
uotes omitted)]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3072]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Factors considered:
}
}
In exercising this discretion, the federal court must consider whether:
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest
;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe claims will be governed by the law of the state in which the actio
n was originally filed or by the laws of other states;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid fede
ral jurisdiction;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe action was brought in a forum with a \u8220\'3fdistinct nexus with
the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants\u8221\'3f;
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fthe number of local class members (in all proposed plaintiff classes)
is substantially larger than class members from any other state and whether thes
e other members are dispersed among a substantial number of states; and
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3fany other class action has been filed within the past three years on b
ehalf of the same persons asserting the same or similar claims. [
}
=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_e9210000ba603" }{\fldrslt
28 USC \u167\'3f 1332(d)(3)(A)-(F)
}}}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3073]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Rationale:
}
}
This gives the federal court power (discretion) to turn away cases that are pred
ominantly of local rather than national interest but do not fall within the \u82
20\'3fhome state\u8221\'3f exception (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3055
}
}
).
\par
}
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(h) [2:3074]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Procedural considerations:
}
}
The removal procedure for minimal diversity class actions or mass actions is the
same as for removal of other state court actions (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3425 ff.
}
}
), except as follows:
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1) [2:3075]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Consent of all defendants not required:
}
}
A minimal diversity class action or mass action may be removed \u8220\'3fby any
defendant
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
without
}
}
the consent of all defendants\u8221\'3f (unlike most other actions,
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2247
}
}
). [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(b)
}}}
(emphasis added); see
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2007) 483 F3d 1184, 1196;
}}}
}
{\fldrslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
United Steel, et al. v. Shell Oil Co.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2008) 549 F3d 1204, 1208\u8211\'3f1209
}}}
\u8212\'3fother defendants cannot prevent or defeat removal of entire action;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc
}
}
. (6th Cir. 2012) 680 F3d 849, 853]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
2) [2:3076]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
No removal by third party defendants:
}
}
Cases hold CAFA\rquote s provision authorizing removal by \u8220\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
any
}
}
defendant\u8221\'3f does not change the traditional rule that only
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
original
}
}
defendants, not third parties, can invoke federal removal jurisdiction (\u182\'
3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2260
}
}
). Therefore, where the original defendant brings a counterclaim asserting a cla
ss action, the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
counterclaim defendants cannot remove
}
}
under CAFA. [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts
}
}
(4th Cir. 2008) 552 F3d 327, 335;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Westwood Apex v. Contreras
}
}
(9th Cir. 2011) 644 F3d 799, 806\u8211\'3f807;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 680 F3d at 853]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3077]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Assigning claims for collection in state court endangers the assignor\rquote s r
ight to remove
}
}
under CAFA. If the collection action defendant asserts a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
class action counterclaim
}
}
against the assignor (e.g., for statutory violations), the assignor
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
cannot
}
}
remove the case to federal court because it is not the original defendant!
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
3) [2:3078]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Time for
}
removal
}
}
}
:
}
}
As with
}
removal
}
}
}
cases generally, a defendant must file a notice of
}
removal
}
}
}
in
}
federal
}
}
}
}
court
}
}
}
within 30 days after receipt of the first state court pleading containing a rem
ovable claim. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(b) (1)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3230 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
But minimal diversity class actions are
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
exempt from the one-year outside time limit
}
}
on removal otherwise applicable to diversity cases (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3401 ff.
}
}
). (I.e., plaintiffs cannot avoid removal by delaying raising class claims until
after the 1\u8211\'3fyear limit.) [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(b)
}}}
;
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Westwood Apex v. Contreras
}
}
, supra, 644 F3d at 804;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
In re Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
}
}
, supra, 680 F3d at 853]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3079]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
PRACTICE POINTER:
}
}
}
This allows defendants to delay removal until they are certain CAFA requirements
are met\u8212\'3fi.e., until
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
after discovery
}
}
as to the number and citizenship of class members.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3080\u8211\'3f3084]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
4) [2:3085]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Evidentiary burdens on remand motion:
}
}
CAFA does not \u8220\'3falter the longstanding rule that the party seeking feder
al jurisdiction on removal bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction\u8
221\'3f (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3739
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co
}
}
. (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F3d 676, 686;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2005) 427 F3d 446, 447\u8211\'3f448;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Miedema v. Maytag Corp.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2006) 450 F3d 1322, 1328]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
a) [2:3086]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Amount in controversy:
}
}
Thus, defendant bears the burden of proving there is at least $5 million in con
troversy in cases removed under CAFA. Courts disagree, however, on the
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
standard
}
}
of proof required:
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f[2:3087]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Legal certainty:
}
}
Some cases require defendant to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in c
ontroversy exceeds the statutory minimum. (In effect, defendant has to prove the
amount of plaintiff\rquote s damages at the outset of the case.) [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Morgan v. Gay
}
}
(3rd Cir. 2006) 471 F3d 469, 473]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f[2:3088]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reasonable probability:
}
}
Other cases require defendant to prove only a reasonable probability that plain
tiff\rquote s claim is for more than $5 million; at that point, the burden shift
s to
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiff
}
}
to prove to a
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
legal certainty
}
}
that any judgment would be for a lesser amount (
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2049
}
}
). [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
}
}
supra, 427 F3d at 448\u8211\'3f449;
}}}
}
t
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Blockbuster, Inc. v. Galeno
}
}
(2nd Cir. 2006) 472 F3d 53, 58]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u8212\'3f[2:3089]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Preponderance:
}
}
Other cases hold defendant must establish the jurisdictional amount by a \u8220
\'3fpreponderance of the evidence.\u8221\'3f [
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Services LLC
}
}
(9th Cir. 2013) 728 F3d 975, 981;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2007) 483 F3d 1184, 1211;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.
}
}
(10th Cir. 2012) 683 F3d 1242, 1246;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hartis v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.
}
}
(8th Cir. 2012) 694 F3d 935, 944]
}}}
\par
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
1/ [2:3089.1]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fstandard of proof in non-CAFA cases:
}
}
In non-CAFA cases, by statute, the standard of proof re the amount in controvers
y is a preponderance of the evidence.
}
[
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1446(c)(2)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:2394 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
b) [2:3090]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Compare\u8212\'3fCAFA exceptions:
}
}
Most courts hold
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
plaintiffs
}
}
bear the burden of proving the \u8220\'3fhome state\u8221\'3f or \u8220\'3floca
l controversy\u8221\'3f exception to CAFA (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3055
}
}
) or grounds for discretionary abstention (\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3071
}
}
). [
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.
}
}
(11th Cir. 2006) 449 F3d 1159, 1164;
}}}
}
slt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.
}
}
(7th Cir. 2006) 457 F3d 675, 680;
}}}
}
drslt
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf5 \i1
Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc.
}
}
(9th Cir. 2007) 478 F3d 1018, 1024]
}}}
\par
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3091\u8211\'3f3094]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(i) [2:3095]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Attorney fees award:
}
}
CAFA does not specifically provide for an attorney fees award for improper remov
al. However, such an award is authorized under the general removal statute. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1447(c)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3800 ff.
}
}
]
\par
}
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\par
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(j) [2:3096]
}
{\f2 \b1 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
Appellate review of remand orders:
}
}
Unlike other removal cases, orders granting or denying remand to state court of
class actions or mass actions are subject to appellate review; but such review
is
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
discretionary
}
}
with the appellate court. [
}
28 USC \u167\'3f 1453(c)
}}}
;
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
see discussion at
}
}
\u182\'3f
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
2:3965
}
}
]
\par
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
{\li1200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
[2:3097\u8211\'3f3109]
}
{\f2 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i1
Reserved
}
}
.
\par
}
}
}
{\li1000 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li800 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li600 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li400 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li200 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
\u169\'3f 1989-2014 by The Rutter Group, a Thomson Reuters Business
\par
}
}
{\f5 \b0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0
(2014)
\par
}
}
{\li0 \f2 \qj \b0 \ri0 \fs20 \cf1 \i0 {
\clpadt24 \clpadft3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr24 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \brdrw10 \
brdrcf21 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clwWidth4320 \cellx4320
\clpadt24 \clpadft3 \clpadl100 \clpadfl3 \clpadr24 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \brdrw10 \
brdrcf21 \brdrs \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \clwWidth5760 \cellx10080
\intbl
{\li24 \ri24
{\li24 \f2 \b1 \ql \ri24 \fs16 \cf21 \i0
End of Document
\par
}
}
}\f2 \li24 \strike0 \ul0 \b1 \sa0 \ql \sb0 \fs16 \ri24 \cf21 \i0 \intbl \cell \i
ntbl
{\li24 \ri24
{\li24 \f2 \b0 \ri24 \fs16 \cf21 \qr \i0
\u169\'3f 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
\par
}
}
}\f2 \li24 \strike0 \ul0 \b0 \sa0 \sb0 \fs16 \ri24 \cf21 \i0 \qr \intbl \cell \r
ow }}\par
}
}\sect }

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