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Philosophy for Pragmatists: Why Ideas Matter

Richard Ostrofsky
(February, 1998)
There is a common attitude in North American society that ideas do not
really matter. This in itself is a philosophical idea, and it has an ancient
pedigree: It was British before it came to North America, and Roman long
before it came to Britain. For pioneers and empire builders, it has some
reason: Taming a wilderness, subduing the natives, building the
infrastructure of global commerce and its management demand much
thought about details but as little as possible about fundamentals. It is better
to keep foundational myths and values settled, and marginalize dissent – so
that the sod-busters and servants of Empire can get on with their jobs, all
pulling in the same direction. Simplicity and clarity are at a premium; the
critical spirit of philosophy, and philosophy's interest in questions that lack
factual answers are not. A broad consensus on basics is vital; any radical
questioning means resistance to the inexorable logic of empire – and
trouble.
When the imperial dream has run its course, ideas still do not seem very
important. Worse, they seem disloyal. When the troubles come, hardy
pragmatists tighten their belts and buckle down to work even harder. They
do not allow themselves the luxury of doubt. Suspicions that the whole
project may have been flawed in conception are scarcely to be tolerated.
This is a pity, because it prevents repentance (literally, "re-thinking") and
the taking of corrective action while there might still be time.
This distaste for fundamental ideas, and for the unresolvable questions
of interpretation and value beneath them, is a tragic flaw. It is
understandable why policy-makers, planners and do-ers who keep the
wheels of civilization turning prefer clear-cut options, and hard, value-free
facts to guide their choices. But, as good pragmatists know – or should
know – the consequences of a mistake are not less grave because the
mistake was understandable. It may be expedient to fire the person who
made it, or to leave him in his job; but either way, you have to clean up the
mess, pick up the pieces, and go on from there. It is in such hard-headed
terms that we might try to understand why the attempt to grapple with
philosophical questions is too important to be left to philosophers.
The basic point is that in many situations, the answer to a question is far
less important than the pattern of discussion and argument around it. That
pattern is characterized by the specific values, interests and perceptions at
stake, by the way these polarize and combine into discrete positions and
coalitions, by the quality and seriousness of the support each of these
receives, and by the over-all tone of the dispute: reasoned or merely
assertive, co-operative, adversarial, or downright hostile. Specific answers
to "philosophical" questions of value and interpretation suggest specific
courses of action, but the pattern of argument determines whether a
reasonable compromise amongst the various preferred courses might be
forthcoming. Pragmatists understand all this very well. What they tend to
miss is their own role in setting the tone of political discourse, and the close
connection that exists between the prevailing level of respect for ideas and
the prevailing style of argument. In a nutshell: "kings" who despise
philosophy – the tradition of reasoned discourse amongst mutually
incompatible ideas – undermine the security of their own "thrones" and
make their realms ungovernable.
People who understand the importance of ideas, and who have some
experience in examining and handling foreign (and therefore, probably,
distasteful) ideas, will understand that their adversaries are not necessarily
fools or villains – a level of political sophistication that is by no means easy
or automatic. At least intellectually, though not with more sympathy on that
account, they will understand how viewpoints opposed to their own are
possible for otherwise decent and acceptable people. Accordingly they will
attempt to meet such adversaries with appeals to reason and to rational self-
interest before resorting to hard steel. Inclined to treat opponents as
reasonable beings, they are more likely to be treated so themselves. All this
makes for a climate of civility at bargaining tables – not at all the same
thing as cordiality – and thereby allows people with conflicting interests
and views to make the best of their disagreements instead of the worst. It is
a lawyerly and bureaucratic virtue – but not to be despised on that account.
It allows people who don't like each other much to live in the same city
(civitas) with an endless jockeying for advantage to be sure, but with a
minimum of outright violence.
The point I am making is that people "of affairs", the pragmatic
individuals who are impatient with abstract ideas, will not take the time to
reflect upon them, and discourage others from doing so, create with this
attitude, in the not-so-long run, a social climate increasingly inhospitable to
civilized life. To that degree, they undermine their own positions, becoming
prisoners of constituencies that cannot see beyond their own immediate
self-interest and rhetoric. Cynicism about ideas reduces the level of
discourse to an endless battle of "spin doctors", propagandists and public
relations experts, in which the very concepts of "public interest" and
"publicly accountable government" are lost. I think we are seeing all this
today.
The take-away point from this discussion is that the concept of a
"public" that transcends in some degree its constituent social classes and
interest groups and cultures, depends on a prior concept of civilization,
which is precisely the free-trade in goods and ideas amongst peoples of
disparate and competing cultures. This in turn presumes a degree of
relativism that is acquired, so far as I know, only through an exposure to
philosophy – the game of reasoned sparring with adversaries who see the
world differently.

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