GR. No. 197472 On June 13, 2000, Rev.
On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond
Alpuerto of the Naval Base Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan, Petitioner,
vs.
REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper
object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect ones
alleged right of possession over the same.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the June 29, 2011 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 89968, which dismissed the appeal
therewith and affirmed the July 3, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation
engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities, established an orphanage and
school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed
that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land
located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his care,
cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable,
humanitarian and missionary works.4
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201
reserving for military purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui
Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui
Island were withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the
Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters
situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. Again subject
to any private rights, the entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of
7,415.48 hectares was accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C. Bias
(Bias) in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command
in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan.1wphi1 According to him, some members
of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Bias, disturbed his peaceful and lawful
possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15,
2000, they commanded him and his men, through the use of force and
intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the
Philippine Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened
with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men
were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said
Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Bias to
restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said
preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory
injunction6 and the parties submission of their respective memoranda,7 the RTC
issued an Order8 dated February 21, 2002 granting the application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the same pertained to five hectares
(subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied
by Rev. Cortez, viz.:
It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers an area of 50 hectares
more or less located at the western portion of Palaui Island which is within the
Naval reservation. [Rev. Cortez] presented what he called as a survey map (Exh.
"H") indicating the location of the area claimed by the Church of the Living God
and/or Rev. Claudio Cortez with an approximate area of 50 hectares identified as
Exh. "H-4". However, the Survey Map allegedly prepared by [a] DENR personnel is
only a sketch map[,] not a survey map as claimed by [Rev. Cortez]. Likewise, the
exact boundaries of the area [are] not specifically indicated. The sketch only
shows some lines without indicating the exact boundaries of the 50 hectares
claimed by [Rev. Cortez]. As such, the identification of the area and its exact
boundaries have not been clearly defined and delineated in the sketch map.
Therefore, the area of 50 hectares that [Rev. Cortez] claimed to have peacefully
and lawfully possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined or
accurately identified.
For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Bias] that [Rev. Cortez] claim
to the 50 hectares of land identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is unclear and ambiguous. It is
a settled jurisprudence that mandatory injunction is the strong arm of equity that
never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law
cannot afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in damages. The right
must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the
protecting preventive process of injunction. The reason for this doctrine is that
before the issue of ownership is determined in the light of the evidence
presented, justice and equity demand that the [status quo be maintained] so that
no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other. And so it was
ruled that unless there is a clear pronouncement regarding ownership and
possession of the land, or unless the land is covered by the torrens title pointing
to one of the parties as the undisputed owner, a writ of preliminary injunction
should not issue to take the property out of possession of one party to place it in
the hands of another x x x.
Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez] tended only to show that
[he] has a pending application of patent with the DENR. Even so, [Rev. Cortez]
failed to present in evidence the application for patent allegedly filed by [him]
showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land which he
possessed or occupied for a long period of time. Under the circumstances,
therefore, the title of petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains
unclear and doubtful, and [is] seriously disputed by the government.
More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on May 22, 1967,
[Rev. Cortez] has not perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired
any vested right thereto considering that he only occupied the land as alleged by
him in 1962 or barely five (5) years before the issuance of the Presidential
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect of removing Palaui Island from
the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain and therefore the island,
as of the date of [the] issuance [of the proclamation], has ceased to be disposable
public land.
However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has lawfully possessed and
occupied at least five (5) hectares of land situated at the western portion of the
Palaui Island identified as Exh "H-4". During the hearing, Cmdr.
Rogelio Bias admitted that when he was assigned as Commanding Officer in
December 1999, he went to Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2) baluga families
tilling the land consisting of five (5) hectares. Therefore, it cannot be seriously
disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and his baluga tribesmen cleared five (5) hectares of
land for planting and cultivation since 1962 on the western portion identified as
Exhibit "H-4". The Philippine Navy also admitted that they have no objection to
settlers of the land prior to the Presidential Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had
been identified as one of the early settlers of the area before the Presidential
Proclamation. The DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has filed an
application for patent on the western area and that he must be allowed to pursue
his claim.
Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of [Rev. Cortez] that he has
already acquired vested rights over the area claimed by him, the court must
recognize that [Rev. Cortez] may have acquired some propriety rights over the
area considering the directive of the DENR to allow [Rev. Cortez] to pursue his
application for patent. However, the court wants to make clear that the
application for patent by [Rev. Cortez] should be limited to an area not to exceed
five (5) hectares situated at the western portion of x x x Palaui Island identified in
the sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the portion where [Rev.
Cortez] has clearly established his right or title by reason of his long possession
and occupation of the land.9
In his Answer,10 Bias countered that: (1) Rev. Cortez has not proven that he has
been in exclusive, open, continuous and adverse possession of the disputed land
in the concept of an owner; (2) Rev. Cortez has not shown the exact boundaries
and identification of the entire lot claimed by him; (3) Rev. Cortez has not
substantiated his claim of exemption from Proclamation No. 201; (4) under
Proclamation No. 447, the entire Palaui Island, which includes the land allegedly
possessed and occupied by Rev. Cortez, was reserved as a marine protected area;
and, (4) injunction is not a mode to wrest possession of a property from one
person by another.
Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision11 making the injunction final and
permanent. In so ruling, the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples
[Right] Act (IPRA) as follows:
The Indigenous [Peoples Right] Act should be given effect in this case. The
affected community belongs to the group of indigenous people which are
protected by the State of their rights to continue in their possession of the lands
they have been tilling since time immemorial. No subsequent passage of law or
presidential decrees can alienate them from the land they are tilling. 12
Ultimately, the RTC held, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.
xxxx
SO DECIDED.13
Representing Bias, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Notice of
Appeal14 which was given due course by the RTC in an Order15 dated August 6,
2007.
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its brief,16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. Cortez admitted during trial that he
filed the Petition for injunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural communities in
Palaui Island and not in his capacity as pastor or missionary of the Church of the
Living God. He also claimed that he has no interest over the land. Based on these
admissions, the OSG argued that the Petition should have been dismissed
outright on the grounds that it did not include the name of the indigenous cultural
communities that Rev. Cortez is supposedly representing and that the latter is not
the real party-in-interest. In any case, the OSG averred that Rev. Cortez failed to
show that he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of injunction. Moreover, the
OSG questioned the RTCs reference to the IPRA and argued that it is not
applicable to the present case since Rev. Cortez neither alleged in his Petition that
he is claiming rights under the said act nor was there any showing that he is a
member of the Indigenous Cultural Communities and/or the Indigenous Peoples as
defined under the IPRA.
In its Decision17 dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the RTCs issuance of a final
injunction based on the following ratiocination:
The requisites necesary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Here,
[Rev. Cortez] has shown the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must
be protected and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. Records reveal that [Rev. Cortez] has been in peaceful
possession and occupation of the western portion of Palaui Island, Sitio Siwangag,
San Vicente, Sta. Ana[,] Cagayan since 1962 or prior to the issuance of
Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 in 1967 and 1994, respectively. There he built an
orphanage and a school for the benefit of the members of the Dumagat Tribe, in
furtherance of his missionary and charitable works. There exists a clear and
unmistakable right in favor [of Rev. Cortez] since he has been in open, continuous
and notorious possession of a portion of Palaui island. To deny the issuance of a
writ of injunction would cause grave and irreparable injury to [Rev. Cortez] since
he will be displaced from the said area which he has occupied since 1962. It must
be emphasized that Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 stated that the same are
subject to private rights, if there be [any]. Though Palaui Island has been declared
to be part of the naval reservation and the whole [i]sland as a marine protected
area, both recognized the existence of private rights prior to the issuance of the
same.
From the foregoing, we rule that the trial court did not err when it made
permanent the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Section 9, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court provides that if after the trial of the action it appears that the
applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined,
the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction.18
Anent the issue of Rev. Cortez not being a real party-in-interest, the CA noted that
this was not raised before the RTC and therefore cannot be considered by it.
Finally, with respect to the RTCs mention of the IPRA, the CA found the same to
be a mere obiter dictum.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premise[s] considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed 3 July 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
Branch 8 in Civil Case No. II-2403 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
Hence, this Petition brought by the OSG on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines (the Republic).
The Issue
The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to
a final writ of mandatory injunction.
The Parties Arguments
The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortez
failed to prove his clear and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui
Island covered by the same. This is considering that by his own admission, Rev.
Cortez started to occupy the said area only in 1962. Hence, when the property
was declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in possession of the 5-
hectare area only for five years or short of the 30-year possession requirement for
a bona fide claim of ownership under the law. The OSG thus argues that the
phrase "subject to private rights" as contained in Proclamation No. 201 and
Proclamation No. 447 cannot apply to him since it only pertains to those who have
already complied with the requirements for perfection of title over the land prior
to the issuance of the said proclamations.
Rev. Cortez, for his part, asserts that the arguments of the OSG pertaining to
ownership are all immaterial as his Petition for injunction does not involve the
right to possess based on ownership but on the right of possession which is a
right independent from ownership. Rev. Cortez avers that since he has been in
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject portion of Palaui Island, he has
the right of possession over the same which is protected by law. He asserts that
based on this right, the writ of injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in his
favor and aptly affirmed by the CA. On the technical side, Rev. Cortez avers that
the Republic has no legal personality to assail the CA Decision through the
present Petition since it was not a party in the appeal before the CA.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the Petition.
For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from a final
injunction.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed
either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as
in this case,] or to refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a
prohibitory injunction."20 "It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action."21
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy
of preliminary injunction."22 A preliminary injunction does not determine the
merits of a case or decide controverted facts.23 Since it is a mere preventive
remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable
harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled. 24 "It is usually granted
when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the
parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status
quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the
case."25 A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to judgment or final order.26 For its issuance, the applicant is
required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by
any substantial challenge or contradiction.27 Simply stated, the applicant needs
only to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.28 On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment
that embodies a final injunction.29 A final injunction is one which perpetually
restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of an
act, or in case of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary
mandatory injuction.30 It is issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is
convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined.31 Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up
with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicants right and of the act
violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a
final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanant injunction, the
right and the act violative thereof must be established by the applicant with
absolute certainty.32
What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of its July 3, 2007
Decision is whether a final injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to
realize this as it in fact made the injunction permanent, the Court, however, finds
the same to be wanting in basis.
Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary
injunction and a final injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself.
For one, what it cited in its Decision were jurisprudence relating to preliminary
injunction and/or mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ and not as a final
injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to determine, based on the
evidence presented during trial, if Rev. Cortez has conclusively established his
claimed right (as opposed to preliminary injunction where an applicant only needs
to at least tentatively show that he has a right) over the subject area. This is
considering that the existence of such right plays an important part in
determining whether the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be
confirmed.
Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the trial courts factual
findings on the matter as well as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis applicable
jurisprudence. As it is, the said Decision merely contains a restatement of the
parties respective allegations in the Complaint and the Answer, followed by a
narration of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the evidence submitted
by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction
and/or specifically, to mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short reference
to the IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally, a conclusion that a
final and permanent injunction should issue. No discussion whatsoever was made
with respect to whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with absolute certainty
hisclaimed right over the subject area.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision,
judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and
distinctly, the facts and the law on which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued
on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No. 1, which requires judges to make
complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal
aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the tendency
to generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.33
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated
guidelines.
In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a
quo for compliance with the form and substance of a Decision as required by the
Constitution. In order, however, to avoid further delay, the Court deems it proper
to resolve the case based on the merits.34
"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be
protected and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right."35 Thus, it is necessary that the Court initially determine
whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is
necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute
certainty.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the
right of possession (jus possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous
possession of the subject area since 1962. He avers that as this right is protected
by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if already
dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory
injunctive writ was correctly issued in his favor.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner36 is one of the two
concepts of possession provided under Article 52537 of the Civil Code. Also
referred to as adverse possession,38 this kind of possesion is one which can ripen
into ownership by prescription.39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor
in the concept of an owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. 40 In the
same manner, the law endows every possessor with the right to be respected in
his possession.41
It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are
susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession. 42 The following
cannot be appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public
dominion, common things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things
specifically prohibited by law.43
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of
possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he
has a claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper
object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.44 Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the
inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have
reclassified or alienated them to private persons." 45 To prove that a land is
alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established. 46
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui
Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to
occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain.
Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of
possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez
claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject
area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long,
cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully
possessed in the first place.
The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No. 447 were
made subject to private rights. The Court stated in Republic v. Bacas,47 viz.:
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting private rights.
In Republic v. Estonilo, where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4319 was
part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable,
it noted the proviso in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation
to be subject to private rights as meaning that persons claiming rights over the
reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims. Stated differently,
the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether x x x the
respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been
segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had to prove
that the subject properties were alienable or disposable land of the
public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and
reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.
265. The question is primordial importance because it is determinative if the land
can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the
Torrens system. Without first determining the nature and character of the
land, all other requirements such as length and nature of possession
and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required
length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the
public domain.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the
proclamation, the subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on
such recognition of possible private rights. In their application, they alleged that
at the time of their application, they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years
and became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or
showing that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement,
or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable. 48

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively
establish his claimed right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would
entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

Anent the technical issue raised by Rev. Cortez, i. e, that the Republic has no
personality to bring this Petition since it was not a party before the CA, the Court
deems it prudent to set aside this procedural barrier. After all, "a party's standing
before [the] Court is a [mere] procedural technicality which may, in the exercise
of [its] discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised." 49

We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the injunction so that he could
continue his humanitarian works. However, considering that inalienable public
land was involved, this Court is constrained to rule in accordance with the
aforementioned.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 89968 denying the appeal and affirming the July 3,
2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan-Branch 08 in Spl. Civil
Action Case No. II-2403, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the final
injunction issued in this case is ordered DISSOLVED and the Petition for
Injunction in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157485
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL
COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her
capacity as ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S.
ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN,
JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
1
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF)
reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and
Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents
claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the
owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less, as per survey by
Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on
the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by
Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L.
Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of
Php1,320.00.2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a
complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF
(hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for recovery of possession, quieting of title,
and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a
41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by
ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of
land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by
respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which
included said portion of private respondents alleged property, as civil reservation
for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred
that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant
and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the
case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of
ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in
view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction
of first-level courts. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a
bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in
New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of
land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same by
planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and
usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin
was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose.
Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that they were previously in possession
of the disputed land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy
land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the
year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein]
the owner and possessor of the land in question in this case and for the
defendants to cause the segregation of the same from the Civil Reservation of the
Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated
March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual
damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the
defendants [on] the land in question when the same has been converted by the
defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the
year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in
question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the
sum of Php10,000.00 for attorneys fees and costs of this suit.3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report
(Exh. "LL") shows that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. Furthermore, the land covered by Civil Reservation under
Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960
(Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415"
was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under
Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals4 where it was pronounced that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement
on them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied,
and improved a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are
considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but where the
President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain lands,
and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously
acquired in such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a
preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously
granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void. (Underscoring from the
MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons
to depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was
subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by
virtue of their and their predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be respected and
protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with
modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving
Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment of damages and attorneys fees. All
other details of the appealed decision are affirmed in toto. 5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by
private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on
appeal unless the court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may
alter the results of its findings. The RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of
the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on record that he acted with
malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074. 6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her
capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals through a Petition for Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land
was likewise declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in
1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that of the private respondents, which
are also within the reservation area, have been issued original certificates of title,
the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural,
and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale,
the subject property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and
Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was
declared a timberland on December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession
of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed
property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property
had been privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a
timberland. This being the case, the said possession has ripened into an
ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one. Nonetheless, it is our
considered opinion that this should come under the meaning of "private rights"
under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of civil
reservation granted to petitioner.7(Citation omitted.)
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING
RESPONDENTS CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND
DESPITE THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS
FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM. 8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of
Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the
Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil
Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any
there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares,
situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines,
designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.] 9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents
retain private rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of
the above proclamation thereon. The private right referred to is an alleged
imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by possession of the
subject property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was
declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property
Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently treated
respondents complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and
declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if
respondents complied with the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as
follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed
property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing petitioners failure to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before
its formal classification as such on said year.11 Petitioner emphatically objects,
alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held
in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic12:
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and
not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable.1wphi1 To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap,13 which presents a similar issue with
respect to another area of the same province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On
September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No.
1801. The respondents-claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim that
through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since
June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above
case with this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved
forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner-
claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064,
alleging that it infringed on their "prior vested right" over portions of Boracay
which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition was
consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular 3- 82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis--vis the right of the claimants to
lands they claim to have possessed since time immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the
Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 14 (Emphases in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby
original; citations omitted.) DISMISSED.

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show SO ORDERED.
competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that said
land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the
presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the
conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,15 wherein we held:

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that
the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to
the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the
land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the
members of this Court in

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.16 In Malabanan, the members of this Court

were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after
June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There
was, however, no disagreement that there must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to
identify a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and
by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into
ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights
within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to reverse the
rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of petitioner Republic to dismiss
Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24,
2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington
and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan
 G.R. No. 193964, December 02, 2015 Administrative Circular No. 1-03, petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on the
following grounds:
ENGINEER BEN Y. LIM, RBL FISHING CORPORATION, PALAWAN
AQUACULTURE CORPORATION, AND PENINSULA SHIPYARD
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. SULPICIO G. GAMOSA, OFFICER-IN-
1) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because
CHARGE, NCIP REGIONAL HEARING OFFICE, REGION IV AND TAGBANUA
[petitioners] are not members of the Indigenous Cultural
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITY OF BARANGAY BUENAVISTA,
Communities/Indigenous Peoples;
CORON, PALAWAN, AS REPRESENTED BY FERNANDO P. AGUIDO, ERNESTO
CINCO, BOBENCIO MOSQUERA, JURRY CARPIANO, VICTOR BALBUTAN,
NORDITO ALBERTO, EDENG PESRO, CLAUDINA BAQUID, NONITA SALVA,
AND NANCHITA ALBERTO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.: 2) Lack of jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners], because summons
were served by mail rather than by personal service;
While we recognize the rights of our Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) as determined in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA), we delineate, in this case, the jurisdiction of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as provided in Section 661 of the IPRA.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 which
denied the petition for certiorari of petitioners Engr. Ben Y. Lim, RBL Fishing 3) Lack of cause of action, because there is no allegation in the petition or
Corporation, Palawan Aquaculture Corporation, and Peninsula Shipyard document attached thereto showing that [respondents] were indeed
Corporation. Affirmed, then, is the Resolution3 of the NCIP in NCIP Case No. RHO authorized by the purported Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community, and
4-01-2006. no Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title has as yet been issued over the
claim; [and]
Respondent Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community of Barangay Buenavista,
Coron, Palawan, represented by individual respondents Fernando P. Aguido,
Ernesto Cinco, Bobencio Mosquera, Jurry Carpiano, Victor Balbutan, Nordito
Alberto, Edeng Pesro, Claudina Baquid, Nonita Salva, and Nanchita Alberto, filed a
petition before the NCIP against petitioners for "Violation of Rights to Free and
Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) and Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with
Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order."4
4) Violation of the rule against forum shopping because [respondents] have
already filed criminal cases also based on the same alleged acts before the
Thereafter, the NCIP issued an Order dated 20 October 2006 and directing the
Municipal Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga.5
issuance and service of summons, and setting the preliminary conference and
initial hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order on
22 November 2006 and the conduct of an ocular inspection of the subject area on
the following day, 23 November 2006. Not contented with their filing of a Motion to Dismiss, petitioners, by way of
special appearance, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, arguing that
Despite a motion to dismiss being a prohibited pleading under the NCIP
"considering the nature of the issues raised [in the Motion to Dismiss], II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
particularly, the issue on jurisdiction, it is imperative that the [Motion to Dismiss] SERIOUS ERRORS IN HOLDING THAT x x x THE [NCIP] ACQUIRED
be resolved first before other proceedings could be conducted in the instant JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE PETITIONERS; and
case."6
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
On 30 November 2006, the NCIP issued a Resolution 7 denying the motion to IN HOLDING THAT x x x RESPONDENTS HAVE CAUSE/S OF ACTION AGAINST
dismiss. While affirming that a Motion to Dismiss is prohibited under Section 29 of THE PETITIONERS.9
the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP, the NCIP squarely
ruled that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents; (2) it
Notably, petitioners have dropped their issue that respondents are guilty of forum
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners; (3) it was premature to rule
shopping.
on the issue of lack of cause of action; and (4) respondents did not violate the
rule on forum shopping.8
At the outset, we note that none of the petitioners, the NCIP, and the appellate
court have proffered an argument, and opined, on the specific nature of the
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition
jurisdiction of the NCIP, whether such is primary and concurrent with courts of
for certiorari before the appellate court, seeking to reverse, annul and set aside
general jurisdiction, and/or original and exclusive, to the exclusion of regular
the NCIP's twin resolutions for being tainted with grave abuse of discretion
courts.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In the main, petitioners argue that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the
As previously stated, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari and
petition filed by respondents because they (petitioners) are non-IPs/ICCs.
affirmed the resolutions of the NCIP. The appellate court echoed the NCIP's stance
Essentially, they interpret the jurisdiction of the NCIP as limited to claims and
that from the wording of Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP was bestowed with an
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both opposing parties are IPs/ICCs.
all-encompassing grant of jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs and that the requirement in the proviso contained in the section, i.e.,
On the other hand, the NCIP and the appellate court rely mainly on the wording of
obtaining a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders that the parties had
Section 66 of the IPRA and the averred purpose for the law's enactment, "to fulfill
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary law prior to the filing of
the constitutional mandate of protecting the rights of the indigenous cultural
an action, applied only to instances where both parties were members of an
communities to their ancestral land and to correct a grave historical injustice to
ICC/IP.
our indigenous people."10 According to the two tribunals, "[a]ny interpretation that
would restrict the applicability of the IPRA law exclusively to its members would
The NCIP also cited Section 14 of its own Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
certainly leave them open to oppression and exploitation by outsiders." 11The NCIP
Procedure Before the NCIP which provides exceptions to the requirement of
and the appellate court maintain that Section 66 does not distinguish between a
exhaustion of administrative remedies under customary laws, such as where one
dispute among members of ICCs/IPs and a dispute involving ICC/IP members and
of the parties is: (1) either a public or private corporation, partnership, association
non-members. Thus, there is no reason to draw a distinction and limit the NCIP's
or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection
jurisdiction over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs." 12 Effectively,
with the performance of his official functions; and (2) a non-IP/ICC or does not
even without asseverating it, the two tribunals interpret the statutory grant of
belong to the same IP/ICC. In all, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NCIP's
jurisdiction to the NCIP as primary, original and exclusive, in all cases and
resolution that when a claim or dispute involves rights of the IPs/ICCs, the NCIP
instances where the claim or dispute involves rights of IPs/ICCs, without regard to
has jurisdiction over the case regardless of whether the opposing party is a non-
whether one of the parties is non-IP/ICC.
IP/ICC.
In addition, the NCIP promulgated its rules and regulations such as NCIP
Adamant, petitioners appeal to us by a petition for review on certiorari, echoing
Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated 9 April 2003, known as the "Rules on
the same issues raised before the appellate court:
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP," and Administrative Circular
No. 1, Series of 2014, known as "The 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY National Commission on Indigenous Peoples." Sections 5 and 1, respectively of
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT x x x THE [NCIP HAS] JURISDICTION OVER THE both the 2003 and 2014 Administrative Circular, Rule III, provide for the
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PETITION x x x; jurisdiction of the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer (RHO), thus:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall
exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and
all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office
(RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and
informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations
of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred
places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A.
8371; and
Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
We first dispose of the primordial question on the nature and scope of the NCIP's
jurisdiction as provided in the IPRA. Specifically, the definitive issue herein boils
down to whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are
ICCs/IPs or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and
exclusive, to the exclusion of the regular courts, on all matters involving rights of
ICCs/IPs.
We are thus impelled to discuss jurisdiction and the different classes thereof.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the Constitution and by
statute, to hear and decide a case.13 The authority to decide a cause at all is what
makes up jurisdiction.
Section 66 of the IPRA, the law conferring jurisdiction on the NCIP, reads:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs:
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council
of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to
the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied).
The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with state policy averred in the
IPRA which recognizes and promotes all the rights of ICCs/IPs within the
framework of the constitution. Such is likewise reflected in the mandate of the
NCIP to "protect and promote the interest and wellbeing of the ICCs/IPs with due
regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and[,] institutions". 14
In connection thereto, from Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development
Bank,15we learned that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by
which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an
administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such
agency.
Plainly, the NCIP is the "primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and
protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their
ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto."16 Nonetheless, the creation of
such government agency does not per se grant it primary and/or exclusive and
original jurisdiction, excluding the regular courts from taking cognizance and
exercising jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights of ICCs/IPs.
Recently, in Unduran et al. v. Aberasturi et al.,17 we ruled that Section 66 of the
IPRA does not endow the NCIP with primary and/or exclusive and original
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Based on the
qualifying proviso, we held that the NCIP's jurisdiction over such claims and
disputes occur only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP. Since two of the defendants therein were not IPs/ICCs, the regular
courts had jurisdiction over the complaint in that case.
In his concurring opinion in Unduran, Justice Jose P. Perez submits that the
jurisdiction of the NCIP ought to be definitively drawn to settle doubts that still
linger due to the implicit affirmation done in The City Government ofBaguio City,
et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.18 of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of
the parties are not ICCs/IPs.
In Unduran and as in this case, we are hard pressed to declare a primary and/or
exclusive and original grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs where there is no clear intendment by the legislature.
Significantly, the language of Section 66 is only clear on the nature of the claim
and dispute as involving rights of ICCs/IPs, but ambiguous and indefinite in other
respects. While using the word "all" to quantify the number of the "claims and
disputes" as covering each and every claim and dispute involving rights of
ICCs/IPs, Section 66 unmistakably contains a proviso, which on its face restrains
or limits the initial generality of the grant of jurisdiction.
Unduran lists the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP: (1) the claim
and dispute involve the right of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. Both elements must be present
prior to the invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.
Thus, despite the language that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, we cannot be confined to that first alone
and therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and
disputes to the exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the intention of the
legislative that: (1) the NCIP exercise primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the
regular courts be excluded from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature could have easily done so as in other
instances conferring primary, and original and exclusive jurisdiction to a specific
administrative body. We will revert to this point shortly but find it pertinent to first
discuss the classes of jurisdiction.
Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and
authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to
act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.19 The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with
special competence.20 In one occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or
should not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the question is resolved by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises
of the regulatory statute administered.21 The objective of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.22
Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive
jurisdiction.23 It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.24 In some instances, the Constitution and statutes grant the administrative
body primary jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized government
agencies or the regular courts, such as the distinct kinds of jurisdiction bestowed
by the Constitution and statutes on the Ombudsman.
The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice25 delineated primary and concurrent jurisdiction as opposed
to original and exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the Constitution and
statutes26 on the Ombudsman concurrent, albeit primary, with the Department of
Justice.
Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz.:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive
conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same
Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law Accordingly, Congress
enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section
15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of
the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8,
1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman
charging any public officer or employee including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the
subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving
criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the
authority to prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance,
either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the
direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman
and other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts.
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly
differentiated the authority to investigate cases from the authority to
prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the
nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases. Whence, focus is directed to the second sentence of paragraph
(1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that
the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial,
city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of
the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in
1990, the Court expressly declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the
power of investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the
Ombudsman is exclusive.
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of
the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said case:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may
take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory
agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a
preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any
stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the
Ombudsman, under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has
jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function
and duty to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any
public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." (Sec. 1[3]). The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct
the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate
action against a public official x x x and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec.
1[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the
nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty.
Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for
the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the
long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices,
and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the
exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations
into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed
necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal
complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or
omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the
duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16,
R.A. 6770).
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman
as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its
jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave offenses
arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those
grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and
prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need for an
independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is
greatest.
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in
the Cojuangco, Jr. case and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more
apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of
the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, that while it may be true that
the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is
merely a primary and not an exclusive authority,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA
6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official.
However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this
authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in
this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the
information and amended information here did not have the approval of the
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at
all. In Deloso v. Domingo; 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the
Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on
the part of any public official, i.e.; any crime imputed to a public official. It must,
however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any
[illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged, i.e.; the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence
upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the
information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department
of Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the
investigation.
In Natividad v. Felix, a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor
contended that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged Murder,
the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo v.
Domagas and Sanchez v. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel
the need for tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the
cases cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the
subject matter, has been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, -
the first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly
repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d)
Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
'SEC. A. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
...
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under
Sec. 4(a)(2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely:
the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office and
than penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second
requirement has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these
Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, would reveal that the
crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their
office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase
which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree
No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary
jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pah materia to Article XI,
Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is
dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not
only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The
rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretand," or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application
and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into
consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written,
its framers had in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In
the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically,
Pres. Decree No. 1861.
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law
(P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated
under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees
in relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give
to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses
committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies
such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting
any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of
penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction[,] take over at any stage.
xxxx
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct
preliminary investigation on charges against any public officers or
employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or
city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or
as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are
in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular
is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation
for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the
principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission
of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised
Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case as not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to
delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency
which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the
Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the
investigation.27 (Emphasis supplied)
In contrast to our holding in Honasan II, the NCIP cannot be said to have even
primary jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP cases comparable to what the Ombudsman
has in cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We do
not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66 of the
IPRA.
Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP
over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.
Thus, we revert to the point on the investiture of primary and/or original and
exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative body which in all instances of such
grant was explicitly provided in the Constitution and/or the enabling statute, to
wit:
1. Commission on Elections' exclusive original jurisdiction over all elections
contests;28
2. Securities and Exchange Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, 29 prior to
its transfer to courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court
by virtue of Section 4 of the Securities Regulation Code;
3. Energy Regulatory Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by it in the exercise of
its powers, functions and responsibilities;30
4. Department of Agrarian Reform's31 primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and its exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); 32
5. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission's original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes involving contracts of construction, whether
government or private, as long as the parties agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration;33
6. Voluntary arbitrator's or panel of voluntary arbitrator's original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies; 34
7. The National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC's) original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases listed in Article 217 of the Labor Code involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural; and
8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration's primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over all deportation cases.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically
excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-
ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to
govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs. In fact, even the IPRA itself recognizes that
customs and customary law cannot be applied to non-IPs/ICCs since ICCs/IPs are
recognized as a distinct sector of Philippine society. This recognition contemplates
their difference from the Filipino majority, their way of life, how they have
continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. The ICCs/IPs share common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, which by their resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories, or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains. 36
In all, the limited or special jurisdiction of the NCIP, confined only to a special
cause involving rights of IPs/ICCs, can only be exercised under the limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute.
To effect the IPRA and its thrust to recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs
within the framework of the Constitution goes hand in hand with the IPRA's
running theme of the primary distinctiveness of customary laws, and its
application to almost all aspects of the lives of members of the IPs/ICCs, including
the resolution of disputes among ICCs/IPs. The NCIP was created under the IPRA
exactly to act on and resolve claims and disputes involving the tights of ICCs/IPs. 37
Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz, the first
challenge to the IPRA, emphasizes the primacy of customs and customary law in
the lives of the members of ICCs/IPs:
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil
Code as a source of law. Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that
custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. In other
words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when
duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a
specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the
civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Once again, the primacy of customs and customary law sets the parameters for
the NCIP's limited and special jurisdiction and its consequent application in
dispute resolution.39 Demonstrably, the proviso in Section 66 of the IPRA limits the
jurisdiction of the NCIP to cases of claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
where both parties are ICCs/IPs because customs and customary law cannot be
made to apply to non-ICCs/IPs within the parameters of the NCIP's limited and
special jurisdiction.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction of
the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no
power and authority to decide on a controversy involving, as well, rights of
non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction
within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern,
non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's
competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach
thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the
controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs
and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with
jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary
law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for
each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,40 we delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, specifically paragraph 3 thereof, as all money claims of
workers, limited to "cases arising from employer-employee relations." The same
clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists
today but the Court ruled that such was a limitation on the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is
outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code x x x:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and
other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims
for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters."
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not
necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that
might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In
the first place, paragraph 3 should not [be] read not in isolation from but rather
within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor practices),
paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment),
paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a particular species of
employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities
prohibited to employees or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying
element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to
cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a
sociis may be [used] in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other
paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the above
conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last
amended by B.P. Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the
Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee relations," which clause was not
expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it
cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do not arise out of or in
connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore
fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended
by the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts
and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The court, therefore,
believes and so holds that the "money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph
3 of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with
the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such
relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money
claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-
employee relationship.
Clearly, the phraseology of "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs"
does not necessarily grant the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the
case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the status of the parties, i.e,
whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.
In Union Glass & Container Corp., et al. v. SEC, et al.,41 we learned to view the
bestowal of jurisdiction in the light of the nature and the function of the
adjudicative body that was granted jurisdiction, thus:
This grant of jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the nature and function of
the SEC under the law. Section 4 of PD No. 902-A confers upon the latter
"absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships
or associations, who are grantees of primary franchise and/or license or permit
issued by the government to operate in the Philippines x x x." The principal
function of the SEC is the supervision and control over corporations, partnerships
and associations with the end in view that investrnent in these entities may be
encouraged and protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of
economic development.
It is in aid of this office that the adjudicative power of the SEC must be
exercised. Thus the law explicitly specified and delimited its jurisdiction
to matters intrinsically connected with the regulation of corporations,
partnerships and associations and those dealing with the internal affairs
of such corporations, partnerships or
associations.42ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Drawing a parallel to Union Glass,43 the expertise and competence of the NCIP
cover only the implementation and the enforcement of the IPRA and customs and
customary law of specific ICCs/IPs; the NCIP does not have competence to
determine rights, duties and obligations of non-ICCs/IPs under other laws although
such may also involve rights of ICCs/IPs. Consistently, the wording of Section 66
that "the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs" plus the proviso necessarily contemplate a limited jurisdiction over
cases and disputes between IPs/ICCs.
That NCIP Administrative Circulars44 expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP as original
and exclusive in Sections 5 and 1, respectively of Rule III:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall
exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and
all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(A.) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
1.) Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of
ICCs/IPs;
xxx
5.) Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICCs/IPs;
xxx
6.) Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of
customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
xxx
8.) Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
9.) Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
is of no moment. The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment.45
It ought to be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of the law into effect. The administrative regulation must be within the scope and
purview of the law.46 The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot
extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute
is vested in the legislature. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override,
but must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement. They
are intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. 47
However, administrative bodies are allowed, under their power of subordinate
legislation, to implement the broad policies laid down in the statute by 'filling in'
the details. All that is required is that the regulation does not contradict, but
conforms with the standards prescribed by law. 48
Perforce, in this case, the NCIP's Administrative Circulars' classification of its
RHO's jurisdiction as original and exclusive, supplants the general jurisdiction
granted by Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 to the trial courts and ultimately, modifies
and broadens the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by the IPRA on the NCIP. We
cannot sustain such a classification.
As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio
City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.49 and similar cases where we made an implicit
affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are non-
ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction
by the NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original
and exclusive jurisdiction, where there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA.
At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular
trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all
controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies.50
Jurisprudence has held on more than one occasion that in determining which body
has jurisdiction over a case, we consider the nature of the question that is the
subject of controversy as well as the status or relationship of the parties. 51
Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in respondents' petition:
4. That [respondents] are members of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Communities in the Calamianes group of islands [in] Coron, Palawan;
5. That Barangay Buenavista, Coron is part of the ancestral domains of the
Tagbanuas within Cluster 1 of the Calamianes group of islands;
6. That prior to the enactment of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), they have already filed their claim for the recognition of their ancestral
domains with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources under DAO-
2-93 and DAO No. 61-91;
7. That because of the enactment of the IPRA, the Provincial Special Task Force on
Ancestral Domains (PSTFAD) recommended instead the validation of their proofs
and claims with the newly created National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) for the corresponding issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domains Title
(CADT).
8. That Sections 3.1 and 11 of the IPRA provided that the State recognizes the
rights of the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) to our ancestral domains by
virtue of their Native Title and that, it was even optional on their part to request
for the issuance of a title or CADT;
9. That as such, it was not even required that they have to obtain first a CADT
before their rights to their ancestral domains be recognized;
10. That furthermore, their free and prior informed consent (FPIC) are required
before any person or entity, whether private or government can enter or
undertake any activity within their ancestral domains;
11. That in order to ensure that their rights to FPIC are not violated, Section 59 of
the IPRA provides that the NCIP had to issue first a Certification Precondition (CP)
that their consent had been elicited first;
12. That their Free and Prior Informed Consent was not elicited by [petitioners]
Engr. Ben Lim, RBL Fishing Corporation, Palawan Aquaculture Corporation and
Peninsula Shipyard Corporation when they unlawfully entered and occupied
portions of their ancestral domains [in] Sitio Makwaw and Sitio Minukbay
Buenavista, Coron, Palawan at a time when the IPRA was already operative;
13. That the workers of the abovenamed persons had destroyed the houses of
[their] tribal members, coerced some to stop from cultivating their lands and had
set up houses within the said portions of their ancestral domains;
14. That the unlawful intrusion and occupation of [petitioners] within the
aforesaid portions of their ancestral domains and their violation of the rights of
[respondents] to Free and Prior and Informed Consent and the criminal acts
committed by [petitioners'] workers had cause (sic) incalculable sufferings among
[respondents] x x x.52ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In their petition before the NCIP, respondents alleged: (1) their status as
Tagbanuas, claiming representation of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural
Communities in the Calamianes Group of Islands in Coron, Palawan; (2) the
provision in the law which recognizes native title of indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous persons; (3) that they have already filed their claim
for the recognition of their ancestral domains with the DENR; (4) that they have
yet to obtain a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) from the NICP which,
under the IPRA, is the agency tasked to validate their claim; (5) the purported
violation of petitioners of their rights to free and prior and informed consent; and
(6) that petitioners unlawfully intruded and occupied respondents' ancestral
domains.
From their allegations in the petition, such call to the fore: (1) respondents' lack of
CADT; and (2) the status of petitioners as non-ICCs/IPs and petitioners' apparent
ignorance that respondents are IPs, and their claim of ancestral domain over the
subject property.
It should be noted that a bare allegation that one is entitled to something is not
an allegation but a conclusion.53 Such allegation adds nothing to the pleading, it
being necessary to plead specifically the facts upon which such conclusion is
founded.54 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, entitled "Manner of Making Allegations in
Pleadings" requires in Section 1, as a general rule, for "[e]very pleading [to]
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as
the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts."
Respondents' status as Tagbanuas, as indigenous persons or members of an
indigenous cultural community, is not an ultimate fact from which respondents
can anchor the rights they claim to have been violated by petitioners.

In this case, respondents' petition, as written, does not mention ultimate facts
that lead to the conclusion that (1) they are Tagbanuas, and (2) they are the
representatives of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community. Neither are
there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or omissions on the part of
petitioners which constitute a violation of respondents' rights.
We elucidate.
In this case, respondents allege that prior to the enactment of the IPRA, they have
previously applied for recognition of their ancestral domain with the DENR under
DENR Administrative Order No. 2-93 and No. 61-91; and with the advent of the
IPRA, it was no longer required that they first obtain a CADT. However, una voce,
they aver that it has been recommended that they validate "their proofs and
claims" with the NCIP for the issuance of a CADT. The allegation itself goes
against respondents' conclusions that they are Tagbanuas.
Such a pronouncement does not contradict the indigenous concept of ownership
even without a paper title and that the CADT is merely a formal recognition of
native title.55 This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
SEC. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
And along those lines, we have subsequently held in Lamsis, et al. v. Dong-
e56that:
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before
the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of
one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral
lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an
ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of
ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only
recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue
of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since
time immemorial.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, the allegation that respondents are Tagbanuas and that they are
representatives of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Communities are conclusions
of their status not derived from facts that should have been alleged. Indeed,
respondents did not even attempt to factually demonstrate their authority to
represent the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community. This is crucial since intra
IPs' conflicts and contest for representation are not impossible.
In that regard, Section 3(f) of the IPRA defines "customary laws" as "a body of
written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs" Section
3(i), on the other hand, refers to "indigenous political structures" consisting of
"organizational and cultural leadership systems, institutions, relationships,
patterns and processes for decision making and participation, identified by
ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders, Council of Timuays, Bodong
Holders, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature." To establish their status
as Tagbanuas or their representation as representatives of Tagbanua Indigenous
Cultural Community, respondents, as "plaintiffs" claiming relief under the IPRA,
should have alleged the ultimate facts constitutive of their customs, political
structures, institutions, decision making processes, and such other indicators of
indigenous persons nature distinct and native to them.
Truly, respondents should have asserted their identification through a reduction
into facts of the defmition and description of an ICC/IP in the IPRA:
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogenous societies identified by self ascription and ascription by others, who
have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common
bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization,
non indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional
domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains[.]58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Also, the right of ancestral property requires historical proof which, of course,
must proceed from allegations in the petition. As noted in the separate opinion of
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Sec of Environment & Natural
Resources,59 the IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs rights over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands where land is the central element of the IPs' existence, viz.:
x x x There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership.
Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to
use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or
stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his
claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are
its true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to
possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future
ones as well.
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land
except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere
stewards. Customary law has a strong preference for communal
ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families
who are related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents of the same
locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal
ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and
highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who
are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and
swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards,
pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. For the Kalingas,
everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule,
rights and obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land
also sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice
farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited
because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as
defined under our Civil Code. Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of
individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and
succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in
the family, or loss of crops. Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered
to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may
land be sold to a non-member of the ili.
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social
system. The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is
alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not
inexistent.60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under the IPRA, ancestral domains and ancestral lands are two concepts, distinct
and different from one another:
a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence
of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to
ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands
which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously,
to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents made no allegation outlining and tracing the history of their
indigenous ownership of domain and land.
To further highlight the necessity of respondents' allegation of their status as
Tagbanuas is the stewardship concept of property which is most applicable to land
among the Philippine IP:62
Land is not an individual item which a man owns for himself and by himself. For
he secures the rights to land in two ways: Firstly, as a citizen of the tribe he is
entitled to some arable land and building land, and to the use of public pasturage,
fishing waters, and wild products. Secondly, in all tribes except those who shift
their gardens widely and have an abundance of land, he gets rights from
membership of a village and a group of kinsfolk. That is, a man's right to land in
the tribal home depends upon his accepting membership of a tribe, with all its
obligations. The right of every subject, while he is a subject, is jealously
safeguarded.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is also significant to note that respondents do not identify themselves with
other Tagbanuas who have been awarded a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim
as of 1998.64

Palpably, in the factual milieu obtaining herein, the NCIP does not have ipso
facto jurisdiction over the petition of respondents just by the mere expedient that
their petition involves rights of ICCs/IPs.
One other thing jumps out from all the discussions herein: the IPRA does not
contain a repeal of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 limiting the general jurisdiction of
the trial, courts even as the IPRA purportedly grants the NCIP jurisdiction over "all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."
Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No.
410, Executive Order Nos. 122B and 122C as expressly repealed. While the same
section does state that "all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly," such an implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a
substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.
The two laws refer to different subject matters, albeit the IPRA includes the
jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts between parties who are
not both ICCs/IPs may still fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts
dependent on the allegations in the complaint or petition and the status of the
parties.
their customs and customary law before bringing their claim and dispute to the
NCIP. The validity of respondents' claim is another matter and a question that we
need not answer for the moment. Too, we do not resolve herein the other issues
raised by petitioners given that we already declared that the NCIP does not have
jurisdiction over the case of respondents against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 98268 dated 26 April 2010 and the Resolution of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples in RHO 4-01-2006 dated 30 November 2006
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The petition in RHO 4-01-2006 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Section 1 of NCIP Administrative
Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, promulgated on 9 October 2014 declaring the
jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer as original and exclusive is
declared VOID for expanding the law. Respondents may refile their complaint
against petitioners in a court of general jurisdiction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the

NCIP in instances where, among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim
or dispute involves their rights, and the specific wording of Batasang Pambansa
Bilang 129, Sections 19-2165 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-3566 on the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a
clear and unequivocal expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest
from the language of Section 66 of the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the
words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to describe the jurisdiction of the
NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" and (2) contained a
proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies
provided under customary laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the
regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of
ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes necessarily include the
IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

All told, we rule that Section 66 of the IPRA, even as it grants jurisdiction to the
NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, requires that the
opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-
CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU
BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW
TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR
S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN,
PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS
S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M.
ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING,
SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN,
ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN,
DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by
her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented
by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by
her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by
her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLES EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.[1] In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan
Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
 On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae.The CHR asserts that IPRA
is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
(Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA
and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples
in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals
and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestation.[2]
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.[3]
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. [4]
These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation,
the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices
of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property
rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of
land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation
thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
 (4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples.[5]
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral
but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination. They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of
control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.[6]
Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and
66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and
desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget
and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for
the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of
carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation
of Philippine natural resources.[7]
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as
follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion,
which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also
filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale
exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5,
6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in
the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the
district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall
between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of
said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of
the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included
the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the
25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and
issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the
registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of
the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the
owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the
registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the
judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose
it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the
registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it,
even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that
theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied
by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same
theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him,
he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to
have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus
lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition
for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot,
including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all
the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or
a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the
affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land
registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to
put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a
title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding
for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial
(Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms
of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in
rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep.,
49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American
Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the
registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent
third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed
by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving
notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration
proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and
to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the
very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have
a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be
registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise
and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The
certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the
real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or
diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all
security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered,
modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by a
direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no
provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present.
There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which
has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the
same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that
future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are
not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other
exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can
not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered
title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act
No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take
notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some
jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has
been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the
courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at
page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the
earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R.,
155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152;
Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however
that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction
relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of
title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter
of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in
his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the
earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not
expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they
provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered
land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all
the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability
of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one
year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud,
after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened
for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such
decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of
the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe
the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in
that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right
of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in
the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other
things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different
persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the
registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers
has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of
the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no
objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a
double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more
in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are
of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land
Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall
prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument
of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served
with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they
became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose
their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent
entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set
up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold
that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is
to quiet title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title
then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land
cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration
and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip
of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it
all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured
their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or
right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be
denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of
the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to
minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the
diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the
appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he
was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in
the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the
registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906.
"Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the
subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in
court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for
impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is
located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the
appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning
the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked
by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act,
that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule
between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the
owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before
the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title,
or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only.
Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt
upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections
38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and
be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of
available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of
the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right
or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to
enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered
in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an
"innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who
have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate
in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him
to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to
an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase
"innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples
there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to
be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded
as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said
sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving
meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original
certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or
interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee?
The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued
until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with
the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded,
or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is
presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well
established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real
Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
(Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97;
Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351;
McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases,
341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is
charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was
ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of
the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be
absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages
to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage
is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the
courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea
of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a
purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its
existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such
lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the
mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be
a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no
knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons
must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all
persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead
ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know
the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It
would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and
contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from
the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a
part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another,
not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should
not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an
"innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of
land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his
successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the
land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the
record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry
there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original
certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order
to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe
the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to
cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under
the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the
record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to
all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good
fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think
not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the
torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in
his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an
"innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor?
Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants,
the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these
rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of
the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor
for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the
holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of
the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure
in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who
had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in
the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public
record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his
negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties
resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent
transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former
registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens
system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be
sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be
examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired
equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who
has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should
be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having
and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with
direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the
error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate
issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. 200773 July 8, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, AGUSTINA TAUEL,**** and LAWANA T.
BATCAGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the February 23, 2012
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 92584 affirming the
September 11, 2008 Amended Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024.
Factual Antecedents
As determined by the appellate court, the facts are as follows:
Appellees Angeline Dayaoen (Angeline), Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana
Batcagan4 (Lawana) filed an Application for Registration5 of three parcels of land
located in Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad, Benguet, described as Lots 1, 6 and
7, each with an area of 994 square meters, 390 sq. m., and 250 sq. m.
respectively, or, a total of 1,634 sq. m. under Survey Plan Psu-1-002413. 6
The subject parcels of land were originally owned and possessed since pre-war
time by Antonio Pablo (Antonio), the grandfather of Dado Pablo (Dado), husband
of appellee Angeline. In 1963, Antonio gave the parcels of land in question to
appellee Angeline and Dado asa wedding gift. From that time on, they
continuously occupied and possessed the properties. In 1976 and 1977, appellee
Angeline sold Lots 6 and 7 to co-appellees Agustina and Lawana, pursuant to an
Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered
Land, respectively. Since 12 June 1945, appellees and their predecessor-in-
interest have been in public, open, exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous
possession thereof in the concept of an owner. Appellees declared the questioned
properties for taxation purposes. There was no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind whatsoever affecting the said parcels of land. Neither did any other person
have an interest therein, legal or equitable, or was in possession thereof.
On the scheduled initial hearing, appellees adduced pieces of documentary
evidence to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notices, posting and
publication. Appellee Angeline testified on the continuous, open, public and
exclusive possession of the lands in dispute.
Trial on the merits ensued. In a Decision7 dated 6 November 2007, the court a quo
granted appellees application for registration. Unflinching, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but failed to attain favorable
relief as its Motion was denied by the court a quoin its Order dated 11 September
2008. On even date, the court a quo rendered the assailed Amended Decision
finding appellees to have the registrable title over the subject properties. 8
LRC Case No. N-453
Previously, or in 1979, herein respondents Angeline, Agustina and Lawana filed a
similar application for registration of the herein subject property which was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-453 before the RTC La Trinidad, Branch 8. The
Republic opposed the application. After trial on the merits, a Decision 9 dated
December 26, 1994 was rendered dismissing the application on the ground that
respondents failed to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Respondents
did not appeal the said Decision; thus, it became final and executory.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024
The September 11, 2008 Amended Decision in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 held as
follows:
Well settled is the rule that the burden of proof in land registration cases is
incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real and absolute owner
in fee simple of the land being applied for. x x x The applicant must present
specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
statements which are more conclusion of law than factual evidence of possession.
Simply put, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence. x x x
However, given the foregoing facts, as borne out by competent, reliable,
concrete, and undisputed evidence, the Court cannot conceive of any better proof
of applicants adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and
exclusive possession and occupation in concept of owners. The Court finds and
concludes that the applicants have abundantly shown the specific acts that would
show such nature of their possession. In view of the totality of facts obtaining in
evidence on record, the applicants had ably complied with the burden of proof
required of them by law. The Court holds that the established facts are sufficient
proof to overcome the presumption that the lots sought to be registered form part the social justice ideal enshrined in the Constitution"(Republic vs. Court of
of the public domain. Hence, they have fully discharged to the satisfaction of the Appeals, G.R. No. L-62680, November 9, 1988).
Court their burden in this proceeding. Moreover, the Court is mindful of what the
Supreme Court said in Director of Lands v. Funtillarx x x that "The attempts of In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey
humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations plan of the land embracing the lots subject of the application was adduced in
titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude evidence as Exhibit "H" for the applicants. At its lower left hand corner is a
but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged." For this reason, the Supreme certification. It states in part: "x x x. This Survey is inside the alienable and
Court limited the strict application of the rule stated in Heirs of Amunategui v. disposable areas per Proc. No. 209, Lot-A. The land herein described is outside
Director of Forestry, x x x, that "In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the any military or civil reservations. x x x" Aside from this certification, it is further
applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of certified by Geronimo B. Fernandez, in his capacity as Supervising Geodetic
Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He Engineer I, "that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College and
must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A." Further scrutiny of the tracing cloth
public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration plan also reveals that the survey plan was approved by Regional Director Sulpicio
in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands."
grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 20910 issued by then President
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his
Ramon Magsaysay on October 20, 1955. It provides:
application." Thus, in Director of Lands v. Funtillar, the Supreme Court liberalized
the aforecited rule and stated:
"Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the provisions of Sections 83 and 89 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws
as amended, I, RAMON MAGSAYSAY, President of the Philippines do hereby
governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must,
exclude from the operation of Proclamation Nos. 99, 64, 39, 102 and 698, series
however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice
of 1914, 1919, 1920, 1927 and 193[4], respectively, and declare the parcel or
and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness
parcels of land embraced therein or portions thereof situated in the Municipality
and injustice.
of La Trinidad, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province, open to disposition
under the provisions of the Public Land Act, to wit: x x x"
Every application for a concession of public land has to be viewed in the light of
its peculiar circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui vs.
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the
Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69) ruling is warranted whenever a portion of the
approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), is one of the three (3) lots described in the
public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other
aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to "disposition under the
questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very
provisions of the Public Land Act."
reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration
Act, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then
their provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey
implementation. plan (Exh. "H"), in conjunction with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support
the certification that the land subject of the survey is alienable and disposable.
The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7
In the present case, there is no showing that any "portion of the public domain is
subject of the present application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural
in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable
College reservation, that it is within the Proclamation No. 209, LotA; that the land
practices." Instead, it is very evident from applicants mass of undisputed
is alienable and disposable pursuant to the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, and
evidence that the present application will enhance social justice considerations
that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This] statement of facts in the
behind the Public Land Law and the Land Registration Act, in the light of the
certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently contain
incontrovertible fact that applicant Angeline Dayaoen and her three (3) children
all the essential factual and legal bases for any certification that may be issued
have long established their residential houses on the land subject of the
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the lots subject of
application, which is "the policy of the State to encourage and promote the
the present application are indeed alienable and disposable. More importantly,
distribution of alienable public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with
the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was approved by Regional Director
Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As such, the aforecited certifications
in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan carry not only his imprimatur but
also that of the Director of Lands for whom he was acting. Thus, the approval of
the survey plan was in effect the act of the Director of Lands. Necessarily, the
certifications in the approved survey plan were [those] of the Director of Lands,
not only of the Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and Regional Director Sulpicio A.
Taeza. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the Director of Lands is empowered to
issue the approved survey plan and to certify that the land subject thereof is
alienable and disposable (Exh. "H") x x x. The law states the powers of the
Director of Lands, as follows:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be the executive officer
charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through the Director of Lands,
who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive
control of the survey, classifications, lease, sale or any other form of concession
or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his
decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
Sec. 5. The Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce shall prepare and issue such forms, instructions, rules, and
regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into
effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under
such provisions.
Therefore, to require another certification to be issued by the Director of Lands
attesting to same facts already certified in the tracing cloth of the approved
survey plan that the lots subject of the present application for registration of titles
are alienable and disposable is a needless ceremony, a pure act of
supererogation.
It is clear, therefore, that the applicants have satisfactorily complied with their
burden of proving "that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable" considering that they have established "the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute." The certifications categorically cited Proclamation No.
209, Lot-A, as the basis in attesting that the land, which is the subject of the
survey and present application, is alienable and disposable because it is inside
Lot A opened by the presidential proclamation "to disposition under the provisions
of the Public Land Act."
The Court finds it significant that the State has not adduced any evidence, in spite
of the fact that it has all the records, resources, and power in its command, to
show that the lots subject of the present application are not alienable and
disposable part of the public domain. Having failed to refute the evidence on the
very face of the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which is a
public document and part of a public record, the presumption that the
certifications therein contained, attesting that the lots subject of the present
application for registration are alienable and disposable, are true and correct have
attained the status of concrete facts.
Hence, the Court now turns to resolve the sole issue of whether or not [sic] the
herein applicants are entitled to the confirmation of their titles to the lots subject
of their present application.
It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in
possession and occupation of the land (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated
by evidence that when the land was verbally given to applicant Angeline Dayaoen
and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already an
old hut thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their
marriage (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005, p. 9), and there were already on the land some fruit
trees, and some other plants, consisting of guavas and avocados already bearing
fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-14). The anterior
possession and occupation of Antonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be
tacked to the possession and occupation of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the
latters possession and occupation, in turn, is tacked to the present possession
and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired titles from her. Consequently,
the applicants are entitled to the benefits of Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended
by R.A. 1942, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own such lands or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for atleast thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter."
This section was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which took effect on
January 25, 1977 (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48327, August 21,
1991). Section 4 thereof provides:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945
In the present case, it will be recalled that Antonio Pablo commenced possession
and occupation of the land subject of the application for confirmation of title since
before the Second World War. Thus, applicant Angeline Dayaoen was already in
possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for more than thirty (30) years, including the anterior possession and
occupation of Antonio Pablo, when P.D. 1073 amended Sec. 48(b) if C.A. 141, as
amended by R.A. 1942. Applicant Angeline Dayaoen already acquired vested right
of ownership over the land and, therefore, already excluded from the public
domain, as it was already a private property over which applicant Angeline
Dayaoen has a confirmable title. Republic vs. Court of Appeals(G.R. No. 48327,
August 21, 1991) held:
It is important to note that private respondents application for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect title was filed in 1970 and that the land
registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued possession
of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c)
was in legal effect. Private respondents imperfect title was, in other words,
perfected or vested by the completion of the required period of possession prior
to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private respondents right in respect of the land
they had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073.
Even if Sec. 48(b) of C.A. 141 is applied in the present case in its textual form as
amended by P.D. 1073, still the present applicants are qualified thereunder to
have their titles confirmed. They have already been in possession and occupation
of the lots subject of their application for confirmation of titles under bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership for more than thirty (30) years since before the
Second World War (or before June 12, 1945) considering that the possession and
occupation of x x x Antonio Pablo, the predecessor-in-interest of the present
applicants, should be tacked to their possession and occupation. Consequently,
applicant Angeline Dayaoen had a vested right over the lots subject of the
present application when she conveyed, transferred and delivered Lots 6 and 7,
respectively, to her co-applicants.
Under Article 541 of the New Civil Code, which squarely applies to applicants
present application, "A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to
show or prove it." Clearly, therefore, since the applicant Angeline Dayaoen and
her predecessor, Antonio Pablo, have been in continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the land since before the Second World War and have been
exercising acts of ownership thereon, it is incumbent upon the State, and not the
applicants, to show that the land still forms part of the public domain. The State
has utterly failed to overcome the presumption with the sole testimony of Irene
Leao Caayas, which the Court does not even accord any weight and credence.
The tax declaration of applicant Angeline Dayaoen and religious payment of real
property taxes lend strong corroboration to the evidence of the applicants. It is
the established jurisprudence that "While it is true that by themselves tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property"(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 533). In the
present application, it has been concretely and [indisputably] established that
applicant Angeline Dayaoen and her predecessor Antonio Pablo have been in
actual and continuous possession of the parcel of land embracing the lots subject
of the present application.
In fine, therefore, the present applicants are entitled to have their titles confirmed
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Court concludes that the
applicants have indeed confirmable and registrable titles over the lots subject of
the instant application for confirmation of titles pursuant to either Sec. 48(b) of
C.A. 141, as amended by R.A. 1942, or Sec. 48(c) of C.A. 141, as amended by
R.A.1942 and P.D. 1073.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING
the herein Application for Registration of the parcels of land described as follows:
Lot 1, Psu-1-002413, in the name of ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, particularly described
as a parcel of land (Lot 1, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of
La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2
by an alley (2.00m. wide); on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leao; on the SE.,
along line 3-4 by lot 2 of the plan; on the SW., along line 4-1 by Mt. State
Agricultural College, T.C.T. # 7179; Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being
S. 63 deg. 59E., 1391.52 m. from Tri. Sta, "TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet,
thence:
 N. 45 deg. 18E., 27.25m. to point 2;
S. 40 deg. 37E., 33.18m. to point 3;
S. 54 deg. 05W., 37.44m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50W., 29.94m. to point of beginning.
Containing an area of NINE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (994) SQ. METERS, more or
less.
Lot 6, Psu-1-002413, in the name of AGUSTINA TAULE, particularly described as a
parcel of land (Lot 6, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of La
Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SW., along line 1-2 by
Mt. State Agricultural College, T.C.T. # 7179; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris
Leao; on the NE., along line 3-4 by Psu-1-000485; on the SE., along line 4-1 by
lot 7 of the plan,. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being S. 64 deg. 20E.
1382.57m. from Tri. "TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence:
N. 20 deg. 50W., 47.27m. to point 2;
S. 45 deg. 15E., 16.02m. to point 3;
S. 43 deg. 38E., 24.91m. to point 4;
S. 38 deg. 20W., 18.96m. to point of beginning.
Containing an area of THREE HUNDRED NINETY (390) SQ. METERS, more or less.
Lot 7, Psu-1-002413, in the name of LAWANA T. BATCAGAN, particularly described
as a parcel of land (Lot 7, Psu-1-002413) situated at Brgy. of Tabangaoen, Mun. of
La Trinidad, Prov. of Benguet, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2
by Psu-1-000485; on the NE., along line 2-3 by Morris Leao; on the SE., along line
3-4 by an alley (2.00 m. wide); on the SW., along line 4-5 by Mt. State Agricultural
College, T.C.T. # 7179; on the NW., along line 5-1 by lot 6 of the plan. Beginning
ata point marked "1" on plan being S. 65 deg. 02E., 1385.03 m. from Tri.
"TRINIDAD", La Trinidad, Benguet, thence:
N. 62 deg. 02E., 3.11m. to point 2;
S. 47 deg. 13E., 10.58m. to point 3;
S. 44 deg. 47W., 26.43m. to point 4;
N. 20 deg. 50W., 10.29m. to point 5;
N. 38 deg. 20E., 18.96m. to point of beginning.
Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (250) SQ. METERS, more or less.
The decree of registration shall be issued upon attainment by this judgment of its
finality.
This Amended Decision supersedes the Decision earlier rendered by the Court.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
92584. Petitioner essentially argued that the La Trinidad RTC erred in granting
respondents application for registration since they failed to prove that the
subject property constitutes alienable and disposable land; that the annotation on
the survey plan that the subject property is alienable and disposable is not
sufficient; and that respondents failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property.
On February 23, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
September 11, 2008 Amended Decision of the La Trinidad RTC, pronouncing thus:
The Appeal bears no merit.
Appellant Republic asseverates that appellees12 failed to comply with the legal
requirement of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands applied for since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.13
Appellants asseveration does not hold sway.
Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 provides:
"Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance x x x an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." By the same token, Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 14114 which took effect [in] November 1936,
amended by Section 4 PD No. 1073, provides:
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945."
The proceedings under the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529), and
Section 48 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141 as amended by P.D. No. 1073), are
the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final.
Both proceedings are likewise governed by the same court procedure and law of
evidence.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under Section 14 (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Withal, appellees must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their
claim and they cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
of law than factual evidence of possession. Jurisprudence dictates that a person
who seeks confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to a piece of land on the
basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest shoulders the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence compliance with the
requirements of Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended.
Parenthetically, case law teaches us that the determination of whether claimants
were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 1945 as required by law, is a question of fact. Here, We
find no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the court a quo that
appellees have the registrable rightowing to their and their predecessor-in-
interest continuous possession of the subject parcels of land. The foundation of
such conclusion is primarily factual. Findings of fact of the trial court are
conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on record.
Contrary to appellants thesis, appellees were able to prove by convincing
evidence that they and their predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous,
open, exclusive and notorious possession over the subject properties since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Appellee Angeline had personal knowledge that her
predecessor-in-interest, Antonio, owned and possessed them from pre-war time.
She and her husband Dado, tilled and cultivated the lands in question since 1963
when it was given to them by Antonio as a wedding gift. This was corroborated by
co-appellee Lawana who was a co-employee of Antonio in 1961 at the Mountain
State Agricultural College (MSAC), and witness Albert Dimas (Albert), a resident of
the adjoining lot (MSAC cottage), and witness Victor Alejandro, a neighbor of
Antonio in Camp Dangwa.
In the same vein, appellees declared the subject properties for taxation purposes.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not
only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Next, appellants
postulations that the disputed lands were not yet alienable and disposable and
that appellees failed to overcome the presumption that all lands form part of the
public domain, carry no weight.
xxxx
In the case at bench, appellees were able to discharge such bounden duty. The
subject properties are no longer part of public domain. Their private character is
declared in the annotation of the survey plan approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources through the Bureau of Lands, Regional Office
No. 1,San Fernando, La Union, viz: "The survey is inside alienable and disposable
areas per Proc. No. 209, Lot-A"; x x x The land herein described is outside any
military and civil reservations. x x x "The Supervising Geodetic Engineer of the
same Office likewise certified "x x x this survey is outside the Mountain State
Agricultural College and it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A."
We echo with approval the disquisition of the court a quo which thoroughly
threshed out the issue on the alienable and disposable character of the
challenged parcels of land
"In the case at bar, the tracing cloth (Diazo Polyester film) of the approved survey
plan of the land embracing the lots subject of the application x x x.
The Court takes judicial notice of Proclamation No. 209 issued by then President
Ramon Magsaysay on October 20, 1955. x x x
Lot A, mentioned in the aforestated certifications in the tracing cloth of the
approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), is one of the three (3) lots described in the
aforecited Presidential Proclamation No. 209 opened to "disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Act."
The categorical statement of facts in the tracing cloth of the approved survey
plan (Exh. "H"), in conjunction with the aforecited Proclamation No. 209, support
the certification that the land subject of the survey is alienable and disposable.
The certifications therein attesting that the land, which embraced Lots 1, 6 and 7
subject of the present application, is outside the Mountain State Agricultural
College reservation, that it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A; that the land
is alienable and disposable pursuant to the Proclamation No. 209, Lot-A, and
that it is outside any military or civil reservations. [This] statement of facts in the
certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan sufficiently
contain[s] all the essential factual and legal bases for any certification that may
be issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the lots
subject of the present application are indeed alienable and disposable. More
importantly, the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan was approved by
Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza "For the Director of Lands." As such, the
aforecited certifications in the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan carry not
only his imprimatur but also that of the Director of Lands for whom he was acting.
Thus, the approval of the survey plan was in effect the act of the Director of
Lands. Necessarily, the certifications in the approved survey plan were [those] of
the Director of Lands, not only of the Supervising Geodetic Engineer I and
Regional Director Sulpicio A. Taeza.
The foregoing discourse is in congruity with the principle enunciated in Republic v.
Serrano15 wherein the Supreme Court explicitly pronounced, viz:
"While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to
the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by
DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the
subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial
compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been
verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18,
1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence
to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the
Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents applications on
the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no
substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification
may be equitably extended in favor of respondents.
In prcis, We discern no reversible error committed by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Amended Decision dated 11
September 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, La Trinidad,
Benguet, Branch 63, in LRC No. 03-LRC-0024, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In a November 25, 2013 Resolution,17 this Court resolved to give due course to
the Petition, which contains the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AS WELL AS
MADE FINDINGS WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH, OR NOT SUPPORTED BY, THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. LIKEWISE, IT GRAVELY MISAPPLIEDTHE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE, AS FOLLOWS:
(a) The land registration court gravely erred in granting the application for
registration of the three (3) subject lots despite respondents utter failure
to prove that the said lots are alienable and disposable, a mere annotation
on the survey plan that the said lots are alienable and disposable being
insufficient to prove alienability;
(b) Respondents evidence is utterly insufficient to prove open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation and possession by themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 18
Petitioners Arguments
In its Petition and Reply19 seeking reversal of the assailed CA decision and the
dismissal of respondents application for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-
0024, petitioner argues that respondents failed to satisfy the legal requirements
relative to proof of the alienability of the subject land and continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession thereof. Particularly, petitioner claims that it
was erroneous for the trial and appellate courts to consider as substantial
compliance the certification or annotation in the survey plan that the subject land
is alienable and disposable; that respondents did not present in court the public
officials who issued the said certification/annotation in order that they may
authenticate the same; that respondents failed to establish the existence of a
positive act of government declaring that the subject land is alienable and
disposable; that respondents failed to secure a government certification that the
subject land constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that
the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Proclamation 209, as the exact
boundaries of the lots covered by said law, as well as that of the subject land, are
not a matter of judicial knowledge; that respondents have not shown that their
predecessors-in-interest were in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land for 30 years or since June 12, 1945 or earlier; that
respondents possession is not genuine; that the trial court erred in relying on the
testimonial evidence taken in LRC Case No. N-453 since the transcripts of
stenographic notes in said case were not submitted to the court; and that
respondents tax declarations and receipts do not constitute proof of adverse
possession or ownership of the subject land.
Respondents Arguments
In their Comment,20 respondents contend that, as correctly found by the trial and
appellate courts, the annotations and certifications in the approved survey plan
substantially comply with the legal requirement for a certification as to the
alienability of the subject land. They cite as follows:
Third. The approved survey plan (Exh. "H") of the respondents contain
certifications attesting to the fact that the three (3) lots, among others, which are
the subject of their application for title, are within the parcel of land described as
Lot A in Presidential Proclamation 209 of the late President Ramon Magsaysay
excluded from the Mountain State Agricultural College (now Benguet State
University) and released for disposition; x x x The certifications are found at the
foot of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H"), which, for ready reference, are here
quoted:
Note:
All corners not otherwise described are P.S. cyl. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm. This
survey is for registration purposes and should not be subject of a public land
application unless declared public land by a competent court. This survey is
claimed by Irene L. Ca-aya representing the Hrs. of M. Leao. This survey is
inside the alienable & disposable area as per Proc. No. 209, Lot A. The land herein
described is outside any military or civil registrations. Tax declaration no. 4317 of
real property has been submitted as part of the survey-returns.
- CERTIFICATION -
I hereby certify that this survey is outside the Mountain State Agricultural College
and it is within the Proclamation No. 209, Lot A.
(Signed)
GERONIMO B. FERNANDEZ
Superv. Geodetic Engineer - I
In recommending approval of the survey plan, Laurentino P. Baltazar, Regional
Chief, Surveys Division, of the Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands, then
Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural
Resources), at San Fernando, La Union, certified:
I certify that the complete survey returns of the herein described survey, which
are on file in this Office, were verified and found to conform with pertinent laws of
the Philippines and with applicable regulations of the Bureau of Lands. In view
thereof, approval of the plan is hereby recommended.
(Signed)
LAURENTINO P. BALTAZAR
Regional Chief, Survey Division
Sulpicio A. Taeza, Regional Director, Regional Lands Office No. 1, Bureau of Lands,
then Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and
Natural Resources), at San Fernando, La Union, approved the survey and plan
(Exh. "H") "For the Director of Lands." The survey plan (Exh. "H") was approved on
April 10, 1976. Subsequent thereto, or on August 18, 1977, the sketch plan of Mr.
Edilberto Quiaoit (Exh. "P" and Exh. "Z" and series) was prepared. It contains this
certification of District Land Officer Amador Roxas of the Bureau of Lands at the
foot thereof, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that this sketch plan is true and correct as plotted from the
technical descriptions of Lot 954, GSS-157, & Lots 1-7, PSU-1-002413 which are
on file in this Office.
Issued upon request of Mr. Lawana Batcagan in connection with Administrative
Case No. (N) Angeline Dayaoen et al. vs. Morris Leao et al.
Bu. Of Lands, Baguio City August 18, 1977
(Signed)
AMADOR P. ROXAS
District Land Officer21
Respondents add that, as correctly held by the trial and appellate courts, they
have satisfactorily proved their continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land; that their predecessors-in-interest occupied the
land as early as during the Japanese occupation, or clearly prior to June 12, 1945;
and that petitioners evidence should not be believed for being biased.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
The trial and appellate courts seriously erred in declaring that the annotation in
the tracing cloth of the approved survey plan (Exh. "H") and the certifications
therein constitute substantial compliance with the legal requirement on
presentation of a certificate of land classification status or any other proof that
the subject land is alienable and disposable. We cannot subscribe to such notion.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.
The classification and reclassification of such lands are the prerogative of the
Executive Department. The President may at any time transfer these public lands
from one class to another.22
While in 1955 the President through Presidential Proclamation No. 209
declared particular lands in Baguio City as alienable and disposable, they may
have been re-classified by the President thereafter. This is precisely the reason
why an applicant for registration of title based on an executive proclamation is
required to present evidence on the alienable and disposable character of the
land applied for, such as a certificate of land classification status from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which only the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer23 (CENRO) and the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer24 (PENRO) are authorized to
issue under DENR Administrative Order No. 38,25 series of 1990 (DAO 38).
In Republic v. Cortez,26 the Court made the following pronouncement:
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.1wphi1
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands
as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect
that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the
kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative actor statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from
the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the
case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the
Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents
failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that
the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. (Emphasis
in the original)
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche, the Court declared that:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the
status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a
certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable
and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through
survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by
the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis in the
original)
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been
classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted
only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no
information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother to establish the
status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title
under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence
required bylaw as proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. Cortez failed to present a certification from
the proper government agency as to the classification of the subject property.
Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR Secretary
had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable. Having
failed to present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez claim that the subject
property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
must fail. (Emphasis supplied)
Later, another pronouncement was made in Fortuna v. Republic, 27 stating thus:
28
Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification of public
lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a
presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be
included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve
a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title
acquired through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established
by the notation in the survey plan, which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map
No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record,
neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject
parcel[.]" However, we find that neither of the above documents is evidence of a
positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least,
only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the
proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of
the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as
declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. In Republic v.
Heirs of Juan Fabio, the Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as
alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the
official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or the
DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable.
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a
positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortunas claim of title
through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied. (Emphasis supplied
and/or in the original)
Yet again, in another subsequent decision of this Court in Remman Enterprises,
Inc. v. Republic,29 it was held that
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must
prove that the properties subject of the application are alienable and disposable.
Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner cannot be
admitted as evidence of the subject properties' alienability and disposability. Such
notations do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the subject properties remain part of the inalienable public
domain. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 209 may be taken, the
DENR certificate of land classification status or any other proof of the alienable
and disposable character of the land may not be dispensed with, because it
provides a more recent appraisal of the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable, or that the land has not been re-classified in the meantime. The
applicable law Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed;30 one way of establishing this material
fact is through the DENR certificate of land classification status which is presumed
to be the most recent appraisal of the status and character of the property.
The ruling in Republic v. Serrano31 cannot be controlling. Instead, We must apply
the pronouncements in Republic v. Cortez, Fortuna v. Republic, and Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. Republic, as they are more recent and in point. Besides, these
cases accurately ratiocinate that such notations or certifications in approved
survey plans refer only to the technical correctness of the surveys plotted in these
plans and have nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the
properties surveyed, and that they only establish that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area
per verification through survey by the proper government office; they do not
indicate at all that the property sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
On the issue of continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession, however,
there appears to be no reason to deviate from the identical findings of fact of the
trial court and the CA, which are rooted in the testimonies of the respondents and
their witnesses - categorical declarations which petitioner has failed to refute. We
adopt the findings of the trial court, to wit:
It has been well established that since pre-war Antonio Pablo had been in
possession and occupation of the land (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005), which is corroborated
by evidence that when the land was verbally given to applicant Angeline Dayaoen
and Dado Dayaoen as a wedding gift, the old man Antonio Pablo had already an
old hut thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, p. 14) where the spouses stayed after their
marriage (TSN, Oct. 19, 2005, p. 9), and there were already on the land some fruit
trees, and some other plants, consisting of guavas and avocados already bearing
fruits, which he had planted thereon (TSN, May 29, 1984, pp. 12-14). The anterior
possession and occupation of Antonio Pablo of the land since pre-war should be
tacked to the possession and occupation of applicant Angeline Dayaoen, and the
latter's possession and occupation, in turn, is tacked to the present possession
and occupation of her co-applicants, who acquired titles from her. 32
Thus, while respondents have complied with most of the requirements in
connection with their application for registration, they have not sufficiently shown
that the property applied for is alienable and disposable at the time their
application for registration was filed. The Court is left with no alternative but to
deny their application for registration. To be sure, the nation's interests will be
best served by a strict adherence to the provisions of the land registration
laws.33 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 23, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92584 and the September 11, 2008
Amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63
in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents'
application for registration in LRC Case No. 03-LRC-0024 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164687 February 12, 2009
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004, which set aside
the lower courts order to suspend the proceedings on respondents application
for land registration.
On July 12, 2001, respondent Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for registration of a parcel of land
with an area of 1,492 square meters located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan.2 Attached to the application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-
01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services (LMS) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.
On August 20, 2001, petitioner SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote
the Chief, Regional Survey Division, DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation
of the respondents survey plan because the lot encroached on the properties it
recently purchased from several lot owners and that, despite being the new
owner of the adjoining lots, it was not notified of the survey conducted on June 8,
2001.3
Petitioner then manifested its opposition to the respondents application for
registration. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their respective oppositions.
On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed its formal opposition. Petitioner alleged that
it had recently bought seven parcels of land in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta,
delineated as Lots B, C, D, E, G, H and I in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan No.
(LRC) Pcs-21329, approved by the Land Registration Commission on August 26,
1976, and previously covered by Survey Plan No. Psu-236090 approved by the
Bureau of Lands on December 29, 1970. These parcels of land are covered by
separate certificates of title, some of which are already in the name of the
petitioner while the others are still in the name of the previous owners.
On February 20, 2002, the RTC declared a general default, except as to the
petitioner, the Republic, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas. Thereafter, respondent
commenced the presentation of evidence.
Meanwhile, acting on petitioners request for the cancellation of the respondents
survey plan, DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and
Public Affairs, Allan V. Barcena, advised the petitioner to file a petition for
cancellation in due form so that the DENR could properly act on the
same.4 Accordingly, petitioner formally filed with the DENR a petition 5 for
cancellation of the survey plan sometime in March 2002, alleging the following
grounds:
I.
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ALIENABLE OR DISPOSABLE PROPERTY WHICH IS
THE SUBJECT LOT IN THIS CASE
II.
NO NOTICE WAS MADE UPON PETITIONER (AS ADJOINING LANDOWNER AND WHO
BEARS INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT LOT) MUCH LESS THE OWNERS OF
ADJOINING LANDS.
III.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES EVIDENTLY SHOW THAT BAD FAITH AND/OR MALICE
ATTENDED THE APPROVAL OF (PLAN WITH PSU NO. 01-008438).6
On July 17, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings 7 in the
land registration case, alleging that the court should await the DENR resolution of
the petition for the cancellation of the survey plan "as the administrative case is
prejudicial to the determination" of the land registration case.
On October 8, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant
motion and suspends the proceedings herein. In the meantime, and until receipt
by this Court of a copy of the resolution of the petition for cancellation by the
DENR, the instant case is hereby ARCHIVED.
SO ORDERED.8
Emphasizing that a survey plan is one of the mandatory requirements in land
registration proceedings, the RTC agreed with the petitioner that the cancellation
of the survey plan would be prejudicial to the petition for land registration. 9
On February 13, 2003, the RTC denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration of its order.10 Respondent thereafter filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA assailing the order suspending the proceedings.
On March 19, 2004, finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the proceedings, the CA granted the petition for certiorari, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
challenged Orders dated October 8, 2002 and February 13, 2003 of the
respondent Court are declared NULL and VOID.
The Court a quo is directed to continue the proceedings until its final
determination. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
The CA ratiocinated that the survey plan which was duly approved by the DENR
should be accorded the presumption of regularity, and that the RTC has the power
to hear and determine all questions arising from an application for registration. 12
On July 15, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution 13 denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner was, thus, compelled to file this petition for review,
ascribing the following errors to the CA:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LAND REGISTRATION CASE IS
LEGAL AND PROPER PENDING THE DETERMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES-REGION 1.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE LOWER COURT HAVE PROPER AND
SUFFICIENT BASES IN FACT AND IN LAW.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN SUSPENDING
THE PROCEEDINGS AND ARCHIVING THE CASE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS NOT THE ONLY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND
ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW ON THE PART OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT.14
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that, since the respondents cause of action in the land
registration case depends heavily on the survey plan, it was only prudent for the
RTC to suspend the proceedings therein pending the resolution of the petition for
cancellation of the survey plan by the DENR.15 It, therefore, insists that recourse
to a petition for certiorari was not proper considering that respondent was not
arbitrarily deprived of her right to prosecute her application for registration. 16
Undeniably, the power to stay proceedings is an incident to the power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of the cases in its dockets, with economy of
time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants. But courts should be mindful
of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case and, thus, should
not be too eager to suspend proceedings of the cases before them. Hence, every
order suspending proceedings must be guided by the following precepts: it shall
be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations,
conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts, 17 or when the
rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the
questions raised in the first action are settled. 18 Otherwise, the suspension will be
regarded as an arbitrary exercise of the courts discretion and can be corrected
only by a petition for certiorari.
None of the circumstances that would justify the stay of proceedings is present. In
fact, to await the resolution of the petition for cancellation would only delay the
resolution of the land registration case and undermine the purpose of land
registration.
The fundamental purpose of the Land Registration Law (Presidential Decree No.
1529) is to finally settle title to real property in order to preempt any question on
the legality of the title except claims that were noted on the certificate itself at
the time of registration or those that arose subsequent
thereto.1avvphi1 Consequently, once the title is registered under the said law,
owners can rest secure on their ownership and possession.19
Glaringly, the petition for cancellation raises practically the very same issues that
the herein petitioner raised in its opposition to the respondents application for
registration. Principally, it alleges that the survey plan should be cancelled
because it includes portions of the seven properties that it purchased from
several landowners, which properties are already covered by existing certificates
of title.
Petitioner posits that it is the DENR that has the sole authority to decide the
validity of the survey plan that was approved by the LMS.20 It cites Section 4(15),
Chapter 1, Title XIV, Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that the DENR
shall
(15) Exercise (of) exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for
classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies.
However, respondent argues that the land registration court is clothed with
adequate authority to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties, and that even
if the DENR cancels her survey plan, the land registration court is not by duty
bound to dismiss the application for registration based solely on the cancellation
of the survey plan.21lawphil.net
Without delving into the jurisdiction of the DENR to resolve the petition for
cancellation, we hold that, as an incident to its authority to settle all questions
over the title of the subject property, the land registration court may resolve the
underlying issue of whether the subject property overlaps the petitioners
properties without necessarily having to declare the survey plan as void.
It is well to note at this point that, in its bid to avoid multiplicity of suits and to
promote the expeditious resolution of cases, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and
the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court.
Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial
and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues. 22 When the
law confers jurisdiction upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. 23 It may,
therefore, hear and determine all questions that arise from a petition for
registration.
In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to
determine whether the issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and
existing certificate of title.24 An application for registration of an already titled
land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, 25 which is not allowed by
law.26 But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to
cancel the survey plan in order to determine whether the subject property is
already titled or forms part of already titled property. The court may now verify
this allegation based on the respondents survey plan vis--vis the certificates of
title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan
precisely serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous
land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.27

Should the court find it difficult to do so, the court may require the filing of
additional papers to aid in its determination of the propriety of the application,
based on Section 21 of P.D. No. 1529:

SEC. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. The
court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to those
prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filing of
any additional papers.

The court may also directly require the DENR and the Land Registration Authority
to submit a report on whether the subject property has already been registered
and covered by certificates of title, like what the court did in Carvajal v. Court of
Appeals.28 In that case, we commended such move by

the land registration court for being "in accordance with the purposes of the Land
Registration Law."29

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated March 19, 2004 and Resolution dated July 15, 2004 are AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is DIRECTED to continue with
the proceedings in L.R.C. Case No. U-1134 and to resolve the same with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 103727. December 18, 1996]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN,
represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F.
SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second
Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C.
DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
[G.R. No. 106496. December 18, 1996]
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE
PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO,
RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and
LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of
controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of,
against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of
approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[1] on the basis of a Spanish
title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim,
according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as
Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus
affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of
Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas
Bay in the south.[2]
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up
and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various
trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, [3] in connection
therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v.
Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357
[1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360
[1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of Lands v. Tesalona,
236 SCRA 336 [1994][4]terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands
covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the
highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point,
litigation must end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for
lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have
been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same
subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the
losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the
conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be
expected; but, it is not their will, but the Courts, which must prevail; and,
to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues
must be laid to rest and the courts dispositions thereon accorded
absolute finality.[5] [Cited cases omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we
render judgment herein writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the
issue of validity of the basis of the estates claim of ownership over this vast
expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out
cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint[6]for recovery of
possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This
was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
104, Quezon City in its decision[7] dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion[8] of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the
defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering
plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or
reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed
on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz,
Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain,
Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria
Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty
Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro
discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067,
1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from
Original Certificate of Title No. 614 [9] and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544
and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the
aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of
certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad
faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and
333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated
March 21, 1988 in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands,
Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in
relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September
12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and
genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the
subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision
dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag,
Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B. [10]
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants,
namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain
and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.[11]
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint
against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung
and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered
owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and
Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. [12]
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo,
Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already
the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which
cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136,
covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which
have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens system by private
persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. [13]
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,[14] and so, the petitioner
estate interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the
appeal was dismissed[15] for being unmeritorious and the lower courts decision
was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate. The appellate court
ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof
was presented in the proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered
under the Torrens System hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly
excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain
and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence,
the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and void. [16]
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate,
on March 16, 1992, filed the present petition[17] docketed as G. R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a petition[18] for
letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order[19] dated November 17, 1978
declaring inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal
force and effect.
The dispositive portion[20] of the said Order reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
 1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside. On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order
appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate. [22]
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal
force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of
therefrom. Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00).[23]
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other
transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to
No. 4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect. furnish copies of the letters of administration and other pertinent orders
approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to the following
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from entities:
the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
(a) The Commanding General
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from Philippine Constabulary
representing or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or
from disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Camp Crame, Quezon City
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.
(b) The Solicitor General
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in
Court within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all
Manila
real and personal properties of the estate which had come into
their possession or knowledge under oath.
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to
continue with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest A. Mabini St., Manila
their case.
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
The consideration and approval of the administrators final
accounting and inventory of the presentation of movants- (e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
intervenors evidence as well as the consideration of all other
incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a. m. (f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and

The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate Caloocan
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971
with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch (g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan
IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as
administrator and co-administrator, respectively. and Rizal

On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, (h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower court without any
opposition.[21] (i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
 (j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various
municipalities in which properties of the estate are
located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon
City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[24]
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any
confusion brought about by various persons who had been misrepresenting
themselves as having been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to
sell its properties by virtue thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the
Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976,
Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and
ineffective as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except
where the holder thereof applies for land registration under Act
496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE
PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or
his supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they
might have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction,
laches and/or prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be
administered for purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in
accordance with law, and all the inventories so far submitted,
insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed
ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land
subject matter of the petition considering that, except such
portions thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid
adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same belong
in State ownership.[25]
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. [26]
On February 16, 1977, the Republics Opposition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge
Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised,
the Court hereby DISMISSES the Opposition dated August 30, 1976, filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the co-administrator Justino Z.
Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies
of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.[27]
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Republic. [28]
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C.
Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April
29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or
173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon,
Quezon City and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa
Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro,
Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and
lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased,
consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and
described by said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which
have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by
private persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its
instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government
as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the
public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been sold,
 quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly
approved by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter
be set aside, after due consideration on a case to case basis, of various
motions to set aside the said Court order which approved the said sales,
quitclaims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co-administrator, is
hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in
the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of
administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-administrator
Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his
co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of
copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to
amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of
the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets
and credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate
legal action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice,
government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or
charges due from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of
the estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate
among the lawful heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to
a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program
of the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of
the New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale
by the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost
housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.[29]
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above
decision:[30]
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and
Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar
Fernandez. On July 12,1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for
Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition.[31]
After hearings were conducted on the Republics Motion for Reconsideration,
Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated Order[32]dated November 17, 1978 which,
in essence, set aside Judge Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect,
thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the
Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality
when it granted the Republics motion for reconsideration which was merely pro
forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same court of the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro.[33]
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners-heirs.[34] In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the
appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 null and void. The
appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republics
claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-
production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat
copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under
Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892
(Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of
Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 had been allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed
and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [35]
Hence, the herein petition,[36] docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on
September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and
106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15, 1994. [37]
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate
motions for intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
 In G.R. No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are
as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC,
Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross negligence of
lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial
and in affirming the lower courts null and void judgment. [38]
In G.R. No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of
errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which
resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower court as
an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated
objections of the petitioners.[39]
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of
Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and
Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court
reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of
Judges of equal rank.[40]
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the
order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of
Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were
already final.[41]
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that
Judge Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge
Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners
were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.[42]
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence
presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely
adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a single piece
of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guido title over Hacienda Angono
in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated therein being Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en banc decision
of the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title.[43]
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative
value of the petitioners Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower
courts resolution of the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in
the special proceedings case. Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of
whether or not petitioners Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no
legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower
court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling
the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No.
4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R. No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower
court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an intestate court, [44] to
resolve the question of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. [45]
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity
as parens patriae, argues that petitioners contention is misplaced considering
that when the Republic questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness
and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said
estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be
mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the States
patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased. [46]
A probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the
heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased
person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of wills.We held in the
case of Maingat v. Castillo,[47] that the main function of a probate court is to settle
and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the
process of administration. Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination
of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or
not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution
of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,[48] we stated, thus:
x x x questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to
estate of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with
the consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons x x x
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima
facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the
inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for letters of
administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo
our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia[49]that:
x x x The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a
deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings,
has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said
power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and
credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his
inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent
power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased
should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or
person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the
courts attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have
been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the
observations, with power to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima
facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in
nature as to the ownership of the said properties.[50] [Underscoring
Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did
not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17,
1978 which set aside Judge Bagasaos decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands
covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards
the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez
act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent
Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally hear the intestate
case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a reviewing judge. By setting aside the
Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag,
Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively,
Judge Fernandez, acting as a reviewing judge, proceeded without authority and/or
jurisdiction.[51]
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the
decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the
case can decide the same as long as the record and the evidence are all available
to him and that the same were taken into consideration and thoroughly
studied. The reviewing judge argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand
on considering that the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear
a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and
conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal. [52] In
the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of
Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the
rationale for reconsidering and setting aside Judge Bagasaos Decision dated April
25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of
Judge Fernandez disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of
the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of
whether or not the lower court in G.R. No. 106496 committed reversible error in
excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the
ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and
effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in
both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the late Mariano San
Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on
February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law
was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands
covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act [53] within six (6)
months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976.
[54]
Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their
lands.[55] Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of
land ownership.[56]
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
SECTION 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law
is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not
yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
 The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies
for its passage, to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances
of large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary
buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons
claiming ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in
conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona
fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the
holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles or
grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property
ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas
affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that
recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law
is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought
under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription,
are now ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of
actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., [57]we took
cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised
in the acceptance and admission of Spanish titles taking into account the
numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their supposed
reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo
de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their
allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. [58] Time and again we have held
that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it.[59] Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate
of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part
of Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to
have declared the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the
effectivity of P.D. No. 892.Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's
decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is
inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special
proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to
wit:
"The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of
recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored
the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and
wise alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the so-
called estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to
charitable and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations
as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to
hood wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims. [60]
In the same light, it does not escape this Courts onomatopoeic observation
that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the
complaint for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R.
No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasaos Decision of April 25,
1978 in support of the Titulos validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the
said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez Order of November
17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts holding in G.R. No. 103727
insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the
registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the
Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be
presented in order to comply with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount
the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not genuine, especially since its
genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases, the
petitioners-heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 nor a genuine copy thereof.In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-
heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. Q-RP) to
produce it as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the
subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other
interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate
estate, the petitioners referred to a document known as hypoteca (the Spanish
term is `hipoteca) allegedly appended to the Titulo.However, the said hypoteca
was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the action
for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-
heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged
illegible copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. C-9 to C-19).
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of
Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule
read:
SEC. 2. - Original writing must be produced; exceptions. - There can be
no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry,
other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;"
xxxxxxxxx
Sections 4 and 5 of the same Rule further read:
SEC. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. --- When
the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of
witnesses.
SEC. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse partys custody.
--- If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory
proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents
thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss.But the notice to produce
it is not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has
been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its
nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the
absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be
disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible
piece of evidence.[61]
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent
proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why
the original copy of the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The
alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue as to the exact
extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not
distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Hing Po v. Court of Appeals,[62] we pointed
out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion
of the court.[63]
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI
expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963
denominated as Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163; (2) a photostat copy
of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca registered in the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge
Bagasaos April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI report
aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro
Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not
the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the
existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. BRINGAS:
With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the distinguished
counsel for the government whether he admits that there is actually a
titulo propriedad 4136.
COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
 We are precisely impugning the Titulo and I think the question of counsel is
already answered by witness. The parties have not yet established the
due existence of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the
question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the
testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is
actually in existence Titulo Propiedad 4136; we are asking the question
candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared to state that
there is really in existence such Titulo Propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this Court that there was such a document
examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia and
Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be authentic.
[64]
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to
our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
x x x the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated
September 2, 1977 (Exhibit `O-RP) concluded that the document
contained material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of p. 1, Title and on line 5 of p. 2, Title, the word
Pinagcamaligan was written after Pulo;
b) On line 16, p. 1, Title, un was converted to mil;
c) On Line 18, p. 1, Title, mil was written at the end of tres in tres mil;
d) On line 19 of p. 1, Title, a semblance of mil was written after setentay tres;
e) On line 6, p. 2, Title, un was formed to a semblance of uni; and
f) On line 8, p. 2, Title, un was formed to mil.
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the
Titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still pieces of
black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of
burnings. The burnings were made on the very portions where there
were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably,
the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act. [65]
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. [66] Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial courts judgment therein,
sustained the finding that:
x x x The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title
in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and
intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the
location of the land described in the original title x x x.
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we
sustain the lower courts analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never
presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces
tecum (Exhibit Q-RP) was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested parties to produce
the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But no one produced the
Titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could
not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary
evidence.
It was explained that the Titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the
hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and
that his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious
efforts on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this
document of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in
order to determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Parks whereabouts are
unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only
logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if
produced.[67]
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the
subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions
required by law for their admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there
exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same
acquires no probative value.[68]
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et
al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch I, et al.[69] is enlightening. In said case, private respondent,
Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (PIADECO), claimed to
be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of
Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo
and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is
of doubtful validity,[70] Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for the Court, stated
that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two
undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces
of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City. Second. The title was signed
only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land
Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a
plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that
private ownership of land must be proved not only through the
genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land
claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20
Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil.
202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367,
371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by
purchase that the land must be concretely measured per hectare or
per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil.
362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used
30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the
land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In
Piadecos Rejoinder to Opposition dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case
3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as
74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of May 13,
1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000
hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous
identity of Piadecos land. Piadecos ownership thereof then equally
suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original
owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by
prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
(Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of
lands. By this decree, applications for adjustment -- showing the location,
boundaries and area of land applied for -- were to be filed with
the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered
the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the
interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing
applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of
the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for
another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano
sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then,
seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25,
1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000
hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares
of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154;
Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal
Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by
purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op.
cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that
Piadecos Titulois held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894
(Ibid., p. 26; Ventura, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second
petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who
had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law
(Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment
of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and
confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were
directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established
by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records
and documents which they may hold in their possession
(Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadecos title here supervenes when we come to consider that
title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days
after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco
exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing
thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.From
Piadecos explanation -- not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188)
we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the
 land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to
one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been
registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894.Don Mariano Ignacio died,
his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land
to herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate
of registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a
shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadecos
treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a
certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada
assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian
Castillo, appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the
land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over
the same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration
therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the
land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the
consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of
the land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity
of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out,
cast great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadecos
title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,[71] we categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative value as evidence of
land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution dated
February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v.
Ortigas docketed as G.R. No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final
judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by
this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on
the Titulos validity. In the WIDORAcase, the Titulos nullification was definitive. In
both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on
opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of
Deeds of Quezon City,[72] the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, viz:
x x x conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which
was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons
in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or
any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action
can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between
the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action,
and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of
Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required by merely identity of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid
to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as
evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory
submitted before the probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the
Titulo. Hence, there can be no net estate to speak of after the Titulos exclusion
from the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R. No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of
private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592
(Exh. 2, Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. 2- De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. 2 -
Dela Cruz).[73] Under the Torrens system of registration, the titles of private
respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final
decree.[74] More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity. [75] As a
last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject
Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed
to prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and
accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper
witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs claim
that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It
is an elementary legal principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
[76]
The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the
non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering
that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the
case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al.,[77] we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his
responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a
judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the
client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the
 mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980]
Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for.Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the
petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an
unsupported claim that the petitioner had been prejudiced by the
negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-
heirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the
writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted
hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration
of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any
Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of
ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General
to be more vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings
involving portions of the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office
of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those who have acquired
ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San
Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a
matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases.Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a
party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a
Resolution dated May 10, 1993,[78]denied Catalinos motion for leave to reopen
and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in
the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio
San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 103727
and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R. No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R. No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows :
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore,
no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from
the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and
terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of
the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby
disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to
otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the
estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby
ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in
possession thereof.
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.