INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK v GUECO

FACTS:

Gueco spouses purchase a Nissan Sentra 1989 model car through a bank loan
with the International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank of the Philippines). They
issued promissory notes and mortgage over the car.

In default of the spouses to pay their loans, the Bank filed a case with Sum of
Money with Prayer for a Writ of replevin in the MTC of Pasay, consequently, served
summons and fetch Dr. Gueco for a meeting which resulted to a negotiation of the
payment from 184,000 lowered to 154,000. Still, the car was detained inside the
banks compound for the non payment of the said negotiated amount.

The amount was lowered into 150,000 through a negotiation with an Auto
Loan/Car collection Head. A managers check of 150,000 was delivered by D. Gueco
but the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to
Dismiss which was considered by the bank as their SOP to effect a compromise and
to preclude future filing of claims, counterclaims or suits for damages.

Spouses filed a case with the MTC but was denied for lack of merit. They
appealed to RTC which ruled in favor of them and ordered the bank to return the car
and to pay damages and cost of suit. The CA also ruled in favor of the spouses, like
the lower court, they also belive that fraud was instituted by the bank when they
require the spouses to sign the joint motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud on the part of the petitioner?

Held: None, the fraud referred to in Article 1170 of the Civil Code is the deliberate
and intentional evasion of the normal fulfillment of obligation. In this case, the court
stated that there was no act of fraud in the part of the bank wherein the said
signing of motion to dismiss will moreover benefit the spouses. True, petitioner may
have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint motion to
dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this can not
in anyway have prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The motion to dismiss was in fact also for the
benefit of Dr. Gueco, as the case filed by petitioner against it before the lower court
would be dismissed with prejudice. The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural
consequence of the compromise agreement and simply stated that Dr. Gueco had
fully settled his obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case. Petitioner's act of
requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss can not be said to be a
deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise
agreement of the parties. It should, likewise, be noted that in cases of breach of
contract, moral damages may only be awarded when the breach was attended by
fraud or bad faith. The law presumes good faith. Dr. Gueco failed to present an iota
of evidence to overcome this presumption. In fact, the act of petitioner bank in
lowering the debt of Dr. Gueco from P184,000.00 to P150,000.00 is indicative of its
good faith and sincere desire to settle the case.

SCHMITZ TRANSPORT AND BROKERAGE CORP. v TRANSPORT VENTURE INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner, here was engaged by the consignee (Little Giant) to secure the
requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and to deliver them
to its warehouse at Cainta Rizal and in turn engaged the services of TVI to send a
barge and tugboat at shipside. Upon the arrival of the 545 hot rolled steel sheets in
coil at the South Harbor the TVI sent the tugboat and barge near the shipside, 37
steel were loaded to the barge.

Due to strong waves, the barge was capsized. Later on, the Little Giant filed
a formal claim against Industrial Insurance amounting P 5,246,113.11. Then later
on, Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI, and
Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before the RTC of
Manila, for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant and faulted them for
undertaking the unloading of the cargoes while typhoon signal No.1 was raised in
Manila. RTC rules in favor of the Industrial Insurance. To the trial courts decision, the
defendants Schmitz Transport and TVI filed a joint motion for reconsideration
assailing the finding that they are common carriers and the award of excessive
attorneys fees of more than P1,000,000. And they argued that they were not
motivated by gross or evident bad faith and that the incident was caused by a
fortuitous event. [20]

ISSUE: Whether or not Schmitz transport and Brokerage Corporation and Transport
Venture Incorporation are solidarily liable for the amount of P 5,246,113.11.

(1) Whether the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event, independent of
any act of negligence on the part of petitioner Black Sea and TVI, and

(2) If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea,
petitioner and TVI.

RULING

NO FORTUITOUS EVENT.
That no tugboat towed back the barge to the pier after the cargoes were completely
loaded by 12:30 in the morning[39] is, however, a material fact which the appellate
court failed to properly consider and appreciate [40] the proximate cause of the loss of
the cargoes. Had the barge been towed back promptly to the pier, the deteriorating
sea conditions notwithstanding, the loss could have been avoided. But the barge
was left floating in open sea until big waves set in at 5:30 a.m., causing it to sink
along with the cargoes.[41] The loss thus falls outside the act of God doctrine.

2. Petitioner, which did not have any barge or tugboat, engaged the services of TVI
as handler[48] to provide the barge and the tugboat. In their Service Contract,
[49]
while Little Giant was named as the consignee, petitioner did not disclose that it
was acting on commission and was chartering the vessel for Little Giant. [50] Little
Giant did not thus automatically become a party to the Service Contract and was
not, therefore, bound by the terms and conditions therein.

Not being a party to the service contract, Little Giant cannot directly sue TVI based
thereon but it can maintain a cause of action for negligence.[51]