Dream & Existence Michel Foucault & Ludwig Binswanger Edited by Keith Hoeller ‘A Special Issue from the Review of Existential Psychology & PsychiatryPreparation of his ise ws sed bya grant from th Publications Progam of the Nationa Endowment fo the Homies, an independent federal agency, ‘This issue was originally published at Volume 19, 0.1 (1984-85) ofthe Review of Existential Pychology & Payoh. (© Copytige 1986 by Keith Hocier ‘To order copies, of for more information, wrt: Review of Existential Pechology & Pechiaary P.O. Box 23020 Seat, WA 98102 DREAM AND EXISTENCE EDITOR'S FOREWORD Keith Hoeler TTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE Forest Willams DREAM, IMAGINATION, AND EXISTENCE. ‘Michel Foucault Translated by Forest Williams) DREAM AND EXISTENCE Ludwig Binswanger Translaed by Jacob Needleman) ‘CONTRIBUTORS: 9Editor’s Foreword Kerra Horie cog a eeton whoa tds al efor te hs, and twenty, Shao consing a aan, emery nd ‘cam "a ies aking ey oe torte ‘tad aan Conn) wae ded ewe exe low Be eae te colle decd oho ean Sinenber 88 “While the names of Michel Foucault and Ludwig Binswanger are familiar tothe readers of the Review of Existential Psychology & Pryehi ‘ary. the linking oftheir names together as co-authors ofa singe volume {sll to come a8 a surprise—not only to you—but to many others a8 ‘vel, Naturally, the Binswanger pole of the conjunction needs litle exla- ‘ation. Binswanger was of course a pioneer Swis psychiatrist in existential analysis Daseinsanayse), colleague of Sigmund Freud and Manin Heidegger, and author ofthe fist workin existential prychiaty to be writen under the influence of Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) “Dream and Existence” (1930). ‘But with Michel Foucault itis another mater. I s tue of course ‘at the ist of his books to appear in English, Madness and Cizaion.* ‘was published in R. D. Lalng’s series, Studies im Eisteniliom and Phenomenology, with an. Tntoduction by David Cooper, inventor ofthe ‘erm “anpsyehiaty.” Foucault's book originally appeared in 1961, an important year fr existential psychiatry and other alternatives to tadional psychiatric approaches. Both Thomas Szaso' The Myth of Mental Ines? sand Laing’ Sef and Others were published in 1961. In this same yest, the Review of Existential Psychology & Prychiary publse its fi ‘volume, which included essays by Vikior Fran, Pal Tic, Rollo May, ‘Adrian Van Keam, F. J. Buytendijt, Leslie Farber, and Car! Rogers, Given this fertile intelectual climate, i isnot at all surprising that Laing and Cooper shoud find a kindred spirit in Foucault and his “history of madness,” as is evidenced bythe following passage from Coopers Into- duction: Recent pcan chp at-seiae—esearch into ring ‘bcm oro nen nora seen hy move eh {te pnton pope sak goat te dy ‘Shes howe nce epost vn tem ma ya ie Seven of gc ess The px fess, Nate tty ‘Rita ar mode icra sete miu ye foes ‘Bema scl oy pacer tha ae mlgile hough vaso ‘Spang aed cog mance? 1s Keith Hoeler Certainly, what Foucault's book has in common withthe thought of Laing and Cooper, or for that mater, even with Szsz’ approach, is that socalled "mental lines fs not undersiood as 29 isolated, intrapsychic ‘entity existing merely within the individal patient. Rater, in oder tO ‘write the history of madness, one must put the patent back ito world ‘ain and wie the history of madmen and society, patients and doctors nother words, what ll hese critics of psychiatry have in common i the ‘eideggerean notion that human beings are always constituted by the ‘concept of “being in-the-word,” and that “madness” i «societal event ‘which ceursbercen people who may in fat have conflicting values and goals. As Foucault makes clear in is Preface to Madness and Civilization, ‘tshis purpose toreuntothe original schism bcween madness and society: Nowe of be coms of pcp. eve ant eel inte Ip rss of eucnectony cn py nega Wha tue te con tt ds nes tt cece Iboger he comaon of aes Smal ies, at end he ‘Shun sey eftcied and ese io Me st ‘med, impr mor witout tan heh the exc ‘Sec tne Id maton me mae Th Inge of pyc SEER gs See oa as il SF rtaguge tt mer ee of ene Precisely what Foucault i concered with i what he wil ater call, “a Natorcal knowledge of struggles. In a 1977 interview, be say, hee min tg ey 0, of eg ene {thom wichita seve «Ths tens canal bead tp in to wor pome and inowioge Iie I wae Maine ‘Goss s se ta r onof teqetes’= ‘These questions of power and knowledge, andthe political status of psy- chiatry 25a science, are all questions which Foucault shares in common withthe existential psychiatrists and with Seas. However, Madness and Cinlizatin, Foucault's doctoral thesis, doesnot explicily invoke exisen- talsm and phenomenology, and certainly doesnot abound with references to Kieskegaad, Huser, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. One finds ‘only passing reference to the German poet, Friedrich Holdrin, about ‘whom Heidegger has written so much, and to Niewsche. Tis is in spite ‘ofthe fact dat, as Foucault himself has admited inthe iterview ced at the beginning of this Foreword, he was steped in the wadition of ‘existentialism and phenomenology." Tis is even more surprising when EDITOR'S FOREWORD 9 ‘one realizes that there i a stage in Foucault's intellectual development, indeed, the very fits stage, in which existential and phenomenological psychiatry are explicitly invoked to characterize his work. This stage in {he development of his thought has remained relatively unknown. While the studies by Sheridan and Dreyfus and Rabinow’” notably refer this cealy stage in thei Tnroduction, lke most works on Foucault, they begin ‘eit commentaries in earest with Madness and Civilization. ‘This stage is characterized by Foucault's first two published works: “Dream, Imagination, and Existence” and Menta less and Psychology. Both ofthese works appeared in 1954, and both can be characterized ss studies in existential psychiatry. Fovcaul’s fist bok, for example, Menta Mess and Psychology, claims “phenomenological psychology” as the method for understanding “meatal illness," and quotes Jaspers, Mit owski, Heidegger, and Binswanger. Inthe culminating chapter ofthe First pat of the book, which, echoing Binswanger's essay “Dream and, Existence,” is ened "Mental Miness and Existence,” Foucault writes: ‘Tae adeting fhe sk conics and the eons of is {pipe rl oo peil oha ‘This book, which was originally published in 1954, and which was substantially evised fora second edition in 1962, concludes witha second ‘art, In this second pat, published in 1962, Foucault expiily tats the results of Madness and Chilisation, snd indeed the words express a coo clusion in agreement with Szas’ Work, The Myth of Mental nes ‘The pcg ants ae edhe brite y which pcos ‘hs Nae pop ac Bt lenght Shwe foe of Shep scGarthcei eh eee teeta sleieter meni above alla projetion of culture themes.” " In other words, “ment illness” is notin fot an “ness” ike anyother, rather, it sa relation between self and other Wien « dcr as be aging maces a 2 parame of ‘ey, scence of a Sel emer ora o ‘dpe. toe sting cme 4 Sagnons fea lines hive partly ot rene oe ples10 Keith Hoeller nwonicputngeal potens coneming pene esse ‘yee mr teapei car tsons hs abe wei om ‘lhe ely a eal bs eae eed er pe.” ‘The titles of the two pars ofthe 1962 version of Mental Mines and Peychoogy beat out the evolution in Foueal's viewpoint fom 1954 10 1961. The first part (1883), in which phenomenological psychology i putto wotk, isentiled “The Psychological Dimensions of Mental ness," ‘while the second part (1962) is called “Madness and Culture." The move- ‘ment is one from «concentration on the word of the individu subject, fon the history of the individual, to a focus on the subjects relation to Society and the relation between madness and civilization historically. In ‘ther words, one cannot study the individual's history alone and rach any vali conclusions. One must situate the individual histanically and secietally: nf, eal in ty that coe can dcver te se conte @ (rian ch mental et wits ey eps oe ‘Spot noy fu “Thus the need for an historical account of madness such as Madness and Cinlizaton In the 1984 interview in which Foucault indicates his being torn between existential psychology and phenomenology while writing Mad: ness and Chilizaton, be says “my research was ab attempt to discover the extent these could be defined in historical trms."™ He goes on t0 immediately say, “That's when I discovered thatthe subject would have to be defined in other terms than Marxism or phenomenalogy."" ll of this would sem to indicate that in Foucault's discovery ofthe importance ‘of history, he felt that phenomenology concentrated on the individual subject and could not lead him over to 2 historical determination ofthe role of madness, which would explain why Madness and Cinilization does ot explicily invoke phenomenology or the phenomenologist. That Foucault holds this view of phenomenology is futher confirmed by & 1977 interview on “Truth and Power,” where he $3) ut hisses eed oY nothing etn {te simple elton oe penonencog abc en lee te rtm an sed y hinge ut pond oe tomenlgs sing jth ve ooh te Case [iy Oe oso Gaps wi on ett get ‘est ola yt ave aan ais ih a co {eee xenon of he it ws mews re ‘sr Fon ent fr try wh ‘Bj, ewido having Yo mat erie 0 8 wich EDITOR'S FOREWORD n Shas amget te caneottaays rm ERE ‘This quotation gives rise to an obvious question: When Foucault links phenomenology tothe subject, in particular to constituent, trnscend- ental, almost ahistorical subject, precisely whose phenomenology does he have in mind? I i clear that i could not be Heidegger's version of phenomenology, since twas the central tsk of Being and Time o dispense With the “subject” and to ground Dascn in ahistorical word. [also do ‘ot think it would apply to Boss’ conception of Daseinsanaysis, which follows Heidegger rater closely. And clearly Laing and Cooper bad no