Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs.

CA
Facts: On May 11, 1975, Anacleto Viana boarded M/V Antonia owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corp.
at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. When the vessel landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on the vessel
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer and
Aboitiz.
While Pioneer was operating its crane to unload the cargoes from the vessel, Anacleto,
who had already disembarked from it, went back to the vessel to seek assistance to unload his
cargoes. It was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his
cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the
crane. He was brought to the hospital where he later died three days thereafter. According to his
Death Certificate, he had died from hypostatic pneumonia secondary to traumatic fracture of the
pubic bone lacerating the urinary bladder. Anacleto was only 40 years old when he died, and
was then in good health.
Private complainants thus filed a case for damages against Aboitiz. In its answer, Aboitiz
denied responsibility contending that the vessel was already under complete control of Pioneer
as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz and that since the crane operator was not an
employee of Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule.
Pioneer, as third party defendant on the other hand, raised that it was not a party to the contract
of carriage and that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family both in the
selection and supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage or injury to
anyone including Anacleto. It further alleged that Anacletos gross negligence was the direct and
proximate cause of his death.
The trial court ruled in favor of Viana. On Appeal Aboitiz raised that Anacleto acted with
gross negligence in failing to notice warning signs in the vicinity and that by this reason, his act
was the proximate cause of his death. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision.

Issue: Whether or not both Pioneer and Aboitiz should be held liable for the death of Anacleto.

Held: No, they are not both liable, as Aboitiz alone should be liable for the death of Anacleto.
The presumption is established by law that in case of passengers death or injury the
operator of the vessel was at fault or negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence,
and it is incumbent upon it to rebut the same.
The evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the
crane, as claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible
warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. Thus, the SC is not
inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently
warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. Even
assuming that existence of the warning signs and cordon of drums, these were at most
insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-a-vis the gravity of the
danger to which the deceased was exposed. There is no showing that petitioner was
extraordinarily diligent in requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly
and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry into the forbidden area. By
no stretch of liberal evaluation can such perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of
very cautious persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can provide" which
is required by law of common carriers with respect to their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still petitioner's aforesaid failure to
exercise extraordinary diligence was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could
definitely have prevented, the former's death.
As for Pioneer, Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence
required of, and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on, common carriers like
Aboitiz. There was also no proof that there was negligence on the part of Pioneer in its
operations.
Dangwa Transportation vs. CA
Facts: On May 13, 1985, private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on March
25, 1985 at Martivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet. Among others, it was alleged that on said
date, while petitioner Theodore Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to petitioner
corporation in a reckless and imprudent manner and without due regard to traffic rules and
regulations and safety to persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat who
was then, on the bus platform when it suddenly accelerated, causing him to fall off the bus.
However, instead of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the said driver, in utter
bad faith and without regard to the welfare of the victim, first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before bringing said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where
he expired.
Dangwa Transportation and Lardizabal alleged that they had observed and continued to
observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the transportation company and
the supervision of the employees, even as they add that they are not absolute insurers of the
safety of the public at large. Further, it was alleged that it was the victims own carelessness and
negligence which gave rise to the incident as he did not signal his intention to board.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to exercise extraordinary diligence required.

Held: Yes, petitioners failed to exercise extraordinary diligence.

The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the
victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention to
board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no
necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility
bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it becomes the
duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The
premature acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad
train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to
afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by
boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while
they are doing so.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be stigmatized
as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus could have gone to
the hospital, but its driver instead opted to first proceed to passengers respective destinations,
despite the serious condition of the victim.
LRT vs. Navidad
Facts: On October 14, 1993, at 7:30 in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the
EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token. While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that
Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by
the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On December 8, 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. and Prudent
Security Agency for the death of her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, LRT must be liable for the death of Navidad.

Held: Yes, LRT must be held liable for the death of Navidad.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to
provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so
long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account
of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to
prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners,
according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been
at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
La Mallorca vs. CA
Facts: On December 20, 1953, Mariano Beltran and his family boarded the Pambusco Bus
owned and operated by La Mallorca at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico,
Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them 4 pieces of baggages containing their
personal belongings. They were issued 3 tickets for the fares of the sps. Beltran and their eldest
daughter, but no fare was charged for the two younger children.
When the bus reached Anao, the Beltran family alighted from the bus and carried their
baggage about 5 meters away from the vehicle. However, upon realizing that Mariano left his
bayong, he returned to the bus without realizing that his daughter, Raquel had followed him.
While Mariano was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his
bayong, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given
the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage
left behind by Mariano. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had
travelled about 10 meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano immediately jumped from the running
board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road. It was
then that he realized that the bus had ran over his daughter, Raquel.

Issue: Whether or not as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5
meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage
also persisted.

Held: Yes, the petitioner must be held liable for the death of the child.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was
not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus
awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even
he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child,
who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed
that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required
by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the
bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the
bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the
baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near
the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of
the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent,
necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while
incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2
of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the
alternative, be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in
controversy may be resolved and determined.