EVID Rule 130 Secs. 26-32 Full Text

Sec. 26.
Admissions of a party
PEOPLE vs. OMICTIN

G.R. No. 188130 July 26, 2010
The Case
This is an appeal from the November 25, 2009 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02793, entitled People of the Philippines v. Mary Lou Omictin y Singco. The CA Decision
affirmed the Decision[2] dated May 3, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104 in Quezon
City, finding accused-appellant Mary Lou Omictin guilty of violating Section 6, in relation to Sec. 7(b),
of Republic Act No. (RA) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Specifically,
accused-appellant was charged with and adjudged guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and three (3)
counts of Estafa.
The Facts
Primo Arvin Guevarra, one of the private complainants, arrived home sometime in September
2003 after his employment contract in Libya expired. In January 2004, he contacted a college classmate,
Rebecca Joy Roque, who previously informed him that she knew of a recruiter for overseas
employment. Roque thus set up a meeting between him and the recruiter, who turned out to be accused-
appellant Omictin.[3]
Omictin met Guevarra along with Anthony Ambrosio and Elisa Dotimas. [4] In that meeting, the
three agreed to pay Omictin PhP 40,000 each for their deployment in London as caregivers. All three
each gave Omictin, there and then, PhP 10,000 as initial payment. Omictin assured them that they would
leave for London within 60 to 90 days.[5]
For such deployment, Guevarra had a medical examination, during which occasion he paid
Omictin an additional PhP 10,000. Later, Guevarra completed his placement payment by giving Omictin
the balance of PhP 20,000. Upon said payment, Omictin informed Guevarra that she would schedule an
orientation and contract signing at a later date. However, the promised orientation and contract signing
never took place. Sometime in February 2004, Guevarra was able to meet with Omictin, who promised to
return his money during the first week of March. Like the earlier promises, the promise to reimburse
remained unfulfilled.[6]
Another private complainant, Veronica Caponpon, was assured of employment in New Zealand as
an apple picker, for which she was required by Omictin to pay PhP 20,000 as placement fee for the
deployment. Caponpon initially paid Omictin PhP 10,000 and was then promised by the latter that she
would leave for New Zealand within two months provided that she complies with all the requirements for
deployment.[7] On April 22, 2003, Caponpon submitted her resum to Omictin and paid the amount of PhP
8,000. The remaining PhP 2,000 was paid on April 27, 2003. For all her efforts and the repeated promises
of Omictin, Caponpon still was not able to leave for New Zealand.[8]
Roy Fernandez Mago, another private complainant, was promised employment abroad as a
caregiver within three months from payment of a placement fee of PhP 40,000 and submission of the
required documents. Mago paid the total placement fee and submitted the required documents. However,
the promised overseas employment remained unfulfilled. [9]
For PhP 40,000, Omictin undertook to send private complainant Anthony Ambrosio overseas for
employment within three to four months. Ambrosio was only able to pay the amount of PhP 16,000. The
promised employment never materialized.[10]
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party
On March 8, 2004, all four private complainants filed complaints against Omictin with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa. Before Joffrey Dela Merced, the
Supervising Agent of the Bureaus Counter-Intelligence Division, Mago related that, the previous day, he
was able to contact Omictin, who required him to pay an additional PhP 60,000 for his deployment
abroad. The designated place for the payment was McDonalds Restaurant at the corner of EDSA
and Quezon Avenue. Thus, the NBI prepared an entrapment operation to arrest Omictin and provided
Mago with PhP 60,000 marked money.[11]
On March 9, 2004, the entrapment operation was set in motion. After receiving the marked money,
Omictin was arrested by the accompanying NBI agents. [12]
As a result, separate informations were filed before the Quezon City RTC charging Omictin with illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125442 to 45. The
informations read:
Crim. Case No. Q-04-125442
That on or about the 9th day of March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without
any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously for a fee, enlist,
recruit, and promise overseas employment to the following persons, to wit: PRIMO ARVIN S.
GUEVARRA, ANTHONY P. AMBROSIO, ROY FERNANDEZ MAGNO and VERONICA G.
CAPONPON, without first securing the required license from the Department of Labor and
Employment, in violation of said law.
That the above-described crime is committed in large scale, as the same was perpetrated against
four (4) persons individually or as a group as penalized under Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995.
Crim. Case Nos. Q-04-125443-45

That on or about the period comprised from January to March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud [Roy Fernandez
Magno, Anthony P. Ambrosio, Primo Arvin S. Guevarra, respectively] in the following manner, to
wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she
made to said complainant[s] to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
the said complainant[s] in U.K. London as caregiver[s] and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said [complainants] to give and deliver, as
in fact, gave and delivered to said accused the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000,
respectively] x x x, on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well
knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made to solely [obtain], as in fact she
did obtain the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively], which amount[s]
once in possession, with intent to defraud [said complainants] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said [complainants] in the aforesaid amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP
40,000, respectively] x x x.[13]
During trial, Omictin gave the following version of the facts: She claimed that she was merely
asked by the private complainants to help them in the processing of their visas for the United
Kingdom and other papers for possible employment in London. They agreed in their preliminary meeting
to pay her PhP 40,000 each for the processing fees. A week after, she averred that Dotimas issued a check
for PhP 106,000 as the initial payment for the processing fees of all four private complainants. Then,
on January 31, 2004, Mago and Guevarra paid her their respective balances for the processing fees, but
both later backed out from the placement agreement. She thus promised Mago and Guevarra that they
would be reimbursed. On March 9, 2004, she met with Mago at McDonalds Restaurant at the corner of
EDSA and Quezon Ave. to discuss the possibility of changing his United Kingdomvisa application to
a United States visa application. For such purpose, she asked from Mago the amount of PhP 60,000. After
Mago paid her the money, she was arrested by the NBI agents. [14]
On May 3, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Omictin guilty as charged, the dispositive portion
reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 04-125442, the Court finds accused MARY LOU OMICTIN
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE
defined and penalized in Section 6 in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, and
sentences her to life imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as
minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Roy
Fernandez Mago in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of estafa defined and penalized in Article
315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of
two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify
complainant Anthony Ambrosio in the amount of Sixteen Thousand (P16,000.00) Pesos.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as
minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Arvin
Guevarra in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Aggrieved, Omictin appealed[16] to the CA, raising in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant, [17] the
following issues:
(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa Dotenes, [18] who issued a
check in favor of accused-appellant in behalf of Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of
Dotenes who was not presented by the prosecution, Guevarras testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay;
[19]
and
(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt presented to show payment to
accused-appellant, rendering his testimony uncorroborated and self-serving. [20]
Eventually, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in light of the [foregoing] disquisitions, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125442, Q-04-125443, Q-04-
125444, and Q-04-125445, finding appellant Mary Lou Omictin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, we have this appeal.
Through a Manifestation (In lieu of Supplemental Brief) [22] dated October 12, 2009, Omictin
repleads and adopts all the defenses and arguments raised in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant [23] dated
January 22, 2008.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is without merit.
An examination of the issues raised by Omictin in her Brief would readily reveal that the same
are all factual issues. Subject to well-defined exceptions, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not
delve once more into the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The Court,
in Dueas v. Guce-Africa,[24] has articulated the rule as follows:
We will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
especially where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are
not a trier of facts. The established rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding on us. We are not wont to review them,
save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis supplied.)
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in the instant case. We thus perceive no reason to disturb the
findings of fact and conclusions of law arrived at by the courts a quo.
Omictin, however, maintains that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts, which, if
considered, would lead to her acquittal. Omictin asserts in her brief the following:
The testimony of Primo Guevarra undoubtedly shows that he was not the one who paid the
accused-appellant. His testimony, to the effect that the check, issued by a certain Elisa Dotenes,
was paid by the bank, clearly falls within the rules proscribing the admission of hearsay
evidence. It bears stressing that the failure of the prosecution to present Elisa Dotenes renders the
testimony of witness Guevarra as unsubstantiated and hearsay.
Another prosecution witness, Mr. Anthony Ambrosio, testified that he gave the accused-appellant
the amount of sixteen thousand (16,000.00) pesos, representing initial payment in consideration of
the work abroad. It is borne on record however, that Anthonys testimony was unsubstantiated by
any proof that he made such payment, i.e., receipts.
A perusal of the records will show that Anthonys testimony that he was divested of said amount,
through the misrepresentation of the accused-appellant, amounts to nothing but a mere
uncorroborated and self-serving allegation.
Surely, mere allegation, without proof, is not enough to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
It is submitted that the trial court should have first considered these testimonies before
rendering a judgment of conviction.[25]
These contentions are erroneous.
First, the testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving evidence. The phrase self-
serving evidence is a concept which has a well-defined judicial meaning. Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals[26] clarified what self-serving evidence is and what it is not, thus:
The common objection known as self-serving is not correct because almost all testimonies
are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is hearsay (Wenke, Making and Meeting
Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and
testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court
advocating his own interest; they do not include a partys testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the
opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony.
This cannot be said of a partys testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the
part of the opposing party for cross-examination.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent People v. Villarama,[27] where the Court ruled, x x
x [A] self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his favor. It does not
include the testimony he gives as a witness in court. Assayed against the foregoing standards, Ambrosios
testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.
We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of Guevarra and Ambrosio
are unsubstantiated and self-serving. Still, the unsubstantiated and self-serving nature of said testimonies
would not carry the day for Omictin, since she admitted, during trial, the substance of their
testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC:
Q So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the processing of
their visa?
A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?

A P16,000.00[28]
Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra
the amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000.
In all, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings and core disposition of the CA, confirmatory
of that of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the November 25, 2009 CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02793 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF CLEMEA vs. HEIRS OF BIEN

G.R. No. 155508 September 11, 2006
The only question presented in this petition for review on certiorari [1] is whether petitioners, the heirs of
Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, should be made to pay respondents, the heirs of Irene B. Bien, compensatory
damages for depriving them of the owners share of the harvest from a tract of riceland in Bolo,
Municipality of Tiwi, Albay.
This piece of land, described in Tax Declaration No. 5299 (TD 5299) as having a surface area of more or
less 20,644 square meters, was one of three lots [2] involved in two consolidated cases [3] for recovery of
possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by respondents predecessor Irene Bien (through her attorney-
in-fact Gregorio Clemea) against petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano. The pertinent
averments in Irene Biens complaint read:
[T]he plaintiff is x x x the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in the province
of Albay described and limited as follows:
Una parcela de terreno arrozal en el sitio de Bolo, Municipio de Tiwi, Provincia de Albay, con una
extension superficial de 20,644 metros cuadrados poco mas o menos, lindante al Norte - Eulalio
Copino y Esteban Bobis; al Este Pedro Clemea y Conde; al Sur Canal de Ragadio y Valentina Conde;
y al Oeste Marcial Copino, Pedro Clemea y Valentina Conde.
Declared as Tax No. 5299 and assessed at P310.00
[T]he plaintiff acquired the above parcel of land by purchase from Victoriano Napa as per deed of sale
in her favor x x x; and the said Victoriano Napa in turn acquired the same by purchase from
Francisco Barrameda who also bought the said land from the administrator of the estate of
Pedro Clemea y Conde which sale had been duly authorized and approved by this Honorable Court in
Civil Case No. 3410-In re The Estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde x x x;
[T]he defendant ever since he was removed as administrator of the Estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde in
the year 1939 deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use of the above
described parcel of land x x x, and has ever since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to
the lawful owner thereof notwithstanding the fact that he has no right or any color of title over the said
land;
[B]y reason of this unlawful occupation and usurpation by the defendant, the plaintiff will suffer
damages and in fact has suffered damages beginning this October 1943 harvest at the rate of
25 cavans of palay per harvest or 50 cavans yearly x x x[4]
In his answer, Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged that the land was his and that it was in his
exclusive possession.[5] His claim of ownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate of the late
Pedro Clemea y Conde to his predecessor-in-interest.
Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the
trial. The plaintiff,Irene Bien, passed away in 1953 and was substituted by respondents.[6] Not long after
that, petitioners succeeded the defendant Pedro Clemea y Zurbano who died in 1955.[7] The trial lasted
decades. Eventually, the cases were re-raffled to Branch 2 [8] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Legaspi City in November of 1994.
On August 10, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision [9] declaring petitioners to be the absolute
owners of the land described in TD 5299 and directing respondents to respect petitioners possession
thereof.[10] Subsequently, however, the RTC reconsidered its findings with respect to ownership. This
time, it ruled that the contending parties had failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and
therefore the land in question still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the late
Pedro Clemea y Conde. Thus, in an order dated November 13, 1995, [11] the RTC modified
the dispositive portion of its decision to read:
1. Considering that the parcel covered by [TD] No. 5299, the other parcel subject matter of
Civil Case No. 115, is not included among those parcels sold by the estate of the late
Pedro Clemea y Conde to Francisco Barameda, the predecessor of the original plaintiff Irene Bien and
neither
was it included in the sale executed by Special Administrator Salustiano Zubeldia in favor of Jesus
Salazar, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants [petitioners], the same still forms part of the
estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde. Neither the plaintiffs [respondents] nor the defendants
[petitioners] own the same.
2. Considering that the defendants [petitioners,] in their opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, no longer disputes (sic) the ownership of the plaintiffs [respondents] as regards the
parcel covered by [TD] No. 5681, subject matter of Civil Case No. 74, plaintiffs [respondents] are
declared the owners thereof, as stated in the decision. As regards the claim for damages by the
plaintiffs [respondents], since it was not duly established that the defendants [petitioners] entered and
occupied a portion of said property, no damage is just the same awarded.
3. Considering that the parcel of land covered by [TD] No. 5685 is included in the sale
executed by Special Administrator Salustiano Zubeldia to Jesus Salazar, and further considering that
said deed of sale is earlier than the sale executed in favor of Mr. Francisco Barameda, the defendants
[petitioners] are declared the owners thereof and therefore entitled to its possession. No damages
having been proved, no award concerning is awarded (sic).
SO ORDERED.[12]
From that order, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). It was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 50912. In a decision dated April 4, 2002, [13] the CA affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issues
relating to the other two parcels of land but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the land covered by
TD 5299. It proceeded to award respondents P118,000 in damages as compensation for their having been
deprived of possession and the owners share in the harvest. The findings on which this award was based
were stated in the appellate courts decision:
[T]he recovered exhibits of the appellants [respondents] clearly indicate that ownership thereof
belongs to [them] by virtue of the following documents of sale x x x. Hence, the appellants
[respondents] are the owners of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 5299. The remaining
issue to be determined is the amount of damages sustained by appellants [respondents]
from appellees [petitioners] retention of possession thereof.
Gregorio Clemea testified on the damages incurred from the appellees occupation of the property in
the form of deprivation of the owners share of the harvest, to wit:
Q This second parcel of land described in the SECOND cause of action which is Tax No. 5299, what
kind of land is this?
A Riceland.
Q How big is this parcel of land?

A More or less, two (2) hectares.
Q What is the average owners share of the harvest?

A About fifty cavans of palay.
xxx xxx xxx
Q From the time you filed this case in the year 1943, who had been receiving the owners share from this
property, known as Tax No. 5299?
A The late Pedro Clemea y Zurbano when he was still alive and then his children after his death.
He likewise testified on the changes in the price of a cavan of palay over the years, thus:
Q What was the current average price of palay after liberation, starting from the year 1945 up to 1950?
A About Fifteen (P15.00) Pesos a sack.
Q How about after 1950 to 1960?

A The same.
Q How about from 1960 to 1970?

A At present, it is Twenty Five (P25.00) Pesos per cavan.
xxx xxx xxx
We believe, in the exercise of discretion, that the [respondents] are entitled to an award of damages in
the amount of P118,000 computed in the following manner: P1,500.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two
[the number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P15.00) multiplied by 27 years (1943 to 1970)
and P2,700.00 (50 cavans multiplied by two [the number of harvests in a year] multiplied by P25.00)
multiplied by 31 years (1971-2001).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly granted in that the Order, dated November 13, 1995, of the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch II, in two consolidated cases, docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 74 and 155, is affirmed with the modification that paragraph 1 is deleted and replaced with the
following:
1. Appellants [respondents] are hereby DECLARED entitled to the ownership of the property covered
by Tax
Declaration No. 5299. The appellees [petitioners] and all persons claiming under them are hereby
ORDERED to vacate this tract of land immediately and to turn over the possession of such land
together with all improvements thereon to appellants. Appellees [petitioners] are further directed to
pay to appellants [respondents] the amount of one hundred and eighteen thousand pesos
(P118,000.00), by way of actual and compensatory damages, with legal interest thereon from the date
of finality of this decision until actual payment thereof. [14]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated October 1, 2002.
[15]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners no longer dispute respondents ownership of the property covered by TD 5299. They
insist, however, that they cannot be held liable to respondents for the harvest because (1) they never took
possession of the property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA relied on to determine the
amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could
not have been a proper basis for such an award.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioners contention that the land was never in their possession should be dismissed outright for
two reasons, both of them simple and rather obvious.
First, petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged in his answer that the land
declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. [16] That statement, insofar as it confirmed the
allegation in the complaint that petitioners predecessor had retained possession of the land in question,
[17]
took on the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [18]
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The
exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and
because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his
admission.[19]
The rule on judicial admissions found its way into black-letter law only in 1964 [20] but its content
is supplied by case law much older and in many instances more explicit than the
present codal expression. In the early case of Irlanda v. Pitargue,[21] this Court laid down the doctrine that
acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the
admission was made through palpable mistake. The rule was more forcibly stated by Mr. Justice Street in
the 1918 decision Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.:[22]
An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making such
admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith
should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the opposite
party or not.[23]
And in Cunanan v. Amparo,[24] the Court declared that:
the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as

against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to, or
inconsistent with, his pleadings.[25]
Petitioners newly-contrived assertion that they were never in possession of the land cannot hold
up against these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the admission of
Pedro Clemea y Zurbano, their predecessor in the litigation. [26] Without any showing that the admission
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now
contradict it.
Second, the issue of whether petitioners ever had possession of the land is undeniably a question
of fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari as the remedy is
confined to pure questions of law.[27]
The Court is well aware, of course, that this rule has been watered down by a slew of exceptions.
Hoping to convince the Court to reverse the CAs findings, petitioners invoke a number of these
exceptions, namely: (1) the factual findings of the trial court and the CA are contradictory; (2) the
decision sought to be reviewed is against the law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3)
there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice relevant
facts and evidence which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion. [28] But this case does
not fall within any of these. For one, petitioners have shown no contradiction between the findings of the
CA and the RTC on the matter. And for obvious reasons, our preceding disquisition on the conclusiveness
of Pedro Clemea y Zurbanos admission of the fact of possession makes the rest of the grounds invoked by
petitioners undeserving of even passing consideration.
Petitioners next proposition, i.e., that Gregorio Clemeas testimony was self-serving and therefore
an improper basis for the damages awarded to respondents, is just as unworthy of this Courts favorable
consideration.
Self-serving evidence, perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a concept much

misunderstood. Not infrequently, the term is employed as a weapon to devalue and discredit a partys
testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is
a grave error. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its
proponents interest.[29] The term, if used with any legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a
party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he
gives as a witness in court. [30] Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay
evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on the consideration
that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. [31] In contrast, a partys testimony in court
is sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other party,[32] and therefore, not susceptible to an
objection on the ground that it is self-serving.
At any rate, for all their protestations against the use of Gregorio Clemeas testimony, petitioners
never once alleged, much less tried to show, that his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. As already
observed, petitioners objection is founded solely on the mere fact that he, being a plaintiff, was a witness
interested in the outcome of the case. Now, it is true that a partys interest may to some extent affect his
credibility as a witness.[33] To insist otherwise would be the height of naivet. Nonetheless, the Court
cannot subscribe to the view, implicit in petitioners argument, that a partys testimony favorable to
himself must be disregarded on account solely of his interest in the case. Our justice system will not
survive such a rule for obdurate cynicism on the part of a court is just as odious to the administration of
justice as utter gullibility.
Moreover, this Court held in National Development Company v. Workmens Compensation

Commission[34] that interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a partys testimony. [35] Elsewhere it has
been said that the interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or
require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness testimony as
he finds credible and to reject the rest. [36] To these dicta we give our complete assent. Petitioners
arguments to the contrary must be rejected.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in relying
on Gregorio Clemeas testimony. The award of damages must stand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 4, 2002 decision and October 1, 2002
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50912 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible
G.R. Nos. 89370-72 May 15, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PAULINO MAGDADARO Y GERONA, accused-appellant.
Convicted in a Joint Decision * by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City of three (3)
counts of Rape, committed on three (3) different occasions, and sentenced to three (3) penalties
of reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant, Paulino Magdadaro, now seeks a reversal.
The Complainant, Beverlinda Abrasado, is a 16-year old country girl, a Grade VI student, daughter of
Leonardo Abrasado. The latter is a tenant of accused-appellant Magdadaro at the latter's farm at Balubal,
Cagayan de Oro City. Beverlinda helps her father till the farm. Appellant is a farmer, 54 years of age,
married residing at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City.
Beverlinda's narration of the three (3) happenings follows:
The 10 July 1988 incident:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, when Beverlinda was gathering "guyabano" near Appellant's
house at Balubal, Cagayan de Oro City, the latter suddenly appeared, held Beverlinda by the hand and
pulled her towards the cornfield nearby. She tried her best to extricate herself but was no match for
Appellant's strength. The latter then held her hand again and boxed her in the stomach, making her fall to
the ground. She lost consciousness. When she regained her senses, Appellant was already on top of her,
taking advantage of her womanhood.
The event over, Beverlinda was ordered to go home by Appellant with the threat not to reveal the
occurrence to any one at the risk of her life and that of her family.
The 15 July 1988 incident.
On this date, while Beverlinda was fetching water from the well near Appellant's house, the latter
appeared, held her by the hand, and pulled her towards the cornfield, despite her resistance and attempts
to free herself. She was again boxed, fell to the ground, and when she came to, Appellant was on top of
her "making the push and pull movements."
As in the first incident, Beverlinda did not reveal the episode for fear of her life.
The 21 August 1988 incident.
At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of this date, Beverlinda was tethering a carabao in a grassy area
adjoining Appellant's house at Balubal. From out of the bushes, Appellant appeared and chased her. She
was able to run but Appellant caught up with her and held her hand tightly. She shouted for help.
Appellant boxed her in the stomach. She lost consciousness and fell to the, ground. Regaining her senses,
she found Appellant already astride her, having carnal knowledge of her.
Unknown to Beverlinda and Appellant, Leonardo Abrasado, Beverlinda's father, heard the shouts and
proceeded towards the direction where they came from. Leonardo testified that upon reaching there, he
could hardly believe his eyes when he saw Appellant, his own landlord, abusing his own daughter.
Engaged, he called "Gaw" and unsheathed his bolo. But Appellant was quick on his feet, stood up, naked
from waist down, and ran away, leaving his pants', his underwear and his hat in his haste. The father
chased Appellant but lost the latter lost in the bushes.
Appellant was found about two hours later by some members of the Bantay Bayan and the military,
approximately 300 meters away from the place of the incident, still hiding in the bushes (Tsn., 29
September 1988, p. 18). He was "wearing his coat, but no pants, he just wrapped himself in the lower
portion of his body with a long sleeved sweater." The witness asked him if he was Paulino Magdadaro
and "why did you do it?" but the latter did not answer (ibid., pp. 10-11). Appellant was then taken to the
checkpoint of the PC detachment by Sgts. Lustre and Viras.
When the search party arrived at the scene of the incident, they found the corn plants toppled down, a pair
of long pants, a pair of briefs, a hat and the underwear of a woman. Beverlinda was also still there, seated,
crying (ibid, p. 25).
The genital examination of Beverlinda, on 22 August 1988, at the Northern Mindanao Regional Training
Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City, disclosed "incomplete hymenal laceration at 1:00, 3:00, 7:00 and 9:00
o'clock position," "suggestive of sexual intercourse," but "negative of spermatozoa" (Exh. D).
Beverlinda's father declared that on his way to the City Hall on 22 August 1988 in the company of Sgt.
Romero, his wife, a Bantay Bayan, and Appellant, the latter asked for forgiveness twice and offered to
pay damages but that he refused because the matter was already before the authorities (Tsn., 11 October
1988, pp. 21, 23). Again, during the investigation at the Fiscal's Office, Appellant asked for settlement of
the case (ibid., p. 24) but he gave the same answer.
So much for the prosecution evidence. Now, for Appellant's own account:
He states that he knows Beverlinda because she is the daughter of his tenant, Leonardo Abrasado. He
admits having had carnal knowledge of her on 10 July, 15 July and 21 August 1988 but maintains that the
act was consummated upon mutual agreement.
On 10 July 1988, he had sex with Complainant at his own house, adding that she was no longer a virgin
as he was able to penetrate immediately and without obstacle (Tsn., 19 December 1988, pp. 5, 7 & 8). The
act consummated, Beverlinda asked him for money so she could buy a birthday dress. He replied that he
had to go home first to get the money. On 14 July 1988, he went to Beverlinda's house at Balubal,
bringing with him fish and P200.00 (ibid., pp. 10-12).
The following day, 15 July 1988, Beverlinda went to his house and he handed her the money. One thing
led to another and they made love. Beverlinda invited him for her birthday but he begged off because of
another appointment in Zamboanga, but promised that he would try and be back.
In the morning of 21 August 1988, Appellant went fishing. Later, with his two children, he went to
Balubal and gave his catch to Leonardo, his tenant. After having lunch at the latter's house, both went out
to gather fruits and cassava. An hour later, or at 2:30 P.M., they placed what they had gathered in sacks
and Appellant instructed his children to hurry so they could catch the bus headed for home. Appellant
accepted Leonardo's offer to help the children carry the sacks. After Leonardo and the two children had
left, Beverlinda went to his house. After a brief conversation, Appellant discovered that he had not
brought the house keys. Beverlinda suggested that they go instead to the cornfield near the house and
repeat what they had engaged in on two other occasions. Upon reaching the cornfield, he took off his
pants and brief. After spreading his pants and brief on the ground, Beverlinda removed her panty. They
made love afterwards. Minutes later, Appellant heard Leonardo calling him "Gaw." Upon seeing him, he
took off immediately, leaving behind his pants and brief.
In the course of his testimony, Appellant stoutly denied having forced Beverlinda to have sex with him; or
having boxed her and rendering her unconscious to satisfy his desire; or having threatened her and her
family if ever she reported the incidents to the authorities. In a nutshell, Appellant's version is that he and
Beverlinda were sweethearts.
The Trial Court disbelieved Appellant, found him guilty in all three criminal cases; sentenced him to three
(3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, the maximum duration of his sentence not to exceed forty (40) years
under the threefold rule; and to indemnify Beverlinda in the amounts of P30,000.00, "which is
jurisprudential" and P20,000.00 as moral damages."
Appellant now faults the Trial Court:
I. In holding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt, when the evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to support a conviction;
II. In accepting as gospel truth the highly improbable, incredible fabricated and concocted testimony of
the complainant and that of her witness;
III. In holding that as between the version of the complainant and the version of the accused regarding the
incident, the court is inclined to believe the testimony of the complainantand in holding that the
testimony of the accused is incredible;
IV. In holding that a) the flight of the accused from the scene of the crime is evidence of guilt; b) the
alleged repeated request for settlement of the case by the accused is an implied admission of guilt; and c)
the failure of the accused to answer the question of Francisco Bagtong when the accused was asked "are
you the one who committed the crime?", which would have naturally called for comment if not true, is
admission of guilt;
V. That the decision of the lower court is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
From the evidence before us, it is difficult to see how Appellant can profess innocence. Even if we were
to discount Beverlinda's testimony, her father's declarations point to Appellant's clear culpability, He had
heard his daughter's shouts (not knowing then that it was she) while she was being pulled by Appellant.
He had actually seen him consummating his dastardly act. Infuriated, the father chased him with a bolo
but he was fast on his feet and successfully eluded pursuit. That immediate flight is strongly indicative of
his consciousness of guilt. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as the
lion."
When found, still hiding behind the bushes, Appellant was still without his brief and pants, was uncovered
from the waist down, his private part exposed. He was caught literally with his pants down. The pieces of
clothing needed to cover him up were all found at the very site of the incident. What more physical
evidence is necessary? They eloquently confirm Beverlinda's testimony that after having undressed
himself Appellant had violated her on 21 August 1988.
Appellant's flight upon discovery by Beverlinda's father of his shameful act, belies consent by Beverlinda
for if that had been so, she would not have been found crying her heart out, nor would he have fled in
fear.
His silence when asked by the Barangay Captain "why he had done it?" is likewise significant. His claim
that there was no admission by silence on his part since he was not given the opportunity to make a reply
besides the fact that whoever asked the question was not known to him, hardly deserves consideration.
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is
made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will at
once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and
self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore,
particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., p. 401).
Appellant's offers to settle the case in exchange for money or land, which were all rejected by
Beverlinda's father, were correctly appreciated by the Trial Court as evidential of his culpability. An offer
of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt (Rule 130,
Sec. 24, Rules of Court).
Discrepancies there may be in Beverlinda's testimony and her affidavit where she did not mention that
Appellant had boxed her but instead said that she had been pushed. Be it one or the other, however, the
inconsistency will not affect the crucial fact that Beverlinda had suffered disgrace at Appellant's hands.
Moreover, as we have consistently held, an affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, sometimes for want of suggestions and inquiries,
without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
that belongs to the subject (People v. De Dios, G.R. No. 58174, 6 July 1990, 187 SCRA 228).
Arrayed against the testimonial and physical evidence presented, Appellant's protestations of innocence
pale into nothingness. We find no hesitation in upholding conviction.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of
P50,000.00 as damages is reduced to P30.000.00, consistent with current jurisprudence.
Costs against accused-appellant, Paulino Magdadaro. SO ORDERED.

TAN vs. RODIL ENTERPRISES

G.R. No. 168071 December 18, 2006
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated 21 October 2002 and the
Resolution[2] dated 12 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, which set aside
the 18 June 2001 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26 in Civil Case No.
01-99797. The RTC reversed the 6 October 2000 Decision[4] of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
of Manila, Branch 13 in Civil Case No. 166584, and dismissed the Complaint filed by
respondent Rodil Enterprises against petitioner Luciano Tan for utter lack of merit.
This case has its origin from the Complaint [5] for Unlawful Detainer filed on 13 March
2000 by Rodil Enterprises against Luciano Tan with the MeTC of Manila, Branch 13, docketed as Civil
Case No. 166584.
The factual antecedents to the filing of the Complaint show that Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the
subject premises, the Ides ORacca Building since 1959. The Ides ORaccaBuilding, located at the corner
of M. de Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila, is owned by the Republic of
the Philippines. On 18 May 1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), entered into a Renewal of a Contract of Lease over the
Ides ORacca Building. A subsequent Supplementary Contract dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered
into, thus, extending the lease agreement until 1 September 1997.
The validity of the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in question in several actions
involving Rodil Enterprises, the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc., and other tenants. This
Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid contracts in a Decision rendered on 29 November 2001, in the
consolidated cases of RodilEnterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-
Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v.
Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).[6]
Prior thereto, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968 entitled, Spouses Saturnino B. Alvarez
and Epifania Binay Alvarez v. Rodil Enterprises Company, Inc. rendered a Decision[7] dated 8 February
1994, declaring the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplementary Contract, dated 18 May 1992
and 25 May 1992, respectively, of no force and effect.
It appears that Rodil Enterprises appealed the 8 February 1994 Decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 which was dismissed by the appellate court for non-compliance with
procedural requirements. The dismissal was appealed by Rodil Enterprises to the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 119711 which was also dismissed. Subsequently, the Office of the President issued
an Order of Execution of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No.
4968. Thereafter, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on
the Order of Execution, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No 79157. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
therein dated 28 March 2005 which annulled the Order of Execution, and enjoined the Office of the
President from enforcing its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968. Likewise, the Court of
Appeals ordered the Office of the President to abide by the 29 November 2001 Decision of the Supreme
Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537, upholding the validity of the
Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplemental Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992,
respectively. Finally, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was brought
on certiorari by the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. to the Supreme Court, and docketed
as G.R. No. 169892. On 25 January 2006, the Court, in G.R. No. 169892, issued a Resolution denying the
Petition. On 20 March 2006, a Resolution was rendered in the same case denying with finality the
amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the preceding cases, on 18 October 1999, a subsequent Contract of
Lease was drawn between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be effective retroactively from
1 September 1997 to 21 August 2012 at a monthly rental of P65,206.67, subject to adjustment upon the
approval of a new appraisal covering the Ides ORacca Building. Rodil Enterprises subleased various units
of the property to members of the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. A space thereof, known
as Botica Divisoria was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.
In Rodil Enterprises Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, the former alleged
that Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease, the amount of P13,750.00 as
monthly rentals, representing the reasonable use and occupancy of the said
premises. However, Luciano Tan unjustifiably and unreasonably refused to pay the rentals from
September 1997 up to the time of the filing of the Complaint, and despite repeated oral and written
demands, refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rents due. Rodil Enterprises prayed
that Luciano Tan and those claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate the leased premises. A
payment of rentals in arrears, amounting toP385,000.00 was similarly sought, including attorneys fees
and litigation costs, as well as, subsequent monthly rentals in the amount of P13,750.00 until Luciano Tan
vacates Botica Divisoria.
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns the
Ides ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the said premises
pending the disposition and sale of the building. He based his claim on the fact that on 8 February 1994,
the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968, had declared the Renewal of Contract of Lease dated 18
May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated 25 May 1992 between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic
to be without force and effect. Accordingly, the DENR was directed to award the lease contract in favor
of the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. of which Luciano Tan is a member. He, thus,
prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had
collected from 1987 to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open court
by Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to put an
end to this civil case for ejectment between them:
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to the present,
which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before June 30, 2000; and
2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5 th day of each
month after June 30, 2000.[8]
On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, [9] averring
therein that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent
monthly rentals as they fall due; that the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted
to P467,500.00; and in line with his good faith in dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit
the aforesaid amount, and the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed
to deposit the Managers Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of
Manila. However, on 15 August 2000, the MeTC denied the Motion on the rationalization
that Luciano Tans prayer to deposit the specified sum with the City Treasurer of Manila contravenes
Section 19,[10] Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Subsequently, the issues for the resolution of the MeTC were synthesized by the court in its Order,
dated 25 July 2000, to wit:
[T]he issue insofar as [Rodil Enterprises], revolved on:
Whether [Rodil Enterprises] is legally entitled to collect from [Luciano Tan] the amount of rentals
and interest thereon as prayed for in the complaint and to ask for the ejectment of the defendant
from the leased premises.
On the other hand, [Luciano Tan]s counsel formulated the issues of the case in the following
manner[,] to wit:
1) Whether or not under the circumstances[,][Luciano Tan] could be ejected from the premises in
question;
2) Whether or not under the circumstances[,] [Rodil Enterprises] should be made to return the
amounts collected from [Luciano Tan] from 1987 to 1997 amounting to P988,650.00.[11]
On 6 October 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The court said
that Luciano Tan did not contest the sublease on a monthly basis, and in fact admitted in judicio, viz:
1.) That [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September 1997 up to the
present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000, on or before June 30,
2000; and
2) [[Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00, on or before the 5th day of
each month after June 30, 2000.
(Order dated June 27, 2000)[12]
According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of compromise
is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot
overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tans counsel of the formers liability in the form of rentals,
coupled with a proposal to liquidate. [13] The foregoing gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to
an admission of a fact, like the existence of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus,
admissible.[14] The court pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the
periodic consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from
disavowing the fact of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in arrears. [15] The MeTC,
explained further:
Prescinding from the foregoing discourse, it ineluctably follows that [Luciano Tan]s indifference to
heed the two demand letters, the cognition of which were recognized (paragraphs VII and IX,
Complaint; paragraph 2, Answer), rendered him a deforciant (1 Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 6th Revised Edition, 1997, page 770, citing Dikit vs. Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44), and was
thus vulnerable to the special civil action under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, especially so when non-payment of rentals is an accepted prelude to, and a secondary
matrix for, a tenants eviction (Article 1673 (2), New Civil Code).
From a different plane, [Luciano Tan]s quest at this juncture for recovery of the rentals he paid to
the plaintiff from 1987 to 1997 will not merit the desired result since, in a manner of speaking, it
will place the cart ahead of the horse, when juxtaposed with another pending controversy between
the parties before the Supreme Court (Annex 1, Position Paper for the Defendant; Annex B,
Answer to Counterclaim).
The decretal portion of the Decision, states, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

[Rodil Enterprises], ordering:
1. Defendant Luciano Tan, and all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate the subject realty,
and to peacefully deliver possession to the plaintiffs representative;
2. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P440,000.00) as recognized unpaid rentals from September, 1997 up to June 30, 2000;
3. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P13,750.00) as agreed rental per month, starting July, 2000, and every month
thereafter, until possession is delivered to the plaintiffs representative;
4. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
reasonable attorneys fees; and
5. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the cost of suit.
For want of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved thereby, Luciano Tan appealed the Decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, Rodil Enterprises filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, [17] which was subsequently denied by the MeTC in the
Order[18] of 15 December 2000.
On 18 June 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment appealed from and dismissing the
Complaint. It found that the MeTC erred in holding that the offer to compromise by Luciano Tans counsel
was akin to an admission of fact, the same being contrary to Section 27, [19] Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. As reasoned by the RTC:
During the pre-trial conference held in the lower court, proposals and counter-proposals emanated
from the parties counsels, which was normally inspired by the desire to buy peace, nay, to put an
end to the troubles of litigation, and to promote settlement of disputes as a matter of public
policy. The act of defendant/appellants (sic) in the midst of pre-trial is not an admission of any
liability and therefore, should not be considered admissible evidence against him. [20]
Proceeding to the issue of the right of Rodil Enterprises to collect rentals and eject Luciano Tan based on
the contracts, dated 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992, the RTC ruled that the controversy is still pending
before the Supreme Court. It, thus, held that the prayer for recovery of rentals from 1987 to 1997 is
premature.
The RTC, disposed, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and
a new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 166584 for utter
lack of merit.[21]
Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review with the appellate court, which, in a Decision
dated 21 October 2002 set aside the judgment of the RTC, and affirmed and reinstated the 6 October
2000 Decision of the MeTC.
According to the appellate court, there is, between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic of the Philippines,
a valid and subsisting Contract of Lease executed on 18 October 1999, the same for a period of fifteen
(15) years.[22] The period of the lease, under the 18 October 1999 contract is from 1 September 1997 to 31
August 2012. The Court of Appeals gave credence to the fact that the existence of the aforesaid contract
was not denied nor controverted by Luciano Tan. What Luciano Tan, instead, impugned was the validity
of the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, which was upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases
of Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-
Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v.
Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).[23]
Ruling on the more important question of whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his
liability as a sublessee of Rodil Enterprises, the Court of Appeals held that the former made an implied
admission of the existence of a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises on the subject
premises; and that he had reneged in the payment of rentals since 1 September 1997. Moreover, it
deemed Luciano Tans Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals as another admission in favor
of Rodil Enterprises. The appellate court elucidated, thus:
The evidence on record indubitably shows that respondent [Luciano Tan] is a sublessee of petitioner
[Rodil Enterprises] who failed to pay rentals from 01 September 1997 and even until the case was filed
before the [M]etropolitan [T]rial [C]ourt, when respondent [Luciano Tan] agreed in principle in open
court to the following terms:
1) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up
to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000, on or before June 30,
2000; and
2) defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5 th day
of each month after June 30, 2000.
at the hearing on 27 June 2000 though no settlement was eventually reached between the parties,
respondent [Luciano Tan] in effect made an implied judicial admission that there was a subsisting
contract of sublease between him and petitioner, and that he was remiss in the payment of rentals from 01
September 1997 up to that day (Rollo, Annex 9 of petition). Respondent [Luciano Tan]s admission was
further bolstered by the fact that he filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals (Rollo, p. 3 of
Annex 15 of petition). By such acts, respondent [Luciano Tan] accepted the truth of petitioner
[Rodil Enterprises] allegation of the existence of a contract of sublease between them and of his non-
payment of the rentals from 01 September 1997. A judicial admission is an admission made in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, verbal or written, by a party accepting for the purposes of the suit the
truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove (Remedial Law by Herrera, Oscar
M. citing Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence and Evidence by Salonga).[24]
The decretal portion of the 21 October 2002 Court of Appeals Decision, states, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
Decision dated 18 June 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated 06 October 2000 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13
is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.[25]
The appellate court denied Luciano Tans Motion for Reconsideration thereon, in a Resolution, [26] dated 12
May 2005.
Thus, petitioner comes before us, raising the following grounds, to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN
IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
ITS DECISION BY RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE MARCH 28, 2005 DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT
YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
RESPONDENT RODIL ENTERPRISES IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT FILED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP. NO.
79517 SEEKING TO NULLIFY THE ORDER OF EXECUTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF ITS 8 FEBRUARY 1994 DECISION IN OP CASE NO. 4968, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT ITS PREVIOUS PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
SAME DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1994 HAD BEEN
DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 17,
1994 DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL RULES.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS A SUBLESSEE OF RESPONDENT AND THAT
PETITIONER WAS REMISS IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS RENTALS OVER THE PREMISES.[27]
The Petition is without merit.
We shall address the first ground raised by petitioner with regard to the alleged reliance of the Court of
Appeals on the Decision of the Tenth Division of the same court, dated 28 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 79157, entitled, Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. The Office of the President and Ides ORacca Building
Tenants Association, Inc.[28]
Contrary to petitioners contention, we do not find that the Court of Appeals was in error when it took
notice of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 in resolving petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. As
respondent Rodil Enterprises asseverated, for the appellate court to ignore a decision rendered by a
division thereof would be to turn a blind eye on a valid judgment rendered by the same appellate
body. Neither can we give merit to petitioners submission that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on its
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 is premature and misplaced. More significantly, the contention of the
petitioner that the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has not attained finality has become mute when
viewed within recent factual developments. The ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has long reached
finality. This Court in a Resolution[29] dated 25 January 2006 denied the Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. thereon. On 20 March 2006,
this Court denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration of the 25 January 2006 Resolution for lack
of compelling reason or substantial argument.[30]
Moreover, on 12 April 2004, the appellate court issued a Resolution, [31] granting petitioner a
hearing on its Motion for Reconsideration as the grounds cited therein needed further clarification. This
belies petitioners claim that the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration was based solely on the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517.
We come to the second ground raised by the petitioner. Petitioner argues that Rodil Enterprises is
guilty of forum shopping when it filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 79157,[32] after it filed an Appeal with the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 34586.
[33]
Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special
civil action of certiorari.[34]
The question of forum shopping is not even material to the instant petition.
It must be emphasized that neither CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 nor CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 is before this
Court for consideration. These cases are separate and distinct from CA-G.R. SP No. 67201 now before us.
What are assailed in the instant Petition are the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21 October
2002 and the Resolution, dated 12 May 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 67201, which reversed the ruling of the
RTC, and affirmed the MeTC, ordering Luciano Tan to vacate the premises and peacefully deliver
possession to Rodil Enterprises. The matter in controversy is the refusal of Luciano Tan to pay the
monthly rentals over Botica Divisoria under the contract of sublease between the parties.
On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify
the Order of Execution of the Office of the President of its 8 February 1994 Decision in OP Case No.
4968 finding the Renewal of Contract of Lease, and the Supplemental Contract of no force and
effect. CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 was an appeal on the Decision in O.P. Case No. 4968, which was the basis
of the Order of Execution. If there has indeed been forum shopping when CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was
instituted during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 34586, such question should have been raised by
petitioner, at first instance, before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517. It should be noted that
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was already given due course by the Court of Appeals and its
ruling therein has long attained finality when, on appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169892, we
denied the said appeal with finality in our Resolutions dated 25 January 2000 and dated 20 March
2006. Whatever matters concerning the said case is now beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve.
We proceed to the final ground raised by the petitioner for the allowance of the instant Petition. Petitioner
assails the factual findings of the Court of Appeals when it ruled that there was a judicial admission as to
petitioners liability under a contract of sublease between him and Rodil Enterprises.
To resolve this issue, a reading of the significant orders of the MeTC and the pleadings filed by petitioner
is warranted.
The MeTC issued an Order, dated 27 June 2000 of the following import, to wit:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms to put an
end to this civil case for ejectment between them:
1.) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up
to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000 on or before June 30,
2000; and
2.) the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the
5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.[35]
On 14 August 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals with the MeTC,
praying that he be allowed to deposit the rentals due as of August 2000, in the amount of P467,500.00,
and the subsequent monthly rentals as it falls due.
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,[36] which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is
not a tacit admission of liability.
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific Industrial
Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[37] to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the

case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the
existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the
offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence
of an indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is
admissible to prove such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980
ed.]); Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9
L. ed., 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance (L.M.
Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]. x x x.[38]
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.[39] the Court applied the exception to
the general rule. In Varadero there was neither an expressed nor implied denial of liability, but during the
course of the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed a willingness to pay the
plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed
was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the
existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the formers liability in the
form of rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners
liability on the subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence of
the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that were
assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which has been upheld
by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537.
Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to
the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was
clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioners
unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals
computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioners
judicial admission in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds
particular significance when viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals,
wherein petitioner stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the
present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to
reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not. [40] A judicial
admission is an admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes
of the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove. [41]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 21 October 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, affirming and reinstating the 6 October
2000 Decision of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 166584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. KALALO

G.R. No. 185522 June 13, 2012
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30473. The CA affirmed the Decision [3] and Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 04-230278-84, which had in turn affirmed the Decision [5] of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, in Crim. Case No. 372535-41. The MeTC acquitted
respondent Helen T. Kalalo (Kalalo) of a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks
Law, but ruled that she was civilly liable to petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the amount
of 71,009 representing the value of unpaid goods.[6]
As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer products since
1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby, prior to the delivery of beer
products, she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner: a blank check and a check to be filled
up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of the goods delivered. At the end of the week,
Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of
the returned empty beer bottles and cases from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they
succeeded in determining the actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank
check, and respondent would fund her account accordingly.[7]
In time, respondents business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC increased
from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it became very difficult
for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she requested regular statements of account
from petitioner, but it failed to comply.[8]
In 2000, SMCs agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the probable increase
in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her of the breakdown of the balance. She
complied with the request; but after making several cash payments and returning a number of empty beer
bottles and cases, she noticed that she still owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it
provide her with a detailed statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to
compel SMC to update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she
had issued to petitioner,[9] the details of which are as follows:[10]
Bank of the Philippine Islands Date Amount

(BPI) Check No.
0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 62,200.00

0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000.00

0012801 Sept. 25, 2000 190,000.00
0012802 Sept. 30, 2000 208,162.00
0012826 Sept. 30, 2000 62,200.00
0012823 Sept. 30, 2000 104,327.00
0012824 Oct. 14, 2000 104,326.00
TOTAL 921,215.00
On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC sent her a
demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks. [11]
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of SMC, [12] respondents
counsel wrote a letter (the Offer of Compromise) wherein Kalalo acknowledge[d] the receipt of the
statement of account demanding the payment of the sum of 816,689.00 and submitt[ed] a proposal by
way of Compromise Agreement to settle the said obligation. [13]
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a Complaint against
respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law.[14]
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During trial, and after
the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all cash payments and
funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the Statement of Account showed that
the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner was 71,009.[15] Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer
of Compromise and stated that, at the time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC
agents with imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner.[16]
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby
acquitted of all the charges against her. However, it appearing that she still owes the
private complainant, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the amount of 71,009.00 to
private complainant.[17]
As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the case, SMC
appealed only the civil aspect of the MeTCs Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to
the larger amount of 921,215.[18] After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the RTC found
no reversible error in the MeTCs Decision, dismissed the appeal of petitioner, [19] and denied the latters
Motion for Reconsideration.[20]
Dissatisfied with the RTCs Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for Review, which was
eventually dismissed by the appellate court. [21] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, to no avail. [22]
SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court. [23]
The Courts Ruling
We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court.
I
The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent
Kalalo.
Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent unequivocally admitted her liability to
private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel. [24]
We quote in full Kalalos Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:
December 5, 2000
Mr. JOSELITO MANALO

GENERAL MANAGER
San Miguel Corporation
Biglang Awa Street
Caloocan City
Dear Sir:
My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby
acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the payment of the sum of 816,689.00
representing her unpaid accounts.
The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had great difficulty in
collecting from the following wholesalers:
1) MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise

624 Chacon St., Tondo, Manila
413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods)
115,500.00 amount of empties.
2) Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS

Ladies and Rum Gen. Merchandizing (sic)
1501 N. Zamora St., Tondo, Manila
150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.
She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of Compromise Agreement to settle the said
obligation:
Advance payment for the empties: 11,500.00

Installment of 10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due.
Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind consideration
and approval.
Very respectfully yours,
SGD
Vicente G. Villamil
Counsel for Helen T. Kalalo[25]
Contrary to petitioners contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express
acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the statement of
account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be
considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[26] we
examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as evidence against the offeror:
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to "buy
his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence, any
communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer to buy
peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements would be
prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would dare offer or
entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a confession of
weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by the
parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an
admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, that
his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid controversy
and save the expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is
made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual concessions. [27](citations omitted)
Petitioner further argues that respondents Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.[28] It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which
states:
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not
an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those

allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5 December
2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March 2001 for a violation of
the Bouncing Checks Law.[29] The Offer of Compromise was clearly not made in the context of a criminal
proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an implied admission of guilt.
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account from
SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the time she had the
letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet undetermined; and that she was
constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioners agents. [30] The trial courts and the CA gave
weight to her justification,[31] and we find no cogent reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore,
that the Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be
the basis of her liability to petitioner in the amount of 921,215.
II
SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of 921,215.
SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of 921,215 representing the value of unpaid
goods from respondent Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that respondent was liable to it to
the extent of only 71,009, because the Statement of Account does not reflect the transactions covered by
the dishonored checks, as it only covers cash transactions. [32]
We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present any evidence to
prove that cash transactions were treated differently from check transactions. Respondent correctly argues
that if the check transactions were covered by other statements of account, petitioner should have
presented evidence of those transactions during the proceedings before the lower court. [33]
In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of 921,215 from respondent, as it
failed to prove the existence of the purported indebtedness. The records are bereft of any evidence, other
than the dishonored checks, establishing the existence of that obligation. Checks, however, are not issued
merely for the payment of a preexisting obligation. They may likewise be issued as a guarantee for the
performance of a future obligation. In this case, it was sufficiently established that the dishonored checks
were issued merely to guarantee the performance of a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net
value of the goods after the value of the empty bottles and beer cases returned to petitioner were deducted
from the gross value of the goods delivered to respondent.
As to the amount of 71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided by SMC
to respondent showed a liability of only 71,009. Respondent presented in evidence the Statement of
Account, which petitioners witness confirmed to have come from SMCs accounting department. [34]
We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalos indebtedness to it
in the amount of 921,215, but that respondents obligation to petitioner in the amount of 71,009 is
unrebutted and supported by sufficient evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the appellate
court, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERGUIZA

G.R. No. 171348 November 26, 2008
The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old girl. And although the Court
may be moved by compassion and sympathy, the Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law.
Basic is the rule that for conviction of a crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt --
conviction with moral certainty.
For review before this Court is the November 18, 2005 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 which affirmed with modification the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, finding Larry Erguiza (appellant) guilty of one
count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated April 10, 2000, in Criminal Case No. SCC 3282 reads as follows:
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of January 5, 2000, at the back of the Bical Norte
Elementary School, municipality of Bayambang, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with AAA[3], a minor of 13 years old, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice. [4]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant (AAA), her mother BBB and
father CCC, and Dr. James Sison. The defense presented five witnesses, namely:
Joy Agbuya, Juanito Macaraeg, Juanita Angeles, Albina Erguiza, and appellant.
On November 27, 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of rape, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
In view whereof, the Court finds the accused LARRY C. ERGUIZA guilty of RAPE under Article 266-a
paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-b of R.A. 8353 and R.A. 7659 and sentences (sic) to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party, AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, to give support to AAA's offspring and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the CA aptly summarized the respective versions of the parties, based on the evidence
presented before the trial court, thus:
PROSECUTION'S VERSION:
On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high
school student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard
located at the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes.[7] When they were bound for
home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAAs short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA
asked Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.[8]
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife
at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise. [9]
Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree and other thorny plants grow.
Then Larry removed his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground. Thereafter, he
removed her short pants and panty, mounted himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private
parts and made push and pull movements. He likewise raised AAAs sandoand mashed her breast. AAA
felt pain when accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her private part after Larry
made the push and pull movements.[10]
Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise he would kill her and all the members of
her family and then he ran away.[11]
AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having spent her tears, she wore her panty and
short pants and proceeded to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep. After staying for some
time at the store, AAA decided to come (sic) home. Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed.
Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept mum on the incident.[12]
On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother (BBB's mother), a hilot residing in
XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAA's throat and the
absence of her monthly period. [13] After examining AAA, her grandmother told BBB that her daughter
was pregnant.
BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA refused to talk. After much prodding,
and in the presence of her Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by accused-
appellant.[14]
On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle, went to the police headquarters in
YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.[15] Then the police brought her to YYY District Hospital[16] where
Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said hospital conducted the examination on Michelle.
Dr. Sison made the following findings:
Q. x x x No extragenital injuries noted. Complete healed hymenal laceration 11:00 o'clock. x x x. In

layman's term, Dr. Sison found no physical injury from the breast, the body except the genital area
wherein he found a significant laceration complete (sic) healed over 11:00 o'clock.[17] Dr. Sison also
testified that a single sexual intercourse could make a woman pregnant.
BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after she was raped and that no amount of
money could bring back the lost reputation of her daughter.
CCC (AAA's father), testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of accused-appellant went to their house
and initially offered P50,000 and later P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his
house for the wedding reception[18], Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m.
DEFENSE'S VERSION
On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of CCC's[19] house from 8:00 o'clock in the
morning up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his
mother Albina Erguiza instructed him to fetch a hilot as his wife Josie was already experiencing labor
pains. He proceeded to fetch the hilot Juanita Angeles and stayed in their house until his wife delivered a
baby at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 6, 2000.[20]
Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed fetched her at around 5:10 pm on
January 5, 2000 to attend to his wife who was experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby at
about 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his wife's side until the latter gave
birth.
Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is the daughter of her balae Spouses CCC and
BBB; that her son Larry, her husband and two others left CCC and BBB's residence at about 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon on January 5, 2000; that she went to Spouses CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of
rape against her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking for P1,000,000.00 which was later reduced
to P250,000.00 and that she made a counter-offer of P5,000.00.[21]
Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg on January
5, 2000; that she never left AAA when her short pants got hooked; that they went together to the
store of Auntie Beth where they parted.[22]
Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that the house of Larry was a walking distance
of about three minutes from the mango orchard; that if one runs fast, it would only take a minute to reach
his house; and that he could not recall having seen Larry in the orchard. [23] (Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, but modified
the amount of the award of exemplary damages and costs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing circumstances, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos (Pangasinan), Branch 57 dated November 27, 2000 in Criminal Case No. SCC-3282
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Larry Erguiza is held GUILTY of Rape and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to give support to AAAs offspring.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Hence, herein appeal.
In his appeal Brief,[25] appellant raises the following errors:
1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVLEY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE, THUS
UNBELIEVABLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA.
2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECTUION EVIDENCE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
3. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

DEFENSE OF ALIBI CORROBORATED BY THE WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.[26]
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution's evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty.
This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the following precepts: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove it; (b) the complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the very
nature of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the complainant's testimony is
convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of the crime. [27]
In the case at bar, the CA upheld the conclusion of the RTC in finding the complainant credible, to wit:
The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age, like AAA, deserve full credence and should
not be dismissed as mere fabrication especially where they have absolutely no motive to testify against
the accused-appellant as in this case. Larry even admitted that AAA had no ill motive for charging him
with rape. The Supreme Court in several cases, ruled that full credence is accorded the testimony of a rape
victim who has shown no ill motive to testify against the accused. This being so, the trial court did not err
in giving full credence to AAA's testimony.[28]
This Court does not agree with the CA.
The Court is not unmindful of the general rule that findings of the trial court regarding credibility of
witnesses are accorded great respect and even finality on appeal. [29] However, this principle does not
preclude a reevaluation of the evidence to determine whether material facts or circumstances have been
overlooked or misinterpreted by the trial court. [30] In the past, this Court has not hesitated to reverse a
judgment of conviction, where there were strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape
charge was false.[31]
Generally, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was committed. And so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility and unless the same is controverted by competent physical and testimonial evidence, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. [32]
After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds that there is testimonial evidence
that contradicts the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis of which no conviction beyond reasonable
doubt could arise. It is the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. The testimony of
Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of rape having taken place as narrated by
complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense witness, Juanita Angeles (Juanita)
corroborated the alibi of appellant.
Before dwelling on the testimonies of Juanita and Joy, the Court shall first scrutinize the testimonial
evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense.
Aside from the testimony of complainant, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr.
James Sison, BBB, and CCC. The pertinent portions of their testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Dr. James Sison testified that he conducted the medical examination of complainant. His diagnosis was
that there was a significant laceration completely healed at the 11:00 o'clock position.[33] However,
Dr. Sison testified that his findings were not conclusive, but were rather suggestive that complainant was
raped. Furthermore, as to the question of paternity of the child of complainant, Dr. Sison suggested doing
a DNA match.[34]
BBB testified the she brought AAA to her grandmother, a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on
the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of complainant's throat and the absence of her monthly period.
[35]
After examining complainant, the hilot told BBB that her daughter was pregnant. AAA later revealed
that she was raped by appellant.[36] BBB further testified that she accompanied AAA to the police
headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.[37] Afterwards, the police brought complainant
to YYY District Hospital[38] where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said hospital, conducted the
examination on complainant. On cross-examination, BBB testified that the family of appellant offered her
money to settle the case.[39]
CCC, the father of AAA, was the lone rebuttal witness of the prosecution. In order to rebut the allegation
made by appellant's family that the present case was filed because appellant's family did a poor job in
preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito, CCC testified that on
the contrary, the wedding went smoothly.[40] CCC further claimed that the family of appellant knelt before
him crying and offered money to settle the case. [41] Moreover, CCC testified that appellant left his house
at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000.
On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses,

namely: Juanito Macaraeg (Macaraeg), Albina Erguiza (Albina), Juanita and Joy.
Macaraeg, the caretaker of the mango orchard, testified that he did not see appellant on any occasion in
the orchard.[42] More specifically, Macaraeg emphasized that he did not see appellant on January 5, 2000.
[43]
However, on cross-examination, he testified that the house of appellant is only a three-minute walk
from the mango orchard and probably a minute if one walks fast. [44]
Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she was with appellant at the house of
CCC and BBB preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD and appellant's brother Carlito. She
said that they left the house of CCC at around 5:00 p.m.[45] Albina narrated that when they arrived home,
at around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as the wife of appellant was having some
labor pains.[46] She said that appellant and the hilot arrived at around 5:30 p.m.[47] According to Albina
appellant never left their house.[48]
On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she had an altercation with BBB regarding the bills
and that they never resolved their quarrel. [49] She spoke to BBB and CCC because she learned that they
were falsely accusing appellant of raping AAA. [50] After talking to BBB and CCC, she and her husband
confronted appellant and asked if he had raped complainant, which appellant denied. [51] Albina claimed
that CCC and BBB were demanding P1,000,000.00 and that they later reduced it to P250,000.00.
[52]
Albina said that she offered P5,000.00 to BBB and CCC only to preserve their relationship as in-laws
and for peace.[53]
In sum, with the exception of the claim of AAA that she was raped by appellant, other evidence presented
by the prosecution did not identify appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense conflict on certain
points, more notably the claim by BBB and CCC that the family of appellant offered to settle the
case. This, however, was denied by Albina, who claimed that it was BBB and CCC who
demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in light of law and
jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.[54] In the case at bar, the offer of compromise was first testified to by BBB on cross-
examination, to wit:
Q. Is it not a fact that there was an offer by you to the mother of the accused that they pay you 1 million
and you have reduced it to P250,000.00?
A. No, sir, it was they who were the ones offering for settlement, but we never offer them any settlement,
sir.[55]
On rebuttal, CCC corroborated the testimony of BBB that the family of appellant offered to settle the
case, to wit:
Q. And according to Larry Erguiza as well as his witnesses they told the Honorable Court that you and
your wife are demanding from Larry Erguiza and his parents the amount of one million pesos so
that you will not file this case against the accused, what can you say about that?
A. There is no truth about that, sir.
Q. And what is the truth about it?

A. It was they who went to my house, they even knelt before me crying and they were offering money, sir.
[56]
However, Albina, the mother of appellant, denied the foregoing allegations, to wit:
Q. What happened when you went to the house of BBB and CCC talking with them about their problem
of the alleged rape on AAA, their daughter?
A. They were asking for a settlement price for one million pesos but we have no money, sir.
Q. What did you do when they were asking one million pesos from you?
A. We told them that we do not have that money until they reduced the price to P250,000.00 but we have no
money because we are poor, sir.
Q. Were you around when BBB testified to the witness stand?

A. I was here, sir.
Q. Did you hear what BBB said that you were the one offering money?
A. Yes, sir, I was here and I heard that.
Q. What can you say to that allegation of BBB?

A. That is not true, sir. She was saying that we were the ones offering money for one million to them but she
was telling a lie, it was they who were asking for one million pesos, sir.
Q. What is your proof that is was they who are demanding the amount of one million and reduced that to two
hundred fifty thousand (P250,000.00)?
A. We already left because we cannot afford to give that much, sir.
Q. Aside from the fact that you do not have money, was there any reason or what was your other reason in
going there?
A. Our reason in talking to them was that when Larry said that he did not commit the alleged rape and so we
went there to talk to them so that we could preserve our relationship as in-laws even if it is for the sake of
peace we could try our best to cope up even P5,000.00 just for the sake of peace because our intention in
going to their house was to extract the truth, sir.[57]
On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements:
Q. Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your parents and you were pleading to the parents of
AAA not to continue anymore the case, is it not?
A. Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship will not be destroyed, sir.
Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?

A. No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA, sir.
Q. But the family of AAA did not agree to the pleadings of your parents that the case be not filed
anymore, is it not?
A. They will agree if we will pay then 1 million, but we do not have 1 million, sir.
Q. Did you offer them 1 million?

A. No, sir. They were the ones who told that to us.[58] (Emphasis Supplied)
The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used against appellant as evidence
of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was
not present when the offer to settle was allegedly made.
An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an admission of the party himself.
[59]
Although the Court has held in some cases that an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the
case is an implied admission of guilt, [60] we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount
to an implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least authorized the proposed
compromise.[61] Moreover, it has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for
monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the prosecution.
[62]
In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to the testimonies
of Albina, on the one hand, and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they are related to the appellant and the
victim, respectively[63] Their testimonies relating to the offer of settlement simply contradict each
other. As a matter of fact, even the lower courts did not consider the alleged offer of settlement in
resolving the case.
Thus, the Court now considers the testimonies of Juanita and Joy.
Testimony of Juanita Angeles
Juanita, a hilot, testified that appellant fetched her at around 5:10 in the afternoon of January 5, 2000.
[64]
She asserted that they arrived at the house of appellant at 5:30 p.m. She said that appellant's wife gave
birth at dawn at 3:00 a.m. of January 6, 2000.[65] Juanita said that appellant was with her the entire time
and never left the house.[66]
Testimony of Joy Agbuya
For a better perspective on the testimony of Joy, it is necessary to repeat the testimony of AAA. AAA
testified that on January 5, 2000, she was accompanied by 12-year-old Joy and the
latter's brother Ricky Agbuya (Ricky) to the mango orchard at the back of the elementary school to pick
fallen mangoes. Further, complainant claims that she was left behind by Joy and Ricky when her shorts
got hooked to the fence and that while she was unhooking her pants from the fence, appellant grabbed her
and raped her.[67]
This was however contradicted by Joy, to wit:
Q. How many times did you go to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg?
A. Three (3) times, sir.
Q. When you usually go to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg, where did you met [sic] with AAA?
A. In their house, I dropped by her house, sir.
Q. Was there an occasion wherein you brought your brother Ricky when you went with AAA to the
mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg?
A. No, sir.
Q. Are we made to understand that Ricky, your brother did not go even once to the mango orchard
of Maning Macaraeg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to AAA in her sworn statement she stated that in [sic] January 5, 2000 you were with
your brother Ricky and AAA in going to the mango orchard, what can you say about that?
A. What she is saying is not true. I was not with my brother, sir. I did not tug him along with me.
Q. It is also said by AAA that you left her behind in the mango orchard when her pants was hooked,
what can you say about that?
A. No, sir I waited for her.
Q. Are we made to understand Madam Witness, that there was no instance or never that happened
that you left her in the mango orchard alone?
A. No, sir, I waited for her and both of us went home together, sir.
Q. Going back to the occasion wherein you were with AAA, who were with you in going back
home?
A. Just the two (2) of us, sir.
Q. In your way home, where did you part or separate with each other?
A. In front of the store of auntie Beth, sir.[68]
xxxx
Q. Is AAA your bestfriend?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since you said that AAA is your bestfriend was there an occasion wherein she told you that she was
raped?
A. None, sir.[69] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On cross-examination, Prosecutor Ely Reintar elicited the following statements from Joy:
Q. In the year 2000, when was the last time that you talked to AAA?
A. April, sir.
Q. After April, you did not talk to AAA anymore?

A. No more, sir.
Q. Your friendship was severed?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court why your friendship became severed?
A. Because she quarreled with me, sir.
Q. And because you quarreled, that is the reason why you are now testifying against her?
A. Yes, sir.[70]
On re-direct examination, Joy clarified, thus:
Q. Madam Witness, you said that you have a quarrel with the private complainant, AAA, will you please
tell this Honorable Court what is the reason or cause of your quarrel with AAA?
A. Because they wanted me to say another statement that I left AAA behind, sir.[71] (Emphasis supplied)
On re-cross examination, Joy gave the following answers to the questions of Prosecutor Reintar:
Q. You said that the reason for your quarrel is that they wanted you to change your statement, that you left
behind AAA, who are those they, that you are referring to?
INTERPRETER
No answer.
Witness
I, sir.
PROS. REINTAR
Q. Who told you to change your statement that you left AAA behind?
A. Because they are saying that I will change my statement that I left AAA but I did not sir.
Q. Who are these who are telling that?

A. They, sir.
Q. Will you please mention them?

A. BBB, only her, sir.[72]
The testimony of 12-year-old Joy makes it impossible for the appellant to have raped AAA the way
complainant narrated it, to wit:
Q. You try to understand clearly the question, Madam Witness, and may I repeat that, at the time of the
rape when according to you, you were the one raped, where were Joy and Ricky Agbuya?
A. They left ahead of me because my short pants was hooked at the fence so I was left behind, sir.
Q. Were you able to remove the pants of yours at the fence?

A. I was removing it sir, when he suddenly grabbed me.
Q. And who is this person you are referring to as the one who grabbed you?
A. Larry Erguiza, sir.[73]
Put simply, complainant could not have been raped because Joy waited for complainant when the latters
shorts got hooked to the fence and thereafter both went home together. The Court finds no cogent reason
for Joy to lie and say that she had waited for complainant and that they both went home together. She had
nothing to gain for lying under oath.Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing or claim that Joy
was related to or was a close friend of appellant or his family. On the contrary, Joy considers herself the
best-friend and playmate of complainant.[74]
When Prosecutor Reintar questioned her as to her understanding of the oath she took, Joy answered, That
I will swear to God, sir. x x x The truth, sir.[75] Furthermore, Joy did not succumb to pressure even as she
was being conscientiously examined by Prosecutor Reintar. Joy boldly testified that BBB, the mother of
complainant, was forcing her to change her statement.
The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are damaging to the case of the
prosecution: first, that Joy did not leave behind AAA when the latters shorts got hooked to the fence; and
secondly, that Joy and AAA left the orchard, went home together and separated at their Aunt Beth's house,
indicating that no untoward incident, much less rape, was committed by appellant at the time and place
that complainant had testified on.
Necessarily, either Joy or AAA lied under oath. It was thus critical for the prosecution to show that Joy
gave false statements.
Unfortunately for AAA, the prosecution miserably failed to rebut Joys testimony. Neither complainant nor
Ricky, BBB or any other witness was called to the witness stand to refute Joys testimony. True, it is up to
the prosecution to determine who to present as witnesses. [76] However, considering that the testimony of
Joy critically damaged the case of the prosecution, it behooved the prosecution to present evidence to
rebut the defense evidence. Witnesses such as Ricky, AAA and BBB should have been presented by the
prosecution to demolish Joy's testimony. The testimony of Ricky is particularly significant, especially
since AAA claimed that he was with her and his sister Joy at the mango orchard on the day of the alleged
rape incident. The failure on the part of the prosecution to present Ricky or AAA bolsters the defense
evidence, that no rape happened on the date and time claimed by AAA.
The prosecution presented CCC, the father of complainant, as it's lone rebuttal witness.[77] However, the
testimony of CCC covered facts and issues not related to the testimony of Joy. The testimony of CCC
merely rebutted the allegation made by appellant's family that the present case was filed because
appellant's family did a poor job of preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD
and apellant's brother Carlito. To this, CCC testified that on the contrary, the wedding went smoothly.
[78]
Furthermore, CCC claimed that the family of appellant knelt before him crying and offered money to
settle the case.[79] In addition, CCC testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5,
2000. Thus, the testimony of CCC did not in any way rebut the testimony of Joy.
Further, Joy testified that during the three times she went with AAA to the mango orchard, the time was
1:00 p.m.[80] However, AAA testified that she went to the mango orchard with Joy at 4:00 p.m. [81] The
variance in the testimonies of Joy and AAA as to the time they went to the mango orchard on the day of
the alleged rape incident may be disregarded as they are de minimis in nature and do not relate to the
commission of the crime. There is a common point uniting the testimonies of both Joy and AAA; that is,
that both referred to the day when AAAs short got hooked to the fence.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the variance between the testimonies of AAA and Joy as to the time
they were together at the mango orchard is an indicia that AAA may have been raped by appellant on a
different day, not on January 5, 2000, to still impute to appellant the crime of rape is not plausible.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape is
extraneous to and is not an element of the offense, such that any inconsistency or discrepancy as to the
same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a ground for acquittal. [82] Such, however, finds no application
to the case at bar. AAA and Joy may differ in their testimonies as to the time they were at the mango
orchard, but there could be no mistake as to the actual day when AAA was supposed to have been raped;
it was the day when AAA's shorts got hooked to the fence at the mango orchard.
The RTC and CA unwittingly brushed aside the testimonies of Juanita and Joy and gave full credence to
the testimony of AAA. As a matter of fact, their probative weight were not considered or evaluated in the
text of the lower courts' decision.
As mentioned earlier, the prosecution could have rebutted the testimony of Joy, but for some reason or
oversight, it chose not to do so.
Consequently, in view of the unrebutted testimony of Joy, appellants defense of alibi and denial assumes
considerable weight. It is at this point that the issue as to the time that the rape was committed plays a
significant factor in determining the guilt or innocence of appellant. This Court must therefore address
this issue for a thorough evaluation of the case.
The Court takes note that Macaraeg, the caretaker of the orchard, testified that appellant's house was only
a minute away from the orchard if one would run.
As earlier mentioned, CCC testified that appellant left CCC's house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000,
contrary to the testimony of Albina that she and appellant left at 5:00 p.m. AAA declared that the alleged
rape took place after 5:00 p.m.
Q. So at 4:00 o'clock you were at the house and you left and proceeded at the back of the school to pick
mangoes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was already around 5:00 o'clock?

A. Yes, sir. I asked my companion Joy.
Q. What did you ask of her?

A. She was wearing a wristwatch and I asked Joy what time is it and when I looked at her wristwatch, it
was already 5:00 o'clock, sir.[83] (Emphasis Supplied)
Moreover, on cross-examination, AAA gave the following statements, to wit:
Q. So it is almost 5:00 p.m. When you went to the mango orchard with Joy Agbuya and Ricky Agbuya?
A. What I only know was that, it was already about 5:00 o'clock then, sir.
Q. How many minutes did you consume in getting mangoes?

A. When we went there, we were not able to get some mango and when I asked sir what was the time then
and when I looked at the wristwatch, it was already 5:00 o'clock, sir.[84](Emphasis Supplied)
The testimony of Joy makes it impossible for AAA to have been raped at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. or any
time thereafter since it was not rebutted that Joy never left complainant at the mango orchard even when
AAA's shorts got hooked to the fence, and both went home together without any other untoward incident.
This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a defense, appellant must establish
by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. [85]
In the case at bar, although the orchard is just a minute away from the house of appellant, in view
of the testimony of the hilot Juanita that appellant was with her from 5:10 p.m. and never left his house
from that time until his wife gave birth at 3:00 a.m.; and the testimony of Joy that she never left AAA in
the orchard and that they both went home together, the defense of alibi assumes significance or strength
when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness. [86] Thus, the Court finds that appellant's alibi is
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- moral certainty that the accused is guilty. [87] The conflicting testimonies of Joy and
complainant, and the testimony of Juanita that corroborated appellants alibi preclude the Court from
convicting appellant of rape with moral certainty.
Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by the equipoise rule.[88] Thus, where
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. [89] The equipoise
rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. [90]
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. [91] What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of the accused with moral certainty. [92] Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal
becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has
imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life. [93]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
H. C. No. 00763 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Larry Erguiza is ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and
to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually
released from confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party / Res inter alios acta, Part One
TAMARGO vs. AWINGAN

G.R. No. 177727 January 19, 2010
This is a petition for review on certiorari [1] of the November 10, 2006 decision [2] and May 18, 2007
resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610.
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed at around
5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had
no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an
affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was
one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that
the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna. [4]
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor[5] issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and
three John Does.[6] On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for murder were filed against
them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty.
Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail Franzielle. [7] Columna was
arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial. [8]
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he
admitted his participation as look out during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan
(alias Mumoy) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent
Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. [9] The former was the ex-mayor and the
latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in
detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a
complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. [10]
On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor [11] who
subjected him to clarificatory questions.[12]
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate
for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his
political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their
political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey.Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once
by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in
the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd
emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan. [13]
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited

handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the
letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings.[14] Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25,
2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited
letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any
violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.[15]
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated
October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against
respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the
jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center.[16]
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).[17] On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal
and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder.[18] He opined that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial
confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and that there was enough
evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. [19] Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the
cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29. [20]
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion for
reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. [21] This time, he declared that the
extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was
admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. [22] As a result, on August 22, 2005, the trial
prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied
petitioners MR.
The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the
Informations in an order dated October 26, 2005. [23] Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily
inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19, presided by Judge
Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a resolution dated December 9,
2005. She ruled that, based on Columnas March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the
Antipordas in an order dated February 6, 2006.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the
CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the RTC
judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the
substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there was no
probable cause against all the accused. It also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not
admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece
of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made
only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP
No. 94188. The CA denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a decision dated August
24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of respondents Antiporda. [24]
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed an
amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94188. The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna
had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder
against respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was probable
cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give
credit to Columnas recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her
evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding
contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columnas extrajudicial confession was inadmissible
against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of
lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial
court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. [25] It may either agree
or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.[26] The
court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. [27]
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1) Columnas
affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of
this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter dated October 29, 2004 and (4)
the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutors recommendation to file the murder charges.
[28]
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004
letter to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his
participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit where he
stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders and (3) his testimony
during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter
and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez[29] that
[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the
judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before
the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal,
therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible
evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have seen that,
aside from the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on them. We quote
with approval the reflections of the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the motion to
withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus
impaired the substantial rights of the accused. Instead, she should have made a
circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made available to her at that point of the
cases. No less than that was expected and required of her as a judicial officer. According
to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent assessment of the merits
of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence
appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may
order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the
court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.[31]
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his March
8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios
acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. [32] Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused[33] and is considered as hearsay against them. [34] The reason for this rule is that:
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would
not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the
acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. [35]
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is
shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. [36] Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the
common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
[37]
Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. [38]
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct
or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it would be
unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief
as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court
case.[39] When, at the outset, the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more
than an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should
not prosper so that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and
expensive litigation.[40] The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio Antiporda
remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna. [41]
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself
whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-
conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against respondents,
her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them were issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the petitions for certiorari
of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184681 February 25, 2013

GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
The instant petition assails the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated August 6, 2008 and October 16, 2008,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, which affirmed the inclusion of
petitioner Gerry A. Salapuddin (Salapuddin) in the amended information for multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), -Branch 83
in Quezon City.
The present controversy started on November 13, 2007 when, shortly after the adjournment of the day's
session in Congress, a bomb exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of
Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan Complex, Quezon City. The blast led to the death of
Representative Wahab Akbar (Congressman Akbar), 3 Marcial Taldo,4 Jul-Asiri Hayudini5 Maan Gale
Bustalio6 and Dennis Manila,7 and the inflicting of serious injuries on Representatives Henry Teves 8 and
Luzviminda Ilagan,9 Ismael Lim, Vercita Garcia,10 Kumhar Indanan,11 Larry Noda12 and Paula Dunga.
The post-blast investigation revealed that the explosion was caused by an improvised bomb planted on a
motorcycle that was parked near the entrance stairs of the South Wing lobby.13
Acting on a confidential information that the person who parked the motorcycle near the South Wing
lobby of the HOR was staying with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and learning that one ASG
member, Abu Jandal alias "Bong," has standing warrants of arrest for kidnapping and serious illegal
detention,14 police officers raided an alleged ASG safehouse located at Blk. 4, Lot 23, Anahaw St.,
Parkwood Hills, Payatas, Quezon City (Parkwood) on November 15, 2007. During the course of the
operation, a firefight ensued killing three persons: Bong, Redwan Indama (Redwan) and Saing
Indama.15 Meanwhile, Caidar Aunal (Aunal), Ikram Indama (Ikram) and Adham Kusain (Kusain) 16 were
arrested and then brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City. Several items were likewise seized from the
premises, including two (2) Cal. 45 pistols, one motor vehicle plate number "8," an I.D. of HOR issued to
Ikram, and a black wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to Aunal with calling cards of Salapuddin. 17 One of
the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced back to Julham S. Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of Salapuddin. 18
On November 16, 2007, a day after the raid, Kusain executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay. In it, he stated that
he is from Tipo-Tipo, Basilan and came to Manila in March 2005, staying when he first arrived in Manila
in the house of Salapuddin, his fathers friend. Salapuddin paid for one year of his college education and
helped him be employed as a building attendant at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. He explained
that he was in the house at Parkwood Hills because Redwan asked him to get the payment for his black
XRM Honda motorcycle that Redwan took from his house on November 2, 2007. He claimed that
Redwan did not disclose the purpose for which the motorcycle will be used and it was only after the raid
that he learned that his motorcycle was the very same motorcycle used during the bombing at
the Batasan Complex.19
On the same day, November 16, 2007, Ikram executed the first of his several affidavits ( Ikrams first
affidavit). He stated that he is a driver working for Salapuddin since July 2002 and was staying in a house
at 48-A Greenbucks, Filinvest St., Batasan Hills, Quezon City (Greenbucks), owned by Salapuddin, from
June 2004 until he went home to Isabela City, Basilan in June 2007. 20 He maintained that he returned to
Manila on October 16, 2007. He stressed that before returning to Manila, or on October 9, 2007, his
cousin Redwan talked to him about a mission to kill Congressman Akbar of Basilan by means of a bomb
to be planted on a motorcycle. He was not, however, informed of the reason for the mission or the
identity of the person who gave the order. He stated that upon arrival in Manila, he stayed at
Greenbucks where the bombing was planned. He stated that those who took part in the planning of the
bombing included: Redwan and his wife Saing; Jang, who was a cousin and member of the staff of
Congressman Mujiv Hataman; Bong, who made the bomb; Aunal; and Kusain. On October 20, 2007, he
and Aunal went home to Basilan and returned to Manila only on November 5, 2007. He also admitted
bringing the motorcycle with the bomb to the HOR. 21 He narrated that at 3:30 p.m. of November 13,
2007, he went to the Batasan premises on board a black Honda XRM with the bomb and parked it near
the entrance of the South Wing lobby, at a spot reserved by Jang. 22 Later that day, he heard the bomb
explode and received a text message from Jang confirming that it was the bomb he brought that exploded.
He explained that it was Jang who set off the bomb by calling the cellphone attached to the bomb inside
the motorcycle.23
Jilbert C. Ortega, Chief of the Complaint and Investigation Unit of the HOR, likewise executed an
affidavit on the same day, November 16, 2007, stating that in the morning of November 13, 2007, he
noticed two men near the South Wing lobby of the HOR roaming around and seemingly surveying the
premises. He identified Ikram as one of the two. 24
On the basis of the sworn statements, a request for the conduct of inquest proceedings relative to the
participation or involvement of Aunal, Ikram, Kusain, and Jang was made. 25
On November 17, 2007, Salapuddin went to Camp Crame and voluntarily gave a sworn statement
denying any knowledge of the Batasan bombing, asserting that his name was being used by the media
only because of his relationship with the persons arrested in connection with the incident: Ikram was his
former driver;26 Aunal, his former brother-in-law, being a brother of his ex-wife whom he divorced under
Muslim laws; and Kusain who once sought his assistance for employment. He clarified that he knew
Redwan and Saing Indama only because they were members of the Moro National Liberation Front but
denied knowing Bong. He stated that the individuals thus mentioned rarely visited him, and before the
incident, he spoke only to Ikram, who was then working in his water refilling station in Basilan, when the
latter asked permission to leave for Manila to look for better employment. 27 He explained that his house at
Greenbucks is usually used by his constituents, including Kusain and Ikram, as a temporary residence or
shelter whenever they are in Manila.28
As the police investigation prospered, Ikram executed several supplemental affidavits augmenting the
statement he previously gave to the authorities. At 8:00 in the morning of November 18, 2007, Ikram
narrated in his first supplemental affidavit 29 (Ikrams second affidavit) that he, together with Aunal,
Redwan, and Bong, planned the Batasan bombing on the night of October 17, 2007 at Greenbucks. On
October 19, 2008, they all proceeded to Raon, Quiapo to shop for materials to make the bomb. 30 He added
that on October 25, 2007, he and Aunal went home to Basilan and returned to Greenbucks in Manila only
on November 5, 2007. Bong made the bomb and placed it inside the toolbox of a Honda motorcycle in
Greenbucks.31 The following day, they all transferred to Parkwood bringing the motorcycle with them. 32 It
was in Parkwood where they completed the plan to kill Congressman Akbar.33
At 6:00 in the evening of the same day, November 18, 2007, Ikram executed another supplemental
affidavit (Ikrams third affidavit).34 There he stated that on October 13, 2007, when they were about to
leave for Manila, he, Bong, Redwan and Aunal passed by Gersal Hardware owned by Salapuddin in
Zamboanga City35 upon the prodding of one Bayan Judda, who handed them a bag. Redwan later
informed him that the bag contained ingredients for explosives. They brought the bag with them to
Greenbucks in Manila.36 On October 17, 2007, he, along with Bong, Redwan and Aunal, went to Quiapo
to buy the wires needed to make a bomb. 37 Thereafter, Bong made two bombs to be used in killing
Congressman Akbar: one intended for the HOR premises and another for either his Valle Verde house or
his condo unit in Ortigas. On October 22, 2007, Hajarun Jamiri (Jamiri), the ex-mayor of Tuburan,
Basilan arrived at Greenbucks on board a black Suzuki motorcycle where the bomb intended for the Valle
Verde house or the Ortigas condo will be placed. After Bong placed the bomb in his motorcycle, Jamiri
left on board the same motorcycle. 38 On November 10, 2007, Ikram went to Jamiris apartment in Malate,
Manila to get money. During the said occasion, he saw the Suzuki motorcycle with the bomb parked
inside Jamiris apartment.39
Notably, Ikram, in his first three affidavits, never mentioned Salapuddins involvement, let alone
implicate him, in the plan to kill Congressman Akbar. Ikrams narration of events altogether
changed in his third supplemental affidavit dated November 20, 2007 (Ikrams fourth
affidavit).40 There, Ikram alleged that, after receiving his last salary from the HOR, he worked for
Salapuddins water refilling station in Isabela City as a delivery boy. In September 2007, before the
Ramadan, Salapuddin asked him to fetch Redwan.41 Ikram complied and brought Redwan to Salapuddins
house on the same day.42 He claimed that he was beside Redwan when Salapuddin ordered: "Pateyun si
Cong. Wahab Akbar."43 Ikram saw Redwan again on October 9, 2007 when the latter told him about the
mission in Manila to kill Congressman Akbar.44 Ikram further narrated in his fourth affidavit that on
October 13, 2007, he, Bong, Redwan and Aunal left Isabela City for Manila. In Manila, they stayed at
Greenbucks owned by Salapuddin. Ikram also alleged in his affidavit that in the third week of October
2007, he and Redwan met with Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman (Jim Hataman) in a Figaro Coffee House in
Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City (Figaro Caf). During the said occasion, Ikram
heard Jim Hataman tell Redwan of the plan to kill Congressman Akbar using a bomb. A week later,
Redwan brought Ikram to the house of Congressman Mujiv Hataman (Congressman Hataman) in
Filinvest II, Batasan Hills where Ikram heard Congressman Hataman order Redwan to kill Congressman
Akbar. Ikram explained that Redwan was a cousin of the Hatamans. 45
Ikram would later amend the dates mentioned in his earlier affidavits by executing an affidavit dated
January 10, 200846 (Ikrams fifth affidavit), where he made it appear that after bringing Redwan to
Salapuddins house in Basilan, he and Redwan again saw each other on the night of September 5, 2007,
not October 9, 2007.47 He declared, however, that Redwan talked to him about a mission to kill
Congressman Akbar only on September 8, 2007, 48 which was also the date that they started for
Manila49 and dropped by Salapuddins Gersal Hardware, not October 13, 2007. 50 He added that they
returned to Manila on September 11, 2007, not on October 16, 2007. 51 He declared that Bong made the
bomb at Greenbucks on September 13, 2007, not October 18, 2007.52Inconsistently, however, he
stated in the same affidavit that he, together with Aunal, Redwan and Bong, planned the Batasan
bombing only on the night of September 17, 2007 at Greenbucks,53 then shopped in Raon for
materials to make the bomb only on September 19, 2007.54 On September 17, 2007, not October 22,
2007, Jamiri supposedly went to Greenbucks to have his motorcycle fitted with a bomb. 55 Ikram also
stated that he last saw Congressman Hataman in September 2007, not October 2007. 56 He further declared
that he and Aunal returned to Basilan on October 14, 2007, not October 20, 2007. 57
Incongruously, however, Joel Maturan, the mayor of Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan, stated in his affidavit that
he saw Ikram driving Salapuddins minitruck in Lamitan, Basilan on September 20, 2007 and delivering
water from Salapuddins water refilling station. 58
On November 19, 2007, Jamiri was apprehended for illegal possession of firearm. The following day, or
on November 20, 2007, he executed an affidavit where he narrated that during Ramadan, in the month of
October,59he brought a Suzuki motorcycle to Greenbucks on the instruction of Redwan. The latter
requested Jamiri to leave the motorcycle behind so that he could place a bomb inside it. Jamiri returned
the following day and was given instructions on how to remove the bomb from the motorcycle. 60 In
exchange for keeping the bomb, Redwan gave Jamiri PhP 50,000 with the promise of an additional PhP
500,000 should the bomb be actually used to kill Congressman Akbar when he dines at Sulo Hotel. 61
However, the bomb was never used as Jamiri failed to bring the motorcycle to the hotel on October 23,
2007.62 He admitted hiding the bomb in a house located at Leveriza Street, Pasay City and expressed his
willingness to surrender it to the police. 63 Pursuant to the undertaking he made in his affidavit, Jamiri
accompanied and guided police authorities in retrieving an improvised explosive device at an apartelle
located in Leveriza St., Malate, Manila on the same day he executed his affidavit. 64
In a supplemental affidavit,65 Jamiri added that during the last week of October 2007, Redwan called him
from Figaro Caf, in Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City and asked him to go to the
same place. When he arrived at the caf, Jamiri saw Redwan with Congressman Hataman and his brother
Jim Hataman. Congressman Hataman then asked Jamiri to help Redwan in his "project" to kill
Congressman Akbar.66 Jim Hataman thereafter interposed that the death of Congressman Akbar will bring
peace to Basilan.67
On November 22, 2007, Aunal executed his own affidavit 68 where he stated that he left Isabela City,
Basilan for Manila on October 13, 2007 with Ikram, Redwan and Bong. 69 They arrived in Manila on
October 16, 2007 and proceeded to stay at Greenbucks. 70 He recalled watching Bong assemble the two
improvised bombs. He stated that when he asked about who their target was, Bong answered that it was
Congressman Akbar. He explained that it had something to do with the politics in Basilan. Aunal likewise
declared that Bong told him that the order to kill Congressman Akbar was made by Jim Hataman who
vied for the congressional seat won by Congressman Akbar. 71Aunal himself heard Jim Hataman order
Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar one evening in October 2007 when they were in Figaro Caf. 72 He
and Ikram then went back to Basilan during the last week of October and came back to Manila in the first
week of November.73 On November 13, 2007, Ikram brought one of the improvised bombs, hidden inside
a motorcycle, to the Batasan premises where Jang detonated it, killing Congressman Akbar.74
Based on the affidavits of Jamiri, Ikram, and Aunal, Police Superintendent Asher Dolina indorsed a letter
dated November 29, 2007 to then Chief State Prosecutor Zuo requesting the inclusion of Salapuddin,
Congressman Hataman, Jim Hataman and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Bayan Judda in the complaints for
murder and multiple frustrated murder.75 After conducting preliminary investigation, the Chief State
Prosecutor approved a Resolution dated December 6, 2007 where he: (1) found probable cause to indict
Aunal, Ikram, and Kusain for multiple murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829; (2)
recommended the conduct of further investigation for their indictment for multiple frustrated murder; and
(3) recommended the conduct of preliminary investigation as to the other respondents who were not under
detention.76
In the meantime, upon the request of the relatives and counsel of the accused, Dr. Benito Molino (Dr.
Molino)77conducted in the presence of investigators from the Commission on Human Rights a medical
examination of the detained on December 1, 4, and 7, 2007. The results: Kusain, Aunal and Jamiri were
subjected to physical and mental torture. 78 In particular, Dr. Molino found that "the injuries found on the
skin and private parts of Mr. Jamiri two weeks after his claimed ordeal that he received countless blows
all over his body in spite of being sick with diabetes, hit by a blunt object on his head and his shins and
that electric current was applied to his private parts while being interrogated as to his knowledge and
participation in the Batasan bombing x x x are consistent. In his case, the three elements of torture are
present."79 Similarly, he found that both Aunal and Kusain "underwent severe physical injuries and
subjected to deep emotional stress x x x intentionally inflicted by men believed to be officers of the CIDG
[Criminal Investigation and Detection Group] x x x to get information from them." 80
On December 10, 2007, Jamiri executed an affidavit withdrawing and disavowing the statements he made
in his previous affidavits.81 He alleged that he was not carrying any weapon, much less an explosive,
when arrested. He was merely walking when six men suddenly arrested him, forced him to a van, and
blindfolded him.82 He was thereafter tortured and forced to sign an affidavit on November 20, 2007, not
knowing its contents.83 On the same day, he was forcibly brought to an apartment in Leveriza Street,
Manila where the police found a bomb. He was thereafter forced to admit that it was he who placed the
bomb in the apartment.84 He was again prevailed upon by Mayor Tahira Ismael of Sumisip, Basilan to
sign another affidavit when the latter told him that the Hatamans and Salapuddin were out to kill his wife
and children.85 He claimed that the contents of the affidavits he was forced to sign were all fabricated by
the police.86
On December 12, 2007, Kusain and Aunal executed their respective affidavits of recantation. 87 Both
stated that they were coerced to sign their confessions after they were subjected to physical and
psychological torture. They were also assisted by counsels not of their choice but endorsed by the
Philippine National Police-CIDG.88
On January 3, 2008, Salapuddin submitted his counter-affidavit where he reiterated the statements he
made in his November 17, 2007 affidavit and assailed Ikrams attempt to implicate him as Ikrams
desperate act of self-redemption after owning up to the crime. 89
Nevertheless, on February 22, 2008, Prosecutor Zuo approved the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Investigating Panels Supplemental Resolution. The Resolution recommended the amendment of the
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982, pending before Quezon City RTC, Branch 83, to include
respondents Ikram, Aunal, Kusain, Jamiri, PO1 Bayan Judda, Jang Hataman and Salapuddin. 90 Referring
to Salapuddin in particular, the DOJ Investigating Panel stated the observation that: "Salapuddins
participation in the [crime] cannot be downplayed just because he did not actively take part in the
planning. Rather, despite this, it has his hands written all over it. The circumstances, the people and place
used are all, [in] one way or another, associated with him. It cannot be mere coincidence." 91 On the other
hand, the resolution dismissed the charge as against Julham Kunam, Congressman Hataman, and Jim
Hataman. So the DOJ Investigating Panel found, "their participation as conspirators in the grand scheme
is unstable x x x apart from the statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman
Hataman-Salliman, no other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement in the
crime."92
On March 7, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review of the Supplemental Resolution with the Office
of the Secretary of Justice.93 The Investigating Panel, Salapuddin rued, refused to give probative weight to
the incriminating statements of Ikram with respect to the Hataman brothers, but relied on the very same
statements in finding probable cause to indict him. Moreover, he maintained that there is no evidence
independent of Ikrams statements that will support the finding of probable cause to indict him for murder
and multiple frustrated murder.
On April 23, 2008, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution excluding Salapuddin from the
Information for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder, thus modifying the Supplemental
Resolution of the Investigating Panel. 94 The Secretary of Justice predicated his modificatory action on the
interplay of the following premises: the only material evidence against Salapuddin is the statements of
Ikram.95 However, Ikrams statements are laden with irreconcilable inconsistencies and contradictions that
they cannot be considered worthy of belief. 96 What is more, the Secretary added, "there is nothing on
record that will indicate that x x x Salapuddin performed the overt acts of the offense charged." 97 The
Secretary of Justice observed that the statements of the other accused cannot be given weight as they were
obtained through force and intimidation contrary to the Constitution and were in fact later recanted.
In a Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2008, herein respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan
questioned the Secretary of Justices Resolution 98 before the CA, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 103461. They argued in the main that matters relating to the admissibility of evidence and credibility
of witnesses are best determined by the courts during trial, and not at the stage of determining probable
cause. There is, so respondents claimed, overwhelming evidence to link Salapuddin in the conspiracy to
kill Congressman Akbar.
The appellate court, by its Decision dated August 6, 2008, set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice. As held, the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent
moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime," 99 the CA
adding in this regard that "the absence (or presence) of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary
in nature after a full-blown trial on the merits." 100And to the CA, the recantation made by Jamiri, Aunal,
and Kusain and their claim of torture were of little probative value inasmuch as these were "unsupported
by competent proof."101
Salapuddin moved for, but was denied, reconsideration per the CAs Resolution dated October 16, 2008. 102
In the meantime, Ikram filed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagbabawi, Pagwalang Bisa ng Naunang Mga
Salaysay at Pagpapatotoo dated October 6, 2008103 with the Quezon City RTC-Branch 83 claiming that
he was forced to sign the affidavits he previously executed and was merely forced to implicate Salapuddin
and the Hataman brothers in the alleged conspiracy by respondent Gov. Jum Akbar and several mayors
from Basilan because of their political rivalry in the province. 104 On November 11, 2008, Ikram submitted
another affidavit of recantation supplying details of his ordeal while under custodial investigation and
alleging that he was physically and mentally tortured so that he was forced to write and sign statements
regarding the Batasan bombing that were in fact supplied by the police officers themselves. 105
On November 24, 2008, Salapuddin filed a Petition for Review before this Court, ascribing on the
appellate court the commission of grave error in admitting the extrajudicial admissions of Jamiri, Kusain,
and Aunal obtained as they were through torture and physical abuse, without the effective assistance of a
competent independent counsel of their choice, and were in fact recanted. The appellate court also
grievously erred, so Salapuddin argued, in according full probative value to Ikrams extrajudicial
confession implicating Salapuddin even if it was riddled with serious contradictions and inconsistencies.
The Court, in a minute resolution, denied the petition on September 29, 2010. Hence, on December 1,
2010, Salapuddin filed a Motion for Reconsideration 106 specifically inviting attention to the prosecutions
admission no less that there is no other direct evidence linking him to the crime charged except Ikrams
testimony.107 Since, as urged, Ikram has recanted his testimony on account of the violations of his
constitutionally protected rights, there is no longer any reason or probable cause to maintain the criminal
case filed against Salapuddin.
To the motion, respondents interposed an Opposition dated December 17, 2010 108 stating that Salapuddin
has not provided this Court any new and substantial matter that would show the serious error attributed to
the CA; that the allegations of torture and recantation have already been denied by the investigating
prosecutors and should not sway this Court to reverse the Decision of the appellate court; 109 and that
Salapuddins evasion from arrest is evidence of his guilt. 110
In a Resolution dated November 21, 2012, the Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner and reinstated the petition.
Upon a second hard look and thorough reexamination of the records, the Court finds merit in the instant
petition.
The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive function that the
courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. 111 Otherwise, a violation of the
basic principle of separation of powers will ensue. The Executive Branch, through its prosecutors, is, thus,
given ample latitude to determine the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person. In the
landmark Crespo v. Mogul,112 We ruled, thus:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or
not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is
sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing
the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecutions by private persons x x x. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them
by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. (Emphasis supplied.)
This broad authority of prosecutors, however, is circumscribed by the requirement of a conscientious

conduct of a preliminary investigation for offenses where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years,
2 months and 1 day.113This rule is intended to guarantee the right of every person to be free from "the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial,
until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon" 114 and to guard the State against
the "burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising
from false, frivolous or groundless charges."115
Hence, even at this stage, the investigating prosecutors are duty-bound to sift through all the documents,
objects, and testimonies to determine what may serve as a relevant and competent evidentiary foundation
of a possible case against the accused persons. They cannot defer and entirely leave this verification of all
the various matters to the courts. Otherwise, the conduct of a preliminary investigation would be rendered
worthless; the State would still be forced to prosecute frivolous suits and innocent men would still be
unnecessarily dragged to defend themselves in courts against groundless charges. Indeed, while
prosecutors are not required to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, a preliminary
investigation still constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case 116 so that the
investigating prosecutor is not excused from the duty to weigh the evidence submitted and ensure that
what will be filed in court is only such criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly
warrant.117
The prosecutors call on the existence or absence of probable cause is further subject to the review of the
Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of control over prosecutors. 118 This much is clear
in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:119
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors;
and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and
City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control.Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; x x x
Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which
read:
Section 3. x x x
The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the
State Prosecutors shall x x x perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of
Justice in the interest of public service.
Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific
power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the
same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to
act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of
bureau, office, division or service.
Supervision and control of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in
administrative law as follows:
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Thus, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, if the Secretary of
Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the investigating prosecutor(s), he or she can direct the
prosecutor(s) concerned "to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to
the parties."120 This action is not subject to the review of courts unless there is a showing that the
Secretary of Justice has committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution.121
Not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, is grave abuse of
discretion.122The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" connotes "a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law."123
In CA-G.R. SP No. 103461, the appellate court, in reversing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, has
evidently neglected this elementary principle. In fact, the CA has assumed, but has not sufficiently
explained, how the Secretary of Justices decision finding the absence of probable cause to indict
Salapuddin amounts to a grave abuse of discretion. Instead, the CA glossed over the testimonies presented
by the parties and adopted the reversed conclusion of the Investigating Prosecutors that the totality of the
evidence presented points to the probability that Salapuddin has participated in a conspiracy that
culminated in the Batasan bombing.
Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it demands more
than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. 124 A review of the records, however,
show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had pointed out at every
conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession is arguably relevant, this is
not the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin participated in the commission of
the crime. On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered against
Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet 125 expressed in
Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. 126 It cannot be admitted against
his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. 127 Tamargo v. Awingan128 elaborated on
the reason for this rule, viz:
On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient,
but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if
a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing the admission
of a conspirator129 requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence other than the
confession.130In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation of Salapuddin
in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill Congressman Akbar. Not one
of the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation professed that Salapuddin was
involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating prosecutors did
no more than to rely on Salapuddins association with these persons to conclude that he was a participant
in the conspiracy, ruling thus:
Respondent Gerry Salapuddins participation in the forgoing, cannot be downplayed just because he did
not actively take part in the planning. Rather, despite this, it has hands written all over it. The
circumstances, the people and place used are all, one way or another, associated with him. It cannot
be mere coincidence.131 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court, however, has previously stressed that mere association with the principals by direct
participation, without more, does not suffice. 132 Relationship, association and companionship do not prove
conspiracy.133 Salapuddins complicity to the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his
relationship, if any, with the arrested persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed
while in Manila.
It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity.134 In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or
approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.135 There must be positive and conclusive
factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy,136 and not simple inferences, conjectures and
speculations137 speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence." 138
The investigating prosecutors themselves were aware of the need for other clear and positive evidence of
conspiracy besides the confession made by a supposed co-conspirator in charging a person with a crime
committed in conspiracy. In discharging the Hataman brothers, the investigating prosecutors ratiocinated:
Apart from the statements implicating respondents Mujiv Hataman and Hadjiman Hataman-Salliman, no
other evidence was presented to sufficiently establish their involvement in the crime. Certainly, this is not
sufficient basis for finding probable cause to indict them for a non-bailable crime. To do so would open
the floodgates to numerous possible indictments on the basis alone of name by mere mention of anyone.
To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation, rather than mere cognizance or approval of an
illegal act is required x x x.139
Notably, the Hataman brothers were named not just by Ikram 140 but also by Jamiri141 and Aunal142 as the
persons who ordered the murder of Congressman Akbar. It is with more reason, therefore, that the
foregoing rationale applies squarely to Salapuddin who was mentioned only by Ikram, and not by the
other persons arrested.
Indeed, the Secretary of Justice has decided in accordance with the dictates of our jurisprudence in
overturning the investigating prosecutors and ordering Salapuddins exclusion from the Information. The
Secretary cannot plausibly be found culpable of grave abuse of his discretion. The appellate court has
committed a reversible error in holding otherwise. As a matter of fact, the CA has failed to capture the
import of Our ruling in People v. Listerio143 in supporting its general declaration that "the totality of
evidence"144 indicates Salapuddins participation in the conspiracy. The appellate court held:
The totality of evidence sufficiently indicates the probability that Salapuddin lent moral and material
support or assistance to the perpetrators or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of the crime.
Jurisprudence teaches that it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. However, this overt
act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators x x x.
In holding thus, the CA failed to correctly appreciate that even in Listerio, the "assistance," which was
considered by this Court as an "overt act" of conspiracy, was extended while "by being present at the
commission of the crime."145 There We stressed:
x x x The rule is that conspiracy must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly
and convincingly as the crime itself. In the absence of direct proof thereof, as in the present case, it may
be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest. Hence, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of
the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, it denotes an intentional participation in the transaction

with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose x x x. In this case, the presence of
accused-appellant, all of them armed with deadly weapons at the locus criminis, indubitably shows
their criminal design to kill the victims.146 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, on the other hand, no evidence or testimony, not even Ikrams, suggests the presence of
Salapuddin during the blast that killed Congressman Akbar and injured several others. He cannot,
therefore, be properly accused of exerting an "overt act" by extending "assistance" to whoever was
responsible for the commission of the felony.
Furthermore, the very cases the appellate court cited provide that while conspiracy can be proven by
circumstantial evidence, the series of evidence presented to establish an accuseds participation in the
conspiracy must be consistent and should lead to no other conclusion but his participation in the crime as
a conspirator.147 After all, the conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the commission of the
felony itself, for it is a "facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold."148
The confession of Ikram relied on by investigating prosecutors and the appellate court does not provide
the threshold consistent picture that would justify Salapuddins complicity in the conspiracy that led to
the Batasan bombing. Consider: Ikram made the allegation regarding Salapuddins participation in the
conspiracy in his fourth affidavit, after he categorically denied knowing who the mastermind was. In his
affidavit dated November 16, 2007, Ikram gave the following answers to the questions thus indicated:
T: Bakit nyo daw papatayin si Wahab Akbar?

S: Hindi po sa amin pinaalam.
T: Alam mo ba kung sino ang nagutos sa inyo para patayin si Wahab Akbar?
S: Hindi po.149 (Emphasis supplied.)
He did not correct this statement in the two affidavits he executed on November 18, 2007. When shown
his affidavit of November 16, 2007, Ikram did not refute his categorical statement denying any
knowledge of the person who gave the command to kill Congressman Akbar. Instead, in the morning of
November 18, 2007, he simply admitted that the November 16, 2007 affidavit was his own sworn
statement:
T: Mayron akong ipapakitang sinumpaang salaysay ni IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA na may petsa ika-
16 ng Nobyembre 2007. Maaari bang suriin mo at sabihin mo kung ito ang sinasabi mong salaysay mo?
(For purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the Sinumapaang Salaysay of IKRAM
INDAMA Y LAWAMA dated April 16, 2007.
S: Opo sa akin pong sinumpaang salaysay na ito.150
He repeated this acknowledgment in the evening of November 18, 2007:
T: Mayron akong ipapakitang sinumpaang salaysay ni IKRAM INDAMA Y LAWAMA na may petsa ika-
16 ng Nobyembre 2007. Maari bang suriin mo at sabihin mo kung ito ang sinasabi mong salaysay mo?
(For purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the Sinumpaang Salaysay of IKRAM
INDAMA Y LAWAMA dated April 16, 2007)
S: Opo sa akin pong sinumpaang salaysay na ito.151
Again, Ikram made the same acknowledgment on November 20, 2007 when he did not say that he lied
when he answered "Hindi po" to the question "Alam mo ba kung sino ang nagutos sa inyo para patayin
si Wahab Akbar?" In his November 20, 2007 affidavit, Ikram stated:
T: Ikaw rin ba si Ikram Indama y Lawama na nagbigay ng Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo
Macatangay Jr noong ika-16 ng Nobyemb[re] 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3
Jonathan F Jornadal noong ika 18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2
Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007?
S: Opo.
T: Mayroon akong ipapakita sayong Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-16
ng Nobyembre 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan F Jornadal noong ika-18 ng
Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng
Nobyembre 2007 na iyong ibinigay. Maari mo bang suriin kung ito ang sinasabing salaysay mo? (For
purposes of identification, affiant was allowed to examine the Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo
Macatangay Jr noong ika-16 ng Nobyembre 2007, Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO3 Jonathan
F Jornadal noong ika 18 ng Nobyembre 2007 at Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay kay PO2 Ubaldo
Macatangay Jr noong ika-18 ng Nobyembre 2007).
S: Opo, ako po ang nagbigay ng mga salaysay na yan. 152
Ikrams acknowledged denial of the person behind the plan to kill Congressman Akbar is to be sure
inconsistent with the claim he made in the very same affidavit dated November 20, 2007 that he heard
Salapuddin order Redwan to kill Congressman Akbar.153 Reference to Salapuddin as the mastermind
behind the grand plan to kill Congressman Akbar also varies with Ikrams claim that the Hataman
brothers made the order on two separate occasions, 154which allegation was, as previously stated,
corroborated by Jamiri155 and Aunal156 in their own affidavits.
Furthermore, if We consider Ikrams last affidavit where he moved back by at least a month the
chronology of the alleged events that led to the Batasan bombing, the coherence of the arrested persons
narration crumbles. For instance, where Aunal stated that he, Redwan, and Ikram left Basilan for Manila
on October 13, 2007,157 Ikram maintained that they started for Manila way back on September 8,
2007.158 And while Ikram claims that he witnessed Bong assemble the bomb on September 13, 2007, he
himself maintains that the plan to kill Congressman Akbar by means of a bomb was hatched only four
days after, or on September 17, 2007, and they shopped for the materials on September 19, 2007 or six
days after the bombs were actually assembled. 159 Further, to reinforce Ikrams association with
Salapuddin, a witness for the prosecution, Joel Maturan, was presented to make it appear that Ikram was
driving Salapuddins mini-truck on September 20, 2007 in Basilan. 160 Ikram himself, however, claims that
he went home to Basilan only on October 14, 2007. It is not necessary to state the impossibility of Ikram
being in two places at the same time. Ikram also alleged that Jamiri went to Greenbucks on September 17,
2007,161 but Jamiri claims that he went to Greenbucks during Ramadan in the month of
October.162 Inconsistently, Ikram further claims that he saw the Hatamans at Figaro Caf during the last
week of September 2007, but Jamiri and Aunal both stated in their respective affidavits that the meeting
with the Hatamans took place in the latter part of October 2007. 163
The discrepancies in Ikrams affidavits and the variations in the statements of the other accused do not
persuade this Court to find probable cause that Salapuddin, who was indicted primarily because of
Ikrams confession, was part of the conspiracy that led to the Batasan bombing. Instead, while We are not
pre-empting the findings of the trial court with regard to Ikram, Aunal, Jamiri and Kusain, the variations
and the inconsistencies contained in their affidavits lend credence to their allegations of torture and
coercion, especially as these allegations are supported by medical reports prepared by an independent
medical practitioner who was assisted by the personnel of the Human Rights Commission.
It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and full respect of the rights of the
accused are essential in the pursuit of justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence, and
all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary investigation. It is, thus, necessary
that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the commission of a felony, only those matters which
are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent and material are considered. No such evidence was
presented to sufficiently establish the probable cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he
is accused of. It, thus, behooves this Court to relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors, anxiety, and
expenses of trial, and to prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the government's resources.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated August 6, 2008 and
Resolution dated October 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103461 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated April 23, 2008 in
I.S. No. 2007-992 is REINSTATED.
Accordingly, let the name of Gerry A. Salapuddin be stricken off and excluded from the Information for
the complex crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder filed in Criminal Case No. Q-07-149982,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 in Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent
LEARNING CHILD, INC. vs. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION

G.R. No. 134269 July 7, 2010
At bar are three consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari all concerning the operation of a
preparatory and grade school located in Ayala Alabang Village, more particularly on a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 149166. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 134269 and
134440 assail the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096, dated
November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998, respectively, which enjoined said schools continued operation on
the ground that the same is in violation of the Deed of Restrictions annotated on the title of the subject
property that limits the use of the lot to the establishment thereon of a preparatory (nursery and
kindergarten) school. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 challenges the Court of Appeals Decision 3 dated
August 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54438, which upheld the validity of a Muntinlupa Municipal
Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance, as
corrected by the challenged Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution, classifies the subject property as
"institutional" where the operation of a grade school is allowed.
FACTS
The factual and procedural antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses Jose
and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne
Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in TCT No. 149166 issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had
been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions indicated that:
2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and
maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such
installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. 4
ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang
Village, including the above restrictions on TCT No. 149166, to the association of homeowners therein,
the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).
In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a
preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was
expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross, which provided additional
grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled advanced.
AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLCs and the
spouses Alfonsos violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the same, and
(3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school and from operating the nursery and
kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance. 5
Injunction Case
On October 13, 1992, AAVA filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an action for
injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses,
particularly of the Deed of Restrictions, the contents of which likewise appear in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. It also alleged violation of Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 (MMC No. 81-
01), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region and
Barangay Ordinance No. 03, Series of 1991. MMC No. 81-01 classified Ayala Alabang Village for zoning
purposes as a low-density residential area, or R-1, thereby limiting the use of the subject property to the
establishment or operation of a nursery and kindergarten school, which should not exceed two
classrooms. The aforementioned barangay ordinance, on the other hand, prohibited parking on either side
of any street measuring eight meters in width. TLC is adjacent to Balabac and Cordillera Streets, which
are both less than eight meters in width. AAVA prayed that defendants be restrained from continuing the
operation of the school. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2950, and was raffled to
Branch 65.
On November 24, 1992, owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC, namely the spouses Ernesto and
Alma Arzaga, Maria Luisa Quisumbing, Arturo Sena, KSL Corporation, and LawPhil, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as the adjacent property owners), filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, seeking the same relief as
AAVA and prayed for damages.
On July 22, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, defendants are ordered to cease and desist at the end of the schoolyear 1994-95 from
operating The Learning Child School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two
(2) classrooms in accordance with the Deed of Restrictions, and to pay the plaintiff the following:
1) P20,000.00 in attorneys fees
2) costs of this suit.
The complaint-in-intervention is dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs-in-intervention to show by

preponderance of evidence that they are entitled to the damages prayed for.6
The RTC ruled that the operation of the grade school and the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of
two classrooms was in violation of a contract to which the defendants are bound. The RTC emphasized
that the restrictions were in reality an easement which an owner of a real estate may validly impose under
Article 688 of the Civil Code. The RTC also agreed with the plaintiffs therein that by allowing parking on
either side of the streets adjacent to the school, the defendants likewise violated Barangay Ordinance No.
3, Series of 1991.
On August 19, 1994, TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Decision. They alleged in the Motion that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39
reclassifying the subject property as "institutional," there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to uphold
the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the spouses Alfonso. The adjacent property owners did not move
for a reconsideration of, nor appeal from, the said Decision insofar as it dismissed their Complaint-in-
Intervention.
In an Order dated March 1, 1995, the RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its earlier
Decision. The decretal portion of the RTC Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court dated 22 July 1995 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and
the Complaint and Complaint-in-Intervention filed on 13 October 1992 and 24 November 1992,
respectively, are dismissed.7
The RTC ruled that with the reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject
property, the earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced. Citing Ortigas & Co. Limited
Partnership v. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 8 it decreed that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exercise of police power by the municipality.
On March 22, 1995, AAVA moved for a reconsideration of the above RTC Order. On July 21, 1995, the
RTC denied the said Motion.
AAVA filed a Notice of Appeal on August 4, 1995. The Appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51096.
On November 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the March 1, 1995 RTC
Resolution:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated March 1, 1995 of the lower court in Civil Case No. 92-2950 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The earlier decision of the said court dated July 22, 1994 is Reinstated. Costs against
defendants-appellees.9
On December 4, 1997, TLC and the spouses Alfonso moved for a reconsideration of the said Decision.
On February 5, 1998, petitioners in G.R. No. 134440, namely, Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E.
Velasco, Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce (Aquino, et al.),
alleging that they are minor children who suffer from various learning disabilities and behavioral
disorders benefiting from TLCs full-inclusion program, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and their
own Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by TLC and the spouses Alfonso. In the same Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., for being proscribed by Section 2, Rule 19 10 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate Petitions for
Review with this Court challenging the July 2, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The Petition of
TLC and the spouses Alfonso, filed on July 9, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No. 134269. The Petition of
Aquino, et al., filed within the extended period on August 21, 1998, was docketed as G.R. No. 134440.
Zoning Ordinance Case

In the meantime, on October 3, 1994, while the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses
Alfonso was still pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang Bayan,
passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel of
land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the
description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang." This
is the same ordinance which was used as basis by the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 92-2950, when it
reversed its own Decision on Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated March 1, 1995. Lot 25, Block
3, Phase V is the subject property wherein TLC is located.
On November 29, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the Metropolitan Manila Zoning
Administration Office, informing the latter of the enactment of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179. On
December 1, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition for the approval of Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). AAVA and the
adjacent property owners filed an Opposition.
On June 26, 1995, the HLURB issued its Resolution on the Petition of the Municipality of Muntinlupa,
the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, we defer action to the Muntinlupa SB Resolution No. 94-
179 and remand the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public
hearings as mandated by Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991, of the Metro Manila Council entitled
"Uniform Guidelines for Rezoning of the Metro Manila Area." 11
According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an
error but an actual rezoning of the property into an institutional area, and therefore remanded the same to
the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required public hearings. The Municipality of
Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the
President.
On July 27, 1999, the Office of the President rendered its Decision, which held that Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an alleged typographical error in Ordinance No.
91-39, and therefore does not need for its validity compliance with the mandatory requirements of notice
and hearing pursuant to Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, 12 of the Metropolitan Manila Council:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, dated June 26, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Resolution No. 94-179 of the
Sanguniang Bayan (now Sangguniang Panglungsod) of Muntinlupa is declared valid. 13
In said Decision, the Office of the President likewise turned down the alternative prayer of oppositors
AAVA and the adjacent property owners that the Office of the President should recognize the Deed of
Restrictions on the subject property and restrict the use thereof in accordance therewith. The Office of the
President ruled on this matter that:
Turning to the alternative relief being sought by the oppositor [that the Office of the President should
recognize the Deed of Restrictions], the same cannot be granted. The reason is simple. No less than Ayala
Corporation in consenting to the transfer from the Yusons to the Alfonsos of the subject property
agreed that the "lot (shall) be used for school and related activities", thereby effectively freeing the
appellants from the deed restriction that the "Lots (shall) be used exclusively for residential purposes."
This is not all. Prior to its sale, the property in question was already used for school purposes.
Further the aforementioned Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance itself classifies the area occupied by the
appellants school as an "institutional zone" and not a residential area. And the fact that TLC is not the
only school operating within the AAV De la Salle-Zobel, Benedictine Abbey School, Woodrose School,
to name a few, conduct classes within the plush village renders unpersuasive appellees line that "x x x
Through the illegal operation of their school, the parties-in-interest appellants spouses Alfonso have
effectively violated the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of the residents of the Village x x
x."14 (Boldfacing supplied; underscoring and italization are present in the original.)
AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The
Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54438.
On August 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision slightly modifying the Decision of the
Office of the President:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the ruling therein passing upon the effect of Ordinance No. 91-39 on the Deed of
Restrictions imposed on the subject property is hereby VACATED. 15
The Court of Appeals agreed with the Office of the President that being merely a rectifying issuance and
not a rezoning enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing. 16 However, the Court of Appeals found the Office of the President to
have exceeded its authority when it ruled 17 that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and effect in
view of the passage of Ordinance No. 91-39. According to the Court of Appeals, the Office of the
President effectively overruled said appellate courts Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 wherein it ruled
that the reclassification under Ordinance No. 91-39 does not have the effect of nullifying the Deed of
Restrictions at the back of the title of the subject property, inasmuch as there is no conflict between the
Ordinance and the Deed of Restrictions.18
On October 3, 2000, AAVA and the adjacent property owners filed the third consolidated Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court assailing the above Court of Appeals Decision. This Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 144518.
ISSUES
Though later in time, we shall first determine the issue in G.R. No. 144518, as the validity of Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 impinges on the issue of the legality of operating a grade school in the subject
property, which is the main issue in G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440. We shall then resolve the issue in
G.R. No. 134440 on whether Aquino, et al., should be allowed to intervene in the injunction case against
TLC. Thereafter, we shall rule on the merits of G.R. Nos. 134269 and 134440 by deciding once and for
all whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the operation of a
grade school in the subject property.
The main issues to be decided by this Court, culled from the consolidated Petitions, are therefore the
following:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the validity of Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in denying Aquino, et al.s Motion to
Intervene; and
3. Whether or not TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the operation
of a grade school in the subject property.
As regards the third and decisive issue, the parties further exchanged their views on the following two
sub-issues:
a. Whether or not Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly corrected by

Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-179, has the effect of nullifying the provisions of the Deed of
Restrictions on the subject property; and
b. Whether or not AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.
RULINGS
Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179

AAVA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, and
therefore did not have to comply with the requirements of notice and hearing which are required for
zoning ordinances. Notice and hearing are required under the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the
Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of the then Metropolitan
Manila Commission (MMC).
In asserting that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment, AAVA faults the
Office of the President and the Court of Appeals in allegedly accepting hook, line and sinker the assertion
of the ENCRFO Regional Officer and the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself that Muntinlupa
Resolution No. 94-179 was passed merely to correct a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance
No. 91-39.19 AAVA adopts the HLURB finding that it was allegedly:
[H]ard to believe that the denomination in the text of Block 1 and instead of Block 3 as an institutional
zone was an accident of (sic) mere oversight, the numbers 1 & 3 are not adjoining each other, but are
separated by the number 2. TLCs position would have been worth considering had the erroneous phrase
typed been Block 2 for then it is more plausible and probable for the typist to have mistyped a "2" instead
of a "3." Besides, Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near each other on the map. Finally, if it were an error, it is
surprising that no one noticed it until after a court had ruled against a party, who now seeks to use said
correcting ordinance in its defense.20
We are not persuaded.
The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is clearly set forth in its whereas clauses:
SAPAGKAT, ang Sanguniang Bayan ng Muntinlupa ay pinagtibay ang Kautusang Bayan Bilang 91-39 na
nagsasaad ng bagong pagreresona ng Bayan ng Muntinlupa;
SAPAGKAT, sa pagrerepaso sa nabanggit na kautusang bayan ay napag-alamang nagkaroon ng isang

"typographical error sa Appendix B" nito;
SAPAGKAT, sa halip na Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang, ang nailagay o nai-type sa hindi
sinasadyang dahilan ay Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang;
SAPAGKAT, ang pagtatamang ito sa teksto ng Appendix B na nakapaloob sa institutional zone ay hindi
makakaapekto sa ibang bahagi o kabuuang nilalaman at itinatakda sa kautusang bayan bilang 91-39. 21
Even more telling that there was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39 is
the fact that both the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village show that
the subject property, described as "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" is classified as
"institutional." On the other hand, neither the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala
Alabang Village classify "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" as institutional. The official zoning
map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance would be
considered void.22 Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39 expressly provides that the Official Zoning
Map of Muntinlupa shall be made an integral part of said ordinance. Both the MMC and the HLURB
Board of Commissioners approved the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa. Furthermore, the very reason
for the enactment of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 is the need to accomplish an updated
zoning map, as shown by the following clause in MMCs Resolution No. 2, series of 1992:
WHEREAS, the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, approved on 10 December 1991
Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 rezoning the entire municipality (as shown in the accompanying zoning
map and described in the attached Appendix "B") as a response to the need to have an updated zoning
map. x x x.23 (Emphases supplied.)
It is furthermore noted that TLCs and the spouses Alfonsos claim that Lot 25, Block 1, Phase 5 of Ayala
Alabang has been and remains to be a residential lot 24 has never been rebutted by AAVA. As regards the
comment that Blocks 1 and 3 are not even near the map, we agree with TLC and the spouses Alfonso that
this bolsters their position even more, as the distance would make it difficult to commit an error on the
map. It is much more plausible to mistype a single digit than to mistake an area for another that is far
away from it.
It is therefore crystal clear that there was a typographical error in Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-
39. AAVA, however, furthermore claims that even assuming arguendo that there was a typographical error
in the said zoning ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate a new zoning ordinance, following all the
formalities therefor, citing the leading case of Resins, Incorporated v. Auditor General. 25
Again, we disagree.
Resins was decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the judiciary should not interfere with
the workings of the executive and legislative branches of government:
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. 26
In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was an error in the printing of the statute, unlike in the
case at bar where it is the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which seeks to correct its own
error in the printing of the ordinance. While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of
powers for the courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute, there would be no violation of said
principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same entity which committed the error.
In Resins, there is a presumption of regularity in favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts should not
speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 which is entitled to a
presumption of regularity.
Finally, AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with the
HLURB under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order No. 648. 27 AAVA reminds us that the decisions
of administrative agencies on matters pertaining to their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by the
courts.28
We should remind AAVA that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the case at bar,
affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President, which had set aside the HLURB ruling. The authority
of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of the former
may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true that courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies, 29 it should be noted that the
HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area.
The then Municipality of Muntinlupa submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the
MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and this
approval should be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it was the MMC itself
which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC
Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the
Municipality of Muntinlupa.
In sum, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by the
lack of notice and hearing as AAVA contends.
Motion to Intervene of Aquino, et al.
It is recalled that the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Aquino, et al., was filed on February 5, 1998,
which was three months after the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals had already rendered its
Decision dated November 11, 1997 setting aside the RTC Resolution which had been in favor of TLC and
the spouses Alfonso.
Aquino, et al., premised their intervention on their being grade school students in the School of the Holy
Cross, wherein they allegedly benefit from the full-inclusion program of said school. Under said full-
inclusion program, Aquino, et al., who claim to suffer from various learning disabilities and behavioral
disorders, are enrolled full-time in educational settings enjoyed by regular, typically developing children.
Aquino, et al., alleges that TLC is the only educational institution in the Philippines that offers a full-
inclusion program, adding that other schools offer only partial integration programs wherein children with
special needs join their typically developing classmates only in certain classes.
Considering the date of the Motion for Leave to Intervene, February 5, 1998, it is apparent that Aquino, et
al., would not still be in grade school at this time, thus rendering their alleged interest in this case moot.
Neither could Aquino, et al., claim to represent other special children since the Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the Motion for Leave to Intervene bore no indication that it was intended as a
class action; they merely sought to represent themselves. Since the interest of Aquino, et al., in the instant
case is already moot, it is but proper for us to affirm the denial of their Motion for Leave to Intervene
before the trial court.
Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that Aquino, et al.s, interest in the injunction suit had not
yet been mooted, we nevertheless find no reversible error in the Court of Appeals denial of their Motion
for Leave to Intervene.
The Motion to Intervene filed by Aquino, et al., was denied in the same Resolution wherein the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the spouses Alfonso. The ground for the
denial of Aquino, et al.s, Petition is Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion to
intervene may be filed "before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous
doctrines on the interpretation of the word "trial," with one decision holding that said Motion may be filed
up to the day the case is submitted for decision, 30 while another stating that it may be filed at any time
before the rendition of the final judgment. 31 This ambiguity was eliminated by the present Section 2, Rule
19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed "at any time before rendition of the judgment by the trial
court," in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the amended provision is that
intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered its Decision, and much less, as in
the case at bar, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on appeal.
Aquino, et al., claim that they could not have intervened in the case earlier, as the full-inclusion program
was allegedly commenced by defendants TLC and the spouses Alfonso only in 1997. However, said
defendants cannot be benefited by their allegedly recent introduction of a full-inclusion program. While
we sympathize with the plight of the minor intervenors, we cannot allow that a program commenced by
the defendants way beyond the institution of the case in 1992 could be considered as a valid defense. To
do so would put into the hands of the defendant in a case the power to introduce new issues to a litigation
on appeal with the assistance of intervenors.
Injunction against the operation of the School of the Holy Cross
Effect of Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Resolution No. 94-179 to the Deed of Restrictions
In reversing itself on Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC cited the Ortigas 32 case and held that the
earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced due to the reclassification by Muntinlupa
Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject property.
In Ortigas, the restriction of exclusive use for residential purposes was contained in the Deeds of Sale of
the subject properties at the insistence of developer Ortigas & Co. and was annotated in the corresponding
titles thereof. Therein defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co. eventually acquired the subject properties from
the successor-in-interest of the original buyers; the deeds of sale and the TCTs issued likewise reflected
the same restriction. However, the then Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal passed a Resolution
declaring the area to which the subject property is situated as an industrial and commercial zone. Ortigas
& Co. later on sued Feati Bank, seeking an injunction to restrain the latter from completing a commercial
bank building on the premises. This Court held that the Mandaluyong Resolution was passed in the
exercise of police power.33 Since the motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution is
reasonable, and it being a legitimate response to a felt public need, not whimsical or oppressive, the non-
impairment of contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipalitys exercise of police
power.34
As previously stated, the Court of Appeals set aside the RTC Resolution and reinstated the original RTC
Decision enjoining TLC and the spouses Alfonso from the operation of the school beyond nursery and
kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms. The Court of Appeals held that there is no
conflict between the Deed of Restrictions, which limited the use of the property for the establishment of a
preparatory school, and the provisions of the Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39, which reclassified
the subject property as "institutional." The Court of Appeals continued that there are valid grounds for it
not to apply the Ortigas case cited by the RTC Resolution, holding that while the subject property in said
case was found in an area classified as industrial and commercial, "a study of the location of defendants
school would clearly reveal that the same is situated within a residential area the exclusive Ayala
Alabang Village."35
TLC and the spouses Alfonso insist on the applicability of Ortigas in the case at bar, and likewise cited
Presley v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. 36 in order to drive home its point that reclassification of
properties is a valid exercise of the states police power, with which contractual obligations should be
reconciled.
AAVA counters that even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not operate to
automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence since the better policy is to reconcile the
conflicting rights and to preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other, citing the case of Co v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.37AAVA thus adopt the finding of the Court of Appeals that even assuming
that the subject property has been validly reclassified as an institutional zone, there is no real conflict
between the Deed of Restrictions and said reclassification.
A careful study of the pertinent documents yields the conclusion that there is indeed a way to harmonize
the seemingly opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions and the assailed zoning ordinance.
To recall, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 149166 covering the subject property provides:
PE-222/T-134042 RESTRICTIONS The property cannot be subdivided for a period of fifty (50) years
from the date of sale. The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an
office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. x x x. 38 (Emphasis ours.)
It is noted that the above restriction limits the use of the subject property for preparatory (nursery and
kindergarten) school, without regard to the number of classrooms. The two-classroom limit is actually
imposed, not by the Deed of Restrictions, but by MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region, which classified Ayala Alabang
Village as a low density residential area or an "R-1 zone." The principal permitted uses of a "low-density
residential area" or "R-1 zone," the classification of the subject property if not for the correction under
Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, is listed in Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01 as
follows:
In R-1 districts, no building, structure or land used, and no building or structure shall be erected or altered
in whole or in part except for one or more of the following:
Principal Uses
1. One-family dwellings;
2. Duplex type buildings;
3. Churches or similar places of worship and dwelling for the religious and seminaries;
4. Nursery and kindergarten schools, provided that they do not exceed two (2) classrooms;
5. Clubhouses, lodges and other social centers;
6. Parks, playgrounds, pocket parks, parkways, promenades and playlots;
7. Recreational uses such as golf courses, tennis courts, baseball diamonds, swimming pools and similar
uses operated by the government or private individuals as membership organizations for the benefit of
their members, families or guests not primarily for gain;
8. Townhouses.39 (Emphasis supplied.)

On the other hand, the following are the principal uses of an institutional site, the classification of the
subject property by virtue of Ordinance No. 91-39 as corrected by Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No.
94-179:
Institutional
Principal Uses
1. Barangay health centers;
2. Day-care centers;
3. Puericulture centers;
4. Clinics, family planning clinics and childrens clinics;
5. Nursery and kindergarten schools;
6. Elementary schools;
7. Elementary and high school;
8. Local civic centers, local auditoriums, halls and exhibition centers;
9. Churches, temples and mosques;
10. Chapels;
11. Barangay centers;
12. Maternity hospitals;
13. National executive, judicial, legislative and related facilities and activities;
14. Government buildings;
15. Tertiary and provincial hospitals and medical center;
16. National museums and galleries;
17. Art galleries;
18. Planetarium;
19. Colleges or universities;
20. Vocational and technical schools, special training;

21. Convents and seminaries;
22. Welfare and charitable institutions;
23. Municipal buildings;
24. Fire and police station buildings;
25. Local museum and libraries;
26. University complexes; and
27. Penal institutions.40 (Emphasis supplied.)
The jurisprudence cited by TLC and the spouses Alfonso requires a meticulous review. We find that a
clarification of the doctrines laid down in the aforestated cases of Co, Ortigas, and Presley is in order.
In the Ortigas case which had been interpreted differently by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, this
Court, in upholding the exercise of police power attendant in the reclassification of the subject property
therein over the Deed of Restrictions over the same property, took into consideration the prevailing
conditions in the area:
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos. 5
and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes
have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity,
noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its
route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution. 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Near the end of the Ortigas Decision, this Court added:
Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable,
nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes,
defendants-appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated under the police
power of the municipality, to use the same for commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian, et al., it was
held that "restrictive covenants running with the land are binding on all subsequent purchasers x x x."
However, Section 23 of the zoning ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring
that the ordinance was not intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or
other agreement between parties." In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the subject property, though declared as an
institutional lot, nevertheless lies within a residential subdivision and is surrounded by residential lots.
Verily, the area surrounding TLC did not undergo a radical change similar to that in Ortigas but rather
remained purely residential to this day. Significantly, the lot occupied by TLC is located along one of the
smaller roads (less than eight meters in width) within the subdivision. It is understandable why ALI, as
the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller, preparatory school that will generate less
traffic than bigger schools. With its operation of both a preparatory and grade school, TLCs student
population had already swelled to around 350 students at the time of the filing of this case. Foreseeably,
the greater traffic generated by TLCs expanded operations will affect the adjacent property owners
enjoyment and use of their own properties. AAVAs and ALIs insistence on (1) the enforcement of the
Deed of Restrictions or (2) the obtainment of the approval of the affected residents for any modification
of the Deed of Restrictions is reasonable. On the other hand, the then Municipality of Muntinlupa did not
appear to have any special justification for declaring the subject lot as an institutional property. On the
contrary, Engr. Hector S. Baltazar, the Municipal Planning and Development Officer of Muntilupa,
testified that in declaring the subject property as institutional the municipality simply adopted the
classification used in a zoning map purportedly submitted by ALI itself. In other words, the municipality
was not asserting any interest or zoning purpose contrary to that of the subdivision developer in declaring
the subject property as institutional.
It is therefore proper to reconcile the apparently conflicting rights of the parties herein pursuant to the
aforementioned Co case. In Co, agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a demolition order, filed a complaint
for maintenance of possession with the Court of Agrarian Relations of Quezon City. The landowner
challenged the jurisdiction of the court arguing that the classification of the subject property therein from
agricultural to a light industrial zone. This Court denied the applicability of the reclassification, and
clarified Ortigas:
This is not to suggest that a zoning ordinance cannot affect existing legal relationships for it is settled that
it can legally do so, being an exercise of the police power. As such, it is superior to the impairment clause.
In the case of Ortigas & Co. v. Feati Bank, for example, we held that a municipal ordinance establishing a
commercial zone could validly revoke an earlier stipulation in a contract of sale of land located in the area
that it could be used for residential purposes only. In the case at bar, fortunately for the private
respondent, no similar intention is clearly manifested. Accordingly, we affirm the view that the zoning
ordinance in question, while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing rights protected
by the impairment clause.
It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and to preserve
both instead of nullifying one against the other. x x x.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Presley, the Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air subdivision likewise restricted its use for a residential
purpose. However, the area (Jupiter Street) where the lot was located was later reclassified into a high
density commercial (C-3) zone. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) sought to enjoin petitioner therein
from operating its Hot Pan de Sal Store, citing the Deed of Restrictions. We allowed the operation of the
Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of Restrictions, but not without examining the surrounding area
like what we did in Ortigas:
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The records
indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have already sprouted in this area. We,
therefore, see no reason why the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from putting up her hot
pan de sal store. Thus, in accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the respondent court's
decision has to be reversed.43
Furthermore, we should also take note that in the case of Presley, there can be no reconciliation between
the restriction to use of the property as a residential area and its reclassification as a high density
commercial (C-3) zone wherein the use of the property for residential purposes is not one of the allowable
uses.
Alleged estoppel on the part of AAVA from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions
TLC and the spouses Alfonsos main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions on
their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts. TLC and the spouses
Alfonso proceeded to enumerate acts allegedly constituting a setting aside of said restrictions:
1. AAVA Village Manager Frank Roa admitted before the trial court that AAVA had previously
approved the proposed construction of a school building with 24 classrooms, which approval is
further evidenced by a stamp mark of AAVA on the Site Development Plan with the signature of
Frank Roa himself.44
2. While the case was submitted for resolution with the Court of Appeals, AAVA, through its
president Jesus M. Taedo, authorized through a letter the construction of a new "school building
extension."45
3. ALI itself requested the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, as allegedly
proven by the testimony of then Municipal Planning and Development Officer Engineer Hector S.
Baltazar, who said:
Engineer Baltazar:
There was a publication, your Honor, the developer of the Ayala Alabang Village, in fact, was the one
who submitted this map of theirs. In deference to the Ayala Land, Inc. which is the developer of the Ayala
Alabang Village whom we know "na maayos naman ang kanilang zoning," we just adopted what they
submitted to us. Whereas, the other areas are "talagang pinag-aralan pa namin."46
TLC and the spouses Alfonso point out that the subject property was considered institutional in the
Official Zoning Map, thereby implying that the submission of the latter constitutes an intent to have the
subject property reclassified as institutional.
4. ALI assented to the reclassification of the subject property to institutional, as shown by its letter dated
July 24, 1991, wherein it stated:
This refers to the 26 June 1991 letter of Mr. Manuel Luis C. Gonzales concerning the proposed expansion
of the school curriculum to grade school of the Learning Child Pre-school owned by Mrs. Mary Anne
Alfonso.
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe that it is a
worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such
proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met. 47
We are not convinced.

Estoppel by deed is "a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted
in it."48 We have previously cautioned against the perils of the misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel:
Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied, estoppel
becomes a most effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a mans mouth from
speaking the truth and debars the truth in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere
argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence. x x x.49
TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVAs acts
so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions.
In numbers 1 and 2 above, TLC and the spouses Alfonso claim that the previous approvals by AAVA of
the construction of additional classrooms allegedly constitute a revocation of the Deed of Restrictions.
However, as we have previously discussed, the two-classroom restriction is not imposed in the Deed of
Restrictions but rather in MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of
additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions, which
merely limit the use of the subject property "exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of
a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school which may include such installations as an office for
school administration, playground and garage school vehicles."
The circumstances around the enumerated acts of AAVA also show that there was no intention on the part
of AAVA to abrogate the Deed of Restrictions nor to waive its right to have said restrictions enforced.
Frank Roas signature in the Site Development Plan came with the note: "APPROVED SUBJECT TO
STRICT COMPLIANCE OF CAUTIONARY NOTICES APPEARING ON THE PLAN AND TO
RESTRICTIONS ENCUMBERING THE PROPERTY REGARDING THE USE AND OCCUPANCY
OF THE SAME."50 The Site Development Plan itself was captioned "The LEARNING CHILD PRE-
SCHOOL,"51 showing that the approval was for the construction of a pre-school, not a grade school.
AAVAs letter dated March 20, 1996 contained an even more clear cut qualification; it expressly stated
that the approval is "subject to the conditions stipulated in the Deed of Restrictions covering your above-
mentioned property, which states, among others, that the property shall be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a PREPARATORY (NURSERY AND KINDERGARTEN)
SCHOOL."
We furthermore accept AAVAs explanation as regards the March 20, 1996 letter that at it had to allow the
construction of the new school building extension in light of the trial courts Orders dated March 9, 1995
and August 3, 1995. It should be noted here that AAVA was the party appealing to the Court of Appeals as
the trial court decision favorable to them had been reversed by the same court on Motion for
Reconsideration.
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. AAVA claims that these acts cannot be considered
in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court embodies said rule:
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The
general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the
title of the subject property, expressly state that: "2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation,
easements and conditions may be enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the
Ayala Alabang Village Association."52 As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with
AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following
exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.53(Emphasis supplied.)
However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The act in number 1 concerns
the alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional which, as we have
already ruled, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions. As regards the act in number
2, the statement in ALIs July 24, 1991 letter that it believes the expansion of TLC is a "worthy
undertaking," it should be pointed out that ALIs purported assent came with conditions:
Insofar as an evaluation of such proposed expansion of the school is concerned, we believe that it is a
worthy undertaking that will definitely benefit the community, and thus interpose no objection to such
proposal as long as the conditions mentioned below are met.
It is true that the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) Board does not have the authority on its own
to alter the Deed of Restrictions for Ayala Alabang Village, and the approval of Ayala is an indispensable
condition precedent to any change in the restrictions. However, we feel that any change in the restrictions
for Ayala Alabang should be concurred to by the AAVA Board on the premise that any change in the
restrictions affects the general welfare of the community which is the primary concern of the AAVA
Board. On this same premise, we have imposed as an additional condition to our approval of the change
in restrictions, that such change should be approved by the residents of the Village or by the residents of
the particular district where the school is situated, at the option of the Board. We feel that the concurrence
of not only the AAVA Board but also of the residents of the Village or of the affected district (as the case
may be) is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 54 (Emphases supplied.)
As previously stated, a majority of AAVAs members, on April 5, 1992, voted to ratify the Board of
Governors resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented. Therefore, the conditions for
ALIs approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions, namely the concurrence of the AAVA Board
and the approval of the affected residents of the village, were clearly not met.
Finally, a thorough examination of the records of the case furthermore shows that AAVA consistently
insisted upon compliance with the Deed of Restrictions:
1. Petitioner Mary Anne Alfonso, as directress of TLC, wrote AAVA on May 20, 1991 requesting
"reconsideration and approval to modify the restrictions at our property at 111 Cordillera to include the
establishment and maintenance of a grade school" and avowed to make a similar representation to
ALI.55AAVA replied on June 26, 1991 with a letter stating that the matter of interpretation or relaxation
of the Deed of Restrictions is not within its power, but of ALI, and thus referred the request to the
latter.56 ALI wrote AAVA on July 24, 1991 stating that while it interposes no objection to the
modification of the restrictions on the subject property, any change on such restrictions should be
concurred in by AAVAs Board of Governors and approved by the residents of the village, particularly
the residents of the district where the school is situated. 57 AAVAs Board of Governors, during its
regular meeting on August 27, 1991, voted unanimously to retain the restrictions and recommended
said retention to ALI.58
2. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on October 25, 1991 requesting a reconsideration of the decision
of AAVAs Board of Governors.59 On October 31, 1991, AAVA wrote ALI to inquire about the reasons
for the restrictions.60 ALI replied that the restrictions were imposed because the school sites located
along small roads had to be limited to small nursery schools since the latter generate less traffic than
bigger schools. ALI reiterated that the residents should be consulted prior to any change in the
restrictions.61 In the meantime, TLC proceeded to operate a grade school on the subject property. On
February 27, 1992, AAVAs former counsel wrote TLC a letter demanding that they suspend the
enrollment of students other than for pre-school. 62
3. The spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA on March 11, 1992, reiterating their request to operate a grade
school in the subject property. 63 On March 24, 1992, the Board of Governors of AAVA affirmed its
earlier decision to retain the restrictions. On March 27, 1992, AAVA replied to the spouses Alfonsos
letter informing them of the denial.64
4. On April 5, 1992, during AAVAs annual membership meeting, the spouses Alfonso appealed
directly to the members of AAVA. Majority of AAVAs members voted to ratify the Board of
Governors Resolutions,65
5. On April 24, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote AAVA another letter requesting that it be allowed to
continue holding classes for Grades I to III at their premises for at least the coming school year, since
they needed time to relocate the same outside the village. 66 AAVA replied on April 30, 1992,
explaining that the Board of Governors has to follow the April 5, 1992 decision of the members and
demanded that the TLC close its grade school in the coming school year.67
6. On June 4, 1992, the spouses Alfonso wrote to AAVA again, appealing to be allowed to continue in
their premises for three more months, June to August, after which they solemnly promised to move the
grade school out of the village, possibly in TLCs former school site in B.F. Homes
Paraaque.68 AAVA replied on June 16, 1992 denying their request, and demanded that TLC cease its
operation of a grade school on the subject property.69
7. In view of the continued operation of the grade school, AAVA sent letters to TLC on August 17
1992 and September 4, 1992 demanding that the latter immediately cease and desist from continuing
and maintaining a grade school in the subject property.70
From the foregoing, it cannot be said that AAVA abrogated the Deed of Restrictions. Neither could it be
deemed estopped from seeking the enforcement of said restrictions.
DISPOSITION
This Court hereby resolves to affirm with modification the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering
the defendants in Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child
School beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. Pursuant to Muntinlupa Ordinance No. 91-39, as
corrected under Muntinlupa Municipal Resolution No. 94-179, we therefore delete the two-classroom
restriction from said Decision.
This Court, however, understands the attendant difficulties this Decision could cause to the current
students of the School of the Holy Cross, who are innocent spectators to the litigation in the case at bar.
We therefore resolve that the current students of the School of the Holy Cross be allowed to finish their
elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in their Grade 7. The school, however, shall no
longer be permitted to accept new students to the grade school.
WHEREFORE, the Court rules on the consolidated Petitions as follows:
1. The Petition in G.R. No. 134269 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated November 11, 1997 and July 2, 1998,
respectively, insofar as they reinstated the July 22, 1994 RTC Decision ordering the defendants in
Civil Case No. 92-2950 to cease and desist from the operation of the Learning Child School
beyond nursery and kindergarten classes with a maximum of two classrooms, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the two-classroom restriction is deleted, and (2)
the current students of the School of the Holy Cross, the Learning Child Schools grade school
department, be allowed to finish their elementary studies in said school up to their graduation in
their Grade 7. The enrollment of new students to the grade school shall no longer be permitted.
2. The Petition in G.R. No. 134440 is DISMISSED on the ground of mootness. The Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51096 dated July 2, 1998, insofar as it dismissed the
Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Jose Marie V. Aquino, Lorenzo Maria E. Veloso,
Christopher E. Walmsley, Joanna Marie S. Sison, and Matthew Raphael C. Arce is hereby
AFFIRMED.
3. The Petition in G.R. No. 144518 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 54438, dated August 15, 2000, which upheld the validity of a Mandaluyong
Municipal Resolution correcting an alleged typographical error in a zoning ordinance is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator
PEOPLE vs. BOKINGCO

G.R. No. 187536 August 10, 2011
For review is the Amended Decision [1] dated 14 November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco [2] (Bokingco) and Reynante Col(Col)
guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On 31 July 2000, an Information[3] was filed against appellants charging them of the crime of
murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in the City of Angeles, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with a claw hammer and with intent
to kill by means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and nighttime, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul NOLI PASION, by hitting
and beating his head and other parts of his body with said hammer, thereby inflicting upon said
NOLI PASION fatal wounds on his head and body which caused his death. [4]
On arraignment, Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial,
Bokingco confessed to the crime charged.[5]
The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion) and his wife, Elsa, were residing in a house along Mac Arthur
Highway in Balibago, Angeles City. Pasion owned a pawnshop, which formed part of his house. He also
maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house. The first row had six (6) units, one of
which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasions brother-in-law,
while the other row was still under construction at the time of his death. Appellants, who were staying in
Apartment No. 3, were among the 13 construction workers employed by Pasion. [6]
The prosecutions evidence show that at around 1:00 a.m. on 29 February 2000, Vitalicio was
spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion came from the front door, passed by him and
went out of the back door.[7] A few minutes later, he heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3. He headed
to said unit to check. He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the
floor. Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco allegedly pushed open the screen door and attacked him with a
hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times. Vitalicio bit Bokingcos neck
and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-
worker. Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead in the
kitchen of Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasions body lying flat on
the kitchen floor. Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital. Pasion expired a few hours later while
Vitalicio was treated for his injuries.[8]
Elsa testified that she was in the masters bedroom on the second floor of the house when she
heard banging sounds and her husbands moans. She immediately got off the bed and went down. Before
reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa asked him why he was inside their house
but Col suddenly ran towards her, sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin.
Elsa was wounded when she bowed her head to avoid the tear gas. [9] Col then instructed her to open the
vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa tried
offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door by holding her neck and pulling her
backward. Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him
tell Col: tara, patay na siya.[10] Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to
Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his own blood. [11]
PO3 Quirino Dayrit (PO3 Dayrit) was stationed at Police Station No. 4 in Barangay Salakot,
Balibago, Angeles City. At 1:20 a.m. of 29 February 2000, he received a phone call regarding the
incident. He, together with a certain P/Insp. Maniago, proceeded to Apartment No. 3 and conducted an
investigation. He noticed a pool of blood on the cemented floor of the kitchen. He also saw a claw
hammer with a green lead pipe handle approximately 13 inches long near the kitchen sink. A lead pipe
measuring 40 inches and a chisel were also found in the nearby construction site. The police went
to Angeles University Medical Center afterwards. PO3 Dayrit saw Pasion lying in one of the beds while
Vitalicio was still loitering around the emergency room. He approached Vitalicio and Elsa who both
informed him of the incident. [12] He prepared a police report on the same day narrating the result of his
investigation.[13]
Evelyn Gan, the stenographic reporter of Prosecutor Lucina Dayaon, jotted down notes during the
preliminary investigation. She attests that Bokingco admitted that he conspired with Col to kill Pasion and
that they planned the killing several days before because they got fed up with Pasion. [14]
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr. Esguerra), contained the following
findings:
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2. Body in rigor mortis
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial infraorbital region extending to the

right of the root of the nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular region.
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of mandible.
6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
8. Contusion with hematoma, right fronto-parietal region.
9. Contusion with hematoma, right supraorbital region.
10. Abrasions, linear, confluent, proximal third, right leg anterior 2 x 6 cm.
11. Contusion with hematoma, left shoulder, level of head of left humerus.
12. Stab wound, anterior chest along the anterior median line, 7 cm above the
nipple line, 0.8cm length, 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm deep, hitting and puncturing the
manubrium sterni, not entering the thoracic cavity.Both extremities round.
13. 2 stab wounds, non-penetrating, anterior chest, 13 cm to the left of the

anterior median line, 3 cm below injury (12) 14 cm the right of the anterior
median line 4 on below injury (12). Wound 0.8 cm in length, both extremities
round.
14. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar shape, 3 cm length, left shoulder.
15. Lacerated wound, right eyebrow area, C-shaped 2 cm length.
16. Lacerated wound, lateral angle, right eye, 0.8 cm length.
17. Lacerated wound, right supraorbital region, medial aspect, 2 cm length.
18. Lacerated wound, semi-lunar, 5 cm length, occipital region 5 cm length

involving all layers of the scalp with brain tissue seen on the gaping wound.
19. Lacerated wound, 4 cm length, C-shaped 2 cm to the right of injury (18) 1 cm

below, wound involving the whole scalp.
20. Lacerated wound, left post-auricular region, C-shaped 4 cm length, 3 cm

length.
21. Lacerated wound left post-auricular region, region of the squamous part of
the left temporal bone, C-shaped (2) 3.5 cm and 4 cm lengths.
22. Lacerated wound, right mandibular region 4 cm length, 1 cm wide.
23. Lacerated wound, stellate, 5.5 x 5 x 5 cm, right fronto-parietal region with
brain tissue out of the gaping wound.
24. Lacerated wound, right submandibular region 0.3 x 3.5 cm.
25. Lacerated wound, right cheek 0.8 cm length.
26. Depressed, complete fracture, occipital bone right with stellate linear
extensions, with gaping, with brain tissue maseration.
27. Skull fracture, right fronto-parietal region, depressed, complete, C-shaped

with linear extensions, with gaping of bone with brain tissue maceration and
expulsion.
28. Hemorrhage, massive, subdural and epidural.

29. Brain tissue damage.[15]
Dr. Esguerra concluded that the injuries sustained by Pasion on his skull proved fatal. [16]
Appellants testified on their own behalf. Bokingco recalled that he was sleeping in Apartment No. 3 at
around 1:20 a.m. on 29 February 2000 when he was awakened by Pasion who appeared to be
intoxicated. The latter wanted to know why he did not see Bokingco at the construction site on 28
February 2000. When Bokingco replied that he just stayed at the apartment the whole day, Pasion
suddenly hit him in the head. This prompted Bokingco to take a hammer and hit Pasion. They both
struggled and Bokingco repeatedly hit Pasion. Bokingco escaped to Manila right after the incident.He was
subsequently arrested in Mindanao on 11 June 2000.[17] During the cross-examination, Bokingco admitted
that he harbored ill feelings towards Pasion.[18]
Col confirmed that he was one of the construction workers employed by Pasion. He however resigned on
26 February 2000 because of the deductions from his salary. He went home to Cainta, Rizal, where he
was apprehended and brought to Camp Olivas. Upon reaching the camp, he saw Bokingco who pointed to
him as the person who killed Pasion. He insisted that he doesnt know Bokingco very well.[19]
On 16 December 2004, the trial court rendered judgment [20] finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MICHAEL BOKINGO alias MICHAEL

BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being the two aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence to be considered against both accused and the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty in favor of accused Bokingo only, hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Each accused is ordered to indemnify the
heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to pay the
heirs of the victim Seventeen thousand six hundred pesos (P17,600.00) as actual damages, Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees, Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.[21]
In its Decision dated 24 July 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court
but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 7659, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-

appellant REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances. The proper
imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate
damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to pay the costs.[22]
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] and called the appellate courts attention on the omission
to rule on Bokingcos fate when it rendered the challenged decision. Appellants also noted the absence of
other evidence, aside from Bokingcos admission, to prove that conspiracy existed in the instant
case. Appellants maintained that the admission made by Bokingco cannot be used as evidence against his
alleged co-conspirator. Appellants also took exception to the findings of the lower courts that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence
attended the commission of the crime. [24]
The Court of Appeals merely modified its Decision by including the criminal liability of
Bokingco in its dispositive portion of its Amended Decision, which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-

appellants MICHAEL BOKINGCO and REYNANTE COL are found GUILTY as conspirators
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the
attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating
circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua without the possibility of parole (in accordance with Section 3 of the said law). Each of
the accused-appellants is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Noli Pasion in the amount
of Seventy five thousand pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to
pay the costs.[25]
Appellants filed a notice of appeal. In its Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the
parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs within 30 days from notice thereof if they so desire.
[26]
Appellants manifested that they are no longer filing a Supplemental Brief and are adopting their
arguments in the Appellants Brief submitted before the Court of Appeals. [27] The appellee likewise
manifested that it is dispensing with the filing of a Supplemental Brief. [28] The instant case was thus
submitted for deliberation.
In seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Amended Decision, two issues were raised: 1) whether the
qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and 2)
whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.
There is no question that Bokingco attacked and killed Pasion. Bokingco made two (2) separate
and dissimilar admissions: first, in his extrajudicial confession taken during the preliminary investigation
where he admitted that he and Col planned the killing of Pasion; and second, when he testified in open
court that he was only provoked in hitting Pasion back when the latter hit him in the head. On the basis of
his extrajudicial confession, Bokingco was charged for murder qualified by evident premeditation and
treachery.
Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder. They question the presence of
treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses testified
on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco. They also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in
the case. They belittle Bokingcos extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing. The
attendance of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence was likewise assailed
by appellants. They aver that nighttime was not purposely sought but it was merely co-incidental that the
crime took place at that time. Neither has trust and confidence been reposed on appellants by the victim to
aggravate the crime by abuse of confidence. Appellants claim that they were living in an apartment
owned by Pasion, not because the latter trusted them but because they worked in the construction of the
victims apartment.
On the other hand, the OSG emphasizes that the prosecution has established that Pasion was
defenseless when fatally attacked by Bokingco and there was no opportunity for him to defend himself
from the unexpected assaults of Bokingco. The OSG agrees as well with the trial courts findings that
evident premeditation, nighttime, and abuse of confidence attended the commission of the crime.
We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the
absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery to be
appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him.[29] Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the
witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at
that time.[30]
Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. [31] But the admitted manner of killing is
inconsistent with evident premeditation. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c)
a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. [32] It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was
hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. [33] In the instant case, no proof was
shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised.Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated
when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head. [34] Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated
poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack.
It was during the preliminary investigation that Bokingco mentioned his and Cols plan to kill
Pasion.[35] Bokingcos confession was admittedly taken without the assistance of counsel in violation of
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In People v. Sunga,[36] we held that the right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that
can be deemed critical stages in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different
from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary
investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless,
of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. [37] In said case, Sunga made an
uncounselled admission before the police. He later acknowledged the same admission before the judge in
a preliminary investigation. Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a
counsel, for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights, he was virtually denied his
right to counsel. Thus, the uncounselled admission was held inadmissible. [38] In the instant case, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against Bokingco because he was not assisted at all by counsel
during the time his confession was taken before a judge.
The finding that nighttime attended the commission of the crime is anchored on the presumption that
there was evident premeditation. Having ruled however that evident premeditation has not been proved,
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be properly appreciated. There was no evidence to
show that Bokingco purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Abuse of confidence could not also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this

case. Taking into account that fact that Bokingco works for Pasion, it may be conceded that he enjoyed
the trust and confidence of Pasion. However, there was no showing that he took advantage of said trust to
facilitate the commission of the crime.
A downgrade of conviction from murder to homicide is proper for Bokingco for failure of the
prosecution to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance alleged and proven in the instant case,
the penalty should be applied in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
which ranges from a minimum of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to a maximum of 17 years and 4
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range
of prision mayor in any of its periods as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum. The range of prision mayor is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, while reclusion temporal in
its medium period, ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Therefore, the
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum is appropriate under the circumstances. [39] The award of
exemplary damages should be deleted as no aggravating circumstance was proven.
Col, on the other hand, was charged as a co-conspirator. He contends that to hold him guilty as
co-conspirator, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Applying Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Col asserts that Bokingcos
uncounselled testimony that appellants planned to kill Pasion bears no relevance considering the fact that
there was no other evidence which will prove the conspiracy. Col also claims that Elsas statements during
trial, such as the presence of Col inside her house and his forcing her to open the vault of the pawnshop,
as well as the alleged statement she heard from Bokingco Tara, patay na siya, are not adequate to support
the finding of conspiracy.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) justifies Cols conviction of murder by conspiracy by
mentioning that starting from the declaration of Bokingco, the victims wife, Elsa, also positively declared
that Col blocked and attacked her with a knife when she tried to check on her husband. She was left alone
by Col when he was told by Bokingco that the victim was already dead. For the OSG, appellants acts are
indicative of conspiracy. The OSG contends that the prosecution witnesses had no ill-motive to lie and
falsely accuse appellants of the crime of murder.
The lower courts concluded that there was conspiracy between appellants.
We disagree.
This Court is well aware of the policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
trial court, owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.[40] However, this rule admits of exceptions, namely: 1)
when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or 2)
when certain facts of substance and value likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked
by the lower court, or 3) when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts. [41] The second
exception obtains in this case.
Indeed, in order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case before us, it is
necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a
joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. [42] Unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.
[43]
As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and
must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. [44]
The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsas testimony that appellants fled together after
killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where
Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he was at Elsas house and allegedly ordering her to open
the pawnshop vault, thus:
Q: Do you remember any unusual incident that happened on that time and date when you were in your
masters bedroom?
A: I heard a bumping sound (kalabog) at the back portion of our building where we reside.
Q: What did you do when you heard those sounds in the wee hours of the morning on that day when you
were in your masters bedroom?
A: I wondered why and I immediately went down to the kitchen since the door of the kitchen was directly
leading to the back door or back portion of the building where the apartments were situated.
Q: Why, on what floor is this masters bedroom located?
A: Second floor.
Q: Were you actually able to go down and see what was happening?
A: Yes, sir, but I was only able to reach the stairs leading to the kitchen. I was not able to go out of the
kitchen because I was blocked.
Q: You were blocked by whom?
A: By Reynante Col.
Q: Are you referring to the same Reynante Col, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said you were blocked by Reynante Col. How did he block you?
A: As soon as I reached the stairs, I was blocked by Reynante Col and he was situated near the back door
of the pawnshop. There is a pawnshop in the front portion of our residence.
Q: When you saw him near the door of your pawnshop, did you confront him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you confront him?
A: I asked him, Reynante, what are you doing here?
Q: What was the reaction of Reynante Col?
A: He ran towards me and sprayed something into my eyes and he put a sharp object under my
chin. (Witness demonstrating by putting her hand under her chin)
Q: How far was he before he attacked you?
A: Probably, from the witness stand up to the chair of Fiscal Hilario. Maybe two steps away from him.
(Around 3 meters)
Q: Were you able to identify what this spray is and what part of your body was hit?
A: My eyes were sprayed with tear gas.
Q: What did you feel when your eyes was (sic) sprayed with tear gas?
A: It was mahapdi (painful).
Q: When you felt pain in your eyes, how were you able to see something or a sharp weapon under your
chin?
A: Before he sprayed the tear gas to my eyes, I was able to see him poke the sharp object under my chin
and I bowed my head a little to avoid the tear gas. I was wounded under my chin and I felt the
sharpness of the object.[45]
Q: What else happened while he was doing that to you?
A: He sprayed tear gas in my eyes and told me to be silent.
Q: What else, if any, did he tell you?
A: To open the combination of the vault.

Q: Did you comply to his order that you open the combination of the vault?
A: No, sir. I do not know the combination.
Q: What vault are you referring to?
A: Vault of the pawnshop.
Q: Where is that pawnshop located with reference to your residence?
A: At the first floor is the pawnshop and at the back is our kitchen.
Q: When you refused to open the vault of the pawnshop, what did Reynante Col do about it?
A: He did not say anything.
Q: How about you, was there anything else you did?
A: I offered him money so he will not kill me.
Q: When you offered him money so he will not kill you, did he agree?
A: No, sir.
Q: What else happened next when he did not agree to your offer of money?
A: He dragged me going towards the back door.[46]
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in
killing Pasion. At the most, Cols actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the
initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for
murder.[47]
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had
to leave the place. This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the
crime. It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united
in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing
Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
In as much as Bokingcos extrajudicial confession is inadmissible against him, it is likewise

inadmissible against Col, specifically where he implicated the latter as a cohort. Under Section 28, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of
another. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused, and is considered as hearsay
against them.[48] An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a
conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. [49] In
order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that first, the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; second, the
admission relates to the common object; and third, it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.[50] As we have previously discussed, we did not find any sufficient evidence
to establish the existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession has no probative value and
is inadmissible in evidence against Col.
Bokingcos judicial admission exculpated Col because Bokingco admitted that he only attacked
Pasion after the latter hit him in the head.
All told, an acquittal for Col is in order because no sufficient evidence was adduced to implicate
him.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00658 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Reynante Col is ACQUITTEDon
ground of reasonable doubt. The Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of
accused-appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action
taken within ten (10) days from notice.
Appellant Michael Bokingco is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years (6) and one (1) day of prision
mayoras minimum to 14 years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum
Appellant is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Noli Pasion in the amount of Seventy five thousand
pesos (P75,000.00); Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; Twenty five thousand pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) as attorneys fees; and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191752 June 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA
We decide the appeal filed by appellants Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian Cruz
Ibanez assailing the August 7, 2009 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No.
03474. The CA decision affirmed with modification the July 14, 2008 decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 196, Paraaque City, finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The prosecutions evidence revealed that on July 23, 2004, Ibaez went to Weapons System Corporation
(WSC) on board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSCs Secretary and Sales Representative, that he
was the one who bought a gun barrel at the companys gun show in SM Megamall. Ibaez inquired from
Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSCs firing range and the amount of the membership fee of
its gun club. He also asked the days when there are many people in the firing range, and whether Henessy
was WSCs only female employee.3
At around 9:00 a.m. of July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no one opened
the door. She went to the back of the office where the firing range was located, and called Zaldy Gabao,
another employee of WSC. Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not understand what he
said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy replied that he could not open the door
because his hands were tied. Henessy called Raymundo Sian, the companys operations manager, and
informed him that Zaldys hands had been tied. After one hour, the police arrived; they opened the gate at
the back using acetylene. When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that Zaldy had
been handcuffed to the vault. Zaldy informed the police that the companys gunsmith, Rex Dorimon, was
inside the firing range. The police entered the firing range, and saw the lifeless body of Rex. 4 Dr. Voltaire
Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot
wounds on the head, thorax and abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol. 5
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of
Cachuela was involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that
Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team and
proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached
them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibaez to look for buyers of firearms. The
police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an entrapment operation
against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the
other persons involved in the crime.6
Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers,
and that they would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a
gasoline station in Naic, Cavite. NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and
the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came and talked to them, and brought them inside his house
where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents inquired from Cachuela whether the
firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up. The NBI agents arrested
Cachuela before he could make any move. The agents recovered four (4) firearms 7 from Cachuelas
house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151. 8
The NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibaez whom the asset also contacted. Ibaez directed the
asset to bring the prospective buyers to his residence in Imus, Cavite. The NBI agents went to Imus and
there met Ibaez whom they saw inside a Nissan California car bearing plate no. PMN 645. Lino, Abiera
and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibaez where the firearms were. Ibaez brought out two (2)
firearms, and showed them to the agents. The agents asked whether the guns had legal documentation;
they then arrested Ibaez when they sensed that he was already becoming suspicious. The agents
recovered two guns from Ibaez, viz.: a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with
serial number 04490Z.9
At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy pointed to the appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons
responsible for the robbery at WSC and for the killing of Rex. 10 Nabilgas also executed a handwritten
confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime. 11
The prosecution filed an Information12 for robbery with homicide before the RTC against the appellants,
Nabilgas and Zaldy, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-0943. The accused all pleaded not guilty on
arraignment.13 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died. 14
In its decision dated July 14, 2008, the RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. It also ordered them to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court likewise ordered the appellants to pay Hector C.
Rodriguez, Jr.15 P1,563,300.00, representing the value of the firearms and ammunitions stolen from WSC.
Excepted from the conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
The appellants filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. In its decision of
August 7, 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications: (a) the appellants
were ordered to pay Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. the amount of P1,093,947.50, representing the value of
the stolen firearms and ammunitions from WSC, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of the decision until fully paid; and (b) they are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Rex P45,000.00 as actual damages with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the decision
until fully paid.
The CA held that the following pieces of circumstantial evidence showed that the appellants robbed WSC
and killed Rex during the course of this robbery: (1) Ibaez visited WSC two days before the robbery and
asked several questions from Henessy; (2) a robbery occurred at WSC where 53 firearms and several
ammunitions worth P1,563,300.00 had been stolen; (3) among the firearms stolen were a .9 mm
Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245; (4)
Rex, a gunsmith working in WSC, was found dead at the firing range; (5) Rex sustained gunshot wounds
on different parts of his body; (6) Cachuela and Ibaez were caught trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli,
with serial number T1102-03E000151, and the .45 Glock 30, with serial number FML 245, respectively,
in separate entrapment operations; and (7) Cachuela and Ibanez were unable to explain how they came
into possession of the stolen firearms.
The CA ruled that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the perpetrators of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It disregarded the appellants defenses of alibi, denial
and frame-up for being self-serving. The CA likewise found unmeritorious the appellants argument that
the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence, pointing out that the seizures were the
result of lawful entrapment operations. It further held that the appellants failed to impute any ill or
improper motive against the police officers who conducted the entrapment operations.
Our Ruling
In this final review, we deny the appeal, and resolve to increase the amount for restitution by the
appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. from P1,093,947.50 to P1,481,000.00.
"A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by
reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;
(2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the malefactor and
the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but
the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery." 16
Admissibility of the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in
the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that
Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and
subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Linos
testimony regarding Zaldys alleged out-of-court identification.
People v. Algarme17 explains the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility
of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness
of the identification procedure. [italics and emphasis supplied]
In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants as the
persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex. Lino did not state when the line-up
took place; how this line-up had been conducted; who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants
(if there were indeed other persons included in the line-up); and whether the line-up was confined to
persons of the same height and built as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied
Zaldy before and during the line-up, and whether there had been the possibility of prior or
contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the appearance of the appellants.
To our mind, Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission
that renders unreliable Zaldys out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the
factors used in determining the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The absence of an
independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict treatment and assessment of
Linos testimony.
The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an extrajudicial confession 18 at the NBI Main Office,
where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged. During trial, he repudiated this
confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a
previously prepared statement.
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand, we hold that Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be
admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be
made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessant's choice;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."19
We point out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed
the alleged written confession. "A custodial investigation is understood x x x as x x x any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. x x x It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when
the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an
alleged offense.20
In People v. Rapeza,21 we explained that the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations
should, as far as reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer
is furnished by the police for the accused, it is important that the lawyer should be competent,
independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from
one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights.
After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas confession was not made with the assistance of
a competent and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas
behalf, were provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas the NBI itself; she was assigned
the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the agencys investigators that he already had a lawyer in
the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was
already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession. Nabilgas also testified
that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him; she merely
represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show
that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully
understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his
constitutional rights.
To be sure, this is not the kind of assistance required of lawyers in a custodial investigation. "An
effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and be able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." 22 In addition, the extrajudicial
confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the written
confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness
stand despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.
At any rate, Nabilgas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view
of the res inter alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against
them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy, and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a
conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object;
and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.23
This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece of evidence
presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in
committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and
conclusively as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to insufficiency of
evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
Sufficiency of the proven circumstantial evidence
In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldys out-of-court identification and Nabilgas extrajudicial

confession, the prosecutions case rests purely on circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be secured "on
the basis of circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading
to a fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of
all others."24 There can be conviction if the prosecution can establish the appellants participation in the
crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the accused, and none other, committed the imputed crime. 25
"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact
in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites
concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances unavoidably leads to a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be the guilt of the accused." 26
In our view, no doubt exists, based on the appellants' actions, that their primary objective was to rob
WSC, and that the killing of Rex was done on occasion, or by reason, of the robbery: first, Ibaez went to
WSC on July 23, 2004, and inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of the firing range,
the amount of the membership fee of the companys gun club, the days when there are many people in the
firing range, and whether she was the only female employee of the company; second, when Henessy
arrived at WSC at 9:00 a.m. on July 26, 2004, Zaldy informed her that he cannot open the front door
because his hands were tied; third, Henessy called the companys operations manager and informed him
that Zaldy had been tied; fourth, the police saw Zaldy handcuffed to the vault when they opened the back
gate; fifth, the police saw the lifeless body of Rex lying on the floor with several gunshot wounds when
they entered the firing range; sixth, the operations manager discovered that 53 guns and several
ammunitions had been missing from the gun store, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number
T1102-03E000151 and a .45 Glock 30 with serial number FML 245; seventh, the NBI agents caught
Cachuela trying to sell the .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 in an entrapment
operation in Cavite; eighth, the NBI agents caught Ibaez trying to sell the .45 Glock 30 with serial
number FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z in a follow-up entrapment operation in
Cavite; ninth, Cachuela and Ibaez were unable to explain how they came into possession of the stolen
firearms; tenth, Police Inspector Armin Austria, the PNP Forensic Firearm Examiner, found that the 98
pieces of .45 fired cartridge cases found at the crime scene were fired from the .45 Llama with serial
number 04490Z recovered from Ibaez; 27 and finally, Dr. Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of
Rex, and found that the victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax, and abdomen caused
by a .45 pistol.
From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants cannot but be to rob
WSC; the killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery. "Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be
inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property." 28 Rex was killed to facilitate the
robbery; he was also the person who would have been a witness to the crime. In People v. De Leon, 29 we
held that "homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to
eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."
In this regard, we cannot overlook the fact that another WSC employee Zaldy was not killed, but
merely tied to the vault. The Court cannot second-guess on what could have been behind the malefactors
decision to spare Zaldys life, but we note that Zaldy became one of the accused in this case after the
Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict him in the crime, as the robbery could have
been the result of an "inside job." Unfortunately, Zaldy was unable to testify during trial since the RTC
ordered that he be brought to the National Center for Mental Health for treatment. Accordingly, Nabilgas
extrajudicial confession (which we ruled to be inadmissible) was the only evidence linking Zaldy to the
crime. For lack of evidence, we cannot make any definite conclusion and can only speculate on Zaldys
involvement in the crime charged.
We find it worthy to stress that the appellants failed to overcome the disputable presumption that "a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act."30 To recall, Ibaez was at WSC two days before the robbery, asking questions to the
companys secretary. Several days after the robbery, the appellants were caught trying to sell firearms that
were reported stolen from WSC in separate entrapment operations; they could not satisfactorily explain
how and why these guns came to their respective possession. The appellants likewise did not impute ill
motive on the part of the arresting officers that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against them.
These factors lead to no other conclusion than that the appellants, to the exclusion of others, had robbed
WSC.
To our mind, the fact that the cartridge bullet shells found at the firing range (where the lifeless body of
Rex had been discovered) matched with one of the guns recovered from Ibaez during the entrapment
operation clinches the case against the appellants insofar as establishing the nexus between the robbery
and the victims killing. Notably, the gunshot wounds suffered by Rex also came from the same caliber of
gun31 recovered from Ibaez. In the final analysis, the prosecution sufficiently established the direct and
intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, and that the death of Rex had been committed by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the
single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. 32
The penalty and the awarded civil indemnities
Robbery with homicide is a single indivisible crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under
paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We find that the trial and appellate
courts correctly sentenced the appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only in the absence of
any aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime.1wphi1
We affirm the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages to the heirs of Rex, as
these awards conform to prevailing jurisprudence on robbery with homicide when the penalty imposed is
only reclusion perpetua.33 We also affirm the award of P45,000.00 as actual damages, as the prosecution
successfully proved this amount through a receipt.
The CA ordered the appellants to restitute the amount of P1,093,947.50, representing of the value of the
stolen firearms and ammunitions. We, however, increase this amount to the total amount of P1,481,000.00
as !his is the value of the stolen items as proven by the evidence on record. 34
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 7, 2009 in
CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount to be restituted
by the appellants to Arms Depot Philippines, Inc. be increased from P1,093,947.50 to P1,481,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NIEVES CONSTANCIO G.R. No. 206226 April 4, 2016
This is an appeal from the February 24, 2012 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02709 which affirmed the January 22, 2007 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 258, Paraaque City, finding the appellants Nieves Constancio y Bacungay (Constancio) and
Ernesto Berry y Bacungay (Berry) guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing them to
surfer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Factual Antecedents
Constancio and Berry, along with co-accused Donardo Pagkalinawan (Pagkalinawan), Danny Darden
(Darden), and alias Burog, were charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide committed against
AAA[3] on the night of March 11, 2001.
The Information states:
That on or about the 11th day of March 2001, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA] against her will and consent.
That on said occasion, all the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strangle and gang up on her thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic
injuries which caused her death.[4]
Constancio and Berry pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on May 3,2001. Trial on the merits
subsequently followed.
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
1. BBB, the mother of the victim AAA, testified that on March 11, 2001, AAA was forcibly
abducted, raped, brutally beaten, and strangled to death. Her body was later found at a creek under a
bridge in San Antonio Valley 3, Brgy. San Antonio, Paraaque City. BBB further testified on the
amount they spent for the wake and funeral expenses of AAA.
2. Myra Katrina Dacanay (Dacanay) testified that she was a high school classmate of AAA. On the
night before AAA was killed, she and AAA planned to watch a movie at the Alabang Town Center
but since they were late for the last full show, they went to Cinnzeo instead where they were later joined
by another friend, Tara Katrina Golez (Golez). After exchanging pleasantries, Golez left first. Thereafter,
she (Dacanay) and AAA proceeded to the parking lot to get AAAs black Mazda 323 with plate
number URN 855. AAA then brought her (Dacanay) home at Ayala Alabang. Dacanay testified that she
tried to contact AAA to make sure that she arrived home safely but she could not be reached.
At around 5:30 in the morning, Dacanay received a call from AAAs father asking about AAAs
whereabouts. She also, received a call from Golez who told her that AAA was not yet home. Dacanay
stated that she was shocked when she learned about AAAs death.
3. Golez testified that AAA was her classmate and that they had been friends for about 10 years; that on
March 10, 2001 at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, she met with AAA and Dacanay at the
Cinnzeo, Alabang Town Center, and stayed with them for about 30 to 40 minutes.
Golez added that at around 6:00 oclock on the morning of March 11, 2001, AAAs father went to her
house to inquire about AAAs whereabouts. Golez told him that she was with AAA and with
Dacanay, the night before but that she left earlier than these two. Golez said that she learned about
AAAs death at about 4:00 oclock on the afternoon of the same day.
4. Janette Bales (Bales) testified that at around 3:00 oclock in the early morning of March 12, 2001, she.
was at Unioil gas station in front of the Multinational Village, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Brgy. Sto. Nino,
Paraaque City waiting for a ride home when a black Mazda car suddenly stopped in front of her and a
male person then alighted from the back seat and immediately grabbed her arm; that she was able to
recognize the face of the person as the appellant Berry whom she identified in open court. Bales further
testified that Berrys face was not covered at the time he grabbed her arm and that Berry attempted to pull
her inside the black Mazda car and abduct her; that she shouted for help and tried to free herself from
Berrys hold on her arm; that she then saw another man who was about to alight from the same black
Mazda car but fortunately, a barangay tanod from behind the car shouted, Hoy! and Berry was not able
to abduct her (Bales); and that Berry was however able to forcibly take her shoulder bag which contained
her wallet, cellphone, necklace, and other personal belongings. On the same date, she reported the
incident to the Paraaque Police Station and executed a sworn statement. When Berry was arrested on
March 30,2001, Bales identified him as the person who grabbed her arm and took her shoulder bag.
5. Dr. Emmanuel Reyes (Dr. Reyes) is the Medico-Legal Officer at the Southern Police District Crime
Laboratory at Fort Bonifacio. He testified that he conducted an autopsy examination on the cadaver of
AAA. According to his Medico-Legal Report No. M-072-2001, the cause of death is asphyxia by
strangulation with traumatic head injuries, with signs of drowning and recent loss of virginity. There was
a fresh deep laceration of the genitalia with hematoma. Dr. Reyes was able to recover samples of sperm
cells collected from the victim.
6. Chito Adarna[5] (Adarna) testified that he is a tricycle driver plying the San Antonio Valley area in
Paraaque City; that on March 11, 2001., he transported a male passenger from the tricycle terminal to the
corner of Sta. Escolastica and Sta. Teresa streets in Paraaque City, where he saw a black Mazda car
parked by the bridge of San Antonio Valley; that he (Adarna) then saw two men carrying something that
they threw over the bridge where the body of AAA was eventually found; and that thereafter, both men
entered the Mazda car with its windows rolled down on the right side. He identified these two men in
open court as the appellants Constancio and Berry.
7. P/Sr. Insp. Edgardo C. Ariate (PSI Ariate) testified that he is the Chief Investigator of the Investigation
Division of Precinct No. 2 of the Paraaque City Police Station; that on March 11, 2001, he received a
telephone call informing him about a body of a female found hogtied and lifeless at the creek of San
Antonio Valley; that he (PSI Ariate) then ordered SPO2 Odeo Carino to conduct an investigation to verify
the truth of the information; that initially, the police officers did not have any suspects to the crime; but a
few weeks later, an informant surfaced and relayed to them the identities of AAAs assailants. The
informant came out after then-Paraaque Mayor Joey Marquez (Mayor Marquez) offered a reward to
anyone who could provide any lead on the identities of AAAs assailants. PSI Ariate added that the
informant identified Berry and Constancio as the persons responsible for the crime. The informant also
gave the whereabouts of the suspects which led to Berrys arrest in Muntinlupa and Constancys arrest in
Cagayan province.
The informant positively identified Berry during the course of the arrest. At the police station, Bales
likewise positively identified Berry as the person who attempted to abduct her and who also took off with
her bag. PSI Ariate testified that Berry confessed his participation in the crime and provided the names of
his companions namely: Pagkalinawan, one alias Burog, and Darden.
8. CCC is the father of AAA. He testified that during the preliminary investigation, he was able to
ask Berry what he did to his daughter. Berry replied that it was better to not let him (CCC) know what
happened as the details of the killing would only hurt him. CCC added that the impression he got from
speaking with Berry was that the latter admitted to him that he and his companions were the ones
responsible for his daughters death. He also asked Berry why they had to kill his daughter. To this Berry
simply responded that he would help him (CCC).
9. Fernando Sanga y Amparo a.k.a. Dindo Amparo (Amparo) testified that he is a reporter of the ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation; that he covered the news on the murder case of AAA, and that he
personally interviewed Berry.
Amparo declared that during his interview, Berry revealed that his co-accused Constancio is his cousin,
and his three companions were alias Burog, Pagkalinawan, and Darden, all three of whom he just met
that very night; that he and his cousin Constancio, and their companions alias Burog, Pagkalinawan and
Darden abducted AAA outside the Alabang Town Center after poking her with a knife; that he (Berry)
at first thought that it would just be a hold-up; and that after threatening AAA with a knife, they placed
AAA at the back seat of her black Mazda car and they all rode in her black car and drove to
Constancio vacant house.
During the same interview, Berry further revealed that while parked in Constancio garage in Luxemburg
Street at the Better Living Subdivision, Paranaqe City, AAAs car was shaking with Constancio inside
with AAA; that this led him to suspect that something was already happening inside the car. Berry also
divulged that when the car door was opened, he saw AAA already apparently lifeless, her private parts
exposed, and without her underwear. Then he (Berry) heard Constancio utter wala na; that when asked
whether by that phrase wala na he meant that AAA was already dead, Berry replied, yes.
In the same interview, Berry also disclosed that AAAs body was placed inside the trunk of her car and
thrown over a bridge at San Antonio Valley III, Paraaque City; that he was prompted to reveal such
information because he felt guilty about what happened. Berry claimed that he had nothing to do with
AAAs killing and promised her family that he would help them obtain justice by becoming a witness in
the case.
10. Atty. Rhonnel Suarez (Atty. Suarez) testified that he was the lawyer who assisted Berry during the
custodial investigation at the Paraaque police station; that it was Berry himself who approached him at
the police precinct and asked for his professional assistance during the custodial investigation; and that he
fully explained to Berry and made the latter understand clearly his constitutional rights before the latter
executed the Sinumapaang Salaysay containing his extrajudicial confession. Berry freely and voluntarily
affixed his signature to the Sinumpaang Salaysay in the presence of Atty. Suarez and two of Berrys
relatives, Estrella Corate (Corate) and Florinda Buenafe (Buenafe).
Version of the Defense
1. Pagkalinawan testified that he was surprised that Berry implicated him in this case because he does not
know him; that he only met Berry inside the police precinct 13 days after his arrest; and that Berry might
have been subjected to torture to give the names of other persons involved in the case.
With regard to Constancio, Pagkalinawan testified that he has known him for less than a year as he was a
neighbor in Bayanan, Muntinlupa; but that several months before the case, he (Pagkalinawan) and
Constancio were no longer neighbors because he (Pagkalinawan) transferred to another place.
Pagkalinawan claimed that he went into hiding because he was afraid that police officers were searching
for him after a reward for information concerning his whereabouts was offered.
2. Napoleon Pagkalinawan (Napoleon) is Pagkalinawans father. He testified that on the night of March
10, 2001, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, he was watching television with his children, including
Pagkalinawan; and that after watching television until 11:00 oclock that evening, he (Napoleon) claimed
that Pagkalinawan went to his room to sleep.
Napoleon also averred that Pagkalinawan had been living with him since birth and that Constancio was
not their neighbor. He said that Pagkalinawan transferred to the house of his in-laws which was less than a
kilometer away from his house.
3. Aida R. Viloria-Magsipoc (Magsipoc) testified that she is a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI); and that she took the buccal swabs from the inner lining of Pagkalinawans mouth.
Her final report concluded that the vomit and hair samples from AAAs car did not match the profile of
the suspects. Magsipoc however could not say whether Pagkalinawan and the other suspects were inside
the car or not since their profile was not found in the car based on the submitted specimen.
4. Constancio testified that on February 24, 2001, his neighbor, the wife of his co-accused Pagkalinawan,
informed him that NBI agents were looking for him regarding a kidnapping with murder case of a certain
Calupig; that for fear of apprehension, he (Constancio) went to his cousin and co-accused Berry and
stayed in the latters house; that he then contacted his girlfriend Aiko Tiu (Aiko) and told her to stay in his
house in Bayanan, Muntinlupa in the meantime; that Aiko later went to see him (Constancio) and
informed him that his house had been ransacked; that his personal belongings had been taken including
his wallet which contained his identification cards; that on February 27, 2001, he (Constancio) went to
Baguio City to hide; that Aiko visited him there on March 14, 2001 as it was his birthday; that the next
day, Aiko returned to Manila and they communicated only through text messages; that about a week later
he (Constancio) was informed that his face was flashed on television with a reward offered to any person
who could provide information regarding his whereabouts; that this prompted him (Constancio) to head
further up north to Aparri, Cagayan on March 24, 2001; and that on March 29, 2001, he was arrested and
brought to the office of Mayor Marquez where he saw his cousin Berry.
5. Aiko testified that Constancio is her live-in partner with whom she has two children; that from
February 27, 2001 to March 14, 2001, while Constancio was in Baguio she called him everyday to make
sure he was safe; that on March 14, 2001, she visited him in Baguio as this was his birthday; that upon her
return to Manila, she learned that Constancio had been arrested; and that this surprised her since she
believes that Constancio did not have anything to do with AAAs murder.
6. Berry testified that on March 10, 2001, he went home after work as a welder and did not go back to
work the next day; that on March 29, 2001, two men in civilian clotliing came to his house and informed
him that they were police officers; that after opening the door, the police officers kicked him in the chest
and thereafter handcuffed him; that he asked them what crime he committed and if they were armed with
a warrant of arrest but the alleged police officers failed to show him any document; that he was then
brought to the Office of Mayor Marquez where he was asked about his cousin Constancio; that thereafter,
he was brought to the Coastal Police Headquarters of Paraaque where he was threatened by PSI Ariate
and forced to sign a Sinumpaang Salaysay, and that said sinumpaang salaysay is false.
Berry further testified that Atty. Suarez assisted him in the execution of his affidavit; that his relatives
Corate and Buenafe also signed the affidavit; and that nonetheless he was not able to narrate the threats
made by PSI Ariate on his life and the lives of his family. Berry stressed that he does not know who
prepared the statements in his Sinumpang Salaysay.
7. Corate testified that Berry is her son-in-law; that while she was at the police station, police officers
asked her to sign a document without informing her of its contents.
Summary of Facts
It appears that on March 10, 2001, AAA went to Alabang Town Center with her friends Dacanay and
Golez. After parting ways with them, AAA was about to board her car when she found herself
confronted by Berry then armed with a knife, who was then in the company of Constancio, Pagkalinawan,
Darden and alias Burog. These five forcibly seized AAAs car and drove her to Constancio house
where she was raped and killed.
In the course of an interview with ABS-CBN Reporter Amparo, Berry revealed that while AAAs car
was parked in Constancio garage, the said car was moving and shaking with AAA inside. [6] This led
him to suspect that something was already happening; that when the door of the car was opened, (Berry)
saw that AAA was without her underwear; and that Constancio then uttered the words, wala na,
indicating that AAA was already dead.[7]
AAAs body was then placed inside the trunk of her car. Adarna, a tricycle driver, saw Berry,
Constancio, and their other companions, throw something over a bridge which turned out to be AAAs
body upon investigation by the authorities.
On the evening of March 12, 2001, Bales almost became the next victim when Berry and his companions
who were still using AAAs car, attempted to abduct her. Fortunately for Bales, a barangay tanod was
present at the scene and was able to foil the abduction when he shouted at the malefactors and startled
them. Nonetheless, Bales bag was taken during this incident.
Eventually, Berry and Constancio were arrested after an informant surfaced and identified them as
AAAs assailants. The informant came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for information
leading to the identity of persons responsible for AAAs rape-slay.
During the custodial investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of his constitutional rights and the
consequences of his statements, Berry executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in
a Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo during an interview that he did take part in the
execution of the crime.
At the trial, however, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he was
coerced into signing the same.
For his part, Constancio contended that he was in Baguio at the time of the commission of the crime. Both
appellants denied the charges against them. These two also asserted that Berrys extrajudicial confession
was inadmissible in evidence.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 23, 2007 the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 258 rendered its Decision finding Constancio
and Berry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As for Pagkalinawan, the RTC acquitted him of the crime for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC held that the prosecution witnesses were not at all able to positively
identify Pagkalinawan as a participant in the crime, thus, he must be absolved of the crime charged.
The dispositive part of the Decision of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, considering that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of
accused NIEVES CONSTANCIO y BACUNGAY and ERNESTO BERRY y BACUNGAY beyond
reasonable doubt, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act 9346 which repealed the death penalty law. However pursuant to
Section 3 thereof, they are not eligible for parole.
Accused, NIEVES CONSTANCIO y BACUNGAY and ERNESTO BERRY y BACUNGAY are also
hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of [AAA] the following amounts, to wit:
1. P92,290.00 as actual damages;

2. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto;
3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused DONARDO PAGKALINAWAN y
VILLANUEVA, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him.
Let alias warrant of arrest issue against Danny Darden and @ Burog, which need not be returned until
after they have been arrested.
The City Jail Warden, this jurisdiction is hereby ordered to immediately release accused, DONARDO
PAGKALINAWAN from further detention unless he is being held for some other cause or causes.
No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED.[8]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of February 24, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC. The CA found that Constancio and Berry
conspired to abduct, rape, and kilt AAA. The CA accorded credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Adarna and Bales, both of whom in the opinion of the CA positively established the identities
of Constancio and Berry. The CA upheld the RTCs assessment of the credibility of these witnesses,
because of the trial courts unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor while on the
witness stand.
Also, the CA gave credence to Berrys extrajudicial confession as contained in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay which he executed with the assistance of Atty. Suarez. Berrys extrajudicial confession was
admitted as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused and
cousin, Constancio as shown by the circumstantial evidence extant in the records.
Invariably therefore, the CA rejected the defences of alibi and denial interposed by Constancio in light of
the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision. finding accused-appellants Nieves

Constancio y Bacungay and Ernesto Berry y Bacungay guilty of the crime charged is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
From the CAs Decision, Berry filed his notice of appeal [10] on March 8, 2012 while Constancio filed his
own notice of appeal[11] on September 12, 2012.
Both appellants filed separate briefs. Berry opted hot to file a Supplemental Brief and instead, adopted the
arguments raised in the Appellants Brief [12] that he filed before the CA. Constancio, on the other hand,
filed a Supplemental Brief[13] raising substantially the same issues as those raised by Berry.
The issues raised by the appellants can be summarized as follows:
I. Whether the CA erred in lending credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
II. Whether the CA erred in declaring Berrys extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence and in
considering it against his co-accused Constancio.
III. Whether the CA erred in finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
Our Ruling
Credibility of the Prosecutions Witnesses
Appellants claim that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, specifically those of Bales and Adarna,
were unreliable and should not have been given credit by the CA in affirming the RTCs Decision; and
that the identification of the appellants made by these witnesses was not believable given the
circumstances of the case.
Constancio, in particular, assails the testimony of Adarna. He argues that, [t]he distance of several meters
between [Adarna] and accused-appellant at the time he allegedly saw the latter riding in the victims car,
as well as the position of [Adarnas] tricycle relative to the vehicle wherein accused-appellant was riding
in, the negligible lighting, time of day, and other circumstances make it impossible for [Adarna] to
positively identify accused-appellant.[14]
Berry, on the other hand, flays Baless testimony, calling it unreliable since her description of the suspect,
i.e. 55 to 56 in height, with brush-up hair, [15] allegedly failed to match his own features. Berry harps
on the fact that Bales was unable to state in court what the suspect was wearing at the time. Likewise,
Berry labels Adarnas testimony as mere afterthoughts and of doubtful veracity. [16]
The appellants assaults upon the credibility of the prosecution witnesses will not succeed. Firmly settled
is the rule that when factual findings of the RTC are affirmed by the CA, such factual findings should not
be disturbed on appeal, unless some material facts or circumstances had been overlooked or their
significance misconstrued as to radically affect the outcome of the case. We find no cogent reason to set
aside the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA because these factual findings are in accord
with the evidence on record. What is more, the appellants have not shown that either or both the RTC and
the CA had overlooked some material facts or circumstances or had misappreciated their import or
significance as to radically affect the outcome of the case.
Admissibility of Berrys Extrajudicial Confession
Both appellants also argue that Berrys extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against them.
Berry insists that when he executed his extrajudicial confession, he was not provided with a competent
and independent counsel of his own choice in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
which provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Berry contends that Atty. Suarez does not qualify as a competent and independent counsel since the
circumstances surrounding this lawyers presence at the precinct during the custodial investigation was
suspect. Berry specifically challenges, the competence and independence of Atty. Suarez and questions
his presence at the police precinct at the very moment he underwent custodial investigation.
After a close reading of the records, this Court believes that Berrys confession is admissible because it
was voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of
Atty. Suarez. In point of fact Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional
rights and the consequences of any statements he would give. Atty. Suarez testified as follows:
ATTY. ANTONIO:
Q: So, what did you do upon your arrival at the police station?
A: Upon my arrival there, I went to the desk and it so happened that there was another case, I
identified myself to the police officer who was manning the desk. And there was another
case, a small case between two (2) parties who also requested my assistance so, I assisted
them. And then, I told the police that I was actually looking for an accused of a rape
incident, and it was at that time that someone approached me and requested my assistance.
Q: And who is this person that approached you, Mr. witness?
A: It was the accused, Berry.
Q: When he approached you what did he tell you, if any?
A: He told me, Sir, pwede ho bang tulungan ninyo ako? Thats what I recalled him saying.
xxxx
Q: So, in short, Mr. witness, it was Ernesto Berry who initially approached you and asked you
to represent him?
A: That is correct because I was there in the precinct, I was infront I was there in the front
desk of the police precinct and when I arrived, he was not there in the general holding area
or lobby. I dont know where he came from but he was the one who approached me.
Q: Did you, in fact, represent this Ernesto Berry during his custodial investigation?
A: Yes
Q: There is testimony of Ernesto Berry during the time that he took the witness stand, Mr.
witness, that he was tortured, coerced and/or forced to sign this extra-judicial confession.
What can you say about that?
A: What I can say is during the entire time that I was there, I made sure that we were alone first
and foremost, and I explained to him his rights under our laws. I also remember that his
relatives were present. Before I allowed the police to go inside the room, I asked that I be
left alone with the accused together with his relatives, and I talked to him for a few minutes
before anything happen.
xxxx
Q: How was the extra-judicial confession taken, Mr. witness? In your presence or without your
presence?
A: I recall that I was there present from the start up to the end, and never left him precisely to
protect his interest.[17]
It is clear from the foregoing testimony that Atty. Suarez is a competent and independent counsel and that
he was in fact chosen by Berry himself during the custodial investigation; and that he was no stranger.at
all to the processes and methods of a custodial investigation. In default of proof that Atty. Suarez- was
remiss in his duties, as in this case, this Court rriust hold that the custodial investigation of Berry was
regularly conducted. For this reason, Berrys extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against
him.
As expected, Berry now assails the extrajudicial confession he made to Amparo. Berry claims he was
under a very intimidating atmosphere where he was coerced by the police to confess and to even name
names.[18] Berry insists that the only incriminating part of his confession was his admission that he was
present at the scene of the crime. Nonetheless, he claims that he was never privy to any of the plans
involving the raping or killing of AAA.
Berrys argument does not persuade. The CA correctly held:
It is already settled that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised
interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this case, there was no ample proof
to show that appellant Berrys narration of events to ABS-CBN reporter Dindo Amparo was the
product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same admissible in evidence. [19]
Berrys confession is admissible in evidence because it was-voluntarily made to a news reporter and not
to the police authority or to an investigating officer. Amparo testified that he requested Berry for an
interview in connection with his confession, and that the latter freely acceded. Hence, Berrys confession
to Amparo, a news reporter, was made freely and voluntarily and is admissible in evidence.
In an attempt to escape liability as a co-conspirator, Berry argues that although he was present at the scene
of the crime, he was not at all privy to any plans to rape and kill AAA.
This argument will not hold.
A closer examination of the prosecutions evidence compels the conclusion that Berry was a co-
conspirator in the rape and killing AAA. In People v. Foncardas,[20] the Court held that:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. There
is, however, no need to prove a previous agreement to commit the crime if by their overt acts, it is clear
that all the accused acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design. It may even be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.
In this case, while there was no direct proof of a previous agreement to rape and kill AAA, it was
nonetheless clear from Berrys conduct that he acted in concerted effort and was united in intent, aim and
purpose in executing the groups criminal design. This was established by Adarnas testimony stating that
he saw Berry throw the body of AAA over a bridge and that he was in AAAs car the night she was
killed. By helping his cousin and co-accused Constahcio dispose of the body of AAA, Berry became a
co-conspirator by direct participation. It is immaterial that Berry was merely present at the scene of the
crime since it is settled that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. If it is true that Berry was not
privy to the plan of raping and killing AAA, he should have prevented the same from happening or at
the very least, left the group and reported the crime to the authorities. Berry did neither and he even
helped Constancio dispose of AAAs body. Clearly, Berry, by his overt acts, became a co-conspirator by
directly participating in the execution of the criminal design.
On the other hand, Constancio argues that Berrys confession is inadmissible in evidence against him
under the principle of res inter alios acta found in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Our
ruling in Tamargo v. Awingan[21] pertinently explains the reason for this rule:
[O]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or
conduct be used as evidence against him.
The general rule is that an extra-judicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is inadmissible
in evidence against his co-accused since it is considered hearsay against them. [22] However, as an
exception to this rule, the Court has held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible against a co-
accused when it is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of said co-
accused in the crime.[23]
In People v. Aquino,[24] this Court held that in order that an extra-judicial confession may be used against a
co-accused of the confessant, there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which when taken
together with the confession would establish the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Applying the rule to Constancys case, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to show
circumstantial evidence to implicate him in the crime.
Significantly, Constancio was positively identified as among those who threw the body of AAA over a
bridge. It is significant to note that eyewitness Adarna also attests that Constancio was riding in the very
same car where AAA was raped and killed. This fact leaves this Court without a doubt that Constancio
is guilty of the crime charged as the same qualifies as circumstantial evidence showing his participation in
the execution of the crime.
Short shrift must be given to Constancios alibi because he was not able to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime the night AAA was abducted, raped, and killed. As
correctly held by the trial court:
xxx However, assuming arguendo that he went up to Baguio City on February 27,2001, there is no
physical impossibility for the said accused to go down from Baguio City and proceed to Manila which
will only take him at least [sic] six (6) hours to reach and then go up again after committing the crime,
x x x[25]
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, this Court hereby modifies the awards of civil indemnity moral
damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each. [26] In addition, interest is imposed on all damages
awarded at the rate of 6% per annum.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 2012
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02709 is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATIONS that appellants are
ordered to solidarity pay the heirs of AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in
the increased amounts of P100,000.00 each. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies
[G.R. No. 152154. July 15, 2003]

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the
Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil
Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its
earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate
amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines
vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA
1379[1] in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now
estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-
gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various
foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2)Xandy-Wintrop:Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes
which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately
acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta
and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements [6] dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the
enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained
therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its premises or whereas clauses the
fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the
Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioners
request for legal assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated
foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor
of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the
partial implementation of said agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs.
Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the
compromise agreement (took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the
motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the
remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an
additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request
was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December
10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the
funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was
allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8,
1998, granted the motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated
October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings,
petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of
the US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
I
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF
THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY
INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE
TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE
PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8]
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a
summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioners motion for summary judgment,
which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted.
In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for
summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully
acquired as ill-gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the
respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31,
2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [10]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise,
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs.
Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs.
Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000
decision, thus denying petitioners motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss
Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by
the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our
judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and
this case is now being set for further proceedings. [12]
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing
its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that --
I
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE

PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R.
MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES
AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WERE

PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS

DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANSWER;
2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY

SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R.

MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA
LEGIS; AND
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF

FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF

UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY

ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A
SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS,

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE
ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED.
IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED
SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED
EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN
HIS PONENCIA DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS

VICTIMS.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE

AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.[13]
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents motions for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss
decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of
lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for
reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to
the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had
been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a decisive issue before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated
translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that
did not diminish by any measure the conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted
before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth
and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on May
22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.[14]
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to
submit the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner
now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not
comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions,
its petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for
further proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition
on the grounds that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH
2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents Answer and other
documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion
was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary
Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis
of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to move for summary
judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF
THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions,
particularly the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature.
These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in favor of private
respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A.
1379 with respect to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the
property which the Marcos couple allegedly acquired during their incumbency.
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple acquired or own the Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been proven,
petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how much
of the Swiss funds was acquired during the incumbency of the Marcos couple
from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has
failed to establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired
property of the Marcos couple over and above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c) [15] (d),
[16]
and (e)[17] of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie
presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can,
therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS

MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO
TREAT THESE AS JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND

THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental
Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements submitted in relation
thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against private
respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements
on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no such judicial admissions were
made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE
NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT
LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.[18]
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable
to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an
attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at the
Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to the authentication
of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is
concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any
interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our known language. She says
the authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This should
stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the
petition be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent
and improper before this Court.
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety of
petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 65 [19] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing
the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule
governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court
under Rule 45, not Rule 65.[20] But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest,
public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
availability of the remedy of appeal.[21]
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the
unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then
President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1,
issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court
in Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was
initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity - the national
coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers
to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino
people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly
and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct,
let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and
resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks. [23]
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any
genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not
petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA
1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus,
on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary judgment was described as a judgment which a
court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon
application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the
adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other
documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that
there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section
1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.[25]
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the
action.[26] The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender
issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
xxx
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public
officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate
President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by
direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM
during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June
1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila
Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of
Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year
and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as
Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS LEGITIMATE INCOME
xxx
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under
Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax
Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the Marcoses are summarized and attached
to the reports in the following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of Income (Annex T hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex T-1 hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex T-2 hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex T-3 hereof).
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex T hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or

US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are
as follows:
Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%

Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount
of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On
the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount
of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry
of Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development
Mutual Fund.
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96%
represents receivables from prior years during the period 1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a
President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and
that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his
Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did
not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as
income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on
record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his
networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda
cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he
referred to in his return as Miscellaneous Items and Various Corporations. There is no indication of any
payor of the dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements which
are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search
of pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax
transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region
No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise,
the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any
filing of capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which
represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or
US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for
subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of
P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total deductions in the
amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or

US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income that is free for
consumption, savings and investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after
tax the personal and additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of
the President for the years 1966 until 1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth of spouses,
Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year
immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00
which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income
approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased or decreased, as the case
may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of
spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75,
assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers
of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees,
fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting
all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation
is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a
reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of
Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO
Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto
empowering him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos
mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller,
also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the
Board of Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos
Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order
naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundations first and sole beneficiary. This was
recorded on December 14, 1971.
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS
FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board
of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated
VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank
Hofman in Zurich under the account Reference OSER. The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the
foundation on June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate
entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo
Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of
the Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted as
fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO
FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as ofDecember 31, 1981
readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed.
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial
successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR
FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public Register on March 21,
1986. However, the bank accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained
with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundations funds
to another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order issued by the Swiss
authorities. One of the latest documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration
signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR
FOUNDATION is owned by the Marcos Familie
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA,
Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI- VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION

ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2)
groups under the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FMs benefit, eventually joined
together and became one (1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both
FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was
drawn when they bought the Central Banks dollar-denominated treasury notes with high-yielding
interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA
using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day,
March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same
bank using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in
Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were
accomplished forms for Declaration/Specimen Signatures submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the
caption signature(s) Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases
underneath. These accounts were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2)
years until their closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred to XANDY
FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron
and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on
March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written
Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the
first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children Imee,
Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third beneficiaries.
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The
Board of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced
by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board
of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of
FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and
Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of
Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The
beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as
fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION
Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA
FOUNDATION Category CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as
those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it
is certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The
balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of
Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss authorities
included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA
FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that
Avertina Foundation is owned by the Marcos Families.
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM
through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and
Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal
counsel, acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated
November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second
beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the
Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his
behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors
remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated
and all its assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account
Reference OMAL. The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation
on June 25, 1981.
40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and
Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundations
Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner of the foundation was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as
fiduciary. However, the list of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December
31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of
December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial
successor of the Valamo Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its
Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several
transfers from the foundations German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category
CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the
Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category
CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E.
Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to
establish the foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement,
both dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and
her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as equal second
beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as
members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the
foundation with a note that the foundations capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited
against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby
foundation. According to written information from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently
had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus
the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981,
Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to
subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to
dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the
account Reference Dido, Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3,
1981.
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and
Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the Foundations Board
of Directors. The account was officially opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one
compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of December
31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically
the same securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the
beneficial successor of the Trinidad Foundation.
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under
General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck
stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber
shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned by Marcos Familie.
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation
was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained
several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the
bribe monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transferred to
Aguamina Corporations (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina
Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J.
Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva
issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971 governing
Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They
further confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of
Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations was found among
Malacaang documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the Companys assets will be for sole and full
right disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal
parts among their children. Another Malacaang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by
Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys
of the company and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple,
also mentioned in the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the
same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to
be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word JOHN LEWIS. This word will have the
same value as the couples own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their
signatures and as John Lewis.
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank
documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories.
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a foundation.
Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets
was left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981
appear to be the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation
cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in favor of SBC and transferred such
power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A.
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundations Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929
NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only
until December 31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which
was subsequently transformed into a foundation.
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred
Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex R-5 hereto attached as integral part
hereof.
x x x x x x.[27]
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos,
Jr., in their answer, stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and other
court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the
matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No.
10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form
a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they
cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged.
12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet.
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity
on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure
assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember
with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.
exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely
stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they
cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent
Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents
were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember
with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos
children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine
issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Respondents defenses of lack of knowledge for lack of privity or (inability to)
recall because it happened a long time ago or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully
acquired are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses were a sham and
evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious
defense:
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated
October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial
brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta
adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos
which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos
children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.,
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly
filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December
17, 2000 of the Marcos children;
(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993.
An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.

Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the
petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like they have
no sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a long time ago, and, as to Mrs.
Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without stating the basis of such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and,
whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his
denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is
true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state,
and this shall have the effect of a denial.[28]
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which
will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support
of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste
of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true
terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art
of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed
to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject
funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were lawfully
acquired without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in
this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied
by any factual support which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the
funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that
the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
material averment in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents
answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of
Appeals,[30]this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done,
performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a
categorical and express denial must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply
saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such
allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for
forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it
was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged. [31]
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers
of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees,
fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting
all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation
is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a
reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise. [32]
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely
stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.[33]
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as
a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at.[34] Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted. [35]
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically
denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the
answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that Respondents
clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of
foundations and corporate entities. Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was thus a denial pregnant
with admissions of the following substantial facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in
the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer,
were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx. [36]
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were pregnant
with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the Republics petition for forfeiture:
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since respondents
were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except
that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to
the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the
same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge
and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not
privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents answer pertained to the creation of
five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in
paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republics petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never
specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her
earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of
the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 47 [37] and 48[38] of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation
and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-
a[39]of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million
were again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all respond
to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were
therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendants denial is a
negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to
the transactions was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her
signatures on some of the vital documents[41] attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos
failed to specifically deny as required by the rules. [42]
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even
signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that
said documents were within their knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice
Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of
the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the First and Second
beneficiary (who are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations,
5) changing the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other
Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168,
Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets
deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies. [43]
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the
existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and
her late husband personally masterminded and participated in the formation and control of said
foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner
correctly points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records,
respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the
balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the
BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of
information will not be considered a specific denial. [44] An unexplained denial of information within the
control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial.[45]
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and
certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are
really being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of delay.[46] In the instant case, the
Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive
this Court by presenting an obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the
pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.[47] Respondents ineffective
denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture
were deemed judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.:
Its specific denial of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the
matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge
and it could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.[48]
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they
were not privy to the transactions cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal
heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father
vis-a-vis the Swiss funds.
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs.
Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to
state and substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even
a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs
which shall contain, among others:
xxx
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies. [49]
It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and
to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence
each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a
description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the
documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law,
it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise,
the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their
proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified period for the
prompt disposition of the action.[50]
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely
stated:
xxx
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional
witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial.
xxx
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be
necessary in the course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the
names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the
testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And
even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such
cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue
was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of
petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said
motion. However, it was again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by
Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days
before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
[51]
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations
in the Republics motion only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and
therefore unworthy of belief.
Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52]
Motions for Reconsideration;[53] and Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54]
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the
funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials without alleging facts which would have
been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her
counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republics
allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds.
This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-
trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M.
Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained
from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos
herself. Thats your statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Thats it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate of Marcos
own anything of the $360 million subject of this case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor.
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.[55]
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to
what facts they would prove or what issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no
doubt in our mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not
trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.
Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier
pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or
that they could no longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she
remembered that it was lawfully acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court,
most respectfully manifests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the
sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed

distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission
of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits.
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge
as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The facts pleaded by
respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere
verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.
We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules,
summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed
by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.[56]
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a
hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary
judgment.[57] A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of
the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no
important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not
be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action
where there exists no serious controversy.[58] Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to
tender issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues
are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for petitioner.[59]
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds
deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements
substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent
pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations against them without
stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally
unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing
affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the
inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses answer were false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly
defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain
time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate
remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and
ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents good faith
should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this
protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all respondents have
offered are foxy responses like lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of privity or they cannot recall
because it happened a long time ago or, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired. But,
whenever it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs
to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc
and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the
motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on
the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary
judgment."[60]
We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did not
preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis
ours)[61]
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment at any time after the pleading in answer
thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary
period is provided by the Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has
been served?
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has
touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly
those of the United States where many of our laws and rules were copied, is in order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of
20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move
for summary judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, specifically
provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only
after an answer has been served. [62] Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed prescriptive period is provided.
Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a motion for
summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait for
the answer before he can move for summary judgment. [64] And like the New York rules, ours do not
provide for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil
Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may
be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation"
mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the New York Supreme Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case
was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty
days after the final adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial
justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also
moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed
mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary
judgment and that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and
unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants
have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule
113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when
a motion for summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to
summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no
limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of the litigation ."
(emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff
has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary judgment." [66]
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled
date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during
the pre-trial conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by
analogy to this case. In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground
similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment"
by her act of proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to
move for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more so should we
permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1,
Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes
evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the
defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation
would go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham
claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial." [68]
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost anything to
delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to
influence the outcome of the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy
and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and the rules provide for a number of devices to
ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary
expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for
summary judgment any time after the respondents answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent
stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from
moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent
Marcoses.
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective
of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." [69]
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer
and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed
on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a
presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. [70] In effect, therefore, the
principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from
prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and
their successors-in-interest".[71]
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in
pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion
for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion
was denied because of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But
during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner
to file another motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the
subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from
filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the
(second) motion for summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction
but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred. [72]
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed
ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any
vested right or interest which could be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or
laches does not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. [73] Nor can
estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.[74]
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. [75] Equity
demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the
Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner
Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of
RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to
forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful
income of the public officer who owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide:
xxxxxx
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
xxxxxx
Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor
of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the
State. Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or
within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the
corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that
forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency,
whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly
disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the
instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the
allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E.
Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President
and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965 to February 25, 1986.
[77]
Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the
personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.[78]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11
of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79] The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were
reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management
Alberto Romulo.[80] The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total
of P2,288,750:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couples combined
salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated
salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-
dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total
amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine
peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and
February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [81]
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the
course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of
judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. [82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in
the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions. [83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they
did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth
could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.
[84]
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive during his
tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source. [85] In fact, his management of
businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the
1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other
office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession,
participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or
any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled
corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled
corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of
Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or
manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as
may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for
determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the
Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of
RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly
against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and
respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated
the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the
known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of
ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those
covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such
persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from
which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law
and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for
their violation of the law.
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings
and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited
with the Swiss banks belonged to them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of
the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos'
Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take
note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that
respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise
admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer stated:
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely
stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and
corporate entities for being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly
admitted their ownership thereof.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature
attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 8 [86] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on
December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was
proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the
General Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December
21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final
judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that:
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to
the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss
deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the
manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents
willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the
Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge
dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and
Supplemental Agreements were null and void. [89] They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus
be admitted in evidence against them because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which,
under Section 27, Rule 130[90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in civil cases, an offer
of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on
the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of
criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGGs commitment to exempt from
all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3)
the governments undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before
the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon
by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents admission
with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those
agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds,
notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated
September 19, 2000 could not have been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did
not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions
made in said agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents. [91]
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document

which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or
incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly,
contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable. [92]
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval
of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner
Republic that respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions
of Ferdinand Jr.s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C.
Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by
PCGG against your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards
achieving some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and the Marcos
family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were initiated by our then
counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open,
we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and any
approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my reaction was the same as
what I have always why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an end to this
problem.[94]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the
banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash. [95]
xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in
connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was
forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then,
subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadnt really discussed the details of
the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the mechanism would be. But
nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement
was perfected and that we were beginning to implement it and that was a source of
satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end. [96]
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of
respondents recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his
testimony arereceivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession
has the force of a judicial admission. [97] It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.s testimony that the Marcos
family agreed tonegotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the
problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an
acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes
of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact
which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.[98]
In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the
following:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the
sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as
bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her
own signatures on the appended copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the
name of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity
of such documents, especially those involving William Saunders and Jane Ryan which actually referred to
Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny
the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was
tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 8[100] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the
Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful
owner. She further made the following manifestations:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Republics cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found
to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both
parties have an inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful
origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic.
(underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less
fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and
transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the
litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas admission of the Marcoses ownership of the
Swiss deposits as in fact the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset.
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria
Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion [102] on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss
deposits) in custodia legis:
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed
in custodia legis or within the Courts protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the
petitioner looms as a distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a
marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos
children revealed their ownership of the said deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on
February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject
Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the funds held in
escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-
plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of
the judgment awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving
US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995,
although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated December
10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests
over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that petitioner failed to prove
that they acquired or own the Swiss funds and that it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain
statements made by private respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial
admissions. The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and
document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs presented by the parties. We
analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an
admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and
examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered on factual
adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is
no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is
interposed by the adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [105]
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents judicial admission of ownership of
the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29
and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in
evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person
jointly interested with the party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. [107]
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a privity of estate exists
between the declarant and the party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession in rights.
[108]
Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent. [109] Without
doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are
jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.
[110]
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to
establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its
findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous records of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the
first element is clearly extant.
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer
during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term
of office.In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the
existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out
of proportion to the public officers salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element
that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos
spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful
income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses
were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise
stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits
amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an
amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of
proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were
unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the
approximate amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government
salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material possessions of those
persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known
lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear
and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact
thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved. [111]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they
were indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of the issues could be made. She
asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as
the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-
inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding
the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied them their rights under
the Swiss constitution and international law.[112]
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign
foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [113] taken from Rule 19b of the
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.
Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However,
failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding
indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is
not divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable parties, though such
judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.[114]
An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated
from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if
the decree will have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in
his absence will be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without
the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the
rights of the other party? [116] There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable
party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998
Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in
controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. [117] Viewed against this
admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the
proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to
petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the $356 million was neither inimical to the
foundations interests nor inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent
Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were established
precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated whatever
illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an opportunity
to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned a nominal share of the assets.
[118]
But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the
ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given by the
Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting
whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their
ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as
indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the
action was unnecessary:
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of
misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the companies themselves are not the
object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their
impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent
any other particular wrongdoing on their part
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or
convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question with the person who
formed or made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally
amassed wealth at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former with
the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal
culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the
sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Governments cause of action
for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their members (or stockholders)
manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this
light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions.
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to
conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to
implead them.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of
petitioner to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan:[120]
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the
sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said firms were
allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of
public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight
reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under
applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of
amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing
amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or
indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to
advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties is a mere technical defect
which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment; and that, particularly in the case
of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for
without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them
should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it
appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties.
[121]
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the
dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The
better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on
joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11,
Rule 3[122] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-
joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. [123]
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3 [124] on
indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been
entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full relief. [125] Mere delay in filing the joinder motion
does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable. [126] Thus, respondent
Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the
non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the
absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not on the absent party.
[127]
If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign foundations,
she should have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She
never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them,
respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the
Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance
with Section 6 of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has
lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of
the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS

DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the original
copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the
court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of these
Swiss decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150
Million to the human rights victims.
While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might
nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The presentation of the authenticated translations of
the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of
fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayans decision was not dependent on the
determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Courts.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this
jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of
the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In
this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on
hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 32. Admission by silence
G.R. Nos. 138195-96 July 10, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICANOR ROA
On appeal is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 171, finding
appellant Nicanor Roa guilty of two counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6294-V-97 and 6295-V-97 and
sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count.
Two separate informations were filed on August 4, 1997 charging appellant as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6294-V-97
That on or about the 29th day of July, 1997 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the
person of MA. NINA DELA CRUZ, 14 years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lie with and have sexual intercourse with her against her will and without her consent. Contrary to law.1
Criminal Case No. 6295-V-97

That on or about the 25th day of May, 1997 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the
person of MA. NINA DELA CRUZ, 14 years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lie with and have sexual intercourse with her against her will and without her consent. Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment on August 15, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty 3 to both cases. Joint trial thereafter
ensued.
Culled from the records of the cases are the following facts established by the prosecution:
On May 25, 1997, around 12:30 a.m., then 15-year old 4 Ma. Nina de la Cruz (Nina) was sleeping in her
room located at the third floor of the residence of her adopting parents, Maxima and Melencio de la Cruz,
in Ilang-Ilang St., Balubaran, Valenzuela City.5 Sleeping in the same room but on a separate bed was
Nina's 23-year old mentally deranged brother.6
Nina was awakened when appellant, who had resided with the de la Cruzes since 1976, he being one of
the workers in the family metal craft business, 7 armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly entered her
room.8 Appellant then covered her mouth, held her hand and removed her shorts and panty 9 after which
he removed his pants and brief, went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. 10 After
satisfying his carnal desire, appellant warned her not tell anyone about what happened and left the room. 11
More than two months after the May 25, 1997 incident or on July 29, 1997, around 1:25 a.m., Nina was,
like her brother with whom she shared her bedroom, sleeping. 12 She was once again awakened when
appellant, also again armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly entered her room. 13 Just like the May 25,
1997 incident, appellant removed her shorts and panty, 14 after which he too removed his pants and brief
and threatened Nina that he'll kill her if she shouted. 15 Appellant thereafter went on top of her and inserted
his penis into her vagina.16 His carnal desire satisfied, appellant left the room. 17
In late July 1997, Nina's mother, after confirming from Nina herself that she was pregnant, confronted
appellant about the incidents but he remained silent. 18 Appellant was thereupon asked to leave as he
did,19 he proceeding to Melencio de la Cruz's father's house at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan. 20 On physical
examination on August 2, 1997, Nina was found to have at least two lacerations on the genital area, and
fifteen to sixteen weeks pregnant.
On the other hand, appellant, who was 55 21 when he testified on November 16, 1998, denied that he raped
Nina on May 25, 1997 or on July 29, 1997. He claimed that on May 25, 1997, around 12:30 a.m., he was
at work in the glass factory of Melencio de la Cruz's niece Dory de la Cruz at Hagonoy; that on July 29,
1997, he was back at the house of the de la Cruzes at Balubaran after Melencio de la Cruz rehired him; 22
and on July 23, 1997, he was confronted about the alleged rape and cursed by Maxima "but [he] did not
retaliate [and] just remained silent," 23 and on even date he left and went to the house of Melencio de la
Cruz's father at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan. 24 Melencio de la Cruz, together with his bodyguard later
maltreated him and haled him into the Hagonoy jail where he was detained. He did not complain,
however.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the Joint Decision on appeal the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Nicanor Roa y Rabino Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6294-V-97
He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs. To indemnify the
offended party the amount of P75,000.00.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6295-V-97
He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.
He is further ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of P75,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of Nina, a close scrutiny of which he claims readily
exhibits inconsistencies which go to the very core of her credibility, 26 he citing the following portions of
her testimony:
FISCAL RAZON: (To the witness)
Q: Madam Witness, we noticed that you are pregnant, will you kindly tell this Court how were you
able to become pregnant and who is the father of the baby inside your womb?
A: Yes, sir, Mang Nick.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madam Witness, on May 25, 1997 at around 12:30 in the morning, do you remember where
you were?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you?
A: I was inside the room sleeping.
Q: Where was your room situated then?
A: At the third floor.
Q: What is this address?
A: 41 Ilang-Ilang St., Balubaran, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Q: And what were you doing on that date and time?
A: I was sleeping, sir.
Q: And who were or was your companion, if any, inside your bedroom?
A: My brother, sir.
Q: How old or young was your brother then?
A: 23 years, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And after removing our short and panty, what happened next?
A: He made me lay down.
xxx xxx xxx27
ATTY. RODRIGUEZ (to the witness)
Q: And you claim to have been raped by this accused in these cases on May 25, 1997?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And you claimed that the accused in these cases is the father of that baby you are conceiving?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Wherein the truth and in fact you were already conc[ei]ving that baby even before or prior to
May 25, 1997. Is that correct?
A: Yes, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx28 (italics supplied)
Appellant argues that "the fact that she was already sleeping would make it impossible for [him] to lay
her down again because these circumstances do not appear to be in consonance with the normal course of
human nature;"29and that while Nina attributed her pregnancy to appellant, she nevertheless admitted that
she was already pregnant before May 25, 199730 when the alleged rape subject of the first case occurred.
Appellant's appeal is devoid of merit.
This Court fails to see anything unusual or not being "in consonance with the normal course of human
nature" to "lay down" one who has been awakened.
As for Nina's attribution of her pregnancy to appellant, albeit she admitted that she was already
pregnant before the first rape incident, the same does not infirm her credibility. While, given her youth,
she may erred in attributing her pregnancy to appellant on account of the May 25, 1997 incident, what
matters is that she was positive in her claim about the occurrence of the sexual assault on her, 31 as shown
in her following verbatim testimony which the trial court did find, as does this Court, to be candid and
bereft of any indication that it was fabricated:

Q: Now, Madam Witness, on May 25, 1997 at around 12:30 in the morning, do you remember where
you were?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you?
A: I was inside the room sleeping.
Q: Where was your room situated then?
A: At the third floor.
Q: What is this address?
A: 41 Ilang-Ilang St., Balubaran, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Q: And what were you doing on that date and time?
Q: And who were or was your companion, if any, inside your bedroom?
A: My brother, sir.
Q: How old or young was your brother then?
A: 23 years, sir.
Q: While you were sleeping were you able to sleep continuously up to the following morning?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because someone enter my room.
Q: Why? How was he able to enter your room, was your room open or lock?
xxx xxx xxx
A: It was opened, sir.
Q: And in what particular portion of the place inside your bedroom? Was it on the floor or in other
place?
A: At the bed, sir.

Q: And who was with you, if any, when you were in your bed while you were sleeping?
A: None, sir.
Q: Now, according to you you noticed that a man entered your place, your bedroom, what happened
when you noticed him entered your bedroom?
A: He covered my mouth and held my hand.
Q: and after that, what did he do?
A: He undressed me.
Q: What was the first part of your clothing did that man remove?
A: My short, sir.
Q: What was the next part of your clothing did he remove?
A: My panty.
Q: And after removing your short and panty, what happened next?
A: He made me lay down.
Q: What about he what did he do to you?
A: Then he undressed himself.
Q: What was the first part of his clothing did he remove?
A: His pants.
Q: And then?
A: His brief.
Q: And after he removed his pant and brief, what did he do?
A: He made me lay down, he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: What was his position when he inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: He was on top of me.
Q: Now, how long did he take to insert his penis into your vagina?
A: Three minutes, sir.

Q: What was your feeling during all the time that he was inserting his penis into your vagina?
A: I felt pain and I was crying.
Q: Why did you not ask help of shout when according to you, your brother was inside your bedroom?
A: I cannot because he was holding a knife.
Q: What hand was he carrying a bladed weapon?
A: His left hand.
Q: And to what direction of portion did he point the bladed weapon?
A: At my neck, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, on July 29, 1997 at around 1:25 early in the morning, do you still remember where you
were?
A: I was in the room, sir.
Q: And also the same room were you staying before?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were you doing?
Q: Who was with you at that time inside the bedroom?
A: My brother, sir.
Q: Were you able to sleep well that night?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why, will you kindly tell the reason?
A: Because he enter the room again.
Q: Who enter the room?
A: Mang Nick.
Q: And when he entered the room, what did he do next?

A: He undressed me, he removed my short and my panty and then he made me lay down then he
removed his pants and brief.
Q: Why did you not shout and ask for help?
A: I was scared.
Q: Why were you scared?
A: Because he tells me that he will kill me if I will shout.
Q: Was he carrying anything?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he carrying?
A: A knife, sir.
Q: Will you kindly demonstrate before this Court the length of the bladed weapon he was carrying
during the May 25 incident (Witness demonstrating)
COURT:
How do you estimate the size?
FISCAL RAZON:
Six inches, Your Honor.
Q: That include the handle.
A: No, sir.
FISCAL RAZON:
Ten inches including the handle.
COURT:
Do you agree?
ATTY. RODRIGUEZ:
Yes, your Honor.

Q: What about the bladed weapon he was carrying during the July 29 incident, will you kindly tell
this Court how long?
A: It was the same bladed weapon that he was carrying on May 25, sir.
Q: After he removed his pants and brief, what did he do to you?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: And he was on your top at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx32
The prosecution having by its evidence prima facie established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the burden of evidence shifted on him. Appellant's evidence, however, is weak and fails to controvert the
positive declaration of Nina who was not shown to have any reason to falsely charge him. His admitted
silence when Nina's mother confronted and even cursed him by his claim, betrays his guilt just as his
passivity does when he was allegedly maltreated and haled into jail by Nina's father on account of the
incidents. For an innocent man would certainly strongly protest and deny a false accusation and do
something positive to spare himself of punishment. But he did not.
Following Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides:
SECTION 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence
against him.
he is, by his silence, deemed to have admitted the charges.
In fine, this Court finds that the trial court committed no error in finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
On the civil aspect of the cases, the trial court ordered appellant to indemnify complainant P75,000.00 for
each count of rape. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, however, the amount of P50,000.00 for
each count should be awarded for purposes of civil indemnity. 33 And following People v. Sitao,34 the
victim should also be awarded moral damages of P50,000.00 for each count.
More. In People v. Catubig,35 this Court held that if an aggravating circumstance is not alleged in the
information but is established during trial, the complainant may still be entitled to exemplary damages. In
the case at bar, although the use by appellant of bladed weapon was not alleged in the information, the
testimony of Nina that he did use one suffices to entitle her to exemplary damages of P25,000.00 for each
count.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated March 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 171, finding appellant Nicanor Roa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape
and sentencing him in each case to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that for each count, appellant is ordered to pay complainant, Ma. Nina de la Cruz, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant cannot be legally convicted of simple seduction under Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code,
for the same is not warranted by the wording of the information, which does not alleged deceit, although
appellant testified that he promised to marry Mirasol if "something happens to her body." Much less can
simple seduction include rape.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, ALIAS "BENBEN", IS HEREBY

ACQUITTED, WITH COSTS de oficio AND HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED
UNLESS HE IS BEING DETAINED ON OTHER CHARGES. SO ORDERED.
SOLAS vs. POWER TELEPHONE SUPPLY PHILS., INC.

G.R. No. 162332 August 28, 2008
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 12, 2003[1] dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed by Herbert Solas (petitioner).
The antecedent facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On 16 August 1997, Herbert Solas entered into a contract of employment with Power and Telephone
/Supply Philippines, Inc., to be the Assistant Sales Manager of the company with a monthly salary
of P21,600.00, excluding bonuses and commission.
On 06 November 1998, private respondent company granted petitioner Herbert Solas and Franklin
D. Quiachon an amount of P85,418.00 each, corresponding to their sales commission from the month of
January to June of 1998. From that time up to the present, no other sales commission was ever again
given to them.
Thus, on 04 February 2000, petitioner requested for the release of his alleged commission which had
already accumulated since July of 1998. However, in an inter-office memorandum, said request was
denied, and instead, petitioner was even mandated to settle his outstanding obligation with the company.
On 07 February 2000, petitioner likewise received another memorandum requiring him to return the
issued cellular phone, car and key to his office, which he allegedly all complied. Petitioner averred that
these were all forms of harassment including the non-payment of his salary for the month of February
2000, and onwards. Hence, on 15 February 2000, he instituted a case for illegal constructive dismissal,
recovery of 10% sales commission on gross sales, and attorney's fees.
In response, private respondents maintained that there was no agreement, written or oral, which talked of
the grant of 10% commission on gross sales to sales agent, nor was there a CBA on the matter. There was
even no CBA to speak of, since the company had no union, with its employees numbering only to less
than 10, all being fixed-salaried employees. The company gave bonuses when there was an income, but
these were purely on the liberality of the company, subject to the availability of funds and
profits. Besides, petitioner has actually no client of his own from whom he could close sales, thus the
claim for commission was utterly baseless.
Private respondents maintained also that the claim of petitioner that he was constructively dismissed, was
without basis. Beginning 02 February 2000, petitioner's attendance was already irregular. On 11 February
2000, he was on absence without leave. He was sick and had a growing lump on his left shoulder. It was
this absence without leave which prompted private respondents to write several memoranda to petitioner,
one advising him to return to work immediately, as his continued absence was inimical to the company;
the other, directing him to explain his continued unauthorized absences within 24 hours from receipt of
the memo.
Private respondents asserted further that neither the order directing petitioner to return the company car,
the issued cellular phone and keys, nor the deductions made on his salary, could constitute as basis for his
alleged constructive dismissal, all allegations being baseless and without merit. Thus, private respondents
prayed for an order directing petitioner to pay the latter's debt with the company, and an award amounting
to P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the dismissal of petitioner from employment.
The parties submitted their position papers. On 31 August 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
finding for the petitioner Herbert Solas, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount
of P892,780.37 as sales commission, and clearly computed appearing as Annex K-K1 and K-3 of
complainant's position paper. Complainant is also entitled to six (6) months backwages and separation
pay of one month for every year of service and 10% attorney's fees, as computed below by the Research
and Information Unit of the Commission:
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[2]
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and set
aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The NLRC ruled that that there was no constructive
dismissal in this case, because petitioner never resigned but merely filed an indefinite sick leave, even
admitting during the preliminary hearings that he was still an employee of respondents, and his principal
claim was for payment of his sales commission. Furthermore, the NLRC saw no badge of constructive
dismissal in respondents' action of applying petitioner's salary for the month of February 2000 as payment
for his debts to the company amounting to P95,000.00. It was also held that petitioner failed to establish
that there was an agreement between him and respondent employer for a 10% sales commission, and that
he failed to establish the origin and authenticity of the specific amount of the commission being claimed
by him.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but the same was
denied per Resolution dated September 24, 2002.
From such adverse judgment, petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a petition
for certiorari. On September 12, 2003, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the NLRC
ruling, stating thus:
An examination of the resolution of the public respondent shows no patent and gross error amounting to
grave abuse of discretion. In reversing the labor arbiter, public respondent NLRC rightly held that
petitioner Herbert Solas did not really quit from his employment, nor did he involuntarily resign
from his office. What he did was merely to file an indefinite sick leave. As aptly observed by public
respondent, if indeed petitioner resigned from his post, he should have filed a resignation letter, not an
indefinite sick leave. His contention that the non-payment of his salary for the month of February
2000 and onwards bolsters even more his claim of constructive dismissal, is without merit. Petitioner
has outstanding loans with private respondent. Thus, it is more logical to conclude that the reason why
he did not receive his salary for the month of February 2000, was due to the off-setting made by the
company of his cash advances amounting to about P95,000.00.
Anent the issue of 10% commission, We find no sufficient basis to grant the claim of petitioner, having no
satisfactory evidence to prove his entitlement thereto. What the petitioner did in this case was merely to
present a certificate of employment which merely confirms the fact that he is an employee of the
company and is receiving the amount provided therein as his salary, exclusive of any bonuses and
commission, and nothing more. Consequently, we cannot grant petitioner's claim of commission on the
basis of the certificate of employment alone. Assuming, arguendo, that the certificate on its face speaks of
petitioner's entitlement to commission, then, the same, however, does not provide for its percentage. The
records attest that petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to bolster his claim that he is
entitled to a 10% commission.His self-serving allegations are not sufficient to justify the claim.
[3]
(Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision promulgated on September 12, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
[4]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision was denied per Resolution
dated February 12, 2004.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, alleging that:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE NLRC FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL.
II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE NLRC
DELETING THE VARIOUS MONEY CLAIM AWARDED IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. [5]
Respondents counter by stressing that the NLRC Decision has become final and executory, and insists
that the NLRC and the CA committed no error in ruling that petitioner was not constructively dismissed. [6]
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
However, at the outset, respondents must be disabused of their belief that since no appeal may be taken
from the NLRC Decision, then the same can no longer be altered. In Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc.,
[7]
the Court explained that:
x x x while under the sixth paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of
the NLRC becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing it
via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and then to
this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45. x x x[8] (Emphasis supplied)
Rule 65 gives the adverse party, petitioner in this case, 60 days from the date of receipt of the order
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration within which to file a petition for certiorari with the
CA. Thus, petitioner took the proper procedural steps to question the NLRC Decision before the CA.
As to the merits of the petition, our oft-repeated ruling, reiterated in Reyes v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[9] must be emphasized, to wit:
x x x findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of
facts.
xxxx
x x x Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have

acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not
to be altered, modified or reversed.[10]
The CA affirmed the finding of the NLRC that petitioner's salary for February 2000 was applied as
payment for his cash advances from the company amounting to about P95,000.00. The CA likewise
upheld the NLRC's finding that the evidence on record was insufficient to establish either that there was
an agreement between petitioner and respondents or that it was company policy to give commissions to
employees.
Considering that the NLRC reversed the findings of the LA, it behooves the Court to re-examine the
records and resolve the conflicting rulings between the LA, on the one hand, and those of the NLRC and
the CA, on the other.[11]
The Court's examination of the records reveals that such factual findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the
CA, are supported by substantial evidence; hence, there is no cogent reason for this Court to modify or
reverse the same.
In Duldulao v. Court of Appeals,[12] the Court held that:
There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or

disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it
would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. It
exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay.[13]
In this case, petitioner's allegations that respondents committed acts of harassment, i.e., the withholding of
his salary for the month of February and directing him to return the company car, cellphoneand office
keys, have been rebutted and sufficiently explained by private respondent company in its Position Paper.
[14]
Respondents were able to show that its acts were not intended to harass or discriminate against
petitioner.
There was valid reason for respondents' withholding of petitioner's salary for the month of February
2000. Petitioner does not deny that he is indebted to his employer in the amount of
around P95,000.00. Respondents explained that petitioner's salary for the period of February 1-15,
2000 was applied as partial payment for his debt and for withholding taxes on his income; while for the
period of February 15-28, 2000, petitioner was already on absence without leave, hence, was not entitled
to any pay.[15]
With regard to the company car, respondents explained that the company car was actually issued
to Franklin D. Quiachon although petitioner and another employee, Nelson Gatbunton, may borrow the
car for company operations with the consent of Quiachon as stated in an office memorandum dated March
10, 1999. Since Nelson Gatbunton had to attend to official business in Clark, said employee was then
given use of the company car.[16]
The taking of the office key from petitioner was also justified, as respondents stated that the company's
office consisted only of one big room without separate or individual offices, so it was only the main door
that required a key. The key to the office door could be borrowed by any employee from a co-employee in
possession thereof in case of overtime or weekend work, but not a single employee had the exclusive use
of the key to the office. Thus, when another employee, Myrna Dumlao, had to work overtime, she
borrowed the key from petitioner on February 4, 2000. Thereafter, on February 18, 2000, respondents
moved to another unit in the same condominium building housing its office, so it was already useless to
return the key to the door of the former office to petitioner.[17]
As to the cellphone, respondents maintain that said phone remained the property of the company, and it
became company policy for its employees to pay for personal calls. When petitioner's debts and advances
accumulated, and he showed no intention of paying for them despite receipt of bonuses, the company had
to take measures to regulate the use of the company cellphones.[18]
Notably, petitioner never refuted respondents' explanations for withholding his salary and the reasons why
he was required to return the company car, key and cellphone. This constitutes admission by silence under
Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. - An act or declaration made in the presence and within
the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration
is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper and
possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.
Verily, the only conclusion that may be reached is that respondents' explanations are truthful and, based
thereon, the NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was no
constructive dismissal in this case.
Lastly, as to petitioner's claim for commissions, the NLRC and the CA were correct in not sustaining the
award thereof by the LA. It must be borne in mind that there is no law which requires employers to pay
commissions;[19] thus, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that that there is indeed an agreement
between him and his employer for payment of the same.
The only evidence presented by petitioner to prove that he is entitled to sales commissions are the
employment certificate, stating that he is an employee of respondents receiving P21,600.00 per month as
salary, exclusive of bonuses and sales commissions, and the undisputed fact that private respondent
company gave him and its other employees the amount of P85,418.00 sometime in 1998.However, the
CA was correct in ruling that the employment certificate was insufficient to prove that
petitioner was indeed entitled to his claim for sales commissions, as said document does
not give the details as to the conditions for payment of the same or the agreed percentage,
if any. As to the amount of P 85,418.00, respondents assert that said amount is actually a
one-time bonus, not a commission. Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioner is entitled
to sales commissions, his evidence is inadequate to establish the amount to which he is
entitled. In Ropali Trading Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20] the
employee presented a Memorandum from his employer stating that he wouldbe receiving a 20%
overriding commission, including sales commission and interest income on all sales he had successfully
obtained. Yet, the Court still struck down petitioner's claim for unpaid commissions, stating that the
employee should present evidence, such as credible documents, to prove his claim. Vague and doubtful
sales documents, the origins of which have not been proven, are considered insufficient to establish a
claim for payment of commissions.
Here, the NLRC and the CA found that the computations for commissions were determined and prepared
unilaterally by petitioner. Thus, it was correctly ruled that said computation, with its uncertain origin and
authenticity, is self-serving and cannot prove petitioner's claim for commissions in the amount
of P892,780.37.
In sum, the Court sees no justification whatsoever to deviate from the ruling of the NLRC and the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 33. Confession
[G.R. No. 133858. August 12, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE @ EMIANO

SATORRE, appellant.
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre was charged with Murder in an information
which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1997 at 2:00 oclock dawn, more or less, in Sitio Kamari, Barangay
Calidngan, Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with the use of .38 paltik revolver and by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and shoot ROMERO PANTILGAN, hitting the latter at the head which caused his instantaneous
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that at 2:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997,
she and her two children were asleep inside the house of her parents at Tagaytay, Calidngan, Carcar,
Cebu.Her mother, Florida Saraum, was also in the house. Her husband, Romero, went out to attend a
fiesta. While she was asleep, she was awakened by a gunshot. Gliceria got up and went out to the porch,
where she found her dead husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on his head.
Rufino Abayata, a barangay kagawad, testified that around 7:00 a.m. of May 25, 1997, his
fellow barangay kagawad, Pio Alvarado, fetched him from his house and, together, they went to verify a
report regarding a dead person on the porch of the Saraum residence. Upon confirming the incident, they
reported the matter to the Carcar Police. Rufino further narrated that appellants father, Abraham Satorre,
informed them that it was appellant who shot Pantilgan. They looked for appellant in the house of his
brother, Felix Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already left. Nevertheless,
appellants brothers, Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufinos house and surrendered the gun which
was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.
Flavio Gelle narrated that he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay
Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant
was detained.
Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain of Can-asuhan, Carcar, Cebu
testified that Abraham Satorre and Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed having
killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that he killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him
with a piece of wood. That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant where she
executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with
the use of a handgun which he wrestled from his possession.
Dr. Plebia Villanueva, Municipal Health Officer of Carcar, Cebu certified that the cause of Pantilgans
death was gunshot wound.[2]
Sec. 33. Confession
Bonifacio Ayag, NBI Ballistician, testified that the deformed bullet taken from Pantilgans head
wound was fired from the gun surrendered by appellants brothers to the Carcar Police. [3]
Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of
the incident. He alleged that Rufino Abayata had a grudge against him because of an incident when he
tied Rufinos cow to prevent it from eating the corn in his farm. He denied having confessed to the killing
of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership over the paltik .38 revolver and stated that he could not even
remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having accompanied appellant to

Castaares house to surrender him.
Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never accompanied appellant to Castaares house
to surrender. His other brother, Felix, also testified that he never surrendered any firearm to anybody.
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and rendered a decision
convicting appellant of Murder,[4] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, accused Herminiano

Satorre is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of Romero
Pantilgan in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited in full during
the whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and
regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant interposed this appeal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in giving full faith and
credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the instant case
amounting to lack of due process provided by law due to its denial of accuseds motion for preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation; and (3) in rejecting the testimony of the defenses witnesses.
The appeal has merit.
In particular, appellant claims that his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by the
Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay and for being obtained without a
competent and independent counsel of his choice. In effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the
prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The bare
allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof of guilt.
Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is the
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein. Both may be given in evidence against the person admitting or confessing. On the
whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person,
voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime. [5]
Sec. 33. Confession
Evidently, appellants alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the Barangay Captain was a
confession. Since the declaration was not put in writing and made out of court, it is an oral extrajudicial
confession.
The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his alleged oral extrajudicial confession given to
Barangay Captain Cynthia Castaares and two barangay kagawads. According to the trial court, their
testimonies were positive and convincing. Appellants retraction of his oral extrajudicial confession should
not be given much credence in the assessment of evidence. However, appellant disputes the admissibility
and sufficiency of the testimonial evidence offered to prove the alleged oral extrajudicial confession.
There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants alleged oral extrajudicial

confession. Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court makes
no distinction whether the confession is judicial or extrajudicial.
The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily, a
confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no
sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator
of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. [6]
Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is was it voluntarily and freely made. The
term voluntary means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord, without inducement of any kind,
and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession, and when the
speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made,
that it renders it admissible in evidence against him. [7] Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in
evidence hinges on its voluntariness.
The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the
confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete
with details which could only be supplied by the accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be
considered voluntary.[8] The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs when the confession is an oral
extrajudicial confession because the proof of voluntariness cannot be inferred from the testimony of a
witness who allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written proof that such confession was
voluntarily made. Neither can the confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was made
outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an oral extrajudicial confession is not
only the admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such confession was indeed made, but
more significantly whether it was made voluntarily.
On the question of whether a confession is made voluntarily, the age, character, and circumstances
prevailing at the time it was made must be considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings
of the accused. This is the position taken by the courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating
statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken into account. It must
be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act. [9]
In the case at bar, appellant was a 19-year old farmer who did not even finish first grade. Granting
that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain Castaares, he may not have realized the
full import of his confession and its consequences. This is not to say that he is not capable of making the
confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his conscience. What we are saying is that due to
the aforesaid personal circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his alleged oral confession may not
be definitively appraised and evaluated.
Sec. 33. Confession
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case against the party by whom it is
made. Such confessions are not conclusive proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were
uttered in ignorance, or levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative
proof which affords but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be
permitted to rest.[10]
Main prosecution witness Castaares testified that after appellants alleged oral confession, she
brought the latter to the office of the police at the Municipal Hall of Carcar, Cebu. [11] At the police station,
Castaares was investigated, after which she executed her sworn statement. [12] Also at the police station,
appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. [13] His statement was not taken nor
was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance alone casts some doubt on the prosecutions
account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan. It raises questions not only as to
the voluntariness of the alleged confession, but also on whether appellant indeed made an oral confession.
To be sure, a confession is not required to be in any particular form. It may be oral or written, formal
or informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion pictures, or tape. [14] However,
while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence, it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded
by video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing. This adds weight to the confession and
helps convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily made. If possible the confession, after being
reduced to writing, should be read to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have
it attested by witnesses.[15]
The trial court gave credence to appellants oral extrajudicial confession relying on jurisprudence
which we find are not applicable. In the cases cited by the trial court, [16] the convictions were based on
circumstantial evidence in addition to the appellants confessions, or the extrajudicial confessions were
reduced to writing and were replete with details which only appellants could have supplied. In the case at
bar, however, there was no circumstantial evidence to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of
appellant. More importantly, the said confession does not contain details which could have only been
known to appellant.
Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical
evidence. According to Barangay Captain Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle
between him and the deceased, he fell to the ground after the latter hit him on the head with a piece of
wood. In the autopsy report, however, Dr. Plebia Villanueva found that the entrance wound on the
deceased was located at the top of the head or the crown, indicating that the victim was probably lying
down when he was shot.[17]
Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There
must be such corroboration that, when considered in connection with confession, will show the guilt of
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a
confession. It is not necessary that the supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the
extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the defendants identity or criminal
agency. All facts and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are admissible to corroborate
extrajudicial confession.[18]
Nonetheless, the fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgans brain can not be considered as
corroborative evidence. While the slug embedded in Pantilgans brain came from the fatal gun, the
prosecution was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other than the bare testimony
of prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun to them. This was denied by
appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the gun to him.
Sec. 33. Confession
On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellants conviction on the testimonial
evidence of prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned up to the killing. We cannot affirm
appellants conviction on mere testimonial evidence, considering that the voluntariness of said confession
cannot be conclusively established because of appellants personal circumstances and the failure of the
police to reduce the alleged oral confession into writing. The doubts surrounding the alleged oral
confession, the conduct of the investigation as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential precedents cited by
the trial court do not lead to the same moral certainty of appellants guilt.
To conclude, it must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as
to their guilt. Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their
innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can
be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt. [19] In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu
City, convicting appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs in the amount of P50,000.00 as well as
costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre is ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE vs. BASCUGIN y AGQUIZ
G.R. No. 184704 June 30, 2009
This is an appeal from the January 16, 2008 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01855 which affirmed the August 15, 2005 Decision [3] in Criminal Case No. 4371 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10 in Balayan, Batangas. The RTC found accused-appellant
Leodegario Bascugin guilty of rape with homicide.
The Facts
In an information dated June 21, 1999, Bascugin was charged with rape with homicide committed as
follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1999 at about 7:45 oclock in the evening, at Barangay [XXX],
Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument and a hard object, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[AAA],[4] against her will and consent and by reason or on the occasion of the said rape, accused with
intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed and hit the said AAA, thereby inflicting upon
Sec. 33. Confession
the latter multiple stab wounds and other injuries on the different parts of her body, which caused her
instantaneous death. CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, Bascugin pleaded guilty upon arraignment on August 5,
1999. Since he was facing a charge for a capital offense, the trial court asked him if his plea was
voluntarily given and whether he understood the consequences of his plea. The case then proceeded to
trial. The prosecution presented testimonial, object, and documentary evidence, while the defense offered
no contest. On June 15, 2000, the trial court adjudged him guilty of the charge beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced him to death.
In the automatic review by the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
Bascugin challenged the proceedings in the trial court, specifically the invalid arraignment of
Bascugin. They contended that the consultation made by the counsel de oficio was hasty; and Bascugin
was not sufficiently apprised of the nature of his case and the consequences of his plea. We found merit in
appeal; hence, we annulled the trial courts judgment and remanded the case to the court a quo for
appropriate proceedings.[6]
On May 6, 2002, Bascugin was once again arraigned. With assistance from his counsel de oficio,
he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution asked the court to adopt the testimonies previously given in the
first trial by some witnesses, namely: PO3 Menandro de Castro, Pet Byron T. Buan, Dr. Antonio Vertido,
Rolando de Mesa, Domingo Liwanag, and BBB, AAAs father. The defense did not object to said motion;
thus, it was granted by the trial court. The prosecution additionally presented the testimonies of CCC,
mother of AAA; Aida R. Villoria-Magsipok, NBI forensic chemist; and further direct examination of Dr.
Vertido.[7]
According to the prosecution, AAA was last seen on June 4, 1999 around 7:00 p.m. by de Mesa, a
tricycle driver. AAA was on board the tricycle driven by Bascugin. De Mesa saw Bascugin again at
around 8:30 p.m. going towards Balayan town proper, but de Mesa did not notice if Bascugin had a
passenger on board. On the same night, Liwanag, an employee of Steel Corporation located in Balayan,
was on his way home from work via his motorcycle when he passed by Bascugins tricycle parked near a
waiting shed in Brgy. XXX, Balayan. Liwanag testified that he heard a girl shout but he ignored the same
because the area was allegedly haunted. [8]
Around 11:50 p.m., AAA was reported missing. The police officers in Balayan conducted an
investigation. PO3 de Castro received information that a patient was being treated at
the Don ManuelLopez Memorial District Hospital for tongue injury. Police officers rushed to the hospital
and found the patient to be Bascugin. Bascugin told the police that AAA was his passenger that night but
as he was about to leave the tricycle terminal, a man and a woman boarded. The man sat behind him
while the woman sad beside AAA. While Bascugin was driving, he was hit by a hard object on his nape
causing him to lose consciousness. When he woke up, his tongue was already injured and his three
passengers were gone. Bascugin was then invited to the police station for further investigation. [9]
Around 1:30 a.m. of June 5, 1999, based on the information from Liwanag, police officers and
AAAs relatives went to the waiting shed where Bascugins tricycle was parked. They found a muddled
portion of the sugarcane plantation with visible tricycle marks, and a hairclip belonging to AAA. Police
officers returned to the site at around 6 a.m. to further investigate. On the way back to the police station,
they discovered AAAs body in the canal along the national road, naked from the waist down and with 13
stab wounds.[10] They also recovered a pair of maong pants and two panties both belonging to the victim.
[11]
Sec. 33. Confession
On September 8, 2003, before the prosecution could rest its case, the defense manifested that
Bascugin wishes to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. The trial court set his re-arraignment to
September 29, 2003 to allow him more time to consider his plea. He was then arraigned on September 29,
2003, and he pleaded guilty to the charge. Upon motion of the prosecution, Bascugin was placed on the
witness stand. He affirmed that he understood the consequences of his voluntary plea, and admitted that
AAA rode his tricycle on June 4, 1999 and that he brought AAA to Brgy. XXX where he raped and killed
her.[12]
On November 12, 2003, Bascugin moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was granted by the
trial court in an order dated November 17, 2003. He was re-arraigned on December 1, 2003 and he
pleaded not guilty.[13]
Bascugin testified that on June 4, 1999, around 5:00 p.m., he and AAAs cousin, DDD, had three
bottles of gin to celebrate the latters birthday. Around 7:00 p.m., Bascugins cousin, Christopher de Mesa,
requested Bascugin to wait for AAA and bring her home because Christopher had to be with his wife who
was about to give birth. AAA arrived around 7:30 p.m.; Bascugin told her that Christopher asked him to
bring her home. AAA then rode Bascugins tricycle. Due to the heavy rain, they stopped at a waiting shed
in a barangay for a long time. Bascugin stated that something happened which he could not tell but after
that incident, he started the engine of his tricycle to bring AAA home but AAA ran away. He said that he
pursued her but he could only remember that he drove the lifeless body of AAA to Bagong
Daan. Assuming responsibility for his passenger, he went to the house of AAAs parents. Thereafter, he
went home; his father saw his bloodied shirt so he was brought
to Don Manuel Lopez Memorial District Hospital. Police officers arrived at the hospital and invited him
to the police station. He voluntarily went with the investigators. On cross-examination, Bascugin admitted
that he raped and killed AAA.[14]
The trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as incriminatory:
1. the victim boarded the tricycle being driven by the accused at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of
June 4, 1999;
2. at about 8:30 oclock of the same night, the accused was seen driving his tricycle without any person
on board going towards the direction of Balayan town proper from Brgy. [XXX];
3. the tricycle then being driven by the accused was seen parked near the waiting shed at Brgy. [XXX]
which was the place discovered by the police officers where the incident took place and the hairclip
belonging to the victim was found;
4. the abaca rope found by the police inside the tricycle of the accused, the pair of maong pants
belonging to the victim was found near the body of the latter, a white panty and yellow panty also
belonging to the victim, a Hanford brief, a sleeveless undershirt, a blue T-shirt and a pair of corduroy
pants, all belonging to the accused were all found to be positive for human blood reactions of Group A
which was the same grouping as that of fresh blood taken from the victim;
5. the yellow panty belonging to the victim was found to be positive to seminal stains;
6. the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the body of the victim which shows that the
latter bore multiple stab wounds and complete fresh hymenal lacerations;
Sec. 33. Confession
7. the complete matching of the bucal swab taken from the accused with the vaginal smear sample
taken from the victim which sufficiently established that the accused had sexual intercourse with the
victim before killing her; and
8. the admission of the accused that he raped and killed AAA when asked by the Court and the
prosecutor.[15]
On August 15, 2005, the trial court found Bascugin guilty. The fallo of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Leodagario Bascugin y [Agquiz]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, defined and penalized under
Art. 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7659 and without considering any mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances,
hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs
of [AAA] the sum of P100,000.00, to pay the same heirs the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral
damages and to pay the costs.
In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case was forwarded to the CA for review.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, Bascugin argued that there was no evidence of force, threat, or intimidation during
sexual intercourse; thus, there was no rape. The human blood from his clothes which matched the blood
type of AAA does not prove that he killed the latter. Also, he asserted that his confession when he pleaded
guilty should have been expunged from the records since he withdrew said plea and substituted it with a
plea of not guilty.
The CA upheld Bascugins conviction. The appellate court concurred with the trial courts finding
that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the culprit. Moreover, he admitted in
open court that he raped and killed AAA. This judicial admission constitutes evidence of high order, not
only because it is presumed that a deliberate confession to a crime is prompted by truth, but also because
such admission was supported by medical findings of sexual intercourse between the accused and the
victim, and resistance by the victim.[16]
The appellate court, however, modified the ruling by ordering imprisonment and adding
temperate damages and increasing the amount of moral damages, as follows:
It having been established beyond any shadow of a doubt that appellant raped [AAA] and
killed her on the occasion thereof, the mandatory penalty of death is inescapable. However, with the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should instead be imposed on accused-appellant.
The trial court correctly awarded P100,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of [AAA]
commensurate with the seriousness of the said complex crime. Likewise, the heirs of [AAA] are
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, despite the paucity of evidence as to
actual damages, inasmuch as it is reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin, burial
and food during the wake. Moreover, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be increased to P75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by

imposing on accused-appellant Leodegario Bascuguin y Agquiz the penalty of reclusion
Sec. 33. Confession
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ORDERING him to further indemnify the heirs of [AAA]
in the increased amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF

THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The decisive factor in Bascugins conviction was his admission to the crime when he was
examined by his lawyer in court. He testified as follows:
Q: At that point, did you come to know the cause of your physical injury?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What may be the reason?
A: According to the doctor, the injury I sustained was a result of a persons bite, sir.
Q: For how long did you stay at that hospital?
A: Less than an hour, sir.
Q: After one (1) hour of staying in that hospital, what happened next?
A: While on our way out at the hospital, I was invited by police investigators to go with them to the police
station and I voluntarily went with them to face the consequences of what I did, sir.
Q: Could you tell to this Honorable Court what do you mean by the consequences of what you did?
A: That if I did something wrong on that time, I should pay for it, sir.
Q: So you mean to say that you have this thinking that you have committed something wrong?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are willing to confront the same, freely, voluntarily and without offering any resistance?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Are you thinking of this case against you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Meaning to say you might have committed the same?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
Q: You said that you were being brought to the police station. What happened there, Mr. Witness?
A: The investigator incarcerated me, sir.
Q: And at that time, do you know the reason why you were incarcerated by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: What was the date when you were being detained at the police station?
A: June 4 already, sir.
Q: Are you sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir, because it was already early morning.
Q: At the police station, Mr. Witness, what happened?
A: At around 7:00 oclock in the morning, [AAA] arrived, sir.
Q: Who were with [AAA]?
A: [Her] parents and the police officers, sir.
Sec. 33. Confession
Q: Was she still alive during that time?

A: No longer, sir.
Q: What was your reaction upon seeing [AAA]?
A: During that moment I was so sorry and I cannot explain and I cannot understand what happened, sir.
Q: Do you mean to tell us that you have this feeling at that time that you were responsible for the killing
and raping of this [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you feel any remorse or resentment to what happened with you and [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I noticed also, Mr. Witness, that at the course of the proceedings of this case you are always changing
your plea of not guilty/to guilty. Why is it so, Mr. Witness?
A: Because I am bothered by my conscience and I was always changing my plea but I feel responsible for
what I did, sir.
Q: Do you know fully the consequences of your testimony, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHAVEZ: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross?
PROS. ALIX: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: By your own testimony you are not admitting that you are responsible for the death of [AAA] and that
you did have carnal knowledge of that? Before you do that, may the Court remind this witness that he
has the right to answer or not the question.
COURT: The Court would like to remind you that you have the right to choose whether to answer or not
to answer the question. You can remain silent so before you answer the question, think of the question
carefully.
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Meaning to say that you not only admit that you killed her but you also raped her?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[17]
Bascugins confession was freely, intelligently, and deliberately given. Judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess
to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. [18] Admission of guilt
constitutes evidence against the accused pursuant to the following provisions of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. [Rule 129]
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. [Rule 130]
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. [Rule 130]
Sec. 33. Confession
Furthermore, Bascugins confession is consistent with the evidence. We agree with the trial and
appellate courts finding that the chain of events constitutes circumstantial evidence that is sufficient to
support a conviction. From the testimonies of witnesses and the physical evidence gathered, it was
established that the victim was last seen with Bascugin in his tricycle; his tricycle was seen parked near a
waiting shed in the premises of which the victims personal belongings were later found; his pieces of
clothing were found positive for human blood that matches the victims; and the medico-legal report states
that Bascugin had sexual intercourse with the victim.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. [19] According to Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In the case at bar, the circumstantial pieces of
evidence enumerated by the trial court all point to Bascugin as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt.
As regards damages, we agree with the appellate courts award of PhP 100,000 as civil indemnity;
PhP 75,000 as moral damages; and temperate damages amounting to PhP 25,000 in lieu of actual
damages, all consistent with prevailing jurisprudence for rape with homicide. [20] The Court also awards
exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 50,000. Article 2229 of the Civil Code grants the award of
exemplary or correction damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future and to
allow the courts to mould behaviour that can have grave and deleterious consequences to society. [21]
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated January 16, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01855
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay additional exemplary
damages of PhP 50,000 to the heirs of the victim. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Sec. 33. Confession
PEOPLE vs. MUIT
G.R. No. 181043 October 8, 2008
Millano Muit y Munoz (Muit), Sergio Pancho y Cagumoc, Jr. (Pancho, Jr.),
Rolando Dequillo y Tampos (Dequillo), Romeo Pancho (Romeo), Eduardo Eddie Hermano alias Bobby
Reyes alias Eddie Reyes (Hermano), and Joseph Ferraer (Ferraer) were charged with kidnapping for
ransom with homicide[1] and carnapping[2] in two separate informations. Only Muit, Pancho Jr., Dequillo,
Romeo, and Ferraer were arrested and stood trial. However, Ferraer was discharged from the criminal
cases by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was utilized as a state witness. [3] All appellants pleaded not
guilty during their arraignments.
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of 11 November 1997, Orestes Julaton, (Julaton), a relative of Ferraer, arrived at the
latters house in Kaylaway, Nasugbu, Batangas with Sergio Pancho, Sr. (Pancho, Sr.), Pancho,
Jr., Dequillo and four other men on board a gray Mitsubishi car with plate number PSV-
818. Julaton introduced them to Ferraer and told the latter that Pancho, Sr. is also their relative. Pancho,
Sr. told Ferraer that they wanted to use his house as a safehouse for their visitor. Ferraer was hesitant at
first as he thought it was risky for him and his family. Hermano told Ferraer not to worry because they
are not killers; their line of work is kidnap for ransom. Ferraer was assured that the money they will get
would be shared equally among them. Ferraer and Pancho, Sr. would guard their victim. Later, five other
men came and they were introduced to Ferraer as Muit, Morales, alias Tony, alias David and
alias Puri. They had dinner and chatted until midnight. That evening, Morales handed to Ferraer for
safekeeping a folded carton wrapped with masking tape contained in a big paper bag, and a green
backpack. Hermano told Ferraer that the package contained guns. Ferraer brought the package inside his
room; he inspected the contents before placing them under the bed, and saw that the carton contained a
shotgun and the green backpack, an Ingram folding. Morales and Udon also showed him their .45 caliber
guns tucked at their waists.[4]
At one oclock in the afternoon of 24 November 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Jr.,
and Hermano with a companion, seated under the tree in front of his house. Pancho, Jr. introduced their
companion as Romeo. They informed Ferraer that the following day, they would proceed with their
plan. Romeo would be the informant since he is an insider and a trusted general foreman of the
victim. The next day, at nine oclock in the morning, Pancho, Sr. arrived at Ferraers house alone and
asked Ferraer if he was already informed of the plan. Ferraer replied in the affirmative. Pancho, Sr. told
him to wait for the groups return. However, the group returned without the intended victim because the
latter did not show up at the construction site. [5] On 2 December 1997, the group received a call from
Romeo informing them that the victim was already at the construction site. Hermano, Morales, Udon,
Manuel, Bokbok, and Muit commuted to the construction site at
Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. Pancho, Jr. was on board the Mitsubishi car as back-up.
At around two oclock in the afternoon of the same date, 2 December 1997,
Roger Seraspe (Seraspe), the personal driver of the victim, drove a blue Pajero with plate number UDL-
746 carrying Engr. Ruth Roldan and the victim to visit the Flexopac project site at
Barangay Darasa, Tanauan, Batangas. At the site, Engr. Roldan and the victim alighted from
Sec. 33. Confession
the Pajero and, along with Engr. Ed dela Cruz, toured the construction site. Seraspe talked with Armand
Chavez (Chavez), the warehouseman of ILO Construction, while waiting for his boss. [6]
After the site inspection, the three engineers walked towards the direction of the Pajero. Seraspe was
surprised to see that the three engineers who stood together suddenly lay prostrate on the ground.
Seraspe and Chavez saw an unidentified man standing near the three engineers. Three more armed men
surrounded the Pajero. Two of them approached Seraspe and Chavez. One of the armed men, Muit,
poked a gun at Seraspe and ordered him and Chavez to lay prostrate on the ground. [7] The assailants
dragged the victim towards the Pajero. They forced the victim to order Seraspe to give them the keys to
the Pajero. When the victim was already on board the Pajero, Seraspe heard one of them
say, Sarge, nandito na ang ating pakay.[8]
They then started the Pajero and drove away, passing through the Pag-asa Road gate. Two more persons
who were waiting at the Pag-asa road boarded the Pajero.[9]
At 2:30 that same afternoon, Lipa City Deputy Chief of Police, Supt. Arcadio Mission (Supt. Mission)
received a radio message from the Tanauan Police Station that a kidnapping was ongoing and the
kidnappers on board a Pajero with plate number UDL-746 were heading towards Lipa City. Supt.
Mission immediately ordered the police posted near the Lipa City bus stop to put up a barricade. In the
meantime, two teams were organized to intercept the Pajero. They proceeded to the barricade.[10]
Right after Supt. Mission and the teams arrived at the barricade, the Pajero was spotted. When
policemen flagged down the Pajero, the driver stopped the vehicle. While two policemen approached
the Pajero, the driver and front passenger opened their car doors and started firing at the policemen. At
this point, all the policemen present at the scene fired back. The cross-fire lasted for around four
minutes. All the occupants of the Pajero, except the driver and the front passenger who managed to
escape, died. SPO1 Rolando Cariaga apprehended one of the escapees who turned out to be Muit, the
driver of the Pajero, at Barangay San Carlos, Batangas, about 200 meters from the place of the shootout.
[11]
On the other hand, after the assailants carried their plan into action, Pancho, Jr. proceeded to
their agreed meeting place but did not find Hermanos group there. Pancho, Jr. waited along the highway
in front of the construction site. He thought that he had been left behind when he did not see the group,
so he left. When Pancho, Jr. returned to Ferraers house, he told Ferraer what happened to their operation.
Worried that something bad might have happened to the group, Pancho, Jr. went back and looked for the
rest of his group. Pancho, Jr. came back alone.
At around 5:30 in the morning of 3 December 1997, Ferraer saw Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr.
watching the TV program Alas Singko y Medya. He joined them and saw on the news the Pajero riddled
with bullets. Pancho, Sr. and Pancho, Jr. left Ferraers house
at around 9:00 in the morning and they also left behind the Mitsubishi car they used. That
night, Ferraer saw on the news program TV Patrol a footage showing the cadavers of Udon, Morales,
Manuel, Bokbok and the victim, and the Pajero riddled with bullets. Ferraer also saw Muit in handcuffs.
The prosecution presented Ignacio Ong, Sr., the father of the victim Engr. Ignacio Ong,
Jr.; Seraspe; Chavez; Dr. Anthony Llamas, the PNP Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy;
Supt. Mission, Ferraer, as the state witness; and Atty. Narzal Mallare[12] (Atty. Mallare), the lawyer who
assisted appellants Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo in executing their respective sworn statements as witnesses.
Their accounts were corroborated by the prosecutions documentary evidence such as the extra judicial
confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo, which were executed with the assistance of
Atty. Mallare. Muit executed two extra judicial confessions: the first statement was dated 4 December
Sec. 33. Confession
1997, in which he was assisted by Atty. Ernesto Vergara, and the second statement was dated 7 December
1997 in which he was assisted by Atty. Solomon De Jesus and witnessed by his
uncle, Bonifacio Muit (Bonifacio), and his brother, Dominador Muit (Dominador). On the other hand, the
defense presented appellants Dequillo, Pancho, Jr., and Muit.
Dequillo, for his part, claimed that for the period of November to December 1997 he was
working as a mason at Villanueva Construction in BF Homes. His work starts at 8:00 in the morning and
ends at 5:00 in the afternoon. He stated that on 8 December 1997, he was arrested by the CIDG at his
house in Purok Sto. Domingo, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. At the CIDG DetentionCenter, he was
questioned about the guns used in the kidnapping of the victim. He was allegedly tortured when he
denied any knowledge about the kidnapping and was forced to sign a statement without being allowed to
read it. Atty. Mallare only came in after he had already signed the statement. He denied any participation
in the crimes charged against him.[13]
Pancho, Jr. claimed that he was arrested on 7 December 1997 in Calbayog, Samar. He was first
brought to the Calbayog City Police Station, and then transferred to Camp Crame. He alleged that the
police tortured him and forced him to sign the written confession of his participation in the crimes. He
denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged against him. [14]
On the other hand, Muit claimed that on 2 December 1997 he was in Lipa City, near the place of
the shootout. He had just attended a gathering of the Rizalistas and was waiting for his
uncle Bonifacio when the police arrested him. He denied having any knowledge of the crime. He denied
knowing the people whose name appeared in his two extra judicial confessions. He claimed that the
names were supplied by the police and that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial
investigation.[15]
In a decision[16] dated 22 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 83
of Tanauan City, Batangas found Muit, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Romeo guilty.[17] Only the cases
involving the charges of carnapping and kidnapping for ransom which resulted in the death of the victim
were automatically appealed to this Court.
The RTC held that mere denials and alibis of appellants cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the prosecutions witnesses. It found the prosecutions witnesses more credible than
appellants, whose self-serving statements were obviously intended to exculpate themselves from criminal
liability. The RTC which were issued during their incarceration and after the execution of their
statements. And the RTC noted that even without appellants extra judicial confessions, there was still
sufficient evidence on record to hold them guilty.
In a resolution dated 17 January 2006, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review.[18]
The Court of Appeals in a decision[19] dated 31 August 2007 affirmed the decision of the RTC.
[20]
The appellate court held that the RTC was correct in convicting appellants for kidnapping
and carnapping. The prosecution was able to prove through Ferraer that appellants conspired with one
another in the planning and execution of their plan to kidnap the victim. Moreover, appellants executed
extra judicial confessions, duly assisted by their counsels, detailing their participation in the kidnapping.
As for Muit, other than his extra judicial confession, he was also positively identified during the
kidnapping by eyewitnesses Seraspe and Chavez. Appellants filed their notices of appeal with the Court
of Appeals.
Before this Court, appellants opted not to file supplemental briefs, and instead adopted the
assignment of errors in their respective original briefs. [21] Taken together, appellants claim that: (i) the
Sec. 33. Confession
RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against them; (ii) the RTC
erred in its finding that they acted in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged against them;
and (iii) the RTC erred in giving credence to the extra-judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo,
and to the sworn statement and testimony of Ferraer in convicting them.[22]
The appeals are bereft of merit.

The elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention [23] are the following: (a) the
accused is a private individual; (b) the accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) in the commission of the
offense, any of the four circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is present. The essence of the crime of
kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the
accused to effect the same.[24] The totality of the prosecutions evidence in this case established the
commission of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended,
defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
[25]
The crime was committed in this case when the victims Pajero was forcibly taken away from him
contemporaneously with his kidnapping at the construction site.
The kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the carnapping were established by the direct
testimony of Ferraer, Seraspe and Chavez. Ferraer testified on how the group approached and convinced
him to let them use his house to keep the victim they planned to kidnap. They planned the crime
in Ferraers house and waited for the call from Romeo to inform them when the victim would be at the
construction site. The group received a call from Romeo on 2 December 1997 informing them that the
victim was already at the construction site, and so they went there to carry out their plan. At the
construction site, as testified to by Seraspe and Chavez, Muit and the other members of the group
pointed their guns at the victim and his companion and ordered them to lie prostrate on the ground. After
getting the keys to the Pajero from Seraspe, they forced the victim to board the vehicle
with Muit driving it. They immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the
kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Mission. Supt. Mission testified that the
kidnappers refused to surrender and engaged the police in a shoot out in which the victim was among the
casualties. Muit was one of the two persons who survived the shoot out, but was apprehended by the
police. Pancho, Jr. returned to the house of Ferraer alone when the group did not arrive at their meeting
place. Ferraer, Pancho, Jr., and Pancho, Sr. learned from the news that the group engaged the police in a
shoot out and most of them were killed, and that Muit was arrested by the police.
After investigation, the police were able to apprehend appellants Pancho, Jr., Romeo,
and Dequillo who all took part in the botched criminal conspiracy to kidnap the victim. During the
investigation, Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit, with the assistance of their counsels and family members,
executed extra judical confessions divulging their respective roles in the planning and execution of the
crimes.
Even though Pancho, Jr., Dequillo and Romeo did not participate in the actual abduction of the
victim, they should still be held liable, as the courts below did, because of the existence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. [26] Where conspiracy is
established, the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes
secondary since the act of one is the act of all. [27] The degree of actual participation in the commission of
the crime is immaterial.
Sec. 33. Confession
The conspiracy to kidnap the victim was proven through circumstantial evidence. The group
thoroughly planned the kidnapping in Ferraers house and patiently waited for the day when the victim
would be at the construction site. Then on 2 December 1997, the group received a call from Romeo so
they proceeded to the construction site and carried out their plan.
All the appellants took active part in the criminal conspiracy and performed different roles to
consummate their common plan. The roles which Muit and his other companions played in the actual
abduction were described earlier. As for Dequillo, he was the one who procured the guns used by the
group. Pancho, Jr. served as the driver of the back-up vehicle, and Romeo was the groups informant.
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence states that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against
them. There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced and tortured into
executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
appellants extra judicial statements is that each contains many details and facts which the investigating
officers could not have known and could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information
given by appellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their
statements. Atty. Mallare testified that Pancho, Jr. and Dequillo executed their statements voluntarily and
affixed their signatures after he talked with them alone and informed them of their constitutional rights.
[28]
Muit, on the other hand, was assisted by counsels in each instance when he executed his two extra
judicial confessions; his second statement was even witnessed by his uncle, Bonifacio, and his
brother, Dominador. Muit cannot just conveniently disclaim any knowledge of the contents of his extra
judicial confession. Nevertheless, in Muits case, he was also positively identified by Seraspe and Chavez
as the one who pointed a gun at them during the kidnapping and ordered them to lay prostrate on the
ground.[29]
Appellants claims of torture are not supported by medical certificates from the physical
examinations done on them.[30] These claims of torture were mere afterthoughts as they were raised for
the first time during trial; appellants did not even inform their family members who visited them while
they were imprisoned about the alleged tortures. [31] Dequillo, for his part, also had the opportunity to
complain of the alleged torture done to him to the Department of Justice when he was brought there.
[32]
Claims of torture are easily concocted, and cannot be given credence unless substantiated by
competent and independent corroborating evidence. [33]
The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit also strengthened the
prosecutions case against Romeo. The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the
person making it recognizes various exceptions. One such exception is where several extra judicial
statements had been made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no
collusion with reference to said several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material respects
identical is confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons
implicated therein. They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated
therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime and may
likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other
persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved. These are known as
interlocking confessions.[34] Nonetheless, the RTC, in convicting Romeo, relied not only on the aforesaid
extra judicial statements but also on Ferraers testimony that Romeo was introduced to him in his house as
the informant when they were planning the kidnapping.
Sec. 33. Confession
As for the penalty, the RTC did not err in imposing the penalty of death since the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Neither actual demand
for nor payment of ransom is necessary for the consummation of the felony. It is sufficient that the
deprivation of liberty was for the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of the four circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 were present in its perpetration. [35] The death of the victim as a result of the
kidnapping only serves as a generic aggravating circumstance for the rule is that when more than one
qualifying circumstances are proven, the others must be considered as generic aggravating circumstances.
[36]
The imposition of death penalty is also proper in the carnapping of the victims Pajero because it was
committed by a band, which serves as a generic aggravating circumstance, without any miti-gating
circumstance.[37] There is band whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in
the commission of the offense. [38] As planned, Muit and three other armed men kidnapped the victim and
drove away with the latters Pajero while two more persons waiting near the Pag-asa road boarded
the Pajero.
However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalties imposed are commuted to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and
without eligibility for parole under Act No. 4103.[39]
As to damages, the RTC erred in awarding compensation for loss of earning capacity. Pursuant
to jurisprudence, the Court precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof as it
partakes of the nature of actual damages.[40] The bare testimony of the
father of the deceased that, at the time of his death, the victim was earning P5,000.00 per month as an
engineer is not sufficient proof. [41] But pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v. Abrazaldo[42] wherein
we deemed it proper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in cases where evidence
confirms the heirs entitlement to actual damages but the amount of actual damages cannot be determined
because of the absence of supporting and duly presented receipts, the Court awards P25,000.00
temperate damages to the heirs of the victim in the present case.
The civil indemnity should be increased to P75,000.00.[43] The award of civil indemnity may be granted
without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. [44] In line with jurisprudence, the moral
damages should also be increased to P 500,000.00.[45]
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for the crime of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide[46] and P25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping should be awarded. The law allows
exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability of the malefactors when the crime is
attended by one or more aggravating circumstances. [47]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02044 which
commuted the death penalties imposed in Criminal Case Nos. P-521 and P-607
to reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for parole is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the
compensation for loss of earning capacity be deleted while the civil indemnity be increased
to P75,000.00 and the moral damages to P500,000.00, and that appellants shall also pay the heirs of
Ignacio Earl Ong, Jr. temperate damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and P25,000.00 for the crime of carnapping. Costs against
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 33. Confession
G.R. No. 162489 June 17, 2015
BERNARDO U. MESINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, in Caloocan
City convicting the petitioner of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.2
Antecedents
On July 9, 1998, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with qualified theft. Upon
his motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. On September 17, 1998, after the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed charging him instead with malversation of public funds, the amended
information alleging thusly:
That on or about the 6th day of July 1998, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said above-named accused, being then an employee of [the] City Treasurer's
Office, Caloocan City, and acting as Cashier of said office, and as such was accountable for the public
funds collected and received by him (sic) reason of his position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and embezzled and convert to his 0~11personal use and
benefit said funds in the sum of P167,876.90, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of
Caloocan in the aforementioned amount of P167,876.90.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The CA adopted the RTC's summary of the facts, as follows:
x x x that in the afternoon of July 6, 1998 between 1 :00 and 2:00 o'clock, herein accused Bernardo
Mesina then Local Treasurer Officer I of the Local Government of Caloocan City went to the so called
Mini City Hall located at Carnarin Road, District I, Caloocan City for purposes of collection. While
thereat, Ms. Rosalinda Baclit, Officer-In-Charge of collection at said onice, turned over/remitted to
Mesina the weeks' collection for the period covering the month of June 1998 representing, among others,
the Market Fees' collection, Miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, Community Tax Receipts (cedula)
and the 'Patubig' (local water system) collection all amounting to P468,394.46 (Exhs. 'K' and 'K-2', 'L' -
'L-2', 'M', 'M-2', 'N' - 'N-2', 'O' - '0-2', 'P' - 'P-2', 'Q' - 'Q-2', 'R', 'R-2', 'S' - 'S-2', 'T' - 'T0-2', 'U' - 'U-2', 'V' -
'V-2', 'W', 'W-2', 'X' -- 'X-2', and 'Y' - 'Y-2'). After counting the cash money, the (sic) were bundled and
placed inside separate envelopes together with their respective liquidation statements numbering about
thirteen (13) pieces signed by both Ms. Irene Manalang, OIC of the Cash Receipt Division, and herein
accused Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof (Exhs, 'K-1 ', 'M-3', 'N-3', 'P-3', 'Q-3', 'R-3',
Sec. 33. Confession
T-3', 'U-3', 'V-3', 'W-3 ', 'X-3 ', and 'Y-3 '). Thereafter, Bernardo Mesina together with his driver left the
Mini City I-Jail and proceeded to City Hall Main.
Later that same afternoon, Ms. Baclit received several phone calls coming from the Main City Hall. At
around 3:00 o'clock, Mrs. Josie Sanilla, secretary of City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, called up the Mini
City Hall confirming the collection of the 'Patubig' by Mr. Bernardo Mesina. Thirty (30) minutes
thereafter, Mrs. Elvira Coleto, Local Treasurer Operation Officer II of the Main City Hall called up to
inform Ms. Baclit that the supposed 'Patubig' collection amounting to P.167,870.90 (Exh. 'K-2') was not
remitted. Also, Bernardo Mesina phoned Ms. Baclit telling the latter that he did not receive the 'Patubig'
collection. Alarmed by these telephone calls she just received, Ms. Baclit then immediately consulted the
documents/liquidation statements supposedly signed by Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection
thereof, however, all efforts to locate and retrieved (sic) these records proved futile at that moment.
Meanwhile, City Treasurer Carolo V. Santos, after having been informed by Mrs. Irene Manalang of the
discrepancy in the collection, summoned both Ms. Baclit and Bernardo Mesina to his office at the Main
City Hall for an inquiry relative to the missing P167,870.90 'Patubig' collection. And as the two (2), Baclit
and Mesina, insisted on their respective versions during said confrontation, City Treasurer Santos, in the
presence of the Chief of the Cash Disbursement Division, Administrative Officers and Local Treasurer's
Operation Officer II Mrs. Coleto, then ordered Mesina's vault scaled pending further investigation.
The following morning July 7, 1998, Caloocan City Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo called for an immediate
probe of the matter. Present during the investigation at the Mayor's Office were Ms. Baclit, accused
Bernardo Mesina, City Auditor Chito Ramirez, City Treasurer Santos as well as the representative from
the different offices concerned. Again, when asked by Mayor Malonzo as to whether or not [t]he 'Patubig'
collection was collected and/or remitted, Mesina stood fast in his denial of having received the same; Ms.
Baclit on the other hand positively asserted the remittance and collection thereof by Bernardo Mesina.
Thereafter, they all proceeded to the cashier's room where Mesina had his safe and thereat, in the presence
of COA State Auditor III Panchito Fadera, Cashier IV-CTO Fe. F. Sanchez, Administrative Officer IV
Lourdes Jose, LTOO II Elvira M. Coleto, accused Bernardo Mesina and LTOO II Rosalinda Baclit,
Mesina's vault was opened and a cash count and/or physical count of the contents thereof was conducted.
Found inside were the following, to wit: I) coins amounting to P107.15; 2) coins amounting to P50.47; 3)
coins amounting to P127.00; 4) coins amounting to P64.1 O; 5) cash with tape amounting to P770.00; 6)
spoiled bills amounting to P440.00; 7) bundled bills amounting to P20,500.00. Also found inside were the
Report of Collection by the Liquidating Officer (RCLO) in the amount of P123,885.55 as well as the
original and duplicate copies of the daily sum of collections of accountable form under the name of one
Racquel Ona dated March 31, 1998 amounting to P123,885.55 (six (6) copies of vales/chits) Exhs. 'Z', 'Z-
1' and 'Z-2'). In addition thereto, the cash amount of P67,900.00 then withheld by the City Cashier
pending this investigation, was turned over to the said auditing team, thus, the total cash money audited
against accused Mesina amounted to P89,965.72 (sic) (Exhs. 'BB' and 'BB-1').
In the afternoon of July 7, 1998, at about 5:00 o'clock, Mses. Rosalinda Baclit and Maria Luisa Canas all
went to the SID Caloocan City Police Station to have their separate sworn statements taken (Exhs. 'E', 'E-
1 ', 'D', 'D-1 ', 'F', and 'F-1 '). Mmes. Lorna Palomo-Cabal, Divina Dimacali-Sarile and Victoria Salita
Vda. De Puyat likewise executed a joint sworn affidavit (Exhs. 'G', 'G-1', 'G-2', and 'G-3') in preparation
for the filing of appropriate criminal charge against Bernardo Mesina.
The following day, July 8, 1998, Mamerto M. Manahan, Panchito Fadera and Carolo V. Santos also
executed their respective affidavits in relation to the incidents at bar (Exhs. 'A', 'A-1 ', 'A-2'; Exhs. 'B', and
'B-1'; Exhs. 'C', and 'C-1'). Meanwhile, the statement of collection supposedly signed by accused Mesina
Sec. 33. Confession
was finally recovered at Rosalinda Baclit's desk hidden under a pile of other documents. (Rollo, pp. 74-
75)4
The Defense presented the oral testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence. 5 He admitted
collecting the total amount of P468,394.46 from Baclit, including the subject patubig collection totaling
to P167,976.90, but adamantly denied misappropriating, misapplying, and embezzling the patubig
collection, maintaining that the patubig collection was found complete in his vault during the inspection.
He explained that he deliberately kept the collection in his vault upon learning that his wife had suffered a
heart attack and had been rushed to the hospital for immediate medical treatment. He believed that he did
not yet need to remit the amount to the OIC of the Cash Receipt Division because it was still to be re-
counted. He claimed that when he returned to the Main City Hall that same day his vault was already
sealed.6 He said that the accusation was politically motivated. In support of his claim of innocence, he
cited his numerous awards and citations for honesty and dedicated public service. 7
On November 8, 2001, the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused BERNARDO MESINA Y UMALI
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
The Court further imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office and a fine
of P167,876.90 upon the accused.
SO ORDERED.8
On July 24, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision, with modification as to the amount of fine
imposed,9decreeing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated November 8, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 120, Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-54217 is affirmed with modification in
the sense that the fine is reduced from 1!167,876.98 to P37,876.98. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In his appeal, the petitioner submits for consideration the following:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION THE

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MAL VERSA TION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT:
a. it had admitted in evidence the testimony of prosecution witness ELVIRA COLITO that she
saw, when accused-appellant 's vault was opened, to have seen (sic) the bundles of the missing
Patubig collections of more than Ps130,000.00 (sic), and thus, in effect, there was no
misappropriation, as one of the elements of the crime of malversation;
Sec. 33. Confession
b. that it erred and completely misapprehended and failed to appreciate the true meaning of the
testimony of the said witness of seeing inside the vault more than Ps130, 000. 00 in bundles by
treating/and/or (sic) appreciating the same as exactly Ps130, 000. 00 flat without appreciating the
words more than, thus guilty of erroneous inference surmises and conjectures; c. that it
overlooked and completely disregarded that inside the vault was the sum of Ps20,500.00 in
bundles also [Exh. "BB and B-1 "j regarding contents of the vault or the total sum of Ps22, 065.
72 testified to by Panchito Madera (sic), Head of the Audit Team;
d. the Court of Appeals gravely erred to surmise and at least look on the lack from the lists of
inventories of the vault the more than Ps130,000.00 in bundles and why it was not listed among
the moneys found inside the accused-appellant 's vault;
e. doubts and inconsistencies existing therefrom shall remained (sic) favorable to the accused-
appellant pursuant to applicable jurisprudence;
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A (SIC) QUESTIONS OF LAW, THAT THE
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE GROUP OF MAYOR MALONZO, THE TREASURER,
THE ADMINISTRATOR, THE CITY AUDITOR, CHIEF OF DIVISIONS AND THE AUDIT
PROCEEDINGS ARE NULL AND VOID DUE:
A. Accused-appellant was not informed of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel as

mandated by the Constitution;
B. The audit proceedings did not comply strictly with the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers
and Auditors and other Guidelines, thus null and void,'
C. Thus, the presumption of juris tantum in Art. 127 of the Revised Penal Code is overcome
firmly supported by the discovery of the missing money and further the conclusions of the Court
of Appeals was against established jurisprudence enunciated in the case of TINGA vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, No. L-57650, [160 SCRA 483};
III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FATALLY WRONG IN NOT APPL YING
EVIDENCE OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER TO ACQUIT AND EXONERATE PETITIONER
ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 130, SEC. 46, OF THE RULES OF COURT. A.
Notwithstanding, not only are the evidence weak, but its findings or discovery of "more than
Ps130,000.00 inside the vault is subject to double interpretations, and/or double alternative or
probabilities, thus the presumption of innocence will be adopted. 10
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
The crime of malversation of public funds charged herein is defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
Sec. 33. Confession
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by R.A. No. 1060)
The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that the offender is a
public officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office; (c) that the funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d)
that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them. 11
The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner.
The Prosecution proved, firstly, that the petitioner was a public officer with the position of Local
Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City; secondly, that by reason of his position, he was tasked to collect
fees and taxes regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including market fees, miscellaneous fees, real
property taxes, and the subject patubig collection; and, thirdly, that all of the fees and taxes collected were
unquestionably public funds for which he was accountable.
As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not rebut the presumption that he had
misappropriated the patubig collection to his personal use. He had earlier feigned ignorance of having
received the patubig collection when he phoned Ms. Baclit to tell her that he did not receive the
collection. He still insisted that he had not received the sum from Ms. Baclit when the City Treasurer
summoned them both. His denial continued until the next day when City Mayor Malonzo himself asked
them both about the matter. Only after the petitioner's vault was finally opened did he declare that the
collection was intact inside his vault. Even then, the actual amount found therein was short by 1!
37,876.98. Conformably with Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, supra, the failure of the petitioner to
have the patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was prima facie
evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal use. Although the showing was merely prima
facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering that he not only did not account for the
collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied having received it up to the time of the inspection of
the sealed vault. Under the circumstances, he was guilty of the misappropriation of the collection.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa is only a modality
in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is proper. 12 All that is necessary for a
conviction is sufficient proof that the accused accountable officer had received public funds or property,
and did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory
Sec. 33. Confession
explanation of his failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the inability to
produce or any shortage in his accounts. 13 Accordingly, with the evidence adduced by the State being
entirely incompatible with the petitioner's claim of innocence, we uphold the CA's affirmance of the
conviction, for, indeed, the proof of his guilt was beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner bewails the deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights during the investigation.
He posits that a custodial investigation was what really transpired, and insists that the failure to inform
him of his Miranda rights rendered the whole investigation null and void. We disagree with the
petitioner's position.
According to People v. Marra, 14 custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner. The safeguards during custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into a still unsolved crime, and the interrogation is then
focused on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions that tend to elicit incriminating statements. The situation contemplated is more
precisely described as one where -After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or
police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators
as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in
their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to extract
the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of
their constitutional rights.
And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an
atmosphere overwhelms them into silence x x x.15
Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the fact that he was one of those being investigated did not by itself
define the nature of the investigation as custodial. For him, the investigation was still a general inquiry to
ascertain the whereabouts of the missing patubig collection. By its nature, the inquiry had to involve
persons who had direct supervision over the issue, including the City Treasurer, the City Auditor, the
representative from different concerned offices, and even the City Mayor. What was conducted was not an
investigation that already focused on the petitioner as the culprit but an administrative inquiry into the
missing city funds. Besides, he was not as of then in the custody of the police or other law enforcement
office.
Even as we affirm the CA, we have to clarify the penalty imposed in terms of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.1wphi1
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law states that an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the
offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. 16 The maximum term is the penalty
properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending circumstance; while the
minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense committed. Conformably with the instructions on the proper application of the
Indeterminate Sentence law in malversation reiterated in Zafra v. People: 17 (a) the penalties provided
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and ( b) considering that the penalties
provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code arc not composed of three periods, the time
included in the prescribed penalty should be divided into three equal portions, each portion forming a
Sec. 33. Confession
period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code. 18 With the amount of P37,876.98 ultimately
found and declared by the CA to have been misappropriated exceeding the P22,000.00 threshold, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua (that is, 17 years,
four months and one day to reclusion perpetua), the minimum period of which is 17 years, four months
and one to 18 years and eight months, the medium period of which is 18 years, eight months and one day
to 20 years, and the maximum period is reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the petitioner is the medium period in view
of the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, while the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence shall be taken from the penalty next lower, which is reclusion temporal in its minimum and
medium periods (i.e., from 12 years and one day to 17 years and four months). Hence, the indeterminate
sentence for the petitioner is modified to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 18
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In addition, the Court notes that both lower courts did not require the petitioner to pay the amount
of P37,876.98 subject of the malversation. That omission was plain error that we should now likewise
correct as a matter of course, for there is no denying that pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The omission, if unchecked and
unrevised, would permanently deprive the City of Caloocan of the misappropriated amount. Such
prejudice to the public coffers should be avoided.
The Court has justifiably bewailed the omissions by the lower courts in this respect, and has seen fit to
point out in Zafra v. People:
One more omission by the CA and the R TC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to
decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused.
That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each count was an element of the penalties imposed
under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution,
which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in
Bacolod v. People, it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for
doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the R TC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest
the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the
final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law
and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of
the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
Sec. 33. Confession
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial
office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their
rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is
what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties
will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been
reserved or waived.19
Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the damage
caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. 20 Given that his obligation requires the payment
of the amount misappropriated to the City of Caloocan, the indemnification for damages is through legal
interest of 6% per annum on the amount malversed, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment.21
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 24, 2003 finding petitioner
BERNARDO U. MESINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 18 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
pay a fine of P37,876.98; and (b) he shall further pay to the City of Caloocan the amount of P37,876.98,
plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision until the
amount is fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence / Res inter alios acta, Part Two
G.R. No. 106671 March 30, 2000
HARRY TANZO vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the April 10, 1992 Resolution of public respondent Secretary of Justice, as well as the latter's
August 6, 1992 Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The assailed Resolutions
upheld the Quezon City Prosecutor's dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa filed by petitioner
Harry Tanzo against private respondents Manuel and Mario Salazar.
The facts are:
Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding and transporting
"balikbayan" boxes from California, U.S.A to Metro Manila, Philippines. Manuel J. Salazar (hereinafter
"Manuel") managed the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a business registered in his name with
principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias Street, Quezon City. On the other hand, Mario J. Salazar
(hereinafter "Mario") handled the U.S. side of the forwarding business as General Manager of M.J.S.
International, Inc., a corporation with principal office at No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
According to the petitioner, sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. Mario tried to convince him to invest some money in the said business. Mario had allegedly
represented that petitioner's money will be held in trust and administered by both him and his brother for
the exclusive use of their forwarding and transporting business. Petitioner further alleged that Mario
promised him a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum (10%) for one month, at the end of
which, his money plus interest earned shall be returned to him.
When petitioner returned to the Philippines, it was Manuel's turn to persuade him to part with his money
under the said investment scheme. Eventually convinced by the private respondents' representations and
assurances, petitioner agreed to invest the total amount of US $34,000.00 which he entrusted to his aunt,
Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in the U.S.A. Thus, petitioner issued several personal checks
made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo,1or to "Calfed"2, or payable to cash3, to wit:
California Federal
Savings and Loan Asso.
Check Numbers Date of Check Amount
319 August 04, 1989 US$5,000.00
320 August 09, 1989 9,000.00
321 August 09, 1989 9,000.00
322 August 08, 1989 2,000.00
323 August 10, 1989 4,000.00
324 August 14, 1989 5,000.00

4
Total US$34,000.00
Except for California Federal Check No. 322 which was encashed by Mario himself, private respondents
received the proceeds of the above checks through Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several occasions in August
1989.
Meanwhile, Mario encountered serious liquidity problems 5 that prompted him to petition the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for a release from his debts on September 27, 1990. He was ordered "released from all
dischargeable debts" by the said court on January 25, 1991. 6
Upon the expiration of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded from Mario in the
States and Manuel in Quezon City proper accounting of his financial investment and/or the return of his
capital plus interest earned. At the outset, private respondents avoided their obligation to petitioner by
making various excuses but after persistent demands by the latter, Manuel finally admitted that their
shipments had encountered some problems with the Bureau of Customs. Thus, on January 29, 1990,
Manuel executed a letter authorizing the petitioner to withdraw documents to assist in the release of their
shipments from the Bureau of Customs. However, when petitioner attempted to secure the release of the
"balikbayan'" boxes from the Bureau of Customs, he discovered that the same had actually contained
smuggled goods and were accordingly seized and forfeited in favor of the government.
When private respondents continued to ignore petitioner's demand for the return of his money, the latter
filed, on June 31, 1991, a complaint-affidavit for estafa against private respondents before the Office of
the Quezon City Prosecutor (hereinafter "prosecutor"). In a resolution dated September 4, 1991 the
prosecutor dismissed the said complaint on the ground that "[t]he Quezon City Prosecutor's Office has no
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged as it was committed not in Quezon City,
Philippines."7 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was denied by the prosecutor
on the same ground.8
Petitioner then filed a petition for review of the dismissal of his complaint for estafa against private
respondents with then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon. On April 10, 1992, Acting Secretary of
Justice, Eduardo G. Montenegro dismissed the said petition for review in a resolution which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
An evaluation of the records of the case disclosed that the incident complained of took place in
the United States, and under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our courts have no jurisdiction
over offenses committed outside the territory of the Philippines. While the rule allows certain
exceptions, the facts do not show that the case falls within any of said exceptions. Hence, we are
convinced, and hereby hold, that there is no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office in the questioned resolution.
ACCORDINGLY, your petition is dismissed for lack of merit. 3
Dissatisfied, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above resolution. However, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and stated in a resolution dated August 6, 1992 that:
xxx xxx xxx

After a careful analysis of the issues raised in your motion and a re-evaluation of the evidence on
record, we find no valid reason to justify a reversal of our previous resolution.
Aside from your bare allegations that there was a trust agreement between you and the
respondents, and that deceit and misappropriation which are the important elements of estafa
were committed by them in the Philippines, you did not present any concrete or convincing
evidence to support the same. On the contrary, your own evidence shows that you transacted with
Mario Salazar through your aunt. Liwayway Dee Tanzo. This bolsters the claim of Manuel
Salazar that the sums of money received by Mario from Liwayway in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A, were simple loans as shown by the loan contracts executed by them in the said place.
WHEREFORE, your motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. 10
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal case for estafa against the private respondents on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the crime
charged was actually committed in the United States. 11
At the outset, we must point out that the Secretary of Justice dismissed the criminal charges against the
respondents not only for lack of jurisdiction but also, and more importantly, because it found petitioner's
evidence insufficient to support his charge of estafa against the private respondents. Thus the immediate
issue for the determination of this Court is whether prima facie evidence exists that the private
respondents had committed the crime of estafa and should be held for trial. After all, a finding that
petitioner's complaint for estafa is not supported by that quantum of evidence necessary to justify the
filing of a criminal case in court shall render irrelevant the question of territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
A judicious scrutiny of the evidence on record leads us to agree with the Secretary of Justice that the
transactions between private respondents, particularly, Mario and the petitioner, were simple loans, and
did not constitute a trust agreement, the violation of which would hold the private respondents liable for
estafa.
Petitioner failed to present evidence other than his bare assertion that he had invested money in private
respondents' business on the basis of a trust agreement. The photocopies of the checks allegedly subject of
the trust agreement did more damage than good to petitioner's proposition. None of these checks were
issued to either Mario or Manuel and were in fact payable to "Liwayway Dee Tanzo", "Calfed" or "Cash".
Moreover, only one of these checks was actually encashed by Mario, the rest by Liwaway Dee Tanzo. On
the basis of the foregoing alone, private respondents could have completely denied the existence of their
liability to petitioner as neither proof in writing nor witnesses exist to substantiate petitioner's claim of a
trust agreement between himself and the private respondents. On the contrary, Manuel does not deny that
Mario had indeed received money from the petitioner, albeit claiming that the latter's liability thereunder
is purely civil in nature for being rooted in a simple loan contract. Manuel offered in evidence copies of
the contracts of loan entered into between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo. 12 We agree
with the petitioner that these loan contracts do not by themselves prove that his agreement with the
private respondents was also a loan. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, he is not a party to these
contracts that clearly stipulate "Liwayway Dee Tanzo" as creditor and "M.J.S. International represented
by its General Manager, Mario J. Salazar" as debtor.
These loan contracts may, however, be given evidentiary value in support of Manuel's claim that the
agreement with petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with Liwayway Dee Tanzo. Under the
rule of res inter alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time, but it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like. 13
Elaborating thus, we have held that:
[C]ollateral facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when there is
a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the
circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently
become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the
state of mind or knowledge of a person, it provides insight into such person's motive or intent ; it
uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it reveals a mistake. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
The series of transactions between MJS International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo were entered into under
similar circumstances as those surrounding the contract between petitioner and Mario. Just like the
alleged trust agreement between petitioner and Mario, the loan contracts between M.J.S International and
Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditor shall lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the
latter in its business operations. 15 Petitioner also admits that he entrusted the checks to Liwayway Dee
Tanzo for investment in private respondents' business. This shows that private respondents were
transacting directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo in the usual manner that they conduct business, that is the
loan of money for stipulated interest. Hence, private respondents' modus operandi, if there ever was one,
in raising additional capital for M.J.S. International was to borrow money from willing investors. It is
thus unlikely, considering the scheme of things, that private respondents would all of a sudden deviate
from an established business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the petitioner.
In view of the foregoing and the unfortunate fact that petitioner has failed to present controverting
evidence, this Court is constrained to adopt private respondents' position that the agreement between
Mario and the petitioner was in the nature of a simple loan agreement.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that private respondents have committed the crime of estafa
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; 16
necessarily fails. This Court has ruled that when the relation is purely that of debtor and creditor, the
debtor cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa, under the above quoted provision, by merely refusing
to pay or by denying the indebtedness. 17 The reason behind this rule is simple. In order that a person can
be convicted of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, it must be proven that he
has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal property that he has received.
The obligation to deliver exactly the same money, that is, bills or coins, is non-existent in a simple loan of
money because in the latter; the borrower acquires ownership of the money borrowed. 18 Being the
owner, the borrower can dispose of the thing borrowed and his act will not be considered
misappropriation thereof. 19
In the alternative, petitioner accuses private respondents of committing the crime of estafa under Article
315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud.
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
Specifically, petitioner contends that he was deceived by private respondents to pay with his money on
their representation that the same would be held in trust for investment in their legitimate freight business
only to find out later on that private respondents used his money for the illicit activity of smuggling
prohibited goods into the Philippines. 20
This contention cannot be sustained for lack of evidence.1wphi1 Petitioner claims that private
respondents used his money for smuggling. The fact, however, that several shipments from M.J.S.
International Freight Services to Mansal Forwarders were seized and forfeited by the Bureau of Customs
for containing smuggled items does not prove that petitioner's money was indeed used by private
respondents in the said illegal activity. Petitioner himself admits that he and his relatives were regular
clients of private respondents since 1988. 21 It cannot, thus, be doubted that the private respondents were
likewise engaged in a legitimate forwarding business in which business petitioner's money could have
actually been invested.
The letter issued by Manuel authorizing petitioner to withdraw documents covering the containers that
were later seized by the Bureau of Customs bears little weight in view of the fact that the same was not
even presented before the prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. Further, as correctly pointed out by the
private respondents, it is a mere blank form that does not even indicate petitioner's name as authorized
bearer. 22
As we have explained earlier, the true nature of the contract between petitioner and private respondents
was that of a simple loan. In such a contract, the debtor promises to pay to the creditor an equal amount of
money plus interest if stipulated. 23 It is true that private respondents failed to fulfill their promise to
petitioner to return his money plus interest at the end of one month. However, mere non-compliance of a
promise to perform a thing does not constitute deceit 24 because it is hard to determine and infer
a priori the criminal intent to the person promising. 25 In other words, deceit should be proved and
established by acts distinct from and independent of, the non-compliance of the promise, 26 and this,
petitioner failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126351 February 18, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RAUL ACOSTA Y LAYGO
This is an appeal from the decision 1 dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch 127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo,
Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer"
Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen. 2 On February 27, 1996, a
few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his
live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and
appliances.3 Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St.,
Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by
appellant.
The pertinent facts in this case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find supported by the
records, are as follows:
At about 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of prosecution witness
Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was
carrying a stove and a kitchen knife (TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 3-4, 7). She went out of her house and
approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that he would
burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. (Ibid., pp. 3-4).
Complainant's house is situated at Banahaw Street, Mountain Heights Subdivision, Kalookan City and
adjacent to the house of prosecution witness Aquino. (Ibid., pp. 2, 18). Only a wall fence divides her
property from that of the complainant. (Ibid., p. 18).
Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino's query, she returned immediately to her
house (Ibid., p. 7). A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the
throwing of chair inside the house of complainant (Ibid., p. 8). When she peeped through her kitchen
door, she saw appellant inside complainant's house, which was unoccupied at that time. ( Ibid., p. 8).
Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted it with cigarette lighter ( Ibid., p. 10).
The fire was easily put off by appellant's wife who arrived at the place. (Ibid., p. 10).
At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa, likewise a
resident of Mountain Heights Subdivision, was roused from her sleep by the barking of their dogs at the
back portion of her house. (TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 3-4). When she went out of her house, she saw
complainant's house situated at the adjacent lot near the back portion of her garage burning. (Ibid., p. 4).
When she peeped through the holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from the adjacent lot, she noticed
the presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. (Ibid., p. 5) Appellant was just
watching the blaze and not doing anything to contain it. (Ibid.)
Witness Videa immediately rushed back to her house and informed her husband about the fire at the
nearby lot. (Ibid., p. 5). They called up the police detachment and alerted other members of her family to
be ready for any contingency. (Ibid., p. 6). The fire truck arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning,
when the house was already razed to the ground. (TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 6; TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 11).
An on-the-spot investigation was conducted by Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare of the Kalookan Fire
Department (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2). After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not
find any incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire remained undetermined. (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5).
In his Report, the investigator did not rule out the possibility of intentional burning, since there is no other
source of ignition, unless otherwise somebody lighted an illuminating object and left it unattended. (TSN,
May 17, 1996, p. 8).
xxx xxx x x x4
On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following Information:
That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously burn the house of one, FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE
MARIGOMEN, located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city, said
accused knowing the same to be prohibited, by then and there setting fire to the said house thereby
causing the same to be totally burned, to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant in the estimated
amount of P100,000.00.
Contrary to Law.5
On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Juanito Crisostomo, was arraigned
and entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videa, (2) Mrs. Mona
Aquino, both neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare. When the defense
agreed to the proposed stipulation that the value of the burned property was P100,000.00, the State
Prosecutor dispensed with the testimony of private complainant, 6 the owner of the house.
The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza and Marieta Acosta as witnesses.
Appellant claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his mother's home, some five
houses away from the burned house. 7 Ernesto Riolloraza testified he lived in the house behind the home
of appellant's mother; that at around 9:00 in the evening, he saw appellant and his family transferring their
belongings to the house of appellant's mother; that at around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant
watching TV; and that at around 1:00 AM, he was awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he and
appellant stood by the roadside and watched the fire. 8Marieta Acosta, common-law wife of appellant,
corroborated appellant's testimony that they were sleeping in the home of appellant's mother at the time of
the incident.9
On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, 10 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused with moral certainty,
this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The period of the Accused's preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his
sentence if qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal assigning the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BASED

MERELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND
ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED.
Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against him. He maintains
that the fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to the ground was not duly proved by
the Prosecutor, and that even the Fire Investigator could not determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant
further assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videa since their
respective testimonies as to his presence in the locus criminis before and after the incident remain
uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly unreliable and insufficient to sustain his conviction.
For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted the factual submissions of appellant. First, appellant himself
testified that he knew that Elmer Montesclaros lived in the house of private complainant. 11 Second, the
testimony of prosecution witness Mona Aquino though uncorroborated does not impair her credibility
since no ill-motive was ascribed to her to testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in
Lina Videa's testimony that she did not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a
reading of her entire testimony. She saw appellant inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not
after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the determination of credibility of witnesses
remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due respect on appeal, absent any
substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked in the decision.
Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire. 12 In this case, the alleged crime was
committed on February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial court found appellant
herein liable under Article 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of R.A. No.
7659, which provides as follows:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant's conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused. 13 But no
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. 14
In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together
constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the
fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant
to the arson, we agree with the trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following
circumstances duly proved and on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently
impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime
charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient
motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses. 15 It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the
afternoon of February 27, 1996, private complainant's grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, stormed the house
of appellant and his wife and burned their clothes, household furniture and appliances, like TV and
karaoke.16 When appellant arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon and was informed of the incident,
he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum ("nagdadabog"). 17 Appellant
had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his
grandmother.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed
("papag") inside the same house (private complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution
witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant
carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered
that he was going to burn the house of private complainant. 18 Later, she heard the sound of somebody
throwing a chair and breaking bottles next door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant
entered the house of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a
fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The
two later left the house at around 6:00 in the evening. 19
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to
prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
In People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393 (1947), we held that:
In the early case of United States v. Evangelista, [24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the accused was convicted of arson
after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. Ruling
on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said that:
. . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to direct
evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which
was charged in the information.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of
other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent
of the accused.
Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening, defense witness Ernesto Riolloraza who lived behind the
house of appellant's mother, saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to said house of
appellant's mother.20
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen inside the yard
of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996,
prosecution witness Lina Videa was awakened by the barking of their dog, so she went to the back of
their house to investigate.21Through the holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside
private complainant's yard watching the house burning. 22 Appellant even looked happy with a canine
smile and crazy-looking expression. ("Siya para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman
humahalakhak, . . . para bang ngiting aso at mukhang nakakaluko, your honor"). 23
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00
noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videa to the place of
Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why
he burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared
meanly at private complainant, who got nervous and had to take medications. 24 The following day,
appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he
would also bum her house.25
All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence on record. Inseparably linked with
one another, they point to no other conclusion than appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While
nobody actually saw appellant light the match which set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances
proved make a complete chain strongly leading, to the conclusion that it was the appellant who
perpetrated the crime.26
In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes (1)
the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendants as the
one responsible for the crime. 27 Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime
has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare
occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.28
Appellant interposes the defense of all in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is
axiomatic that the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was
committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of
the alleged crime.29 In this case, appellant himself testified that the house of his mother where he was
staying on that fateful night was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering
the distance, it was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime and then gone home
to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of the offense is
not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to
destruction."30 It is indeed a heinous crime that the law wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious
penalty because of its grave anti-social character.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer
G.R. No. L-57552 October 10, 1986
LUISA F. MCLAUGHLIN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive part of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED and
the Orders of respondent court dated November 21 and 27 both 1980 are hereby nullified and set aside and
respondent Judge is ordered to order private respondent to accept petitioner's Pacific Banking Corporation certified
manager's Check No. MC-A-000311 dated November 17, 1980 in the amount of P76,059.71 in full settlement of
petitioner's obligation, or another check of equivalent kind and value, the earlier check having become stale.
On February 28, 1977, petitioner Luisa F. McLaughlin and private respondent Ramon Flores entered into
a contract of conditional sale of real property. Paragraph one of the deed of conditional sale fixed the total
purchase price of P140,000.00 payable as follows: a) P26,550.00 upon the execution of the deed; and b)
the balance of P113,450.00 to be paid not later than May 31, 1977. The parties also agreed that the
balance shall bear interest at the rate of 1% per month to commence from December 1, 1976, until the full
purchase price was paid.
On June 19, 1979, petitioner filed a complaint in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No.
33573) for the rescission of the deed of conditional sale due to the failure of private respondent to pay the
balance due on May 31, 1977.
On December 27, 1979, the parties submitted a Compromise Agreement on the basis of which the court
rendered a decision on January 22, 1980. In said compromise agreement, private respondent
acknowledged his indebtedness to petitioner under the deed of conditional sale in the amount of
P119,050.71, and the parties agreed that said amount would be payable as follows: a) P50,000.00 upon
signing of the agreement; and b) the balance of P69,059.71 in two equal installments on June 30, 1980
and December 31, 1980.
As agreed upon, private respondent paid P50,000.00 upon the signing of the agreement and in addition he
also paid an "escalation cost" of P25,000.00.
Under paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement, private respondent agreed to pay one thousand (P
l,000.00) pesos monthly rental beginning December 5, 1979 until the obligation is duly paid, for the use
of the property subject matter of the deed of conditional sale.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Compromise Agreement further state:
That the parties are agreed that in the event the defendant (private respondent) fails to comply with his
obligations herein provided, the plaintiff (petitioner) will be entitled to the issuance of a writ of execution
rescinding the Deed of Conditional Sale of Real Property. In such eventuality, defendant (private
respondent) hereby waives his right to appeal to (from) the Order of Rescission and the Writ of Execution
which the Court shall render in accordance with the stipulations herein provided for.
That in the event of execution all payments made by defendant (private respondent) will be forfeited in
favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) as liquidated damages.
On October 15, 1980, petitioner wrote to private respondent demanding that the latter pay the balance of
P69,059.71 on or before October 31, 1980. This demand included not only the installment due on June 30,
1980 but also the installment due on December 31, 1980.
On October 30, 1980, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner signifying his willingness and intention
to pay the full balance of P69,059.71, and at the same time demanding to see the certificate of title of the
property and the tax payment receipts.
Private respondent states on page 14 of his brief that on November 3, 1980, the first working day of said
month, he tendered payment to petitioner but this was refused acceptance by petitioner. However, this
does not appear in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On November 7, 1980, petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution alleging that private respondent
failed to pay the installment due on June 1980 and that since June 1980 he had failed to pay the monthly
rental of P l,000.00. Petitioner prayed that a) the deed of conditional sale of real property be declared
rescinded with forfeiture of all payments as liquidated damages; and b) the court order the payment of
Pl,000.00 back rentals since June 1980 and the eviction of private respondent.
On November 14, 1980, the trial court granted the motion for writ of execution.
On November 17, 1980, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration tendering at the same time
a Pacific Banking Corporation certified manager's check in the amount of P76,059.71, payable to the
order of petitioner and covering the entire obligation including the installment due on December 31, 1980.
However, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated November 21, 1980 and
issued the writ of execution on November 25, 1980.
In an order dated November 27, 1980, the trial court granted petitioner's ex-parte motion for clarification
of the order of execution rescinding the deed of conditional sale of real property.
On November 28, 1980, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the orders dated November 21 and 27, 1980.
As initially stated above, the appellate court nullified and set aside the disputed orders of the lower court.
In its decision, the appellate court ruled in part as follows:
The issue here is whether respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders
dated November 21, 1980 and November 27,1980.
The general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but
only for such breaches as are substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making
the agreement. (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821)
In aforesaid case, it was held that a delay in payment for a small quantity of molasses, for some twenty
days is not such a violation of an essential condition of the contract as warrants rescission for non-
performance.
In Universal Food Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, the Song Fo ruling was reaffirmed.
In the case at bar, McLaughlin wrote Flores on October 15, 1980 demanding that Flores pay the balance
of P69,059.71 on or before October 31, 1980. Thus it is undeniable that despite Flores' failure to make the
payment which was due on June 1980, McLaughlin waived whatever right she had under the compromise
agreement as incorporated in the decision of respondent court, to demand rescission.
It is significant to note that on November 17, 1980, or just seventeen (17) days after October 31, 1980, the
deadline set by McLaughlin, Flores tendered the certified manager's check. We hold that the Song Fo
ruling is applicable herein considering that in the latter case, there was a 20-day delay in the payment of
the obligation as compared to a 17-day delay in the instant case.
Furthermore, as held in the recent case of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Alberto
Seneris, L-41764, December 19, 1980, it is the accepted practice in business to consider a cashier's or
manager's check as cash and that upon certification of a check, it is equivalent to its acceptance (Section
187, Negotiable Instrument Law) and the funds are thereby transferred to the credit of the creditor
(Araneta v. Tuason, 49 O.G. p. 59).
In the New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. case, the Supreme Court further held that the object of
certifying a check is to enable the holder thereof to use it as money, citing the ruling in PNB vs. National
City Bank of New York, 63 Phil. 711.
In the New Pacific Timber case, it was also ruled that the exception in Section 63 of the Central Bank Act
that the clearing of a check and the subsequent crediting of the amount thereof to the account of the
creditor is equivalent to delivery of cash, is applicable to a payment through a certified check.
Considering that Flores had already paid P101,550.00 under the contract to sell, excluding the monthly
rentals paid, certainly it would be the height of inequity to have this amount forfeited in favor
McLaughlin. Under the questioned orders, McLaughlin would get back the property and still keep
P101,550.00.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in not observing the provisions of Article No. 1306 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and in having arbitrarily abused its judicial discretion by disregarding
the penal clause stipulated by the parties in the compromise agreement which was the basis of the
decision of the lower court.
We agree with the appellate court that it would be inequitable to cancel the contract of conditional sale
and to have the amount of P101,550.00 (P l48,126.97 according to private respondent in his brief) already
paid by him under said contract, excluding the monthly rentals paid, forfeited in favor of petitioner,
particularly after private respondent had tendered the amount of P76,059.71 in full payment of his
obligation.
In the analogous case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, this Court sustained the order of the
respondent judge denying the petitioners' motion for execution on the ground that the private respondent
had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement, and directing the
petitioners to immediately execute the necessary documents transferring to the private respondent the title
to the properties (July 23, 1985, 137 SCRA 730). In the case at bar, there was also substantial compliance
with the compromise agreement.
Petitioner invokes the ruling of the Court in its Resolution of November 16, 1978 in the case of Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co., Inc., to the effect that Republic Act 6552 (the Maceda
Law) "recognizes and reaffirms the vendor's right to cancel the contract to sell upon breach and non-
payment of the stipulated installments but requires a grace period after at least two years of regular
installment payments ... . " (86 SCRA 305, 329)
On the other hand, private respondent also invokes said law as an expression of public policy to protect
buyers of real estate on installments against onerous and oppressive conditions (Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 6552).
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6552 which took effect on September 14, 1972 provides as follows:
In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer a grace period
of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the
installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days
from receipt by the buyer of the notice of the cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by
a notarial act.
Section 7 of said law provides as follows:
Any stipulation in any contract hereafter entered into contrary to the provisions of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6,
shall be null and void.
The spirit of these provisions further supports the decision of the appellate court. The record does not
contain the complete text of the compromise agreement dated December 20, 1979 and the decision
approving it. However, assuming that under the terms of said agreement the December 31, 1980
installment was due and payable when on October 15, 1980, petitioner demanded payment of the balance
of P69,059.71 on or before October 31, 1980, petitioner could cancel the contract after thirty days from
receipt by private respondent of the notice of cancellation. Considering petitioner's motion for execution
filed on November 7, 1980 as a notice of cancellation, petitioner could cancel the contract of conditional
sale after thirty days from receipt by private respondent of said motion. Private respondent's tender of
payment of the amount of P76,059.71 together with his motion for reconsideration on November 17, 1980
was, therefore, well within the thirty-day period grants by law..
The tender made by private respondent of a certified bank manager's check payable to petitioner was a
valid tender of payment. The certified check covered not only the balance of the purchase price in the
amount of P69,059.71, but also the arrears in the rental payments from June to December, 1980 in the
amount of P7,000.00, or a total of P76,059.71. On this point the appellate court correctly applied the
ruling in the case of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. vs. Seneris (101 SCRA 686, 692-694) to the
case at bar.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific
property is, if rejected, equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or
property.
However, although private respondent had made a valid tender of payment which preserved his rights as a
vendee in the contract of conditional sale of real property, he did not follow it with a consignation or
deposit of the sum due with the court. As this Court has held:
The rule regarding payment of redemption prices is invoked. True that consignation of the redemption
price is not necessary in order that the vendor may compel the vendee to allow the repurchase within the
time provided by law or by contract. (Rosales vs. Reyes and Ordoveza, 25 Phil. 495.) We have held that
in such cases a mere tender of payment is enough, if made on time, as a basis for action against the
vendee to compel him to resell. But that tender does not in itself relieve the vendor from his obligation to
pay the price when redemption is allowed by the court. In other words, tender of payment is sufficient to
compel redemption but is not in itself a payment that relieves the vendor from his liability to pay the
redemption price. " (Paez vs. Magno, 83 Phil. 403, 405)
On September 1, 1986, the Court issued the following resolution
Considering the allegation in petitioner's reply brief that the Manager's Check tendered by private
respondent on November 17, 1980 was subsequently cancelled and converted into cash, the Court
RESOLVED to REQUIRE the parties within ten (10) days from notice to inform the Court whether or not
the amount thereof was deposited in court and whether or not private respondent continued paying the
monthly rental of P1,000.00 stipulated in the Compromise Agreement.
In compliance with this resolution, both parties submitted their respective manifestations which confirm
that the Manager's Check in question was subsequently withdrawn and replaced by cash, but the cash was
not deposited with the court.
According to Article 1256 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, if the creditor to whom tender of payment
has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by
the consignation of the thing or sum due, and that consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the
five cases enumerated therein; Article 1257 provides that in order that the consignation of the thing (or
sum) due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of
the obligation; and Article 1258 provides that consignation shall be made by depositing the thing (or sum)
due at the disposal of the judicial authority and that the interested parties shall also be notified thereof.
As the Court held in the case of Soco vs. Militante, promulgated on June 28, 1983, after examining the
above-cited provisions of the law and the jurisprudence on the matter:
Tender of payment must be distinguished from consignation. Tender is the antecedent of consignation,
that is, an act preparatory to the consignation, which is the principal, and from which are derived the
immediate consequences which the debtor desires or seeks to obtain. Tender of payment may be
extrajudicial, while consignation is necessarily judicial, and the priority of the first is the attempt to make
a private settlement before proceeding to the solemnities of consignation. (8 Manresa 325). (123 SCRA
160,173)
In the above-cited case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals (137 SCRA 730), the vendee was released
from responsibility because he had deposited with the court the balance of the purchase price. Similarly,
in the above-cited case of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. vs. Seneris (101 SCRA 686), the
judgment debtor was released from responsibility by depositing with the court the amount of the
judgment obligation.
In the case at bar, although as above stated private respondent had preserved his rights as a vendee in the
contract of conditional sale of real property by a timely valid tender of payment of the balance of his
obligation which was not accepted by petitioner, he remains liable for the payment of his obligation
because of his failure to deposit the amount due with the court.
In his manifestation dated September 19, 1986, private respondent states that on September 16, 1980, he
purchased a Metrobank Cashier's Check No. CC 004233 in favor of petitioner Luisa F. McLaughlin in the
amount of P76,059.71, a photocopy of which was enclosed and marked as Annex "A- 1;" but that he did
not continue paying the monthly rental of Pl,000.00 because, pursuant to the decision of the appellate
court, petitioner herein was ordered to accept the aforesaid amount in full payment of herein respondent's
obligation under the contract subject matter thereof.
However, inasmuch as petitioner did not accept the aforesaid amount, it was incumbent on private
respondent to deposit the same with the court in order to be released from responsibility. Since private
respondent did not deposit said amount with the court, his obligation was not paid and he is liable in
addition for the payment of the monthly rental of Pl,000.00 from January 1, 1981 until said obligation is
duly paid, in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement. Upon full payment of the
amount of P76,059.71 and the rentals in arrears, private respondent shall be entitled to a deed of absolute
sale in his favor of the real property in question.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
(a) Petitioner is ordered to accept from private respondent the Metrobank Cashier's Check No. CC 004233
in her favor in the amount of P76,059.71 or another certified check of a reputable bank drawn in her favor
in the same amount;
(b) Private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner, within sixty (60) days from the finality of this
decision, the rentals in arrears of P l,000.00 a month from January 1, 1981 until full payment thereof; and
(c) Petitioner is ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondent over the real
property in question upon full payment of the amounts as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) above. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Sec. 26.

PEOPLE vs. OMICTIN

Crim. Case No. Q-04-125442

Crim. Case Nos. Q-04-125443-45

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Hence, we have this appeal.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

These contentions are erroneous.

Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?

HEIRS OF CLEMEA vs. HEIRS OF BIEN

Declared as Tax No. 5299 and assessed at P310.00

Q How big is this parcel of land?

Q What is the average owners share of the harvest?

xxx xxx xxx

Q How about after 1950 to 1960?

Q How about from 1960 to 1970?

xxx xxx xxx

The petition is devoid of merit.

And in Cunanan v. Amparo,[24] the Court declared that:

the allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as

Self-serving evidence, perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a concept much

Moreover, this Court held in National Development Company v. Workmens Compensation

G.R. Nos. 89370-72 May 15, 1991

Beverlinda's narration of the three (3) happenings follows:

The 10 July 1988 incident:

The 15 July 1988 incident.

The 21 August 1988 incident.

Appellant now faults the Trial Court:

Costs against accused-appellant, Paulino Magdadaro. SO ORDERED.

TAN vs. RODIL ENTERPRISES

The decretal portion of the Decision, states, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

The RTC, disposed, as follows:

The Petition is without merit.

To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. KALALO

Bank of the Philippine Islands Date Amount

0012825 Sept. 16, 2000 62,200.00

0008250 Sept. 18, 2000 190,000.00

The Courts Ruling

We quote in full Kalalos Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:

Mr. JOSELITO MANALO

1) MRS. EVELYN R. MONTILLA/MINES & LYN General Merchandise

2) Mr. DANIEL TOMAS/ MRS. FORTUNE TOMAS

Advance payment for the empties: 11,500.00

Very respectfully yours,

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERGUIZA

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter trial ensued.

Q. x x x No extragenital injuries noted. Complete healed hymenal laceration 11:00 o'clock. x x x. In

Hence, herein appeal.

In his appeal Brief,[25] appellant raises the following errors:

2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APPELLANT OF THE

3. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S

On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses,

Q. And what is the truth about it?

Q. Were you around when BBB testified to the witness stand?

A. Yes, sir, I was here and I heard that.

Q. What can you say to that allegation of BBB?

On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements:

Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?

Q. Did you offer them 1 million?

Testimony of Juanita Angeles