Tormis v. Paredes, A.M. No.

RTJ-13-2366, [February 4, 2015]

FACTS:
Jill was a former student of judge Paredes at Southwestern University College of Law in
Cebu. In his class discussions, Judge Paredes named Jills mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis,
then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one
of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned
in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law; and also included her brother, Francis Tormis, in his discussions
stating that he was a court-noted drug addict.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that
committed by her mother, in accepting a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an
accused in a criminal case. Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively
sanctioned for his actuations.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a
result of the influence of Judge Tormis.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he
personally accepted a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused. He
claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for
bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. That he
merely followed procedure, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business
day, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court.
The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official
receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash
bond only a week after.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of
Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not
done in the performance of his judicial duties.

ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. YES

HELD:
Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
o His use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His
statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable. The New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify
propriety at all times.
o CANON 4: PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should
do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that
is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
o A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
 must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.
He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore,
a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty
tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is
required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language.

Bravo v. Morales, A.M. No. P-05-1950, MTJ-1612, [August 30, 2006]

FACTS:
Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge, MeTC of Manila, Branch 16, charges his former
branch clerk of court, Atty. Miguel C. Morales, now detailed with the Office of the Clerk of
Court, MeTC, Manila, with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer.
o While serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of MeTC, Manila, Branch 17, he
recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) the immediate dismissal
of Atty. Morales from the service for corrupt practices.
o Since he made the recommendation, he observed Atty. Morales to have acted
discourteously and disrespectful toward him. He relates that whenever he greets
court employees with a "good morning ladies and gentlemen" after every flag raising
ceremony, as was his usual practice, he noticed Atty. Morales mimicking him in a
squeaky comical voice, obviously to make fun of him.
o Before the start of the flag raising rite, he caught Atty. Morales about to do his
mocking imitating act, prompting him to tell the latter "Tumigil ka."; that he then
ordered one of the security guards to arrest Atty. Morales preparatory to charging him
with unjust vexation.
o He waited for the flag raising ceremony to end before apologizing to the crowd for
the incident, only to witness Atty. Morales responding with a shout: "Sa akin hindi ka
mag-aapology!"
o He ignored Atty. Morales' outburst and instead instructed the OIC of the security
guards to call the Manila City Hall Police Detachment, which immediately dispatched
police officers whom regarding the flag-raising ceremony incident and about the
preceding exchange of charges and counter-charges filed with the OCA.
o Atty. Morales' sympathizers circulated a manifesto on that same day denouncing his
act as a judge and soliciting support for Atty. Morales from the Union of the Clerks of
Court of the MeTC, Manila; that of the 29 union members, only 3 supported Atty.
Morales. One of the three, Atty. Yarra, even pointing to the provocative act of Atty.
Morales as the root cause of the incident adverted to.
OCA recommended that Judge Bravo be reprimanded for abuse of authority and Atty.
Morales be fined in the amount of P2,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a government
officer.

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Morales is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a government

officer. YES

HELD:
Atty. Morales is guilty of conduct unbecoming a government employee.
o His insulting act of mimicking the judge, in the presence of other court employees, a
gesture calculated to ridicule, is a behavior unexpected of one in the judicial service.
 o The ideal is for a court employee to be well-mannered, civil, and considerate in his
actuations, more particularly with respect to his relation to the presiding judge he is
assigned under.
o Atty. Morales' acts went against the principles of public service and such unpleasant
kind of behavior must not be tolerated if we are to demand the highest degree of
excellence and professionalism among public employees and to preserve the
integrity and dignity of our courts of justice. He failed to live up to the norms of
conduct demanded of his position.
They ought to be reminded that the nature and responsibilities of the men and women in
the judiciary, as defined in different canons of conduct, are neither mere rhetorical words
nor idealistic sentiments but working standards and attainable goals to be matched with
actual deeds.
Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants
charged with dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism
and responsibility, if not maturity. Their conduct must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with law and court regulations.
They should avoid any act or conduct that would or tend to diminish public trust and
confidence in the courts.
Government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing
justice; civility is never a sign of weakness and courtesy is a mark of culture and good
breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no place in the government service in which
personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.

IN RE: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the MTCCs
Koronadal City, A.M. No. 02-9-233-MTCC, [April 27, 2005]
FACTS:
Judge Agustin T. Sardido, who presided over the MTCC of Koronadal City, assumed office
sometime in May 1988; and Clerk of Court Maxima Borja, on February 18, 2002. The
latter, however, had been employed therein since 1987, serving as Clerk II and
Stenographer until she was appointed clerk of court. Prior to Borja's assumption, the
Clerk of Court was Normandie A. Ines, who compulsorily retired on October 9, 2001.
The audit team found that Judge Sardido usually arrived late for work. On Mondays, he
would report only in the afternoons. Due to his habitual tardiness, court sessions were
usually scheduled only in the afternoons.
They also found that Judge Sardido had allowed Rufino Vargas, a non-employee of the
court, to discharge the duties and functions of a court interpreter without the prior
approval of the OCA.
Judicial Audit
o 32 civil cases remained undecided beyond the reglementary period of 90 days (or 30
days for those falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure.)
o 43 criminal cases likewise undecided beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
o Court was highly disorganized in its custody of exhibits. For example: in People v.
Vicente Seromines: Judge Sardido personally received from the PNP a .45-caliber
pistol, which he did not turn over to Borja. The judge took possession of the gun and
carried it around, allegedly because of threats on his life. When its safety pin
malfunctioned, he supposedly gave it to a member of the PNP for repair. The judge
was later informed that it had been taken by another PNP member, who allegedly
recognized it as the gun that had been stolen from the latter.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Judge Sardido may be administratively held liable. YES

HELD:
Judge Agustin T. Sardido is found GUILTY of dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross
ignorance of the law.
o In legal contemplation, the judge presiding over a branch of a court is the head of
that branch. As such, Judge Sardido should have served as an example to the court
employees working under him.
o He should have been more efficient in dividing his time among his assignments,
devised a schedule to be followed in all four courts and, more important, informed his
staff of that schedule. Absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible. Court has
emphasized the need for officials and employees of the judiciary to observe official
time strictly, so as to inspire public respect for the justice system.
o This Court has reiterated the need for judges to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously. It cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. The failure
of judges to decide cases with dispatch constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
the imposition of administrative sanctions.
o Judge Sardido showed gross ignorance of the law when he accepted BP 22 cases
despite the fact that the corresponding filing fees had yet to be collected. He also
admitted his ignorance of the requirement of first seeking OCA approval before
allowing Rufino Vargas to assume the vacant position of court stenographer.
o By his practice of dismissing criminal cases under preliminary investigation without
transmitting the pertinent resolution and records to the prosecutor, Judge Sardido
showed either gross ignorance of remedial law or, worse, willful disobedience thereof.
o For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been
charged with grave misconduct. That he intended to repay the amounts "borrowed" is
immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of official business as
embodied in Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
o The judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It
is from him that the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the
judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for others to follow.
o Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to present himself as an example to his
staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction in violating the law, as well
as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance
of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have warranted the maximum
penalty of dismissal, were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed from
the service in another administrative case.

IN RE: Cases Submitted For Decision before Judge Damaso A. Herrera, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1924 (Resolution), [October
13, 2010]
FACTS:
Judge Damaso A. Herrera, the former Presiding Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bian, Laguna, filed an application for optional retirement effective April 5,
2004. The Court approved his application through the resolution issued on July 5, 2004 in
A.M. No. 11570-Ret.
 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now a Member of the Court, initiated
an administrative matter for agenda dated October 1, 2004 to report on the cases
submitted for decision before newly-retired Judge Herrera, citing 55 of such cases
mentioned in the March 2004 monthly report of Judge Herrera's branch, some of which
were already beyond the reglementary period to decide.
The report further indicated that the cases submitted for decision as reported in the
December 2003 monthly report totaling 26 increased to 55 in the March 2004 monthly
report due to the addition of 29 cases; that Judge Herrera failed to request the extension
of his time to decide the cases; that Branch 24 did not submit the monthly reports of
cases within the period required; and that most of the cases submitted for decision had
not been reflected in the submitted reports.
Through a resolution, the Court ordered the release of Judge Herrera's retirement
benefits but withheld the amount of P40,000.00 subject to the outcome of this
administrative matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Herrera is guilty of undue delay in the disposition of the cases pending
him his court. YES

HELD:
Court has impressed upon trial judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously to accord with the time honored precept that justice delayed is justice
denied.
Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes
the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it
into disrepute. Indeed, a judge must display that "interest in his office which stops not at
the minimum of the day's labor fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of
official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even
into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the
administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the
people.
Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable
reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanction on the defaulting judge.
Judge Herrera's plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, poor health, and physical
impossibility could not excuse him. Such circumstances were not justifications for the
delay or non-performance, given that he could have easily requested the Court for the
extension of his time to resolve the cases.
No judge can choose to prolong, on his own, the period for deciding cases beyond the
period authorized by the law. Without an order of extension granted by the Court, a
failure to decide even a single case within the required period rightly constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
Judge Herrera should have sought additional time by simply filing a request for extension
if, to him, rendering a decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period
became unavoidable. That he did not so seek additional time reflected his indifference to
the prescription to decide within the time limits of the law.
 The excuses, assuming they were true, could only be treated as mitigating
circumstances vis--vis the properly imposable penalty. The fact that the more than
1,000 inherited cases added to Judge Herrera's workload can be treated as a mitigating
circumstance.

IN RE: Petition for the dismissal from the service and/or disbarment of JUDGE
BALTAZAR R. DIZON, A.C. No. 3086 (Resolution), [May 31, 1989]
FACTS:
Charge brought against the respondent by the former Commissioner of Customs, Hon.
Alexander A. Padilla, of which we found him guilty in our Resolution of February 23, 1988,
is that he rendered a manifestly erroneous decision in People v. Lo Chi Fai through gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
Lo Chi Fai alleged that he and five other business associates from Japan and Hongkong
separately brought the foreign currencies into the Philippines for a business venture and
that he tried to declare his $50Kand 8.5M upon arrival but the Central Bank
representive refused to accept his declaration pending confirmation from the Hongkong
source. We ruled was palpably concocted.
Judge Dizon not only acquitted Lo Chi Fai of the crime of violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 in spite of the accused having been apprehended with $355,349.57 worth of
foreign currencies while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State
must first prove the criminal intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act; he
also ordered the return of $3K out of the $355,349.57 thus seized to the accused on the
grossly wrong interpretation that Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts this amount
from seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
In offenses punished by special laws, proof of malice or deliberate intent is not
necessary. The offenses are mala prohibita. C. B. Circular No. 960 also requires a tourist
upon arrival to declare any foreign currency he is carrying if the same exceeds $3K.
Respondent having manifestly disregarded and failed to apply this plain and fundamental
legal principle, despite the fact that the $3K was never returned to Lo Chi Fai by order of
the respondent or otherwise we considered that "his actuations in this case amounted
to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair administration of justice"
and ordered his dismissal from the service.
The respondent now comes to us appealing for a compassionate review of the Court's
judgment. He admits that his decision was erroneous but pleads that his mistaken
judgment proceeded from good faith and not from a deliberate desire to pervert his
position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Dizon should be meted a lesser penalty and reinstated to his office.
YES

HELD:
We have decided to act favorably on the respondent's plea to view with less rigor the
error of judgment he committed. We have also taken into account the long government
service of the respondent spanning more than 26 years.
A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for
an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
 We do not, by any means, exonerate the respondent from all blame nor do we
completely overlook the erroneous judgment. His act remains unjustified. It does not
speak well of an officer who must "read, study and ponder" and "personify learning and
equanimity."
It is a truism that the learning process in law does not stop upon graduation from college
and admission to the Bar. There should be, on the contrary, more sustained intellectual
effort on the part of the members of the legal profession. Certainly, judges are not
exempt from this obligation. It is even more incumbent on them as they are thought of
as the oracles of law. There is likely then to be a disillusionment in the judicial process if,
as did happen here, an occupant of the bench was found to be woefully lacking in legal
knowledge. . . . The efforts for improvement in the mode of administering the
government in all its manifold complexity would come to naught if our people can harbor
the suspicion that judges do not even know what the law is.
While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it reasonably expects a
faithful and intelligent discharge of duty by those who are selected to fill the positions of
administrators of justice.
We have taken into account the overloaded dockets of Metro Manila trial judges, the
unceasing strain caused by daily hearings on complex cases and the sad lack of libraries,
decent courtrooms, office equipment, supplies, and other court facilities which
sometimes result in less than thorough appreciation of all relevant data and applicable
laws thus leading to lapses and errors which we find difficult to comprehend once the
case reaches us. Still, a Judge must rise above environmental difficulties and keep a clear
and cool mind when writing down his decisions.

Gandeza, Jr. v. Tabin, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736, [July 25, 2011]

FACTS:
 In November 2007, the cars of Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. and Paul Casuga collided with
each other. Later at the scene of the collision, Judge Maria Clarita Tabin arrived. She was
the aunt of Casuga. Atty. Gandeza observed that the judge kept on reminding the
investigating officer that the driver of Gandeza was drunk.
Later at the hospital, blood alcohol test was conducted on the driver of Gandeza. The
initial result returned negative. But Judge Tabin insisted that the doctor do a second test.
This time, the result was positive.
About a week later, a criminal case was filed against the driver of Gandeza. The wife of
Atty. Gandeza, also a lawyer, later observed that a court employee was bringing the
records of the case outside the premises of the court where the case was filed. The court
employee said that the records were requested by Judge Tabin. The case also went to
mediation where Gandeza also learned that Judge Tabin went to the mediation center
and inquired about the case.
All these acts of the judge led to Gandezas filing of an administrative case against Judge
Tabin for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
In her defense, Judge Tabin said that she never publicly made known that she was a
judge when she was at the collision scene. But she did admit that the investigating
officer as well as the doctor knew her to be such. She also said that she merely borrowed
the records of the case because she learned that her nephew still did not have a lawyer.
She also said that when she was at the mediation center, she merely went there to assist
her sister (Casugas mom) as the latter did not know where the mediation center was
located.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
NO

HELD:
But she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Her being concern of her nephew is just but natural but as member of the judiciary, she
should know that she should not interfere in the conduct of an investigation. She should
always appear impartial this did not happen when she interfered with the investigation
and when she borrowed the records as well as when she was at the mediation center
inquiring about the records of the case. She may have the best intention devoid of any
malicious motive but sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was
using her office to unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the
medical examination as well as the investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while Judge Tabins concern over the safety of her nephew and the outcome of
his criminal case is understandable, she should not have disregarded the rules on proper
decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court. Although concern for family
members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, she, being a judge, should bear in
mind that she is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity
of the entire Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Clarita C. Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
4, Baguio City, GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and is hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Maceda v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, [April 22, 1993]
FACTS:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court
of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1)
the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the
Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit
and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil
and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period
of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998, when in
truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and
ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further
alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of
February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning
January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court
an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. Petitioner also
contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap v. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court. NO

HELD:
Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in
the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge
unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard
to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
 encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court
personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to hem if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Ombudsman
cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service
to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one
of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint.