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41 F.3d 1490
WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H.
Cooper,
for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board of
County Commissioners of Palm Beach County,
Defendants-Appellants.
Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104.
Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S.
Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449.
Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L.
Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
1 After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants
raise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court in
the joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed.
2 The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches)
offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976
instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and Other
Unexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to local
Ordinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the
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41 F.3d 1490 Page 2 of 4
3 Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms
(and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as an
unconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of their
property.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication;
but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted the
dedication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that the
County had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. The
district court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simple
owners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying the
Ordinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees.
Defendants appeal.
4 The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could not
possibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But given
plaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the record
supports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this case
because the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the district
court. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs were
successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to a
decision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is their
property.
5 But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing
Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33
Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is that
plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguing
that it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because the
district court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, had
the better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court's
order. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss this
case for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had the
burden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County's
citation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoining
landowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests).
6 And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs
accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (asserting
ownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions which
transferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the County
applied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundable
application fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990).
7 The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs'
claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in
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district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrial
stipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ...
jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, it
should not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in the
stipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims for
declaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper.
8 The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulation
as a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right to
make several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed of
motions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury's
conclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims."
The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation.
And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement of
pretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th
Cir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of the
stipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County's
post-verdict motions.
9 Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal.
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation
"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v.
Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County's
argument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing could
not possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of this
claim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case of United States v.
16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs'
ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the government
expressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe,
we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. We
do note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim.
Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requested
if plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th
Cir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction was
stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that
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41 F.3d 1490 Page 4 of 4
the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County argues
frivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest--
that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of
title; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors in
interest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JORG BUSSE
Plaintiff,
Defendants.
___________________________________
I.
The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo
Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and
lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public
the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and
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accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 1, 2.) Plaintiff describes Lot
15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of
rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby
-3-
Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under
was outside of Lee County’s home rule powers, and therefore the
his accretions onto the riparian gulf front Lot 15A without
alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted
that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have
induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches
power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of
the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of
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Count 4 alleges a conspiracy to fabricate, fraud and
admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution.
and park for the benefit of the State and County. (Id. at ¶24.)
received purchase offers far below market value and the County
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Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and
defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to
revenues which could have been received from the private accretions
based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 U.S.C. § 1343,
4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, ¶7), the 1899
the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at ¶9), the federal common law Doctrine
-6-
III.
The Court will first address the federal claims, since these
Complaint liberally.
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23 (1978). The Third Amended
Takings Clause.
a legal question for the court to decide. Morley’s Auto Body, Inc.
1
See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoning
history of the island since 1978.
-7-
v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996). Under Florida law
Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987);
Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These
Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013,
New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th
U.S. 172, 195 (1972). “Williamson County boils down to the rule
-8-
takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe
195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274,
277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162
Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least
563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d
1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d
-9-
Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings
prejudice.
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14
only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit
Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the
dismissed.
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C. Procedural Due Process Claim:
process claim. For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had
subdivision (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was
and recording requirements (id. at ¶¶ 17, 23), and that the taking
Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).
County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff
asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200
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merely because state mandated procedures were not followed. First
20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the
remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as
Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also
Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th
Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any
federal jurisdiction.
courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a
Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000). Therefore
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courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create
Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007). Since none of plaintiff’s
federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, § 1343
claims.
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Appraisal Institute. Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2
are all state law claims. Read liberally, the Third Amended
claims. Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th
prejudice. Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, it is now
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ORDERED:
paragraph 5 below.
5 below.
May, 2008.
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