[G.R.No.168437.January8,2009.]|||(Gomav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.
168437, Intheirdefense,NatalioandLaurinio,whileadmittinghavingaffixed
[January8,2009],596PHIL114)
LAURINIOGOMAandNATALIOUMALE,petitioners,
vs.THECOURTOFAPPEALS,PEOPLEOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,andSANGGUNIANMEMBER
MANUELG.TORRALBA,respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO,JR.,Jp:
TheCase
Appealed,viathisPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45,is
theDecision1datedJune6,2005oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.CR
No.27963,affirmingtheJuly28,2003Decision 2 oftheRegionalTrialCourt
(RTC),Branch26inSantaCruz,LagunainCriminalCaseNo.SC6712.TheRTC
convictedpetitionersofthecrimeoffalsificationofpublicdocumentunderArticle
171oftheRevisedPenalCode(RPC).HESIcT
TheFacts
OnthebasisoftheaffidavitcomplaintofManuelTorralbaandtwo
othermembersofthe SangguniangBarangay ofBrgy.Cabanbanan,Pagsanjan,
Laguna,theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanforLuzonfiledwiththeRTCinSta.Cruz,
LagunaanInformationforfalsificationofpublicdocumentunderArt.171(2)of
theRPCagainstpetitionersLaurinioGomaandNatalioUmale.3Specifically,the
complaint alleged that Laurinio and Natalio, as barangay chairperson and
secretary,respectively,falsifiedabarangayresolutiondatedSeptember24,1995,
allocatingtheamountofPhP18,000asdisbursementforaseminarforthetwo
officials. The indicting information, docketed as Crim. Case No. SC6712 and
raffledtoBranch26oftheSta.CruzRTC,allegedasfollows:
ThatonoraboutSeptember24,1995inBarangayCabanban
[sic], Pagsanjan, Laguna, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused LAURINIO GOMA and NATALIO A. UMALI,
both public officials, being the Barangay Chairman and
BarangaySecretary,respectively,takingadvantageoftheir
officialpositionsandcommittingtheoffenseinrelationto
theiroffice,inconnivanceandconspiracywitheachother,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsifyaResolutiondatedSeptember24,1995,anofficial
document, by indicating therein that aforesaid Resolution
waspassedonmotionofKagawadRenatoDizon,seconded
by Kagawad Recaredo C. Dela Cruz and unanimously
approvedbythosepresentinthemeetingheldonSeptember
24, 1995 at 2:00 P.M., when in truth and in fact no
meeting was held as no quorum was mustered, to the
damageandprejudiceofpublicinterest.
CONTRARYTOLAW.4
When arraigned, both Laurinio and Natalio, assisted by counsel,
pleadednotguiltytotheabovecharge.Pretrialandtrialthenensued.
The prosecution presented the three complaining witnesses, 5 who
testifiedthat,forlackofquorum,noactualsessionofthe sanggunian ofBrgy.
Cabanbanantookplace onSeptember24,1995,thedaythedisputedresolution
was allegedly passed. On that day, according to the three, they went to the
barangayhealthcentertoattendaprescheduledsessionwhich,however,didnot
pushthroughas,apartfromthem,onlyoneothermember,i.e.,Laurinio,came.But
theylatergotwindoftheexistenceofsubjectResolutionNo.T95(Res.T95)
datedSeptember24,1995,inwhichitwasmadetoappearthatallthesanggunian
membersattendedthesessionofSeptember24,1995andunanimouslyapproved,
uponmotionofkagawadRenatoDizon,dulysecondedbykagawadRicaredodela
Cruz, theallocation ofPhP18,000to defray theexpensesoftwoofficials who
wouldattendaseminarinZamboanga.Onthefaceoftheresolutionappearsthe
signature of Natalio and Laurinio, in their respective capacities as barangay
secretaryandchairperson.Italsoboretheofficialsealofthebarangay.
OnOctober15,1995,the sanggunian heldaspecialsessionduring
whichitpassedaresolutionthereinstatingthatnosessionwasheldonSeptember
24,1995.6
theirsignaturesontheadvertedfalsifiedresolution,allegedthatsaidresolutionwas
nothingmorethanamereproposaloradraftwhichNatalio,aswasthepractice,
preparedandsignedaweekbeforethescheduledSeptember24,1995.Theyalso
allegedthatthesameresolutionwasnottheenablinginstrumentforthereleaseof
theseminarfunds.
TheRulingoftheRTC
Aftertrial,theRTCrenderedonJuly28,2003judgment,findingboth
LaurinioandNatalioguiltyaschargedand,accordingly,sentencedthem,thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Laurinio
GomaandNatalioA.Umaliguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt
as principals in the felony of falsification of public
documentpunishableunderSection[sic]171oftheRevised
Penal Code and there being neither aggravating nor
mitigatingcircumstance,herebyimposesuponeachofsaid
accusedthepenaltyoffour(4)yearsandtwo(2)monthsof
prisioncorreccional, asminimum, toeight(8)years,and
two(2)monthsofprisionmayor,asmaximum.
Costsagainstbothaccused.
SOORDERED.7
The RTCfoundRes.T95tohavealltheappearanceofacomplete
and"trueandgenuinedocument",sealedandsignedbytheSangguniansecretary.
8Andforreasonssetoutinitsdecision,thetrialcourtdismissed,asincredulous,
thedefense'stheory,andtheargumentsproppingit,aboutthesubjectresolution
beingjustamereproposal.
TheRulingoftheCA
FromtheRTCdecision,LaurinioandNatalioappealedtotheCA,
theirrecoursedocketedasCAG.R.CRNo.27963,raisingthreeissues,towit:(a)
whetherRes.T95isapublicdocument;(b)whethertheyviolatedArt.171(2)of
theRPC;and(c)whetherthepenaltyimposedisproper.Answeringallthreeissues
intheaffirmative,theCA,byitsDecisiondatedJune6,2005,affirmedthatofthe
trialcourt,disposingasfollows:
WHEREFORE, the 28 July 2003 Decision of Branch 26,
Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna finding
accusedappellants Laurinio Goma and Natalio A. Umali
guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeoffalsification
of public document under Article 171(2) of the Revised
PenalCodeandsentencingthemtosufferthepenaltyoffour
(4)yearsandtwo(2)monthsofprisioncorrectional[sic],as
minimum,toeight(8)years,andtwo(2)monthsofprision
mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellants.
SOORDERED.9
PetitionersarenowbeforethisCourtraisingtheverysameissuesthey
earlierinvokedbeforetheCA,thefirsttwoofwhichmaybereducedintothe
following proposition: Whether Res. T95 may be characterized as a public
document to bring the case, and render petitioners liable on the basis of the
evidenceadduced,underArt.171(2)oftheRPC.
TheCourt'sRuling
Thepetitionisbereftofmerit.
Asapreliminaryconsideration, petitioners,inthisrecourse,merely
highlightanddiscusstheirdefensethatthesubjectresolutionisameredraftor
proposed resolution not acted upon by the sanggunian for lack of quorum on
September24,1995,andthattheyneverhadanycriminalintentwhentheysigned
suchproposedresolution.Theydenyhavingaffixedthebarangayofficialsealon
thesubjectresolution.
SubjectResolutionaPublicDocument
UnderSec.19(a)ofRule132,RevisedRulesonEvidence, public
documentsinclude"[t]hewrittenofficialacts,orrecordsoftheofficialactsofthe
sovereignauthority,officialbodiesandtribunals,andpublicofficers,whetherof
thePhilippines,orofaforeigncountry." Verily, resolutionsandordinancesof
sanggunians,betheyofthe sanggunianpanlalawigan, panlungsod,bayan, or
barangay,comewithinthepaleoftheaboveprovision,suchissuancesbeing
theirwrittenofficialactsintheexerciseoftheirlegislativeauthority.Asa
 matter of common practice, an action appropriating money for some public
purposeorcreatingliabilitytakestheformofanordinanceorresolution.
Blackdefinesa publicdocument as"a documentofpublicinterest
issued or published by a political body or otherwise connected with public
business."10Thetermisalsodescribedasadocumentintheexecutionofwhicha
personinauthorityornotarypublictakespart.11Therecanbenodenyingthatthe
publicmoneydisbursingandseeminglygenuineRes.T95,inthepreparation
ofwhichpetitioners,intheirofficialcapacity,hadahand,is,incontext,a
public document in a criminal prosecution for falsification of public
document.AnditbearstostressthatinfalsificationunderArt.171(2)ofthe
RPC,itisnotnecessarythattherebeagenuinedocument;itisenoughthat
the document fabricated or simulated has the appearance of a true and
genuinedocumentorofapparentlegalefficacy.12
PetitionersGuiltyofFalsification
Attheoutset,itmustbeemphasizedthattheCourtusuallydefersto
factual findings of the trial court, more so when such findings receive a
confirmatorynodfromtheappellatecourt.Weexplainedinonecase:
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of theprobative weight thereof, as wellas its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high
respectifnotconclusiveeffect. Thisismoretrueifsuch
findingswereaffirmedbytheappellatecourt.Whenthetrial
court'sfindingshavebeenaffirmedbytheappellatecourt,
saidfindingsaregenerallybindinguponthisCourt.13
And this factual determination, as a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, deserves great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal,
exceptonlyforthemostconvincingreasons,14suchaswhenthatdeterminationis
clearlywithoutevidentiarysupportonrecord15orwhenthejudgmentisbasedon
misapprehensionoffactsoroverlookedcertainrelevantfactswhich,ifproperly
considered,wouldjustifyadifferentconclusion.16Thisisasitshouldbesinceit
isnotthefunctionoftheCourtunderRule45oftheRulesofCourttoevaluateand
weigh all over again the evidence presented or the premises supportive of the
factualholdingsoflowercourts.17IHTaCE
ThecasedispositionoftheCAandthefactualandlogicalpremises
holdingittogethercommendthemselvesforconcurrence.Itsinculpatoryfindings
on the guilt of petitioners for falsification under Art. 171 (2) of the RPC,
confirmatoryofthoseofthetrialcourt,areamplysupportedbytheevidenceon
record,consistingmainlyofthetestimonyofthecomplainingwitnessesandacopy
ofthesubjectresolution.
Art.171(2)oftheRPCprovidesasfollows:
ART. 171.Falsification by public officer, employee; or
notaryorecclesiasticalminister.Thepenaltyofprision
mayorandafinenottoexceed5,000pesosshallbeimposed
uponanypublicofficer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantageofhisofficialposition,shallfalsifyadocument
bycommittinganyofthefollowingacts:
xxxxxxxxx
(2)Causingittoappearthatpersonshaveparticipatedinany
actorproceedingwhentheydidnotinfactsoparticipate.
The elementsof thecrime offalsification ofpublicdocuments, as
abovedefinedandpenalized,are:
1.Thattheoffenderisapublicofficer,employee,ornotary
public.
2.Thathetakesadvantageofhisofficialposition.
3.Thathefalsifiesadocumentbycausingittoappearthat
persons have participated in any act or
proceeding.
4.Thatsuchpersonorpersonsdidnotinfactsoparticipate
intheproceeding.18
Thefirsttwoelementsclearlyobtain,petitioners,duringtheperiod
material,beinglocalgovernmentelectedofficialswho,byreasonoftheirposition,
certified, as Natalio did, as to the holding of a barangay session and falsely
attested,asLauriniodid,astotheveracityofaresolutionsupposedlytakenup
therein.Theothertwoelementsarelikewisepresent.Ascorrectlyobservedbythe
CA:
...[Petitioners]madeitappearintheBarangayresolution
dated 24 September 1995 that all members of the
Sangguniang Barangay deliberated upon and unanimously
approved the questioned resolution, when in fact no such
deliberationandapprovaloccurred.Thenonparticipationof
themembersoftheSangguniangBarangayinthepassageof
the resolution was established by the 15 October 1995
resolutionissuedby7ofthe8membersoftheSangguniang
Barangaydenyingthatthechallengedresolutionwaspassed
uponandapprovedbythecouncil.19ICHAaT
Petitioners' bid to pass off the resolution in question as a mere
proposaloradraftcannotbeaccordedmeritinthelightofthemannertheyworded
andmadeitappear.Considerthefollowingaptobservationsofthetrialcourt:
Barangay Resolution No. T95 does not appear to be a
proposedresolutioninallaspects...
xxxxxxxxx
b)the opening paragraph unequivocally states that the
contents thereof were copied from the minutes of the
ordinarysessionofSanggunianheldonSeptember24,1995
meeting,at2:00o'clockpm;
c)it announces all the names of the members of the
Sanggunian who attended the session during which said
resolution[was]passed;
d)it bears the resolution number, not the proposed
resolutionnumber;
e)the title clearly states that the Sanggunian had already
approvedtheallocationofP18,000.00fortwo(2)barangay
officials...;
f)itmadementionthatKagawadRenatoM.Dizonmadethe
motion, duly seconded by Kagawad [Ricaredo] C. de la
Cruz,forthepassingofsaidresolution;and
g)accused Natalio A. Umali, in his official capacity as
Barangay Kalihim, certified said resolution as true and
correct,andaccusedLaurinioA.Goma,PunongBarangay,
attestedtothetruthfulnessofsaidresolution.20
Indeed,the contentsandappearanceofRes.T95argueagainstthe
veryideaofitsbeingmerelyaproposaloradraftbarangayenactment.Resipsa
loquitur.Adraftresolutionwouldnotbenumberedorbecarryingcertificatoryand
attestativesignatures,letaloneimpressedwiththedrysealofthe barangay.It
would notalsoincludesuchparticularsastheattendanceofallmembersofthe
sanggunianandtheidentityofthemovingandsecondingkagawadsrelativetothe
passageoftheresolution,forsuchdetailsarenotcertain;unlesstheyhavebeen
rehearsedorplannedbeforehand.Butthenotionthataplanhadbeenarrangedby
thesanggunianasabodywouldbenegatedbysubsequentdevelopmentwhichsaw
the approval of a resolution dated October 15, 1995 duly signed by seven
kagawadsvirtuallytrashingRes.T95asafalsity.Thesequenceofeventswould
readilyshowthatpetitionersfalsifiedthesubjectresolution,butonlytobeexposed
byprivatecomplainants.ECcDAH
Petitioners'allegationthatkagawadTorralbawastheonewhoaffixed
thesealorthatheharboredillfeelingstowardsthemstrikesthisCourtasamere
afterthought,absentconvincingevidencetosupporttheimputation.
Finally,petitionersurgetheiracquittalonthetheorythattheydid
notbenefitfrom,orthatthepublicwasnotprejudicedby,theresolutionin
question,itnothavingbeenusedtoobtainthePhP18,000seminarfunds.The
argumentholdsnowater.Falsificationofapublicdocumentisconsummated
upontheexecutionofthefalsedocument. And criminalintentispresumed
upontheexecutionofthecriminalact.Erringpublicofficers'failuretoattain
theirobjectives,ifthatreallybethecase,isnotdeterminativeoftheirguiltor
 innocence.Thesimulationofapublicdocument,doneinamannersoastogiveit
theappearanceofatrueandgenuineinstrument,thus,leadingotherstoerrorsasto
itsauthenticity,constitutesthecrimeoffalsification.21
Infine,theelementofgainorbenefitonthepartoftheoffenderor
prejudice to a third party as a result of the falsification, or tarnishing of a
document'sintegrity,isnotessentialtomaintainachargeforfalsificationofpublic
documents.22Whatispunishedinfalsificationofpublicdocumentisprincipally
the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly
proclaimedtherein.Inthisparticularcrime,therefore,thecontrollingconsideration
lies in the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice
caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes
immaterial.23
ThirdIssue:ImposedPenaltyProper
Finally,thepenaltyimposedbytheRTC,asaffirmedbytheCA,is
proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a single divisible penalty of prision
mayor to public officers or employees who, taking advantage of their official
positions, shall cause it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceedingwhentheydidnotinfactparticipate.Andwhereneitheraggravating
nor mitigating circumstanceattendedtheexecutionof theoffense, ashere, the
imposablepenaltyis,accordingtoArt.64oftheRPC,thatofthemediumperiod
provided.Themediumperiodforprisionmayorisfromeight(8)yearsandone(1)
daytoten(10)years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable
would be that of a degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor as
minimum, and the maximum is any period included in the medium period of
prisionmayor.Thedegreelowerthanthemediumperiodofprisionmayoristhe
mediumperiodofprisioncorreccionalwhichrangesfromtwo(2)years,four(4)
months,andone(1)daytofour(4)yearsandtwo(2)months.SIDTCa
The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional,asminimum,toeight(8)yearsandtwo(2)monthsofprisionmayor,
asmaximum,thusimposedonpetitionersiswellwithintheauthorizedimposable
range,andis,therefore,proper.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly,theappealedCADecisiondatedJune6,2005inCAG.R.CRNo.
27963isherebyAFFIRMEDINTOTO.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Quisumbing,CarpioMorales,TingaandBrion,JJ.,concur.
|||(Gomav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.168437,[January8,2009],596PHIL114)
[G.R.No.186030.March21,2012.]
NORMADELOSREYESVDA.DELPRADO,EULOGIAR.DELPRADO,
NORMITAR.DELPRADOandRODELIAR.DELPRADO,petitioners,vs.
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondent.
Beforeusisapetitionforreviewon certiorari under Rule45oftheRulesofCourt,
whichseekstoassailandsetasidethefollowingissuancesoftheCourtofAppeals(CA)
inthecasedocketedasCAG.R.CRNo.31225andentitled"NormaDelosReyesVda.
DelPrado,EulogiaR.DelPrado,NormitaR.DelPradoandRodeliaR.DelPradov.
PeopleofthePhilippines":SDITAC
1)theDecision1datedSeptember15,2008affirmingwith
modification the decision and order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38,
Lingayen,PangasinaninCriminalCaseNo.L
8015;and
2)the Resolution 2 dated January 6, 2009 denying the
motion forreconsiderationof theDecisionof
September15,2008.
TheFactualAntecedents
ThispetitionstemsfromanInformationforfalsificationunderArticle172,inrelationto
Article171(4),oftheRevisedPenalCodefiledagainsthereinpetitionersNormaDelos
Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado
(Eulogia)andRodelia 3DelPrado(Rodelia)withtheMunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)of
Lingayen,Pangasinan,allegedlycommittedasfollows:
That on or about the 19th day of July, 1991, in the
[M]unicipality of Lingayen, [P]rovince of Pangasinan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,theabovenamed accused,conspiring,confederating
and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wil[l]fully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyfalsified,execute[d]
and cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF
SUCCESSION, by stating and making it appear in said
documentthattheyweretheonlyheirsofthelateRafaeldel
Prado,whenintruthandinfact,alltheaccusedwellknew,
that Ma. Corazon Del PradoLim is also an heir who is
entitledtoinheritfromthelateRafaelDelPrado,andallthe
accuseddeliberatelyusedtheDEEDOFSUCCESSIONto
claimownershipandpossessionofthelandmentionedinthe
DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the
complainantMa.CorazonDelPradoLimtoherdamageand
prejudice.
ContrarytoArt.172inrelationtoArt.171,par.4ofthe
RevisedPenalCode.4
Uponarraignment,theaccusedthereinenteredtheirpleaof"notguilty".Afterpretrial
conference,trialonthemeritsensued.
The prosecution claimed that Ma. Corazon Del PradoLim (Corazon), private
complainantinthecriminalcase,wasthedaughterofthelateRafaelDelPrado(Rafael)
by his marriage to Daisy Cragin (Daisy). After Daisy died in 1956, the late Rafael
marriedNormawithwhomhehadfivechildren,namely:Rafael,Jr.,Antonio,Eulogia,
NormitaandRodelia.
ThelateRafaeldiedonJuly12,1978.OnOctober29,1979,Corazon,asadaughterof
thelateRafael,andNorma,asthelateRafael'ssurvivingspouseandrepresentativeof
theirfiveminorchildren,executeda"DeedofExtraJudicialPartitionoftheEstateof
RafaelDelPrado"tocoverthedistributionofseveralpropertiesownedbythelateRafael,
includingtheparceloflandcoveredbyOriginalCertificateofTitle(OCT)No.P22848,
measuring 17,624 square meters, more or less, and situated at Libsong, Lingayen,
Pangasinan.
Peragreementoftheheirs,Corazonwastogeta3,000squaremeterportionoftheland
coveredbyOCTNo.P22848.ThisrightofCorazonwasalsoaffirmedintheDeedof
ExchangedatedOctober15,1982andConfirmationofSubdivisionwhichsheexecuted
withNorma.acAIES
Corazon,however,laterdiscoveredthatherrightoverthesubjectparceloflandwas
neverregisteredbyNorma,contrarytothelatter'sundertaking.The petitionersinstead
executedonJuly19,1991aDeedofSuccessionwhereinthey,togetherwithRafael,Jr.
andAntonio,partitionedandadjudicateduntothemselvesthepropertycoveredbyOCT
No.P22848,totheexclusionofCorazon.ThedeedwasnotarizedbyLoretoL.Fernando
(Loreto),andprovidesinpart:
WHEREAS,onthe12[th]dayofJuly1978,RAFAELDEL
PRADO[,] SR., died intestate in the City of Dagupan,
leaving certain parcel of land, and more particularly
describedandboundedtowit:
ORIGINALCERTIFICATEOFTITLENO.P
22848
"Acertainparcelofland(LotNo.5518,Cad
373D) Lingayen Cadastre, situated in
Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos.
5522,5515;and6287;ontheSE.,byLotsNos.
5516,5517,55andRoad;ontheSW.,byRoad,
andLotsNos.5521,5510,and5520;andonthe
NW., by Road; . . . containing an area of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
TWENTYFOUR (17,624) Square Meters,
moreorless. CoveredbyPsd307996(LRC),
consistingoftwolots.LotNo.5510AandLot
5518B."
WHEREAS,the partiesheretoaretheonlyheirsofthe
decedent,thefirstname,isthesurvivingspouseandtherest
arethechildrenofthedecedent;
xxxxxxxxx
 NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
premisesandinvokingtheprovisionsofRule74,Sec.1of
the RulesofCourt,thepartiesheretodobythesepresents,
agree to divide and partition the entire estate
above[]described and accordingly adjudicate, as they do
herebyadjudicatethesameamongthemselves,hereinbelow
specifiedtowit:
xxxxxxxxx5
ByvirtueofthesaidDeedofSuccession,OCTNo.P22848wascancelledandseveral
newtitleswereissuedunderthenamesofCorazon'scoheirs.WhenCorazondiscovered
this,shefiledacriminalcomplaintagainstnowpetitionersNorma,Eulogia,Normitaand
Rodelia.AntonioandRafael,Jr.hadbothdiedbeforethefilingofsaidcomplaint.
AmongthewitnessespresentedduringthetrialwasLoreto,whoconfirmedthatuponthe
requestofNormaandAntonio,hepreparedandnotarizedthedeedofsuccession.He
claimedthatthepetitionersappearedandsignedthedocumentbeforehim.DEacIT
Fortheirdefense,thepetitionersdeniedhavingsignedtheDeedofSuccession,orhaving
appeared before notary public Loreto. They also claimed that Corazon was not a
daughter,butaniece,ofthelateRafael.Normaclaimedthatsheonlylaterknewthata
deed of succession was prepared by her son Antonio, although she admitted having
executedadeedof real estatemortgage infavor ofmortgagee Prudential Bank over
portionsofthesubjectparceloflandalreadycoveredbythenewtitles.
TheRulingoftheCA
OnSeptember15,2008,the CArendereditsdecision 12 dismissingthepetitionand
affirming the RTC's ruling, with modification as to the imposable penalty under the
IndeterminateSentenceLaw.Thedecretalportionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 10,
2007 and Order dated October 31, 2007 of the Regional
TrialCourt,Branch38,Pangasinan,inCrim.CaseNo.L
8015 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellantsNormadelosReyesVda.DelPrado,EulogiaR.
DelPradoandNormitaR.DelPradoareherebysentencedto
sufferanindeterminatepenaltyofone(1)yearandone(1)
dayofarrestomayor,asminimum,tothree(3)years,six(6)
monthsandtwentyone(21)daysofprisioncorreccional,as
maximum.
SOORDERED.13
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the CA in its
resolution14datedJanuary6,2009.Feelingaggrieved,thepetitionersappealedfromthe
decision and resolution of the CA to this Court, through a petition for review on
certiorari15underRule45oftheRulesofCourt.

ThePresentPetition
TheRulingoftheMTC

Thepetitionerspresentthefollowingassignmentoferrorstosupporttheirpetition:
TheMTCrejectedforbeingunsubstantiatedthepetitioners'denialofanyparticipationin
the execution of the deed of succession, further noting that they benefited from the
propertyafteritstransferintheirnames.Thus,onAugust9,2006,thecourtrenderedits A.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
decision 6 finding petitioners Norma, Eulogia, Normita and Rodelia guilty beyond CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate COMPLAINANT MA. CORAZON DEL
penaltyoffourmonthsandonedayofarrestomayorasminimumtotwoyearsandfour PRADOLIM WAS EXCLUDED AS AN
monthsandonedayofprisioncorreccionalasmaximum.Theywerealsoorderedtopay HEIROFTHELATERAFAELDELPRADO.
afineofP5,000.00each,withsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofnonpaymentoffine.

B.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT

ConsideringtheminorityofRodeliaatthetimeofthecommissionofthecrime,shewas CLEARLYERREDINNOTAPPRECIATING
sentencedtosufferthepenaltyoffourmonthsofarrestomayor,pluspaymentoffineof THE FACT THAT IN SEVERAL
P5,000.00,withsubsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofnonpayment. DOCUMENTS/INSTRUMENTS EXECUTED
BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE
PARTICIPATION OF COMPLAINANT MS.
AllthepetitionerswereorderedtoindemnifyCorazonintheamountofP10,000.00as CORAZON DEL PRADOLIM, SHE WAS
attorney'sfees,andtopaythecostsofsuit. SPECIFICALLY NAMED AS AN HEIR
WITH CORRESPONDING
UnsatisfiedwiththeMTC'sruling,the petitionersfiledamotionfornewtrialonthe SHARES/INHERITANCE IN THE ESTATE
groundsofallegedgrosserroroflaw,irregularitiesduringthetrial,andnewandmaterial OF THE LATE RAFAEL DEL PRADO.
evidence.ToprovethattheydidnotintendtoexcludeCorazonfromtheestateofthelate CcTHaD
Rafael,thepetitionerscitedtheirrecognitionofCorazon'srighttotheestateinthedeed
ofextrajudicialpartition,confirmationofsubdivision,deedofexchange,jointaffidavit C.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
andpetitionforguardianshipofminorsRafael,Jr.,Eulogia,AntonioandNormita,which CLEARLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
they had earlier executed. 7 Again, the petitioners denied having signed the deed of APPRECIATE THE GOOD FAITH OF THE
succession,andinsteadinsistedthattheirsignaturesinthedeedwereforged. PETITIONERS WHICH NEGATES THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OF
The motion was denied by the MTC via a resolution 8 dated December 21, 2006, FALSIFICATIONONTHEIRPART.
promptingthefilingofanappealwiththeRTC.
D.WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT
TheRulingoftheRTC CLEARLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE PRESUMPTION
OnAugust10,2007,theRTCrendereditsdecision9affirmingtheMTC'sdecision,with OF INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONERS
modificationinthatthecaseagainstRodeliawasdismissedinviewofherminorityatthe NOTHAVINGBEENOVERCOMEBYTHE
timeofthecommissionofthecrime.Thedecretalportionofthedecisionreads:HIaTDS PROSECUTION'SEVIDENCE.

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theappealedDecision
oftheMunicipalTrialCourtofLingayen,Pangasinandated
August9,2006isherebyAFFIRMED,butmodifiedasto
accused Rodelia R. Del Prado as the case against her is
herebyDISMISSEDonaccountofherminorityatthetime
ofthecommissionoftheoffense.
SOORDERED.10
AmotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedforlackofmeritbytheRTCviaitsresolution
11 dated October 31, 2007. Hence, Norma, Eulogia and Normita filed apetition for
reviewwiththeCA.
E.WITHDUERESPECT[THELOWERCOURTERRED]
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CASE IS
PURELYCIVILONE[,]NOTCRIMINAL.16
Tosupporttheirassignederrors,thepetitionersinvoketheexistenceandcontentsofthe
several documents which they hadpresented before the MTC, including the deed of
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Rafael Del Prado dated October 29, 1979,
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and petition in the guardianship
proceedingsfortheminorDelPradochildrenfiledbyNorma,inwhichdocumentsthey
claimtohaveindicatedandconfirmedthatCorazonisalsoanheirofthelateRafael.
Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with
falsificationforhavingexcludedCorazonasanheiroftheirdecedent.
Insum,theissueforthisCourt'sresolutioniswhetherornottheCAerredinaffirming findingsarecontrarytothosebythetrialcourt,(8)whenthefindingsareconclusions
thepetitioners'convictionforfalsification,notwithstandingthesaidpetitioners'defense withoutcitationofspecificevidenceonwhichtheyarebased,(9)whentheactssetforth
thattheyneverintendedtoexcludeprivatecomplainantCorazonfromtheestateofthe inthepetitionaswellasinthepetitioner'smainandreplybriefsarenotdisputedbythe
lateRafael. respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised onthe supposed absence of
evidenceandcontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord,or(11)whentheCAmanifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
ThisCourt'sRuling considered, would justify a different conclusion. 20 After a consideration of the
petitioners'arguments,thisCourtholdsthatthepresentappealdoesnotfallunderanyof
Thepetitionisboundtofail. theseexceptions.

Onlyquestionsoflawmayberaised Therecanbenogoodfaithonthe
inpetitionsforreviewoncertiorari partofthepetitionerssincethey
underRule45oftheRulesofCourt. knewoftheuntruthfulcharacter
ofstatementscontainedintheir
deedofsuccession.
First,thequestionsbeingraisedbythepetitionersrefertofactualmattersthatarenot
propersubjectsofapetitionforreviewunderRule45.Settledistherulethatinapetition
forreviewunderRule45,onlyquestionsoflawmayberaised.ItisnotthisCourt's Evengrantingthatthepresentpetitionmaybeadmitted,wefindnocogentreasonto
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the reversetheCAdecisionappealedfrom,consideringthattheelementsofthecrimeof
proceedingsbelow,ourjurisdictionbeinglimitedtoreviewingonlyerrorsoflawthat falsificationunderArt.171,par.4oftheRevisedPenalCode,inrelationtoArt.172
mayhavebeencommittedbythelowercourt.Theresolutionoffactualissuesisthe thereof,weredulyprovedduringtheproceedingsbelow.Saidelementsareasfollows:
functionofthelowercourts,whosefindingsonthesemattersarereceivedwithrespect.A EAIaHD
question of law which we may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probativevalueoftheevidencepresentedbythelitigants.17ThisisclearunderSection (a)Theoffendermakesinapublicdocumentuntruthful
1,Rule45oftheRulesofCourt,asamended,whichprovides:ITHADC
statementsinanarrationoffacts;

Section1.FilingofpetitionwithSupremeCourt.Aparty (b)Theoffenderhasalegalobligationtodisclosethetruth
desiringtoappealbycertiorarifromajudgment,finalorder ofthefactsnarratedbyhim;and
orresolutionoftheCourtofAppeals,theSandiganbayan,
theCourtofTaxAppeals,theRegionalTrialCourtorother
courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the (c)Thefactsnarratedbytheoffenderareabsolutelyfalse.21
SupremeCourtaverifiedpetitionforreviewon certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and TheseelementsarebasedontheprovisionsofArt.172,inrelationtoArt.171,par.4,of
shallraiseonlyquestionsoflaw,whichmustbedistinctly theRevisedPenalCode,whichreads:
set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or Art.171.Falsificationbypublicofficer,employeeornotary
proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis orecclesiasticalminister.Thepenaltyofprisionmayor
supplied) andafinenottoexceedP5,000pesosshallbeimposedupon
anypublicofficer,employee,ornotarywho,taking
advantageofhisofficialposition,shallfalsifyadocument
Thedistinctionbetweenaquestionoflawandaquestionoffactissettled.Thereisa
bycommittinganyofthefollowingacts:
questionoflawwhenthedoubtordifferencearisesastowhatthelawisonacertainstate
offacts.Suchaquestiondoesnotinvolveanexaminationoftheprobativevalueofthe
evidencepresentedbythelitigantsoranyofthem.Ontheotherhand,thereisaquestion xxxxxxxxx
offactwhenthedoubtarisesastothetruthorfalsehoodoftheallegedfactsorwhenthe
query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the
credibilityofwitnesses,existenceandrelevancyofspecificsurroundingcircumstances, 4.Makinguntruthfulstatementsinnarrationoffacts;
theirrelationtooneanotherandtothewhole,andtheprobabilitiesofthesituation.18
xxxxxxxxx
Contrarytotheserules,thepetitionersaskustoreviewthelowercourts'factualfinding
onCorazon'sexclusioninthesubjectdeedofsuccession,toreconsideritscontentsand
Art. 172.Falsification by private individual and use of
thoseoftheotherdocumentaryevidencewhichtheyhavesubmittedwiththecourt aquo,
falsifieddocuments.Thepenaltyofprisioncorreccional
allofwhichinvolvequestionsoffactratherthanquestionsoflaw.Intheirassignmentof
initsmediumandmaximumperiodsandafineofnotmore
errors,petitionersevenfullyquestionthefactualbasisforthecourts'findingoftheir
thanP5,000pesosshallbeimposedupon:
guilt.However,aswehaveexplainedinMedinav.Asistio,Jr.:19

1.Anyprivateindividualwhoshallcommitany
Petitioners' allegation that the Court of Appeals "grossly
ofthefalsificationsenumeratedin
disregarded"theirExhibits"A","B","C","D"and"E",in
the next preceding article in any
effect, asks us to reexamine all the [evidence] already
public or official document or
presentedandevaluatedaswellasthefindingsoffact
letter of exchange or any other
madebytheCourtofAppeals.Thus,inSottov.Teves(86
kindofcommercialdocument;and
SCRA 154 [1978]), [w]e held that the appreciation of
evidence is within the domain of the Court of Appeals
becauseitsfindingsoffactarenotreviewablebythisCourt 2.Anyperson who, to the damage of a third
(Manlapazv.CA,147SCRA236[1987];Knechtv.CA,158 party, or with the intent to cause
SCRA80[1988]andalonglineofcases). suchdamage,shallinanyprivate
documentcommitanyoftheacts
of falsification enumerated in the
ItisnotthefunctionofthisCourttoanalyzeorweighsuch
nextprecedingarticle.
evidence all over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewingerrorsoflawthatmayhavebeencommittedby
the lower court. (Nicolas[,] et al. v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 xxxxxxxxx
[1987];Tiongcov.delaMerced,58SCRA89[1974]).

Therearerecognizedexceptionstothisruleonquestionsoflawassubjectsofpetitions
forreview,towit:(1)whenthefindingsaregroundedentirelyonspeculation,surmises
orconjectures,(2)whentheinferencemadeismanifestlymistaken,absurdorimpossible,
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in
making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrarytotheadmissionsofboththeappellantandtheappellee,(7)whentheCA's
The materialdocumentclaimedtobefalsifiedinthiscaseistheDeedofSuccession
datedJuly19,1991,thepresentationofwhichbeforetheRegisterofDeedsandother
governmentagenciesallowedthecancellationofOCTNo.P22848,andtheissuanceof
several new titles in its stead. The first and third elements were committed by the
inclusioninthesubjectdeedoftheclausethatstates,"(w)hereas,thepartiesheretoare
theonlyheirsofthedecedent,thefirstname,isthesurvivingspouseandtherestarethe
children of the decedent." 22 The untruthfulness of said statement is clear from the
severalotherdocumentsuponwhich,ironically,thepetitionersanchortheirdefense,such
asthedeedofextrajudicialpartitiondatedOctober29,1979,theparties'confirmationof
subdivision,deedofexchangeandNorma'spetitionforguardianshipofherthenminor
children.Specificallymentionedinthesedocuments isthefactthatCorazonisalsoa
daughter,thusanheir,ofthelateRafael.
DesiertoaffirmedthefindingsofGIOGenerosobuttemperedthepenaltytoone(1)year
suspensionfromservicewithoutpay.
Aggrieved,MaricarandMarianwenttotheCAviaapetition6forcertiorariunderRule
65oftheRulesofCourt.

Theobligationofthepetitionerstospeakonlythetruthintheirdeedofsuccessionis
clear,takingintoaccounttheverynatureofthedocumentfalsified.Thedeed,whichwas InaDecisiondatedJanuary6,2004,theCAgrantedthepetition.Whileaffirmingthe
transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, findingsoffactoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,theCAsetasidethefindingof
requiredonlytruthfulstatementsfromthepetitioners.Itwasalegalrequirementtoeffect administrativeguiltagainstMaricarandMarianratiocinatinginthiswise:
thecancellationoftheoriginalcertificateoftitleandtheissuanceofnewtitlesbythe
Register of Deeds. The false statement made in the deed greatly affected the Itisundisputedthatpetitionersareconfidentialemployees
indefeasibilitynormallyaccordedtotitlesoverpropertiesbroughtunderthecoverageof oftheirfather.Assuch,thetasktheywererequiredto
landregistration,totheinjuryofCorazonwhowasdeprivedofherrightasalandowner, perform,isupontheinstanceoftheirfather,andthetime
andtheclearprejudiceofthirdpersonswhowouldrelyonthelandtitlesissuedonthe theywererequiredtoreportmaybeintermittent.Toour
basisofthedeed.cEAIHa mind,thefalseentriestheymadeintheirdailytimerecords
onthespecificdatescontainedtherein,hadbeenmadewith
Wecannotsubscribetothepetitioners'claimofgoodfaithbecauseseveraldocuments nomaliceordeliberateintentsoastoconstitutefalsification.
prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of Theentriesmademaynotbeabsolutelyfalse,theymayeven
succession.Thepetitioners'allegedgoodfaithisdisputedbytheirpriorconfirmationand beconsideredashavingbeenmadewithacoloroftruth,not
recognitionofCorazon'srightasanheir,becausedespiteknowledgeofsaidfact,they adownrightandwillfulfalsehoodwhichtakensingly
includedinthedeedastatementtothecontrary.ThewrongfulintenttoinjureCorazonis constitutesfalsificationofpublicdocuments.AsCuello
clear from their execution of the deed, showing a desire to appropriate only unto Calonstated:"Lamerainexactudnoesbastantepara
themselvesthesubjectparcelofland.Corazonwasundulydeprivedofwhatwasdueher integrarestedelito."Inthepresentcase,thedailytime
notonlyundertheprovisionsofthelawonsuccession,butalsoundercontractsthatshe recordshavealreadyservedtheirpurpose.Theyhavenot
hadpreviouslyexecutedwiththepetitioners. causedanydamagetothegovernmentorthirdperson
becauseunderthefactsobtaining,petitionersmaybesaidto
haverenderedserviceintheinterestofthepublic,with
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby properpermissionfromtheirsuperior.aCIHAD
DENIED.TheDecisiondatedSeptember15,2008andResolutiondatedJanuary6,2009
oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CRNo.31225areherebyAFFIRMED.
Itmaybetruethatadailytimerecordisanofficial
document.Itisnotfalsifiedifitdoesnotpervertitsavowed
SOORDERED. purposeaswhenitdoesnotcausedamagetothe
government.Itmaybedifferentinthecaseofapublic
documentwithcontinuinginterestaffectingthepublic
|||(Vda.delPradov.People,G.R.No.186030,[March21,2012],685PHIL149164) welfare,whichisnaturallydamagedifthatdocumentis
falsifiedwhenthetruthisnecessaryforthesafeguardand
protectionofthatgeneralinterest.Thekeepingand
submissionofdailytimerecordswithinthecontextof
[G.R.No.168309.January29,2008.] petitioners'employment,shouldbetakenonlyforthesake
ofadministrativeproceduralconvenienceorasamatterof
practice,butnotforreasonofstrictlegalobligation.
OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMAN,petitioner,vs.
MARIAND.TORRESandMARICARD.TORRES,
respondents. Assumingthatpetitionersareunderstrictlegalobligationto
keepandsubmitdailytimerecords,stillwearedisposedto
theviewthattheallegedfalseentriesdonotconstitute
falsificationforhavingbeenmadewithnomaliceor
Thisisapetition1forreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtfiledby deliberateintent.
petitionerOfficeoftheOmbudsmanseekingthereversaloftheDecision2datedJanuary
6,2004andtheResolution3datedMay27,2005oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA
G.R.SPNo.69749. ThefollowingpronouncementinthecaseofLecarozvs.
Sandiganbayanmayserveasaguidepost,towit:"[I]fwhat
isprovenismerejudgmentalerroronthepartoftheperson
ThecasearosefromanadministrativecomplaintforDishonesty,GraveMisconduct,and committingtheact,nomaliceorcriminalintentcanbe
FalsificationofOfficialDocumentfiledbeforetheOfficeoftheOmbudsman(docketed rightfullyimputedtohim.....Ordinarily,evilintentmust
asOMBADM0000926)bythenBarangayChairmanRomancitoL.Santosof unitewithanunlawfulactforacrimetoexist.Actusnon
Concepcion,Malabon,againstEdilbertoTorres(Edilberto),MaricarD.Torres(Maricar), facitreum,nisimenssitrea.Therecanbenocrimewhen
andMarianD.Torres(Marian),thenMunicipalCouncilor,LegislativeStaffAssistant, thecriminalmindiswanting.Asageneralrule,ignoranceor
andMessenger,respectively,oftheSangguniangBayanofMalabon.MaricarandMarian mistakeastoparticularfacts,honestandreal,willexempt
aredaughtersofEdilberto. thedoerfromfeloniousresponsibility.Theexceptionof
courseisneglectinthedischargeofdutyorindifferenceto
consequences,whichisequivalenttocriminalintent,forin
MaricarwasappointedasLegislativeStaffAssistantonFebruary16,1995,whileMarian
thisinstance,theelementofmaliciousintentissuppliedby
wasappointedasMessengeronMay24,1996.Atthetimeoftheirpublicemployment,
theelementofnegligenceandimprudence.Intheinstant
theywerebothenrolledasfulltimeregularcollegestudentsMaricar,asafulltime
case,thereareclearmanifestationsofgoodfaithandlackof
studentattheUniversityofSantoTomas(UST)andMarianasadentistryproperstudent
criminalintentonthepartofpetitioners."
attheCollegeofDentistryofCentroEscolarUniversity.Duringtheperiodsubjectofthis
case,theywereabletocollecttheirrespectivesalariesbysubmittingDailyTimeRecords
(DTR)indicatingthattheyreportedforworkeveryworkingday,from8:00a.m.to5:00 Asafinalnote,theremaybesomesuspicionsastothereal
p.m.EHTSCD intentionofprivatecomplainantininstitutingtheaction
beforepublicrespondent,cautionshouldbetakentoprevent
thedevelopmentofcircumstancesthatmightinevitably
AfterdueproceedingsheldintheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,GraftInvestigationOfficer
impairtheimageofthepublicoffice.Privatecomplainantis
(GIO)MorenoF.Generoso,intheDecision4datedNovember9,2001,foundMaricar
agovernmentofficialhimself,assuchheshouldavoidsofar
andMarianadministrativelyguiltyofDishonestyandFalsificationofOfficialDocument
asreasonablypossible,asituationwhichwouldnormally
andrecommendedtheimpositionofthepenaltyofdismissalfromtheservice.Thecharge
tendtoarouseanyreasonablesuspicionthatheisutilizing
againstEdilbertowasdismissed,havingbecomemootandacademicinviewofhisre
hisofficialpositionforpersonalgainoradvantagetothe
electiononMay14,2001inaccordancewiththerulinginAguinaldov.Santos5that"a
prejudiceofpartylitigantsorthepublicingeneral.For
publicofficialcannotberemovedforadministrativemisconductcommittedduringa
"theremaybeoccasionthenwheretheneedsofthe
priorterm,sincehisreelectiontoofficeoperatesasacondonationoftheofficer's
collectivitythatisthegovernmentmaycollidewithhis
previousmisconducttotheextentofcuttingofftherighttoremovehimtherefor."Upon
privateinterestasanindividual".
recommendationofDeputySpecialProsecutorRobertE.Kallos,OmbudsmanAnianoA.
 Inclosing,itmustbeborneinmindthattheevidentpurpose
ofrequiringgovernmentemployeestokeepadailytime
recordistoshowtheirattendanceinofficetoworkandtobe
paidaccordingly.Closelyadheringtothepolicyofnowork
nopay,adailytimerecordisprimarily,ifnotsolely,
intendedtopreventdamageorlosstothegovernmentas
wouldresultininstanceswhereitpaysanemployeeforno
workdone.Theintegrityofthedailytimerecordasan
officialdocument,however,remainsuntarnishedifthe
damagesoughttobepreventedhasnotbeenproduced.The
obligationtomakeentriesinthedailytimerecordsof
employeesinthegovernmentserviceisamatterof
administrativeproceduralconvenienceinthecomputationof
salaryforagivenperiod,characteristically,notanoutright
andstrictmeasureofprofessionaldiscipline,efficiency,
dedication,honestyandcompetence.Theinsignificant
transgressionbypetitioners,ifeveritisone,wouldnottilt
thescalesofjusticeagainstthem,forcourtsmustalwaysbe,
astheyare,therepositoriesoffairnessandjustice.7
HACaSc
PetitionermovedtoreconsiderthereversalofitsDecisionbytheCA,butthemotionwas
deniedintheCAResolutiondatedMay27,2005.Hence,thispetitionbasedonthe
followinggrounds:
I
THEFILLINGUPOFENTRIESINTHEOFFICIAL
DAILYTIMERECORDS(DTRs)ISNOTAMATTEROF
ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURALCONVENIENCE,
BUTRATHERREQUIREDBYCIVILSERVICELAW
TOENSURETHATTHEPROPERLENGTHOFWORK
TIMEISOBSERVEDBYPUBLICOFFICIALSAND
EMPLOYEES,INCLUDINGCONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEESLIKEHEREINPRIVATERESPONDENTS.
THEFALSIFICATIONOFDTRsWOULDRENDERTHE
AUTHORSTHEREOFADMINISTRATIVELYLIABLE
FORDISHONESTYANDGRAVEMISCONDUCTFOR
THEDAMAGINGFALSENARRATIONANDTHE
COLLECTIONOFFULLCOMPENSATIONFOR
INEXISTENTWORK.
II
THEELEMENTOFDAMAGETOTHEGOVERNMENT
ISNOTAREQUISITEFORONETOBEHELD
ADMINISTRATIVELYLIABLEFORDISHONESTY
ANDMISCONDUCT.ASSUMINGITISFOR
ARGUMENT'SSAKE,DAMAGEWASCAUSEDTHE
GOVERNMENTWHENPRIVATERESPONDENTS
FALSIFIEDTHEIRDAILYTIMERECORDSINORDER
TOCOLLECTTHEIRSALARIES.
III
THEELEMENTOFINTENTORMALICEAPPLIESTO
CRIMINALPROSECUTION,NOTTOANOFFENSEOF
DISHONESTYANDMISCONDUCT.8
Petitioner'sfirstsubmissionisthatthefillingupofentriesintheofficialDTRisnota
matterofadministrativeproceduralconveniencebutisarequirementbyCivilService
Lawtoensurethattheproperlengthofworktimeisobservedbyallpublicofficialsand
employees,includingconfidentialemployeessuchasrespondents.ItarguesthatDTRs,
beingrepresentationsofthecompensableworkinghoursrenderedbyapublicservant,
ensurethatthetaxpayingpublicisnotshortchanged.Tobolsterthisposition,petitioner
citedRuleXVIIonGovernmentOfficeHoursoftheOmnibusRulesImplementingBook
VofExecutiveOrderNo.292andOtherPertinentCivilServiceLaws,towit:SHacCD
SECTION1.Itshallbethedutyofeachheadofdepartment
oragencytorequireallofficersandemployeesunderhimto
strictlyobservetheprescribedofficehours.Whenthehead
ofoffice,intheexerciseofdiscretionallowsgovernment
officialsandemployeestoleavetheofficeduringtheoffice
hoursandnotforofficialbusiness,buttoattend
socials/events/functionsand/orwakes/interments,thesame
shallbereflectedintheirtimecardsandchargedtotheir
leavecredits.
SEC.2.Eachheadofdepartmentoragencyshallrequirea
dailytimerecordofattendanceofalltheofficersand
employeesunderhimincludingthoseservinginthefieldor
onthewater,tobekeptintheproperformand,whenever
possible,registeredinthebundyclock.
Service"inthefield"shallrefertoservicerenderedoutside
theofficeproperandservice"onthewater"shallreferto
servicerenderedonboardavesselwhichistheusualplace
ofwork.
SEC.3.ChiefsandAssistantChiefsofagencieswhoare
appointedbythePresident,officerswhorankhigherthan
thesechiefsandassistantchiefsinthethreebranchesof
government,andotherpresidentialappointeesneednot
punchinthebundyclock,butattendanceandallabsencesof
suchofficersmustberecorded.
SEC.4.Falsificationorirregularitiesinthekeepingoftime
recordswillrendertheguiltyofficeroremployee
administrativelyliablewithoutprejudicetocriminal
prosecutionasthecircumstanceswarrant.
SEC.5.Officersandemployeesofalldepartmentsand
agenciesexceptthosecoveredbyspeciallawsshallrender
notlessthaneighthoursofworkadayforfivedaysaweek
oratotaloffortyhoursaweek,exclusiveoftimeforlunch.
Asageneralrule,suchhoursshallbefromeighto'clockin
themorningtotwelveo'clocknoonandfromoneo'clockto
fiveo'clockintheafternoononalldaysexceptSaturdays,
SundaysandHolidays.
SEC.6.Flexibleworkinghoursmaybeallowedsubjectto
thediscretionoftheheadofdepartmentoragency.Inno
caseshalltheweeklyworkinghoursbereducedintheevent
thedepartmentoragencyadoptstheflexitimeschedulein
reportingforwork.
SEC.7.Intheexigencyoftheservice,orwhennecessaryby
thenatureoftheworkofaparticularagencyandupon
representationswiththeCommissionbythedepartment
headsconcerned,requestsforthereschedulingorshiftingof
workscheduleofaparticularagencyforanumberof
workingdayslessthantherequiredfivedaysmaybe
allowedprovidedthatgovernmentofficialsandemployees
renderatotaloffortyhoursaweekandprovidedfurtherthat
thepublicisassuredofcoreworkinghoursofeightinthe
morningtofiveintheafternooncontinuouslyforthe
durationoftheentireworkweek.ACcEHI
SEC.8.Officersandemployeeswhohaveincurredtardiness
andundertimeregardlessofminutesperdayexceeding[at
least]tentimesamonthfortwo(2)consecutivemonthsor
for2monthsinasemestershallbesubjecttodisciplinary
action.9
Petitionerpositsthat,byreasonoftheaboveprovisions,makingfalseentriesinthe
DTRsshouldnotbetreatedinacavalierfashion,butratherwithamodicumof
sacrednessbecausetheDTRmirrorsthefundamentalmaximoftransparency,good
governance,publicaccountability,andintegrityinthepublicservicepursuantto
theconstitutionalpreceptthat"publicofficeisapublictrust".Consequently,the
officeroremployeewhofalsifiestimerecordsshouldincuradministrativeliability.
Onitssecondandthirdsubmissions,petitionerassailedthepositionoftheCAthat
respondentscannotbeheldguiltyoffalsificationbecausetheydidnotcauseanydamage
tothegovernmentandtherewasnointentormaliceontheirpartwhentheymadethe
falseentriesintheirrespectiveDTRsduringthequestionedperiodofservice.According
topetitioner,respondentswerenotcriminallyprosecutedforfalsificationunderthe
RevisedPenalCode,butwerebeingheldadministrativelyaccountablefordishonesty,
gravemisconduct,andfalsificationofofficialdocuments;thus,theelementsofdamage
andintentormalicearenotprerequisites.Itfurtherclaimedthatforthispurpose,only
substantialevidenceisrequired,andthishadbeenstronglyestablished.Petitioneralso
arguedthat,eveniftheelementofdamageismandatory,respondentshadcauseddamage
tothegovernmentwhentheyreceivedtheirfullsalariesforworknotactuallyrendered.
IntheirComment,10respondentsclaimedthattheCAcorrectlydismissedthe
administrativechargesagainstthemastheintegrityoftheirDTRshadremained
untarnishedandthattheyactedingoodfaithinmakingtheentriesintheirDTRs.They
saidthattheCAclearlyelaboratedthelegalbasisforitsrulingintheirfavor.Theyeven
arguedthattheadministrativechargeslodgedbyRomancitoSantoswerebasedonmere
conjecturesandconclusionsoffact,suchthatitwasnotimpossibleforcollegestudentsto
workeight(8)hoursadayandattendclasses.Theyfurtherclaimedthatpetitionerfailed
toprovethattheyactuallyattendedtheirclasseswhichtheywereenrolledin.
Respondentsalsoarguedthatpetitionererredinnothavingdismissedoutrightthe
administrativechargesagainstthembecause,atthetimethecomplaintwasfiled,the
chargeshadalreadyprescribedunderSection20(5)ofRepublicActNo.6770(The
OmbudsmanActof1989),towit:
(5)Thecomplaintwasfiledafteroneyearfromthe
occurrenceoftheactoromissioncomplainedof.CacHES
Theysaidthattheactscomplainedofoccurredin1996to1997,whilethecasewas
filedonlyonFebruary2000,orafterthelapseofmoreorlessthree(3)years.
RespondentMaricaralsoasseveratedthatthedoctrinelaiddowninAguinaldov.Santos
11shouldalsoapplytoherconsideringthatshewaselectedasCityCouncilorof
MalabonCityinthe2004elections.Shealsoclaimedthattheinstantcaseadversely
affectedtheirlives,particularlyinhercase,forwhileshegraduatedfromtheUniversity
oftheEastCollegeofLawin2004,shewasonlyabletotakethebarexaminationsin
2005duetothependencyoftheadministrativecaseagainsther.Shealsocitedthefact
thatthecriminalcaseinvolvingthesamesetoffactswasdismissed,insinuatingthat,asa
resultofthis,theadministrativecaseshouldhavelikewisebeendismissed.
Thepetitionisimpressedwithmerit.
Attheoutset,itmustbestressedthatthisisanadministrativecasefordishonesty,grave
misconduct,andfalsificationofofficialdocument.Tosustainafindingofadministrative
culpabilityonlysubstantialevidenceisrequired,notoverwhelmingorpreponderant,and
verymuchlessthanproofbeyondreasonabledoubtasrequiredincriminalcases.12
Substantialevidencemeanssuchrelevantevidenceasareasonablemindmightacceptas
adequatetosupportaconclusion.
Thefollowingfactsareborneoutbytherecords:(1)Maricarwasappointedas
LegislativeStaffAssistantintheOfficeofthenCouncilorofMalabon,EdilbertoTorres,
onFebruary16,1995;13(2)MarianwasappointedasMessengerinthesameofficeon
May24,1996;14(3)atthetimeofMaricar'sappointmenttoandemploymentinher
position(19951997),shewasafulltimeregularcollegestudentatUST;15(4)atthe
timeofMarian'sappointmentandemploymentasmessengerinherfather'soffice(1996
2000),shewasafulltimeregulardentistryproperstudentattheCollegeofDentistryof
CentroEscolarUniversity;16(5)duringtheemploymentofrespondentsingovernment
service,theysubmittedDTRsindicatingthattheyreligiouslyreportedforworkfrom8:00
a.m.to5:00p.m.duringworkdays;17(6)byreasonthereof,respondentscollectedtheir
fullsalariesduringtheentiretimeoftheiremploymentintheirrespectivepositions;18
and,(7)thesealloccurredwiththefullknowledgeandconsentoftheirfather.19
Itisalsoworthytonotethatthefactualfindingmadebypetitioner,i.e.,thatrespondents
madefalseentriesintheirrespectiveDTRsfortheperiodsubjectofthiscase,was
affirmedbytheCAintheassailedDecisiondatedJanuary6,2004.20HTCAED
Onthebasisoftheseestablishedfacts,petitionerwascorrectinholdingrespondents
administrativelyguiltyofdishonestyandfalsificationofofficialdocument.Dishonestyis
definedasthe"dispositiontolie,cheat,deceive,ordefraud;untrustworthiness,lackof
integrity."21Falsificationofanofficialdocument,asanadministrativeoffense,is
knowinglymakingfalsestatementsinofficialorpublicdocuments.Botharegrave
offensesundertheUniformRulesonAdministrativeCasesintheCivilService,which
carrywithitthepenaltyofdismissalonthefirstoffense.22
FalsificationofDTRsamountstodishonesty.23Theevidentpurposeofrequiring
governmentemployeestokeepatimerecordistoshowtheirattendanceinofficetowork
andtobepaidaccordingly.Closelyadheringtothepolicyofnoworknopay,aDTRis
primarily,ifnotsolely,intendedtopreventdamageorlosstothegovernmentaswould
resultininstanceswhereitpaysanemployeefornoworkdone.24EDATSC
Respondents'claimofgoodfaith,whichimpliesasincereintentnottodoanyfalsehood
ortoseekanyundueadvantage,cannotbebelieved.ThisCourtpronounced
Goodfaith,hereunderstood,isanintangibleandabstract
qualitywithnotechnicalmeaningorstatutorydefinition,
anditencompasses,amongotherthings,anhonestbelief,
theabsenceofmaliceandtheabsenceofdesignto
defraudortoseekanunconscionableadvantage.An
individual'spersonalgoodfaithisaconceptofhisown
mindand,therefore,maynotconclusivelybedetermined
byhisprotestationsalone.Itimplieshonestyofintention,
andfreedomfromknowledgeofcircumstanceswhichought
toputtheholderuponinquiry.Theessenceofgoodfaithlies
inanhonestbeliefinthevalidityofone'sright,ignoranceof
asuperiorclaim,andabsenceofintentiontooverreach
another....25
Inthiscase,respondentsknewfullywellthattheentriestheymadeintheirrespective
DTRswerefalseconsideringthatitwasphysicallyimpossibleforthemtohavereported
forfullworkdayswhenduringthosetimestheywereactuallyattendingtheirregular
classes,whichundoubtedlywouldtakeupmostofthedaytimehoursoftheweekdays.
Withthisknowledge,respondentsdidnotbothertocorrecttheDTRentriestohonestly
reflecttheirattendanceattheirworkplaceandtheactualworktheyperformed.Worse,
theyrepeatedlydidthisforalongperiodoftime,consequentlyallowingthemtocollect
theirfullsalariesfortheentiredurationoftheirpublicemploymentasstaffmembersof
theirfather.
Respondents'protestationsthatpetitionerfailedtoprovetheiractualattendanceintheir
regularclassesandthus,suggestthattheymaynothavebeenattendingtheirclasses,is
preposterousandincredible,simplybecausethisisnotinaccordwiththenaturalcourse
ofthings.ThevoluminousdocumentaryevidencesubpoenaedbypetitionerfromUST
andCentroEscolarUniversityshowingthescheduleofclassesofrespondentsduringthe
questionedperiod,alongwiththecertificatesofmatriculationpainstakinglyperusedby
GIOGeneroso,stronglymilitatesagainstthisclaim.Itwouldbetheheightofabsurdity
onthepartofrespondentstovoluntarilyenrollintheirrespectivecourses,payschool
fees,andnotattendclassesbutinsteadreportforwork.Evenifthiswasremotely
possible,suchasituationwouldbeirreconcilablewiththerespondentshavinggraduated
fromtheirrespectivecourses.
Withoutdoubt,thescrutinyofthenumerousschooldocuments,theDTRssubmitted,and
thepayrollsfromtheofficeofthethenMunicipalAccountantofMalabon
overwhelminglyrevealedthattheclassesinwhichrespondentsenrolledforseveral
schoolyearswereinstarkconflictwiththetimeentriesintheDTRs,andseveralpayroll
sheetsshowedthatrespondentscollectedtheirfullsalariescorrespondingtotheDTR
entries.Thesefindingsoffactmadebypetitioner,beingsupportedbysubstantial
evidence,areconclusive;26moresothatthefindingoffalseentriesintheDTRswas
affirmedbytheCA.cSTDIC
Thus,theCAgravelyerredwhenitexoneratedrespondentsfromadministrativeguilt
basedonthefindingsoffactofpetitionerwhichitevenaffirmed.Thejurisprudence27
adoptedbytheappellatecourtinlayingthelegalbasisforitsrulingdoesnotapplytothe
instantcasebecausesaidcasespertaintocriminalliabilityforFalsificationofPublic
DocumentundertheRevisedPenalCode.Theelementofdamageneednotbeprovedto
holdrespondentsadministrativelyliable.
Butitcannotevenbesaidthatnodamagewassufferedbythegovernment.When
respondentscollectedtheirsalariesonthebasisoffalsifiedDTRs,theycausedinjuryto
thegovernment.Thefalsificationofone'sDTRtocoverupone'sabsencesortardiness
automaticallyresultsinfinanciallossestothegovernmentbecauseitenablesthe
employeeconcernedtobepaidsalariesandtoearnleavecreditsforserviceswhichwere
neverrendered.Undeniably,thefalsificationofaDTRfoistsafraudinvolving
governmentfunds.28
Likewise,theexistenceofmaliceorcriminalintentisnotaprerequisitetodeclarethe
respondentsadministrativelyculpable.Whatismerelyrequiredisashowingthatthey
madeentriesintheirrespectiveDTRsknowingfullywellthattheywerefalse.Thiswas
evidentinthemanydocumentsviewedandreviewedbypetitionerthroughGIO
Generoso.
Ontheissueofprescription,weagreewithpetitioner'scontentionthattheOfficeofthe
OmbudsmanisgivenbyR.A.No.6770awiderangeofdiscretionwhetherornotto
proceedwithaninvestigationofadministrativeoffensesevenbeyondtheexpirationof
one(1)yearfromthecommissionoftheoffense.29
Likewise,thedismissalofthecriminalcaseinvolvingthesamesetoffactscannotbenefit
respondentstocausethedismissaloftheadministrativechargesagainstthem.Asweheld
inTecsonv.Sandiganbayan30
[I]tisabasicprincipleofthelawonpublicofficersthata
publicofficialoremployeeisunderathreefold
responsibilityforviolationofadutyorforawrongfulactor
omission.Thissimplymeansthatapublicofficermaybe
heldcivilly,criminally,andadministrativelyliablefora
wrongfuldoing.Thus,ifsuchviolationorwrongfulact
 resultsindamagestoanindividual,thepublicofficermay
beheldcivillyliabletoreimbursetheinjuredparty.Ifthe
lawviolatedattachesapenalsanction,theerringofficermay
bepunishedcriminally.Finally,suchviolationmayalsolead
tosuspension,removalfromoffice,orotheradministrative
sanctions.Thisadministrativeliabilityisseparateand
distinctfromthepenalandcivilliabilities....IDSETA
Hence,therewasnoimproprietycommittedbypetitionerwhenitconductedthe
administrativeinvestigationwhichledtothefindingofguiltagainstrespondents.
AsregardstheapplicabilityofAguinaldo,ourpronouncementthereinisclearthat
condonationofanadministrativeoffensetakesplaceonlywhenthepublicofficialisre
electeddespitethependencyofanadministrativecaseagainsthim.Inthecaseof
Maricar,priortoherelectionasCouncilorofnowMalabonCity,sheheldanappointive,
notanelective,position,i.e.,LegislativeStaffAssistant,appointedbyherveryown
father,thenCouncilorEdilbertoTorres.
Asmentionedabove,falsificationofaDTR(anofficialdocument)amountsto
dishonesty.Thus,respondentsshouldbeheldadministrativelyliable.Whiledismissal
wasoriginallyrecommendedforimpositiononrespondents,thepenaltywaseventually
temperedtosuspensionofone(1)yearwithoutpay.
Weagreewiththeimpositionofthelowerpenaltyconsideringthatrespondents'public
employmentwiththethenSangguniangBayanofMalabon,evenwhiletheywereregular
collegestudents,wasofaconfidentialcharacter,andthearrangementwaswiththefull
knowledgeandconsentoftheirfatherwhoappointedthemtotheirpositions.
WhilethisCourtrecognizestherelativelaxitygiventoconfidentialemployeesinterms
ofadjustedorflexibleworkinghours,substantialnonattendanceatworkasblatantand
glaringasinthecaseofrespondentscannotbecountenanced.Collectingfullsalariesfor
workpracticallynotrenderedissimply,downrightreprehensible.Inevitably,thisleadsto
theerosionofthepublic'sfaithinandrespectforthegovernment.
WHEREFORE,theDecisiondatedJanuary6,2004andtheResolutiondatedMay27,
2005oftheCourtofAppealsareREVERSEDandSETASIDE,andtheDecisionofthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsmandatedNovember9,2001isREINSTATED.aHESCT
SOORDERED.
YnaresSantiago,AustriaMartinez,Corona*andReyes,JJ.,concur.
|||(OfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.Torres,G.R.No.168309,[January29,2008],567PHIL
4663)
[G.R.No.185493.February2,2011.]
LTC.ROBERTOK.GUILLERGAN(Ret.),petitioner,
vs.PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondent.
Thiscaseisabouttheconvictionofanaccusedforanoffenseother
thanthatchargedintheInformationbasedonaclaimthattheessentialelementsof
theoffenseofwhichhewasconvictedarealsoelementsoftheoffensechargedin
theInformation.
TheFactsandtheCase
OnJune20,1995theOfficeofthe Ombudsmanindictedpetitioner
Roberto K. Guillergan (Guillergan) for estafa through falsification of public
documentsbeforetheSandiganbayaninCriminalCase22904.1
Theevidenceshowsthatsometimein1987,petitionerGuillergan,a
LieutenantColonelintheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),directedMaster
SergeantEdnaSeclon(Seclon),ChiefClerkoftheComptroller'sOffice,tocause
the preparation ofthe payrollsof theircivilianintelligenceagents (CIAs)with
supportingtimerecordandbook.Theagents'nameswerecopiedand,basedon
theirappointmentpapers,certifiedascorrectbyGuillerganandthenapprovedby
BrigadierGeneralDomingoT.Rio(Rio).2
Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of
signaturesofthepayees,GuillerganwoulddirectTechnicalSergeantNemesioH.
Butcon(Butcon),theBudgetandFiscalNonCommissionedOfficer,toaffixhis
initialonthe"Remarks/Sig"columnofthepayrollstocompletetherequirements
andfacilitatetheprocessingofthetimerecord,book,andpayrolls.3
AlsoonGuillergan'sinstruction,the CIAs'payrollsinRegion6for
1987,totalingP732,000.00,werecoveredbycashadvancespayabletoCaptain
Roland V. Maclang, Jr. (Maclang, Jr.), which advances were issued upon his
requestasdisbursingofficerforthatpurpose.Whenready,Guillerganreceivedthe
correspondingcashorchecksthenturnedthemovertoRio.4
At the end of 1987, Rio further received P787,000.00 in
"administrative funds" to be paid out to contractors for repairs in the men's
barracks,thefiringrange,theguesthouseandothers.ButRiorequestedthatthis
"administrativefunds"berealignedto"intelligencefunds"inordertofacilitate
clearing.5
On April 14, 1989 the AFP AntiGraft Board filed a complaint 6
againstRio,Butcon,Maclang,Jr.,Seclon,andGuillerganforviolatingArticlesof
War94inrelationtoArticle217oftheRevisedPenalCode(RPC).TDcAaH
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman
Visayasissuedaresolution7datedMay24,1991,recommendingthedismissalof
the case for lack of merit. On April 21, 1992, however, the ombudsman
investigatorissuedamemorandum,recommendingthefilingofchargesofillegal
useofpublicfundsagainstRioandtheexonerationoftheotherrespondents.Ina
memorandum 8 datedFebruary11,1993,thereviewpanelintheOfficeofthe
SpecialProsecutoraffirmedtherecommendation.
On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the filing of charges against all the accused before the
Sandiganbayan.Consequently,an Information wasfiledagainstthemforestafa
underArticle315,par.2(a),9inrelationtoArticle17110oftheRPC.
Whilethecasewaspending,Riodied,promptingtheSandiganbayan
todismissthecaseagainsthim.11
OnJanuary20,2006,thepartiessubmittedastipulationoffactswith
motion for judgment 12 based on such stipulations. On June 30, 2008, the
SandiganbayanSecondDivisionrenderedjudgment, 13 findingGuillerganguilty
offalsificationpenalizedunderArticle172 14 oftheRPC andsentencedhimto
sufferthepenaltyofimprisonmentfor2yearsand4monthsasminimumto4
years,9monthsand10daysasmaximum.Thecourtacquittedtheotheraccused
onthegroundoflackofproofoftheirguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.
TheIssuesPresented
Theissuespresentedinthiscaseare:
1.Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of
violationofArticle172oftheRPCunderan Information thatchargedhimwith
estafainrelationtoArticle171ofthecode;and
2.Whetherornotpetitionerisguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crimeoffalsificationofpublicdocuments.
TheCourt'sRulings
The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by
makingitappearinseveralpublicdocumentsthatP1,519,000.00inAFPfunds
intendedfortheCIAs'payrollwerepaidforthatpurposewhenintruththesewere
justgiventoRio,resultingindamageandprejudicetothegovernment.Although
thechargewasestafainrelationtoArticle171oftheRPC,thefactsallegedinthe
information sufficiently made out a case for violation ofArticle 172 of which
Guillerganwasconvicted.WhatisimportantisthattheInformationdescribedthe
latter offense intelligibly and with reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to
understandthechargeagainsthimandsuitablypreparehisdefense.15
Whatispunishedinfalsificationofapublicdocumentistheviolation
ofthepublicfaithandthedestructionofthetruthassolemnlyproclaimedinit.16
Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is apublic officer,
employee,ornotarypublic;2)hetakesadvantageofhisofficialposition;and3)
thathefalsifiesadocumentbycommittinganyofthewaysitisdone.17
Ontheotherhand,theelementsoffalsificationofdocumentsunder
paragraph1,Article172 are:1)the offenderisaprivateindividualorapublic
officeroremployeewhodidnottakeadvantageofhisofficialposition;2)the
offendercommittedanyoftheactsoffalsificationenumeratedinArticle171;18
and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.19AlloftheforegoingelementsofArticle172arepresentinthiscase.
First.Guillerganwasapublicofficerwhenhecommittedtheoffense
charged.HewasthecomptrollertothePC/INPCommandinRegion6.Whilethe
Information saidthathetookadvantageofhispositionincommittingthecrime,
the Sandiganbayan found that his work as comptroller did not include the
preparationoftheappointmentsandpayrollsofCIAs.Nordidhehaveofficial
custodyofthepertinentdocuments.20Hisofficialfunctionwaslimitedtokeeping
therecordsoftheresourcesthatthecommandreceivedfromCampCrame. 21
Still,hetookthelibertyofinterveninginthepreparationofthetimerecord,book,
andpayrollsinquestion.
 Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the
offensechargedby"causingittoappearthatpersonsparticipatedinanactora
proceedingwhen they didnot infactsoparticipate." 22 In People v. Yanson
Dumancas,23theCourtheldthatapersonmayinduceanothertocommitacrime
intwoways:1)bygivingapriceorofferingarewardorpromise;and2)byusing
wordsofcommand.Inthiscase,theSandiganbayanfoundthatGuillerganordered
Butcontosignthe"receive"portionofthepayrollsaspayeetomakeitappearthat
personswhosenamesappearedonthesamehadsignedthedocumentwhentheyin
factdidnot.24HEITAD
Third.Thereisnodisputethatthefalsificationwascommittedonthe
timerecord,book,andpayrollswhichwerepublicdocuments.
Whatismore,giventhatsomeoftheessentialelementsofArticle171
constitutethelesseroffenseoffalsificationofpublicdocumentsunderArticle172,
thentheallegationsinthe Information weresufficienttoholdGuillerganliable
underArticle172.
Asarule,theCourtregardsasconclusiveonitthefactualfindingsof
theSandiganbayanunlessthesefallundercertainestablishedexceptions.25Since
noneof those exceptionscanbeidentified inthis case, theCourt must accord
respectandweighttotheSandiganbayan'sfindings.Ithadthebetteropportunityto
examineandevaluatetheevidencepresentedbeforeit.26Asaptlypointedoutby
theSandiganbayan,towit:
There are telltales signs that the agents listed on the
payrolls did not receive their salaries. First, . . .
Guillergandeclaredthathepersonallyturnedoverthe
entire amount of [P1,519,000.00] to Gen. Rio. Second,
Butcon'snarrationthathewasinstructedbyGuillergan,
to[affixhis]initialatthereceiveportionofthepayrolls.
Lastly,accordingtotherecordsofthecase,theofficeof
Guillerganhadnobusinessinprocessingthepayrollof
thesepersonnel....
Additionally,theappointmentpapersfromwhichthese
payrollswerebaseddonotrevealanyinformationabout
theacceptanceoftheappointmentsbytheagents.Ina
letterdatedApril14,1989oftheAntiGraftBoardofthe
Armed forces of the Philippines . . . [to Ombudsman
Vasquez],itwasstatedthattheappointmentpapersof
theagents"must"beaccompaniedbytheacceptanceof
theagents.Thesepapers"shouldordinarily"beattached
tothepayrollsforproperclearingpurposes.Sincethere
were no acceptance papers presented, it only suggests
thatthelistsonthepayrollsarenamesofghostagents.
Even more, the board made a comment that . . .
Guillergan denies knowledge of the persons appointed
evenifhecertifiedtothecorrectnessofthepayrolls.
Theonlyconclusion...isthedeliberatefalsificationof
the payrolls; causing it to appear that persons have
participatedinanyactorproceedingwhentheydidnot
infactsoparticipate.27
TheCourtfindsnoerrorinthedecisionoftheSandiganbayanthat
found Guillergan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public
DocumentsunderArticle172oftheRPC.
WHEREFORE,theCourtDENIESthepetitionandAFFIRMSthe
Sandiganbayan'sdecisiondatedJune30,2008andResolutiondatedJanuary7,
2004whichfoundpetitionerRobertoK.GuillerganguiltyofviolationofArticle
172oftheRevisedPenalCodeinCriminalCase22904.
SOORDERED.
Carpio,Nachura,LeonardodeCastro*andMendoza,JJ.,concur.
|||(Guillerganv.People,G.R.No.185493,[February2,2011],656PHIL527536)
SPOUSESREVELOVILLAMARandCORAZON
PENULIARVILLAMAR,petitioners,vs.PEOPLEOF
THEPHILIPPINES,respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO,Jp:
Thisisapetition1forreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRules
ofCourt.Thepetitionchallengesthe27June2007Decision 2 oftheCourtof
Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 29524. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modificationthe11August2005Decision 3 oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),
JudicialRegion1,Branch40,DagupanCity,inCriminalCaseNo.20050172D,
affirmingthe8February2005Decision 4 oftheMunicipalTrialCourtinCities
(MTCC),JudicialRegion1,Branch1,DagupanCity,inCriminalCaseNo.42907.
On20April1967,ElenaManantan(Elena)soldaparceloflandtoher
nine children: Cornelia Penuliar (Cornelia), Simplicio Penuliar (Simplicio),
Modesta Flores (Modesta), Eulalia Penuliar (Eulalia), Hermogenes Penuliar
(Hermogenes), Lucia Penuliar (Lucia), Pedro Penuliar (Pedro), Felipe Penuliar
(Felipe),andJosePenuliar(Jose).On6June1983,CorneliaEulalia,Hermogenes,
Lucia,Pedro,andJosesoldtheirsharetoSimplicio.ModestaandFelipedidnot
selltheirshare.
On7September1989,Simpliciosoldhistotalsharetohisdaughter,
petitionerCorazonPenuliarVillamar(Corazon). Corazonismarriedtopetitioner
ReveloVillamar(Revelo).CorazonandRevelopossessedandregisteredwiththe
OfficeoftheProvincialAssessorofLingayen,Pangasinan,asignedandnotarized
deedofsaledated23November1989.NotaryPublicQuiricoBacharnotarizedthe
deed.In thedeed,itwasmadetoappearthatallofElena'schildren,including
ModestaandFelipe,soldthepropertytothespouses.ThesignaturesofModesta,
Hermogenes,andLuciawereforged.CorazonandReveloallegedthat"employees
oftheAssessor'sOffice"committedthefalsification.
In1999,Modestadiscoveredthe23November1989deedofsale.In
an information 5 dated 7 September 2000, Second Assistant City Prosecutor
Regulus V. Reyes charged Corazon and Revelo with falsification of public
document.
In its 8 February 2005 Decision, the MTCC found Corazon and
Reveloguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtoffalsificationofpublicdocument.The
MTCCsentencedthespousestoanindeterminatepenaltyoffourmonthsandone
day arrestomayor asminimumtothreeyears,sixmonthsand20days prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay Modesta P20,000 moral damages. The
MTCCheldthat:aHTEIA
There is no question that the signature of the private
complainantintheDeedofSale,datedNovember23,1989
wasfalsified.Infact,eventheaccusedadmittedthatindeed
privatecomplainantModestaPenuliarFloreswasnotoneof
thevendorsinthesaiddocument.Buttheaccusedmaintain
that they could not be held guilty of the crime charged
becausetheywerenottheoneswhofalsifiedthedocument
as it was prepared by somebody in the Office of the
ProvincialAssessorofLingayen,Pangasinanwithouttheir
knowledge.Theaccusedinsistedthatwhentheywenttothe
saidofficetoregistertheDeedofSalemarkedExhibit2,
theywereaskedtoleaveit,andwhentheyreturnedtoget
their document, they were given another document
particularlyExhibitAwhichisthereasonwhytheywere
charged with falsification because it appears in the said
documentthatprivatecomplainantModestaPenuliarFlores
wasoneofthesignatorieswhen, infact, shewasnot.In
other words, the accused maintain that they could not be
held liable for falsification of public document because
criminalintentwaslacking.Butiftheaccusedactedingood
faith, why did they not immediately inform the private
complainant about the matter. Moreover, they should not
have received the falsified document from the Assessor's
Officeknowingthatitwasnotthedocumentthatwasgiven
to their office for registration. The actuation and the
behavioroftheaccusednegatetheirclaimofinnocence.Itis
very unusual that they entrusted such very important
documenttosomebodywhosenametheydon'tevenknow.
Furthermore,whydidtheaccusedwaited[sic]fortheadvice
oftheBrgy.Captainoftheirplacetosettletheirproblem
with the private complainant. Their silence work [sic]
againstthemasitgoesagainsttheprinciplethatthefirst
impulse of an innocent was [sic] when accused of
wrongdoingistoexpresshisinnocenceatthefirstopportune
time.Besides,otherthantheselfservingtestimoniesofthe
accused, no other evidence was presented by them to
substantiatetheirpretenseofinnocence.Theyshouldhave
presentedthepersonfromtheAssessor'sOfficewhogave
them Exhibit A to corroborate their claim if indeed they
have no hand in its falsification. It is wellsettled in this
 jurisdiction that the person who stood to benefit by the
falsificationofapublicdocumentandwasinpossessionof
itispresumedtobethematerialauthorofthefalsification.
Hence, the defense of good faith of the accused is not
acceptable as it is not supported byclear andconvincing
evidence.
All told, the prosecution has succeeded in rebutting the
presumption of innocence accorded the accused who, on
theirpart,havedismallyfailedtosubstantiatetheirpretense
ofinnocence.6
Corazon and Revelo appealed to the RTC. In its 11 August 2005
Decision,theRTCfoundCorazonandReveloguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtof
falsificationofpublicdocument.TheRTCheldthat:
Afteracareful review ofthe decisionappealedfrom, the
Courtfindsnoreversibleerrorcommittedbythecourtaquo
asthesameisdulysupportedbyevidence.
Theprosecutor'sevidencehasdulyprovedthatthesignature
of the private complainant in the Deed of Sale dated
November 23, 1989 was falsified. Even the accused
admittedthatindeedprivatecomplainantModestaPenuliar
Floreswasnotoneofthevendorsinthesaiddocument.
The accused, while admitting that private complainant
ModestaPenuliarFloreswasnotoneofthevendorsinthe
saiddocument,theymaintainedthattheycouldnotbeheld
guiltyofthecrimechargedbecausetheywerenottheones
whofalsifiedthedocumentasitwaspreparedbysomebody
in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen,
Pangasinanwithouttheirknowledge,andputupthedefense
ofgoodfaith.
As correctly held by the Court aquo, the actuation and
behavioroftheaccusedinnotimmediatelyinformingthe
complainantabouttheinclusionofhernameinthesubject
DeedofSaleasoneofthevendorsthereinnegatetheirclaim
ofinnocence.
TheCourtisinconsonancewiththerulingofthecourt a
quothatthepersonwhostoodtobenefitbythefalsification
of a public document and was in possession of it is
presumedtobethematerialauthorofthefalsification.
As held bythe Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Manansala (105 Phil. 1253), it is an established rule that
whenapersonhasinhispossessionafalsifieddocument
andmakesuseofthesame,thepresumptionorinferenceis
justifiedthatsuchpersonistheforger.7
CorazonandReveloappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.Inits27June
2007Decision,theCourtof AppealsfoundCorazonandReveloguiltybeyond
reasonable doubt of falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals
affirmedwithmodificationtheMTCC'sandRTC'sdecisionsbyaddingonedayto
themaximumpenalty.TheCourtofAppealsheldthat:
Art.172oftheRevisedPenalCodeprovides:
"Art. 172.Falsification by private individuals and use of
falsifieddocuments.Thepenaltyofprisioncorreccional
initsmediumandmaximumperiodsandafineofnotmore
than5,000shallbeimposedupon:
"1.Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsificationsenumeratedinthenextprecedingarticleinany
public or official document or letter of exchange or any
otherkindofcommercialdocument;and
xxxxxxxxx"
Ontheotherhand,Article171ofthesameCodeprovides:
"Art. 171.Falsification by public officer, employee; or
notaryorecclesiasticalminister.Thepenaltyofprision
mayorandafinenottoexceed5,000pesosshallbeimposed
uponanypublicofficer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantageofhisofficialposition,shallfalsifyadocument
bycommittinganyofthefollowingacts:aCHDAE
"1.Counterfeitingorimitatinganyhandwriting,signature,
orrubric;
xxxxxxxxx"
From the foregoing, the elements of the crime of
falsificationunderparagraph1ofArticle172are:(i)thatthe
offenderisaprivateindividual;(ii)thathecommittedanyof
theactsoffalsificationenumeratedinArt.171;and(iii)that
the falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercialdocument.Alltheseelementsarepresentinthe
instantcase.
ItisnotdisputedthatModesta'ssignatureinthequestioned
Deed of Sale was forged. Indeed, petitionerspouses
admittedthatModestaandFelipeneverparticipatedinthe
sale of the property subject of the Deed of Sale in their
favor. Theyargue,however,thattheywerenottheauthors
of the falsification, claiming that the employees of the
Assessor's Office of Lingayen, Pangasinan were the ones
whofalsifiedthedocument.Theymaintainthatthedeedof
saletheysubmittedtotheAssessor'sOfficedidnotinclude
Modestaasoneofthevendorsbutwhentheyreturnedto
said Office after one month, the employees therein gave
themthequestioneddocumentwhichincludedModestaas
oneofthevendors.
Wearenotconvinced.
Thatpetitionersweretheauthorsand/ormastermindsofthe
falsification is presumed from the fact that they actually
benefited from it. In Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a
forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of
falsification. "Ifapersonhadinhispossessionafalsified
documentandhemadeuseofit,takingadvantageofitand
profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the
materialauthorofthefalsification."
Intheinstantcase, petitionersfailedmiserablytorebutthe
above presumption. Clearly, they were the ones who
benefitedfromthefalsifieddocument,thesamehavingbeen
executedintheirfavor. Toemphasize,theyweretheones
whocausedtheregistrationofthedeedofsaleandwerethe
ones who received the falsified document from the
Assessor's Office. Their barefaced assertion that the
employees of the Assessor's Office committed the
falsificationisflimsyandunsupportedbyevidence.
Inthefirstplace,acomparisonoftheSeptember7,1989
Deed of Sale allegedly submitted by petitioners to the
Assessor'sOfficeandthefalsifiedNovember23,1989Deed
ofSalereturnedtothembythesaidOfficerevealsthatthe
twodocumentsaretotallydifferentfromeachother,bothin
the print or font of the contents and the location of the
namesofthesignatories.Wecannot,therefore,seehowthe
employeescouldhaveinsertedthenamesofModestaand
Felipeinthequestioneddocument,muchlessfalsifiedtheir
signatures,withoutanyonenoticingit.Whatistaxingtothe
mindis:Whywouldtheemployeesincludethenamesof
ModestaandFelipeandfalsifytheirsignatures,andwhat
couldtheygaintherefrom?8
Hence,thepresentpetition.CorazonandReveloraiseasissuethat:
The facts of the case . . . is [sic] that petitioners were
innocentoftheexistenceofthefalsifieddocumentonthe
ground that what was submitted to the Office of the
Assessos[sic],Lingayen,Pangasinantobethebasisofthe
petitioners'ownershipwasagenuinedocumentwhichtruly
 didnotincludetheshareoftheprivatecomplainant,nowthe
privaterespondent.Whatwasinthemindoftheperpetrators
employeesoftheAssessor'sOfficewhompetitionerssought
assistanceforthetransferofthedocumentintheirfavorwas
beyond their control as they were never informed
beforehandoftheexecutionofthequestioneddocument. 9
EIDTAa
Thepetitionisunmeritorious.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for
reviewoncertiorari"shallraiseonlyquestionsoflawwhichmustbedistinctlyset
forth."InPagsibiganv.People,10theCourtheldthat:
ApetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt
shouldcoveronlyquestionsoflaw.Questionsoffactarenot
reviewable.Aquestionoflawexistswhenthedoubtcenters
onwhatthelawisonacertainsetoffacts.Aquestionof
factexistswhenthedoubtcentersonthetruthorfalsityof
theallegedfacts.
Thereisaquestionoflawiftheissueraisediscapableof
being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be
limitedtodeterminingwhatthelawisonacertainsetof
facts.Oncetheissueinvitesareviewoftheevidence,the
questionposedisoneoffact.11
WhetherCorazonandRevelo"wereinnocentoftheexistenceofthe
falsifieddocument"isaquestionoffact.Itisnotreviewable.
ThefactualfindingsofthelowercourtsarebindingontheCourt.The
exceptionstothisruleare(1)whenthereisgraveabuseofdiscretion;(2)whenthe
findingsaregroundedonspeculation;(3)whentheinferencemadeismanifestly
mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehensionoffacts;(5)whenthefactualfindingsareconflicting;(6)when
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are
contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals
overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
differentconclusion;(8)whenthefactssetforthbythepetitionerarenotdisputed
bytherespondent;and(9)whenthefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsarepremised
ontheabsenceofevidenceandarecontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord. 12
CorazonandRevelodidnotshowthatanyofthesecircumstancesispresent.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court
AFFIRMSthe27June2007DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CRNo.
29524.
SOORDERED.
Peralta,Abad,Perez*andMendoza,JJ.,concur.
|||(SpousesVillamarv.People,G.R.No.178652(Resolution),[December8,2010],652
PHIL117125)
ANNALERIMAPATULA,petitioner,vs.PEOPLEOF
THEPHILIPPINES,respondent.
Inthetrialofeverycriminalcase,ajudgemustrigidlytesttheState'sevidenceofguiltin
order to ensure that such evidence adheres to the basic rules of admissibility before
pronouncinganaccusedguiltyofthecrimechargeduponsuchevidence.Nothinglessis
demandedofthejudge;otherwise,theguaranteeofdueprocessoflawisnullified.The
accusedneednotadduceanythingtorebutevidencethatisdiscreditedforfailingthetest.
Acquittalshouldthenfollow.
Antecedents
PetitionerwaschargedwithestafaunderaninformationfiledintheRegionalTrialCourt
(RTC)inDumagueteCitythataverred:
ThatonoraboutandduringtheperiodfromMarch16to20,
1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthis
HonorableCourt,thesaidaccused,beingthenasaleswoman
of Footlucker's Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City,
havingcollectedandreceivedthetotalsumofP131,286.97
fromseveralcustomersofsaidcompanyundertheexpress
obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and
deliver the collection to the said company, but far from
complyingwithherobligationandafterareasonableperiod
oftimedespiterepeateddemandstherefore,andwithintent
todefraudthesaidcompany,did,thenandtherewillfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslyfailtodeliverthesaidcollection
to the said company but instead, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapplyandconverttheproceedsofthesaletoherownuse
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
companyintheaforesaidamountofP131,286.97.
ContrarytoArt.315,par1(b)oftheRevisedPenalCode.1
Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pretrial, no
stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining.
Thereafter,trialonthemeritsensued.aITECA
TheProsecution'sfirstwitnesswasLambertoGo,whotestifiedthathewasthebranch
managerofFootlucker'sChainofStores,Inc.(Footlucker's)inDumagueteCitysince
October8,1994;thatpetitionerwasanemployeeofFootlucker's,startingasasaleslady
in1996untilshebecameasalesrepresentative;thatasasalesrepresentativeshewas
authorizedtotakeordersfromwholesalecustomerscomingfromdifferenttowns(like
Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and
Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign official
receiptsofFootlucker'sforthepayments,whichshewouldthenremit;thatshewould
thensubmitthereceiptsforthepaymentsfortallyingandreconciliation;thatatfirsther
volumeofsaleswasquitehigh,butlaterondropped,leadinghimtoconfronther;that
sherespondedthatbusinesswasslow;thathesummonedtheaccountingclerktoverify;
thattheaccountingclerkdiscoverederasuresonsomecollectionreceipts;thathedecided
tosubjecthertoanauditbycompanyauditorKarenGuivencan;thathelearnedfroma
customerofpetitioner'sthatthecustomer'soutstandingbalancehadalreadybeenfully
paidalthoughthatbalanceappearedunpaidinFootlucker'srecords;andthatonenight
lateron,petitionerandherparentswenttohishousetodenyhavingmisappropriatedany
moneyofFootlucker'sandtopleadforhimnottopushthroughwithacaseagainsther,
promisingtosettleheraccountonamonthlybasis;andthatshedidnotsettleafterthat,
butstoppedreportingtowork.2
On March 7, 2002, Go's cross examination, redirect examination and recross
examinationwerecompleted.
TheonlyotherwitnessfortheProsecutionwasKarenGuivencan,whomFootlucker's
employedasitsstoreauditorsinceNovember16,1995untilherresignationonMarch31,
2001.ShedeclaredthatGohadrequestedhertoauditpetitioneraftersomecustomershad
toldhimthattheyhadalreadypaidtheiraccountsbuttheofficeledgerhadstillreflected
outstanding balances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the
customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguita in Negros Oriental, andthen in
Siquijor;thatshediscoveredinthecourseofherauditthattheamountsappearingonthe
originalcopiesofreceiptsin thepossession ofaround 50 customers varied from the
amountswrittenontheduplicatecopiesofthereceiptspetitionersubmittedtotheoffice;
thatuponcompletingheraudit,shesubmittedtoGoawrittenreportdenominatedas"List
ofCustomersCoveredbySaleswomanLERIMAPATULAw/DifferencesinRecordsas
perAuditDulyVerifiedMarch1620,1997"markedasExhibitA;andthatbasedonthe
report,petitionerhadmisappropriatedthetotalamountofP13l,286.92.3
DuringGuivencan'sstintasawitness,theProsecutionmarkedtheledgersofpetitioner's
variouscustomersallegedlywithdiscrepanciesasExhibitsBtoYYandtheirderivatives,
inclusive.Eachoftheledgershadafirstcolumnthatcontainedthedatesoftheentries,a
secondthatidentifiedtheinvoicesbythenumber,athirdthatstatedthedebit,afourth
thatnotedthecredit(ortheamountspaid),andafifththatsummedthebalances(debit
minuscredit).Only49oftheledgerswereformallyofferedandadmittedbytheRTC
becausethe50thledgercouldnolongerbefound.EHTIDA
In the course of Guivencan's directexamination, petitioner's counsel interposed a
continuingobjectiononthegroundthatthefiguresenteredinExhibitsBtoYYandtheir
derivatives,inclusive,werehearsaybecausethepersonswhohadmadetheentrieswere
not themselves presented in court. 4 With that, petitioner's counsel did not anymore
crossexamineGuivencan,apparentlyregardinghertestimonytobeirrelevantbecause
shetherebytendedtoprovefalsification,anoffensenotallegedintheinformation.
TheProsecutionthenformallyoffereditsdocumentaryexhibits,includingExhibitsBto
YYandtheirderivatives(liketheoriginalsandduplicatesofthereceiptssupposedly
executedandissuedbypetitioner),inclusive,theconfirmationsheetsusedbyGuivencan
inauditingtheaccountsservedbypetitioner,andGuivencan'ssocalledSummary(Final
Report)ofDiscrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to ACCUSEDFALSIFIEDEXHIBITS"B"TO"YY""YY2"
evidencealthoughithadmanifestedtheintentiontodoso,andinsteadresteditscase. INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSED'S
TheProsecutionandDefensesubmittedtheirrespectivememoranda,andsubmittedthe CONSTITUTIONALRIGHTTOBEINFORMEDOFTHE
casefordecision.6 NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE
OnJanuary28,2004,theRTC,statingthatinasmuchaspetitionerhadopted"notto ACCUSEDISESTAFAUNDERART.315,PAR.1(B)OF
presentevidenceforherdefense"theProsecution'sevidenceremained"unrefutedand THEREVISEDPENALCODE.
uncontroverted,"7rendereditsdecisionfindingpetitionerguiltyofestafa,towit:

5.WHETHERORNOTTHETRIALCOURTERREDIN
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE
circumstances,theCourtfinds ANNALERIMAPATULA PROSECUTION "REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofEstafaunder UNCONTROVERTED" DESPITE ACCUSED'S
Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code and OBJECTIONTHATSAIDEVIDENCEISIMMATERIAL
accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an ANDIRRELEVANTTOTHECRIMECHARGED.
INDETERMINATEPENALTYofimprisonmentof8years
and1dayofprisionmayor asminimumto18yearsand4
months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the 6.WHETHERORNOTTHEDEFENSE'SNOTCROSS
accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify EXAMININGKARENGUIVENCANFORTHEREASON
privatecomplainanttheamountofP131,286.92withinterest THAT HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND
at12%perannumuntilfullypaidandtopaythecosts. IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO PROVE AN
OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION
RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of TESTIMONY AS BEING "UNREFUTED AND
CriminalProcedure,thecashbailputupbytheaccusedshall UNCONTROVERTED",ANDWHETHERORNOTTHE
beeffectiveonlyuntilthepromulgationofthisjudgment. DEFENSE'S OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE
HcTIDC CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS
EXAMINEDSAIDWITNESS.CHIScD
SOORDERED.8
7.WHETHERORNOTTHETRIALCOURTERREDIN
Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsideration,buttheRTCdeniedthemotiononMay7, RULINGTHATEXHIBIT"A",WHICHISTHELISTOF
2004.9 CUSTOMERSCOVEREDBYSALESWOMANLERIMA
PATULA WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT
HEARSAYANDSELFSERVING.10
Issues
Theforegoingissuesarenowrestatedasfollows:
Insisting that theRTC'sjudgment "grossly violated[her]Constitutionaland statutory
righttobeinformedofthenatureandcauseoftheaccusationagainstherbecause, while
thechargeagainstherisestafaunderArt.315,par.1(b)oftheRevisedPenalCode,the 1.Whetherornotthefailureoftheinformationforestafato
evidence presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was allegethefalsificationoftheduplicatereceipts
falsification,anoffensenotallegedorincludedintheInformationunderwhichshewas issuedbypetitionertohercustomersviolated
arraignedandpleadednotguilty,"andthatsaidjudgmentlikewise"blatantlyignoredand petitioner'srighttobeinformedofthenature
manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the documentary andcauseoftheaccusation;
evidenceadmittedbythetrialcourtwereallprivatedocuments,thedueexecutionand
authenticityofwhichwerenotprovedinaccordancewithSec.20ofRule132ofthe 2.WhetherornottheRTCgravelyerredinadmitting
RevisedRulesonEvidence,"petitionerhasdirectlyappealedtotheCourt viapetitionfor evidenceofthefalsificationoftheduplicate
reviewoncertiorari,positingthefollowingissues,towit: receiptsdespitetheinformationnotallegingthe
falsification;
1.WHETHERTHEACCUSEDORANYACCUSEDFOR
THATMATTER,CHARGEDOFESTAFA UNDERART. 3.Whetherornottheledgersandreceipts(ExhibitsBto
315,PAR.1(B)OFTHE REVISEDPENALCODE CAN YY,andtheirderivatives,inclusive)were
BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF admissibleasevidenceofpetitioner'sguiltfor
FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT estafaaschargeddespitetheirnotbeingduly
ALLEGEDINTHEINFORMATION. authenticated;and

2.WHETHER THE ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL 4.WhetherornotGuivencan'stestimonyontheledgersand

ANDSTATUTORYRIGHTTOBEINFORMEDOFTHE receipts(ExhibitsBtoYY,andtheir
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION derivatives,inclusive)toprovepetitioner's
AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS misappropriationorconversionwas
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF inadmissibleforbeinghearsay.
FALSIFICATIONCONSIDERINGTHATTHECHARGE
AGAINST HER IS ESTAFATHROUGH
MISAPPROPRIATIONUNDERART.315,PAR.1(B)OF Ruling
THEREVISEDPENALCODE.
Thepetitionismeritorious.
3.WHETHERORNOTTHETRIALCOURTERREDIN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS "B" TO
"YY""YY2",ALLPRIVATEDOCUMENTS,THEDUE I
EXECUTIONANDAUTHENTICITYOFWHICHWERE Failureofinformationtoallegefalsification
NOTPROVEDINACCORDANCEWITHSEC.20,RULE didnotviolatepetitioner'srighttobeinformed
132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE
ofthenatureandcauseoftheaccusation
ASIDEFROMTHEFACTTHATSAIDEXHIBITSTEND
TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A
CRIMENEITHERCHARGEDNORALLEGEDINTHE PetitionercontendsthattheRTCgrosslyviolatedherConstitutionalrighttobeinformed
INFORMATION. ofthenatureandcauseoftheaccusationwhen:(a)itheldthattheinformationdidnot
havetoallegeherfalsificationoftheduplicatereceipts,and(b)whenitconvictedherof
estafa underArticle315,paragraph1(b)ofthe RevisedPenalCode byrelyingonthe
4.WHETHERORNOTTHETRIALCOURTERREDIN
evidenceonfalsification.
ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN
GUIVENCANDESPITETHEOBJECTIONTHATSAID
TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE Thecontentionofpetitionercannotbesustained.
The BillofRights guaranteessomerightstoeverypersonaccusedofacrime,among
themtherighttobeinformedofthenatureandcauseoftheaccusation,viz.:
Section14.(1) Nopersonshallbeheldtoanswerfora
criminaloffensewithoutdueprocessoflaw.
(2)In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent untilthe contraryis proved, and shall
enjoytheright tobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel, tobe
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
againsthim,tohaveaspeedy,impartial,andpublictrial,to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment,trialmayproceednotwithstandingtheabsence
oftheaccusedprovidedthathehasbeendulynotifiedand
hisfailuretoappearisunjustifiable.
Rule110oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,therulethenineffectwhentheinformationwas
filedintheRTC,containedthefollowingprovisionsonthepropermannerofallegingthe
natureandcauseoftheaccusationintheinformation,towit:TCIHSa
Section8.Designationoftheoffense.Wheneverpossible,
a complaint or information should state the designation
giventotheoffensebythestatute,besidesthestatementof
theactsoromissionsconstitutingthesame,andifthereisno
suchdesignation,referenceshouldbemadetothesectionor
subsectionofthestatutepunishingit.(7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions
complainedofasconstitutingtheoffensemustbestatedin
ordinary and concise language without repetition, not
necessarilyinthetermsofthestatutedefiningtheoffense,
but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
commonunderstandingtoknowwhatoffenseisintendedto
be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment.(8)
Theimportanceofthepropermannerofallegingthenatureandcauseoftheaccusationin
theinformationshouldneverbetakenforgrantedbytheState.Anaccusedcannotbe
convictedofanoffensethatisnotclearlychargedinthecomplaintorinformation.To
convicthimofanoffenseotherthanthatchargedinthecomplaintorinformationwould
beviolativeoftheConstitutionalrighttobeinformedofthenatureandcauseofthe
accusation.11Indeed,theaccusedcannotbeconvictedofacrime,evenifdulyproven,
unlessthecrimeisallegedornecessarilyincludedintheinformationfiledagainsthim.
The crime of estafa charged against petitioner was defined and
penalizedbyArticle315,paragraph1(b),RevisedPenalCode,viz.:
Article 315.Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraudanotherbyanyofthemeansmentionedhereinbelow
shallbepunishedby:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed22,000pesos,andifsuchamountexceedsthelatter
sum,thepenaltyprovidedinthisparagraphshallbeimposed
initsmaximumperiod,addingoneyearforeachadditional
10,000pesos;butthetotalpenaltywhichmaybeimposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposedundertheprovisionsofthisCode,thepenaltyshall
betermedprisionmayororreclusiontemporal,asthecase
maybe.
2nd.Thepenaltyofprisioncorreccionalinitsminimumand
mediumperiods,iftheamountofthefraudisover6,000
pesosbutdoesnotexceed12,000pesos;
3rd.Thepenaltyofarrestomayorinitsmaximumperiodto
prisioncorreccional initsminimumperiodifsuchamount
isover200pesosbutdoesnotexceed6,000pesos;and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such
amountdoesnotexceed200pesos,providedthatinthefour
cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the
followingmeans:ESCcaT
xxxxxxxxx
1.Withunfaithfulnessorabuseofconfidence,namely:
xxxxxxxxx
(b)Bymisappropriatingorconverting,totheprejudice
ofanother,money,goods,oranyotherpersonalproperty
receivedbytheoffenderintrustoroncommission,orfor
administration,orunderanyotherobligationinvolving
thedutytomakedeliveryofortoreturnthesame,even
thoughsuchobligationbetotallyorpartiallyguaranteed
byabond;orbydenyinghavingreceivedsuchmoney,
goods,orotherproperty.
xxxxxxxxx
Theelementsoftheoffensechargedwereasfollows:
(a)Thattheoffenderreceivedmoney,goodsorother
personalpropertyintrust,oroncommission,or
foradministration,orunderanyother
obligationinvolvingthedutytomakedelivery
of,ortoreturn,thesame;
(b)Thattheoffendermisappropriatedorconvertedsuch
money,goodsorotherpersonalproperty,or
deniedhispartinitsreceipt;
(c)Thatthemisappropriationorconversionordenialwasto
theprejudiceofanother;and
(d)Thattheoffendedpartymadeademandontheoffender
forthedeliveryorreturnofsuchmoney,goods
orotherpersonalproperty.12ISHaTA
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or
convertedthesumspaidbyhercustomers,andlaterfalsifiedtheduplicatesofthereceipts
beforeturningsuchduplicatestoheremployertoshowthatthecustomershadpaidless
thantheamountsactuallyreflectedontheoriginalreceipts.Obviously,shecommittedthe
falsificationinordertoconcealhermisappropriationorconversion.Consideringthatthe
falsificationwasnotanoffenseseparateanddistinctfromtheestafachargedagainsther,
the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of
establishinghermisappropriationorconversionasanessentialingredientofthecrime
dulyallegedintheinformation.Inthatmanner,herrighttobeinformedofthenatureand
causeoftheaccusationagainstherwasnotinfringedordeniedtoher.
Weconsideritinevitabletoconcludethattheinformationhereincompletelypleadedthe
estafa definedandpenalizedunderArticle315,paragraph1 (b), RevisedPenalCode
withinthecontextofthesubstantivelawandtherules.Verily,therewasnonecessityfor
theinformationtoallegetheactsoffalsificationbypetitionerbecausefalsificationwas
notanelementoftheestafacharged.
Notsurprisingly,theRTCcorrectlydealtinitsdecisionwithpetitioner'sconcern
thuswise:
InherMemorandum,itisthecontentionof[the]accused
that [the] prosecution's evidence utterly fails to prove the
crime charged. According to the defense, the essence of
KarenGuivencan'stestimonyisthattheaccusedfalsifiedthe
receiptsissuedtothecustomersservedbyherbychanging
oralteringtheamountsintheduplicatesofthereceiptsand
therefore,hertestimonyisimmaterialandirrelevantasthe
chargeismisappropriationunderArt.315,paragraph(1b)of
the Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation
whatsoeverofanyfalsificationoralterationofamountsin
the [i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned
andpleadedNOTGUILTY.Accused,thus,maintainsthat
thetestimonyofKarenGuivencanshouldthereforenotbe
consideredatallasittendedtoproveanoffensenotcharged
or included in the [i]nformation and would violate [the]
accused'sconstitutionalandstatutoryrighttobeinformedof
 thenatureandcauseoftheaccusationagainsther.TheCourt
isnotinaccordwithsuchpostureoftheaccused.
Itwouldseemthattheaccusedisoftheideathatbecause
thecrimechargedinthe[i]nformationismerely[e]stafa
andnot[e]stafa[t]hru[f]alsificationofdocuments,the
prosecution could not prove falsification. Such
argumentation is not correct. Since the information
charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to
Art.315,par.(1b)oftheRevised[P]enalCode,theCourt
holds that there is no necessity of alleging the
falsificationintheInformationasitisnotanelementof
thecrimecharged.DTcASE
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of
Estafa and Falsification will constitute asone complex
crime and when they are considered as two separate
offenses. The complex crime of Estafa Through
FalsificationofDocumentsiscommittedwhenonehasto
falsifycertaindocumentstobeabletoobtainmoneyor
goods from another person. In other words, the
falsification isanecessarymeansofcommittingestafa.
However,ifthefalsificationiscommittedtoconcealthe
misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsificationarecommitted.
In the instant case, when accused collected payments
from the customers, said collection which was in her
possessionwasatherdisposal.Thefalsifiedorerroneous
entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the
receiptswerecontrivedtoconcealsomeamountofher
collectionwhichshedidnotremittothecompany....13
II
Testimonialanddocumentaryevidence,beinghearsay,
didnotprovepetitioner'sguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt
Nonetheless,inallcriminalprosecutions,theProsecutionbearstheburdentoestablish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the
Prosecution's duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
informationtowarrantafindingofguiltforthatcrimeorforanyothercrimenecessarily
includedtherein.14TheProsecutionmustfurtherprovetheparticipationoftheaccused
inthecommissionoftheoffense.15Indoingallthese,theProsecutionmustrelyonthe
strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidenceoftheaccused.TheburdenofproofplacedontheProsecutionarisesfromthe
presumptionofinnocenceinfavoroftheaccusedthatnolessthantheConstitutionhas
guaranteed.16Conversely,astohisinnocence,theaccusedhasnoburdenofproof,17
thathemustthenbeacquittedandsetfreeshouldtheProsecutionnotovercomethe
presumptionofinnocenceinhisfavor.Inotherwords,theweaknessofthedefenseputup
bytheaccusedisinconsequentialintheproceedingsforaslongastheProsecutionhas
notdischargeditsburdenofproofinestablishingthecommissionofthecrimecharged
andinidentifyingtheaccusedasthemalefactorresponsibleforit.
DidtheProsecutionadduceevidencethatprovedbeyondreasonabledoubttheguiltof
petitionerfortheestafachargedintheinformation?
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the
testimoniesofGoandGuivencan,andvariousdocumentsconsistingof:(a)thereceipts
allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the
ledgerslistingtheaccountspertainingtoeachcustomerwiththecorrespondingnotations
of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets
accomplished by Guivencan herself. 18 The ledgers and receipts were marked and
formallyofferedasExhibitsBtoYY,andtheirderivatives,inclusive.
Onhispart,Goessentiallydescribedforthetrialcourtthevariousdutiesofpetitioneras
Footlucker'ssalesrepresentative.Onherpart,Guivencanconcededhavingnopersonal
knowledgeoftheamountsactuallyreceivedbypetitionerfromthecustomersorremitted
bypetitionertoFootlucker's.ThismeansthatpersonsotherthanGuivencanprepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her
testimonyontheentriesfoundinthereceiptssupposedlyissuedbypetitionerandinthe
ledgersheldbyFootlucker'scorrespondingtoeachcustomer,aswellasontheunsworn
statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who
testifiedontheentrieseffectivelydeprivedtheRTCofthereasonableopportunityto
validate andtest the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner's
misappropriationorconversionthroughcrossexaminationbypetitioner.Thedenialof
thatopportunityrenderedtheentireproofofmisappropriationorconversionhearsay,and
thusunreliableanduntrustworthyforpurposesofdeterminingtheguiltorinnocenceof
theaccused.AICHaS
ToelucidatewhytheProsecution'shearsayevidencewasunreliableanduntrustworthy,
andthusdevoidofprobativevalue,referenceismadetoSection36ofRule130,Rulesof
Court,arulethatstatesthatawitnesscantestifyonlytothosefactsthatsheknowsofher
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise providedin the Rules ofCourt. The personal knowledgeofawitness isa
substantiveprerequisiteforacceptingtestimonialevidencethatestablishesthetruthofa
disputedfact.Awitnessbereftofpersonalknowledgeofthedisputedfactcannotbe
calleduponforthatpurposebecausehertestimonyderivesitsvaluenotfromthecredit
accordedtoherasawitnesspresentlytestifyingbutfromtheveracityandcompetencyof
theextrajudicialsourceofherinformation.
Incaseawitnessispermittedtotestifybasedonwhatshehasheardanotherpersonsay
aboutthefactsindispute,thepersonfromwhomthewitnessderivedtheinformationon
thefactsindisputeisnotincourtandunderoathtobeexaminedandcrossexamined.
Theweightofsuchtestimonythendependsnotupontheveracityofthewitnessbutupon
theveracityoftheotherpersongivingtheinformationtothewitnesswithoutoath.The
informationcannotbetestedbecausethedeclarantisnotstandingincourtasawitness
andcannot,therefore,becrossexamined.
Itisapparent,too,thatapersonwhorelatesahearsayisnotobligedtoenterintoany
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she
entrenchesherselfinthesimpleassertionthatshewastoldso,andleavestheburden
entirelyuponthedeadorabsentauthor.19Thus,theruleagainsthearsaytestimonyrests
mainlyonthegroundthattherewasnoopportunitytocrossexaminethedeclarant. 20
Thetestimonymayhavebeengivenunderoathandbeforeacourtofjustice,butifitis
offeredagainstapartywhoisaffordednoopportunitytocrossexaminethewitness,itis
hearsayjustthesame.21
Moreover,thetheoryofthehearsayruleisthatwhenahumanutteranceisofferedas
evidenceofthetruthofthefactasserted,thecreditoftheassertorbecomesthebasisof
inference,and,therefore,theassertioncanbereceivedasevidenceonlywhenmadeon
thewitnessstand,subjecttothetestofcrossexamination.However,ifanextrajudicial
utteranceisoffered,notasanassertiontoprovethematterassertedbutwithoutreference
tothetruthofthematterasserted,thehearsayruledoesnotapply.Forexample,ina
slandercase, ifaprosecutionwitnesstestifiesthatheheardtheaccusedsaythatthe
complainantwasathief,thistestimonyisadmissiblenottoprovethatthecomplainant
wasreallyathief,butmerelytoshowthattheaccusedutteredthosewords. 22Thiskind
of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. 23 The distinction is,
therefore,between (a) thefactthatthestatementwasmade,towhichthehearsayrule
doesnotapply, and (b) thetruthofthefactsassertedinthestatement,towhichthe
hearsayruleapplies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explainswhytestimonythatishearsayshouldbeexcludedfromconsideration.Excluding
hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to crossexamine the
originaldeclarantclaimingtohaveadirectknowledgeofthetransactionoroccurrence.
25 Ifhearsayisallowed,therightstandstobedeniedbecausethedeclarantisnotin
court. 26 It isthen tobe stressedthatthe rightto crossexaminethe adverse party's
witness,beingtheonlymeansoftestingthecredibilityofwitnessesandtheirtestimonies,
isessentialtotheadministrationofjustice.
Toaddresstheproblemofcontrollinginadmissiblehearsayasevidencetoestablishthe
truthinadisputewhilealsosafeguardingaparty'srighttocrossexamineheradversary's
witness,theRulesofCourtofferstwosolutions.Thefirstsolutionistorequirethatallthe
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or
affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 ofthe Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz.:
EAcHCI
Section1.Examinationto be done inopencourt. The
examinationofwitnessespresentedinatrialorhearingshall
bedoneinopencourt,andunderoathoraffirmation.Unless
thewitnessisincapacitatedtospeak,orthequestioncallsfor
adifferentmodeofanswer,theanswersofthewitnessshall
begivenorally.(1a)
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
ensuresthissolutionthusly:
Section 6.Crossexamination; its purpose and extent.
Upontheterminationofthedirectexamination,thewitness
may be crossexamined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracyandtruthfulnessandfreedomfrominterestorbias,
 orthereverse,andtoelicitallimportantfactsbearingupon ProsecutiondutifullyseeingtotheirauthenticationinthemannerprovidedinSection20
theissue.(8a) ofRule132oftheRulesofCourt,viz.:

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept
relevanttocriminalcases,i.e.,Section14,(2),ArticleIII,ofthe1987Constitution,
whichguaranteesthat:"Inallcriminalprosecutions,theaccusedshall...enjoy
theright...tomeetthewitnessesfacetoface...,"therulerequiringthecross
examinationbytheadversepartyequallyappliestononcriminalproceedings.
Section 20.Proof of private documents. Before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
provedeither:

(a)Byanyonewhosawthedocumentexecutedor
Wethusstressthattheruleexcludinghearsayasevidenceisbaseduponseriousconcerns written;or
aboutthetrustworthinessandreliabilityofhearsayevidenceduetoitsnotbeinggiven
underoathorsolemnaffirmationandduetoitsnotbeingsubjectedtocrossexamination
bytheopposingcounseltotesttheperception,memory,veracityandarticulatenessofthe (b)Byevidenceofthegenuinenessofthesignatureor
outofcourt declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the outofcourt handwritingofthemaker.
statementdepends.27

Anyotherprivatedocumentneedonlybeidentifiedasthat
Basedontheforegoingconsiderations,Guivencan'stestimonyaswellasExhibitsBto whichitisclaimedtobe.
YY,andtheirderivatives,inclusive,mustbeentirelyrejectedasproofofpetitioner's
misappropriationorconversion.
TheProsecutionattemptedtohaveGoauthenticatethesignatureofpetitionerinvarious
receipts,towit:
III

Lackoftheirproperauthenticationrendered ATTY.ABIERA:
ExhibitsBtoYYandtheirderivatives
inadmissibleasjudicialevidence
Q.Now,thesereceiptswhichyoumentionedwhichdonot
tallywiththeoriginalreceipts,doyouhave
PetitioneralsocontendsthattheRTCgrosslyerredinadmittingasevidenceExhibitsBto copiesofthesereceipts?
YY,andtheirderivatives,inclusive,despitetheirbeingprivatedocumentsthatwerenot
dulyauthenticatedasrequiredbySection20,Rule132oftheRulesofCourt.
A.Yes,Ihaveacopyofthesereceipts,butit'snotnowin
mypossession.
Section19,Rule132oftheRulesofCourtdistinguishesbetweenapublicdocumentand
aprivatedocumentforthepurposeoftheirpresentationinevidence,viz.:
Q.Butwhenaskedtopresentthosereceiptsbeforethis
HonorableCourt,canyouassurethis
Section19.Classesofdocuments.Forthepurposeof
theirpresentationinevidence,documentsareeither
(NextPage)
publicorprivate.

ATTY.ABIERA(continuing):cAaTED
Publicdocumentsare:

HonorableCourtthatyouwillbeabletopresentthose
(a)Thewrittenofficialacts,orrecordsoftheofficialactsof
receipts?
thesovereignauthority,officialbodiesandtribunals,and
publicofficers,whetherofthePhilippines,orofaforeign
country; A.Yes.

(b)Documentsacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublicexcept Q.Youarealsofamiliarwiththesignatureofthe
lastwillsandtestaments;andCSIcHA accusedinthiscase,AnnaLerimaPatula?

(c)Publicrecords,keptinthePhilippines,ofprivate A.Yes.
documentsrequiredbylawtobeenteredtherein.

Q.Whyareyoufamiliarwiththesignatureoftheaccused
Allotherwritingsareprivate. inthiscase?

Thenatureofdocumentsaseitherpublicorprivatedetermineshowthedocumentsmay A.Iusedtoseehersignaturesinthepayrollandinthe
be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or receiptsalso.
sovereigncharacter,orbecauseithasbeenacknowledgedbeforeanotarypublic(except
anotarialwill)oracompetentpublicofficialwiththeformalitiesrequiredbylaw,or
becauseitisapublicrecordofaprivatewritingauthorizedbylaw,isselfauthenticating Q.Okay,Ihavehereamachinecopyofareceiptwhich
andrequiresnofurtherauthenticationinordertobepresentedasevidenceincourt.In wewouldpresentthis,orofferthesameassoon
contrast, a private document is anyother writing, deed, or instrument executed by a astheoriginalreceiptscanbepresented,but
privatepersonwithouttheinterventionofanotaryorotherpersonlegallyauthorizedby forpurposesonlyofyourtestimony,I'm
which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or goingtopointtoyouacertainsignatureover
sovereigncharacterofapublicdocument,orthesolemnitiesprescribedbylaw,aprivate
thisreceiptnumberFLDT9620441,areceipt
documentrequiresauthenticationinthemannerallowedbylaworthe RulesofCourt
fromCirilaAskin,kindlygooverthe
beforeitsacceptanceasevidenceincourt.Therequirementofauthenticationofaprivate
documentisexcusedonlyinfourinstances,specifically: (a) whenthedocumentisan signatureandtelltheHonorableCourt
ancientonewithinthecontextofSection21,28Rule132oftheRulesofCourt;(b)when whetheryouarefamiliarwiththesignature?
thegenuinenessandauthenticityofanactionabledocumenthavenotbeenspecifically
deniedunderoathbytheadverseparty;29(c)whenthegenuinenessandauthenticityof A.Yes,thatishersignature.
thedocumenthavebeenadmitted;30or(d)whenthedocumentisnotbeingofferedas
genuine.31
INTERPRETER:
ThereisnoquestionthatExhibitsBtoYYandtheirderivativeswereprivatedocuments
becauseprivateindividualsexecutedorgeneratedthemforprivateorbusinesspurposes Witnessispointingtoasignatureabovetheprintedword
oruses.Consideringthatnoneoftheexhibitscameunderanyofthefourexceptions,they "collector".
could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the
 (NextPage) nomenclature to refer instead to an entirely different document entitled "List of
CustomerscoveredbyANALERIMAPATULAw/differenceinRecordsasperAudit
dulyverifiedMarch1620,1997."
ATTY.ABIERA:

In hercase, Guivencan'sidentification ofpetitioner'ssignatureontworeceipts based

Q.Isthistheonlyreceiptwhereinthename,the aloneonthefactthatthesignaturescontainedthelegiblefamilynameofPatulawas
signaturerather,oftheaccusedinthiscase ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence
appears? against petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioner's
signatureonthereceiptseitherbecauseshelackedfamiliaritywithsuchsignature,or
becauseshehadnotseenpetitioneraffixhersignatureonthereceipts,asthefollowing
A.Thatisnottheonlyone,therearemanyreceipts.
excerptsfromhertestimonybearout:

ATTY.ABIERA: ATTY.ZERNAtowitness:

In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be Q.Therearetwo(2)receiptsattachedhereinthe

presentingtheoriginalreceipts YourHonor, confirmationsheet,willyougoovertheseMiss
becauseit'squitevoluminous,sowewilljust witness?
foregowiththetestimonyofthewitnessbutwe
willjustpresentthesameusingthetestimony
of another witness, for purposes of A.Thiswasthelastpaymentwhichisfullypaidbythe
identifyingthesignatureoftheaccused.We customer.Theotherreceiptistheoneshowing
willrequestthatthissignaturewhichhasbeen herpaymentpriortothelastpayment.
identified to by the witness in this case be
marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to COURT:
presenttheoriginalcopyandpresentthesame
toofferasourexhibitsbutforthemeantime,
thisisonlyforthepurposesofrecording,Your Q.Wheredidyougetthosetwo(2)receipts?
Honor,whichwerequestthesame,thereceipt
which has just been identified awhile ago be
markedasourExhibit"A"YourHonor. A.Fromthecustomer.

COURT: Q.Andwhoissuedthosereceipts?

MarkthereceiptasExhibit"A". A.Thesaleswoman,MissPatula.

ATTY.ABIERA: ATTY.ZERNA:

AndthesignaturebebracketedandbemarkedasExhibit Wepray,YourHonor,thatthisreceiptidentifiedbemarked
"A1". asExhibit"B3",receiptnumber20441.

(NextPage) (NextPage)

COURT: COURT:

Bracketthesignature&markitasExh."A1".Whatisthe Markit.
numberofthatreceipt?
ATTY.ZERNA:
ATTY.ABIERA:
Thesignatureofthecollectorbemarkedas
ReceiptNo.20441datedAugust4,1996thestatementthat:
receivedfromCirilaAskin.32aHCSTD Q.Bytheway,thereisasignatureabovethenameofthe
collector,areyourfamiliarwiththat
xxxxxxxxx signature?(showntowitness)

Astheexcerptsindicate,Go'sattemptatauthenticationofthesignatureofpetitioneron A.Yes.
the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as
ExhibitA,whilethepurportedsignatureofpetitionerthereonwasmarkedasExhibitA
1)immediatelyfizzledoutaftertheProsecutionadmittedthatthedocumentwasamere Q.Whosesignatureisthat?
machine copy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the
Prosecutionexpresslypromisedtoproduceatalaterdatetheoriginalsofthereceiptwith A.MissPatula.
serialnumberFLDT96No.20441andotherreceipts.Butthatpromisewasnoteventrue,
becausealmostinthesamebreaththeProsecutionofferedtoauthenticatethesignatureof
petitioneronthereceiptsthrough adifferentwitness (thoughthenstillunnamed).As Q.Howdoyouknow?
mattersturnedoutintheend,theefforttohaveGoauthenticateboththemachinecopyof
thereceiptwithserialnumberFLDT96No.20441andthesignatureofpetitioneronthat
receiptwaswastefulbecausethemachinecopywasinexplicablyforgottenandwasno A.ItcanberecognizedbecauseofthewordPatula.
longerevenincludedintheProsecution'sOfferofDocumentaryEvidence.
Q.Areyoufamiliarwithhersignature?
ItistruethattheoriginalofthereceiptbearingserialnumberFLDT96No.20441was
subsequentlypresentedasExhibitBthroughGuivencan.However,theProsecutiondid
notestablishthatthesignatureappearingonExhibitBwasthesamesignaturethatGo A.Yes.
had earlier sought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A1) on the
machinecopy(ExhibitA).ThisisborneoutbythefactthattheProsecutionabandoned ATTY.ZERNA:
ExhibitAasthemarkingnomenclatureforthemachinecopyofthereceiptbearingserial
numberFLDT96No.20441forallintentsandpurposesofthiscase,andusedthesame
 Wepraythatthesignaturebebracketedandmarkedas COURT:
Exhibit"B3a"

Makeafollowupquestionandwhatwastheresultwhen
COURT: youcopiedthatamountintheledgerandyou
haditconfirmedbythecustomers,whatwas
theresultwhenyouhaditconfirmedbythe
Markit. customers?

ATTY.ZERNA: WITNESS:

Theotherreceiptnumber20045bemarkedasExhibit"B4" A.Shehasnomorebalancebutinourofficeshehasstilla
andthesignatureasExhibit"B4a". balanceofP10,971.75.

COURT: ATTY.ZERNAtowitness:

Markit.33 Q.Doyouhaveawhat'sthebasisofsayingthatthebalance
ofthiscustomerisstillP10,971.75
xxxxxxxxx
(NextPage)
ATTY.ZERNA:
ATTY.ZERNA(continuing):
Q.Ms.Witness,hereisareceiptcoloredwhite,number
26603issuedtooneDivinaCadilig.Willyou [i]nyouroffice?
pleaseidentifythisreceiptifthisisthereceipt
ofyouroffice?
COURT:

A.Yes.AaCTcI
Thatwasalreadyansweredpaero,theofficehasaledger.

Q.Thereisasignatureovertheportionforthecollector.
Whosesignatureisthis? Q.Now,didyoubringtheledgerwithyou?

A.Ms.Patula. A.No,Ma'am.35

Q.Howdoyouknowthatthisishersignature? (ContinuationoftheDirectExaminationof
KarenGuivencanonAugust13,2002)

A.BecausewecanreadthePatula.34
ATTY.ZERNAtowitness:

Wealsohavesimilarimpressionsoflackofproperauthenticationastotheledgersthe
Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amounts petitioner had Q.Okay,Yousaidtherearediscrepanciesbetweenthe
allegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted to originalandtheduplicate,willyouplease
Footlucker's.Guivencanexclusivelyreliedontheentriesoftheunauthenticatedledgers enlightentheHonorableCourtonthat
to support her audit report on petitioner's supposed misappropriation or conversion, discrepancywhichyousaid?
revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
followingexcerptsofhertestimonyshow:
A.LikeinthiscaseofCirilaAskin,shehasalreadyfully
paid.Herledgershowsazerobalanceshehas
ATTY.ZERNAtowitness: fullypaidwhileintheoriginal

Q.Whatisyourbasisofsayingthatyourofficerecords (Nextpage)
showedthatthisCeciliaAskinhasan
accountofP10,791.75?
WITNESS(continuing):

ATTY.DIEZ:
[r]eceiptshehasabalanceofTenThousandSeven
hundredNinetyonePesosandSeventyfive
Thequestionanswersitself,YourHonor,whatisthebasis, Centavos(10,791.75).
officerecord.

COURT:
COURT:

Q.Whatabouttheduplicatereceipt,howmuchisindicated
Letthewitnessanswer. there?

WITNESS: A.Thecustomerhasnoduplicatecopybecauseitwas
alreadyforwardedtotheManilaOffice.
A.Imadethebasisonourledgerintheoffice.Ijust
copiedthatandshowedittothecustomersfor Q.Whatthenisyourbasisintheentriesintheledger
confirmation. showingthatithasalreadyazerobalance?

ATTY.ZERNAtowitness: A.Thisisthecopyofthecustomerwhileintheoffice,inthe
originalreceiptshehasstillabalance.
Q.Whataboutthereceipts?
 xxxxxxxxx becausetheseweretheledgersonfileintheiroffice.

ATTY.ZERNA: ATTY.DIEZ:

Theconfirmationsheet Thatiscorrect,YourHonor,butthepersonwhomadethe
entriesisnotthiswitness,YourHonor.How
doweknowthattheentriesthereis(sic)
COURT:
correctonthereceiptssubmittedtotheir
office.
Theconfirmationsheetwastheoneyoureferredtoasthe
receiptinyourearliertestimony?Isthatwhat
youreferredtoasthereceipts,theoriginal COURT:
receipts?HIaTDS
Precisely,shebroughtalongthereceiptsalsotosupportthat.
A.ThisiswhatIcopiedfromtheledger. Letthewitnessanswer.

WITNESS:
Q.Sowherewasthat(sic)originalreceiptwhichyousaid
showedthatthatparticularcustomerstillhasa
balanceofTenThousandsomething? A.It'stheofficeclerkincharge.

A.Thereceiptisnolongerhere. COURT:

Q.Youmeantheentryofthatreceiptwasalready Theonewhopreparedtheledgeristheofficeclerk.
enteredintheledger?

ATTY.ZERNA:
A.Yes.36

Sheisanauditor,YourHonor.Shehasbeenqualifiedand
InthefaceofthepalpableflawsinfectingtheProsecution'sevidence,itshouldcomeas sheistheauditorofFootluckers.TIEHSA
nosurprisethatpetitioner'scounselinterposedtimelyobjections.Yet,theRTC
mysteriouslyoverruledtheobjectionsandallowedtheProsecutiontopresentthe
unauthenticatedledgers,asfollows: COURT:

(ContinuationoftheDirectExaminationof Ithink,Irememberinthelastsettingalso,shetestified
WitnessKarenGuivencanonSeptember11,2002) wherethoseentriesweretaken.So,youanswer
thequeryofcounsel.

ATTY.ZERNA:
xxxxxxxxx

CONTINUATIONOFDIRECTEXAMINATION
ATTY.DIEZ:

Q.Ms.Witness,lasttimearoundyouwereshowingus
severalledgers.Whereisitnow? YourHonorplease,toavoiddelay,mayIinterposea
continuingobjectiontothequestions
profounded(sic)onthoseledgersonthe
A.Itishere. groundthat,asIhavesaid,itishearsay.

Q.HereisaledgerofoneDivinaCadilig.ThisDivina COURT:
Cadilig,howmuchisheraccountinyour
office?
Okey(sic).Letthecontinuingobjectionbenoted.
ATTY.DIEZ:
Q.(ToWitness)Theclerkwhoallegedlywastheonewho
preparedtheentriesonthoseledgers,isshe
YourHonorpleasebeforethewitnesswillproceedto
stillconnectedwithFootluckers?
answerthequestion,letmeinterposeour
objectiononthegroundthatthisledgerhas
notbeendulyidentifiedtobythepersonwho A.Sheisnolongerconnectednow,YourHonor.
madethesame.Thiswitnesswillbe
testifyingonhearsaymattersbecausethe
COURT:
supposedledgerwasnotidentifiedtobythe
personwhomadethesame.
Alrightproceed.

COURT:
(NextPage)

Thoseledgerswerealreadypresentedinthelasthearing.I
thinktheywerealreadydulyidentifiedbythis ATTY.ZERNA:
witness.Asamatteroffact,itwasshewho
broughtthemtocourt
YourHonor,theseareentriesinthenormalcourseof
business.So,exemptfromthehearsayrule.
(NextPage)

COURT:
COURT(cont.):
 Okey(sic),proceed.37
ThemysteryshroudingtheRTC'ssofttreatmentoftheProsecution'sflawedpresentation
wasavoidablesimplybytheRTCadheringtotheinstructionsoftherulesearlierquoted,
aswellaswithSection22ofRule132oftheRulesofCourt,whichcontainsinstructions
onhowtoprovethegenuinenessofahandwritinginajudicialproceeding,asfollows:
Section22.Howgenuinenessofhandwritingproved.The
handwritingofapersonmaybeprovedbyanywitnesswho
believesittobethehandwritingofsuchpersonbecausehe
hasseenthepersonwrite,orhasseenwritingpurporting
to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwritingmayalsobegivenbyacomparison,madeby
the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treatedasgenuinebythepartyagainstwhomtheevidence
isoffered,orprovedtobegenuinetothesatisfactionofthe
judge.(Emphasessupplied)
IfitisalreadyclearthatGoandGuivencanhadnotthemselvesseentheexecutionor
signingofthedocuments,theProsecutionsurelydidnotauthenticateExhibitsBtoYY
andtheirderivativesconformablywiththeaforequotedrules.Hence,ExhibitsBtoYY,
andtheirderivatives,inclusive,wereinescapablybereftofprobativevalueasevidence.
Thatwastheonlyfairandjustresult,astheCourtheldin MalayanInsuranceCo.,Inc.v.
PhilippineNailsandWiresCorporation:38
Onthefirstissue,petitionerMalayanInsuranceCo.,Inc.,
contends that Jeanne King's testimony was hearsay
becauseshehadnopersonalknowledgeoftheexecution
of the documents supporting respondent's cause of
action,suchasthesalescontract,invoice,packinglist,bill
of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy.
Petitioner avers that even though King was personally
assignedtohandleandmonitortheimportationofPhilippine
NailsandWiresCorporation,hereinrespondent,thiscannot
beequatedwithpersonalknowledgeofthefactswhichgave
rise to respondent's cause of action. Further, petitioner
asserts,eventhoughshepersonallypreparedthesummaryof
weightofsteelbilletsreceivedbyrespondent,shedidnot
have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets
actuallyshippedanddelivered.IEHDAT
At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of
actionisfoundedonbreachofinsurancecontractcovering
cargoconsistingofimportedsteelbillets.Toholdpetitioner
liable, respondent has to prove, first, its importation of
10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00,andsecond,theactualsteelbilletsdelivered
to and received by the importer, namely the respondent.
Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle
respondent's importations, including their insurance
coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify
thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is
defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
However,sheisnotqualifiedtotestifyontheshortagein
thedeliveryoftheimportedsteelbillets.Shedidnothave
personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received.
Eventhoughshepreparedthesummaryofthereceived
steelbillets,shebasedthesummaryonlyonthereceipts
preparedbyotherpersons.Hertestimonyonsteelbillets
receivedwashearsay.Ithasnoprobativevalueevenif
notobjectedtoatthetrial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to
properly authenticate respondent's documentary evidence.
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court,before a
private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticatedeitherbythepersonwhoexecutedit,the
person before whom its execution was acknowledged,
anypersonwhowaspresentandsawitexecuted,orwho
afteritsexecution,sawitandrecognizedthesignatures,
orthepersontowhomthepartiestotheinstrumentshad
previously confessed execution thereof. In this case,
respondent admits that King was none of the
aforementionedpersons.Shemerelymadethesummary
oftheweightofsteelbilletsbasedontheunauthenticated
billofladingandtheSGSreport.Thus,thesummaryof
steelbilletsactuallyreceivedhadnoprovenrealbasis,
andKing'stestimonyonthispointcouldnotbetakenat
facevalue.
...Undertherulesonevidence,documentsareeitherpublic
orprivate.Privatedocumentsarethosethatdonotfallunder
anyoftheenumerationsinSection19,Rule132oftheRules
ofCourt.Section20ofthesamelaw,inturn,providesthat
beforeanyprivatedocumentisreceivedinevidence,itsdue
executionandauthenticitymustbeprovedeitherbyanyone
whosawthedocumentexecutedorwritten,orbyevidence
of thegenuinenessof thesignatureorhandwriting ofthe
maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits are
private documents. They are not among those
enumeratedinSection19,thus,theirdueexecutionand
authenticity need to be proved before they can be
admittedinevidence.Withtheexceptionconcerningthe
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported,
respondentpresentednosupportingevidenceconcerning
theirauthenticity.Consequently,theycannotbeutilized
to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short
deliveryoftheimportedsteelbillets.Insum,wefindno
sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner's
liability.HaTSDA
ThattheProsecution'sevidencewasleftuncontestedbecausepetitionerdecidednotto
subjectGuivencantocrossexamination,anddidnottenderhercontraryevidencewas
inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to
Guivencan'stestimonybypetitioner'scounselduetothehearsaycharacter,itcouldnotbe
deniedthathearsayevidence,whetherobjectedtoornot,hadnoprobativevalue. 39
Verily,theflawsoftheProsecution'sevidencewerefundamentalandsubstantive,not
merelytechnicalandprocedural,andweredefectsthattheadverseparty'swaiverofher
crossexaminationorfailuretorebutcouldnotsetrightorcure.Nordidthetrialcourt's
overrulingofpetitioner'sobjectionsimbuetheflawedevidencewithanyvirtueandvalue.
Curiously,theRTCexceptedtheentriesintheledgersfromtheapplicationofthehearsay
rule by also tersely stating that the ledgers "were prepared in the regular course of
business."40Seemingly,theRTCappliedSection43,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,to
wit:
Section 43.Entries in the course of business. Entries
madeat,ornearthetimeofthetransactionstowhichthey
refer,byapersondeceased,orunabletotestify,whowasin
apositiontoknowthefactsthereinstated,maybereceived
asprimafacie evidence,ifsuchpersonmadetheentriesin
hisprofessionalcapacityorintheperformanceofdutyand
intheordinaryorregularcourseofbusinessorduty.
ThiswasanothergraveerroroftheRTC.Theterseyetsweepingmannerofjustifyingthe
applicationofSection43wasunacceptableduetotheneedtoshowtheconcurrenceof
theseveralrequisitesbeforeentriesinthecourseofbusinesscouldbeexceptedfromthe
hearsayrule.Therequisitesareasfollows:
(a)Thepersonwhomadetheentrymustbedeadorunable
totestify;
(b)Theentriesweremadeatornearthetimeofthe
transactionstowhichtheyrefer;
(c)Theentrantwasinapositiontoknowthefactsstatedin
theentries;
(d)Theentriesweremadeinhisprofessionalcapacityorin
theperformanceofaduty,whetherlegal,
contractual,moral,orreligious;
(e)Theentriesweremadeintheordinaryorregularcourse
ofbusinessorduty.41
TheCourthastoacquitpetitionerforfailureoftheStatetoestablishherguiltbeyond
reasonabledoubt.TheCourtreiteratesthatinthetrialofeverycriminalcase,ajudge
must rigidly test the State's evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence
adheredtothebasicrulesofadmissibilitybeforepronouncinganaccusedguiltyofthe
crimechargeduponsuchevidence.Thefailureofthejudgetodosohereinnullifiedthe
guaranteeofdueofprocessoflawinfavoroftheaccused,whohadnoobligationto Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil
proveherinnocence.Heracquittalshouldfollow. action brought against her for the recovery of any amount still owing in favor of
Footlucker'sChainofStores,Inc.

IV
Nopronouncementoncostsofsuit.TaCDcE
Noreliableevidenceondamage

SOORDERED.
Conformablywithfindingtheevidenceofguiltunreliable,theCourtdeclaresthatthe
dispositionbytheRTCorderingpetitionertoindemnifyFootlucker'sintheamountof
P131,286.92withinterestof12% perannum untilfullypaidwasnotyetshowntobe Corona,C.J.,LeonardodeCastro,DelCastilloandVillarama,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
factuallyfounded.Yet,shecannotnowbeabsolvedofcivilliabilityonthatbasis.Her
acquittalhastobedeclaredaswithoutprejudicetothefilingofacivilactionagainsther
fortherecoveryofanyamountthatshemaystillowetoFootlucker's.

|||(Patulav.People,G.R.No.164457,[April11,2012],685PHIL376411)
WHEREFORE,theCourt SETSASIDEANDREVERSES thedecisionconvicting
ANNALERIMAPATULAofestafaascharged,andACQUITSherforfailureofthe