Rethinking of the Concept of Mimesis in Platos Republic

Ikko TANAKA (Kyoto University)

I Introduction

In the beginning of the Republic 10, Socrates says that it was right not to have admitted
in the ideal state so much of poetry as is mimetic1 (595a52), and he returns to his
argument about poetry (595a-b), asking what mimesis in general is (595c8). When he
explains and defines mimesis, he posits painting in the centre of this consideration. A
painter is described as the maker of a painting, which is merely an apparition
()/appearance () of the real things. Moreover, a painter does not
know what he paints, rather he can only view the surface of the real thing from a
limited standpoint (598b). Based on this understanding of painting, Socrates says that
mimetic artists are the apparition-makers (599a), and that mimesis, including poetry, is
the superficial activity of apparition /appearance-making.
As is often said, there seems to be a discrepancy in the definition of the concept of
mimesis between book 10 (595a-608b) and book 3 (392c-398b). Because a mimetic
activity is explained in terms of an activity of impersonation or enactment in book 3,
some scholars think that the concept of mimesis changes from book 3 to book 10 where
it seems to mean a reproduction or representation3. This resolution of the discrepancy,
however, raises a few questions. One is that the argument of book 10 would be less
persuasive if it did not appropriately cover the important activity of poets, i.e. dramatic
enactment4. Moreover, we can easily find the usage of mimesis and its cognates in the
context of impersonation or dramatic enactment in book 105. In view of these matters, it
would be a more refined and accurate to state that mimesis has been used in a narrower
sense in most of book 3 and in a broader sense in most of book 10 wherein its concept
includes poetry, painting, and other representational arts6.
If the concept of mimesis in book 10 includes the activity of poets as in book 3, the
activity of enactment/impersonation must come under the definition of mimesis in book
10. This leads to the question as to how (and why) we can construe the activity of

1 This means whether poetry that is mimetic should not be admitted in the ideal state, or
all poetry is mimetic and should not at all be admitted. As long as hymns to gods and
encomiums to the excellent are admitted (607a3-5), the former is preferable.
2 All references are to Slings (2003).

3 Brownson (1920), pp. 92-93. Cornford (1941), p. 324 n. 1.

4 Cf. Annas (1981).

5 Halliwell (2005) refers to 603c5, 604e3-4, and 605c11.

6 Cf. Halliwell (2002), p. 75. I do not intend to say that Plato refer only to the dramatic

enactment when he argues the activity of poets in book 10, but rather that the argument
about poetry, based on painting, can be also applied to the impersonation of poets on
stages.

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impersonation/enactment as somewhat of an apparition-making activity. In this paper,
I try to answer this question, and I prove that mimesis as apparition-making is the
basic and coherent concept which generally explaining mimetic activity in the Republic.
There have been innumerable attempts to reconcile the different attitudes of Plato
toward poetry in between book 2-3 and 10. However, here my concern is not directly
with the problem, but rather with examining the concept of the concept of mimesis
through these books and grasping the scope of it.

II The structure of mimetic activities

My approach is to analyse the structures of mimesis as apparition-making and as

impersonation/enactment. As a first step, I briefly confirm that the activity of
apparition-making is described as a triadic relation. When Socrates explains mimesis in
book 10, he introduces three makers of a couch: the god who makes a Form of a couch7,
a carpenter who makes a couch in reality, and a painter who makes () a painting
of a couch. It is said that when a painter makes a painting of the couch, he imitates
() a real couch by a carpenter, and so a painter is an imitator ().
Although a painter can make paintings of a carpenter or shoemaker, he does not have
the knowledge of their craftsmanship. Socrates says that what imitators make is far
from the truth, and just an apparition of what he is imitating (596-598b).
As Nehamas notices8, an imitator (and his art of imitation []) vacillates
between being an imitator of a model and a maker of an apparition when his activity is
explained in book 10. While he is characterized as a maker, it is stressed that he is also
an imitator. Therefore, we can understand the apparition-making activity in the triadic
relation; the imitator, the model (what he imitates), and the apparition as a mimetic
product ().
On the other hand, the activity of impersonation/enactment seems to be
described as a dualistic relation. In book 3, mimesis as impersonation/enactment is
brought out, by being compared to the simple narrative ( ) (392c-394c).
During performance, a poet speaks as himself in his own words through the simple
narrative. In contrast, when he becomes like the model he wants to speak as, he makes
his own way of speech similar to that of the model as far as possible through mimesis.
This mimetic activity is briefly explained as follows.

And is not likening oneself to another in speech or bodily shape an imitation of

the persons to whom one is likened?
Surely. (following the translation of Shorey)

7 We should read the present passage () as an ad hoc adaptation of Platos theory of

Forms (Halliwell (2005), p. 110, see also p. 114).
8 Nehamas (1982), p. 62.

2


(393c4-6)

In this explanation of a mimetic activity, we only find two existences, i.e. the poet
himself () and the person to whom he likens himself. Therefore mimesis seems
to be described as a dualistic relation between the poet and the model he is likened to,
and has an essentially different structure from mimesis as apparition-making.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, mimesis as impersonation/enactment can also be
represented as a triadic relationship.
I examine the Belfiores interpretation which analyses the structures of mimesis9.
She claims that the quotation above is the most comprehensive definition of imitation
(to mimeisthai), and is consistent with and subsumes the definition of mimesis in book
10. She paraphrases the phrase likening oneself to another ( )
in speech or bodily shape into making one thing (or person) similar to another thing
(or person) in sound or shape as the definition of mimesis, and she says, the imitator is
both an imitator of sounds or shapes and a maker of (other similar) sounds or shapes.
These two roles (i.e. imitating and making) of the imitator in book 3 anticipate the
activity of the apparition-maker in book 10.
However, her interpretation is not derived from the quotation for two reasons.
Firstly, the word oneself () cannot be generalized to one thing (or person).
This is because in book 3, what is likened by an imitator is always the impersonator
himself, in concrete terms, his own way of speaking, behaviour, or shapes, not
anything else besides him. We cannot widen the connotation of the passage as Belfiore
does10. Second, though the verb means making (something) similar to, its
making is quite different from the sense of making () in apparition-making as
represented in book 1011. The latter making is rather substituted for producing or

9 Belfiore (2006), pp. 91-93. Against Belfiore, I agree with Lear who thinks that mimesis as
apparition-making includes mimesis as impersonation/enactment. But my analysis of the
text is different from her.
10 Belfiore (p. 93) justifies the generalization in saying that the masculine () do not

have any theoretical significance because Plato fails to distinguish imitation of human
beings from imitation of living things or of inanimate objects. In my opinion, however, the
point is not the gender of , rather, what is likened in the passage, and it is always
impersonator himself or of his own (On the impersonation of animals and inanimate
objects, see Murray 177-178). On the other hand, the things and human beings to which an
impersonator likens himself are, as Belfiore says, not distinguished (396b, 397a).
11 I do not intend to say that the term mimesis in this context of book 3 is used only for the

activity of impersonators, i.e. likening oneself to another ( ) in

speech or bodily shape. Plato uses the verb to describe poetic composition which

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creating, the meaning of which does not have. If we understand the poet
as a maker of sounds or shapes, we need a further explanation why likening oneself to
another ( ) can be construed as the making. Nevertheless,
the quotation above explains the poet as an imitator, not a maker.
Basically, poets and the characters they enact seem to be indivisible and united in
the activity of impersonation. Nevertheless, poets do clearly draw a line between
themselves and characters during enactment/impersonation. Socrates says, If the poet
should conceal himself nowhere, then his entire poetry and narration would have been
accomplished without imitation () (393c10-d). This means that when the
entire poetry and narration of the poet is accomplished through mimesis, he conceals
himself everywhere. This concealment is practiced so that spectators believe that it is
not the poet himself but the character that speaks on stage (393b). During the activity of
impersonation, the poet himself is opposed to the characters and should disappear.
Consequently, we can analyse the poet on the stage in two parts: the poet himself who
is concealed, but still existing, and the character he realizes. When spectators watch a
character on the stage, the poet or actor does not appear to them if mimesis is fully
accomplished. Therefore, mimesis as impersonation/enactment can also be described as
a triadic relation; the poet himself as an imitator (), the model which he
impersonates or likens himself to, and the character as a mimetic product ().
When we clearly distinguish poets on a stage from the characters, the activity of
enactment seem to represent a kind of making. This is not because a poet is called a
maker (). Rather, we can understand the activity of enactment through the
more literal meaning of making, which is generally the activity to bring something
which did not exist before into existence (Sph., 219b, 265b). A character does not appear
before the poet realizes (makes) it on the stage, but it appears and is made by the
concealed poet during mimesis as impersonation/enactment.
Moreover, the character on the stage is understood as an apparition without the
analogy of a painting. In its archaic usage, the word apparition () is used to
express a substitute for something real and original. Apollo saves Aeneas from the
battle, and he fashions an apparition of Aeneas to bring it back to the midst of the
battle (Il. 5. 445-453). Athena makes an apparition of Ipthime and sends it to her elder
sister Penelope who is deeply grieved (Od. 4. 795 ff.). As Vernant points out, this word
is closely related and frequently used with the words such as , , and
12. The existence of an apparition always depends on its original or on what is real,
and it calls peoples attention to the original which is absent. This is an important
feature of the apparition - it indicates what fluctuates between in presence (i.e. the
presence of a substitute) and in absence (i.e. the absence of the original). In Euripides

takes mimetic form (393b3, 395a4). In these cases, the poetic composition can be reduced to
a triadic relationship, i.e. a poet, what he intend to describe, and poem (or narrative).
12 Vernant (1991), pp. 167-168.

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Helen, the word apparition is used for the illusion or phantom of Helen, which is sent
by a god (34, 582, 684, 1136). The cause of the Trojan War is ascribed to this and not the
real Helen, because she was sheltered in Egypt during the war13. This feature of the
apparition is included in the characters on stage. During enactment, they are in
presence in the sense that the substitute of the original is actually on stage, but in
absence in the sense that the original model does not appear.

III Viewer-dependent mimesis

I have shown that the activity of enactment/impersonation is an activity

of making. My analysis of it maintains the coherent concept of mimesis between books
3 and 10 in the same triadic structure: an imitator (), what he imitates, and a
mimetic product (), which is made by him. Furthermore, I would like to attract
attention to some situations where mimesis cannot be described in the form of a triadic
relationship. This relationship is typically formed when imitators are in mimetic
situations which involve people perceiving mimetic products (e.g. an audience).
However, the language of mimesis does not necessarily entail the activity of imitators.
In the simile of the Line in book 6, the real things such as animals, plants, artifacts
(510a5-6) are said to be what are imitated (, 510b414) by its images such as
shadows and apparitions on mirrors and water surface (509d10-510a3). Here, we
cannot find any activity of an imitator on the background, only the originals and
apparitions of it in the ontological hierarchy of the Line. The language of mimesis is
employed metaphorically as if apparitions could be engaged in the mimetic (human)
activity. This can be called personification of mimesis, and this usage implies that the
mimetic situation depends on the point of views of people because things do not
imitate other things literally. We cannot see the personified or metaphorical mimesis in
the part of Book 3 (392c-398b) where mimesis as impersonation/enactment is described15,

13 This episode is found with also in the Republic (586b-c) with the word apparition.
14 There are different manuscripts (, ), but see Adam, ad. loc.
15 But this metaphorical usage is found in the end of book 3. When Socrates and his

interlocutors examine the word (), tune (), and rhythm (), that
are the components of the song (), it is said that the tune should imitate
(, 399a7; , 399c3) the voices and the accents of the virtuous people,
though the tune itself is not engaged in the activity of mimesis literally. This personified
mimesis might be attracted by the existence of imitators (), who are engaged in the
arts of Muses (cf. 372b4) and are the subjects of the mimetic activity virtually, in the
background. I believe that Plato here could have used the noun imitation () to
describe the relationship between the imitation and its model, i.e. the voices and the accents
of the virtuous people, as he did at 401a8, where cultural products in more genres are said
to be the imitations of the virtuous or unvirtuous peoples characters (, cf. Burnyeat,

5
and book 10 (595a-608b), both of which always involve imitators or their arts16.
The mimetic situation without an imitator might form an important key to
understanding the concept of mimesis. If the mimetic situation stands without an
impersonator, then we can say that the activity of imitator is not necessary for the
situation. In other words, the usage of the language of mimesis itself does not always
presuppose the activity of an imitator. Rather, what is indispensable for a mimetic
situation is, as is the case in the Line, (at least) two things which are based on a
hierarchy and the person who detects their relationship. He can describe them in a
mimetic relationship when the one thing is, for example, an illusion of17 the other from
his point of view.
I briefly show examples in which the mimetic situation depends on its viewers.
Thucydides History reports the arrogant behaviour of a Spartan general, Pausanias,
and it is said that he appeared the mimesis of despotic power rather than of the office
of a general ( , I 95.3). Here
Pausanias is called the mimesis of despotic power not because he intentionally enacted
and manifested the significant of despotic power, but because the Greeks perceived his
behaviours that way. In other words, they perceived the behaviour of Pausanias from
their point of view, regarding him as a tyrant. In the Hercules Furens of Euripides, the
club of Heracles is called an iron-forging imitation ( ) when he
swings it back. Here the club of Heracles does not literally imitate an iron-forging
hammer, nor does Heracles intentionally impersonate a blacksmith. The language of

282-283).
16 As Belfiore points out (p. 95), mimesis in general, which Socrates asks as the subject of

the argument at 595c8, is replaced with the art of imitation in general ( )

at 603a10. This perhaps implies that the charge in book 10 is against poets who practice the
art of imitation or the person who is skilled at it (). Therefore, there still remain in
the ideal state some kinds of mimesis such as of virtuous people (cf. 395c, 396b-d). Further,
Nehamas (p. 69) and Murray (p. 229) think that the hymns to gods and encomiums to the
excellent (607a3-5) could remain as tailor-maid. I think this interpretation fits with the
argument about the education with poetry in books 2-3. Poetry must meet the criteria
which are prescribed in laws (, 380c7, 383c7) and forms (, 379a1-2, 383a2,
387c10, 398b3) by a lawgiver (). Plato forbids poets to make poetry with their
own creativity because it incurs a risk of turning peoples values upside down (424b-c, cf.
Lg. 656c). See n. 1.
17 The two things described by mimetic language can form the various relationships; e.g.

the one may be a substitute for, a similar thing to, an illusion of, and an imitation of the
other. It is difficult to define the exact meaning of mimesis for the reason that these
relationships do not directly signify the meaning of it. On the classification of the usage of
mimesis in various contexts, see Halliwell (1998, 109-121). Moreover, the metaphorical usage
of mimesis blurs the original meaning of it, and sometimes it may extend the concept of
mimesis itself. Else (1958) argues the 5 B.C. development of the concept of mimesis, at least
partially, from this point of view.

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mimesis is employed here by Euripides, from his point of view, to vividly describe the
similarity between the actions of Heracles and those of a blacksmith18. These examples
show that the language of mimesis can be used relatively loosely if viewers, including
the narrators or writers of the mimetic situations, perceive two things in a mimetic
situation.
In the time of Plato, people who were professionally engaged in mimetic
activities were united by the mimetic terms 19 , and the language of mimesis was
employed to describe them, their products, and their activities. In this sense, the
language of mimesis is important to demarcate the scope of mimetic activities of poets,
painters, sculptors, and so on. As I have discussed above, however, the language of
mimesis and the mimetic situation described by it does not entail the activities of
mimetic artists. Therefore, the language of mimesis does not always lead to our
understanding the ancient views of mimetic artists.
This circumspection is required also when we examine Platos aesthetic thought.
In Timaeus, the language of mimesis is employed to describe the creation of the universe by
the demiurge: the demiurge models the universe after the eternal, and the result is called
the imitation () of the model 20 . This cosmic, metaphysical, and philosophical
mimesis of the eternal and the divine might be reduced to Platos aesthetic thought21. In fact,
some critics think that this usage of mimesis and the mimetic situation implies the
possibility of mimetic artists who can grasp metaphysical truth and implant it in their
works. However, this understanding of mimetic artists is apparently inconsistent with the
one in Platos earlier dialogue Republic (Book 10), wherein mimetic artists are generally
condemned as ignorant.

Because it is beyond the purpose of this paper to scrutinize the language of mimesis in
the other dialogues of Plato, I have limited my analysis of mimesis and the mimetic
situation in the Republic. I have argued that mimesis as impersonation/enactment in book 3
is analyzed in a triadic relationship and is subsumed in mimesis as apparition-making in
book 10, and that the latter is the basic concept which regulates mimetic activities. I did not

18 Keuls (1978, 16-17) thinks that these examples are the variations of the original meaning
of mimetic language, i.e. dramatic mimicry/impersonation/enactment. I will not argue here
about the original meaning, but will note the following: since human beings consciously
perform the activity of mimicry/impersonation/enactment, if a subject is described in a
mimetic relationship but not consciously engaged in the activity, then a point of view of the
subject in a mimetic relationship must exist. In other words, viewers, but not the activity of
mimicry/impersonation/enactment, are necessary to form the mimetic relationship.
19 Cf. Rep. 372b4, Phaedr. 248e, Ti. 19d6.

20 48e-49a, cf. 38a, 39d-e, 80b.

21 The possibility of the divine mimetic artists is suggested by Politte (47-48) and

presumably adopted by Zeyl (2000, xxix and n. 54). For the instances of metaphysical
mimesis in Plato and before Plato, see Halliwell (1998, 115-118; 2002, 15-16).

7
discuss the most controversial topic concerning the concept of mimesis, Platos different
attitudes towards poetry in between books 3 and 10. However, what I have analysed in this
paper would be a preface to rethinking Platos attitude toward mimetic artists not only in
the Republic but also in his other dialogues22.

References

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22 This research was supported by a grant from the Kyoto University's Kyoto Erasmus
Program which is funded by 'The Institutional Program for Young Researcher Overseas
Visits' of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. I owe thanks to the host institute,
the School of Classics at the University of St Andrews, which willingly provided me with
excellent facilities and library service. I truly appreciate the host researcher, professor
Stephen Halliwell, who gave me stimulating and illuminating advice and has encouraged
me to study Plato.