Shioji v. Hon.

Geo Harvey (Malcolm, 1922)

In a previous case, judgment was rendered ordering defendants Toyo Kisen Kaisha & Pacific MailSteamship Co to
jointly and severally pay plaintiff Shioji. Defendants Toyo & Pacific appealed by bill ofexceptions to the Supreme
Court. Defendants however failed to present their brief or to file forextension during the 30-day period within which
they should have served and filed copies of their briefunder Rule 21. The Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 24, then
denied defendants motion for additional period for being filed out of time. Subsequent motions for recon were
likewise denied. Execution was issued to enforce judgment but prior to the levy, defendants Toyo and Pacific filed and
action in the CFI of Manila claiming that the SCs decision was unconscionable and rendered without due process,
and that Rule 24 is unconstitutional for being in conflict with law. Judge Harvey, respondent in this case, granted
an injunction in accordance with Toyo & Pacifics complaint. Hence thispetition by Shioji to compel Judge Harvey to
desist from interfering with the execution and revoking thepreliminary injunction.

Issue:
1. w/n action of J. Harvey in assuming jurisdiction to interpret and review the judgmentof the SC and to obstruct
execution thereof is proper. Improper
2. w/n Rule 24(a) of the SC is valid. ValidDecision:

1. It is not proper.
A judge of the lower court cannot enforce different decrees than those rendered by the superior court.
a. When a cause has been appealed from CFI to SC, and a judgment is rendered by the latter, no
interference therewith by the lower court can be toleratedthrough any proceedings other than such as are directed by
the appellatecourt.

b.Sibbald v. US: The inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it
into execution according to the mandate.

2. Rule 24(a) is valid and not in conflict with any law of the US or of the Phil.
a. Judiciary Act, 28: SC is empowered to make all necessary rules for orderlyprocedure in the SC in accordance
with provisions of the Code of CivilProcedure, which rules shall be binding upon the several courts Included inthe
preceding regulations having to do with the filing of briefs.
i. Rule 21: Within 30days from receipt .. appellant shall serve on appellee errorsand file 30copies with the clerkii.Rule 23:
Rules for extension of time for filing of briefs must be presented before the expiration of the time mentioned in rules
21 and 22iii.Rule 24 (a): If the appellant in any civil case, fails to serve his brief within thetime prescribed..The court
may, on motion of the appellee and notice to theappellant, or on its own motion, dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.

b. These Rules must be observed. It is the duty of the court to enforce its rules tothe best of its judgment. Extensions
are granted daily, 15days(1stextension),10(2nd), 5(3rd) PREREQ motion presented before expiration of period to file.
Infull, 601 days to prepare, in extraordinary cases/for good and sufficient reasonthis period may even be enlarged.

c.Generally limited that it must not be in conflict with the laws of the US/Phil.

d. J. Fisher (drafter of rules) principal change: the discouragement of dilatorytactics by imposing upon the
moving party the duty of proceeding promptlyunder penalty of dismissal of appeal

e.Salaveria v. Albindo: RoCdrafted with primary objective of expediting justice.f.Reason for the
Rules: Otherwise, dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result,
without rules governingpractice.g.Here however, Toyo (Respondents) point out no provision of a federal
statutewhich bears on the issue (in conflict with Rule24(a)), and we know none.

3. It is our holding that Rule24(a) is valid. Not in conflict with any law of US/Phil. It is a rule that:
a.Relates to a matter of practice and procedure over which the Legislative has not exercised its power.
b.Does not operate to deprive a party of any statutory right.
c.In harmony with judicial practice and essential to the existence of courts.d.Must be enforced according to the
discretion of the court.

4. Note that respondents here have already had their day in court.

WHEREFORE writ prayed for granted. Prelim Injunction made permanent. Execute CFI org judgment, Levy the
properties of Toyo and Pacific.
 Alvero v. Dela Rosa

FACTS: On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila, against petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging two causes of action: (1)
to declare in force the contract of sale, between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two parcels of land
in the Manotoc subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, which
land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for
the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and (2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void. On July 7, 1945,
Margarita Villarica filed an answer to said complaint, expressly admitting having sold said land to Fresdesvindo S.
Alvero, for P100,000, in December, 1944, due to the necessity of raising funds with which to provide for herself and
family, and that she did not remember the previous sale; at the same time, offering to repurchase said land from
Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept the offer. Jose R. Victoriano filed an
answer to said counterclaim, denying Fredesvindo S. Alvero's alleged ownership over said land, and the other
allegations contained in Alvero's answer. On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering said complaint, denied
the allegations and claimed exclusive ownership of the land in question.

Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, one of the respondents in this
case, rendered his decision, in which it was declared that the two parcels of land in question had been sold by Margarita
Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano and that Victoriano continued making monthly payments until December, 1941, but that
owing to the war-time conditions then existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to suspend such payments until the
restoration of peace and that Margarita Villarica, having forgotten the sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the
same for P100,000 in Japanese military notes, on December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, but afterwards offered
to repurchase said property from him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine Philippine currency, after liberation. Jose R.
Victoriano had presented the deed of sale which was older than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, the respondent judge
rendered his decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over the property in question, including
all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim.

On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, he filed a
petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946. On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal
bond. Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion
to dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and
allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his lawyer's wife. The respondent
judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal
and record on appeal had been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.

ISSUE: Is the petition defective in form as well as in substance?

HELD: Yes, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was
notified of the judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal
and record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his appeal bond, which was
only filed on January 15, 1946. Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure to
perfect and file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife. It is not difficult to understand the state of mind of the
attorney, and his intense devotion and ardent affection towards his dying wife. Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has
created a difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not point
out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment, are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to
law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely
to delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection
of the appeal. He could have asked for an extension of time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in the court
below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of
court, which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity. Human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration
should stand in the way of performing a legal duty.
 DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed
petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy
of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion
for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal
and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed
the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they
were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final
order appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period to appeal, the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the final order. In the
case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed
his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the
omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise
dismissed for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within
15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The
SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of
dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again
considered the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of
the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners view that the
order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or
signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense
in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal
may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the
trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTCs
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule
41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

NOTE:
The FRESH PERIOD RULE do not apply to Rule 64 (Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It
is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases.
 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011]

FACTS:
Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took petitioners lands on December 9, 1996. Land Bank
valued the properties atP165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount. Consequently, on
instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86
and P45,481,706.76, respectively, or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the expropriated properties, Land
Bank eventually made additional deposits, placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62
+ P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed separate
complaints for just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was dismissed, after three
years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a case with the RTC for the proper determination of just compensation.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest
plus attorneys fees. Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the Supreme Court where the RTC ruling was
upheld. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the award of interest and attorneys fees and entry
of judgment was issued. The just compensation of which was only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a second
motion for reconsideration with respect to denial of award of legal interest and attorneys fees and a motion to refer the
second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted accordingly, restoring in toto the ruling of the RTC. Respondent
filed their second motion for reconsideration as well for holding of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not the rules on second motion for reconsideration by the Supreme Court should be strictly complied
with by a vote of two-thirds of its actual membership.
(2) Whether or not the holding of oral arguments would still serve its purpose.
(3) Whether or not the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention from the Office
of the Solicitor General may still be granted.

RULINGS:
Remedial Law
(1) No. When the Court ruled on the petitioners motion for reconsideration by a vote of 12 Members (8 for the grant
of the motion and 4 against), the Court ruled on the merits of the petitioners motion. This ruling complied in all
respects with the Constitution requirement for the votes that should support a ruling of the Court. Admittedly, the Court
did not make any express prior ruling accepting or disallowing the petitioners motion as required by Section 3, Rule
15 of the Internal Rules. The Court, however, did not thereby contravene its own rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration; since 12 Members of the Court opted to entertain the motion by voting for and against it, the Court
simply did not register an express vote, but instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule through the participation
by no less than 12 of its 15 Members. Viewed in this light, the Court cannot even be claimed to have suspended the
effectiveness of its rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration; it simply complied with this rule in a form other than by
express and separate voting.

(2) No. The submissions of the parties, as well as the records of the case, have already provided this Court with
enough arguments and particulars to rule on the issues involved. Oral arguments at this point would be superfluous and
would serve no useful purpose.

(3) No. The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG speaks, has been amply protected through the direct action of
petitioner LBP the government instrumentality created by law to provide timely and adequate financial support in all
phases involved in the execution of needed agrarian reform. The OSG had every opportunity to intervene through the
long years that this case had been pending but it chose to show its hand only at this very late stage when its presence
can only serve to delay the final disposition of this case. The arguments the OSG presents, furthermore, are issues that
this Court has considered in the course of resolving this case. Thus, every reason exists to deny the intervention prayed
for.
 Sarmiento v. Zaratan

Facts: Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. ( MeTC ordered the defendant to
pay plaintiff monthly rentals and to vacate the premises.)
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.
In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the provisions
of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.
Respondents counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite
memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the
said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and
flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal as follows:
Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry Return
Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. 298). Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, she
had fifteen (15) days or until June 3, 2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further appears on record,
however, the required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 (Record, p. 623), or six (6) days
beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted the petition of respondent.
The appellate court nullified and set aside Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondents appeal.
Consequently, respondents appeal memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

Issue: Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal is fatal,
such that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper.

Held: In this case, the answer is NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in
her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latters motion is a worthless piece of paper with
no legal effect.

It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of Appeal and payment of the
required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time
seeking an additional period of five days within which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing
required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party,
every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without
a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural
justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for
the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the
motion. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose
or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that
procedural due process was substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of
petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due to respondents
counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There
is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension prior to
the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed within the requested extended period. Under
the circumstances, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to
the possession of the land in question.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary
to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the
parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not
affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and
also in situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or
the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
 F.A.T. KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC., vs. ONLINE NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL, INC

Petitioner F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. (FAT KEE) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling
computer equipment and conducting maintenance services for the units it sold. ONLINE is also a domestic corporation
principally engaged in the business of selling computer units, parts and software.

ONLINE sold computer printers to FAT KEE. However, FAT KEE failed to pay its obligations to ONLINE without any
valid reason. ONLINE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against FAT KEE.

During the trial FAT KEE insisted that the conversion rate they agreed upon was P34:US$1 and not P40 as insisted by
ONLINE.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of ONLINE for the latters failure to establish its claim. The appellate court reversed
and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that even granting that FAT KEE was of the impression that
P34:$1 was the applicable rate for its obligation, ONLINE cannot be put in estoppel as this was immediately rectified
by ONLINE.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN renders the petition of FAT KEE fatally
defective.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

First issue:

REMEDIAL LAW: Attachments

Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to the petition for review on certiorari such
material portions of the record as would support the petition. However, such a requirement was not meant to be an
ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same would merit the outright dismissal of the petition.
 G.R. No. 168973 August 24, 2011
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, Petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,Respondent.

Facts :
The City of Dumaguete represented by its mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated March 4, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 6, 2005 of the Court Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 64379. The Court of Appeals granted the granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of
respondent Philippine Ports Authority and set aside the Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44 of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case No. N-201.

The genesis of the case started when the City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo
(Remollo),filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with
improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property Registration
Decree. However the application for registration of the City of Dumaguete for the said lot was opposed by the Republic
of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent, represented by the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and
respondent averred that petitioner may not register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding
the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the
Republic. The city of Dumaguete insisted that it has occupied the land in open, continous exclusive and notorious
manner for more than 30 years. However , the government filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court has no
jurisdciton because the lot being claimed by Dumaguete is not alienable and disposable because said lot is a foreshore
lot which can never be alienable and disposable based on the Presidential Property Decree 1529. Petitioner invoked
Republic Act No. 1899,9 which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out, at their own
expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and grants said chartered cities and municipalities
ownership over the reclaimed lands. The present claim of petitioner that the subject property is reclaimed land should
not be allowed for it would improperly change the earlier theory in support of the application for registration.

Respondent reiterated that the subject property is foreshore land which cannot be registered; and that Presidential
Proclamation No. 1232 is very material to LRC Case No. N-201 because it confirms that areas within the Dumaguete
Port Zone, including the subject property, are not alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

On September 7, 2000, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of respondent. It said that indeed said
lot comes within the purview non alienable and nod disposable land of the public domain which makes the contention
of Dumaguete lacking in merits. Dumaguete filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the dismissal will violated
its right to due process. Respondent based its Opposition (To Applicants Motion for Reconsideration dated September
28, 2000)21 and Opposition (To Applicants Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration)22 on technical and substantive
grounds. According to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4 (Hearing of
motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner did not set
its Motion for Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could not be considered as non-litigable.In its
Order23 dated November 16, 2000, the RTC initially agreed with respondent that the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Resultantly, the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner was considered as not filed and did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal,
rendering final and executory the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201. However, after taking into consideration
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, the RTC issued another Order24 dated December 7, 2000,
setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding
to determine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201.

It was then the turn of respondent to file with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated December 7,
2000. In an Order dated February 20, 2001, the RTC denied the motion of respondent and admitted that it made a
mistake when it declared the said lot as shorelot when its adjoining lots are aready titled. And it is for this reason that
the court reconsidered and set aside said September 7, 2000 Order, to correct the same while it is true that said
September 7, 2000 Order had attained its finality, the Court cannot in conscience allow injustice to perpetuate in this
case and that hearing on the merits must proceed to determine the legality and truthfulness of its application for
registration Dumaguete. Respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a Certiorari and Prohibition claiming
that theRTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent reiterated
that the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000, dismissing LRC Case No. N-201 had already attained finality. The
defects of the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner rendered the same as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll
the running of the prescriptive period to appeal the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000. The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated March 4, 2005, found merit in the Petition of respondent and set aside the RTC Orders dated December
7, 2000 and February 20, 2001. The appellate court, in its Resolution dated June 6, 2005, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Hence the instant appeal to the Supreme Court as a final recourse by Dumaguete.

ISSUE : Is the order granting the motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff valid considering that it has violated the
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court?

Held : The supreme Court ruled that procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the
latter. Although the Supreme Court has held time and again that violatiopn of the rules of the court pertaining to
motion, notices and services is fatal and makes the mmmmmotion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper,
nevertheless the Court declares that a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned
final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus
be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
 VETTE INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC. vs CHENG
G.R. No. 170232 Dec 5, 2006

FACTS:
Cheng filed an action for specific performance and damages against Vette Industrial Sales Co. for breaching their
obligation contained in the Memorandum of Agreement. Under the MOA, the company acknowledged owing Cheng a
sum of money as compensation for the shares he transferred, insurance proceeds and signing bonus. In their answer
with counterclaim, Vettel Industrial claimed that the shares have already been paid; that the MOA is unenforceable and
void. After failing to settle during mediation, the case was referred back to the court.

On the day of the Pre-trial, Cheng and his counsel Atty. Ferrer failed to appear resulting to the dismissal of the case.
Cheng filed a motion for reconsideration. Vette Industrial claims that the motion was procedurally defective because it
was not served three days before the date of the hearing and no proof of service was given to the court, in violation of
Sections 4 and 6 of Rule 15. The trial court granted the motion. Vette Industrial elevated the case to the CA. The ruling
of the trial court was vacated and Chengs complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Both parties assailed the ruling
before the SC.

ISSUE:
Is the rule of notice required under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court violated?

RULING:
No. Although the Court has consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, there are exceptions to the strict application
of this rule:

1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice; especially if a party successfully
shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein;
2. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
3. Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court;
4. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate [to] the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed."

A notice of hearing is conceptualized as an integral component of procedural due process intended to afford the adverse
parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is
permitted time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. When the trial court received Chengs Manifestation
and Motion for Reconsideration, it did not immediately resolve the motion. Instead, it allowed Vette Industrial to file
their comment and also leave to file a rejoinder if Cheng files a reply.

The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to
promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid
application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, SC is empowered to suspend their
operation.