Compilation 5.01 - Article IX-A To IX-B Sec. 2

Political Law Review A-2015 | Dean SedfreyCandelaria | Case Digest Compilation 5.A Art. IX-A and IX-B (Sec.
Case Digest Compilation 5.A Art. IX-A and IX-B (Sec. 1-2) Page 1 of 20
charter, empowers its BOD to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern,
ARTICLE IX A and to approve its own compensation and position classification system and qualification
Sec. 2-6 standards. On the basis of Sec. 7, TIDCORP is thus exempted from existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards, and is not bound by the
1. Trade and Investment Dev. v. CSC (CG) DBMs Index of Occupational Service.
G.R. No. 182249 | March 5, 2013 | BRION, J. Tambanillo also noted that prior to de Guzmans appointment as FMS IV, the position had
earlier been occupied by Ma. Loreto Mayor, whose appointment was duly approved by Dir.
PETITIONER: Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) Bugtong. Dir. Bugtongs invalidation of de Guzmans appointment is thus inconsistent with
RESPONDENT: Civil Service Commission (CSC) her prior approval of Mayors appointment to the same position.
CSC-NCR: Dir. Padilla denied Tambanillos appeal because de Guzmans appointment failed
SUMMARY: De Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV in TIDCORP, a
to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, which requires that
GOCC. This was disallowed by the CSC-DBM because the position was not included in DBMs
the position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform to the approved
Index of Occupational Service. The EVP of TIDCORP appealed it to CSC-NCR, CSC-CO, and
Position Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Also,
thereafter, the CA, but all affirmed the decision of CSC-DBM. This prompted TIDCORP to file a
Padilla stressed that the 1987 Administrative Code empowers the CSC to formulate policies
petition for review on certiorari before the SC. The issue here is WON the Constitution
and regulations for the administration, maintenance and implementation of position,
empowers the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service rules and regulations contrary to laws
classification and compensation.
passed by Congress NO. The CSC's rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still
CSC-Central Office (CSC-CO): CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCRs decision. TIDCORP would still
limited to the implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce. The
have to comply with civil service rules because Section 7 did not expressly exempt TIDCORP
Memorandum Circulars that CSC issued require, as a condition sine qua non for the approval of
from civil service laws.
an appointment, that the position title indicated therein conform with the approved Position
CA: Denied TIDCORPs petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO. CA cited CSCs
Allocation List. However, Section 7 of TIDCORP's charter (RA 8494) exempts it from rules
mandate under the 1987 Constitution to approve or disapprove appointments and to
involving position classification. As a plain reading of the said law itself would confirm,
determine whether an appointee possesses civil service eligibility.
TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards, including compliance with Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum
The Present Petition
Circular No. 40, s. 1998. The CSC, therefore, should have given due course to De Guzman's
TIDCORP: argued that the CSC's interpretation of the last sentence of Section 7 of RA 8494
appointment.
(which mandates it to endeavor to make the system conform as closely as possible with the
principles provided in RA 6758) is misplaced.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of TIDCORP seeking the reversal of the decision
o This provision does not bar TIDCORP from adopting a position classification system
and the resolution of the CA. These affirmed the resolution of the CSC invalidating Arsenio
and qualification standards different from those prescribed by the CSC. It asserts that
de Guzmans appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV (FMS IV) in TIDCORP.
it is not also duty bound to comply with civil service rules on compensation and
The CA subsequently denied the MR that followed.
position classification, as it is exempt from all these rules.
o Instead, TIDCORP is only required to furnish the CSC with its compensation and
FACTS
position classification system and qualification standards so that the CSC can be
In 2001, de Guzman was appointed, on a permanent status, as FMS IV of TIDCORP, a GOCC
properly guided in processing TIDCORP's appointments, promotion and personnel
created pursuant to PD No. 1080. His appointment was included in TIDCORPs Report on
action.
Personnel Actions (ROPA) for Aug 2001, which was submitted to the CSC-Dept. of Budget
o Insisting on its exemption from RA 6758 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s.
and Management (DBM) field office.
1998, TIDCORP emphasizes that the provisions of RA 6758, which the CSC applied to
Director Leticia Bugtong disallowed de Guzmans appointment because the position was
TIDCORP, is a general law, while TIDCORP's charter, RA 8494, is a special law.
not included in the DBMs Index of Occupational Service
o Further, RA 8494 is a later expression of Congress' intent as it was enacted nine years
TIDCORPs EVP Jane Tambanillo appealed the invalidation to Director IV Agnes Padilla of after RA 6758 was approved, and should therefore be construed in this light in its
the CSC-NCR. According to Tambanillo, Sec. 7 of RA No. 8494,1 which amended TIDCORPs relation with the latter.
o Under these principles, TIDCORP argued that Section 7 of RA 8494, the provision of a
1Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and staffing pattern for officers and special law, should be interpreted as an exemption to RA 6758. Thus, CSC
employees of the Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon
recommendation of its President, appoint and fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided,
That the Board shall have exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and re-assign personnel
of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding. the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than once every four (4) years
without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. TIDCORP shall be
All positions in TIDCORP shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualification exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards approved by TIDCORP's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual standards. It shall, however, endeavor to make the system to conform as closely as possible to the principles and
duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in modes provided in Republic Act No. 6758.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Political Law Review A-2015 | Dean SedfreyCandelaria | Case Digest Compilation 5.A Art. IX-A and IX-B (Sec. 1-2) Page 2 of 20
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which was issued pursuant to RA 6758, should The 1987 Administrative Code then spelled out the CSC's rule-making power in concrete
not have been applied to limit TIDCORP's staffing prerogatives. terms in Section 12, Book V, Title I-A, which empowered the CSC to implement the civil
CSC: noted that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, as amended by CSC service law and other pertinent laws, and to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines
Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, was issued in accordance with its authority to for the civil service.
prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of civil service laws and other The CSC's rule-making power as a constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a
pertinent laws (Administrative Code), and not pursuant to RA 6758. constitutional commission. It places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress,
o The CSC maintained that Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the Constitution includes GOCCs which cannot withdraw the power at any time.
as part of the civil service. TIDCORP, a GOCC, is therefore covered by the civil service Gallardo v. Tabamo, Jr.: Upheld the validity of a resolution issued by the COMELEC, another
rules and by the CSC. It should submit its Position Allocation List to the DBM, constitutional commission. This case enunciated that the present Constitution upgraded to
regardless of its exemption under RA 6758. a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory authority to grant the Commission broader
o Lastly, the CSC argued that RA 8494 should not prevail over RA 6758 because the and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from
latter also applies to GOCCs like TIDCORP; RA 8494 even makes a reference to RA legislative intrusions.
6758. But while the grant of the CSC's rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws
that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress.
ISSUES As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is subject to the same
Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service rules limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates
and regulations contrary to laws passed by Congress YES must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and
Whether the requirement in Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. implement. T
1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, applies to appointments Grego v. COMELEC: It was improper for the COMELEC, a constitutional body bestowed
in TIDCORP NO with rule-making power by the Constitution, to use the word "shall" in the rules it
Whether De Guzman's appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV in TIDCORP is formulated, when the law it sought to implement uses the word "may." While rules issued
valid YES by administrative bodies are entitled to great respect, "[t]he conclusive effect of
administrative construction is not absolute. [T]he function of promulgating rules and
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of
and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated September 28, 2007 and the resolution dated the law into effect. . . . [A]dministrative regulations cannot extend the law [nor] amend a
March 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 81058, as well as Resolution No. legislative enactment; . . . administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
030144 and Resolution No. 031037 of the Civil Service Commission that the Court of Appeals provisions of the law[,]" and in a conflict between the basic law and an implementing rule
rulings affirmed. No costs. or regulation, the former must prevail.
RATIO: CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, and CSC Resolution No. 15, s. 1999, which were
While the CSC has authority over personnel actions in GOCCs, the rules it formulates
issued pursuant to the CSC 's rule-making power, involve rules on position classification.
pursuant to this mandate should not contradict or amend the civil service laws it
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, or the "Revised Omnibus Rules on
implements.
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions," updated and consolidated the various
Doctrine: The CSC's rule-making power, albeit constitutionally granted, is still limited to issuances on appointments and other personnel actions and simplified their processing.
the implementation and interpretation of the laws it is tasked to enforce. This was subsequently amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999.
The 1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government The assailed provisions in those memorandum circulars, however, involve position
mandated to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity, classification.
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It is a constitutionally
Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, requires, as a
created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
condition sine qua non for the approval of an appointment, that the position title indicated
or rule-making powers.
therein conform with the approved Position Allocation List. The position title should also be
While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making power is subsumed under its designation found in the Index of Occupational Service.
as the government's "central personnel agency" in Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987
According to National Compensation Circular No. 58, the Position Allocation List is a list
Constitution.
prepared by the DBM, which reflects the allocation of existing positions to the new position
The original draft of Section 3 empowered the CSC to "promulgate and enforce policies on titles in accordance with the Index of Occupational Service, Position Titles and Salary
personnel actions, classify positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to Grades issued under National Compensation Circular No. 57.
compensation and other monetary benefits which shall be provided by law." This, however,
Both circulars were published by the DBM pursuant to its mandate from RA 6758 to
was deleted during the constitutional commission's deliberations because it was redundant
establish a position classification system in the government.
to the CSC's nature as an administrative agency.
Further, the CSC admitted in its comment that RA 6758 was the basis for the issuance of Had the intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. with RA 6758, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave
15, s. 1999. TIDCORP was to endeavor to conform to the principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to
the entirety of this law.
Section 7 of TIDCORP's charter exempts it from rules involving position classification These inter-relationships render it clear, as a plain reading of Section 7 of RA 8494 itself
To comply with Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, would confirm, that TIDCORP is exempt from existing laws on compensation, position
TIDCORP must conform with the circulars on position classification issued by the DBM. classification and qualification standards, including compliance with Section 1 (c), Rule III of
Section 7 of its charter, however, expressly exempts TIDCORP from existing laws on CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
position classification, among others.
In its comment, the CSC would want us to disregard TIDCORP's exemption from laws De Guzman's appointment as Financial Management Specialist IV is valid
involving position classification because RA 6758 applies to all GOCCs. It also noted that Since Section 1 (c), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, is the only
Section 7 of RA 8494, the provision TIDCORP invokes as the source of its exemption, also requirement that De Guzman failed to follow, his appointment actually complied with all
directs its Board of Directors to "endeavor to make its system conform as closely as the requisites for a valid appointment. The CSC, therefore, should have given due course to
possible with the principles [and modes provided in] Republic Act No. 6758[.]" De Guzman's appointment.
This reference of RA 6758 in Section 7 means that TIDCORP cannot simply disregard RA
6758 but must take its principles into account in providing for its own position
classifications.
This requirement, to be sure, does not run counter to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Sec. 7
Constitution which provides that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, 1. De La Llana v. Chairperson (RL)
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or G. R. No. 180989 | February 7, 2012 | SERENO, J
controlled corporations with original charters." Petitioner: GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA
Respondents: THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE NATIONAL TREASURER
The CSC shall still enforce position classifications at TIDCORP, but must do this under the
terms that TIDCORP has itself established, based on the principles of RA 6758.
SUMMARY: COA issued several circulars regarding the lifting and reinstatement of the pre-
To further expound on these points, the CSC's authority over TIDCORP is undisputed. The audit system. One of these circulars is Circular 89-299, which lifted the pre-audit of
rules that the CSC formulates should implement and be in harmony with the law it seeks to government transactions of the national government agencies, and the GOCCs. LGUs were
enforce. subsequently included. Such circular further provided that pre-audit activities retained by the
In TIDCORP's case, the CSC should also consider TIDCORP's charter in addition to other civil COA is no longer a pre-requisite to implement projects and in the payment of claims. Dela
service laws. Having said this, there remains the issue of how the CSC should apply the civil Llana, on 3 May 2006, wrote to the COA regarding the recommendation of the Senate
service law to TIDCORP, given the exemptions provided in the latter's charter. Committee on Agriculture and Food that the Dept. of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit
Does the wording of Section 7 of RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued service. The COA informed him of the Circular as well as AO 278, directing the strengthening of
requirements pursuant to RA 6758 despite its exemption from laws involving position internal audit systems. He then filed for this petition on certiorari, alleging that COA has the
classification? We answer in the negative. duty to pre-audit government transaction under Sec. 2 Art IX-D of the Constitution and that a
circular cannot lift the same. Such lack of pre-audit has allegedly led to the commission of
Intent of the legislature serious irregularities such as the P728M fertilizer fund scam. The issue of the case is w/n
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from Certiorari is the proper remedy.
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. The SC held that under Sec. 7, Art IX-A, decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words court via a petition for certiorari. However, these refer to decisions and orders which were
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the
statute. COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence, it is not reviewable by certiorari.
The use of "to endeavor" in the context of Section 7 of RA 8494 means that despite Nevertheless, the SC relaxed this procedural defect due to the seriousness of the allegation of a
TIDCORP's exemption from laws involving compensation, position classification and grave deficiency in observing a constitutional duty if proven correct. The SC held that there is
qualification standards, it should still strive to conform as closely as possible with the no mandatory duty under the Constitution to conduct a pre-audit. It is within COAs discretion
principles and modes provided in RA 6758. to do so in line with its vested exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
The phrase "as closely as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP's duty "to endeavor to examination. Pre-audit may be required such as when there is an inadequacy in the internal
conform," recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from RA 6758, but it should control system of an audited entity and such may be resorted to as a measure to correct the
still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. deficiencies.
control systems of government offices through the installation of an
internal audit service (IAS).
FACTS: On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the pre-
On 26 October 1982, COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the pre-audit system of audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that
government financial transactions. pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the
o The circular affirmed the state policy that all resources of the government 1987 Constitution.
shall be managed, expended or utilized in accordance with law and o Further, because of the lack of pre-audit, serious irregularities in
regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal or government transactions have been committed, such as the P728-million
improper disposition. fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory
o It was also designed to further facilitate or expedite government project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
transactions without impairing their integrity. On 22 February 2008, public respondents filed their Comment, arguing for the
After the 1986 revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the governments dismissal of the Petition because of its defective form (failure to allege material dates
financial transactions were uncovered. Hence, the pre-audit was reinstated thru such as receipt of a copy of the circular, to attach certified true copy of the assailed
Circular No. 86-257. Order, etc) and that certiorari is not the proper remedy considering that:
When the political system and government operations stabilized, COA issued Circular o (1) there is no allegation showing that the COA exercised judicial or quasi-
No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit of government transactions of national judicial functions when it promulgated Circular No. 89-299; and
government agencies (NGAs) and GOCCs. o (2) there is no convincing explanation showing how the promulgation of
o It reaffirmed the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management the circular was done with grave abuse of discretion.
as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; Public respondents aver that the circular is valid, as the COA has the power under the
o It also contributed to accelerating the delivery of public services and 1987 Constitution to promulgate it.
improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape
and ensuring facilitation of government transactions. ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to the extraordinary writ of certiorari to assail the Circular
o It also mandated the installation, implementation and monitoring of an 89-299NO.
adequate internal control system.
Circular No. 89-299 further provided that the pre-audit activities retained by the COA HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED.
shall no longer be a pre-requisite to the implementation or prosecution of projects
and the payment of claims. RATIO:
o The COA aimed to focus its efforts on the post-audit of financial accounts
and transactions, as well as on the assessment and evaluation of the Procedural Issues
adequacy and effectivity of the agencys fiscal control process. 1. While it is true that public respondents correctly allege that there was no attached
The COA later issued Circular No. 94-006 on 17 February 1994 and Circular No. 95- CTC of the assailed Order, and that the Petition lacked a statement of material dates,
006 on 18 May 1995 to include LGUs in the lifting of pre-audit activities. the SC still decided to tackle the merits due to the serious matters dealt in the
It also issued COA Circular No. 89-299, as amended by Circular No. 89-299A, which in Petition.
Section 3.2 provides that when the internal control system of a government agency is 2. Filed as a taxpayers suit, the SC held that they have standing. As claimed by the
inadequate, COA may reinstitute the pre-audit system or other control measures petitioner, the government transactions have been left unchecked by the lifting of
necessary to protect the funds and property of the agency. the pre-audit system and have led to the dissipation of public funds through
On 18 May 2009, COA issued Circular No. 2009-002, which reinstituted the selective numerous irregularities. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer,
pre-audit due to the rising incidents of irregular, illegal, wasteful and anomalous since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.
disbursements of huge amounts of public funds and disposals of public property. This
was again lifted on 22 July 2011 (CN 2011-002) because of the heightened vigilance 3. Propriety of Certiorari
of government agencies in safeguarding their resources. Public respondents aver that a petition for certiorari is not proper in this case, as
In the interregnum, on 3 May 2006, petitioner Dela Llana wrote to the COA regarding there is no indication that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, as required in certiorari proceedings.
Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. Conversely, petitioner for his part claims that certiorari is proper under Section 7,
o On 18 July 2006, the COA replied to petitioner, informing him of the prior Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part:
issuance of Circular No. 89-299. It also emphasized the required observance o Section 7. x x x. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
of AO 278 dated 8 June 1992, which directed the strengthening of internal any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from o COA is not required by the Constitution to conduct pre-audit of all
receipt of a copy thereof. government transactions and for all government agencies.
(DOCTRINE) Petitioner is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are o The only reference of a pre-audit requirement is when there is an
reviewable by the court via a petition for certiorari. inadequacy in the internal control system of an audited entity and such
o However, these refer to decisions and orders which were rendered by the may be resorted to as a measure to correct the deficiencies.
COA in its quasi-judicial capacity. Hence, the conduct of pre-audit is not a mandatory that the SC may compel the COA
o Circular No. 89-299 was promulgated by the COA under its quasi- to perform. It is within COAs discretion to do so in line with its vested exclusive
legislative or rule-making powers. authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.
o Hence, it is not reviewable by certiorari.
A petition for prohibition appropriate is not also in this case because it only lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative
functions.
The SC decided to set aside the technical procedure including the defects of the 2. Sahali v. Comelec (MT)
G.R. No. 201796 January 15, 2013
Petition to resolve the merits of the case due to the seriousness of the allegation of a Petitioners: GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI and VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALl
grave deficiency in observing a constitutional duty if proven correct. vs.
o Rules of procedure were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), RASHIDIN H. MA TBA and JILKASI J. USMAN
administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it.
Summary:
In this case, petitioner avers that the conduct of pre-audit by the COA could have
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court filed by
prevented the occurrence of the numerous alleged irregularities in government
Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and Ruby M. Sahali (Ruby), assailing the Order dated May 3, 2012
transactions that involved substantial amounts of public money.
issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and
2010-77. During the May 10, 2010 elections, Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba
Substantive Issues
(Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with
of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position
broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures
of Vice-Governor. On May 14, 2010, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed
and the use of public funds and property.
petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of
Its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
the province of Tawi-Tawi. Usman and Matba filed a protest.
give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
Private respondents Matba and Usman averred that, instead of recounting the ballots in the
Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct
pilot precincts constituting 20% of the protested precincts, the COMELEC First Division should
pre-audit.
order the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia from the 38 clustered
o A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
precincts that are the subject of both election protests filed by them. On March 5, 2012, the
consumption or payment.
COMELEC First Division issued an Order which granted the said ex-parte motion filed by Matba
o It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present:
and Usman. Thus, the COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics
(1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law
Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of the said election paraphernalia by
or other specific statutory authority;
comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing
(2) sufficiency of funds;
on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. The petitioners feeling that the comelec was in GADALEJ.
(3) reasonableness of the proposed expenditure, and the
Hence, the aforesaid petition was filed. The SC did not agree and said.
unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be charged
The petitioners resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an interlocutory order
is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and
issued by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. "A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order
(4) approval of the proper authority of the transaction and the
issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the order in
claim is duly supported by authentic underlying evidence.
this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
Petitioner anchors his argument on Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
which gives COA the power to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of public funds and on a post-
Facts:
audit basis. It also states that should the internal control system of audited agencies
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of
is inadequate, COA may adopt measures to correct the deficiencies. Thus, he claims
Court filed by Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and Ruby M. Sahali (Ruby), assailing the
that pre-auditing is mandatory and that it cannot be lifted by a mere circular.
Order dated May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections
The SC disagreed with the petitioner as such allegations find no support in the
(COMELEC) in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77.
Constitution.
During the May 10, 2010 elections, Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba following: first, the said Order was issued without due process since the COMELEC
(Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in the First Division did not allow them to oppose the said ex-parte motion; second, the
Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) COMELEC First Division cannot just order a technical examination in the absence of
ran for the position of Vice-Governor. published rules on the matter; and third, the COMELEC First Division could not just
On May 14, 2010, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners examine the said election paraphernalia without violating the Precautionary
Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the Protection Order issued by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the protest case
province of Tawi-Tawi. between Manuel Roxas and Jejomar Binay.
Alleging that the said elections in the Province of Tawi-Tawi were attended by The COMELEC First Division maintained that Sadikul and Ruby were not deprived of
massive and wide-scale irregularities, Matba filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam due process. It pointed out that the intention of Matba and Usman to ask for the
with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts technical examination of the said election documents had always been apparent
that functioned in the province of Tawi-Tawi. from the filing of their separate election protests, preliminary conference briefs and
Usman also filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC, contesting the their intention to offer as evidence all election documents and paraphernalia such as
results in 39 out of the 282 clustered precincts in the Province of Tawi-Tawi. Usmans the EDCVL, VRRs and Book of Voters on the protested precincts.
election protest was likewise raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC and was Hence, petitioners Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition with the SC essentially
docketed as EPC No. 2010-77. The respective election protests filed by private asserting that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion
respondents Matba and Usman prayed, inter alia, for the technical examination of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when: first, it did not give them the
the ballots, Election Day Computerized Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration opportunity to oppose the motion for technical examination filed by Matba and
Record (VRR), and the Book of Voters in all the protested precincts of the province of Usman; and second, it ordered the technical examination of the said election
Tawi-Tawi. paraphernalia despite the lack of sanction and published rules governing such
On January 17, 2012, the COMELEC resolved to consolidate EPC No. 2010-76 and EPC examination.
No. 2010-77. Issue: WON comelec acted with GADALEJ. NO.
On February 9, 2012, the retrieval and delivery of the ballot boxes and other election Ratio:
documents from the 39 protested precincts were completed. On February 20, 2012, The petition is denied.
the COMELEC First Division ordered the recount of the contested ballots, directing The petitioners resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to assail an
the creation of five recount committees for the said purpose. interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is amiss. "A party aggrieved
On February 24, 2012, Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an election protest
(Re: Order Dated 20 February 2012), requesting that they be allowed to secure may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for
photocopies of the contested ballots. Further, they moved for a technical certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the
examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters for the contested appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.
precincts in the province of Tawi-Tawi by comparing the signature and the Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases falling within
thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or
Book of Voters. resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division
Private respondents Matba and Usman averred that, instead of recounting the thereof. Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution mandates: Sec. 7. Each Commission
ballots in the pilot precincts constituting 20% of the protested precincts, the shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before
COMELEC First Division should order the technical examination of the said election it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
paraphernalia from the 38 clustered precincts that are the subject of both election or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
protests filed by them. pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
On March 5, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued an Order which granted the said Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
ex-parte motion filed by Matba and Usman. Thus, the COMELEC First Division decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
examination of the said election paraphernalia by comparing the signature and (Emphasis ours)
thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, this Court elucidated on the import of the said provision in
Book of Voters. this wise:
On March 9, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration (Of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
Order Dated March 5, 2012). They asserted that the March 5, 2012 Order issued by decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
the COMELEC First Division, insofar as it directed the technical examination of the division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters, should be reversed on account of the
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it
Division of the Commission on Elections. to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed
elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the
of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction
Civil Procedure, as amended. or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit
banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of the
filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc.
Here, the Orders dated March 5, 2012 and May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of The exception in Kho does not apply in the instant case since the COMELEC First
the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an Division is authorized to act on the ex-parte motion for the technical examination of
incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the said the said election paraphernalia. The COMELEC First Division has already acquired
election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for the petitioners is to await the jurisdiction over the election protests filed by Matba and Usman. Concomitant with
decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and such acquisition of jurisdiction is the authority of the COMELEC First Division to rule
Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC on the issues raised by the parties and all incidents arising therefrom, including the
en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration. authority to act on the ex-parte motion for technical examination of said election
The petitioners reliance on Kho case is misplaced. In Kho, the issue was whether a paraphernalia.
Division of the COMELEC may admit an answer with counter-protest which was filed The petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the COMELEC granted
beyond the reglementary period. This Court held that the COMELEC First Division the motion for technical examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them
gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the answer with counter-protest that the opportunity to oppose the said motion.
was belatedly filed. This Court does not agree.It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is
On the propriety of a filing a Petition for Certiorari with this Court sans any motion not duty-bound to notify and direct a party therein to file an opposition to a motion
for reconsideration having been filed with the COMELEC en banc, it was held therein filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems it
that, as an exception, direct resort to this Court via certiorari assailing an necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of a copy of
interlocutory order may be allowed when a Division of the COMELEC commits grave the same without awaiting for the COMELECs directive to do so. On this score,
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 clearly provides that:
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure confirms Sec. 3. No hearings on motions. Motions shall not be set for hearing unless the Commission
that the subject case does not fall on any of the instances over which the Commission directs otherwise. Oral argument in support thereof shall be allowed only upon the discretion
en banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows: "Section 2. The Commission en of the Commission. The adverse party may file opposition five days from receipt of the motion,
banc. - The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or upon the expiration of which such motion is deemed submitted for resolution. The Commission
in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of a shall resolve the motion within five days.
Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, If the party concerned, despite receipt of a copy of the motion that was filed with the
upon a unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or COMELEC, did not file an opposition to the said motion, the motion would be
issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the deemed submitted for resolution upon the expiration of the period to file an
Commission en banc." In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject opposition thereto.
controversy is one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of It should be stressed that one of the factors that should be considered in election
Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown that the protests is expediency. Proceedings in election protests are special and expeditious
present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to act nor a situation and the early resolution of such cases should not be hampered by any unnecessary
wherein the members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the subject observance of procedural rules. "The proceedings should not be encumbered by
case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the delays. All of these are because the term of elective office is likewise short. There is
circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum which the matter the personal stake of the contestants which generates feuds and discords. Above all
concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to. is the public interest. Title to public elective office must not be left long under cloud.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed grave abuse Efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus understandable
of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory that pitfalls which may retard the determination of election contests should be
orders relative to an action pending before it and the controversy did not fall under avoided."
any of the instances mentioned in section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Further, this Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in the
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the issuance of the COMELEC First Divisions March 5, 2012 Order. The petitioners were
able to present their opposition to the said motion for technical examination in their opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February
manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC 04,1 9 9 9 , C h a i r m a n C o r a z o n A l m a G . d e t h e C o m m i s s i o n o n A u d i t r e q u e s t i n g
First Division on March 9, 2012. Indeed, the petitioners objections to the technical o p i n i o n o n w h e t h e r o r n o t Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff
examination of the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February
COMELEC First Division in its May 3, 2012 Resolution. Having filed a motion for 02, 1999.
reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions March 5, 2012 Order, the petitioners On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the
claim of denial of due process is clearly unfounded. term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated inher appointment
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. conformably with the constitutional intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in
by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective
correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission
winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication on Audit Enbanc.
of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal.
the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper
by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the people. which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to
Here, the technical examination ordered by the COMELEC First Division, by recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the
comparing the signature and the thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against President.
those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters, is a reasonable, efficient and In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on
expeditious means of determining the truth or falsity of the allegations of fraud and Audit denied the motion.
irregularities in the canvass of the votes in the province of Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly,
the COMELEC First Division did not commit any abuse of discretion when it allowed ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Gaminde as Commissioner of the CSC expired on Feb 2,
the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia. 1999, as stated in her appointment paper or on Feb 02, 2000 as she claims.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Order dated May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the Commission HELD: Gamindes term ends on Feb 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment papers and not on
on Elections in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Feb 2, 2000 as she claims. The opinion of the Deputy Exec Secretary (Si former Chief Justice
Corona yan, just in case he asks) that her term was until Feb 2, 2000 is incorrect.
Term v. Tenure
Termthe time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
ARTICLE IX-B Sec. 1 interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
Gaminde v. COA (JM) Tenuremay be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
GR No. 140335 | December 13, 2000 incumbent.
Pardo, J.
Rotation/Cycle
Petitioner: Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde
Respondents: Commission on Audit and/or Hon. Celso D. Gangan Republic v. Imperial: the operation of the rotational plan requires two indispensible
Hon. Raul C. Flores and Emmanuel M. Dalman conditions, 1) that the terms of the first 3 commissioners should start on a common date
and 2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
SYLLABUS DOCTRINE: Term is the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of
SUMMARY: the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the
Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. The
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On S e p t e m b e r 0 7 , 1 9 9 3 , t h e appropriate starting point of terms under the 1987 Consti must be on Feb 2, 1987the
Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed date of adoption of the Consti. In case of belated appointment or qualification, the time
t h e appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the between the start of the term and actual qualification must be counted against the
Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the appointee.
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998. Opined that petitioners term
of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory
*Read quickly the discussion on computation of terms in the ratio of the digest to better
understand. ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Gaminde as Commissioner of the CSC expired on Feb 2,
1999, as stated in her appointment paper or on Feb 02, 2000 as she claims.
FACTS:
Nature of the Casespecial civil action for certiorari seeking to annul or set aside two HELD: WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as
decisions of the Commission on Audit ruling that Gamindes term of office as Commissioner, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President
Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de
02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment paper. facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and
other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred
Appointment Paper in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous
Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil staff.
Service Commission on June 11, 1993. She assumed office on June 22 after taking an oath and ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow
her appointment was confirmed by Congress on September 7, 1993. the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff
during her tenure asde facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.
Her appointment paper reads:
11 June 1993 RATIO:
Madam: Rotation/Cycle of Terms
Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, Article IX, Section 1(2), 1987 Constitution
COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2, 1999. Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your oath reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
of office. Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
Request for Clarification predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
On Feb 24, 1998, Gaminde sought clarification from the Office of the Pres as to when capacity.
her term of office expires. In a letter, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that Gamindes
term of office will expire on February 02, 2000 and not on February 2, 1999. The first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC was first
Gaminde relied on the opinion and stayed in office even after Feb 2, 1999. On Feb 4, introduced in the 1973 Constitution. This was copied from the 1935 Consti on the
1999, the Chairman of the CSC, De Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit to ask for their rotation/cycle of the COMELEC
opinion on the expiration of Gamindes term of office. And whether or not Gaminde and her Republic v. Imperial: the operation of the rotational plan requires two indispensible
co-terminous staff may be paid salaries notwithstanding the expiration of the appointments conditions, 1) that the terms of the first 3 commissioners should start on a common date
on Feb 2, 2000. and 2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
COA Decision Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional
On Feb 18, the General Counsel of COA issued an opinion stating that Gamindes term of office Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of
has expired on Feb 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order
intent. that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the
regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. The
Consequently, the CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit appropriate starting point of terms under the 1987 Consti must be on Feb 2, 1987the
the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde and her co-terminous staff, effective Feb 2, 1999. date of adoption of the Consti. In case of belated appointment or qualification, the time
between the start of the term and actual qualification must be counted against the
Gaminde appealed the disallowance to the Commission en banc. On June 15,1999, the COA appointee.
issued a decision dismissing the appeal and affirmed the disallowance. The term of office can
be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper. COA also said that it does Term v. Tenure
not have the power to extend the term of Gaminde, not even with the implied acquiescence of Termthe time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
the Office of the President. interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.
Tenuremay be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
Gaminde moved for reconsideration but was denied by the COA. Hence, the petition. incumbent.
In May 1988, Cory appointed him for a three year term which ended on Feb 2, 1990. But
Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Consti he served as de facto commish until May 31, 1991.
SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Ereneta was then appointed for a term expiring on Feb 2, 1997.
Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year after the
ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become Pattern: Regular interval of vacancy every 2 years:
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term Feb 2, 1994 for the first Chairman
thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than seven years including service Feb 2, 1992 for the first five-year term commissioner
before the ratification of this Constitution. Feb 2, 1990 for the first three-year term commissioner
This pertains to TENURE and NOT TERM of the incumbent Members of the CSC, Comelec
and COA. Their successors must maintain the two year interval.
The transitory provisions mean that incumbent members of the ConComs shall continue in Type Start Term End Term Tenure
office for one more year after the ratification of the Constitution under their existing Chairman First 7 year Feb 2, 1987 Feb 2, 1994 Mar 4, 1988-
appointments and at the discretion of the appointing power who may cut short their original Mar 8, 1995
TENURE by: Successor 1 Feb 2 1994 Feb 2001 Mar 22, 199
1. Removal from office for cause Feb 2, 2001
2. Becoming incapacitated to discharge duties of their office Successor 2 Feb 2001 Feb 2008 ----
3. Their appointment to a new term thereunder 2nd Member First Appointee Feb 1987 Feb 1992 Mar 4 1988-
All of which have to occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity (5 years) Mar 4 1993
of the Constitution. Successor 1 Feb 1992 Feb 1999 June 11, 1993
The transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, which (GAMINDE) Feb 2 , 2000
provides for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees. Successor 2 Feb 1999 Feb 2006 Sep 8, 2000 to
Feb 2, 2006
Computation of the TERMS of the first appointees and their successors to the CSC by their 3rd Member First Appointee Feb 1987 Feb 1990 May 30, 1988 to
respective lines (3 years) May 31, 1991
Successor 1 Feb 1990 Feb 1997 Dec 12 1991 to
FIRST LINEChairman7 years Feb 02 1997
Start: Feb 2, 1987; End: Feb 1, 1994 Successor 2 Feb 1997 Feb 2004
On January 30, 1988, Sto. Tomas was appointed as Chairman of the CSC. Her appointment
was confirmed by Congress on March 2, 1988. She assumed office on March 4, 1988. Basta the term is fixed. So if they extend their tenure, the person who will succeed them will
Her term ended on Feb 2, 1994 but she served as de facto Chairman until March 4, 1995. start from the end of the term and not from the end of the tenure.
On March 5, 1995, De Leon was appointed to a regular seven-year term. This term must
be deemed to start on Feb 2, 1994, immediately succeeding her predecessor. Her term
will thus end on Feb 1, 2001. Sec. 2
SECOND LINECommissionerFirst Appointee for 5 years (This is where Gaminde falls) 1. MWSS v. Hernandez (MB)
Start: Feb 2, 1987; End: Feb 2, 1992 Employees of GOCCs governed by civil service laws
The Commissioner before Gaminde also served as de facto Commissioner for one year G.R. No. 71818. August 19, 1986. Narvasa, J.
after the expiration of his term, which was on Feb 2, 1992. Petitioner: Metropolitan Waterworks And Sewerage System (MWSS)
Gaminde, who was appointed in 1993, is deemed to have started her term on Feb 2, 1992. Respondents: Hon. Bienvenido S. Hernandez, Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission, Lemuel B. Alegado,
Danilo S. Lopez, Fortunato L. Madrona, Etc., Et Al.
She is bound by the terms of her appointment which was to end in Feb 2, 1999. The
opinion of Deputy Exec Secretary Corona that her term will expire on Feb 2, 2000 was
wrong. SUMMARY:
MWSS contractual employees filed a complaint for willfull failure to pay wage differentials,
THIRD LINECommissionerFirst Appointee for 3 years allowances and other monetary benefits in the NLRC. MWSS answered that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction because it is a GOCC. Labor Arbiter ruled against MWSS saying that since
Start: Feb 2, 1987; End: Feb 2, 1990
employees are contractual and not regular, they are governed by the Labor Code, and that the
Commissioner Yango was already incumbent Commissioner at the time of the adoption of
NLRC has jurisdiction over monetary claims.
the 1987 Consti. His extended tenure ended on Feb 2, 1988.
Issue: Are employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations
governing the civil service? --- CIVIL SERVICE
1. Employment in the MWSS, a GOCC, is governed not by the Labor Code but by the civil o Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
service law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
that employment are not cognizable by the NLRC. requiring special or technical skin not available in the employing agency, to
2. No distinction between regular or contractual employees. Positions in the civil service be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one
are classified into career and non-career service. Non-career service includes year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
contractual personnel. responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
3. Civil service law governs monetary claims as well. agency.
2. Civil service law governs monetary claims as well.
FACTS: The Labor Arbiter's other postulation, that the Civil Service Law governs employment
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) was haled before the in the MWSS in all aspect except "monetary claims," and that as to the latter, it is the
Arbitration Branch, NCR of the NLRC on charges of willfull failure to pay wage Labor Code that applies, is even more patently illogical and deserves no confutation.
differentials, allowances and other monetary benefits to its contractual employees
numbering 2,500 or so.
MWSS answered:
o It is a GOCC and therefore the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case. 2. BLISS v Callejo (RS)
o Terms and conditions of the complainants who are all contractual GR no 80887 | 9/30/1994 | Kapunan, J
employees are governed by their respective contracts Petitioner: BLISS Devt Corp. Employees Union [BDCEU]-Sentro ng Demokratikong Manggagawa [SDM]
Respondent: Hon. Pura Calleja, BLISS Devt Corp. [BDC]
LA ruled against MWSS
o Agrees that if the complainants are regular employees of MWSS, it being a
SUMMARY
GOCC, said employees are within the mantle of the civil service rules and
Petitioner unions filed a petitioner for certification election. The petition was dismissed by the
regulations, their salaries are standardized by the National Assembly, then
Med-Arbiter and the Director of the BLR for the reason that BDC is a GOCC, which is covered by
this Commission has no jurisdiction in the case BUT an examination of the
EO 180, requiring registration under 7 thereof as a precondition for PCE. WN BDC is a GOCC
records shows that complainants are not regular employees of the
subject to Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations. No. 1 of EO 180 expressly limits its
respondent MWSS, but one of limited period.
application to only GOCCS with original charters. A corporation is created by operation of law.
o Controversies do fall within the competence of the NLRC if they
It acquires a judicial personality either by special law or a general law. The general law under
involve non-regular or contractual employees of the MWSS.
which a private corporation may be formed or organized is the Corporation Code, the
o The Civil Service Decree applies to employees in government corporations
requirements of which must be complied with by those wishing to incorporate. On the other
in all matters except "monetary claims"; as regards the latter, it is the Labor
hand, a government corporation is normally created by special law, referred to often as a
Code that governs.
charter. BDC is a government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law. It is
Hence the present petition for certiorari and prohibition by MWSS.
without a charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law hence,
ISSUE:
Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it.
Are employees of the MWSS covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing
the civil service? --- CIVIL SERVICE
FACTS
10/10/1986 Petitioner, a duly registered union, filed a petition for certification
HELD:
election of BDC w/ the DOLE-NCR.
Decision of the LA void and set aside for lack of jurisdiction.
Med-arbiter Fernando dismissed petition for lack of jurisdiction stating that
RATIO:
majority of BDCs stocks is owned by Human Settlement Development Corporation
1. Employees of GOCCs are governed by civil service law.
[HSDC], a GOCC. Portions of the Order:
The character of the MWSS as a GOCC is not contested.
o NHC v. Juco: There should no longer be any question at this time that
Employment in the MWSS is governed not by the Labor Code but by the civil service
employees of government owned or controlled corporations are governed
law, rules and regulations; and controversies arising from or connected with that
by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
employment are not cognizable by the NLRC.
o Corollary to the issue of whether or not employees of BDC may form or join
The argument of the Labor Arbiter that it is only disputes between the MWSS and labor organizations therefore is the issue of whether or not BDC is a
its regular employees that are beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRC, not those government owned corporation.
between it and its "non-regular or contractual" employees, is sophistical. There is no o Pertinent law on the matter is PD 2029 Section 2 Definition A
legal or logical justification for such a distinction. government-owned or controlled corporation is a stock or non-stock
Positions in the civil service are classified into career and non-career service. Non- corporation whether performing government or proprietary functions,
career service includes: which is directly chartered by special law or if organized under the general
corporation law is owned or controlled by the government or subsidiary o Section 1 of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the
corporation, to the extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."
stock or of its outstanding voting stock. o Every means each one of a group, without exception. It means all possible
o It is not disputed that majority of the stocks of BDC are owned by Human and all, taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a
Settlement Development Corporation, a wholly government owned corporation created as a government-owned or controlled
corporation, hence, this Office cannot, but otherwise conclude that Bliss entity. . . . .
Development Corporation is a government owned corporation whose However, our ruling in NHC v. Juco case, which was decided under the 1973
employees are governed not by the Labor Code but by the Civil Service law, Constitution, lost its applicability with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
rules, and regulations. Its employees therefore, are prohibited to join or Thus, in National Service Corporation v. NLRC, we held that:
form labor organization. Further, this Office is without authority to o . . . In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCCs, the 1987
entertain the present petition for obvious lack of jurisdiction. Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC vs.
Petitioner union appealed with the BLR Juco is based. Under the 1973 Constitution, it was provided that:
1/1/1987 Meantime, Prez Cory Aquino issued EO 180, extending to government The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
employees the right to organize and bargain collectively. instrumentality of the Government, including every government-
o Sec. 1 This Executive Order applies to all employees of all branches, owned or controlled corporation. . . . [Constitution, 1973, Art. II-
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including B, Sec. I(1)]
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. . . . o On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution provides that:
(Emphasis supplied) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
o Sec. 7 - Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. The government-owned or controlled corporations with original
application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the charter. (Emphasis supplied) [Constitution (1987), Art. IX-B, Sec.
Department which shall process the same in accordance with the 2(1).
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Applications o Thus the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and
may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and expressed by the Court in the National Housing Corporation case in the
Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the following manner [continue reading onto the next open bullet point]
Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt hereof. The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a
8/7/1987 Dir. Pura Calleja of the BLR dismissed the appeal circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: It would be possible for a regulate ministry of government to
WN BDC is a GOCC subject to Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations. No. create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation
WN BDCEU is covered by EO No. 180 and must register under 7 thereof as a Code funded by a willing legislature.
precondition for filing a petition for certification election. Therefore, BDC is subject to A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary
Civil Service law, rules and regulations. No. corporations.
These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two
HELD worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged
Granted. Director of Labor Relations is hereby directed to give due course of individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the
petitioner's application for certification election. Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on
Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive
RATIO restrains of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of
1 of EO 180 expressly limits its application to only GOCCS with original charters. civil service employment.
Hence, Callejas order dated 8/7/1987 requiring petitioner union to register in Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations
accordance with Section 7 of executive Order No. 180 is without legal basis. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through
Without categorically saying so, public respondent sustained the Med-Arbiter's incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional
invocation of the case of National Housing Corporation v. Juco, which rules that the amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the
inclusion of GOCCs within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort of civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a
the framers of the 1973 Constitution to plug an earlier loophole which allowed situation cannot be allowed to exist. [134 SCRA 182-183]
GOCCs to avoid the full consequences of the all encompassing coverage of the civil o appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional
service system. In said case, we stressed that: provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter; and, therefore, by clear
implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or is not automatically vested or transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the latter simply
controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
government-owned or controlled corporations under the general
corporation law. FACTS:
A corporation is created by operation of law. It acquires a judicial personality either In a resolution dated October 29, 1982, the SC granted the motion of the widow of
by special law or a general law. The general law under which a private corporation Feliciano Talens to substitute the heirs of private respondent Feliciano C. Talens in
may be formed or organized is the Corporation Code, the requirements of which place of respondent, in view of the latter's death on August 28, 1982.
must be complied with by those wishing to incorporate. There is no dispute as to the factual antecedents of this case.
o Only upon such compliance will the corporation come into being and Feliciano C. Talens, a civil service eligible, was appointed on March 16, 1970 by then
acquire a juridical personality, thus giving rise to is right to exist and act as a City Mayor Macario Asistio of Caloocan City, as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor.
legal entity. o His appointment was attested to as a permanent one under Section 24(b)
On the other hand, a government corporation is normally created by special law, of RA 2260, as amended by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
referred to often as a charter. o He performed the duties of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor and even
BDC is a government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law. It is twice received increases in salary.
without a charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Law On January 11, 1972, City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, successor of Mayor Asistio,
hence, Executive Order No. 180 does not apply to it. furnished Talens with AO 3 stating that, pursuant to Sec. 5(f) of the Civil Service Law,
Consequently, public respondent Calleja committed grave abuse of discretion in he has been terminated as Asst. Secretary to the Mayor for lack and loss of
ordering petition to register under Section 7, of EO 180 as a precondition for filing a confidence, given that such position is non-competitive and that inherent in the
petition for certification election. nature of such position to be primarily and highly confidential.
Talens, acknowledging receipt of said order, demurred on the ground Sec. 5(f) of the
Civil Service Law, which specifies as non-competitive only the positions of
"secretaries of provincial city and municipal boards and councils."
3. Samsonv CA (HQ) o He asked that the AO be recalled as he was permanently appointed to a
G.R. No. L-43182 | November 25, 1986 | ALAMPAY, J.
Petitioners: MARCIAL F. SAMSON, City Mayor of Caloocan City, THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY AUDITOR, both of Caloocan classified position in the city government and that in accordance with
City, and HERMOGENES LIWAG Section 32, his position as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor was not
Respondents: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CFI-RIZAL and FELICIANO C. TALENS covered by the Civil Service Law; thus, he can be removed only for cause
and after due process has been observed.
SUMMARY: AO 3 was issued by the then Mayor Samson of Caloocan City, summarily On January 17, 1972, Mayor Samson declined to recall the AO for the same reasons
terminating the services of the Feliciano C. Talens, who held the position of Assistant Secretary stated in the AO.
to the Mayor, on the ground of "lack and loss of confidence" and appointing in place of the Talens filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto with
latter Hermogenes Liwag. The sole issue to be resolved in this case is the legality of such AO. the CFI of Caloocan on January 21, 1972 in order to annul the disputed AO, to enjoin
Cited in support of the challenged AO is section 5(f) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, as the petitioner mayor, treasurer and auditor from enforcing the same, and to compel
amended. This provision declares the position of secretaries to city mayors non-competitive all the said public officials to pay to private respondent the salaries and emoluments
and this was interpreted by herein petitioner Mayor as to include the position of Assistant due to him as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor.
Secretary to the Mayor. The SC held that as a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions o He also sought the ouster from the disputed position of Hermogenes Liwag,
and instrumentalities of the governmentalities of the government, including those in GOCCs, one of the petitioners herein, who was appointed by Mayor Samson as
belong to the competitive service. The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to Assistant Secretary.
be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily CFI ruled for Talens
confidential or highly technical in nature. Under the rules of StatCon, exceptions must be CA affirmed CFI decision.
construed strictly and when an enumeration is provided for, it should exclude those not
Hence the petition.
expressly mentioned. Asst. Secretaries are not among those expressly declared as non-
According to petitioners, the only issue which this Court has to resolve is the legality
competitive. Furthermore, it is the nature of the functions which ultimately determines
of the termination of Talens' services. They contend that the termination of his
whether such position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical. It is not
services is authorized by Section 5(f) of the Civil Service Acy which declares the
the powers and duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant Secretary. Contrary to
position of Secretaries of City Mayors as belonging to the non-competitive service.
Petitioners arguments that it falls under the general term secretaries in Sec. 5(f), an assistant
Further, they aver that termination of the services of Talens is justified by the fact
merely helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the person who is actually clothed
that the disputed position is inherently and primarily highly confidential in nature.
with all the duties and responsibilities of "secretary." The functions strictly attributable to a
"secretary" and which would repose on such person the trust and confidence of the employer,
ISSUE: WON AO 3 is validNO.
HELD: CA decision AFFIRMED. It should be stressed that the position of Secretary to the Mayor and that of
Assistant Secretary to the Mayor are two separate and distinct positions.
RATIO: o While both individuals may be called "secretary," one is certainly of a
Section 5 of RA No. 2260, as amended by RA 6040 provides that "That non- higher category and rank than the other with the added distinction that a
competitive service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be Secretary must enjoy the confidence of the Mayor.
in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily o However, the position of Assistant Secretary need not carry the requisites
confidential or highly technical in nature" and continues with an enumeration of attaching to the primarily confidential position of the actual Secretary to
specific officers and employees embraced within the scope of non-competitive the Mayor.
service. Moreover, if it was the intention of Congress to include the Assistant Secretaries
o Among those included in the enumeration are heads of departments within the purview of Section 5(f) of R.A. No. 2260, the law could have been easily
created in charters of cities and secretaries of provincial governors, city worded "secretaries and their assistance."
mayors and municipal mayors. Further, the SC disagreed with petitioners contention that an Asst. Secretary is also a
Although the position of assistant secretary to the city mayor is not among those secretary included in the general term under Sec. 5(f).
therein expressly declared, petitioners argue that an assistant secretary is also a o An "assistant" merely helps, aids or serves in a subordinate capacity to the
secretary, and thus comprised within the general term "secretaries" as provided for person who is actually clothed with all the duties and responsibilities of
in Section 5(f). "secretary."
The SC disagreed. o The functions strictly attributable to a "secretary" and which would repose
As may be noted, the general purpose of the Civil Service Law (RA 2260) is "to insure on such person the trust and confidence of the employer, is not
and promote the constitutional mandate regarding appointment only according to automatically vested or transferred to an "assistant secretary," because the
merit and fitness, and to provide within the public service a progressive system of latter simply assists or aids the former in the accomplishment of his duties.
personal administration to insure the maintenance of an honest and efficient The rulings of this Court in De Los Santos vs. Mallare and Besa vs. PNB invoked by the
progressive and courteous civil service in the Philippines." petitioners do not provide support to petitioners' case.
As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the o The case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, relates to a quo warranto proceeding,
governmentalities of the government, including those in GOCCs, belong to the questioning the legality of the appointment of the respondent therein to
competitive service. the office of the City Engineer for the City of Baguio which petitioner De los
o The only exceptions are those expressly declared by law to be in the non- Santos was then occupying. Said position was in fact declared to be neither
competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical and
confidential or highly technical in nature. petitioner therein was adjudged to be entitled to remain in office and the
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be respondent's appointment was declared ineffective.
strictly, but reasonably construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the o Neither would the other case of Besa vs. PNB find any application to the
general provisions rather than the exception. instant case because the position therein involved was that of Chief Legal
o Where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to Counsel which, by its very nature, was rightfully ruled to be both impressed
operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not with a highly technical aspect and confidential character.
expressly mentioned (Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979 ed., p. 71 citing o The facts and circumstances in the present case and even the principal
Dave's Place vs. Liquor Control Comm., 269 N.W., p, 504). issue involved in the case at bar are distinctly different from the cases cited
The exceptions provided for in Section 5 should be strictly construed. by petitioners.
o It follows then that on this general governing principle, the position of Further, in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the SC held that the fact that they, at times, handle
assistant secretary to the City Mayor of Caloocan City should be 'confidential matters' does not suffice to characterize their 'positions' as primarily
considered as not belonging to the non-competitive service. confidential. Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle 'other routine
The parties agreed that the nature of the functions ultimately determines whether matters,' and it has not even been shown that their work is, at least, principally
such position is policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical. confidential.
o It is not the powers and duties exercised and discharged by the Assistant
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but considering the notice of death given to this Court of
Secretary to the Mayor as may be delegated and assigned by the Mayor the death of the herein private respondent Feliciano C. Talens, on August 28, 1982 (Rollo, p. 184), the dispositive portion
that makes the position of Assistant Secretary primarily confidential. of the subject decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. C-2308, is hereby MODIFIED, to now read as follows:
o While duties possibly involving confidential matters are sometimes handled IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of Petitioner
Feliciano C. Talens, and against the Respondents, and Declaring Administrative Order No. 3, dated January 10,
by the Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, this does not necessarily transform 1972, of Respondent City Mayor Marcial F. Samson, null and void;
the nature of the position itself as one that is primarily and highly Ordering Respondents, except private respondent Hermogenes Liwag, to pay Petitioner Feliciano C. Talens, all
confidential. the salaries and emoluments appurtenant to and due to the latter as Assistant Secretary to the Mayor of
Caloocan City, but for a limited period of three years. Without costs.
Dissenting:
4. Grino v CSC (VG) Padilla: The removal of Provincial Officers, being not part of the Governors confidential staff,
G.R. No. 91602 February 26, 1991 | GANCAYCO, J.
Petitioners: HONORABLE SIMPLICIO C. GRIO, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, SANTOS B. AGUADERA, MANUEL B. TRAVIA and should be subject to the CSC rules.
MANUEL M. CASUMPANG Sarmiento: The loss of confidence must also be applied to subordinate officials.
vs.
Respondents: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TEOTIMO ARANDELA, CIRILO GELVEZON, TEODULFO DATO-ON, and NELSON
GEDUSPAN FACTS
Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo.
Summary: When Demaisip resigned as Provincial Atty of Iloilo, he recommended Arandela to When he resigned to become acting Governor, he recommended the elevation of Teotimo
such position. Arandela was later appointed as such which Gelvezon, Datu-on and Geduspan Arandela from Senior Legal Officer to Provincial Attorney.
assuming subordinate position. A month after Grio was elected for Governor, he terminated OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador later on decided to appoint Arandela as the Provincial
Arandela and all legal officers at the Provincial Attorneys Office. He mentioned of an article Attorney. One Cirilo Gelvezon, on the other hand, was promoted from Legal Officer II to
about said Provincial Attorneys Office appeared in the Panay News and such has "undermined Senior Legal Officer. Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan were appointed to the
that trust and confidence" reposed to them. The 4 officials appealed to the Merit Systems position of Legal
Protection Board, which ruled in their favor. Governor appealed to the CSC and which affirmed Officer II.
the Boards position. The issue is WON the position of a provincial attorney and those of his Later, Simplicio Grio assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month
legal subordinates are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those holding later, he informed Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office
the said items can be terminated upon loss of confidence. YES, but does not apply to about his decision to terminate their services.
subordinate officers. In his letter, Grio made mention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo office of the
Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which "undermined that trust
The SC ruled based on two cases: Cadiente vs. Santos and Besa v. PNB and confidence" that he reposed on them.
Governor Grio reappointed Demaisip as the Provincial Attorney. Grio also arranged the
In Cadiente vs. Santos, this Court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is undeniably replacements of the other legal officers, such as Gelvezon and Geduspan.
one which is primarily confidential in this manner: Subsequently, Governor Grio formally terminated the services of the Arandela, Gelvezon,
- The position of a City Legal Officer is one which is "primarily confidential." Geduspan and Datu-on on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The 4 apealled to
- This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido that the position of a City Legal the Merit Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission.
Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended The Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring their termination illegal and ordering
to said officer. that they be immediately restored to their positions with back salaries and other
- The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of emoluments due them.
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them Grio appealed to the Civil Service Commission.
endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal In Resolution No. 89-the Civil Service Commission affirmed the Order of the Merit Systems
- When such confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is separated from Protection Board, and directed that the four to be restored to their former legal positions
the service, such cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term. and be paid back salaries and other benefits.
In Besa vs. Philippine National Bank, where petitioner, who was the Chief Legal Counsel Grio filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CSC resolution and was denied.
with the rank of Vice President of the PNB:
- Where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical and ISSUE: WON the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal subordinates are
confidential, there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the latter primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be
aspect predominates. terminated upon loss of confidence.
- The incumbent of a primarily confidential position should realize that at any time
the appointing power may decide that his services are no longer needed. HELD: WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED with respect to the
Such previous rulings apply in the case because: position of provincial attorney of Iloilo. Respondent Teotimo Arandela is hereby ordered to
The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA No. 5185 vacate said position upon the finality of this Decision. The Decision of the respondent Civil
which categorized them together as positions of "trust", to wit: To enable the provincial Service Commission pertaining to respondents Cirilo Gelvezon, Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson
and city governments to avail themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal Geduspan is hereby AFFIRMED.
officer Their services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services."
The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and RATIO
confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person ON whether the position of a provincial attorney is primarily confidential so that the
or a government functionary. But that does not extend to the subordinate officers. holder thereof may be terminated upon loss of confidence.
In Cadiente vs. Santos, this Court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is undeniably - Where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical and
one which is primarily confidential in this manner: confidential, there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the latter
- The position of a City Legal Officer is one which is "primarily confidential." aspect predominates.
- This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido that the position of a City Legal - The incumbent of a primarily confidential position should realize that at any time the
Officer is one requiring that utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended appointing power may decide that his services are no longer needed.
to said officer.
- The relationship existing between a lawyer and his client, whether a private The position is imbued with trust. Being a legal adviser and legal officer for the civil
individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust that cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely
the latter entertains for the counsel selected. categorized by law to be "trusted services."
- As stated in the case of Pinero vs. Hechanova, the phrase "primarily confidential"
"denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the - The SC ruled that they apply to the present case.
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without - A city legal officer appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on for its counterpart in the province a provincial attorney appointed by the provincial
confidential matters of state. governor.
- The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of - The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created under RA No.
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them 5185 which categorized them together as positions of "trust", to wit:
endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal Sec. 19. Creation of positions of Provincial Attorney and City Legal officer.
- When such confidence is lost and the officer holding such position is separated from To enable the provincial and city governments to avail themselves of the
the service, such cessation entails no removal but an expiration of his term. full time and trusted services of legal officers, the positions of provincial
- In the case of Hernandez vs. Villegas, the termination of their official relation can be attorney and city legal officer may be created and such officials shall be
justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation appointed in such manner as is provided for under Section four of this Act.
from office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office For this purpose the functions hitherto performed by the provincial and city
two different causes for the termination of official relations recognized in the Law of fiscals in serving as legal adviser and legal officer for civil cases of the
Public Officers. province and city shall be transferred to the provincial attorney and city
- In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayor of Davao terminated the services legal officer, respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)
of the petitioner, he was not removed or dismissed. There being no removal or By virtue of RA No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the
dismissal it could not, therefore, be said that there was a violation of the legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they
constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be work for. Their services are precisely categorized by law to be "trusted services."
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section 1 The fact that position of Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as one
(3), 1973 Constitution). under the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission
- In the case of Ingles vs. Mutuc, when an incumbent of a primarily confidential cannot conceal or alter its highly confidential nature.
position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and the pleasure turns As in Cadiente where the position of the city legal officer was duly attested as permanent
into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term by the Civil Service Commission before this Court declared that the same was primarily
merely expires. confidential, this Court holds that the position of respondent Arandela as the provincial
- The main difference between the former the primary confidential officer and attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily confidential position.
the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is Following the principle that the tenure of an official holding a primarily confidential
not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes position ends upon loss of confidence, the Court finds that private respondent Arandela
fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an was not dismissed or removed from office when his services were terminated. His term
end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not merely expired.
removed or dismissed from office his term merely expired. The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and
- The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence of the highest degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them a government functionary. The personal character of the relationship prohibits its
endures, and thus their cessation involves no removal. delegation in favor of another attorney without the client's consent.
In Besa vs. Philippine National Bank, where petitioner, who was the Chief Legal Counsel However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the relationship, can be
with the rank of Vice President of the r Philippine National Bank, questioned his being delegated. The practice of delegating work of a counsel to his subordinates is apparent in
transferred to the position of Consultant on Legal Matters in the Office of President, this the Office of the Provincial Attorney wherein it can be gleaned from the power granted to
Court, considering said position to be primarily confidential held such officer to exercise administrative supervision and control over the acts and decision
- It cannot be denied of course that the work of the Chief Legal Counsel of the Bank is of his subordinates.
impressed with a highly technical aspect.
It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where lawyers act as While it is true that Cadiente and Besa only involved a city legal officer and the PNB chief
counsel in confidential and non-confidential positions by simply looking at the proximity of legal counsel, the same cases do not by any means preclude the application of the said
the position in question in relation to that of the appointing authority. precedents to legal assistants or subordinate lawyers in appropriate cases when such
Occupants of such positions would be considered confidential employees if issue is squarely raised as presently.
the predominant reason they were chosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief Hence, both positions, the termination from office of the legal assistants or subordinate
that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which measures lawyers must likewise follow as a consequence of the loss of confidence upon them by the
freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal provincial governor.
of personal trust on confidential matters of state.
This implies that positions in the civil service of such nature would be limited to those not
separated from the position of the appointing authority by an intervening public officer,
or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy. This is an additional reason why
5. Achacoso v Macaraig (LC)
Petitioner: Tomas D. Achacoso
the positions of "City Legal Officer" and "Private Secretary to the President" were Respondents: Catalino Macaraig and Ruben Torres, as Exec Sec and DOLE Sec, and Jose Sarmiento
considered primarily confidential by the Court. GR 93023
On the other hand, a customs policeman serving in the Harbor Patrol, in relation to the March 13, 1991
Cruz, J.
Commissioner of Customs, and an executive assistant, stenographer, or clerk in the Office
of the President, were not considered so by the Court.
Summary: Achacoso was appointed as Administrator of the POEA. In 1990, the President
There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists requested all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads, and
the confidential employer above described. other government officials to file a courtesy resignation. Achacoso did, and it was accepted.
- Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the Later, when he was asked to turn over his office, he refused, saying that the resignation was
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. not voluntary. When Sarmiento was appointed as POEA Admin, Achacoso protested, and filed
- The importance of these subordinates to the appointing authority now lies in the with the SC after the protest was denied. Issue is whether or not Achacoso has Security of
contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential employee. Tenure, since he is in the Career Executive Service. SC held NO because when he was
- At this level of the bureaucracy, any impairment of the appointing authority's interest appointed, he did not have the requisite qualifications for POEA Administrator. Thus, his
as a client, which may be caused through the breach of residual trust by any of these appointment had no fixed tenure, and could validly be revoked at the instance of the
lower-ranked lawyers, can be anticipated and prevented by the confidential appointing power.
employee, as a reasonably competent office head, through the exercise of his power
to "review, approve, reverse, or modify" their acts and decisions. At this level, the Two Opposing Points of View: Achacoso invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal
client can be protected without need of imposing upon the lower-ranked lawyers the without legal cause. The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not
fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client relationship. Hence, there is now no a career official.
obstacle to giving full effect to the security of tenure principle to these members of
the civil service. FACTS
- Their positions are highly technical in character and not confidential, so they are
permanent employees, and they belong to the category of classified employees
under the Civil Service Law. Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the POEA on October 16, 1987,
- Consequently, the holders of the said items, being permanent employees, enjoy and assumed office on October 27, 1987.
security of tenure as guaranteed under the Constitution. o On January 2, 1990, in compliance with a request addressed by the
President of the Philippines to "all Department Heads, Undersecretaries,
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting: Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other government officials, he
The Provincial Attorney is an employee of the provincial government to which he owes his filed a courtesy resignation.
loyalty, and not to the elected Governor, for he is not part of the latter's personal or o This was accepted by the President on April 3, 1990, "with deep regrets."
confidential staff. On April 10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested Achacoso to turn over his office
As a provincial public officer, the Provincial Attorney's suspension, removal or transfer is to the Deputy Administrator as officer in-charge.
subject to the provisions of the civil service law, rules and regulations. o In a letter dated April 19, 1990, he protested his replacement and declared
In other words, he may not be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not
More specifically, he may be removed from office for incompetence, dishonesty, or other voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive.
misconduct but not for the Governor's loss of confidence in him, which by its very nature, On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of the
can be as broad as anything imaginable. POEA, vice the petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring & dissenting:
o Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to o Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Service
vacate his office. He filed a motion for reconsideration on April 23, 1990, shall be made by the President from a list of career executive
but this was denied on April 30, 1990. He then came to this Court for relief. eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on
In this petition for prohibition and mandamus, this Court is asked to annul the the basis of rank; provided that appointments to the higher ranks which
appointment of Sarmiento and to prohibit the respondents from preventing the qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of the
petitioner from discharging his duties as Administrator of the POEA. bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES o The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person
who is not a Career Executive Service eligible, provided that such

appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he
so enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service qualifies in such examination.
as distinguished from the Non-Career Service.
The respondents contend that as the petitioner was not a career executive service
Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he says he comes under Article IV, eligible at the time of his appointment, he came under the exception to the above
Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree, which includes in rule and so was subject to the provision that he "shall subsequently take the
the Career Service: required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted
Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination."
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, o Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may position
be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom The SG claims that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who
are appointed by the President.
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including
His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the above-named the appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not.
officials, it was "beyond the prerogatives of the President" to require them to submit o At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary.
courtesy resignations. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and
o Such courtesy resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having "at a moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.
been submitted "under duress," as otherwise the President would have the
power to remove career officials at pleasure, even for capricious reasons.
o In support of this contention, he invokes Ortiz vs. Commission on ISSUE
Elections, where we observed that "to constitute a complete and operative
act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to Whether or not Achacoso is entitled to security of tenure.
relinquish" and that "a courtesy resignation cannot properly be
interpreted as a resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily a RATIO
reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position."
o He concludes that as his removal was illegal, there was no vacancy in the
o The Court, having considered these submissions and the additional arguments of the
disputed office to which respondent Sarmiento could have been validly
parties in the petitioner's Reply and the Solicitor-General's Rejoinder, must find for
appointed.
the respondents.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General concedes that the office of POEA Administrator
o The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
is a career executive service position but submits that the petitioner himself is not a
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
career executive service official entitled to security of tenure. He offered a
qualifications.
certification from the Civil Service Commission to show that the petitioner did not
o Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
possess the necessary qualifications when he was appointed Administrator of the
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
POEA in 1987.
o A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
o The certification said that Achacoso had not participated in a Career
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the
Executive Service Development Program, and is not a Career Executive
rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
Service Eligible.
appropriate eligibles.
o It further certified that Achacoso was not appointed to a rank in the CES
o The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even
and is not a member of the Career Executive Service.
if it may be so designated.
The SG also refers to several Rules embodied in Decrees regarding the CES:
o The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the o WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending ordered.
the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
o The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the
condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so
by the appointing authority. 6. Santiago v CSC (JG)
o In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of October 27, 1989
terminating official relations known in the law of public officers as expiration of the J. Melencio-Herrera
term. Petitioner: Narciso Santiago
Respondents: Civil Service Commission and Leonardo Jose
o His term is understood at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at
the pleasure of the appointing authority.
o When required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being RECIT-READY:
removed in violation of his security of tenure because removal imports the Petitioner Santiago, then a Customs Collector I, was extended a promotional appointment as
separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. Customs Collector III by Customs Commissioner Taada. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector
o This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as provided by II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board against Santiagos promotional
law. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has appointment on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III.
expired. Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional Commissioner Tanada upheld Santiagos promotional appointment stating that (1) the next-in-
provision on security of tenure. rank rule is no longer mandatory; (2) Santiago is competent and qualified; and (3) appointing
o There is a long line of cases affirming the rule that: authority is given a wide discretion, provided no GAD. Thereafter, Jose appealed to the Merit
o One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his Systems Promotion Board. The Board then revoked Santiagos appointment, and directed that
employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, Jose be appointed instead. The CSC thereafter issued Resolution No. 87-554, which ruled that
there being no need the show that the termination is for cause. although both Santiago and Jose are qualified for the position of Customs Collector III,
o The petitioner contends that his appointment was really intended to be permanent respondent Jose has far better qualifications and holds a position of higher rank and salary
because temporary appointments are not supposed to exceed twelve months and he range.
was allowed to serve in his position for more than three years. ISSUE: Whether or not Santiagos promotional appointment as Customs Collector III should be
o This is unacceptable. upheld YES.
o Even if that intention were assumed, it would not by itself alone make his Contrary to respondents allegations, there is no mandatory requirement that persons next-in-
appointment permanent. Such an appointment did not confer on the rank are entitled to preference in appointment. One who is next-in-rank is entitled to
petitioner the appropriate civil service eligibility he did not possess at the preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily
time he was appointed, nor did it vest him with the right to security of follow that he and no one else can be appointed. (take note: preferential consideration only,
tenure that is available only to permanent appointees. not preference in appointment). There is no ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
o The case of Luego vs. Civil Service Commission is not applicable because the facts of promote the next-in-rank to the next higher position. The power to appoint is a matter of
that case are different. discretion. Ultimately, there is no reason to disturb Santiagos promotional appointment
o The petitioner in Luego was qualified and was extended because he adequately satisfied the minimum qualifications and the standard of merit and
a permanent appointment that could not be withdrawn on the ground that fitness.
it was merely temporary.
o In the case at bar, the petitioner was not eligible and therefore could be FACTS:
appointed at best only in a temporary capacity. Santiago held the position of Customs Collector I.
o The other cases he cites, viz. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila On November 18, 1986, then Customs Commissioner Wigberto E. Taada extended a
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 8Palma-Fernandez vs. De la permanent promotional appointment to Santiago as Customs Collector III.
9 10
Paz, and Dario vs. Mison, are also not pertinent because they also On November 26, 1986, respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with
involved permanent appointees who could not be removed because of the Merit Systems Promotion Board against Santiagos promotional appointment
their security of tenure. mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs
o It should be obvious from all the above observations that the petitioner could have III.
been validly replaced even if he had not filed his courtesy resignation. The Board referred the protest to Commissioner Tanada for appropriate action.
o We therefore do not have to rule on its legality. Suffice it to say that it could have Commissioner Tanada upheld Santiagos promotional appointment stating that:
been a graceful way of withdrawing him from his office with all the formal amenities o (1) the next-in-rank rule is no longer mandatory;
and no asperity or discord if only he had not chosen to contest it. But it was his right o (2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the position and such fact
to do so, of course, although his challenge has not succeeded. was not questioned by the protestant; and
o (3) existing law and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to the compared to a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the minimum
appointing authority provided there is no clear showing of grave abuse of requirements for the position.
discretion or fraud. In his Reply to the Merit Systems Board, Customs Commissioner Tanada explained
Jose appealed to the Board which decided to revoke petitioner Santiagos why he appointed Santiago and not Jose:
appointment and directed that respondent Jose be appointed in his stead. o On 31 January 1984, Jose was assigned to Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
Santiago filed an MR but the Board denied the same. but he never assumed that position. For the past five years, there is no
The CSC affirmed the Board Resolutions in its own Resolution No. 87-554. official record of any activity that recommends him for promotion.
o It ruled that although both Santiago and Jose are qualified for the position o On the other hand, after the February revolution, Santiago was
of Customs Collector III, respondent Jose has far better qualifications in immediately designated as Chief of a task force which has been credited
terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars with the seizure of millions of pesos worth of smuggled shipments.
and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent o Santiago has also been the recipient of citations awarded by the Customs
appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range. Commissioner for the two consecutive years 1984 and 1985, for exemplary
o It added that the Commission is empowered to administer and enforce the performance of official duties, particularly investigation and prosecution.
merit system as mandated by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and to The power to appoint is a matter of discretion.
approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in Ocampo v. Subido - The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice as to who is
the civil service, subject to specified exceptions, pursuant to paragraphs (a) best qualified for the position
and (h), Section 9 of the Civil Service Law. Pineda v. Claudio - To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid
formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those
ISSUE: Whether or not Santiagos promotional appointment as Customs Collector III should be qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative
upheld YES of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.
The case of Meram vs. Edralin is inapplicable to the factual situation herein.
HELD: o In said case, we affirmed the appointment of the next-in-rank because the
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 87-554 of the Civil Service Commission is SET ASIDE and original appointee's appointment was made in consideration of political,
petitioner's promotional appointment as Customs Collector III is hereby UPHELD. The ethnic, religious or blood ties totally against the very purpose behind the
Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued, enjoining respondents from enforcing CSC establishment of professionalism in the civil service.
Resolution No. 87-554, is hereby made permanent. True, the CSC is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the
RATIO: appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification
In Taduran vs. Civil Service Commission, it was held that there is "no mandatory nor (paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D. No. 807).
peremptory requirement in the (Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are However, consistent with Luego vs. CSC , all the commission is actually allowed to
entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would be do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not eligibility or the required qualifications.
filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other modes of o If he does, his appointment is approved;
appointment." o If not, it is disapproved.
One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it
the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by
appointed. the proper authorities.
o The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a It has no authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an
next higher position. encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in the appointing authority).
As provided for in Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 83- 343: There is no reason to disturb Santiagos promotional appointment.
Section 4. An employee who holds a next-in- rank position who is deemed The minimum qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have been
the most competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority.
eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion shall be promoted
to the higher position when it becomes vacant.
However, the appointing authority may promote an employee who is not
next-in-rank but who possesses superior qualifications and competence

Compilation 5.01 - Article IX-A To IX-B Sec. 2

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Political Law Review A-2015 | Dean SedfreyCandelaria | Case Digest Compilation 5.A Art. IX-A and IX-B (Sec.

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