Axiomathes

DOI 10.1007/s10516-014-9238-7

ORIGINAL PAPER

Knowledge, Truth and Plausibility

Carlo Cellucci

Received: 12 March 2014 / Accepted: 8 May 2014

Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract From antiquity several philosophers have claimed that the goal of nat-
ural science is truth. In particular, this is a basic tenet of contemporary scientific
realism. However, all concepts of truth that have been put forward are inadequate to
modern science because they do not provide a criterion of truth. This means that we
will generally be unable to recognize a scientific truth when we reach it. As an
alternative, this paper argues that the goal of natural science is plausibility and
considers some characters of plausibility.

Keywords Concept of truth
Criterion of truth
Plausibility
Analytic

method
Scientific realism

1 Natural Science and Truth

From antiquity several philosophers have claimed that the goal of natural science is
truth. For example, Aristotle states that the goal of theoretical science is truth
(Aristotle, Metaphysica, a 1, 993 b 2021). Frege states that all sciences have truth
as their goal (Frege 1984, 351). Popper states that the aim of science is truth
(Popper 1972, 57).
In particular, that the goal of natural science is truth is a basic tenet of scientific
realism, at least in one of its more popular formulations, according to which the
aim of science is to discover the truth about the world (Sankey 2008, 13). Or
perhaps in virtually any of its formulations if, as Giere states, virtually every
characterization of scientific realism has been framed in terms of truth (Giere
2005, 154).

C. Cellucci (&)
Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
e-mail: carlo.cellucci@uniroma1.it
URL: http://cellucci.altervista.org

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However, the assumption that the goal of natural science is truth is problematic,
and so is the concept of truth itself. In this article I analyze some of the problems to
which they lead, as an alternative I argue that the goal of natural science is rather
plausibility, and consider some characters of plausibility. Since what is being
discussed is the goal of natural science, throughout this article by truth I will mean
empirical truth.

2 Truth as Correspondence

The claim that the goal of natural science is truth raises the question: What is truth?
From antiquity various concepts of truth have been considered. In particular,
Aristotle discusses two concepts of truth: truth as correspondence, and truth as
intuition of the essence. I will argue that, according to Aristotle, the former concept
of truth is inadequate and only the latter is adequate. (This is not the traditional
view. For the latter, see Crivelli 2004).
According to the concept of truth as correspondence, to say of what is that it is
is true, while to say of what is that it is not is false (Aristotle, Metaphysica,
C 7, 1011 b 2627).
For Aristotle, this concept of truth is inadequate because it does not provide a
criterion of truth, that is, a (generally non-algorithmic) means which allows us to
distinguish true statements from false statements. It does not provide a criterion of
truth because we cannot ascertain whether a statement corresponds to any nature
existing objectively outside thinking (ibid., E 4, 1028 a 2). We can only compare
the statement with a representation of some thing existing outside thinking. But a
representation is only an affection of thinking (ibid., E 4, 1027 b 341028 a 1).
This means that we can only compare a statement with an affection of thinking.
Then the false and the true are not in things but only in thinking (ibid., E 4,
1027 b 2527). It follows that the concept of truth as correspondence does not
provide a criterion of truth. Therefore Aristotle concludes that this concept of truth
cannot be used in practice, and hence must be dismissed (ibid., E 4, 1027 b 34).
Contrary to this interpretation, Aristotle is often presented as being a supporter of the
concept of truth as correspondence, or even its author. Thus Tarski states that the earliest
explanation of the concept of truth as correspondence can be found in Aristotles
Metaphysics and this is the concept of truth put forward by Aristotle (Tarski 1969,
63). It is the classical Aristotelian conception of truth (Tarski 1944, 342).
These claims are unjustified. First, it is unjustified to say that the earliest
explanation of the concept of truth as correspondence can be found in Aristotles
Metaphysics. Already Plato states that the statement which says of what is that it is,
is true, while the one which says of what is that it is not, is false (Plato, Cratylus,
385 b 78). The true statement states the things that are as they are while the
false one states things different from the things that are (Plato, Sophista, 263 b
47). Secondly, it is unjustified to say that the concept of truth as correspondence is
put forward by Aristotle and is the classical Aristotelian conception of truth. As
argued above, Aristotle considers such concept of truth to be inadequate for natural
science.

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It may even be disputed whether, when stating that to say of what is that it is, is true,
while to say of what is that it is not, is false, Aristotle really means to refer to the concept
of truth as correspondence. Thus Wolenski states: I see little justification for this
interpretation (Wolenski 2004, 358). Indeed, Aristotle never used any label being a
counterpart of correspondence (Wolenski 1999, 52). On the other hand, Engel states
that it is not obvious that Aristotle is here giving a definition of truth (Engel 2002, 15).
But even if Aristotle is giving a definition of truth, the definition expresses a relation of
identity rather than a relation of correspondence. For if to say what is true and to say
what is (or what is false and what is not) is to say the same thing, truth and being are one
and the same thing (ibid.). Under Engels interpretation, Aristotle would not be
discussing two different concepts of truth but a single one, that is, the concept of truth as
intuition of the essence. For, as we will see below, it is with the concept of truth as
intuition of the essence that truth and being are one and the same thing.
In any case, that the concept of truth as correspondence is inadequate because it
does not provide a criterion of truth, has been repeatedly argued since Aristotle.
Thus Kant states that the concept of truth as correspondence does not provide a
criterion of truth because, on the basis of it, my cognition, to count as true, is
supposed to agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition,
however, only by cognizing it (Kant 1992, 557). But since the object is outside
me, the cognition in me, all I can ever pass judgment on is whether my cognition of
the object agrees with my cognition of the object (ibid., 557558). With the
concept of truth as correspondence it is just as when someone makes a statement
before a court and in doing so appeals to a witness with whom no one is acquainted,
but who wants to establish his credibility by maintaining that the one who called
him as witness is an honest man (ibid., 558).
Similarly, Frege states that, on the basis of the concept of truth as correspondence, in
order to establish if something is true, we should have to inquire whether it is true that
an idea and a reality, say, correspond (Frege 1984, 353). But it would only be possible
to compare an idea with a thing if the thing were an idea too, and this is not at all what
people intend when they define truth as the correspondence of an idea with something
real. For in this case it is essential precisely that the reality shall be distinct from the
idea (ibid.). Thus the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down.
And any other attempt to define truth also breaks down (ibid.).
The arguments of Aristotle, Kant, and Frege that the concept of truth as
correspondence does not provide a criterion of truth are quite convincing. They are
relevant to the question of whether the goal of natural science is truth because, if a
concept of truth does not provide a criterion of truth, we will generally be unable to
recognize a truth when we reach it.

3 Concept of Truth and Criterion of Truth

It might be objected that a concept of truth need not provide a criterion of truth.
Thus Tarski states that there is no point in complaining that the concept of truth
as correspondence does not provide a criterion of truth, since the concept of truth as
correspondence is not designed at all for this purpose (Tarski 1969, 69).

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Similarly, Davidson states that the complaint against correspondence theories,

that a correspondence view of truth makes the concept of truth useless, is not
sound because it depends on assuming that a useful theory would make truth
epistemically accessible (Davidson 2005, 39). But the supporter of the correspon-
dence view could simply reply that his position is untouchedhe always
maintained that truth was independent of our ability to learn the truth (ibid.).
The objection, however, is unjustified because, if a concept of truth does not
provide a criterion of truth, this makes truth humanly transcendent, in the sense that
we will generally be unable to recognize a truth when we reach it.
Sankey states that the concept of truth as correspondence is the only concept of
truth compatible with realism (Sankey 2008, 17). If so, scientific realism makes
truth humanly transcendent. This is a problem for scientific realism, since the latter
is a position of epistemic optimism which holds that humans are able to acquire
knowledge of the world (ibid., 3). If truth is humanly transcendent, we will
generally be unable to recognize a truth when we reach it, therefore we will be
unable to say that we have acquired knowledge of the world through it.
Even distinguishing between science and non-science is a serious problem for
scientific realism. For according to the latter, not only we may have no rational
grounds to believe a proposition that is in fact true, but we may even rationally
believe a proposition that is false (ibid., 112).
Admittedly, Sankey states that there can be no reason to accept a claim about
reality until some method of inquiry is justified (ibid., 143). But he also states that,
in order for a claim about reality to justify a method of inquiry there must be
reason to accept the claim about reality (ibid.). Clearly, this is circular. Sankey
admits that such circularity is surely to be avoided, but the only argument he
provides to this effect is that claims about method and claims about reality fit
together in relations of mutual support (ibid.). Then it is unclear how scientific
realism could avoid the circularity.

4 Impossibility of a Criterion of Truth, and Success

Not only the concept of truth as correspondence does not provide a criterion of truth
but, as Tarski states, a criterion of truth will never be found (Tarski 1944,
363364). This can be shown by slightly modifying the argument by which Frege
supports his claim that any attempt to define truth breaks down. To have a criterion
of truth certain characteristics would have to be specified. And in application to
any particular case the question would always arise whether it were true that the
characteristics were present (Frege 1984, 353). To answer this question one would
need the criterion of truth, but then we should be going round in a circle (ibid.)
Scientific realism might try to overcome the problem that a criterion of truth will
never be found by assuming that successful theories are true, that is, success is a
reliable indicator of truth (Wray 2013, 1719). This assumption, however, is
unconvincing, because the history of science offers us many examples of scientific
theories that were successful but which are, according to contemporary scientific
theories, false. (See Laudan 1981).

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Scientific realism might try to overcome this problem by assuming that, when a
theory is successful, the best explanation of such success is that the theory provides
an approximately true description of the way the world is. In light of such success,
we may infer that the entities postulated by the theory exist (Sankey 2008, 118).
But also this weaker assumption is unconvincing because, once again, the history of
science offers us many examples of scientific theories that were successful but
which are, according to contemporary scientific theories, non-referential with
respect to many of their central explanatory concepts (Laudan 1981, 33). That is,
the entities such theories talk about do not exist. Now, whatever it means for a
scientific theory to be approximately true, a necessary condition is surely that the
entities the theory talks about do exist.
Scientific realism might try to overcome this problem by assuming that we need
care only about those constituents of scientific theories which contribute to
successes and which can, therefore, be used to account for these successes (Psillos
1999, 105). Only such constituents are approximately true. But, as Lyons points out,
this assumption has the potential to fare far worse against the historical argument
than the naive holistic versions of realism over which it is thought to be an
improvement (Lyons 2006, 558). For each false constituent that is deployed in a
key successful prediction constitutes a counterinstance, and, on the other hand, a
particular false constituent stands as a counterinstance each time it is deployed in a
successful prediction (ibid.).
Thus appealing to the empirical success of scientific theories, or of certain
constituents of scientific theories, would not permit scientific realism to overcome
the problem that a criterion of truth will never be found.

5 An Alleged Rehabilitation of Truth as Correspondence

Despite the problems connected with the concept of truth as correspondence, in the
last century the latter has had several supporters. For example, Popper states that the
main achievement of Tarskis invention of a method of defining truth is the
rehabilitation of the notion of truth or correspondence to reality, a notion which had
become suspect (Popper 1972, 5960).
But this is unjustified. Tarski did not invent a method of defining truth. He states that
if we succeed in introducing the term true into the metalanguage in such a way that
every statement of the form discussed can be proved on the basis of the axioms and rules
of inference of the metalanguage, then we shall say that such way of using the concept
of truth is adequate (Tarski 1983, 404). Thus he requires that, if L-true is to be an
adequate truth predicate for a language L, all instances of the expression
(T) P is L-true iff P (where P is a name of L-sentence P)
must be theorems of metatheory MT. But Tarski makes it quite clear that neither
the expression (T) itself nor any particular instance of the form (T) can be
regarded as a definition of truth (Tarski 1944, 344).
In particular, Tarski did not invent a method of defining truth in the sense of the
correspondence theory. As Bunge points out, the expression (T) bridges metalanguage

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and language instead of contrasting language with extralinguistic realitywhich is

what correspondence means (Bunge 2003, 239). Indeed, the expression (T) only
bridges the language of metatheory MT and language L instead of contrasting
L with extralinguistic reality. Tarski himself makes it quite clear that (T) is not
intended to give a definition of truth in the sense of the correspondence theory. He
mentions that, in a group of people, only 15 % agreed that true means agreeing
with reality, while 90 % agreed that a sentence such as it is snowing is true if,
and only if, it is snowing (Tarski 1944, 360). Thus a great majority of people
accepted the expression (T) but seemed to reject the classical correspondence
conception of truth (ibid.).
Tarskis requirement, that if L-true is to be an adequate truth predicate for a
language L, all instances of (T) must be theorems of metatheory MT, presupposes
that the axioms of MT be true. But, by Godels second incompleteness theorem, it is
impossible to demonstrate by any absolutely reliable means that the axioms of MT
are true. For if it were possible to demonstrate by such means that they are true, it
would be possible to demonstrate by those means that they are consistent, which is
excluded by Godels second incompleteness theorem.
The condition that the axioms of MT be true is essential because, if they are not
true, it may be the case that all instances of (T) are theorems of MT even though
some of them are false. Against this, Raatikainen objects that no instance of (T) can
be false. He argues that, if some instance of (T) is false, this means that, for some
sentence P, the equivalence
(1) P is L-true iff P
is false. Then either:
(a) P is L-true is true but P is false;
or
(b) P is L-true is false but P is true.
Now, according to Raatikainen, neither case is actually possible (Raatikainen
2003, 39). For if, as in (a), P is L-true is true, then certainly P is true, not
false (ibid.). And if, and in (b), P is L-true is false, then certainly P is false, not
true. Thus no instance of (T) can be false and hence all instances of (T) are in
fact necessary (ibid.).
This argument, however, is invalid because if, as in (a), P is L-true is true,
then to infer that certainly P is true we would need that the equivalence (1) be true,
while by hypothesis it is false. Similarly if, as in (b), P is L-true is false, then to
infer that certainly P is false we would need that the equivalence (1) be true, while
by hypothesis it is false.

6 Truth as Intuition of the Essence

As an alternative to the concept of truth as correspondence, Aristotle proposes the

concept of truth as intuition of the essence. According to it, truth is intuiting the

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essence of a thing, because when intuition is about what a thing is according to its
essence, it is true (Aristotle, De Anima, C 6, 430 b 28). More precisely, truth is
intuiting and stating the essence of a thing, because stating and asserting are not
the same (Aristotle, Metaphysica, H 10, 1051 b 2425). Now, stating the essence
of a thing means giving a definition of it, since definition is the discourse which
reveals the essence of a thing (Aristotle, Topica, H 3, 153 a 1516). Therefore,
truth is intuiting the essence of a thing and giving a definition of it.
By intuiting the essence of a thing we know what that thing is in itself
(Aristotle, Metaphysica, Z 4, 1029 b, 1415). That is, we know its essence. And
knowing a thing is to know its essence because any single thing and its pure
essence coincide (ibid., Z 6, 1031 b 1921). For such reason, according to
Aristotle, while the concept of truth as correspondence is inadequate, the concept of
truth as intuition of the essence is adequate.
It might be objected that if, as Aristotle assumes, we do have a faculty capable of
apprehending the essence of things, that is, intuition, truth as correspondence must
be a genuine concept of truth for him, because intuition gives us direct access to
things existing outside thinking.
This objection, however, is unjustified because, if we have a faculty capable of
apprehending the essence of things, then truth does not consist in the correspon-
dence of a statement with some thing existing outside thinking, but rather in the
direct apprehension of the essence of the thing. By such apprehension, intuition and
the essence of the thing are the same. In fact Aristotle states that intuition becomes
the object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that intuition and
the object of thought are the same (Aristotle, Metaphysica, K 7, 1072 b 2021).
But if intuition and the object of thought are the same, then speaking of
correspondence is misleading. While truth as correspondence merely involves a
congruence, or isomorphism, between thought and being, truth as intuition of the
essence involves an identity of thought and being.

7 Truth and Modern Science

The concept of truth as intuition of the essence, however, applies only to Aristotles
essentialist science, in which we have scientific knowledge of a thing when we
know its essence (ibid., Z 6, 1031 b 67). It does not apply to modern science,
which originated from Galileos philosophical revolution: the renunciation to know
the essence of natural substances, contenting oneself with knowing some of their
properties mathematical in character, such as location, motion, shape, or size.
Galileo famously states: Either, by speculating, we seek to penetrate the true
and intrinsic essence of natural substances, or we content ourselves with coming to
know some of their properties [affezioni] (Galilei 1968, V, 187). Trying to
penetrate the essence of natural substances is a not less impossible and vain
undertaking with regard to the closest elemental substances than with the remotest
celestial things (ibid.). Therefore, we will content ourselves with coming to know
some properties of them, such as location, motion, shape, size, opacity, mutability,
generation, and dissolution (ibid., V, 188). While we cannot know the essence of

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natural substances, we need not despair of our ability to come to know such
properties even with respect to the remotest bodies, just as those close at hand
(ibid.).
Because of Galileos renunciation to know the essence of natural substances, the
concept of truth as intuition of the essence does not apply to modern science.
Admittedly, since Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975), some people, noticeably Ellis
(2001, 2002, 2009), have proposed to return to some kinds of essentialism. But, as
Khalidi argues, essentialism encounters some fundamental problems which
constitute obstacles to integration with science (Khalidi 2009, 86).

8 Alternative Concepts of Truth

If the concept of truth as intuition of the essence does not apply to modern science
because of Galileos renunciation to know the essence of natural substances, the
concept of truth as correspondence does not apply to it either for the reason stated
by Aristotle, Kant, and Frege. Therefore, none of the two concepts of truth
considered by Aristotle applies to modern science.
One may ask if some other concept of truth might apply to modern science. The
answer is negative because all alternative concepts of truth that have been put
forward are inadequate to modern science. It would be impossible to discuss all of
them here. (For surveys, see Blackburn and Simmons 1999, Burgess and Burgess
2011, Engel 2002, Kirkham 1992, Kunne 2003, Lynch 2001, Schantz 2002). I will
only discuss four concepts of truth which seem especially relevant to distinct parts
of modern science: Hilberts concept of truth as consistency, Joachims concept of
truth as systematic coherence, Tarskis concept of truth as possession of a model,
and Prawitzs concept of truth as provability.

9 Truth as Consistency

According to Hilberts concept of truth as consistency, a statement is true if and

only if it is consistent with a specified set of other statements. Indeed, Hilbert states
that, if the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict one another with all their
consequences, then they are true (Hilbert 1980, 39). In particular, a statement
which is not in contradiction with arbitrarily given axioms is true. Consistency is a
necessary and sufficient condition of truth, because non-contradictory is identical
to true (Hilbert 1931, 122).
But the concept of truth as consistency is inadequate, because two mutually
inconsistent statements can be both consistent with the same set of other statements.
For example, the continuum hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with
ZermeloFraenkels axioms of set theory, so, by the concept of truth as consistency,
they are both true. But since they are mutually inconsistent, this is impossible.
Moreover, by a corollary of Godels first incompleteness theorem, for any consistent,
sufficiently strong, deductive theory S, there is a consistent extension T of S in which
some false sentence is demonstrable. (For a demonstration of this corollary, see for

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example Cellucci 2013, Sect. 12.12). From the corollary it follows that the axioms of T,
though consistent, cannot be said to be trueif they could be said to be true, only true
sentences should be demonstrable in T. Thus, contrary to Hilberts claim, consistency is
not a sufficient condition for truth. Actually, that consistency is not a sufficient condition
for truth was already made quite clear well before Godel. For example, Pascal states that
neither is contradiction a mark of falsehood, nor non-contradiction a mark of truth
(Pascal 1890, 190). Kant states that for all that a judgment may be free of any internal
contradiction, it can still be either false or groundless (Kant 1998, B 190).

10 Truth as Systematic Coherence

According to Joachims concept of truth as systematic coherence, a statement is true

if and only if it forms a whole with a specified set of other statements, such that all
its constituent elements reciprocally involve one another, or reciprocally determine
one anothers being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning (Joachim
1906, 66). This is the concept of truth as systematic coherence (ibid., 65).
Systematic coherence must not be confused with the consistency of formal
logic, because a piece of thinking might be free from self-contradiciton, might be
consistent and valid as the formal logician understands those terms, and yet it
might fail to exhibit that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant
whole (ibid., 76).
But the concept of truth as systematic coherence is inadequate, for instance,
because the propositions of a fable form a systematically coherent whole, though
being a fiction.
Joachim answers this objection by saying that his concept of truth is intended to
describe the nature of truth as an ideal, as the character of an ideally complete
experience (ibid., 78). Human knowledge is clearly not a significant whole in this
ideally complete sense, thus his concept of truth is an ideal, and an ideal which can
never as such, or in its completeness, be actual as human experience (ibid., 79). But this
answer is inadequate because, if the concept of truth is an ideal that can never be actual
as human experience, then such concept is humanly transcendent, and hence cannot be
rationally propounded. Nor can one use the argument that the concept of truth as
systematic coherence does not imply that a statement that forms a systematically
coherent whole with a specified set of other statements is true. It only implies that a
statement that forms a systematically coherent whole with a specified set of other true
statements is true. By this argument, the latter statements are true if and only if they form
a systematically coherent whole with a specified set of other true statements, and so on.
This leads to an infinite regress.

11 Truth as Possession of a Model

According to Tarskis concept of truth as possession of a model, a sentence is true if

and only if there is a structure such that every infinite sequence of objects in the
structure satisfies the sentence (Tarski 1983, 200).

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But the concept of truth as possession of a model is inadequate, for instance,

because even a fiction can be true in terms of it. Indeed, even for a fiction there
can be a structure such that every infinite sequence of objects in the structure
satisfies the sentence. Therefore, that a sentence is true in terms of this concept
of truth does not entail that it is true in the real world. Scientific realists, who
assume the concept of truth as possession of a model, are also bound to assume
that structures are isomorphic or at least homomorphic to the real world. But
since isomorphism or homomorphism is a relation between mathematical
structures, this involves assuming that the real world is a mathematical structure.
Such assumption is dubious because only some properties of the world are
mathematical in character. Now, as van Fraassen states, if the target is not a
mathematical object then we do not have a well-defined range for the function,
so how can we speak of an embedding or isomorphism or homomorphism or
whatever between that target and some mathematical object? (van Fraassen
2008, 241).
Moreover, according to the concept of truth as possession of a model, to know
that a sentence is true, one must show that there exists a structure such that every
infinite sequence of objects in the structure satisfies the sentence. This must be
demonstrated in some mathematical theory, and ultimately in ZermeloFraenkel set
theory (ZF), and presupposes that the axioms of ZF be true. But, by Godels second
incompleteness theorem, it is impossible to demonstrate by any absolutely reliable
means that the axioms of ZF are true.

12 Truth as Provability

According to Prawitzs concept of truth as provability, a sentence is true if and

only if there exists a proof of it, where there exists is to be meant in an
abstract, tenseless sense, that is, it is not required that we have actually
constructed the proof or that we have a method for constructing it (Prawitz 1998,
287). What counts as proofs of different sentences is specified in the meaning
theory for the mathematical language in question (ibid.).
But the concept of truth as provability is inadequate because, according to it, a
sentence in the language of arithmetic is true if and only if there exists a proof
of it, where what counts as a proof is specified in the meaning theory for the
language of arithmetic. Now, the latter must specify the meaning of the concept
of natural number, and such meaning is specified by the axioms of Peanos
second order arithmetic because they are categorical, that is, they have exactly
one model up to isomorphism. But, by Godels first incompleteness theorem,
there is a sentence of arithmetic which is true but unprovable from the axioms of
Peanos second order arithmetic. Such sentence is an example of sentence which
is true but for which there is no proof of the kind specified in the meaning
theory for the language of the sentence. Therefore truth does not reduce to
provability.

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13 Plausibility

As it has been argued above that some alternative concepts of truth are inadequate, it
could be argued that the same holds of all alternative concepts of truth that have
been proposed. This suggests reconsidering the view that the goal of natural science
is truth.
As an alternative to that view it can be stated that, rather than aiming at truth,
natural science aims at the solution of problems. This view is not new. For example,
Laudan argues that we do not have any way of knowing that science is true, or
that it is getting closer to the truth. Such aims are utopian, in the literal sense that
we can never know whether they are being achieved. (Laudan 1977, 127).
Therefore, rather than aiming at truth, science fundamentally aims at the solution
of problems (ibid., 45). This alternative approach is workable because, while we
do not have any criterion of truth, in principle, we can determine whether a given
theory does or does not solve a particular problem (ibid., 127).
However, while stating that science aims at the solution of problems, Laudan has
nothing to say about how the solution of problems can be brought about. His
account of problems is limited to the context of justificationthe evaluation of
ready-made theories in terms of their capacity for solving problems. As regards the
context of discovery, he states that no rules can fulfill the heuristic tasks conceived
for a logic of discovery (Laudan 1980, 182). The case has yet to be made that the
rules governing the techniques whereby theories are invented (if such rules there be)
are the sorts of things that philosophers should claim any interest in (ibid.).
But the view that science aims at the solution of problems is poor if it has nothing
to say about how the solution of problems can be brought about. In fact, since
antiquity, a (non-algorithmic) general method for solving problems is known, the
analytic method, first used by the mathematician Hippocrates of Chios and the
physician Hippocrates of Cos and explicitly formulated by Plato in Meno, Phaedo
and the Republic.
The analytic method is the method according to which, to solve a problem, one
looks for some hypothesis from which a solution to the problem can be deduced.
The hypothesis is obtained from the problem, and possibly other data already
available, by some non-deductive rule, it need not belong to the same field as the
problem, and must be plausible, that is, in accord with experience. But the
hypothesis is in its turn a problem that must be solved, and is solved in the same
way. That is, one looks for another hypothesis from which a solution to the problem
posed by the previous hypothesis can be deduced, it is obtained from the latter
problem, and possibly other data already available, by some non-deductive rule, it
need not belong to the same field as the problem, and must be plausible. And so on,
ad infinitum. Thus solving a problem is a potentially infinite process. (For more on
the analytic method, see Cellucci 2013, Chapt. 4 and 17).
As stated above, in the analytic method hypotheses must be plausible, that is, in
accord with experience. This means that we can agree on them after a careful
examination of the arguments for and against them on the basis of experience. Here,
as Aristotle suggests, we means everyone, or the great majority, or the
wise, and among them either all of them, or the great majority, or the most

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famous and esteemed (Topica, A 1, 100 b 2123). The reference to Aristotle is

appropriate because there is a relation between plausible hypotheses and Aristotles
endoxa. Indeed Aristotle states that, in order to establish that an opinion is an
endoxon, we must examine the arguments for it and the arguments against it
(Aristotle, Topica, H 14, 163 a 37b 1).
Now, if natural science aims at the solution of problems and problems are solved
finding plausible hypotheses by the analytic method, then the goal of natural science
is plausibility rather than truth. The concept of plausibility is all that is needed for
modern science. The concept of truth is a remnant of Aristotelian science, which
claimed to know the essence of natural substances and for which, therefore, the
concept of truth, and specifically that of truth as intuition of the essence, was central.
Other is the case of modern science, which originated from Galileos philosophical
revolutionthe renunciation to know the essence of natural substances, contenting
oneself with knowing some of their properties mathematical in character. The
concept of truth is inessential to it. Indeed, it can be argued that it is inessential also
elsewhere. Outside science, we say This is true not to assert a real connection
between a sentence and the world, but only to express our agreement with an
assertion that someone else has made. Therefore, outside science, This is true
simply stands for I agree.

14 The Plausibility Test Procedure

If a hypothesis is plausible, then for the moment it can be approved. In fact

plausible comes from the Latin plausibilis, which derives from plaudere that
means to applaud, to approve.
In order to show that a hypothesis is plausible it may be useful to use the
following plausibility test procedure:
1. Deduce conclusions from the hypothesis.
2. Compare the conclusions with each other, in order to see that the hypothesis
does not lead to contradictions.
3. Compare the conclusions with other hypotheses already known to be plausible,
and with results of observations or experiments, in order to see that the
hypothesis is compatible with them.
If the hypothesis passes the plausibility test procedure, for the moment it can be
approved. Only for the moment, because new data may always emerge with which
the hypothesis may turn out to be incompatible. If the hypothesis does not pass the
plausibility test procedure, then, while not being rejected outright, it is put on a
waiting list, subject to further investigation.

15 Plausibility as Distinguished from Truth and Probability

Plausibility must not be confused with other concepts to which it is sometimes

assimilated, such as truth and probability.

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Plausibility must not be confused with truth, in particular with truth as

correspondence. For example Peirce, on the one hand, accepts the view that truth is
the correspondence of a representation with its object (Peirce 19311958, 5.553).
On the other hand, he states that the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed
to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth (ibid., 5.407). These two
statements do not agree with one another because they refer to two different
concepts of truth. A proposition is true in the sense of the correspondence theory if it
corresponds to reality. A hypothesis is plausible if it is compatible with our present
experience of some phenomenal properties of reality.
Plausibility must not be confused either with probability. For example, Polya states
that the calculus of plausibilities obeys the same rules as the calculus of probabilities
(Polya 1941, 457). But it is not so. Plausibility involves a comparison between the
arguments for and the arguments against, so it is not a mathematical concept.
Conversely, probability is a mathematical concept. That plausibility is different from
probability is clear from the fact that there are hypotheses which are plausible but, in
terms of the classical concept of probability, have zero probability. On the other hand,
there are hypotheses which are not plausible but, again in terms of the classical concept
of probability, have a non-zero probability. The same holds on other concepts of
probability. (See Cellucci 2013, Sect. 20.4).

16 Plausibility as Distinguished from Warranted Assertibility

Plausibility must also not be confused with Deweys warranted assertibility. Dewey
rejects the concept of truth as correspondence, because it is problematic how
something in experience could be asserted to correspond to something by definition
outside experience (Dewey 1941, 178179). He replaces the concept of truth as
correspondence with warranted assertibility, a term that designates a potentiality
rather than an actuality and is intended to stress that all special conclusions of
special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going
concern (Dewey 1938, 9).
Between plausibility and warranted assertibility there are substantial differences.
Dewey states that, if inquiry begins in doubt, it terminates in the institution of
conditions which remove need for doubt. The latter state of affairs may be designated
by the words warranted assertibility (ibid., 7). But inquiry does not terminate in the
institution of conditions which remove need for doubt. First, inquiry never terminates.
Indeed, in the analytic method, solving a problem is a potentially infinite process.
Secondly, all the hypotheses that such potentially infinite process produces are only
plausible, and a plausible hypothesis is not beyond doubt, it can be approved for the
moment, but new experience may always arise with which the hypothesis may turn out
to be incompatible.
Moreover, Dewey views scientific inquiry as a process converging to the ideal limit
of truth. He states that the best definition of truth is that by Peirce, according to whom
truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which
endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief (Dewey 1938, 345, footnote
6; for Peirces definition, see Peirce 19311958, 5.565). There is no doubt that Dewey

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accepts this definition of truth, because in the index to Dewey 1938 he states: Truth:
Defined, 345n (Dewey 1938, 546). Thus, according to Dewey, truth is the ideal limit
towards which scientific hypotheses tend as they are increasingly more fully warranted
by scientific inquiry. But, as Russell argues, Peirces concept of truth is a vague
concept (Russell 2009, 171).

17 Plausibility in Place of Truth

As stated above, the goal of natural science is plausibility rather than truth.
Scientific theories do not deal with the essence of natural substances, but only with
some of their phenomenal properties, and deal with them by making plausible
hypotheses. Therefore the concept of truth, which is proper to Aristotelian science,
must be replaced with that of plausibility. A scientific theory is not a set of truths,
but rather a set of problems and plausible hypotheses that permit us to solve them.
Thus natural science aims at the solution of problems. More specifically, it aims at
the solution of problems by the analytic method.
That the goal of natural science is plausibility rather than truth overcomes the
problem facing scientific realism, that the history of science offers us many examples of
scientific theories that were successful but which are, according to contemporary
scientific theories, false. From the empirical success of a scientific theory one may infer
that such theory is plausible, not that it is true, and, while truth is an absolute concept,
plausibility is a relative concept. A theory that is plausible at a certain stage may become
implausible at a later stage, when new data emerge. Sankey states that if a theory is
subjected to a battery of demanding tests, consistently yielding accurate predictions in a
range of different circumstances, such performance under test is to be accorded
evidential weight with regard to the truth of the theory (Sankey 2008, 143). But this is
unjustified because, as we have seen, on the other hand he states that one may rationally
believe a proposition that is false. The performance in question is to be accorded
evidential weight only with regard to the plausibility of the theory.
Between the concepts of plausibility and truth there are at least three important
differences. First, a criterion of truth will never be found. Conversely, a criterion of
plausibility exists, being given by the plausibility test procedure described above.
Secondly, although a concept of truth can be made mathematically precise through
Tarskis expression (T), this does not provide a means which allows us to distinguish true
statements from false statements. Conversely, although the concept of plausibility cannot
be made mathematically precise, it provides a means which allows us to distinguish
acceptable statements from unacceptable statements. Finally, plausibility has to do with
reality. Conversely, as already argued with reference to truth as systematic coherence and
to truth as possession of a model, truth has not necessarily to do with reality.

18 Knowledge and Certainty

That the goal of natural science is plausibility means that our knowledge cannot be
absolutely certain, because new data may always emerge with which hypotheses
may turn out to be incompatible.

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Axiomathes

Against the claim that our knowledge cannot be absolutely certain it is sometimes
objected that such claim is self-defeating, because it implies that the claim itself
cannot be absolutely certain. But this objection is unjustified. For, saying that the
claim cannot be absolutely certain confirms that we can never be absolutely certain
of anything, and hence that our knowledge cannot be absolutely certain. (In this
regard, see the anecdote of Peirce 19311958, 1.10).
Admittedly, the search for certainty responds to a deep need of humans who, in
their life dominated by precariousness, feel the necessity to find secure footholds
and look for them in religion, science or philosophy. But precariousness is a
constituent part of human life and there is no ultimate way out of it. As Russell says,
the demand for certainty is one which is natural to man, but is nevertheless an
intellectual vice (Russell 1950, 26). Precariousness is also a constituent part of
human knowledge, because all human knowledge is based on hypotheses and no
hypothesis is absolutely certain, therefore all human knowledge is not absolutely
certain.
All human knowledge also includes mathematical knowledge. As Cohen says,
this is our fate, to live with doubts, to pursue a subject whose absoluteness we are
not certain of, in short to realize that the only true science is itself of the same
mortal, perhaps empirical, nature as all other human undertakings (Cohen 1971,
15).
That all human knowledge is not absolutely certain does not mean, however, that
knowledge is impossible. What is impossible is only absolutely certain knowledge.
Knowledge would be impossible only if hypotheses were arbitrary, but they are not
arbitrary since they must be plausible. Therefore we can have knowledge, albeit
fallible knowledge. Moreover, we can have fallible but rational knowledge.
Contrary to Poppers claim, knowledge does not have its basis in an irrational
decision, nor we must admit a certain priority of irrationalism (Popper 1945, II,
218). Knowledge has its basis in a wholly rational procedure, the analytic method,
so we need not admit any priority of irrationalism.

Acknowledgments I wish to thank Reuben Hersh, Howard Sankey, Fabio Sterpetti, Jan Wolenski, and
three anonymous referees, for their comments and suggestions.

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