Henry Cabot Lodge and The Treaty of Versailles

In the fight over the United State’s ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the
associated League of Nations Covenant it seems that Henry Cabot Lodge won the
battle but Woodrow Wilson the war. The history war that is. David Fromkin observed
that Wilson is today viewed as the internationalist and Lodge the isolationist who
killed America’s participation in the League of Nations.1 Such an interpretation is
simplistic and inaccurate. Henry Cabot Lodge’s campaign to ensure that the Senate
did not ratify the League of Nations covenant had many different actors each driven
by differing concerns. What motivated Lodge is difficult to pin down though there
was obviously a number factors that directed his actions. They include his personal
hatred of Woodrow Wilson, political concerns centred on the Republican Party and
the next Presidential election, issues relating to nationalism and sovereignty and a
conflict between the powers of the executive and the legislature. To argue that Lodge
was a committed isolationist is wrong even though his campaign encouraged certain
attitudes prevalent in American society at the conclusion of the war. The failure to
ratify the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations covenant had a negative impact
on America’s prestige in Europe lasting until WWII.
Henry Cabot Lodge observed at the conclusion of the war that the man in the street
was saying, “Now the war is over let us have peace as quickly as possible.”2 The
mood of the American public was decidedly hostile toward Germany, and even
Europe, as the perception was that the ‘Old World’ had dragged America into its dirty
war. Lodge perceived that the “great mass of the American people are with me and
mean to have an unconditional surrender.”3 Secretary of State Lansing commented
that the “psychological effect [of Allied successes] upon the American people has
been peculiar. The natural enthusiasm…has been accompanied by an increasing
bitterness toward the German people.”4 The public attitude being as it was, Wilson
and his Fourteen Points would seem to have been out of step. In 1917 he stated his
goal of “peace without victory”5 but he returned from Versailles with a treaty that did
not represent this goal. The consolation was the League of Nations covenant which
1
David Fromkin, “Rival Internationalism: Lodge, Wilson and the two Roosevelts.” In World Policy
Journal, Summer 1996, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 78.
2
Henry C. Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations, New York, 1925, p. 147.
3
John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge, a biography, New York, 1953, p. 341.
4
Ibid, p. 341.
5
Ibid, p. 345.
Wilson was determined to put through the Senate together with the peace treaty,
without any amendment. Despite the public’s hostility toward Germany they were
overwhelmingly in favour of a multilateral body that would put an end to war. A poll
in April 1919 found that, 88% were in favour of American participation in the League
of Nations,6 the problem was that not all could agree on what format that participation
would take, especially the Senate.
Lodge was not an isolationist and took a view similar to that of Teddy Roosevelt.
They saw the United States as becoming a great international power. In 1915 he had
advocated an international body along the lines of the League of Nations but had
since retracted that view.7 He said of the League when it was presented to the Senate,
“I could not accept the League as it stood under any circumstances” and resolved to
“proceed in the discussion of the treaty by way of amendment and reservation” 8
Lodge was a committed nationalist and had campaigned for immigration restriction in
the past, but did not reject the League covenant out of hand, though he did have
strong reservations to specific elements.
Undoubtedly Lodge intensely disliked Wilson, saying at the time of his inauguration,
“I think he would sacrifice any opinion, at any moment, for his own benefit and go
back to it the next moment, if he thought returning to it would be profitable.” 9 And by
all accounts his personal dislike was at least a small factor in fighting Wilson and his
League. A more important factor though was Lodge’s long-standing approach to
foreign policy. In the past Lodge had refused to put his name to a “treaty that
promises to do things which we know we would not do.”10 Lodge claimed that “there
was no desire on the part of Senators of either Party at that stage to bind the United
States irrevocably with agreements to go to war again.”11 much of Lodge’s concern
centred on a perceived loss of sovereignty that would have resulted from America’s
entry into the League of Nations.
6
W.F. Kuehl, Seeking World Order, Nashville, 1969, p. 316.
7
8
9
10
Ibid, p. 345.
11
The Monroe Doctrine was enunciated in 1823 and stated, “American questions shall
be settled by Americans alone.”12 The doctrine put in clear terms that the United
States would no longer tolerate any European interference in the Americas. One of the
principle concerns of Lodge and those who either wanted to defeat the treaty or attach
reservations to it, was that it would result in interference in the United States ‘sphere
of influence.’ Lodge went on to say that “American sovereignty must not be
diminished by membership in the League superstate; the sacred Monroe Doctrine
should not be weakened; and the United States should preserve full freedom to pursue
its own interests and regulate it’s own affairs.”13 The concern over the Monroe
Doctrine was one of a number of concerns that would lead to Lodge’s campaign
against the League. Lodge’s position encompassed a broad church within his party,
including the ‘Irreconcilables’ and the ‘Reservationists’.
Following the 1918 elections, forty-nine Republicans held the majority in the Senate.
Lodge was elected the Senate majority leader by his party and took on the post of the
head of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. From this position he would have
powerful platform to run his campaign against the League of Nations covenant. Lodge
was prepared to pass the treaty and attached covenant through the Senate but only
with significant reservations to crucial points. He argued that “if we were successful
in putting on reservations we should create a situation where if the acceptance of the
treaty was defeated, the democratic party and especially Mr Wilson’s friends, should
be responsible.”14 As mentioned previously, public opinion was broadly in favour of
entering the League of Nations so to attack it directly would have alienated the public
from the Republican Party who had been out of power since Wilson’s election. Thus
by proceeding “by way of amendment and reservation” 15, the result would be that if
Wilson accepted the reservations then the republicans could claim credit and if
Wilson refused, then the blame for the treaty’s failure would fall upon him. That
Lodge managed to maintain party discipline throughout the long period that the
conflict over the League lasted was a remarkable achievement and probably played a
crucial role in Harding’s election to president in 1921. Of the forty-nine Republican
12
13
Daniel Smith, The great departure; the United States and World War I, 1914-1920, New York, 1965,
p. 179.
14
15
Ibid, p. 147.
senators fifteen were irreconcilables and thirty-four would vote for the treaty only
with reservations attached.16 The great tragedy was that of those prepared to vote for
the treaty, there was no agreement forthcoming on what form the reservations would
take that would allow the two-thirds majority required for the treaty and covenant to
be ratified.
After Wilson’s return from Paris, Lodge sponsored the famous Round Robin where
37 Senators indicated that they would not vote in favour of the League of Nations
covenant and called on President Wilson to separate the League covenant from the
treaty document.17 The impact of this was that Wilson knew clearly that the treaty as it
stood was unlikely to pass the Senate. Senators Taft, Root, Hitchcock, Hughes and
Lodge outlined their main concerns as being protection of the Monroe doctrine, the
exemption of domestic questions from League interference and the power to decide
what was and what was not a domestic matter, a provision for unilateral withdrawal
from the League and clarifications regarding voting procedures.18 The most
significant sticking point was regarding Article X of the covenant. Article X of the
covenant stated that:
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members
of the League. In any case of any such aggression the council shall advise upon the
means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled.19
Lodge described Article X as “loose, involved and full of dangers”20 and that it would
require the United States to “guarantee the territorial integrity and political
independence of every nation on earth.”21 Senator Philander Knox believed the
covenant would perpetuate inequities and be dominated by the major nations.22 As
mentioned one of the main concerns centred on voting procedures, one of the
16
17
18
19
Herbert F. Margulies, “The Moderates in the League of Nations battle: an overlooked faction.” in
The Historian, Winter 1998, vol. 60, no. 2, p. 281.
20
21
22
reservations stated that the United States would not be bound by any resolution in
which dominions of other nations had voted, thus providing a country such as Britain
with more than one vote. Initially up to fourteen amendments to the treaty were
proposed but after these were defeated, Lodge and the Republicans resolved to
continue with proposing reservations to the treaty to become know as the ‘Lodge
reservations.’
Essentially the struggle over the treaty was a struggle for power, specifically in
relation to the area of foreign affairs, between the legislature and the executive.
Traditionally the Senate had been sensitive to interference with its power in foreign
relations. Wilson had refused to separate the Versailles Treaty from the League of
Nations covenant, insisting that they be passed together. He said, “The Senate must
take its medicine.”23 A large number of Republicans and even democrats, disliked
Wilson for his dictatorial manner and the struggle over the treaty was in a real sense
an executive-legislative conflict for control of foreign policy.24 In broad terms, the
Irreconcilables would not pass the treaty because of concerns over sovereignty,
enmity of Wilson and loss of diplomatic freedom. The Reservationists, to whom
Lodge belonged, had two groups within them, the mild and the strong Reservationists.
Lodge was certainly a strong Reservationist. They wanted to see many points of the
treaty clarified or amended, acceptance of these changes by the Allied powers (which
was forthcoming), protection for the Monroe doctrine, protection over the United
States control over tariffs and immigration and a watering down of article X. The real
debate in the Senate was between the mild and strong internationalists, not
isolationists and internationalists.25 The pre existing divisions in the Senate were
advantageous to Lodge as he could use this to cause delay to the treaty’s ratification
and use the time to point out defects in the treaty.
As mentioned previously, public opinion though strongly nationalistic after the war,
was widely in favour of American entry into the League of Nations. Regardless of the
correctness of Lodge’s views he certainly took his role in the Senate seriously though
he was not above twisting events for his and the Republican Party’s political gain.
23
24
p. 181.
25
Ibid, p. 181.
Lodge said, “To yield helplessly to the clamour [of public opinion] was impossible
for those to whom was entrusted the performance of a solemn public duty.” 26 Lodge
decided that holding up the process of the treaty was “one of our strongest
weapons.”27 By adding reservations to the treaty and convincing the public of their
utility, Lodge could ‘Republicanise’ the treaty. Lodge’s stated goal was to “take the
US out of the treaty entirely on all points were we whish to refuse obligations.” 28
When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened to consider the treaty and
produce a report, Lodge took up the first two weeks in reading the entire document of
roughly 268 pages.29 This committee eventually delivered a report that recommended
ratification of the treaty with reservations. A separate Democratic report
recommended ratification without change. The Senate subsequently split and neither
side gained the necessary two-thirds needed for ratification. Only one Senator, Porter
J. McUmber of North Dakota took a middle ground. He criticised both parties for
playing politics with such an important issue.30 Former President Taft accused Lodge
of stacking the Foreign Relations committee to prejudice the report.31 Thus, while the
Senate was unable to reach a consensus, Wilson went on the road to increase public
pressure on Lodge to pass the treaty unamended.
Lodge’s principal concern lay with article X. He was concerned that the guarantee of
collective security would take the power to declare war out of the hands of congress.
He said, “It must be made perfectly clear that no American soldiers…can ever be
engaged in war or ordered anywhere except by the constitutional authorities of the
United States.”32 Wilson argued that article X was the “kingpin of whole the whole
structure” and that the “will to war is everything” 33 Wilson claimed that the Lodge
reservations as a whole, do “not provide for ratification, but rather, for the
nullification of the treaty.”34 But by July 1919 public opinion was turning toward
26
27
28
29
p. 186.
30
Ibid, p. 191.
31
Ibid, p. 186.
32
Ibid, p. 184.
33
Frank A. NinKovich, The Wilsonian century: U.S. foreign policy since 1900, Chigago, 1999, p. 50.
34
Frank A. NinKovich, The Wilsonian century: U.S. foreign policy since 1900, Chigago, 1999, p. 50
ratification with the reservations35 and Wilson went on his speaking tour on 3
September 1919.36 Unfortunately Wilson suffered his stroke during this tour and
afterwards took a less active but still important role in the debate.
Scholars disagree on what the effect of the reservations would have been on
America’s participation in the League. The majority seems to conclude that the
reservations would have significantly curtailed American participation. Kuehl argues
that the reservations did nullify the articles that they were aimed at,37 and Smith
contends that the difference between entering the League with or without the
reservations was a “limited and grudging participation in world affairs and Wilson’s
concept of an America willingly assuming the full burdens of a great power and
becoming actively involved in making the League a success.”38 Fromkin argues that
the proposed reservation regarding article X today appears reasonable, as it would
have essentially handed power to declare war to the executive and that no Senate
would today consider such a move.39 Finally, Ninkovich asserts that article X was
flexible and placed no constraints on sovereignty. He points out that courts had
previously sustained the power of the executive the enter treaties that required some
kind of military guarantee.40 Whether Lodge’s reservations were reasonable or not,
some scholars have criticised Wilson for his intransigence and inability to
compromise and blame him equally for the failure of the treaty to be passed by the
Senate. Today, Wilson’s view of the future in which he stated, “I do not hesitate to
say that the war we have just been through…is not to be compared with the war we
would have to face the next time [if the treaty were not ratified]”, 41 seems to be too
close to the truth.
Wilson, on two separate occasions, urged Democrat Senators to vote down the treaty
with the Lodge reservations attached. He described the Presidential elections of 1920
35
36
37
38
p. 194.
39
David Fromkin, “Rival Internationalism: Lodge, Wilson and the two Roosevelts.” In World Policy
Journal, Summer 1996, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 78.
40
41
Ibid, p. 75.
as a “great and solemn referendum”42 on the League issue. But it seems that Wilson’s
optimism that public pressure would eventually force the Republicans to cave in was
misplaced. Lodge seems to have had the better grasp of public sentiment after the
war. Wilson had gone to war based upon the lofty aims of his fourteen points. He
asserted that America was on a mission to spread the benefits of its democracy across
the world. Ninkovich argues that Wilson’s historical interpretation of the war was not
believable enough for the American public and that Americans had gone to war to
defend neutral rights and to teach the Germans a lesson. Wilsonianism was at once
too idealistic and too alarmist and the public did not accept Wilson’s portents of doom
if the United States did not join the League. 43 Smith argues that Wilson should have
emphasised America’s self interest in joining the League. The end to costly
armaments, protection against a revival German imperialism, the justice and
convenience of a world court and the practical non-political functions.44 Lodge
identified the trend toward self-interest in the American public and encouraged the
nationalism that spurred it. The American public were increasingly disillusioned with
Wilson’s idealistic exhortations and the result of this would be a tragedy for American
foreign policy.
The broad consequence of America’s failure to ratify the Versailles treaty and join the
League of Nations was an estrangement between the United States and the Allies. The
United States retreated from active participation in Europe, a situation that would
remain until America entered World War II. Allied confidence in the United States
was undermined as the French wanted American participation to restrain a recalcitrant
Germany and the British to restrain French demands.45 John W. Davis, the United
States ambassador in London said that he preferred ratification with the Lodge
reservations to nothing, as “this action would at least show Germany that America
stood with the allies on a substantive portion of the treaty, regardless of the League of
Nations.”46 The French President Clemenceau stated, “Fundamentally, so far as the
42
43
44
p. 178.
45
Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American diplomatic tradition: the treaty fight in
perspective, New York, 1987, p. 211.
46
Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American diplomatic tradition: the treaty fight in
perspective, New York, 1987, p. 215.
League of Nations itself is concerned, our ardent desire is to see America, as a result
of whose initiative it came into being, make the enterprise a success.”47 Europe also
noted the anti European tone present in the League of Nations debate in the United
States. Wiseman, the chief adviser on American affairs in the British delegation at
Versailles observed an anti British character in Republican criticisms of the League.
After the election of the Republican President Harding, the United States retreated
into isolation for much of the 1920s and 30s. A Neutrality Act, one of a number, was
passed in 1935 and the peak of isolationism was recorded in 1937 with a Gallup Poll
showing 94% being opposed to American intervention in Europe.48
Thus the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations was defeated in the United
States Senate. Lodge achieved his goal of either seeing the treaty go through with
significant reservations or not go through at all by more accurately judging the public
mood and inflaming its nationalism and self-interest Lodge was able to discredit
Wilson and ensure that a Republican President was elected in 1920. It can be
convincingly argued that Lodge did want to pass the treaty in some appropriate form
but by his own actions may well have defeated this aim. Thanks to Lodge’s campaign
Harding inherited a foreign policy platform that was isolationist and did not resemble
in any way Lodge’s vision of America asserting itself as a great power. We have seen
that Lodge’s personal dislike of Wilson, party political considerations and concerns
over the text of the League of Nations covenant and its effect on America’s
independence, beloved Monroe doctrine and the power of the Senate, were all factors
influencing his position. He waged a campaign based on delay and negativity that
Wilson was unable to counter and the result was a United States that remained inward
looking like much of its history.
47
Ibid, p. 211.
48
Henry J. Sage, Background to World War II:American Foreign Policy 1920-1941,
http://www.sagehistory.net/worldwar2/topics/1920WWII1940.htm, accessed 14 October 2005.

Henry Cabot Lodge and The Treaty of Versailles

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Henry Cabot Lodge and The Treaty of Versailles

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

In the fight over the United State’s ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the

Вам также может понравиться