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August 5, 1986
Cruz, J.:
NATURE: Exact nature not stated. Action to question an order of the CSC in
an appointment protest
FACTS
Feb. 18, 1983 - Felimon LUEGO was appointed Administrative Officer II for the
Office of the Mayor, Cebu City by then-Mayor Florentino Solon.
Mar. 22, 1984 CSC found that Tuozo was better qualified for the
Administrative Officer II position. Luegos appointment was revoked.
June 28, 1984 Then-Mayor Ronald Duterte appointed Tuozo to the position.
Luego filed the present petition to assail the CSC order revoking his
appointment.
RATIO
SC: While the OSG correctly stated the rule on temporary appointments, the
rule has no application here since Luegos appointment is PERMANENT.
The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in
the space provided for in Luegos appointment paper (CS Form 33).
What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the
appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary was the fact that
it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the
verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
The approval is more appropriately called an attestation of the fact that the
appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. Such
attestation is required merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil
Service laws. (In re Arcega)
The CoA can even review the wisdom of the appointment and can refuse to
concur even of the appointee has all the requisite qualifications under the
law.
The CSC has no such power under the Civil Service Decree. Its authority is
limited to a non-discretionary one, i.e., to determine if the appointee meets
all the conditions required by the law.
CAB: By admitting that Luego and Tuozo were both qualified for the
Administrative Officer II position, the CSC has rendered itself functus officio.
It had nothing else to do but affirm the validity of Luegos appointment. CSC
had no authority to revoke Luegos appointment simply because it thinks
Tuozo is more qualified. That would constitute encroachment of the
discretion vested in the City Mayor.
Rule V, Section 91, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies
is inapplicable because neither Luego nor Tuozo is next-in-rank. Moreover,
the rule is not absolute and the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be
filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or
appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.
The political detachment of the civil service will be impaired if the security of
tenure clause in the
The pertinent part provides: "whenever there are two or more employees
who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the employee who is most
competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility.
Facts:
1
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a
domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business,
entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI
OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United
Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut
Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in
bulk through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF
companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as
administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could
terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was
given to the other party. However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration
of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent
Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance
notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT
Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.
The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should
have been filed in the regular court. This Office has no jurisdiction to
determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered
into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations
(over) which this Office has no jurisdiction.
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its
rules in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the delay was just a
matter of days and he, a layman not aware of technicalities, personally filed
the complaint.
Respondents contention:
Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized
and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are
private individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that
they are not public officers as defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act but are private executives appointed by the Boards of Directors
of the CIIF companies. They asseverate that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a learned counsel.
They then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he had similarly filed
a case for collection of a sum of money plus damages before the trial court.
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved
the recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the complaint
because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis for the criminal
indictment of private respondents.
Issue: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman
The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On
21 October of that year, P. D. No. 961was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it
was amended by P. D. No. 1468 by inserting a new provision authorizing the
use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the
acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of
engaging in the establishment and operation of industries x x x commercial
activities and other allied business undertakings relating to coconut and
other palm oil indust(ries)." From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of
stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were
purchased.
We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the
State's police and taxing powers such that the utilization and proper
management thereof were certainly the concern of the Government. These
funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies
were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the
shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of
the shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in
LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT
and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately,
it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There
is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF
companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not
within the scope of its jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
On August 21, 1998, public respondent issued the first assailed Order5
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. It further scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on the criminal aspect of the complaint and a preliminary conference
on its administrative aspect on September 2, 1998. Petitioner received the
order on August 26, 1998 and she filed a motion for reconsideration6 the
next day.
Issue: W/N Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary organization.
Held:
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary
organization. The following circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the
private character of the organization: (1) the PNRC does not receive any
budgetary support from the government, and that all money given to it by
the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization;
(2) funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments
come from yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and rentals from its
properties; and (3) it is not audited by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner
states that the PNRC falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, a
Switzerland-based organization, and that the power to discipline employees
accused of misconduct, malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC
Secretary General by virtue of Section "G", Article IX of its by-laws.
She threatens that "to classify the PNRC as a government-owned or
controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose
its neutrality, independence and impartiality . . . .
Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter, pursuant to
Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman
Act of 1989", to wit:
Sec. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
ever case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service
by the Government to the people.11
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called
"mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17,
1990 to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great detail the character and
origins of those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts
to negotiate their correction; these are more briefly, but quite adequately
and with no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the petition in G.R. No.
954451, portions of which are quoted hereunder without necessarily
affirming their objective truth or correctness:
4. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities
and municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS
premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands. No response was made by the
respondent Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration, so the
petitioners began the ongoing protest mass actions on September,
17,1990. ...
September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day.
There is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action
did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition
in G.R. No. 95590, 4 they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the
morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly. At about 1:00
o'clock p.m., three representatives of the group were allowed to see the
respondent Secretary of Education who "brushed aside their grievances,"
warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on illegal and
unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent's presence, they
were handed an order directing all participants in the mass action to return
to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements.
On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports submitted by the
principals of the various public schools in Metro Manila, the respondent
Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative complaints
against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and defied the
return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without
official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive suspension.
The respondents were served copies of the charge sheets and given five (5)
days to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990, the
respondent Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to
determine and take the appropriate course of action on the formal charges
and designated the special prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle
their prosecution during the formal hearings.
Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 18, a petition 10 for
prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order of September 17,
1990 and the suspension or dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto and to
declare said order null and void. Issuance ex-parte of a temporary restraining
order was sought, but seeing no compelling reason therefor, the Regional
Trial Court instead set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing,
and heard the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter and following the
submission of memorandums by the parties, said Court rendered judgment
declaring the assailed return-to-work order valid and binding, and dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. 11
Held:
The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of law or
established fact that would impair the validity of these postulates or preclude
continued reliance thereon for the purpose of resolving the present petitions
on their merits.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a
right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons,
nor whether or not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally evident
from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about this.
What therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or not
any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution
as it applies to administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation,
conduct, or disposition of the investigations complained of.
Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about denial of due
process being their "paramount complaint" ... "central to their prayer for
interlocutory relief' 20 could as well be said of the merits of their main cause
as of their plea for a restraining order pendente lite or a preliminary
injunction.
There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue
and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this
Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious
reason that it is one of fact. The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the
petitioners allege facts and circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial
of due process, citing as supposedly "representative samples" among others:
(a) that teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of their
principals and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the return-to-
work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the particular charges
or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not furnished
sworn complaints, and others were suspended without any formal charges;
(d) that teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable time after
notice of the return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
allegations.
It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who
would now withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of
what in truth transpired concerning the disputed incidents. Even if that were
within its competence, it would be at best a monumental task. At any rate,
the petitioners cannot-as it seems they have done lump together into what
amounts to a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own
peculiar set of facts, and expect a ruling that would justly and correctly
resolve each and everyone of those cases upon little more than general
allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
"representative" of each case or group of cases.
This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court,
especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts are
concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization
of what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The
petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings
but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein,
see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to
the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate
recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the
respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
to apply, not directly to the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court,
where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting
corrective relief.
SO ORDERED.
vs.
Court of Appeals
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
unionsdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed
before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter
since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security System
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil
Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not
covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to
the COA on the following grounds:
The SC Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for clarification2 filed
by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union
case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries
2 The clarification was the Courts action on the motion for clarification filed in Civil Liberties Union v.The
Executive Secretary, and revises the main opinion promulgated on February 22, 1991 (194 SCRA 317)
totally invalidating Executive Order No. 284 dated July 25, 1987 (whose questioned Section 1 states:
Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not
apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.). The clarifying dictum now considered Executive Order No. 284 partly valid to the extent that
it included in its coverage other appointive officials aside from the members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, with the dispositive part of the clarificatory resolution of
August1, 1991 stating: WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void insofar as it allows a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary to hold other positions in the government and government-
owned and controlled corporations.
and their assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below
the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition;
Section 11 of RA No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the movant to receive
per diem. Said law was enacted in 1995, 4 years after the Civil Liberties
Union case became final. In expressly authorizing per diems, Congress
should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of
the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received
by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings
as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
RULING: YES. The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely
by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since
the Secretary is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional
office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who
sat on behalf of the Secretary. We cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in PEZA to have a better right than
his principal. The contention that RA 7916 as a legal basis has no merit since
such law was amended by RA 8748 where provisions in conflict with the law,
specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.
Citation: Cayetano vs. Monsod
FACTS:
iii. Worked for his fathers firm after graduating from UP; operations officer
in World Bank Group; chief executive officer and business conglomerate
MERALCO; legal and economic consultant; secretary-general and chairman
NAMFREL.
Issue
Held
1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in courtIn general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a
lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than 10 years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the
Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The
power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so
vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the
SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA.
FACTS:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On
June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the
case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of
the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but
the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb
1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then
moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor.
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Canicosa v COMELEC
Facts:
Ricardo Boy Canicosa and Severino Lajara were candidates for Mayor in
Calamba, Laguna during the 8 May 1995 elections. Lajara was proclaimed
winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Issue: W/N a COMELEC division should have first heard the petition before
deciding on it en banc on a motion for reconsideration.
Held: NO. Section 3, Article IX-C applies only when the COMELEC acts in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely
exercises purely administrative functions. Moreover, it is expressly provided
in Rule 27, Section 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a right to
appeal to the COMELEC en banc. Questions as to whether elections have
been held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured and
therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to
vote. Such questions are properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC en banc
without having to pass through any of its divisions.
There are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared:
namely:
The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes;
The election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or
After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes.
The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the
right to vote which is not within the power and authority of COMELEC to rule
upon. The determination of whether one has the right to vote is a justiciable
issue properly cognizable by our regular courts.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanrobles virtual law library
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under- privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
FACTS:
(1) Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992
elections for the office of the Vice- Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas,
Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes,
such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan.
(2) On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul
Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and
tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIO:
An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival
candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win,
is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For
this reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election
protests must be
liberally construed to the end that the popular will, ex pressed in the election
of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated
Ponente: Feliciano
That 11(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and tv broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity or volume of info concerning candidates and issues in the election,
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to info and opinion.
Issue: WON 11(b) of RA 6646 has gone beyond the permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech & freedom of the press
SC says: Nope. It has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision
or regulation of media operations during election periods.
Ratio:
It prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaign or
other political purposes except to Comelec.
90&92 of the OEC on the other hand, require the Comelec to procure
Comelec space and Comelec time to be allocated to all candidates for free.
It is important to note, that the objective, is not only a legitimate one, it has
also been given constitutional status by the terms of Art. IX(C)(4) of the 1987
Consti.
Art. IX-C, Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, and equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of the
press3, has to be taken in conjunction with Art. IX (C) (4) which may be seen
to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period, i.e.
during election pd.
The rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are
not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of
polities.
In our own society, equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office,
without regard to ones financial capacity, is clearly an important value.
One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Art. II, 26, Consti,
is the egalitarian demand that the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law.
The technical effect of Art. IX(C)(4) of the Consti, may be seen to be that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing
equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free
speech and free press.
3 Art. III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
Thus the time-honored rule: A statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.
In Summary, 11(b)
Does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion, or commentary about
candidates, their qualifications, and platforms and promises
Does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the content of
the normal operations of the media
Does not prohibit Comelec from procuring print space and air time for the
candidates.
Anent Cruzs assigned flaw-that it still does not restrict the rich candidate
from spending on other campaign activities.
The Consti does not, and cannot exact perfection in governmental regulation.
All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under
challenge bear a reasobable nexus with the constitutionality sanctioned
objective.
The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free form such
intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of
the candidates to advertise themselves.
Facts:
Held: No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec,
Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which
is another office, shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing
of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong
barangay. Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his position
as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule
cannot thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the
resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is not
within the same class as that of the incumbents. The court cannot sustain
the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates for
kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be
regarded as running for the same office.
Garces v CA
FACTS:
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and
Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize
respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that
the appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the
same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution,
and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be
raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC,
else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution
contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo
warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred
under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections.
ISSUE:
HELD:
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered
this Controversy.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests
with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.
*Petition denied
Citation: Philippine Airlines v COA
Facts:
COA told PAL to stop the bidding and only get from Petron
COA denied. Told PAL to just negotiate with Petron. Hence, petitioner.
Issue:
Held:
SC ruled that:
Department Order 19 required all GOCCs to get their fuel from Petron. In the
case of PAL v. COA, COA ordered PAL to follow DO 19
The very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the COA the irregular,
excessive or unconscionable expenditures of the government. Thus, it has
the power and the duty to exempt certain branches from any regulation if,
obedience to it would lead to those kinds of excessive expenditures.
Facts:
However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the Urban Housing
Dagat-Dagatan Project II was not completed as scheduled. Thus an extension
of the contract was made since the NHA did not appear to have much choice.
Several extensions were made which triggered the difficulties experienced
by NHA.
Issue:
WON the COA has authority to disallow a duly entered contract and
substitute its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of the
management or governing body of government entities
Decision:
The COA has been enshrined by the government with powers to "promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties." It has been recognized in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. COA,
that COA has authority to disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures.
The nature of the terminal phase of the Dagat-Dagatan project does not
require the expertise of a foreign consultant and that the finishing stage
merely requires simple advisory services that can be undertaken by NHA or
DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most a local consultant. Our
Constitution prohibits unnecessary expenses of public funds. The postulates
of our Constitution are not mere platitudes, which we should honor only in
rhetorics but not in reality. The power to contract a foreign loan does not
carry with it the authority to bargain away the ideals of our Constitution.