EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election
were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed
by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, [2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril
and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual
citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate
for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections.The petition is based on the ground that
the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented
himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner
with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In
other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3] The motion remained pending even
until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
 On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners motion was
opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its
Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US
citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and
mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using
an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American
law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not
yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of
Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of
two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand
two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the
popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be
settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7,
1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-
mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to
reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of
Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31,
1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not
yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified
to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
 We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner
Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support
of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling
denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or
proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the
Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to
protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed
as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty
contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,
[6]
reiterated in several cases, [7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been
no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from
running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted
the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on
May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial
of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.As the COMELEC en banc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for
intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
 This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship
and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with
dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. [8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this
case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country
such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the
instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: [10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a
memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is
larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual
allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well
as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative
Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of
Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several
years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who
are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or
Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially
Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is
already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-
Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a
capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably
Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP
AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:
[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it
implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate
thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which
implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive
to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and
back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I
think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a
foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its
attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what
the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of
the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper
time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must
be understood as referring to dual allegiance.Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country
of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly
shows:[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual
citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr.
President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father
and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a
local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run
for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
 SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the
father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the
world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for
him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt
act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not
renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run,
the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have
only one citizenship.

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he
can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative
of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of
Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department
has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is
absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will
and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,while the United States follows the
doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the
United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and
1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent
was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that
A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . .
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However,
by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on
March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN

 ....

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO;
THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation
not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him
from running for any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to
hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he
ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship-long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned
and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate
of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this
Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally
without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made
upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen
in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last
travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy
on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of
his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there
is no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship
and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
 On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation
in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.

Pardo, J., no part

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 91602 February 26, 1991

HONORABLE SIMPLICIO C. GRIO, SIXTO P. DEMAISIP, SANTOS B. AGUADERA, MANUEL B. TRAVIA and
MANUEL M. CASUMPANG, petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, TEOTIMO ARANDELA, CIRILO GELVEZON, TEODULFO DATO-ON, and
NELSON GEDUSPAN, respondents.

Sixto P. Demaisip for petitioners.

Rex C. Muzones for private respondents.
Thelma A. Panganiban-Gaminde, Rogelio C. Limare and Normita M. Llamas-Villanueva for Civil Service Commission.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the position of a provincial attorney and those of his legal
subordinates are primarily confidential in nature so that the services of those holding the said items can be
terminated upon loss of confidence.

The facts of this case are simple.

Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was the first appointed Provincial Attorney of Iloilo. He held this position from April 3,
1973 up to June 2, 1986 when he offered to resign and his resignation was accepted by the then Acting Governor.
In his resignation letter, petitioner Demaisip recommended the elevation of respondent Teotimo Arandela from
Senior Legal Officer to Provincial Attorney. OIC Governor Licurgo Tirador later on decided to appoint respondent
Arandela as the Provincial Attorney. Respondent Cirilo Gelvezon, on the other hand, was promoted from Legal
Officer II to Senior Legal Officer. Respondents Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan were appointed to the
position of Legal Officer II.

On February 2, 1988, petitioner Simplicio Grio assumed office as the newly elected governor of Iloilo. One month
later, he informed respondent Arandela and all the legal officers at the Provincial Attorney's Office about his
decision to terminate their services. In his letter, petitioner Grio made mention of an article pertaining to the Iloilo
office of the Provincial Attorney which appeared in the Panay News and which "undermined that trust and
confidence" that he reposed on them. Petitioner Demaisip was reappointed by Governor Grio as the Provincial
Attorney, The latter, on the other hand, arranged the replacements of the other legal officers. Respondent Cirilo
Gelvezon was replaced by petitioner Santos Aguadera, respondent Nelson Geduspan was replaced by petitioner
Manuel Casumpang and petitioner Manuel Travia took the place of respondent Teodolfo Dato-on.

On March 15, 1988, petitioner Governor Grio formally terminated the services of the respondents herein on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence. This action taken by the governor was appealed by respondents to the Merit
Systems Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission.

On March 9, 1989, the Merit Systems Board issued an Order declaring the respondents' termination illegal and
ordering that they be immediately restored to their positions with back salaries and other emoluments due them.
This was appealed by petitioner Grio to the Civil Service Commission.

In Resolution No. 89-736 dated October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission affirmed the Order of the Merit
Systems Protection Board, and directed that the respondents be restored to their former legal positions and be paid
back salaries and other benefits.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned Decision of the Civil Service Commission. The
motion was denied on December 7, 1989 in Resolution No. 89-920.

Hence, this petition for review whereby petitioners seek the reversal of Resolution No. 89-736 of the Civil Service
Commission and Resolution No. 89-920 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

We shall first discuss whether the position of a provincial attorney is primarily confidential so that the holder
thereof may be terminated upon loss of confidence.

In Cadiente vs. Santos, 1 this Court ruled that the position of a city legal officer is undeniably one which is primarily
confidential in this manner:

In resolving the merits of the instant case, We find as an undeniable fact that the position of a City Legal
Officer is one which is "primarily confidential." This Court held in the case of Claudio vs. Subido, L-30865,
August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 481, that the position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that utmost
confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer
and his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of
trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. As stated in the case of Pinero vs. Hechanova, L-
22562, October 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 417 (citing De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289), the phrase
"primarily confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their
term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endure; and thus their cessation involves no removal
(Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591-596). When such confidence is lost and the
officer holding such position is separated from the service, such cessation entails no removal but an
expiration of his term. In the case of Hernandez vs. Villegas, L-17287, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 548, it was
held

It is to be understood of course that officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The termination of their official relation can be
 justified on the ground of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from office involves no
removal but merely the expiration of the term of office two different causes for the termination of official
relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.

In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayor of Davao terminated the services of the petitioner, he
was not removed or dismissed. There being no removal or dismissal it could not, therefore, be said that
there was a violation of the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section 1 (3), 1973
Constitution).

The matter of expiration of a term of an officer holding a primarily confidential position, as distinguished
from a removal or dismissal, was further explained by this Court, in the case of Ingles vs. Mutuc, L-20390,
November 29, 1960, 26 SCRA 171, in this wise:

When an incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and the pleasure turns into a displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office
his term merely expires, in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of
the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be deemed removed or
dismissed therefrom, upon expiration of said term.

The main difference between the former the primary confidential officer and the latter is that the
latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his
appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its
decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not
removed or dismissed from office his term merely expired.

The foregoing merely elaborates what this Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stressed in the case
Corpus vs. Cuaderno, L-23721, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 591. In said case We stated that:

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their
term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures, and thus their cessation involves no
removal. 2

In Besa vs. Philippine National Bank, 3 where petitioner, who was the Chief Legal Counsel with the rank of Vice
President of the respondent Philippine National Bank, questioned his being transferred to the position of Consultant
on Legal Matters in the Office of President, this Court, considering said position to be primarily confidential held

It cannot be denied of course that the work of the Chief Legal Counsel of respondent Bank, as of any lawyer
for that matter, is impressed with a highly technical aspect. As had been pointed out, however, it does not
mean that thereby a client is precluded from substituting in his stead another practitioner. That is his right;
Ms decision to terminate the relationship once made is impressed with the attribute of finality. The lawyer
cannot be heard to complain; it is enough that his right to compensation earned be duly respected.

In that sense, it is equally clear that where the position partakes of the attributes of being both technical
and confidential, there can be no insistence of a fixed or a definite term if the latter aspect predominates.
To paraphrase the language of the Chief Justice in the opinion previously cited, the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position, as was the case of petitioner, should realize that at any time the appointing power
may decide that his services are no longer needed. As thus correctly viewed, Corpus v. Cuaderno cannot be
read as lending support to petitioner's efforts to retain his position as Chief Legal Counsel of respondent
Bank, contrary to its wishes as so explicitly declared in its Resolution No. 1053.

The question now is should the ruling in Cadiente be made applicable to a provincial attorney? According to the
petitioners, Cadiente must be applied because by the nature of the functions of a provincial attorney and a city
legal officer, their positions are both primarily confidential. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that since
the Civil Service Commission has already classified the position of private respondent Arandela as a career position
and certified the same as permanent, he is removable only for cause, and therefore Cadiente is not applicable.

We agree with the petitioners and answer the question earlier propounded in the affirmative. A city legal officer
appointed by a city mayor to work for and in behalf of the city has for its counterpart in the province a provincial
attorney appointed by the provincial governor. In the same vein, a municipality may have a municipal attorney who
is to be named by the appointing power. The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were created
under Republic Act No. 5185 which categorized them together as positions of "trust", to wit:

Sec. 19. Creation of positions of Provincial Attorney and City Legal officer. To enable the provincial and
city governments to avail themselves of the full time and trusted services of legal officers, the positions of
provincial attorney and city legal officer may be created and such officials shall be appointed in such
manner as is provided for under Section four of this Act. For this purpose the functions hitherto performed
by the provincial and city fiscals in serving as legal adviser and legal officer for civil cases of the province
 and city shall be transferred to the provincial attorney and city legal officer, respectively. (Emphasis
supplied.) 4

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5185, both the provincial attorney and city legal officer serve as the legal adviser and
legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their services are precisely
categorized by law to be "trusted services."

A comparison of the functions, powers and duties of a city legal officer as provided in the Local Government Code
with those of the provincial attorney of Iloilo would reveal the close similarity of the two positions. Said functions
clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the two offices and the need for a relationship based on trust
between the officer and the head of the local government unit he serves. The "trusted services" to be rendered by
the officer would mean such trusted services of a lawyer to his client which is of the highest degree of trust. 5

The fact that the position of respondent Arandela as provincial attorney has already been classified as one under
the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission cannot conceal or alter its highly
confidential nature. As in Cadiente where the position of the city legal officer was duly attested as permanent by
the Civil Service Commission before this Court declared that the same was primarily confidential, this Court holds
that the position of respondent Arandela as the provincial attorney of Iloilo is also a primarily confidential position.
To rule otherwise would be tantamount to classifying two positions with the same nature and functions in two
incompatible categories. This being the case, and following the principle that the tenure of an official holding a
primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence, 6 the Court finds that private respondent Arandela was
not dismissed or removed from office when his services were terminated. His term merely expired.

The attorney-client relationship is strictly personal because it involves mutual trust and confidence of the highest
degree, irrespective of whether the client is a private person or a government functionary. 7 The personal character
of the relationship prohibits its delegation in favor of another attorney without the client's consent. 8

However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the relationship, can be delegated. 9 The practice of
delegating work of a counsel to his subordinates is apparent in the Office of the Provincial Attorney wherein it can
be gleaned from the power granted to such officer to exercise administrative supervision and control over the acts
and decision of his subordinates. 10

It is therefore possible to distinguish positions in the civil service where lawyers act as counsel in confidential and
non-confidential positions by simply looking at the proximity of the position in question in relation to that of the
appointing authority. Occupants of such positions would be considered confidential employees if the predominant
reason they were chosen by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which measures freedom of discussion, without fear of embarrassment or
misgivings of possible betrayal of personal trust on confidential matters of state. 11

This implies that positions in the civil service of such nature would be limited to those not separated from the
position of the appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic
hierarchy. This is an additional reason why the positions of "City Legal Officer" and "Private Secretary to the
President" were considered primarily confidential by the Court. 12 On the other hand, a customs policeman serving
in the Harbor Patrol, in relation to the Commissioner of Customs, and an executive assistant, stenographer, or clerk
in the Office of the President, were not considered so by the Court. 13

There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which assists the confidential employer
above described. Since the positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from that of the appointing
authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. The importance of these subordinates to
the appointing authority now lies in the contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential
employee. At this level of the bureaucracy, any impairment of the appointing authority's interest as a client, which
may be caused through the breach of residual trust by any of these lower-ranked lawyers, can be anticipated and
prevented by the confidential employee, as a reasonably competent office head, through the exercise of his power
to "review, approve, reverse, or modify" their acts and decisions. 14 At this level, the client can be protected
without need of imposing upon the lower-ranked lawyers the fiduciary duties inherent in the attorney-client
relationship. Hence, there is now no obstacle to giving full effect to the security of tenure principle to these
members of the civil service.

Thus, with respect to the legal assistants or subordinates of the provincial attorney namely, Cirilo Gelvezon,
Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan, the Cadiente and Besa rulings cannot apply. To recall, said cases
specifically dealt with the positions of city legal officer of the city and chief legal counsel of the PNB. There was no
reference to their legal staff or subordinates. As head of their respective departments, the city legal officer, the
provincial attorney or the PNB chief legal counsel cannot be likened to their subordinates. The latter have been
employed due to their technical qualifications. Their positions are highly technical in character and not confidential,
so they are permanent employees, and they belong to the category of classified employees under the Civil Service
Law. Thus, the items of Senior Legal Officer and Legal Officer II remain permanent as classified by the Civil Service
Commission. Consequently, the holders of the said items, being permanent employees, enjoy security of tenure as
guaranteed under the Constitution.
This notwithstanding, petitioners contend that respondents are estopped from protesting the termination of their
services because of their actions which, if taken together, would allegedly reveal that they have accepted their
termination, such as: applying for clearances, not remaining in office and signing their payroll for March 15, 1988
acknowledging therein that their appointment "terminated/expired."

We cannot agree with petitioners in this regard. The respondents did the above-mentioned acts because their
services were actually dispensed with by petitioner Governor Grio. As a consequence of their termination, they
could not remain in office and as required of any government employee who is separated from the government
service, they had to apply for clearances. However, this did not mean that they believed in principle that they were
validly terminated. The same should not prevent them from later on questioning the validity of said termination.

The facts clearly show that respondents protested their termination with the Civil Service Commission within a
month from the time of their termination. The Court holds that the said protest was filed within a reasonable period
of time.

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED with respect to the position of provincial
attorney of Iloilo. Respondent Teotimo Arandela is hereby ordered to vacate said position upon the finality of this
Decision. The Decision of the respondent Civil Service Commission pertaining to respondents Cirilo Gelvezon,
Teodolfo Dato-on and Nelson Geduspan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
Grio-Aquino and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion in its classification of the positions of legal assistants or subordinates of the
Provincial Attorney as highly technical in character, falling under the category of permanent employees, with
security of tenure under the civil service system. I dissent, however, from the majority opinion in its treatment of
the position of Provincial Attorney, for the following reasons:

The position of Provincial Attorney was created under Sec. 19 of RA 5185 to enable the provincial government to
avail of the legal advice and services of its own counsel in civil cases affecting the province. Although the power to
appoint the Provincial Attorney is vested in the Governor, however, the said local public officer is an employee of
the provincial government to which he owes his loyalty, and not to the elected Governor, for he is not part of the
latter's personal or confidential staff. As a provincial public officer, the Provincial Attorney's suspension, removal or
transfer is subject to the provisions of the civil service law, rules and regulations. In other words, he may not be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. More specifically, he may be removed from office for
incompetence, dishonesty, or other misconduct but not for the Governor's loss of confidence in him, which by its
very nature, can be as broad as anything imaginable.

In its resolution, the Civil Service Commission has classified the position of Provincial Attorney as a career service
position and a permanent one. It is but proper that a career position be developed for the Provincial Attorney to
minimize the "spoils system", whereby everytime a new Governor is elected, he can appoint his own man by
terminating the services of the one holding the position, regardless of his competence and performance, on the
basis (in reality, pretext) of an alleged "loss of confidence", leaving the appointees to said position at the mercy of
the Governor's whims and caprices. To clothe the Governor with an unlimited or blanket authority to dismiss the
Provincial Attorney on the ground of such generality as "loss of confidence" only aggravates the problem which has
for too long plagued this country and that is the undue dominance of partisan politics in the appointment and
retention of government officers and/or employees. Such practice only hinders the growth of trained-career
personnel in the government service resulting in the demoralization of those officers and/or employees who would
prefer to stake their fate in the government service on the basis of merit.

The Office of Provincial Attorney is composed of a Provincial Attorney, one (1) Senior Legal Officer, five (5) Legal
Officers and its administrative staff. Private respondent Teotimo Arandela rose from the ranks, wherein he started
as Legal Officer III, to Senior Legal Officer and finally to Provincial Attorney, under the terms of three (3) Governors,
before Gov. Grio was elected to office. 1 To unceremoniously terminate private respondent Arandela, who has
risen from the ranks and who has been in government service for many years, at the pleasure or fancy of an
incumbent Governor, is, to my mind, contrary to the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee of the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."

Abuse of power in the termination and/or suspension of an appointee to the position of Provincial Attorney or of a
similar position on the basis of "loss of confidence" which is not duly substantiated should not be allowed. The
reason stated by the Governor for his alleged loss of trust and confidence in private respondent was that " . . . an
article pertaining to your office which appeared yesterday in Panay News undermined that trust and confidence
which should otherwise prevail." Whatever the content of said article which allegedly triggered the loss of
confidence on the part of the Governor in the private respondent was not specifically stated in his letter dated 1
March 1988 dispensing with the services of the private respondent. 2 The reason given by the Governor in
terminating private respondent's services does not only appear unsubstantiated but is vague and uncertain.

The presence of Cadiente vs. Santos, 142 SCRA 280 (1980), upon which the majority opinion relies in support of its
thesis that the Provincial Attorney may be terminated at any time by the Provincial Governor upon loss of
confidence, should be the last thing to bother one in attempting to establish a wholesome doctrine in the law of
public officers.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition and to AFFIRM the questioned Civil Service Commission rulings in
favor of private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring & dissenting:

I concur with the first part of the ponencia holding that the position of a provincial attorney appointed by the
provincial governor being akin to that of a city legal officer appointed by the city mayor, is primarily confidential
and hence, the termination from office of the provincial attorney follows as a consequence of the loss of confidence
upon him by the provincial governor.

However, I can not agree with the second part of the decision when it refused to apply the same aforementioned
ruling to the case of legal assistants or subordinate lawyers on the justification that the earlier cases
of Cadiente and Besa only specifically dealt with the positions of city legal officer and PNB chief legal counsel,
respectively, and that the positions of legal assistants or subordinate lawyers are highly technical in character and
not confidential.

While it is true that Cadiente and Besa only involved a city legal officer and the PNB chief legal counsel, the same
cases do not by any means preclude the application of the said precedents to legal assistants or subordinate
lawyers in appropriate cases when such issue is squarely raised as presently.

Anent the claim that the positions of assistant legal officers or subordinate lawyers is highly technical and not
confidential, this contention is not supported by any evidence on record or any basis in law. On the contrary, the
function of an assistant or a subordinate legal officer, as can be gleaned from the Local Government Code, is to
"assist the chief officer and perform such duties as the latter may assign him." I can not see how such a function
can be any less confidential than that of the chief legal officer.

Absent any showing of substantial distinctions between the nature of the work or function of the provincial attorney
and that of the legal assistants or subordinate lawyers, it is logical to presume that both public officers handle
confidential matters relating to the legal aspect of provincial administration and that their relationship with their
appointing power is that of a lawyer and his client requiring utmost confidence and the highest degree of trust.
Hence, both positions being primarily confidential, the termination from office of the legal assistants or subordinate
lawyers must likewise follow as a consequence of the loss of confidence upon them by the provincial governor.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the majority opinion in its classification of the positions of legal assistants or subordinates of the
Provincial Attorney as highly technical in character, falling under the category of permanent employees, with
security of tenure under the civil service system. I dissent, however, from the majority opinion in its treatment of
the position of Provincial Attorney, for the following reasons:
The position of Provincial Attorney was created under Sec. 19 of RA 5185 to enable the provincial government to
avail of the legal advice and services of its own counsel in civil cases affecting the province. Although the power to
appoint the Provincial Attorney is vested in the Governor, however, the said local public officer is an employee of
the provincial government to which he owes his loyalty, and not to the elected Governor, for he is not part of the
latter's personal or confidential staff. As a provincial public officer, the Provincial Attorney's suspension, removal or
transfer is subject to the provisions of the civil service law, rules and regulations. In other words, he may not be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. More specifically, he may be removed from office for
incompetence, dishonesty, or other misconduct but not for the Governor's loss of confidence in him, which by its
very nature, can be as broad as anything imaginable.

In its resolution, the Civil Service Commission has classified the position of Provincial Attorney as a career service
position and a permanent one. It is but proper that a career position be developed for the Provincial Attorney to
minimize the "spoils system", whereby everytime a new Governor is elected, he can appoint his own man by
terminating the services of the one holding the position, regardless of his competence and performance, on the
basis (in reality, pretext) of an alleged "loss of confidence", leaving the appointees to said position at the mercy of
the Governor's whims and caprices. To clothe the Governor with an unlimited or blanket authority to dismiss the
Provincial Attorney on the ground of such generality as "loss of confidence" only aggravates the problem which has
for too long plagued this country and that is the undue dominance of partisan politics in the appointment and
retention of government officers and/or employees. Such practice only hinders the growth of trained-career
personnel in the government service resulting in the demoralization of those officers and/or employees who would
prefer to stake their fate in the government service on the basis of merit.

The Office of Provincial Attorney is composed of a Provincial Attorney, one (1) Senior Legal Officer, five (5) Legal
Officers and its administrative staff. Private respondent Teotimo Arandela rose from the ranks, wherein he started
as Legal Officer III, to Senior Legal Officer and finally to Provincial Attorney, under the terms of three (3) Governors,
before Gov. Grio was elected to office. 1 To unceremoniously terminate private respondent Arandela, who has
risen from the ranks and who has been in government service for many years, at the pleasure or fancy of an
incumbent Governor, is, to my mind, contrary to the constitutional provision that "no officer or employee of the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law."

Abuse of power in the termination and/or suspension of an appointee to the position of Provincial Attorney or of a
similar position on the basis of "loss of confidence" which is not duly substantiated should not be allowed. The
reason stated by the Governor for his alleged loss of trust and confidence in private respondent was that " . . . an
article pertaining to your office which appeared yesterday in Panay News undermined that trust and confidence
which should otherwise prevail." Whatever the content of said article which allegedly triggered the loss of
confidence on the part of the Governor in the private respondent was not specifically stated in his letter dated 1
March 1988 dispensing with the services of the private respondent. 2 The reason given by the Governor in
terminating private respondent's services does not only appear unsubstantiated but is vague and uncertain.

The presence of Cadiente vs. Santos, 142 SCRA 280 (1980), upon which the majority opinion relies in support of its
thesis that the Provincial Attorney may be terminated at any time by the Provincial Governor upon loss of
confidence, should be the last thing to bother one in attempting to establish a wholesome doctrine in the law of
public officers.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition and to AFFIRM the questioned Civil Service Commission rulings in
favor of private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring & dissenting:

I concur with the first part of the ponencia holding that the position of a provincial attorney appointed by the
provincial governor being akin to that of a city legal officer appointed by the city mayor, is primarily confidential
and hence, the termination from office of the provincial attorney follows as a consequence of the loss of confidence
upon him by the provincial governor.

However, I can not agree with the second part of the decision when it refused to apply the same aforementioned
ruling to the case of legal assistants or subordinate lawyers on the justification that the earlier cases
of Cadiente and Besa only specifically dealt with the positions of city legal officer and PNB chief legal counsel,
respectively, and that the positions of legal assistants or subordinate lawyers are highly technical in character and
not confidential.

While it is true that Cadiente and Besa only involved a city legal officer and the PNB chief legal counsel, the same
cases do not by any means preclude the application of the said precedents to legal assistants or subordinate
lawyers in appropriate cases when such issue is squarely raised as presently.1wphi1

Anent the claim that the positions of assistant legal officers or subordinate lawyers is highly technical and not
confidential, this contention is not supported by any evidence on record or any basis in law. On the contrary, the
function of an assistant or a subordinate legal officer, as can be gleaned from the Local Government Code, is to
"assist the chief officer and perform such duties as the latter may assign him." I can not see how such a function
can be any less confidential than that of the chief legal officer.
Absent any showing of substantial distinctions between the nature of the work or function of the provincial attorney
and that of the legal assistants or subordinate lawyers, it is logical to presume that both public officers handle
confidential matters relating to the legal aspect of provincial administration and that their relationship with their
appointing power is that of a lawyer and his client requiring utmost confidence and the highest degree of trust.
Hence, both positions being primarily confidential, the termination from office of the legal assistants or subordinate
lawyers must likewise follow as a consequence of the loss of confidence upon them by the provincial governor.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 104158 November 6, 1992

HON. GEMILIANO LOPEZ, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila; EUFEMIA DOMIGUEZ, in her capacity
as City Budget Officer; HERMINIO ARCEO, in his capacity as Chairman, Committee for Retirement
Gratuity and Terminal Leave Pay of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila; and HON. ANTHONY
ACEVEDO, in his capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GALICIANO P. MANAPAT, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

On 29 February 1972, private respondent Galicano Manapat retired from the government service as Chief of the
Legal Division of the office of the Municipal Board of Manila. He retired under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as
amended, having then rendered twenty (20) years of service to petitioner City of Manila and received the amount
of P24,479.02 representing his full retirement benefit.

On April 1977, Manapat was reemployed by the City of Manila this time as Secretary of the City of Manila Board of
Tax Assessment Appeals, with a monthly salary of P3,993.33. He occupied that position until he reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 27 June 1989. The City of Manila extended his period of
service for six (6) months, i.e., up to 27 December 1989. During this additional period of service, i.e., on 1 July
1989, the Salary Standardization Law (R.A. No. 6758) took effect and increased Manapat's monthly salary from
P3,993.33 to P11,385.00.

Upon expiration of private respondent Manapat's six (6)-month extended period of service, he filed with the
Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") an application for retirement under R.A. No. 1616, as amended.
This application was approved by the GSIS on 6 April 1990, initially on the basis of his previous salary of P3,993.33
per month; on that basis, he was entitled to a total retirement gratuity of P179,274.04, less the amount of
P24,479.02 previously received as retirement pay when he first retired on 29 February 1972, making a net balance
of P154,795.02.

On 16 May 1990, the GSIS adjusted Manapat's approved application for retirement to conform with his last
standardized monthly salary of P11,385.00. This adjustment resulted in a total collectible retirement pay or
gratuity of P486,634.84 for Manapat.

The approved adjusted claim of Manapat for retirement benefits was forwarded by the GSIS to the Board of Tax
Assessment Appeals of the City of Manila. The Assistant Department Head of that Board in turn transmitted the
papers to the Chairman of the Committee on the Settlement of Claims for Retirement Gratuity and Terminal Leave
Pay ("Committee") by an Indorsement dated 21 May 1990. The next day, however, the Chairman of that
Committee returned the papers to the Manila Board of Tax Assessment Appeals without acting on the retirement
gratuity claim of Manapat, upon the ground that it was existing policy of the City of Manila that an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years must retire under R.A. No. 660 and not under
the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended.

Manapat appealed the action of the Chairman of the Committee to the City Budget Officer. The latter officer replied
by informing Manapat that his claim for retirement pay was forwarded to the then Mayor of the City of Manila,
petitioner Gemiliano Lopez, Jr., as well as to the City Legal Officer for legal advice.

On 1 October 1990, the City Legal Officer of the City of Manila rendered a written opinion to the effect that the City,
as employer, had discretionary authority to allow or disallow a claim to retire under R.A. No. 1616, as amended,
considering that retirement under that law was optional and payment of retirement benefits thereunder was
subject to the availability if funds. A week later, on 8 October 1990, Manapat received a letter from petitioner City
Mayor advising that his (Manapat's) request for settlement of his claim for retirement gratuity under R.A. No. 1616
could not be favorably acted upon due to financial constraints upon the City Government.

Manapat then commenced in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila, a special civil action for mandamus to
compel petitioner officials of the city of Manila to allow Manapat to retire under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as
amended. The trial court dismissed the petition.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and issued a writ of mandamus ordering
petitioner officials to pay the retirement claim of Mr. Manapat in the amount of P486,636.84 with legal interest from
the time of filling of the petition for mandamus and awarded as well Mr. Manapat P30,000.00 as moral damages
and another P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioner officials of the City of Manila pose the very same issues they had
raised before the Court of Appeals, namely:

(1) Whether a government employee, who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years,
may opt to retire under R.A. No. 1616 as amended or, alternatively, is entitled only to retirement
benefits under the mandatory retirement clause of R.A. No. 660; and

(2) Whether the City of Manila as employer may be compelled to pay the retirement benefits of its
employees under R.A. No. 1616, notwithstanding lack of available funds for that purpose.

We are aware of the very practical considerations which underlie the respective positive taken by petitioners and
private respondent. Petitioners are insisting that private respondent Manapat retire under the provisions of R.A. No.
660 because, under those provisions, the GSIS is bound to pay the retirement benefits properly accruing to
Manapat, while it is the City of Manila as employer which is liable for the retirement gratuity appertaining under
R.A. No. 1616 as amended to Manapat. Upon the other hand, Manapat wishes to retire under the provisions of R.A.
No. 1616 as amended because the amount of the gratuity under that law will be significantly higher than the
gratuity which would be payable under the terms of R.A. No. 660. 1

Both R.A. No. 660 and R.A. No. 1616 were amendments to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 186, otherwise known as
the Government Service Insurance System Charter. Section 12, C.A. No. 186, as amended by both R.A. No. 660 and
R.A. No. 1616 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

SECTION 12. Conditions for retirement. . . .

(a) On completion of thirty years of total service and attainment of age fifty-seven years, a
member shall have the option to retire. In all cases of retirement under this Act, the last three
years of service before retirement must be continuous and he must have made contributions for at
least five years, which contributions may, upon his request approved by the Board, be deducted
from his life annuity under such terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe: . . . In all cases
no one shall be entitled to retirement benefit if his age is below fifty-two years or his total service is
less than fifteen years.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a member may be allowed to retire
after rendering a total service of thirty years, regardless of age, the retiring employee to receive a
monthly annuity for life, but the benefits for service rendered after June sixteen, nineteen hundred
 and fifty-one, shall be whatever amount of annuity can be purchased by the accumulated
government and personal contributions to the credit of a member plus interest allowed by the
system on the date of retirement. Said annuity shall be computed in accordance with the mortality
table and the rate of interest adopted by the system. This benefit for service rendered prior to June
sixteen, nineteen hundred and fifty-one as provided in section eleven (A) of this Act.

(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to any official or employee, appointive or elective, regardless of
age and employment status, who has rendered a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal
contributions with interest compounded monthly and the payment of the corresponding employer's
premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity
equivalent to one month's salary for every year of the first twenty years of service, plus one and
one-half month's salary of every years of service over twenty but below thirty years and two
month's salary for every year of service over thirty years in case of employees based on the
highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. This
gratuity us payable by the employer or officer concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the
necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings
in its appropriations. Officials and employees retired under this Act shall be entitled to the
commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which
they may have to their credit at the time of retirement.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five years with lump sum
payment of present value of annuity for the first five years and future annuity to be paid monthly,
and future annuity to be paid monthly, and future annuity to be paid monthly, and other benefits
given to a compulsory retired member as provided for in Republic Act Number Six hundred and
sixty as amended, if he has completed fifteen years of service and if he has not been separated
from the service during the last three years of service prior to retirement; otherwise he shall be
allowed to continue in the service until he shall have completed the required length of service,
unless he is otherwise eligible for disability retirement. This paragraph shall not apply to elective
officials and constitutional officers whose tenure of office is guaranteed. Upon specific approval of
the President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, an employee may
be allowed to continue to serve in the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government
after the age of sixty-five years if he possesses special qualifications and the corresponding
Department Secretary certifies in writing that his services are needed.

The automatic and compulsory retirement age for members of the judiciary shall be seventy years
under the conditions and with all the benefits provided for in the next preceding paragraph.

If a member exercises the option to retire pursuant to the provisions of Subsection (a) above at age
sixty-three years, he shall likewise be entitled to all the benefits provided for in the first paragraph
of this subsection. If the option is exercised at age sixty or over but below sixty-three years, the
retiree shall be entitled to a lump sum payment of present value of annuity for the first three years,
with the balance of the five-year guaranteed annuity payable in lump sum upon reaching the age
of sixty-three years, and future annuity to be paid monthly, in addition to other benefits provided
for in Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and sixty, as amended.

It shall be the duty of the employer concerned to notify each employee under its direction of the
date of his automatic separation from the service at least sixty days in advance thereof.

xxx xxx xxx 2

(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners do not disputed the fact that private respondent Manapat had, at the time of his second retirement on
27 December 1989, rendered a total of thirty-five (35) years of government service, with the result that he had
complied with the requirement for retirement under each and every one of the four (4) modes of retirement
provided in Section 12 of C.A. No. 186 as amended, quoted above, to wit:

Section 12(a) 30 years of government service and attainment of age 57 years;

 12(b) 30 years of government service "regardless of age;"

12(c) 20 years of government service "regardless of age;" and

12(e) 15 years of government service and attainment of age 65 years.

Petitioners, however, insist that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-
five (65) years, with at least fifteen (15) years of service in the government, has no choice save to retire under the
provisions of Section 12(e) of C.A. No. 186 as amended (i.e., R.A. No. 660), retirement thereunder being "automatic
and compulsory."

The Court is unable to agree. While Section 12(e) of C.A. No. 186 as amended provides that "[r]etirement shall be
automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years," there is nothing in the statute to suggest that a government
employee who, like private respondent Manapat, happens to satisfy the requirements not only of Section 12(e). but
also Section 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c), must necessarily retire under Section 12(e). We find it very difficult to
understand why a government employee who reaches the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) but who
has served a total, not of fifteen (15) years (the minimum required under 12[e]) but rather thirty-five (35) years
(i.e., more than the years of service specified under 12[a], 12[b] and 12[c]), should be regarded as deprived of the
right to retire under 12(c) (i.e., R.A. No. 1616 as amended), where the required number of years of services is only
twenty (20).

The interpretation urged by petitioners is conspicuously at war with the basic policy purpose of C.A. No. 186 as
amended by R.A. No. 1616 which is, of course, to create an added incentive for qualified government employees to
remain in the service of the government. The basic principles for the construction of statutes tell us that a statute
must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Under this principle of
effectiveness, retirement statutes, in case of a real as distinguished from a merely ostensible doubt or ambiguity,
must be so construed as to give meaning and effect to their humanitarian purposes and so as reasonably to benefit
employees who had opted to stay in the services of the government for so many years. 3 Thus, we read Section
12(c) as applicable in respect of private respondent Manapat who had complied with the requirement of that
subsection of at least twenty (20) years of service. The benefits of Section 12(c) are, under its express terms,
available to anyone who shall have rendered at least twenty (20) years of service, "regardless of [the] age"
reached by the retiree at the time of his retirement.

We agree, therefore, with the respondent Court of Appeals which held that Section 12(e) of C.A.. No. 186 as
amended "cannot and should not be construed as limiting the mode of retirement of [a] government employee
who was has reached the age of 65 years:"

This provision of law . . . is mandatory only [in respect of] those who have reached the age of [sixty
-five] 65 years and have rendered at least fifteen [15] years of government service but not [in
respect of] those who have rendered at least twenty (20) years of service. For, in the latter
case, the retiree is given the option to retire under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1616
[i.e. s. 12 (c), C.A. No. 186], amending Commonwealth Act No. 186. And this is true regardless of
the age of the retiree. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The enactment of Republic Act No. 1616 is exactly intended to provide for two [2] other modes of retirement, and
these are:

(1) retirement after rendering a total service of thirty (30) years, regardless of age;

(2) retirement after rendering at least twenty (20) years of service, regardless of age;

It is crystal clear, therefore, that a retiree, regardless of age, that is, whether or not he is 65 [sixty-
five] years at the time of his retirement, for as long as he has rendered at least twenty (20) years
of service or has rendered a total service of thirty (30) years, can retire under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1616. 4 (Emphasis supplied)

We should also note that the phrase "regardless of age" found in Section 12(c) becomes particularly meaningful
when it is recalled that Section 12(e), which declares that "retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at age
65," nonetheless gives an employee who has already reached sixty-five (65) years of age the option to remain in
the government service in order to complete the 15-year minimum service requirement. 5

We consider, therefore, and so hold that an employee who shall have satisfied the requirements for retirement
under more than one (1) subsection of Section 12 of C.A. No. 186 as amended is entitled to choose the subsection
(whose requirement he has complied with and) under which he shall retire. The option of retiring under Section
12(c) or Section 12(e), in the circumstances of this case, belongs to private respondent Manapat and not to his
employer, the City of Manila. That option cannot be taken away from the retiree by the employer, which is precisely
what petitioners purported to do through the medium of the "policy" of restricting the options open to a retiree who
has reached the age of sixty-five (65) to retirement under Section 12(e) even though such retiree simultaneously
satisfies the requisites of retirement under some other subsection or subsections of Section 12. To sustain the
petitioners' alleged "policy" would in effect constitute an amendment of the terms of the applicable statute
something which neither this Court nor petitioners are authorized to do.

We turn to the second issue of whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to pay the retirement
benefit due to private respondent Manapat notwithstanding the lack of funds for that purpose asserted by
petitioners.

The application for retirement of Manapat having been approved and adjusted under the provisions of Section
12(c), C.A. No. 186 as amended, it became ministerial on the part of petitioner City of Manila as employer of
Manapat to provide the funds necessary to pay the latter's lawfully accrued retirement gratuity. We expressly reject
the argument of petitioners that the funding of private respondent's retirement gratuity under Section 12(c) is
"discretionary" on the part of such employer.

The fact that petitioner City of Manila may have no item in its General Appropriation Ordinance specifically
earmarking an amount of P486,634.84 for payment to Mr. Manapat, presents no legal obstacle. In Baldivia, et
al. v. Lota, etc., 6 the petitioners were denied payment of their terminal leave pay because allegedly the
Municipality of Taal, Batangas, had no budget or appropriation ordinance setting aside the sums necessary to pay
petitioners' terminal leave pay. This Court, through the then Mr. Justice and later Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion held that:

Indeed, respondent could have, and should have, either included the claim of petitioners herein in
the general budget he is bound to submit, pursuant to section 2295 of the Revised Administrative
Code, or prepared a special budget for said claim, and urged the municipal council to appropriate
the sum necessary therefor. In any event, if the municipal mayor fails or refuses to make the
necessary appropriation, petitioners may bring an action against the municipality for the recovery
of what is due them and after securing a judgment therefor, seek a writ of mandamus against the
municipal council and the municipal mayor to compel the enactment of approval of the
appropriation ordinance necessary
therefor. 7

(Emphasis supplied)

In the more recent case of Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court went a little further and held
that mandamus was available to compel, not only the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance but also the corresponding payment of municipal funds therefor:

Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and [PNB] are left with no legal recourse.
Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money
judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor. (See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal
Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 [1926]; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 [1960]; Yuviengco v. Gonzales,
108 Phil. 247 [1960]). 9

In fact, however, the Court of Appeals has pointed out that the City of Manila does have an appropriation
authorizing payment of retirement claims like those of Mr. Manapat:

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that payment of retirement gratuities under R.A. 1616 is
indeed subject to the availability of funds, still respondents-appellees cannot escape or without
payment to petitioner-appellant for the following reason:
 In 1990, the City of Manila had an annual appropriation for retirement benefits in the amount of
P14,000,000.00 (Exhibit "J-1"). In view of its failure to enact a new budget for the fiscal year 1991
(the year this case was filed), its budget for 1990 was considered re-enacted, hence, the
aforementioned appropriation for retirement purpose was deemed in force and effect at the time
of the filling of this case on January 22, 1991. Therefore, respondents-appellees cannot claim that
the City of Manila had no available funds for the purpose. And this is especially true considering
that the said appropriation cannot be used for any other purpose, the same being classified as
"Statutory and Contractual Obligation" (Exhibit "J-2"), and the assurance of the City Budget Officer,
Eufemia Domiguez, to indicate the source of funds to pay petitioner-appellant's claim provided only
that his (petitioner-appellant) "request will be acted upon favorably by the foregoing officials."
(Exhibit "G")." 10 (Emphasis supplied)

We must, moreover, underscore that Section 12(c), C.A. No. 186 as amended, in fact effectively dispenses with the
need for enacting an ordinance specifically appropriating private respondent Manapat's retirement pay, or
inserting an appropriate item to that effect in a General Appropriation Ordinance of the City of Manila. For Section
12(c) provides in part as follows:

This gratuity is payable by the employer or officer concerned which is hereby authorized to provide
the necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or
savings of its appropriations. . . . .(Emphasis supplied)

In other words, Section 12(c) itself furnishes statutory authority to petitioners to pay Manapat's claim out of any
savings the City of Manila may have from its other appropriations.

One final point. The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages
and another P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. Viewed as a whole, the record does not show, in a clear and convincing
manner, the evident bad faith and arbitrariness on the part of petitioners which generate liability for moral
damages; we therefore delete this award. Upon the other hand, the award of attorney's fees is entirely just and
equitable since petitioners' act or omission compelled private respondent Manapat, a life-long government
employee, to have recourse to litigation to protect his right to retirement benefits. 11

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, expected that the award of P30,000.00 "as and for moral
damages" is hereby DELETED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. P-94-1089. August 22, 1996]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. VICENTE P. LIBRADO, Deputy Sheriff, MTCC,
Branch 1, Iligan City, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Respondent Vicente P. Librado is deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, in Iligan
City. On September 19, 1994, he was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 in an information filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 5, for selling and having in his possession certain quantities of
prohibited drugs known as metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and marijuana. He was subsequently found
guilty and sentenced to six (6) years of imprisonment.

Pursuant to its authority under the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 12, 1981, the Office of the
Court Administrator filed this administrative complaint against him and on November 23, 1994, he was suspended
from office.

Respondent admits that he had been convicted of violation of R.A. No. 6425 and claims that he is now on
probation. He narrated the incident that led to his apprehension, as follows:
1) That on September 12, 1995 (sic) at 10:00 PM, a minica driver, a.k.a. JUN NEGRO . . . together with an
unidentified companion, came to my residence in Pala-o and induced me to procure shabu.

2) On September 13, 1994 at 7:00 PM, Jun Negro, together with a nice looking lady brought with them two [packs]
of shabu worth P1,000 each[,] [t]wo-third[s] of which was consumed by that lady, [Jun Negro], and myself, leaving
a small quantity which Jun Negro requested me to convert [into] cash.

3) September 13, 1994-2:00 AM

I was awakened by two men who insisted [on entering into] my residence. As I opened the door, I . . . learned that
it was Jun Negro and a person [who] introduced himself as Randolph. Then Jun Negro asked me if I still ha[d] a pack
of shabu. I gave to him the remaining pack which he price (sic) P300.00 to Randolph. The latter gave his P300
pesos to [me] while requesting for more. But I didnt have any. He later said that I would buy more this fiesta (sic).

This Jun Negro immediately opened the door, seconds later, Rene Salazar came in and said: We have a Search
Warrant. This Randolph stood up and a shot took place! I was so nervous and out of my senses. (Note: The Narcom
agents never reported the matter).

They then conducted their search with their witness, Mr. Nerius M. Actub . . . He was killed three (3) weeks later,
while their alleged agent Jun Negro has disappeared.

xxx xxx xxx

With all my shortcomings: A) Arrested on September 14, 1994; b) My wife had just arrived from USA on September
27, 1994, [and] immediately filed an Annulment of Marriage; and C) My house has been demolished on October 2,
1994 . . . I pleaded guilty of said crime.

I am now on probation hoping that Id be given a second chance.

Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Executive Judge of RTC-Iligan City, to whom this case
was referred for investigation, report and recommendation, recommends that in view of respondents probation, a
penalty short of dismissal be meted out against respondent to provide him with the incentive and the will to
rehabilitate himself and apply his time to his work as a judicial employee. [1]

This case involves a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for disciplinary action under
the Civil Service Law.[2] Under the rules of the Civil Service Commission, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is considered a grave offense punishable, upon first commission, by dismissal. [3] As this Court has held, it
alone suffices as a ground for the dismissal of a civil service employee. [4]

Drug-pushing, as a crime, has been variously condemned as an especially vicious crime, [5] one of the most
pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society. [6] For those who become addicted to it not only slide into the
ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of
society,[7] while peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction. They deserve no less than the maximum
penalty [of death].[8]

There is no doubt that drug-pushing is a crime which involves moral turpitude and implies every thing which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals [9]including acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule
of right and duty between man and man. [10] Indeed nothing is more depraved than for anyone to be a merchant of
death by selling prohibited drugs, an act which, as this Court said in one case, [11]

often breeds other crimes. It is not what we might call a contained crime whose consequences are limited to that
crime alone, like swindling and bigamy. Court and police records show that a significant number of murders, rapes,
and similar offenses have been committed by persons under the influence of dangerous drugs, or while they are
high. While spreading such drugs, the drug-pusher is also abetting, through his greed and irresponsibility, the
commission of other crimes.

The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which involves moral turpitude. While indeed the purpose
of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as amended) is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that
unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of which the person under probation has been convicted. The
reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may seek to
reenter government service, but only after he has shown that he is fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated
too often that a public office is a public trust, which demands of those in its service the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, respondent Vicente P. Librado is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits
and retirement benefits and with disqualification for reemployment in the national and local governments, as well
as in any governmental instrumentality or agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This decision is immediately executory. Let a copy be entered in the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.