US-China Relations China Policy On Capitol Hill PDF

U.S.
China Relations
With Chinas rapid ascendance to great power status, the U.S.China rela-
tionship has become one of the most important international relationships in
the world today. This book explores relations between the U.S. and China,
focusing in particular on China policy-making in the U.S. Congress, which
has been unusually active in the development of this relationship. Based on
detailed analysis of China bills introduced in Congress over the past three
decades, it provides detailed analysis of how Congressional policy-making
works in practice, and explores the most controversial issues in U.S.China
relations: Taiwan, trade and human rights. It considers the voting patterns
and party divisions on these issues, showing that liberals and conservatives
often form an alliance concerning China because Chinas authoritarian
regime, human rights problems, soaring trade surplus with the U.S and rising
military power attract criticism from both camps. It also argues that congres-
sional committees, bicameralism and presidential veto make it virtually
impossible for Congress to legislate on China, despite its intense preferences,
and therefore Congress often turns to informalbut no less eectivemeans
to exert inuence on China policy, such as framing public opinion and gener-
ating situations that result in anticipated reactions by the executive branch
or Beijing.
Tao Xie is Assistant Professor at the American Studies Centre, Beijing For-
eign Studies University, China. He holds a Ph.D. in political science. His
primary research interests are U.S. Congress and American electoral
behavior.
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U.S.China Relations
China policy on Capitol Hill
Tao Xie
U.S.China Relations
China Policy on Capitol Hill
Tao Xie
First published 2009 by Routledge
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2009 Tao Xie
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
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invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Tao, Xie, 1973
U.S.China relations : China policy on Capitol Hill / Tao Xie.
p. cm(Routledge contemporary China series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. United StatesForeign relationsChina. 2. ChinaForeign
relationsUnited States. 3. United StatesForeign relations1945
1989. 4. United StatesForeign relations1989-. 5. United States.
CongressDecision making. 6. TaiwanStrategic aspects.
7. United StatesCommerceChina. 8. ChinaCommerce
United States. 9. Human rightsChina. I. Title. II. Title: United
StatesChina relations.
E183.8.C5T36 2008
327.73051dc22
2008014023
ISBN 0-203-89014-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 0415776880 (hbk)

ISBN10: 0203890140 (ebk)
ISBN13: 9780415776882 (hbk)
ISBN13: 9780203890141 (ebk)
To Zhang Can
Contents
List of gures xi
List of tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Introduction 1
Congress and foreign policy 2
Why China? 5
Contributions of the book 9
Structure of the book 10
1 The new institutionalism and legislative behavior 13

The new institutionalism 13
Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy 19
Methodology 23
2 Congressional eorts to punish China 26

Collection of China bills 27
Number and nature of China bills 29
What inuences the ebb and ow of China bills? 34
3 Eects of congressional activism on China policy 43

Bicameralism 43
Congressional committees 48
Presidential veto 50
More bark than bite? 52
Why so many China bills? 54
Does Congress matter in China policy? 55
4 Congress and U.S.China trade relations 60

Booming economic ties 60
x Contents
Congress and U.S.China Trade 63
Legislative battle over PNTR 65
5 Congress and Taiwan 78

Historical ties between Congress and Taiwan 79
Congressional attempts to enhance U.S.Taiwan relations 82
6 Congress and Chinas human rights 100

Before Tiananmen: China as the exception 101
Tiananmen: the dividing line 104
MFN renewal and congressional eorts to change human rights
in China 108
7 Beyond the case of China 122

Selection of cases 123
Theoretical expectations 129
8 Conclusion 142
Legislative institutions and their impact on China policy 142
The international environment and Congresss China
policy 144
Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy 145
Policy implications 149
A look into the future 154
Appendix: Sources 157

Source of China bills and coding scheme 157
Sources of other quantitative data 157
Notes 161
Bibliography 177
Index 199
List of gures
2.1 Classication of China bills (including amendments),

19732006 32
2.2 Time trend of China bills (including amendments),
19732006 33
2.3 Favorability ratings of China on 10-point scale, 19542001 37
2.4 Favorability ratings of China on four-category scale,
19772006 38
3.1 HouseSenate ratios for China bills and bills in general
(excluding amendments), 93rd109th Congresses 44
3.2 Number of China bills (excluding amendments) by
policy type and chamber, 19732006 45
5.1 Time trend of Taiwan bills introduced in each chamber,
19732006 82
6.1 Bills concerning Chinas human rights, 19892006 106
6.2 Time trend of bills relating to Chinas MFN status,
19732006 109
7.1 U.S. trade decit with Japan, 19622006 125
List of tables
2.1 House China bills by policy and type, 19732006 29

2.2 Senate China bills by policy and type, 19732006 31
2.3 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding
amendments) introduced in the House, 19732006 39
2.4 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding
amendments) introduced in the Senate, 19732006 41
3.1 Frequency of the number of China bills (excluding
amendments) by chief sponsor and chamber, 19732006 46
3.2 Members of Congress who introduced ten or more
China bills (excluding amendments), 19732006 47
3.3 Freestanding China bills enacted into law, 19732006 53
4.1 U.S.China trade in goods, 19732006 61
4.2 U.S. imports of selected commodities from China in
19892005 62
4.3 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 4444 72
4.4 Increases in probabilities associated with one
standard deviation increase in independent variables
(HR 4444) 73
5.1 House roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act 85
5.2 Senate roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act 86
5.3 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwans ranking
among U.S. arms sales to foreign countries 89
standard deviation increase in independent variables
(HR 2386) 92
standard deviation increase in independent variables (HR 1838) 95
6.1 House roll call votes on joint resolutions to
disapprove of Chinas MFN, 19902001 110
6.2 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of
Chinas MFN under President Bush 115
xiv List of tables
standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes
under Bush) 115
6.4 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of
Chinas MFN under President Clinton 117
standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes
under Clinton) 118
7.1 Total U.S. trade and decit with Japan, Canada, and
Mexico, 19852006 124
7.2 U.S.Japan trade and automotive decit, 19862006 126
7.3 Total U.S. trade and decit with Hungary, Romania,
and Vietnam 130
7.4 House roll call votes on trade and MFN extension for
selected countries 132
7.5 Logit analysis of House roll call votes on trade with
Japan, Canada, and Mexico 133
standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes on
Japan, Canada, and Mexico) 134
7.7 Logit analysis of House votes on extension of MFN
to Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam 138
standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes on
MFN extension to Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam) 139
A.1 Examples of coding of China bills 158
Acknowledgments
In the process of researching the book, I have accumulated an enormous debt

to a number of individuals. Without their encouragement, support, advice,
and critique, the book would never have evolved into what it is today.
Je Jenkins oered a number of penetrating comments. Without his input,
the book would have been much less alert to the complexities of congres-
sional structures and procedures. The book also beneted from Victor Shihs
extensive knowledge of U.S.China relations and international relations.
Dennis Chong generously supported my training in quantitative methods.
More than that, had it not been for his unfailing encouragement, I would
have quit being a political scientist a long time ago. Sean Gailmard kindly
helped me tackle many methodological questions. Each in his own way, John
Bennett and Chris Bray made my life at Northwestern University more
enjoyable.
To Benjamin I. Page, I owe the most intellectual debt. Without his support,
I would probably have not embarked on the project in the rst place. His
enthusiasm has sustained me throughout research and writing. He supervised
the project from the beginning to the end, bringing to bear his enormous
knowledge of American politics and guiding me through the art of academic
writing. He certainly exemplies the profound impact that a professor can
have on students.
Since we rst met back in 2002, Jordan Jay Hillman has been an intellectual
mentor and a fatherly gure to me. In addition to sharpening my thinking on
many topics over numerous lunches which he generously paid for, he also
invited me to have each Hanukkah and Passover dinner with his family. When
I look back at the six years of doctoral study in the U.S., I am always grateful
to Jay and his family.
It was Professor Mei Renyi who inspired me to study American politics
when I was a graduate student in Beijing ten years ago. Without his unwaver-
ing support, I would not have decided to pursue a doctorate. His insights into
American politics have been a constant source of research ideas.
Many former and current graduate students at Northwestern University
helped me in a number of ways. In addition to livening up my social life,
Julia Rabinovich was a great source of research ideas. Conservations with
xvi Acknowledgments
Jean-Franois Godbout often ended up producing some fascinating reec-
tions on my own research. Birol Baskan and I often discussed a wide range of
topics over a cup of coee. Jiangnan Zhu, Kai Zeng, and Qi Zhang enriched
my intellectual as well as culinary life.
Special thanks go to librarians at the Government Publications Section of
Northwestern University Library, particularly Jiuping Chen, Beth Clausen,
Ann Janda, Kathleen Murphy, Louis Takacs. Because of their smiles and
patience, digging through government documents became a more pleasant
process. I especially want to thank Jiuping, who never complained about my
frequent and unannounced visits to his oce.
The Graduate School at Northwestern University provided a Graduate
Research Grant, which helped cover the cost of collecting China bills. The
School of English and International Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies Uni-
versity provides an ideal environment for a junior faculty. However, neither of
the two institutions bears any responsibility for the views expressed in the
book.
Many thanks are also due the editorial sta at Routledge. Peter Sowden
convinced me of the importance of the project and encouraged me to pursue
it further. Tom Bates was instrumental in shaping the book as it stands
now. The two anonymous reviewers of the manuscript oered a number of
trenchant comments which improved the quality of the book.
A short version of Chapter 4 was published in American Politics Research,
and a dierent version of Chapters 23 was published in Journal of Con-
temporary China. I thank the two journals for granting me the right to reprint
portions of the two articles.
My father was deprived of a good education, but insisted that his son get
the best education possible. Without his sacrice, devotion, and love, I would
not have accomplished what I have.
Zhang Can has been a really good sport about being the wife of a junior
faculty. Without her love, care, and sacrice, I would not have been able to
nish the project on time. There is no better way to thank her than to dedicate
my rst book to her.
Introduction
Only in the case of Communist China has the Congress played a major role
over a long period of time to conne narrowly the presidents means of
maneuver.
(Herbert Carroll 1965: 161)
While the executive branch is constitutionally charged with the management

of foreign policy, on several occasions the Congress has decisively intruded
into the management of China policy. When the Congress has chosen to
immerse itself, its impact has proven profound and long-lasting.
(Michel Oksenberg 1986: 218)
The United States and our allies must recognize that in the upcoming Pacic
Century no country will play a larger role in shaping the future of Asia
than China, and no single bilateral relationship in the region will be more
important to the US than the SinoAmerican one.
(Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) 1996)
The U.S.China relationship is arguably the most important international

relationship in the world today. It involves one country that is the worlds fore-
most economic and military power, and another country that has the largest
population and is enjoying rapid economic growth that could make it a great
power in the near future. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of annual
trade, thousands of students and scholars traveling across the Pacic each year,
and issues related to Taiwan, Chinas human rights, and non-proliferation
make the relationship simultaneously extensive and contentious, mutually
benecial and profoundly controversial (Harding 1995: 49).
The U.S. Congress has been unusually active in the development of this
important relationship. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the China Aid
Act of 1948, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the annual congres-
sional debates over the renewal of Chinas Most Favored Nation trade status
(MFN, now called Normal Trade Relations or NTR since 1998), and the
legislative battle over granting China Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR) all attest to congressional activism in China policy.1 Since 2005,
2 Introduction
Congress has launched a series of initiatives pressuring Beijing to appreciate
its allegedly undervalued currency.
This record of legislative activism raises a number of crucial questions.
Why is Congress so active in China policy? What are the causal factors that
have inuenced the collective policy of Congress, and what has inuenced the
legislative behavior of individual members? What overall impact has congres-
sional activism had on U.S. China policy? Do the same dynamics that help
explain congressional decision-making on U.S.China relations also explain
congressional policy-making generally? These are questions that this book
attempts to answer. The rst step toward answering these questions is to pro-
vide a brief survey of the literature on Congress and foreign policy so as to
situate this study in proper context.
Congress and foreign policy2

The relationship between the president and Congress in foreign policy is one
of the abiding mysteries of the American system of government (Schlesinger
and De Grazia 1967: 1). The founding fathers drafted a constitution that
purportedly divides foreign policy powers between the president and Con-
gress. In reality, what the framers created is a system of separated institu-
tions sharing [foreign policy] powers (Neustadt 1990: 29). Powers shared are
frequently contested and jealously guarded. They are the source of endless
disputes, accusations, and confrontations between the two branches. Corwin
(1948: 200) famously wrote, the Constitution, considered only for its arma-
tive grants of power which are capable of aecting the issue, is an invitation
to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy. Wilcox
(1985: 38) concurred, In some ways, our constitution is an invitation to dis-
unity, for it divides the power in foreign policy between the two branches so as
to give eect to our checks and balances system. In Sundquists (1981: 16)
words, the Constitution put the two combatants [Congress and the president]
in the ring and sounded the bell that sent them into endless battles.
Scholarly research on Congresss role in foreign and defense policy has
paid particular attention to three broad questions.3 What is the power of
Congress in relation to the president?4 Why do members of Congress act as
they do? How are decisions made in Congress? One school of thought con-
tends that the president wins most of the battles against Congress. In propos-
ing the two presidencies thesis, Wildavsky (1966: 7) asserted that in the realm
of foreign policy there has not been a single major issue on which Presidents,
when they are serious and determined, have failed. 5 To Spanier and Uslaner
(1974: 69), The President proposes, the President disposes. Schlesingers
(1973) condemnation of the imperial presidency also testies to the dominance
of the president over Congress in foreign policy.6
A number of factors are believed to be responsible for presidential domin-
ance in foreign policy: executive monopoly of intelligence, the unitary nature
of the presidency, presidential power to commit troops, public readiness to
Introduction 3
rally around the ag, and the norm of deference among members of Con-
gress (Corwin 1948; Crabb and Holt 1984; Dahl 1950; Robinson 1967;
Spanier and Uslaner 1974; Wildavsky 1966). In a word, in this view, the
president dominates foreign policy-making and Congresss role is one of
legitimating, amending, or vetoing executive proposals (Robinson 1967:
14), or accepting, modifying, or rejecting executive policies (Spanier and
Uslaner 1974).
Some scholars disagree; they argue that patterns of executivelegislative
interactions in foreign policy are cyclic, with the pendulum swinging in one
branchs favor at one time and in the other branchs favor at another. Peppers
(1975: 462) contended that the two presidencies thesis came at the end of the
propresidency swing, suggesting that there would be a reverse swing back to
Congress. In reassessing Wildavskys two presidencies thesis, Sigelman raised
an important question: Are we witnessing a secular change or a momentary
uctuation in the balance of power between President and Congress? His
answer was unequivocal: the pendulum of power often shifts. In crisis
periods, power tends to gravitate toward the Presidency, but eventually Con-
gress has always moved to reassert its positions (Sigelman 1979: 1204). Con-
tinuing with his boxing metaphor, Sundquist (1981: 16) noted, The president
may appear as the heftier contestant, he cannot win every round; the balance
will continue to shift back and forth. Indeed, congressional assertiveness
in foreign policy since the 1970s appears to support the pendulum thesis of
executive-legislative relationship (Abshire and Nurnberger 1981; Forsythe
1988; Franck and Weisband 1979; Ripley and Lindsay 1993; Wildavsky
1991).
Other scholars have proposed a contingency view of executive-legislative
interactions in foreign policy.7 For them, the balance of power between the
president and Congress is not xed; instead it varies considerably from one
policy area to another. Lindsay and Ripley (1993) are the most forceful advo-
cates of the contingency view. Based on distinctions among policies made by
previous scholars (Huntington 1961: 34; Lowi 1967: 324325; Ripley and
Franklin 1980: 2324), they contended that presidential power is at a maxi-
mum in crisis policy, less extensive in strategic policy, but at its weakest
in structural policy (Lindsay and Ripley 1993: 1822).8 To put it a dierent
way, the power of Congress tends to be at its strongest in structural policy,
at its weakest in crisis policy, and in between the two extremes in strategic
policy.
Instead of ascertaining which branch prevails under what circumstances
and why, another line of research has focused on the causal factors under-
lying foreign policy-related legislative behavior of individual members of
Congress, particularly roll call voting.9 Inspired by Miller and Stokes (1963)
path-breaking study of constituency inuence on members of Congress, this
line of research can be further divided into two major sections. The rst
section examines the determinants of members votes on defense spending,
and the preponderance of evidence suggests that ideology, not constituency
4 Introduction
interests, is the best predictor of roll call votes (e.g., Bernstein and Anthony
1974; Cobb 1969; Fleisher 1985; Lindsay 1990; McCormick and Black 1983;
Moyer 1973; Ray 1981; Russett 1970; Wayman 1985). The second section
concentrates on foreign trade policy. Here one study after another have
reported strong evidence that party and constituency interests are the major
determinants of members roll call votes (e.g., Bailey 2001; Bailey and Brady
1998; Conley 1999; Conybeare 1991; Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; McArthur
and Marks 1988; Tosini and Tower 1987; Wink et al. 1996).
A few scholars have also examined the process of foreign policy decision-
making in Congress. The process consists of two components: committees
and parties. Ray (1980) looked at the degree of responsiveness of the Armed
Services Committees to the parent chambers. McCormick (1993) examined
decision-making in the House Foreign Aairs Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Deering (1993) the Armed Services Commit-
tees, and White (1993) the Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense and
Foreign Operations. Sinclair (1993) described the role of party leaders in
foreign and defense policy, situating her analysis in the context of increasing
intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity since the 1970s and
the resulting rise of party leadership.
To sum up, students of Congress and foreign policy have conducted exten-
sive research on the balance of power between the president and Congress,
the causal factors that inuence roll call votes, and the process of decision-
making within Congress. These three issues will likely continue to animate
scholarly debate on Congress and foreign policy. In fact, this book represents
another attempt to address the three issues. However, instead of analyzing
each of them separately, it combines the rst and third into one broad ques-
tion that asks how exogenous (e.g., constitutional rules) and endogenous
(e.g., committees) structures and procedures inuence Congresss China pol-
icy. As is apparent to many students of American politics, this approach is
grounded in the new institutionalism, which no scholar to my knowledge has
applied to the study of U.S.China relations. To address the second issue,
I rst examine roll call votes on three China-related issues, paying particular
attention to the eects of partisanship, ideology, and constituency interests
the three factors that previous studies have reported as the major determin-
ants of roll call behavior. Then I go beyond the case of China by analyzing
roll call votes on six countries that are similar to China in relevant respects. A
comparison of ndings from the China case and those from the six countries
suggests a general theory of roll call voting on foreign policy.
At this point, some readers may pause and ask, Wait a second, why do
you choose China? Answers to this important question are in the next
section.
Introduction 5
Why China?
An active Congress
It is not too much exaggeration to say that of all the bilateral relationships the
U.S. has with other countries, Congress has been most active in the relation-
ship with China. One of Congresss earliest actions was the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882, which excluded all Chinese laborers from immigrating to the U.S.
for ten years.10 Half a century later, under pressure from American silver pro-
ducers Congress enacted the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 that had a devastat-
ing impact on Chinas economy by driving up the value of the silver-based
Chinese currency (e.g., Ho et al. 2005; Roberts 1936).11 When China was
engulfed in a civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists in the late
1940s, Congress passed the China Aid Act of 1948 in order to salvage the
Nationalist regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. After the Chinese Communists
victory, Congress vehemently opposed U.S. recognition of China and Chinas
admission to the United Nations, delaying the former until 1979 and the latter
until 1971.12 Meanwhile, Congress remained steadfast in its support for Chi-
ang and the regime he established on Taiwan, passing the U.S.Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the Taiwan Relations Act.
Congress was conspicuously inactive in China policy in the decade after
normalization. American euphoria about China that had been building
since Nixons 1972 trip, which reached its zenith in the aftermath of Deng
Xiaopings successful visit to the U.S. in 1979, plus the election of Ronald
Reagan, who was a staunch supporter of Taiwan, probably diminished
Congresss interest in China policy.13 Yet this interlude of congressional reti-
cence was cut short by the Tiananmen Incident. Since then, Congress has been
extremely active in nearly every aspect of China policy. As Mann wrote:
But especially after 1989, Congresss involvement in China policy was

far more pervasive. American decisions about Chinese students, grain
sales, human rights, arms-control policies, business contracts and trans-
fers of technology were not only inuenced but, in some cases, initiated
by Congress.
(1999: 11)
Moreover, from the Chinese perspective, Congresss China policy has almost
always been one of antagonism and punitive actions. The above review of
Congresss involvement in U.S.Taiwan policy amply illuminates this point.
It is primarily because of staunch congressional support for Taiwan that
Beijing has not been able to regain control of the island. Another example of
congressional antagonism involves MFN renewal. Congress rst granted
China MFN status in 1980 and had not objected to presidential renewal of it
until 1989, the year of the Tiananmen Incident. Each year between 1990 and
2001, Congress attempted to revoke MFN or to add various conditions to its
6 Introduction
renewal (Pregelj 2001). Twice (both in 1992), Congress was just one step away
from enacting legislation attaching human rights and other conditions to the
renewal of Chinas MFN.
More recently, Congress initiated a series of punitive actions against China:
In May 2006, under pressure from Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA),

chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on ScienceState
JusticeCommerce and a long-time critic of China, the State Department
announced that it would not use computers acquired from Lenovo, a
computer company partly owned by the Chinese government, for classi-
ed work. The State Department initially planned to use 900 out of
16,000 Lenovo computers it purchased for classied work (Blustein
2006b; Kirchgaessner 2006; ONeil 2006; Perez 2006).
On June 30 2005, the House voted twice to block China National Oshore
Oil Corporation (CNOOC for short) from acquiring the California-
based Unocal Corporation. The rst vote was on a provision to HR 3058
that would prohibit the Treasury Department from using any funds to
favorably recommend the sale of Unocal to CNOOC. The provision
passed 33392. The second vote was on H.Res. 344 stating that U.S.
national security would be jeopardized if the proposed Chinese takeover
goes through. The resolution passed 39815 (CQWR 2005: 1833, 1906,
195253). CNOOC eventually dropped its bid.
On March 3 2005, confronted with mounting trade decit with China,
Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Charles Schumer (D-NY) intro-
duced a bill (S 295) to impose a sti 27.5 percent tari on Chinese
imports unless the Chinese government appreciated its allegedly under-
valued currency, which is believed to be partly responsible for the com-
petitiveness of Chinese imports (Andrews 2006; Blustein 2006a; MacLeod
2006; Magnier and Lee 2006).
Between February and July 2005, six resolutions were introduced in
Congress, denouncing Beijings attempts to justify its use of force against
Taiwan by enacting an anti-secession law, which was eventually ratied
by the Peoples Congress on March 14 2005 (Culpan and Pan 2005; Los
Angeles Times 2006; Pan 2005).
On February 3 and March 17 2005, Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL)
and Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) respectively introduced H.Res.57
and S.Res.91, urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo
on China. The former passed 4113 and the latter with unanimous con-
sent. Partly because of strong opposition from Congress, the European
Union postponed the lifting of the embargo (CQWR 2005: 714; Los
Angeles Times 2005).
Not surprisingly, Beijing has consistently viewed Congress as the anti-China

bastion in the U.S. and frequently lashed out at it. There are always people
in Congress who oppose improvements in U.S.China relations. Every time
Introduction 7
relations get better, they will go out of their way to create obstacles, but
history will show this to be futile, said the Chinese Foreign Ministrys
spokesman, referring to a series of China-related bills passed by the House
immediately after President Jiang Zemins visit to the U.S. in 1997 (quoted in
The Australian 1997). In 1999, a resolution was introduced in each chamber,
attacking Chinas human rights record and calling on the Chinese government
to launch an ocial investigation of the Tiananmen Incident, and Beijing
was furious. The attempt of those anti-China U.S. congressmen to interfere
in Chinas internal aairs under the pretext of human rights is doomed to
failure, said Zhu Bangzhao, the Chinese Foreign Ministrys spokesperson
(quote in Laris 1999). In reaction to the Cox Report on alleged Chinese thefts
of U.S. nuclear secrets, the Chinese blasted the Cox Committee, accusing
members of the committee of clinging to Cold-War mentality, harboring
deep prejudice and hostility toward China, and creating a lot of rumors
. . . to stir up anti-Chinese sentiments (quoted in ibid.). During congres-
sional debate over CNOOCs proposed bid for Unocal, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry issued a statement demanding that the U.S. Congress correct its
mistaken ways of politicizing economic and trade issues and stop interfering
in the normal commercial exchanges between enterprises of the two countries
(quoted in Harney and Roberts 2005).
Scholarly neglect
Yet despite congressional activism and antagonism, only a few scholars have
paid close attention to Congresss role in China policy. This scholarly neglect
appears to have something to do with the American constitutional structure.
Though Congress, particularly the Senate, does have a number of foreign
policy powers such as treaty ratication and approval of ambassadorial
appointments, it is the executive branch that is constitutionally charged with
the management of U.S. foreign policy. In the case of China policy, it is
President Nixon who initiated the normalization process; it is President Carter
who negotiated the terms of normalization; and it is President George H. W.
Bush who almost single-handedly salvaged the relationship from a total break-
down in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. As a result,
some scholars of U.S.China relations may have underestimated Congresss
inuence in China policy. What Chang (1993) concluded about Congresss role
in U.S.China relations seems to be representative of the general impression
among them:
For the most part, Congress and other non-administration sources are
excluded from the dialogue and discourse in the making of China policy.
When their voices are heard sporadically over the course of Sino-
American relations, they usually come out supporting the actions and
decisions taken by the White House.
(Chang 1993: 244)
8 Introduction
Thus most students of U.S.China relations tend to focus on the executive
branch (e.g., Harding 1992; Lampton 2001; Mann 1999; Ross 1986; Ross
1995; Suettinger 2003; Tucker 1983; Tucker 1994). Those who do pay particu-
lar attention to Congress usually focus on the late 1940 up until the late 1950s,
a period when Congress was unusually active and inuential in China policy
(e.g., Dulles 1972; Finkelstein 1993; Grasso 1987; Purifoy 1976; Tsou 1963;
Tucker 1983). Some scholars also highlight Congresss role in the normaliza-
tion process, particularly the enactment of the TRA (Kraft 1991; Sutter 1983;
Tan 1992). Only a handful of scholars have conducted exclusive analysis of
Congresss China policy (Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Sutter 2001; Xie 1993;
Yang 2000; Zhang 1995).
Nor have students of American politics showed strong interest in Con-
gresss role in China policy, notwithstanding the voluminous literature on
Congresss role in U.S. foreign policy generally (e.g., Corwin 1948; Crabb and
Holt 1984; Dahl 1950; Franck and Weisband 1979; Lindsay 1994; Ripley and
Lindsay 1993; Robinson 1967; Spanier and Uslaner 1974) and roll call voting
on foreign policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cronin and Fordham 1999;
Fordham 1998; Lindsay and Ripley 1992; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990;
McCormick and Wittkopf 1992). The disciplines emphasis on rigorous
theorizing is partly responsible for the lack of interest. China is merely one
case, it is said, and no matter how important it is, you cannot build a good
theory with one case. As a result, only a few students of American politics have
paid detailed attention to Congresss involvement in China policy (Crabb and
Holt 1984; Nokken 2003; Rourke 1983: 7476, 130145; Westereld 1955:
Chapter 12, Chapter 16).
However, it is not just scholars who have largely neglected Congress.
Policy-makers in Beijing, after many years of frustration with and criticism
of Congresss China policy, have yet to make earnest and concerted eorts to
understand the mysterious beast called Congress and to inuence its behavior
(see Harney and Roberts 2005; Ma 2006; Mufson 1998; Weisskopf 1993).
Some of the older [members of the Chinese] leadership dont understand
that simply because a senator gets up on the oor of the Senate and says
some uncomplimentary things about China that [sic] thats not necessarily
government policy, said James Sasser, former U.S. ambassador to China
(quoted in Mufson 1998). When the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister sug-
gested in a meeting that Congress not bring up something about China, an
impatient Senator John Glenn (D-OH) snapped back: You just dont
understand our form of government if you think anybody can tell a particu-
lar Congressman or Senator not to bring up something about China
(quoted in Sciolino 1996). Says a public aairs director at a large U.S.
manufacturer with considerable investment in China, The Chinese might
have got the hang of capitalism, but they dont understand democracy and
the free press yet and that shows up in the way they misread the political
mood here (quoted in Harney and Roberts 2005). The former Chinese
President Jiang Zemin himself candidly admitted in 1995 that the Chinese
Introduction 9
havent done enough lobbying of U.S. Congress (quoted in Sciolino
1996).
Contributions of the book

This study attempts to make a number of signicant contributions to schol-
arly research on Congresss role in China policy. First and foremost, whereas
most previous scholars have examined Congresss China policy either at the
macro level (Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Sutter 2001) or at the micro level
(Nokken 2003; Xie 1993; Xie 2006; Yang 2000), this study oers careful
analyses at both levels. At the macro level, I examine the patterns of China-
specic bills, resolutions, and amendments (hereafter referred to collectively
as China bills unless otherwise specied) introduced in each chamber in
19732006. No scholar to my knowledge has performed a similar study. This
is the major contribution of this book. The purpose of this analysis is to
provide additional support for the new institutionalist claim that how legisla-
tors preferences are aggregated also aects what policy outcomes are arrived
at. To my knowledge, no scholar has applied the new institutionalism to the
study of U.S.China relations. In particular, macro level analysis focuses on
the impact of congressional committees, bicameralism, and presidential veto
on Congresss China policy.
Micro level analysis focuses on roll call votes. While previous studies examined
only one or two issues in U.S.China relations, this analysis will be the rst to
analyze roll call votes on the three most controversial issues in U.S.China
relations, namely, U.S.Taiwan relations, U.S.China trade, and Chinas
human rights.14 Taiwan has been the central issue in the bilateral relationship
since 1949. Human rights have been a constant source of dispute since 1989.
As the U.S. trade decit with China has skyrocketed since the mid-1990s,
bilateral trade has become an immensely controversial topic on Capitol Hill.
Second, most previous studies of Congresss China policy are qualitative
analyses relying almost exclusively on observations, unstructured interviews,
and/or anecdotal evidence (Crabb 1985; Mann 2001; Oksenberg 1986; Rourke
1983; Sutter 2001; Westereld 1955; Yang 2000), with only a few of them
having both qualitative evidence and quantitative data (Nokken 2003; Xie
1993; Zhang 1995). This study will combine both, but with far more and
better quantitative data. For instance, particularly helpful is the dataset of
China bills introduced in each chamber between 1973 and 2006. Some other
data such as state exports to China, which were simply not available to previ-
ous authors, are now available thanks to eorts by scholars and U.S. federal
government agencies.
Third, I also highlight the implications of my ndings for policy-makers in
both Washington and Beijing as well as for organizations and individuals
interested in promoting friendly U.S.China relations. Considering the impor-
tance and complexity of the relationship, the controversy it has generated in
both societies, and congressional activism in China policy, it is highly desirable
10 Introduction
that the policy implications of this study be discussed. The aim is to help
policy-makers as well as concerned organizations and individuals work for a
better U.S.China relationship, one that is characterized by fewer disputes,
conicts, or confrontations and more dialogue, cooperation, and partnership.
Apart from its signicant contributions to scholarly research on Congress
and China policy, this study also marks a small but important step in building
a general theory of congressional policy-making. To ascertain whether the
same dynamics that explains congressional policy-making on China-related
issues also explains congressional policy-making in general, I compare
China with six similar countries: Japan, Canada, and Mexico on trade and
Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam on human rights. The ndings from this
comparative analysis lay the foundation for a general theory of congressional
policy-making.
Structure of the book

Chapter 1 spells out the theoretical foundation of my analysis of congressional
policy-making toward China. The rst part reviews the new institutionalism
as applied to the study of the U.S. Congress. While legislative scholars usually
focus on endogenous structures and rules such as committees and House spe-
cial rules (e.g., Schickler 2000; Schickler and Rich 1997; Shepsle 1986; Shepsle
and Weingast 1981, 1984, 1987; Sinclair 1994), I also examine exogenous
structures and rules imposed by the U.S. Constitution, i.e., bicameralism and
presidential veto. The most important prediction from the new institutional-
ism is that these endogenous and exogenous institutions severely constrain
the ability of Congress to assert itself in foreign policy through legislative
means. Thus it would be misleading to judge Congresss inuence in China
policy by merely counting how many China bills were enacted into binding
legislation that prescribes or proscribes presidential actions. The second part
reviews past research on roll call voting, with particular attention to three
factors: party, ideology, and constituency interests.
Chapter 2 presents the general patterns of China bills introduced in 1973
2006. The rst part describes the number, type, and nature of China bills in
each chamber and documents the time trend of China bills. The second part
attempts to identify macro-level determinants of the number of China bills
introduced in each chamber. I report that far more China bills were introduced
in each chamber after the Tiananmen Incident. Also, the rst session of each
Congress witnessed more China bills than the second session. In addition,
more China bills were introduced when Republicans were the majority in the
House and when a Democratic president was in the White House.
Chapter 3 continues to analyze China bills in order to illustrate the impact
of legislative rules and procedures on Congresss China policy. I adduce evi-
dence that congressional committees as gatekeepers have kept most China
policy proposals from Congresss legislative agenda, that the Senate has served
as a check on House activism in China policy, and that the supermajority
Introduction 11
requirement for overriding presidential veto has repeatedly thwarted congres-
sional attempts to enact major changes to China policy.
The next three chapters are analyses of China-related roll call votes.
Chapter 4 examines roll call voting on HR 4444, the bill that granted perma-
nent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China. Party has the largest impact,
with Democrats considerably more likely to vote against the bill (hence
against their own president Bill Clinton). The ideological ends of both parties,
instead of voting against each other, actually formed a coalition against the
bill. Constituency interests generally have rather weak impact on the vote.
Chapter 5 analyzes House votes on two bills regarding U.S.Taiwan rela-
tions, namely, the U.S.Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation
Act of 1997 and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 2000. Controlling
for other factors, the impact of constituency interests is far weaker than that
of party or ideology in both votes. Without controlling for hawkishness,
party has the largest impact. Once hawkishness is controlled for, party no
longer has any signicant impact and hawkishness turns out to have the big-
gest impact. Though both liberals and conservatives seemed to be supportive
of the two bills, the former was much less so than the latter. Moreover, a
comparison of ndings from the two votes suggests that many members of
Congress voted strategically on the second one.
In Chapter 6, I rst oer a detailed historical-comparative account of
congressional involvement in Chinas human rights. A central theme of this
account is that the Cold War had profoundly shaped Congresss human
rights policy. In the latter part of the Cold War when the two countries
formed a strategic alliance against the former Soviet Union, Congress largely
turned a blind eye to Chinas human rights problems. The demise of the former
Soviet Union, plus the Tiananmen Incident, liberated congressional critics
and resulted in unprecedented congressional activism in Chinas human
rights. Next, I analyze the ten House votes on joint resolutions to disapprove
of Chinas MFN status in order to punish its alleged violation of human rights.
During the Bush years, Republicans were consistently more likely to oppose
these resolutions than Democrats. During the Clinton years, Democrats
demonstrated little party loyalty. Except for one year, the ideological ends of
both parties formed an alliance on these resolutions. Moreover, the strength
of this alliance increased during the Clinton years.
Chapter 7 goes beyond the case of China by analyzing roll call voting
on six other countries: Japan, Canada, and Mexico on trade and Hungary,
Romania, and Vietnam on MFN extension. Constituency interests have
bigger impact on trade votes involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico than on
the China trade vote (i.e., the vote on Chinas PNTR). Whereas liberals and
conservatives were almost always united on the two issues involving China,
such a coalition appeared far less frequently on votes involving these six
countries. Finally, loyalty to ones president seems to be the most important
determinant of votes on MFN extension to the other three countries, but it
has much smaller impact on votes involving China.
12 Introduction
The nal chapter concludes the book. In addition to summarizing the var-
ious ndings, I also discuss the implications of the ndings for policy-makers
in Beijing and Washington as well as for concerned organizations and indi-
viduals who are interested in promoting friendly relations between the two
countries.
Two caveats are in order before I proceed. First, when I speak of Congresss
China policy, I do not mean that Congress is a monolithic bloc speaking
with one coherent voice on how to deal with U.S.China relations. To begin
with, Congress has two chambersthe House of Representatives and the
Senateand the two chambers do not always agree with each other on foreign
policy. Second, the House has 435 members and the Senate 100 members, and
each member is independently elected byand hence is individually account-
able tohis or her constituents, not to other members or the president. This
electoral independence means that under many circumstances members are
free to disagree with each other or with the president, without fearing retribu-
tion from fellow members or the White House. Thus, it is possible to have
435 secretaries of state in the House and 100 more in the Senate (Washington
Post 1978a). In a word, it would be nave to expect uniformity of views
and attitudes among members of Congress. Congressman Clement Zablocki
(D-WI) aptly captured what this means for China policy:
When anyone refers to a congressional view on a matter such as this

[U.S. policy toward China], there is not just a single view. Perhaps one
could say that there are 435 views in the House and 100 in the Senate, and
that these may not always be the same from one week to another.
(quoted in Yang 2000: 29)
Second, the very notion of China policy, as Oksenberg (1986: 208) cau-
tioned, is an intellectual abstraction that, upon close examination, can lose
its purported analytical clarity. China policy is the sum of ocial actions
proposed or implemented regarding U.S. relations with China. It encompasses
many issues: arms sales to Taiwan, textile quotas, military relations, cultural
and educational exchanges, export control, IPR protection, and so on. China
policy also includes issues that primarily concern other countries but in
which China is a signicant, perhaps silent partner (ibid.). U.S. policy toward
North Korea stands out as a key example, since China is the single most
important ally of that country. U.S. policies toward Pakistan and some Middle
East countries are also complicated by Chinas involvement in those regions,
mainly through its actual or alleged sales of weapons. Furthermore, all these
issues are not only part of China policy, but also part of broad U.S. foreign
policy as wellnon-proliferation, trade, human rights, etc. Thus there are
some problems related with the term China policy, though it continues to
be an analytically useful concept.
1 The new institutionalism and
legislative behavior
By the mode of its election and the greater length of the term by which its
seats are held, the Senate is almost altogether removed from that temptation
to servile obedience to the whims of popular constituencies to which the
House is constantly subject, without as much courage as the Senate has to
guard its virtue.
(Woodrow Wilson 2006: 153)
Just as the standing committees control legislative action, so the chairmen are
masters of their committees . . . In short, committee chairmen exercise crucial
powers over the legislative process.
(George Galloway 1953: 289)
Starting with Mayhews (1974) path-breaking work, the study of Congress

has taken on a decidedly rational choice avor. That is, members of Congress
are assumed to be utility-maximizing rational actors who have certain goals
and preferences, and these goals and preferences determine their behavior.
Yet in pursuing the various goals, they are constrained by a multitude of
structures and procedures that govern collective decision-making in Con-
gress. These structures and procedures are the focus of a long line of research
called the new institutionalism. Yet to my knowledge no scholar has applied
the new institutionalism to the study of U.S.China relations.
Meanwhile, inspired by Miller and Stokess (1963) classic study, students
of American politics have conducted voluminous research on roll call voting.
A handful of students of U.S.China relations have also examined China-
related roll call votes (Xie 1993; Zhang 1995). With few exceptions, previous
studies of roll call voting tend to focus on the impact of three sets of factors,
namely, party, constituency, and ideology.
The new institutionalism

The new institutionalism is a variant of the rational choice theory.1 More
accurately, it is a response to the rational theory that emphasizes the
14 New institutionalism, legislative behavior
institutional context in which rational individuals interact (for a review, see
Shepsle 1989). Underlying the rational choice theory is the assumption
borrowed from homo economicusthat individuals are purposeful agents
who have preferences and try to maximize them. The rational choice theory
itself is a rejection of the sociological approach that explains individual
behavior on the basis of social norm, status, and learned responses. Yet in
hailing the utility-maximizing individual, rational choice theorists seem to
care little about the context in which individual behavior takes place or the
sources of preferences and beliefs. As a result, rational man becomes an
atom unconnected to the social structure in which he or she is embedded
(Shepsle 1989: 134). The new institutionalism attempts to address this
diculty by turning to institutions in which individuals are embedded.
Institutions include both structures and procedures. In the study of
legislative politics, structures refer to the division and specialization of
labor (committees), leadership organization, stang arrangements, party
groupings, and procedures rules of debate, amendment, and those regulat-
ing other features of daily ocial life (ibid.: 135). Legislative structures and
procedures govern how Congress conducts its legislative business. The U.S.
Constitution does not provide for them. Instead, Article I, Section V reads:
Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . As a result, at
the beginning of each Congress, a simple majority decides on the kind of
structures and procedures that will govern the ow of legislative business in
each chamber. Out of respect for precedents and because of the transaction
cost involved in formulating, negotiating, and passing new ones, legislative
structures and procedures of one Congress are usually inherited from the
previous Congress with few modications.2
In the theoretical literature on Congress, legislative structures and pro-
cedures usuallyif not alwaysmean committees and House special rules.
But this is a rather narrow denition that includes only endogenous structures
and procedures. In this book I dene legislative institutions more broadly to
include two exogenous institutions: bicameralism and presidential veto. This
broad denition should not be controversial. First, no bill may be enacted
into law unless it is approved in identical form by both chambers. Second,
Congress and the president share legislative powers in that the president may
veto a piece of legislation, but his veto is subject to override by a two-thirds
majority in both chambers.
One of the most important insights from the new institutionalism is that
legislative structures and proceduresparticularly committees and special
rulesinduce equilibrium. This is called structure-induced equilibrium, or
SIE for short (e.g., Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast 1981).
Thus, the new institutionalism provides an answer to the social choice prob-
lem rst identied by Arrow (1951) and further developed by other scholars
(e.g., Black 1958; McKelvey 1976; Plott 1967; Riker 1988; Schoeld 1978).
To make a long story short, the social choice problem refers to the absence
of a stable outcome under simple majority rule or other decision-making
New institutionalism, legislative behavior 15
processes in multi-dimensional politics. The new institutionalist response is
to set up structures and procedures that reduce multi-dimensional politics to
one-dimensional politics. In the one-dimensional world, the median voter
prevails and a stable outcome can be produced (Black 1958; Downs 1957).
Congressional committees
To understand Congress, one must understand its committees. For most
members of Congress, political life on Capitol Hill begins and ends with
committees. Moreover, it is committees to which bills are referred; it is com-
mittees that hold hearings on bills; and it is in committees where bills are
marked up. In a word, committees are where the bulk of legislative work gets
done. Woodrow Wilson (2006: 69) famously wrote, Congress in session is
Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-room is
Congress at work. Because of the central role of committees in the legis-
lative process, they have life-or-death control over legislative proposals
(Johnson et al. 1994: 450451). As Bryce (1911: 157) vividly put it, A bill
comes before its committee with no presumption in its favor but rather as a
shivering ghost stands before Minos in the nether world.
Committees and rules of procedures lie at the heart of the theoretical
literature on Congress (e.g., Shepsle 1979, 1986, 1989; Shepsle and Weingast
1981, 1987, 1994; Weingast and Marshall 1988). While conceptually distinct,
committees and rules of procedures are actually inseparable. For rules of pro-
cedures give shape to the committee structure and constitute the major source
of committee power. Wrote Woodrow Wilson (2006: 62), The privileges of
the Standing Committees are the beginning and the end of the rules.
Under the committee structure, each committee can be viewed as respon-
sible for one policy dimension. Each and every billwith rare exceptions
must be referred to the committee(s) with proper jurisdiction over the policy
content of the bill. The chamber ordinarily may not vote on a bill unless it is
approved by the referred committee. Moreover, committees have ex post veto
power, i.e., the power to kill a piece of legislation at the conference stage
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987).3 Last but not least, the germaneness rule, closed
rule, and other special rules in the House impose severe restrictions on
amendments oered by non-committee members on the oor. These special
rules empower committee to be monopoly supplier of policy alternatives to
the status quo (Denzau and Mackay 1983; Krehbiel 1991: Chapter 5). To put
it a dierent way, they give committees gatekeeping rights.4
As a result of gatekeeping rights, majority cycling can be avoided and
equilibrium induced because the chamber needs to consider only one issue at
a time, instead of voting on a multitude of policy issues at the same time. And
in single-dimension politics, the median voter is where the equilibrium lies. In
a word, the committee structure transforms multi-dimensional politics into
single-dimension politics and induces equilibrium.
In so far as substantive policy is concerned, gatekeeping rights enable
committee members to keep controversial or undesirable policy proposals
from reaching the oor, while at the same time proposing policy alternatives
that they prefer. To be sure, the full chamber does have certain toolse.g., the
discharge ruleto force a committee to report a bill to the oor, but these
tools are rarely used and, even if they are used, almost always fail (Krehbiel
et al. 1987).5 Maltzman (1997: 65) thus asserted, Undoubtedly, the most
important tool possessed by committee is their gatekeeping power. Woodrow
Wilson, that astute student of American government and politics, described
in vivid language the power of committees over bills:
The fate of bills committed is generally not uncertain. As a rule, a bill

committed is a bill doomed. When it goes from the clerks desk to a
committee-room it crosses a parliamentary bridge of sighs to dim dun-
geons of silence whence it will never return.
(Wilson 2006: 63)
Moreover, gatekeeping rightsalong with possible committee-oor similar-

ity in policy preferencesensure that bills reported by committees almost
always prevail on the oor.6 For if a bill approved by a committee is voted
down on the oor, the committeeas a monopoly supplier of policy alterna-
tivescan retaliate in the future by not reporting any bill favored by the oor
majority. Fully aware of the gatekeeping rights of committees, a member will
usually vote for bills that come to the oor. Thus Congressman Clem Miller
(1962: 110) wrote, Congress is a collection of committees that come together
in a Chamber periodically to approve one anothers actions.
Because of gatekeeping rights, committees can serve a variety of useful
purposes. In the informational theory of legislative organization, gatekeeping
rights encourage committee members to acquire policy expertise because they
make it dicult for non-committee members (i.e., non-experts) to challenge
the policy proposals of committee members (Krehbiel 1991: Chapter 5). In
the distributive theory, committees help members achieve their electoral
goals because they facilitate gains from trade (Mayhew 1974; Weingast and
Marshall 1988). In the partisan theory, committees become tools of the ma-
jority party to set the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005).7
Aided by the gatekeeping rights of committees, members with intense policy
preferences are expected to have signicant impact on substantive policy. If
they also happen to be the chairmen of committees or subcommittees, then
almost certainly they will exert disproportionate power in the policy areas
about which they have intense preferences. Janda et al. (1995: 380) wrote,
Government by committee vests a tremendous amount of power in the
committees and subcommittees of Congressespecially in their leaders. In
the realm of foreign policy, chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee have often held up ambassadorial appointments, and their counter-
parts in the House have often stalled on foreign aid and State Department
authorization bills (McCormick 1993).
Bicameralism
The Senate, where each state is equally representedas opposed to propor-
tional representation on the basis of population in the Housewas originally
created as a political compromise between the smaller states and the larger
states at the Constitutional Convention (e.g., Madison 1969; Wood 1969;
Wirls and Wirls 2004). In the arguments of James Madison, the father of the
Constitution, what once was a political compromise became a necessary good
for republican government.
In particular, the Senate can serve as a check on the more numerical and
hence presumably more volatile House. The necessity of a senate is not less
indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to
the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious
leaders, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions, asserted Madison
(1982d: 315). Woodrow Wilson (2006: 154) agreed with Madison, asserting
that being less quickly sensitive to the hasty or impulsive movements of
public opinion constitute its [the Senates] value as a check, a steadying
weight, in our very democratic system. Toward this end, the framers
made the Senate much smaller in size, stipulated special qualications for and
election of Senators, and gave them a much longer tenure.8
In a word, the Senate as a separate and distinct body is expected to be a
cooling saucer to the House.9 Wrote James Madison (1969: 83), The use
of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more
system and with more wisdom, than the popular branch. As Fenno (1982: 3)
nicely pointed out, the founding fathers, suspicious of certain inrmities
endemic to large, popularly elected legislaturestendencies to instability in
action, to impulsive, unpredictable, changeable decisions, and to a short-run
view of good public policy, set up the Senate as a restraining, stabilizing
counterweight, as being a source of a more deliberate, more knowledgeable,
longer-run view of good public policy.
The single most important policy implication of bicameralism is that it
signicantly increases the diculty of lawmaking. First, structural dier-
ences between House and Senate elections ensure that policy views will not be
distributed and aggregated identically in the two chambers (Binder 2003:
81). Second, it takes only one chamberpresumably the less numerical
Senateto scuttle a piece of legislation. A long line of research has produced
evidence that bicameralism indeed increases the probability of legislative
gridlock (e.g., Binder 2003; Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998; Patterson
and Mughan 1999; Tsebelis and Money 1997).
Presidential veto
Presidential veto and the supermajority requirement for congressional over-
ride clearly reect the founding fathers deep suspicion of accumulation of
all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective
(Madison 1982a: 244). Two means were adopted to prevent the concentration
of powers. As Madison (1982c: 262) wrote, A dependence on the people is
no doubt the primary controul [sic] on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. For Madison, the
auxiliary precautions consist of a constitutional structure under which
the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several
bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their limits, without
being eectually checked and restrained by the others (Madison 1982b: 252).
In Federalist Papers No. 51, he most forcefully and eloquently spelled out the
rationale behind such a constitutional structure:
But the general security against a graduate concentration of the several

powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who adminis-
ter each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence
[sic] must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the
danger of attack. Ambition must be made to check ambition. The inter-
est of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the
place.
(Madison 1982c: 262)
The Constitution that was ratied in 1787 epitomizes Madisons theory of

checks and balances. In the realm of foreign policy, the president is the
Commander-in-Chief, receives and appoints ambassadors, and negotiates
treaties, but he is also instructed to seek the advice and consent of the
Senate on treaties and ambassadorial appointments. Moreover, only Congress
can declare war against a foreign country, and it is Congress that appropriates
money to raise and support the armed forces. Since the president and Con-
gress share foreign policy powers, congressional participation in foreign
policy-making becomes unavoidable. As a result, the two branches have
engaged in a perennial struggle for foreign policy prerogatives (e.g., Corwin
1948; Crabb and Holt 1984; Lindsay 1994; Schlesinger 1972).
Above all, the founding fathers gave each branch a powerful institutional
weapon with which to guard its foreign policy powers. The president may
veto a piece of legislation passed by Congress, but the latter may override the
veto with a two-thirds majority. Because of the veto and override, neither
branch can absolutely dominate the other. Nonetheless, it is extremely dif-
cult to assemble the constitutionally required supermajority to override the
presidents veto. Congress has two distinct chambers, 535 members, and
dozens of committees. Each member (Senators in particular), committee, and
chamber may be able to derail any veto-overriding battle. In fact, since 1973
only one presidential veto in foreign policy has been overridden, and that is
President Nixons veto of the War Powers Act.
Thus in the nal analysis, the supermajority requirement gives the president
a decisive advantage vis--vis Congress, making it hard for the latter to pass
substantive legislation prescribing or proscribing policy actions for the for-
mer. As a result, Congress often turns to other means of inuence in foreign
policy. The other means include procedural legislation, participation in dip-
lomacy, framing public opinion, and creating situations that generate desired
reactions from the executive branch (see Franck and Weisband 1979; Lindsay
1993; Lindsay and Ripley 1993).
Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy

There is an enormous body of research on roll call voting on foreign and
defense policy (see Lindsay and Ripley 1992, for an excellent review). Yet
previous studies tend to focus almost exclusively on what I call country-
blind issues such as defense spending (e.g., Bartels 1991; Clotfelter 1970;
Cobb 1969; Lindsay 1990; Moyer 1973; Ray 1981; Russett 1970; Wayman
1985) and foreign trade policy (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999;
Gartzke and Wrighton 1998). Only a handful of scholars have examined roll
call votes concerning particular countries (Leogrande and Brenner 1993;
McCormick and Black 1983; Nokken 2003; Xie 1993, 2006), This focus on
country-blind issues may be attributable to the prevailing belief among many
scholars that any analysis of roll call votes concerning a particular country is
a case study and thus has little theoretical value. Yet this theoretical challenge
can be overcome by increasing the number of countries studied. In fact, this
is the task I set for myself in Chapter 7. In this section, I will briey discuss
the eects of three factors on roll call voting, namely, party, constituency
interests, and ideology.
Before I proceed, however, I need to say a few words about the use of roll
call data. Voting on a roll call is merely one of the myriad legislative activities
a member of Congress is routinely engaged in. Other legislative activities
include sponsoring legislation, holding hearings, participating in oor debates,
etc. Yet of all the legislative activities, scholars seem to be particularly inter-
ested in roll call voting. Several factors may explain this special interest
among scholars (for the pros and cons of using roll call data, see Schneider
1979: Chapter 4; Xie 1993: 1214; Zhang 1995: 111115). First, roll call votes
are easily accessible. Second, roll call votes are almost free of measurement
errors. By contrast, interviews or surveys often have measurement errors due
to interview techniques, question wording, coding, or response rates, to name
just a few. Third, roll call votes are often good indicators of a members
preferences. A member may support protectionism at a labor union gathering
and denounce it at a chamber of commerce meeting, but he or she can cast
only one vote on a trade bill. When forced to go on record, members gener-
ally cast votes in line with their preferences, whether those preferences derive
from personal beliefs, constituency inuence, or party leadership.
To be sure, roll call votes have their disadvantages too. First, though roll call
votes reveal preferences, they tell nothing about the intensity of preferences.
That is, no matter how much a member supports or opposes a bill, he or she
has only one vote to cast. Second, when members vote strategically, it would
be wrong to take a roll call vote at its face value. Thus a conservative may vote
for a liberal amendment to a bill that would probably pass on its own, know-
ing that the bill with the amendment would be voted down on the oor. The
Powell Amendment that killed federal aid to public schools is one of the best
examples of strategic voting (see Stewart 2001: 3335). Last but not least, roll
call votes are informative only on issues that reach the nal stage of the
legislative process; they tell us nothing about issues that are excluded from the
legislative agenda. However, since I do not use roll call votes to study prefer-
ence intensity or agenda setting, these shortcomings become largely irrele-
vant. Strategic voting appears to be present in one vote that I examine, but
I have taken it into account in the analysis.
Party
[P]olitical parties created democracy, and . . . modern democracy is unthink-
able save in terms of parties, declared E.E. Schattschneider (1942: 1). Political
parties can be viewed as endogenous institutions created by politicians to
achieve certain goals (Aldrich 1995; Downs 1957). Wrote Aldrich (1995: 28):
A series of problems that necessarily arise in elections and in governance
make it possible for politicians to win more of what they seek to win, more
often, and over a longer period by creating political parties. The Democratic
Party and the Republican Party have dominated American electoral politics
since their emergence in the early nineteenth century. Because of the two-
party system, party politics (or partisanship) has become an integral part of
American politics.
Partisanship manifests itself in two fundamental ways in the halls of Con-
gress. On the one hand, it means loyalty to the president of ones own party,
because the president is the leader of his party and his leadership extends to
the legislative arena. In behavioral terms, party loyalty entails, among other
things, voting for the presidents policy agenda in spite of ones own prefer-
ences or constituent preferences. Indeed, Bond and Fleisher (1990) adduced
evidence that the most important determinant of a presidents legislative
success is party loyalty. The demand for loyalty is particularly high when the
opposition party has a majority in Congress, since the majority party has
strong electoral incentives to embarrass the president, with a view toward
winning the presidency in the next election.
On the other hand, partisanship also means electorally-induced inter-party
dierences. Because of electoral competition and historical circumstances,
the two parties have developed relatively stable and usually distinct positions
on a number of issues that generally reect the preferences of their respective
electoral bases. For example, since the 1940s, the Republican Party has tended
to be the party of free trade, whereas the Democratic Party has been the party
of protectionism (see Bailey and Brady 1998; Gibson 2000; OHalloran
1994). When members take distinct positions along electoral lines, it can be
viewed as partisanship. As Davidson and Oleszek (1990: 130) aptly put it,
partisanship means constituency dierences translated into issues.
However, it is sometimes dicult to empirically distinguish between the
two aspects of partisanship. Again, take foreign trade as an example. When
Republicans vote for a free trade bill supported by a Republican president, it
is likely that they do so not only because of their loyalty to the president, but
also because of their traditional support for free trade, and the latter may be
more important a factor than the former. However, it is hard to distinguish
the one from the other in this particular case. On the other hand, it is easier to
distinguish the two aspects when a Democratic president sends to Congress a
free trade bill. Given the Democrat Partys traditional alliance with labor
unions, a vote in support of the president can be a vote against labor unions
in light of the latters long-standing opposition to free trade.
In general, when a foreign policy issue has apparent and immediate impli-
cations for the electoral bases of the two parties, the likelihood of inter-party
conict signicantly increases. Crabb thus wrote:
Nonetheless, when an issue in the foreign policy area has an evident and
substantial bearing upon domestic policyas with the issue of tari ver-
sus reciprocal trade, foreign aid spending, and the size and composition
of the armed forcesthen the diculty of arriving at bipartisan under-
standings is greatly increased. Not only is the diculty increased, but the
desirability of bipartisan co-operation may be greatly reduced, if not
altogether eliminated.
(1957: 174)
Ideology
Ideology is a conguration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are
bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence
(Converse 1964: 207). Hinich and Munger (1994: 11) dened it as an intern-
ally consistent set of propositions that make both prescriptive and proscrip-
tive demands on human behavior. According to Hunt (1987: 12), ideology is
integrated and coherent systems of symbols, values, and beliefs. What these
various denitions have in common is the coherence and consistency of ones
beliefs. Translated into plain language, the ideological hat one wears enables
others to predictwith reasonable accuracywhere one would stand on a
particular issue. For example, being a liberal generally means support for
abortion and gun control, while being a conservative often means opposition
to abortion and gun control.
The other important attribute of ideology is stability. Once formed, ideo-
logy tends to remain remarkably stable over time and across issues.10 As
Poole and Rosenthal (1997: 8) vividly noted, Members of Congress come to
Washington with a staked-out position on the [ideological] continuum, and
then, largely die with their ideological boots on. In a word, coherence and
stability are the dening characteristics of ideology. It is precisely because of
these two attributes that a members roll call votes on a wide variety of issues
across a long period of time can be arranged on a simple liberal-conservative
continuum (ibid.). And empirical research has produced an impressive
amount of evidence that ideology usually has the biggest impact on members
votes on foreign and defense policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb
1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
Usually members from the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum are
expected to take opposite positions on a particular issue. For example, a
liberal is expected to oppose the war in Iraq while a conservative is supposed
to support it. However, on certain occasions ideological foes may form
a temporary alliance out of strategic considerations or genuine policy
concerns. For instance, a piece of legislation may be too conservative for
liberals but too liberal for conservatives. Liberals may cast sincere votes to kill
it, while conservatives may vote strategically by joining the liberals, knowing
that they can introduce a more conservative alternative once the proposal at
hand is defeated (see Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Nokken 2003). As will be
shown shortly, such a coalition of liberals and conservatives is frequently
found on China policy because of the peculiarities of U.S.China relations.
Constituency inuence
Constituency inuence stems from the electoral connection (Fiorina 1974,
1977; Mayhew 1974). If members of Congress are assumed to be single-
minded seekers of reelection (ibid.: 5), they should be responsive to consti-
tuency interests in order to get reelected. The electoral connection is relatively
strong for House members whose two-year term puts them on a short leash
with their constituents. The much longer tenure of Senators enables them to
have relatively more autonomy from constituency inuence (see Fenno 1982).
While not every member is single-mindedly in pursuit of reelection, other
goals such as power within Congress and good public policy are impossible to
achieve without being elected (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974).
Regardless, reelection generally requires responsiveness to constituency
interests, particularly but not exclusively economic interests. And a long line
of research has produced ample evidence that constituency economic inter-
ests have signicant impact on legislative behavior, particularly roll call vot-
ing (e.g., Bailey 2001; Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999; Gartzke and
Wrighton 1998). Indeed, even during the height of the Cold War when secur-
ity issues seemed paramount, economic interests inuenced Senators voting
on foreign policy (Fordham 1998).
However, it is possible that constituency inuence on foreign policy may
not be strong, or at least not as strong as it is on domestic policy. First and
foremost, the American public is notorious for its poor knowledge of foreign
policy issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and is widely believed to have
no stable, meaningful, or coherent foreign policy preferences (see Page and
Shapiro 1992: chapter 1).11 As a result, they are not expected to pay much
attention to how their representatives in Congress vote on foreign policy
issues. Moreover, most foreign policy decisionswith foreign trade being the
single most important exceptiondo not have clear, immediate impact on
domestic constituents. Even on defense spending (e.g., weapons purchase and
military bases), an issue that presumably has huge constituency implications,
responsiveness may be weak because the costs are diuse and benets are
highly concentrated.
Lindsay and Ripley aptly explained why constituency inuence in foreign
policy may be weak and it is worth quoting them in length:
[M]ost members of the House and Senate have great freedom in taking
substantive positions on foreign policy issues. One reason is that most
constituents are uninformed or unconcerned about specic issues. Voters
care mostly about pocket-book issues, and many foreign policy issues
have no heavy economic components . . . Even when voters do have opin-
ions on a foreign policy issue, they often do not hold their opinions very
strongly, at least not strongly enough to punish errant legislators at the
polls. And the publics memory of foreign policy developments typically
fades quickly: witness the speed with which public anger over U.S. policy
toward China after the 1989 crackdown dissipated.
(1992: 422)
To conclude, with the probable exception of foreign trade, most foreign pol-
icy decisions do not have direct impact on domestic constituents. As a result,
voters at home may not pay much attention to them. This enables members to
enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in foreign policy-making. Instead
of following constituency preferences, they are likely to follow their own
foreign policy preferences, the presidents plea for loyalty, or the dictates of
party leadership. This may help explain why most previous studies have pro-
duced little or no evidence of a signicant relationship between defense
spending and roll call voting (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969;
Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
Methodology
Having laid out the theoretical foundation of my analysis of congressional
policy-making toward China, I will briey discuss methodology. This study
combines both qualitative (i.e., historical-comparative analysis) and quanti-
tative (i.e., statistical analysis) methods. Many scholarly works in American
politics today employ only the latter, while most students of U.S.China
relations choose the former. Such methodological pluralism is necessary for
three reasons. First, dry statistics will do little justice to the intense passions
this controversial relationship evokes among many members of Congress. It
is one thing to tell readers how many China bills a member introduced in one
session or how he or she voted on a China bill, and it is quite another to
describe his or her feelings and attitudes toward China. Thus whenever
possible and appropriate, I will let members speak for themselves through
extensive use of quotes.
Second, historical-comparative analysis provides important contextual
background for quantitative analysis. Moreover, in some instances where
quantication is impossible or extremely dicult, historical-comparative
analysis is perhaps the only tool available. For example, I rely on historical-
comparative analysis to support my argument that the Cold War had a sig-
nicant impact on Congresss human rights policy toward China and that
democratization has been the primary source of congressional support for
Taiwan since the 1990s.
Third, quantitative methods are useful in identifying general patterns of
congressional behavior toward China. They can be very precise about the
eects of a particular factor, whereas qualitative analysis oers only impres-
sionistic observations. More specically, negative binomial regression is
used to examine the determinants of the number of China bills introduced in
each chamber, and logit regression is utilized to analyze the eects of party,
ideology, and constituency interests on roll call behavior.
In so far as roll call analyses are concerned, three methodological issues
deserve special notice. First, since this study examines not only roll call votes
on three China policy issues but also roll call votes on U.S. relations with
other countries, it is imperative that the same set of independent variables
be used across issues and countries. Otherwise, cross-issue or cross-country
comparison becomes problematic.
Second, because constituency variables are usually highly correlated with
party and ideology due to the electoral connection, including all of them
in the same equation can potentially dampen the eects of the former.
Consequently, each regression has two models, the rst with only consti-
tuency variables and the second with party and ideology added. This
method allows me to ascertain the independent eects of constituency vari-
ables and to identify instances where their eects are dampened by party and
ideology.
The third methodological issue concerns constituency opinion. Given the
theoretical and empirical signicance of public opinion, it is desirable that I
examine its eects on legislative behavior. Normative democratic theory pos-
tulates that elected ocials should be responsive to public opinion (Dahl
1956, 1998), and rational choice models of democracy predict that self-
interested politicians will respond to public opinion in order to be elected
(Downs 1957). Empirically, research in American politics has produced ample
evidence that public opinion has some eects on public policy (e.g., Erikson
et al. 2002; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Russett 1970;
Sobel 2001). Moreover, numerous studies have produced evidence that con-
stituency opinion has varying impact on roll call behavior (e.g., Bartels 1991;
Erikson 1981; Herrera et al. 1992; Holian et al. 1997; McDonagh 1993; Miller
and Stokes 1963; Page et al. 1984).
Thus, it appears imperative that I include constituency opinion in my
analysis. And I do have an aggregate measure of public opinion when I
examine the determinants of the number of China bills introduced in each
chamber. However, I do not include any direct measure of constituency opin-
ion in roll call analyses because there simply is no district or state-level public
opinion data about China policy.12 It is beyond the scope of this study to oer
an in-depth analysis of the eects of public opinion on Congresss China
policy at both the individual and the aggregate level. Such a research topic
would develop into a major project in and of itself.
2 Congressional eorts to
punish China1
The thing, [sic] that angers me the most is I hear people saying let us not use
MFN. There must be some other approach we can take. What other device is
there for Congress? This is the only game in town.
(Representative Joe Scarborough (R-FL), U.S. Congress 1997c: 97)
For four years the President has pursued a policy best described as aggressive
appeasement, rolling over on issue after issue like an obedient puppy deter-
mined to receive the approval of a demanding master . . . [I]t amounts to the
continuation and intensication of a tragic 25-year unrequited love aair with
Beijing.
(Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) 1997)
During his six-day state visit to the U.S. in 1997, the former Chinese President
Jiang Zemin dropped by the Capitol Hill and had breakfast with 55 members
of Congress, including all the members of the leadership except for House
Republican Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), who stayed away to protest Chinas
alleged suppression of religious liberties. The lawmakers peppered Jiang with
pointed questions on everything from religious persecution to forced abor-
tion, from organ harvesting to Chinese transfer of nuclear technology to Iran
(CQ Almanac 1997: 8: 39). Republicans listened in stony silence as Jiang
ercely defended Chinas human rights practices (Campbell 1997). It
reminded me of the old days of the Soviet Union, Congressman Chris Smith
(R-NJ) said after the breakfast. He denied everything (quoted in ibid.). On
the Democratic side, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO)
said he told Jiang that we could not have a normal relationship with a
country that trampled on the rights of its people (quoted in Slavin and
Nichols 1997). Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) remained highly crit-
ical after the exchange with Jiang. In my view, the responses were evasive,
she said (quoted in Mitchell 1997).
In retrospect, Jiangs meeting with the lawmakersand his summit with
Clinton for that matterwould probably not have happened, had it not
been for Republican restraint on China bashing. In late September, despite
Congressional eorts to punish China 27
strong reservations from several Democrats and Republicans, the House
International Relations Committee marked up ve bills critical of China.
These bills were ready for oor action in early October, but under intense
pressure from President Clinton, House Republican leadership agreed to
postpone oor consideration until after the summit (CQ Almanac 1997:
8: 38). Immediately after Jiangs departure, the House launched a legislative
blitzkrieg on China (Campbell 1997). Within ve days, that is, November 59,
the Republican-controlled House passed nine bills, including the ve bills
already approved by International Relations. Among other things, these bills
aimed to do the following:
Increase funding for human rights monitoring in China and extend con-
gressional review of nuclear technology transfer to China (HR 2358).
Deny U.S. visas to Chinese ocials involved in religious persecution
(HR 967).
Require the Secretary of Defense to study the feasibility of constructing
a theater missile defense for Taiwan (HR 2386).
Impose sanctions on China for transferring cruise missiles to Iran
(H.Res. 188).
Appropriate funds to enforce the ban on Chinese prison labor products
(HR 2195).
Condemn forced abortion in China and propose a visa ban on Chinese
ocials involved in forced abortion (HR 2570).
Oppose international loans to China (HR 2605).
Authorize the president to monitor, restrict, and seize the assets of and
ban companies in U.S. associated with the Chinese army (HR 2647).
Increase broadcasting by Radio Free Asia to China (HR 2232).
(CQ Almanac 1997: 8: 3940; CQWR 1997: 153637, 261820)
Though none of the nine bills was enacted into law, the sheer number never-
theless attests to congressional activism in China policy. Some readers may
wonder whether this ood of China bills was unique due to Jiangs visit. As
will be demonstrated shortly, this is not an isolated episode, but reects a
general pattern of congressional activism and antagonism in China policy.
Collection of China bills

Admittedly, one can construct an indicator of congressional activism and
antagonism in China policy from a variety of sources, including the number
and nature of congressional hearings or oor remarks. Bills are chosen for
several reasons. First, it is relatively easy to locate and code bills. Thomas, the
online legislative database of the Library of Congress, allows search of bills,
resolutions, and amendments (hereafter collectively referred to as bills unless
otherwise specied) introduced in each session and chamber since 1973. It
also lists the major sponsor(s) and co-sponsor(s) of these bills. In addition to
28 Congressional eorts to punish China
a one-sentence summary, Thomas also provides a more detailed summary of
each bill prepared by the Congressional Research Service. These two types of
summaries greatly facilitate bill coding.
Second, if passed by both chambers in identical form and signed by the
president, a bill becomes law and is bound to have policy implications. Since
one of the tasks of this study is to nd out the impact of congressional
activism and antagonism on China policy, it seems appropriate to study bills
instead of hearings or oor remarks. Last but not least, sponsoring a bill
generally requires much more legislative resources than holding a hearing or
speaking on the oor. To sponsor a bill, a member needs to not only devote
sta resources and legislative expertise, but also use political capital to inu-
ence other lawmakers if the bill is to be reported out of committees and
passed on the oor. By contrast, holding a hearing or speaking on the oor
usually demands far fewer legislative resources. In other words, sponsoring a
bill generally indicates more intense policy preferences than holding a hearing
or speaking on the oor.
A China bill is dened as one that deals exclusively with China policy.
Exclusively means that it addresses only China-related issues. Thus an
authorization or appropriations bill that has China-related riders is not
included here.2 Also excluded are bills that target not only China, but also
other countries or other policy issues. For example, an amendment to grant
asylum to citizens of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China who recover an
American POW is not counted as a China amendment.
China policy is dened broadly to include not only Congresss policy
toward Beijing, but also its policy toward Taiwan.3 This should not be a
controversial denition. Beijing has always considered Taiwan a renegade
province. Moreover, in the WashingtonTaipeiBeijing triangle that has
existed since 1949, Congresss policy toward one has almost always had
important implications for its policy toward the other. For example, the Tai-
wan Relations Act ostensibly governs U.S.Taiwan relations, but few would
deny that it also represents U.S. policy toward Beijing. It is a constant
reminder to Beijing that the U.S. is rmly committed to Taiwans security and
that only peaceful means may be used to resolve disputes across the Taiwan
Strait.
I use Thomas as the exclusive source of China bills. Two schemes are used
to code these bills. The rst is the specic policy issue each bill addresses:
U.S.Taiwan relations, MFN renewal, Chinas accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), generic trade issues, generic human rights issues, fund-
ing to the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF), Tibet, the Tiananmen
Incident, export control, and foreign assistance.4 Bills that address any com-
bination of the ten issues or issues that cannot be neatly classied into any of
the ten categories are put into Other.
Second, each bill is coded according to its policy nature, that is, whether
it is punitive, neutral/technical, or favorable to China. Punitive bills criti-
cize the Chinese government and propose certain punitive actions, such as
condemning Chinas human rights practices, supporting strong U.S.Taiwan
relations, or calling for tighter export control regarding China. Technical/
neutral bills deal with technical issues in bilateral relations such as approval
of tax treaties or shery agreements. Bills that address U.S.Taiwan trade
or Taiwans human rights also belong to this category because they have
no explicitly positive or negative implications for U.S.China relations.
Favorable bills promote U.S.China relations. Thus bills that establish stu-
dent or parliamentary exchange programs, urge recognition of China, or
relax export control will be viewed as favorable ones. Details on data collec-
tion and coding are contained in the Appendix.
Number and nature of China bills

Between 1973 and 2006, 543 China bills were introduced in the House and
332 in the Senate. Table 2.1 classies House bills by policy issue and bill type.
There were 189 concurrent resolutions and 90 simple resolutions. Together,
these two types of resolutions constitute 51 percent of the China bills intro-
duced in the House. A concurrent resolution is used to express opinion on
behalf of both chambers; it is also used to set adjournment date or congres-
sional budget. A simple resolution, by contrast, is used to take action on
behalf of only one chamber or to express its non-binding opinion. A simple
resolution is also used to modify or propose an internal rule or to create a
new committee. Unlike bills, joint resolutions, or amendments, however, these
two types of resolutions do not make law. This raises an important question
that will be answered in the next chapter: Why did members introduce so
many non-binding resolutions?
House members were most likely to sponsor concurrent resolutions when
Table 2.1 House China bills by policy and type, 19732006
Concurrent Simple Joint Bill Amendment Total

resolution resolution resolution
Taiwan 112 21 5 22 7 167

Generic human 33 15 1 22 4 75
rights
MFN 2 21 22 3 48
Export control 3 5 4 11 22 45
Generic trade 4 7 22 2 35
Tibet 11 7 9 2 29
Tiananmen 7 5 2 7 21
UNPF 14 14
WTO 1 9 10
Foreign 1 5 6
assistance
Other 18 27 4 34 10 93
Total 189 90 37 163 64 543
they wanted to express their opinions about U.S.Taiwan relations, as 112 out
of a total of 167 Taiwan bills were concurrent resolutions. Meanwhile, these
Taiwan-related concurrent resolutions accounted for nearly 60 percent of
House concurrent resolutions on China policy. In a word, concurrent reso-
lution seems to be the most popular legislative vehicle to express ones prefer-
ences about Taiwan policy. In 1975, for example, 15 concurrent resolutions
declaring congressional support for Taiwan were introduced in the House.
There were 37 joint resolutions, and 21 of them were related to the re-
newal of Chinas MFN status. Since Congress rst granted MFN status to
China in 1980, it had not objected to its renewal until 1990. Outraged by the
Tiananmen Incident and determined to punish Beijing for its alleged human
rights violations, Congress repeatedly attempted to revoke Chinas MFN sta-
tus (for a comprehensive review of the legislative history regarding Chinas
MFN status, see Pregelj 2001). Under the JacksonVanik Amendment to the
1974 Trade Act, Congress has to pass a joint resolution to disapprove of
presidential renewal of MFN status and the joint resolution is subject to
presidential veto. This is why the vast majority of joint resolutions were
related to MFN renewal.
When it comes to funding to the UNPF, House members relied exclusively
on amendments. Because this is an issue that involves funding and foreign
policy, it is not surprising that all the 14 amendments were attached to foreign
relations authorization bills. In 1995, the House considered HR1561, which
appropriates funds for foreign operations for scal years 1996 and 1997, and
three amendments were introduced to prohibit or limit funding to the UNPF
unless it ceased its activities in China. In 1998, President Clinton vetoed the
scal year 1999 State Department authorization bill (HR 1757) because anti-
abortion Republicans inserted two amendments that imposed stringent
restrictions on funding to international population programs in general and
those in China in particular (CQWR 1998: 2921).
House members also relied heavily on amendments to deal with export
control policy toward China.5 Nearly half of legislative measures concerning
export control were amendments. Like MFN, export control did not become
a salient issue on Capitol Hill until after the Tiananmen Incident. In 1990,
ve amendments were sponsored in the House that imposed various restric-
tions on the issuance of export license, particularly regarding U.S. satellite
export. Amidst accusations of Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear secrets and
Clintons relaxation of export control in exchange for corporate campaign
donations, the House approved in 1998 four amendments to the defense
authorization bill that would prohibit the transfer of missile technology and
U.S.-made satellites to China (CQWR 1998: 137576, 14001403).
Table 2.2 presents the distribution of China bills in the Senate. There were
57 concurrent resolutions and 74 simple resolutions; they combine to account
for nearly 40 percent of the China bills introduced in the Senate. This is
considerably smaller than that in the House (51 percent). Of 57 concurrent
resolutions, 27 are related to Taiwan, and these concurrent resolutions make
Table 2.2 Senate China bills by policy and type, 19732006
Concurrent Simple Joint Bill Amendment Total

resolution resolution resolution
Taiwan 27 21 4 10 18 80
Generic 9 16 2 8 25 60
human rights
MFN 1 7 18 5 31
Tiananmen 1 3 9 10 23
Tibet 6 10 3 3 22
Generic trade 2 6 2 4 3 17
Export control 2 1 4 2 8 17
WTO 6 3 9
UNPF 1 1
Other 9 17 1 18 27 72
Total 57 74 20 78 103 332
up slightly more than 30 percent of the Taiwan bills introduced in the Senate,
which is about half of the corresponding percentage in the House. However,
Senators were more likely than their House counterparts to use simple resolu-
tions to convey their opinions about Taiwan policy, as 21 out of 80 Senate
Taiwan bills were simple resolutions, compared with 21 out of 167 in the
House.
As in the House, the largest number of Senate joint resolutionsseven to
be exactwas related to MFN renewal. However, they account for only
slightly more than 30 percent of all the Senate joint resolutions, as opposed to
57 percent in the House. Thus in both absolute numbers and percentages,
Senators were less likely to sponsor joint resolutions disapproving of presi-
dential renewal of Chinas MFN status.
The most striking dierence between the two chambers lies in the number
of amendments. Even though the Senate is less than one fourth the size
of the House, it has nearly twice the number of amendments. Except for
export control, there were more amendments in the Senate for each policy
issue than in the House. Anyone who is familiar with the internal operations
of Congress knows that this inter-chamber dierence in amendments results
from dierent rules governing oor debate in each chamber.6
Having discussed the frequency of each type of bills, I will examine con-
gressional activism in each policy issue. Excluding the Other category, three
policy issues have the same ranking in each chamber. In descending order,
they are Taiwan policy, generic human rights, and MFN renewal. There were
167 Taiwan bills in the House and 80 in the Senate. When combined, this
means that on average seven Taiwan bills were introduced in Congress annu-
ally during the 34-year period, or more than one out of four China bills
introduced in Congress during this period pertained to Taiwan policy.
The number of generic human rights bills is 75 and 60 in the House and the
Senate respectively. These bills pertain to such issues as religious freedom,
political dissent, and labor rights. One can argue that bills respecting the
Tiananmen Incident, funding to the UNPF, and Tibet should also be counted
as human rights bills. For many members of Congress, the Tiananmen Inci-
dent exemplies Chinese violation of human rights. The controversy over
funding to the UNPF arose amidst allegations of forced abortion in China,
which was viewed by many members of Congress as violations of human
rights. Tibet attracted congressional attention due to alleged Chinese repres-
sion of Tibetans. If these bills were counted, then the total number of human
rights bills would jump to 245. In addition, there were 79 bills related to MFN
renewal. Since the MFN debate was primarily about how to use trade to
leverage human rights progress in China, these bills can also be viewed as
human rights bills. If so, the number of human rights bills would be 324,
surpassing that of Taiwan policy.
Export control does not attract as many headlines as Chinas human rights
or the soaring U.S. trade decit with China, but it is clearly an important part
of Congresss China policy, particularly in the House. As was briey men-
tioned in the Introduction, Congress not only makes sure that the U.S. main-
tains a tight export control regime regarding China, but also successfully
pressured the European Union to delay its lifting of arms embargo against
China.
Bilateral trade seems to be another issue of major concern to members of
Congress, as 52 bills concerning issues like taris, textile quotas, and intel-
lectual property rights (IPR) were introduced. Also, 19 bills specically
addressed issues concerning Chinas entry into the World Trade Organization.
With only six bills, foreign assistance (e.g., international loans to China) does
not seem to be an issue of particular concern to Congress.
Figure 2.1 classies China bills according to several general categories
Figure 2.1 Classication of China bills (including amendments), 19732006.

related to oor action, party of chief sponsor, session, and timing before or
after the Tiananmen Incident. The ndings can be summarized as following:
Far more China bills (665) were introduced in the 17 years after 1989
(including 1989) than those introduced in the 17 years before it (210).
This huge disparity strongly suggests that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident
has been a major source of congressional activism in China policy.
The total number of China bills introduced in the rst session of each
Congress (578) is nearly twice that in the second session (297). This is
strikingly similar to the aggregate ratio for all bills introduced in Con-
gress during the same period.7 One reason for inter-session dierence
may be that members introduce bills in the rst session so as to allow
more attention and time for committee and oor consideration of their
bills, knowing that the legislative agenda is crowded but time is limited.8
Republicans sponsored 475 China bills and Democrats 394 bills, with
Independents contributing 6 bills (which are not presented in Figure 2.1).
This inter-party dierence is quite noteworthy because more Democrats
held oce during this period than Republicans.
Congress took oor actionvoice vote or roll call voteon 259 bills, or
less than one-third of all China bills introduced. Since the full chamber
normally may not debate and vote on a bill unless it is reported out of a
committee, it appears that committees failed to report the vast majority
of China bills to the oor.
The time trend of China bills is depicted in Figure 2.2. A tentative impression
Figure 2.2 Time trend of China bills (including amendments), 19732006.

from this graph is that the ebb and ow of these bills was largely determined
by the major events in bilateral relations. For example, the sudden surge of
China bills in 1979from 6 in 1978 to 37 in 1979coincided with heated
congressional debate over Carters decision to recognize China and over
future U.S.Taiwan relations. What resulted from the debate was the contro-
versial Taiwan Relations Act. In 1989, 63 China bills were introduced, as
opposed to 9 in the previous year. The Tiananmen Incident of 1989 was
almost certainly responsible for this deluge of China bills on Capitol Hill.
The huge spike in 199780 bills compared to 22 in 1996may be attributed
to a number of events such as the reversion of Hong Kong to Beijing, the
former Chinese President Jiangs visit to Washington, and congressional
investigations of alleged illegal Chinese campaign contributions. The trend
line seems to provide support for what Suettinger (2003: 434) called an
event-driven relationship.
Next, I will show the nature of China bills. According to my coding
scheme, there were 18 favorable and 57 neutral/technical China bills in the
House, and the corresponding numbers in the Senate were 13 and 38 respect-
ively. Most favorable bills pertain to export control, MFN, and Other. The
largest number of neutral/technical bills is related to human rights in Taiwan
and issues under Other. When these two types of bills are deducted from the
total number of China bills, I arrive at the number of punitive bills: 468 in the
House and 281 in the Senate. All the bills about generic human rights, Tibet,
Tiananmen, and UNPF are punitive, so are most bills on U.S.Taiwan rela-
tions. Punitive bills accounted for 86 percent and 85 percent of all the China
bills introduced in the House and the Senate respectively. In a word, when we
talk about Congress and China policy, we are really talking about a punitive
Congress.
To sum up, Congress has been extremely active in China policy, particu-
larly U.S.Taiwan relations, Chinas human rights, MFN renewal, and export
control. Moreover, Congress has been unambiguously antagonistic toward
China, calling for one punitive action after another. Also, the major events in
bilateral relationssuch as normalization and the Tiananmen Incident
seem to have determined the ebb and ow of China bills. Last but not least,
the Tiananmen Incident almost single-handedly transformed Congress into
an active player in China policy.
What inuences the ebb and ow of China bills?

Having examined the number and nature of China bills, I will conduct a
quantitative analysis of macro-level factors that aected the number of
China bills introduced in each chamber. It is worth reiterating that this is an
aggregate analysis, not individual-level analysis such as one that examines roll
call behavior. As such, the ndings and conclusions should not be construed
as necessarily applicable to individual-level legislative behavior.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: More China bills will be introduced under divided gov-
ernment than under unied government, other things being equal.
The two political parties have frequently used China policy to attack each
other, particularly in times of divided government, that is, the presidency and
Congress are controlled by dierent parties. When Republicans regained
majority control of Congress in 1947the rst time since 1933congres-
sional debate about what the U.S. should do respecting the Chinese civil war
became much more partisan (e.g., Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983, 1994; Westereld
1955). Republicans intended to use the China issue to embarrass President
Truman, with an eye toward defeating him in the coming 1948 election.
Rourke (1983: 6) wrote, In control of Congress for the rst time in almost
two decades and condently looking forward to capturing the White House
in 1948, Republican foreign policy activity became increasingly motivated by
partisan considerations.
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, the Democratic majority in
Congress launched harsh criticism of President Bushs China policy and
their criticism seemed to be largely motivated by partisanship. Ross (1992:
290) claimed that the Democratic-controlled Congress used China policy
as a vehicle for both pursuing its foreign policy agenda and weakening
the presidents domestic popularity. Harding (1992: 244) asserted that
the deep division between the White House and Congress on China
policy . . . reect[s] simple partisan politics, with the Democrats seeing in
China one of the few foreign policy issues on which a popular new
Republican president might prove vulnerable. Richard Bush (1995: 149150)
agreed: China became subject to the dynamics of divided government. A
Democratic Congress, with support from some conservative Republicans,
sought to use the China issue to embarrass a Republican administration for
political gain.
Similarly, when Republicans took control of Congress in 1995, they
became immediately active in China policy. They put enormous pressure on
Clinton and forced the latter to grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the former
Taiwanese president. Then the Republican-controlled House passed the
U.S.Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act in 1997 and the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act in 2000 (e.g., Bush 2004: Chapter 7; Mann
2001; Yang 2000: Chapter 6). In the meantime, Republicans launched high-
prole investigations of allegedly illegal Chinese campaign donations in the
1996 presidential election (e.g., CQWR 1997: 1140, 1568, 1601, 1861). In
1998, the Republican majority formed a Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the Peoples Republic of
China, chaired by Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA). In early 1999, the
committee released the highly controversial Cox Report (CQWR 1998: 1375,
14001402, 18861889).
Hypothesis 2: The number of China bills introduced should be positively
associated with the strength of anti-Communism in Congress, other
things being equal.
Ideology has profoundly inuenced U.S. policy toward China. Harding

(1992: 17) wrote, Ideological considerations have been a constant source of
ambivalence and opposition to Sino-American relations in both societies for
more than forty years. The onset of the Cold War coincided with the out-
break of the Chinese civil war, and the U.S. supported Chiang Kai-shek
against the Chinese Communists primarily because of his awless record of
anti-Communism. In particular, the China bloc in Congressa group that
consisted mostly of right-wing Republicanssuccessfully pressured the
Truman administration to provide military and economic aid to Chiang even
when his cause seemed hopeless (Christensen 1996; Koen 1974; Rourke 1983;
Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983; Yang 2000: Chapter 2). The eventual defeat of
Chiang and the outbreak of the Korean War made anti-Communism an even
more salient factor in China policy (Finkelstein 1993; Grasso 1987; Purifoy
1976). Within Congress, anti-Communism manifested itself in steadfast con-
gressional opposition to U.S. recognition of China and Chinas admission to
the United Nations (Bachrack 1976).
Though the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, anti-Communism
appears to be still alive on Capitol Hill today because China remains under
Communist rule. When he was in the Senate, Jesse Helms (R-NC) still used
such ideologically charged language as Red China or communist China
(CQWR 1999: 2605). Commenting on a 1996 House resolution (H.Con.-
Res.148) rearming U.S. commitment to Taiwans security, a close observer
of Congress wrote that support for the resolution reected the enduring
strength of anti-Communism in the unsettled post-Cold War era (CQWR
1996: 712). Also, using content analysis and survey responses, Chen (1992)
identied two periods of strong impact of anti-Communism on U.S. China
policy (19491953 and 19801982) and one period of weak impact (1969
1972). During the rst two periods, China policy was rigid and confronta-
tional (ibid.: 43), whereas in the third period China policy was exible and
cooperative (ibid.: 72).
Hypothesis 3: The number of China bills will be negatively associated

with favorable public opinion about China, other things being equal.
A long tradition of research in American politics has produced ample evi-

dence that public opinion exerts signicant impact on public policy (e.g.,
Erikson et al. 2002; Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983).
Moreover, the eects of public opinion are not conned to domestic policies,
but are reported in foreign policy as well (e.g., Mueller 1994; Page and
Shapiro 1983; Russett 1990; Sobel 2001). Some scholars also have reported
evidence that public opinion inuenced China policy (Kusnitz 1984; Teles
1998). Though these studies did not examine specically the relationship
between public opinion and Congresss China policy, they lead to the expect-
ation that Congress may also respond to public opinion in formulating China
policy. More specically, fewer China bills are expected when the American
people have a more favorable opinion of China.
Three other factors could have impacted the number of China bills intro-
duced in each chamber, namely, session, the Tiananmen Incident, and elapse
of time. Because of crowded legislative agenda, members are expected to
introduce more China bills in the rst session of each Congress just to give
their bills more attention and time. The Tiananmen Incident is arguably the
single most important event in U.S.China relations since the two countries
normalized their relations in 1979. It nearly destroyed all the good feelings
toward China that had been accumulating among Americans since Nixons
landmark visit (see Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4). The time trend of China bills
(see Figure 2.2) also indicates that Congress has become decidedly much
more active and punitive since the Tiananmen Incident. Finally, it is highly
likely that the number of China bills increased over time as a result of
expanding economic, cultural, and military ties between the two countries.
That is, more issues require legislative actions as bilateral relations grow.
Methodology
Because there are two major political parties and three branchesthe White
House, the House, and the Senateparty control of government can come in
any of the following four forms: unied Republican control of White House
Figure 2.3 Favorability ratings of China on 10-point scale, 19542001.

Figure 2.4 Favorability ratings of China on four-category scale, 19772006.
and House (Senate), unied Democratic control of White House and House
(Senate), Democratic PresidentRepublican House (Senate), and Republican
PresidentDemocratic House (Senate). The rst three forms are included in
regression analysis, with the last form being treated as the baseline.
Favorable public opinion about China is measured as the percentage of
Americans who reported having a favorable opinion of China in various
surveys. Notwithstanding slight variations in question wording and response
categories, these survey responses are generally good indicators of Americans
overall opinion of China (see the Appendix). For a year in which no such
question was asked, the average of the previous and following years is used.
For years in which there were multiple surveys, the average is taken.
It is hard to construct an aggregate measure of anti-Communism in
Congress. Instead, I use a rather crude measure, namely, the percentage of
Republican membership in each chamber. Republicans in general have tradi-
tionally been more vocal in anti-Communism than Democrats.9 To be sure,
not every Republican adopts a hard-line approach to China. Furthermore,
hard-liners often had to compromise with moderate Republicans like
Doug Bereuter (R-NE) (see CQWR 2000: 263). But, in general, the more
Republicans there were in each chamber, the more punitive China bills would
be introduced due to their antipathy toward Communism.
The rst session of each Congress is coded as 1 and the second session 0.
Tiananmen is coded 0 for years before 1989 and 1 for years thereafter (includ-
ing 1989). I include a time trend variable Year, which is expected to capture
any autonomous change in the number of China bills that is independent of
other variables. Last but not least, since House rules make it much more
dicult to amend a bill on the oor than in the Senate, I exclude amendments
in the following analysis.
Findings
I run two negative binomial regressions, one for each chamber.10 Results for
the House are presented in Table 2.3. Since the average number of China bills
introduced in the House between 1973 and 2006 is 14, this means that con-
trolling for other factors, a Democratic president facing a Republican major-
ity in the House witnessed an estimated 22.68 (1.62 14) more China bills, as
compared with a Republican president facing a Democratic-controlled
House. This is clear indication of the important impact of divided govern-
ment on China policy.
Notice that between 1973 and 2006, there was only one Democratic
president who faced a Republican majority in the House, and that president
was Bill Clinton. As discussed shortly before, House Republicans were par-
ticularly active in China policy after they regained House majority in 1995.
Table 2.3 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) intro-
duced in the House, 19732006
Independent variables Coecients Estimated eects
Unied Republican 1.48** 20.72

(.53)
Unied Democratic .29
(.22)
Democratic PresidentRepublican 1.62** 22.68
House (.46)
Tiananmen 1.34** 18.76
(.40)
Session .62** 8.68
(.14)
Favorability rating .007
(.008)
Republican percentage .09** 1.26
(.03)
Year .03
(.03)
Constant 67.8
(56.00)
Pseudo R2 .17
Log likelihood 99.65
Likelihood ratio test against = 0 9.87
N = 34
Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coecients. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.
** Signicant at .01
Clintons situation was strikingly similar to that of President Harry
Truman, whose China policy was subject to bitter attacks by the newly
inaugurated Republican majority. This statistical nding plus Trumans
experience with the Republican-controlled Congress strongly suggests that a
House Republican majority tends to use China policy as a partisan issue to
attack Democratic presidents.
Unied Republican control of the House actually led to 20.72 more China
bills than a Republican president facing a Democratic majority, controlling
for other factors. During the 34-year period, the House was under unied
Republican control only for six years (20016). Among other things, George
W. Bushs tough stance in dealing with the collision of a U.S. reconnaissance
plane with a Chinese ghter jet in early 2001, congressional frustration with
the astronomical trade decit with China, and congressional opposition to
the European Unions proposed lifting of arms embargo against Beijing may
be responsible for the increase of China bills under unied Republican
control of the House.
Consistent with my expectation, the rst session of each Congress pro-
duced 8.68 more China bills than the second session, when other factors are
controlled for. Also, a post-Tiananmen House session had 18.76 more China
bills than a pre-Tiananmen session, holding other factors constant. This pro-
vides strong evidence that the Tiananmen Incident was primarily responsible
for congressional activism and antagonism in China policy since 1989.
Republican membership appears to have signicant impact, but it has a
wrong sign. That is, when other factors are held constant, increase in
House Republican membership actually led to fewer China bills. One
possible explanation is that during the studied period, signicant increase in
Republican membership in the House occurred after two major events in
U.S.China relations, namely, the Taiwan Relations Act and the Tiananmen
Incident. And these two major events brought about a sharp increase in
China bills introduced in the House. Finally, contrary to my expectation,
favorable public opinion does not appear to have any signicant impact.
Table 2.4 reports regression results for the Senate. Now only three factors
have signicant eects: session, Tiananmen, and favorability rating. Since the
average number of China bills introduced in the Senate was 6.7, this means a
rst session in the Senate witnessed on average 6.2 more punitive bills than a
second session. A post-Tiananmen Senate session produced 9.2 additional
China bills, compared with a pre-Tiananmen one, controlling for other fac-
tors. Thus in both chambers, signicantly more China bills were introduced
in the post-Tiananmen years. Suettinger thus wrote of the impact of the
Tiananmen Incident on U.S.China relations:
The events of June 4 dealt an enormous setback to bilateral relations bet-

ween the United States and Chinaa setback from which, in some ways,
they have never recovered. Indeed, one could say that the Tiananmen
crackdown set the U.S.China relations on an entirely dierent course,
Table 2.4 Determinants of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) intro-
duced in the Senate, 19732006
Independent variables Coecients Estimated eects
Unied Republican .62

(.48)
Unied Democratic .08
(.31)
Democratic PresidentRepublican .07
Senate (.50)
Tiananmen 1.38* 9.2
(.52)
1st Session .93** 6.2
(.18)
Favorability rating .02* .1
(.10)
Republican percentage .03
(.05)
Year .02
(.031)
Constant 42.47
(56.04)
Pseudo R2 .21
Log likelihood 78.61
Likelihood ratio test against = 0 4.38
N = 34
Notes: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coecients. Numbers in parentheses are
standard errors.
** Signicant at .01; * signicant at .05.
one that is far more contentious and hostile than at any time since the
late 1950s.
(2003: 85)
Contrary to my expectations, however, more favorable public opinion

about China is positively associated with the number of Senate China bills.
Even though substantively insignicantone point increase in favorability
rating resulted in 0.1 more China billsthis nding nonetheless indicates the
possible existence of a gap between public opinion and Senators preferences.
That is, as the American public gradually recovered from the initial shock of
the Tiananmen Incident, Senators generally remained critical of Beijing and
continued to introduce China bills. This nding seems to support Suettingers
(ibid.: 426) claim that post-Tiananmen congressional attitudes on China are
likely to change only slowly and at the margins. Finally, that none of the
divided government variables are signicant in the Senate suggests that the
upper chamber as a whole has not demonstrated signicant partisanship in
its approaches to China policy.
To sum up, quantitative analysis provides strong support for three conclu-
sions. First, the rst session of each Congress witnessed signicantly more
China bills than the second session. Thus the electoral institution as an
exogenous force has had some impact on Congresss China policy. Second, as
perhaps the single most important event since normalization, the Tiananmen
Incident has cast an enduring shadow over Congresss China policy. Third,
House Republicans tend to use China policy as a political issue against
Democratic presidents.
3 Eects of congressional
activism on China policy
In both the American and Swiss Constitutions the Upper House has as much
authority as the second; it could produce the maximum of impedimenta
dead-lock, if it liked.
(Walter Bagehot, quoted in Wilson 2006: 151)
Given an active subcommittee chairman working in a specialized eld with a

sta of his own, the parent committee can do no more than change the
grammar of a subcommittee report.
(Congressional sta member, quoted in Goodwin 1962: 596)
In the previous chapter, I adduced evidence that Congress has been extremely
active in China policy. The next logical question is: What is the impact of
congressional activism on U.S.China policy? In answering this question, one
should consider the institutional structure under which Congress makes
China policy. After all, Congress and its members do not make China policy
(or any policy for that matter) in an institutional vacuum. If the institutional
structure makes it extremely dicult for Congress to transform its collective
preferences into policy outcomes, then Congress cannot have much impact
on China policy, regardless of how active it is or how strong its policy
preferences are. As will be shown in this chapter, bicameralism, the com-
mittee structure, and presidential veto have combined to severely constrain
Congresss ability to assert itself in China policy.
Bicameralism
The founding fathers created a second and distinct chamber in the hope that
it would serve as a cooling saucer to the rst and presumably more activist
chamber. Thus, the rst and most crucial step in assessing the policy impact
of bicameralism is to nd out whether the House is indeed more active than
the Senate.
Figure 2.1 already shows that the number of China bills introduced in the
House is larger than that of the Senate. However, this nding does not
44 Eects of congressional activism
necessarily constitute conclusive evidence of House activism in China policy.
First, the House is more than four times larger than the Senate, which makes
any inter-chamber comparison based on absolute numbers potentially prob-
lematic. Second, one can argue that the inclusion of amendments can skew
the results because it is much easier to sponsor amendments in the Senate
than in the House. The rst problem can be dealt with by examining inter-
chamber ratios instead of absolute numbers and the second by excluding
amendments.1
I rst calculate the ratio of House China bills to Senate China bills for each
Congress, and then compare it with the ratio for bills in general (i.e., all bills
introduced in each Congress). The purpose of this exercise is to nd out: (1)
whether there is any inter-chamber dierence in China policy; (2) whether
that dierenceif any at allis consistent across each Congress; and (3)
whether that dierence is unique to China policy or exemplies a general
pattern.
The HouseSenate ratios for China bills and bills in general are depicted in
Figure 3.1. With the exception of the 95th Congress (which has a ratio of 14),
the inter-chamber ratio of China bills stabilizes around 2 (the mean is 2.2).
The ratio for China bills is nearly identical to that for bills in general (the
mean is 2.3), and the correlation between the two ratios is 0.565 and signi-
cant at 0.05. All these statistics indicate that the House has indeed been
Figure 3.1 HouseSenate ratios for China bills and bills in general (excluding
amendments), 93rd109th Congresses.
Eects of congressional activism 45
Figure 3.2 Number of China bills (excluding amendments) by policy type and cham-
ber, 19732006.
signicantly and consistently more active in China policy than the Senate.
More importantly, this pattern of inter-chamber dierence is not unique to
China policy, but exemplies House activism in congressional policy-making
in general.
Figure 3.2 depicts inter-chamber dierence in the number of China bills in
each policy area. The most striking nding is that in each policy area the
number of China bills in the House is consistently larger than that in the
Senate. In terms of ratio, which is not reported here, the HouseSenate ratio
for each policy area uctuates closely around 2 (the mean is 1.97 if foreign
assistance is excluded). This ratio is nearly identical to the average aggregate
HouseSenate ratio of China bills reported above (2.2). Thus, in the par-
ticular case of China policy, what is true for aggregate level inter-chamber
dierence also appears to be true when it comes to specic policies.
Table 3.1 provides additional evidence of House activism. It depicts the
frequency of the number of China bills (excluding amendments) by chief
sponsor in each chamber. Of the hundreds of members who served in Congress
during the 34-year period, only 174 representatives and 79 Senators ever
introduced any China bill. Of those who did, 92 representatives and 37
Senators introduced only one China bill. That is, more than half of represen-
tatives and close to half of Senators who introduced any China bill at all
Table 3.1 Frequency of the number of China bills
(excluding amendments) by chief sponsor and chamber,
19732006
Number of China House Senate Total

bills
1 92 37 129
2 38 9 47
3 13 9 22
4 8 10 18
5 5 3 8
6 4 5 9
7 0 3 3
8 2 1 3
9 3 0 3
10 3 0 3
11 0 1 1
13 1 0 1
16 1 0 1
17 2 0 2
18 1 0 1
22 0 1 1
37 1 0 1
Total 174 79 253
introduced only one bill. The average is 2.7 (449 divided by 174) for each
representative and 2.9 (229 divided by 79) for each Senator.
While the average number of bills introduced by representatives and
Senators is strikingly similar, they mask the important fact that a handful of
House members were particularly active in China policy. Nine representatives
introduced ten or more China bills; together they introduced 148 China bills
out of a total of 449. By contrast, only two Senators introduced ten or more
China bills; together they introduced 33 out of a total of 229. It seems that
inter-chamber dierence in China policy arises primarily because the House
has more members with more intense China policy preferences. Table 3.2 lists
the nine representatives and two Senators as well as the policy issues that were
addressed in their bills.2
Up to this point, I have adduced strong evidence of House activism in
China policy. The next step is to establish that the Senate has checked House
activism in China policy. Two concrete examples will help illustrate the func-
tion of the Senate. In response to the Tiananmen Incident, Congress pro-
posed a number of sanctions against China, but these sanctions were never
enacted into law (Oberdorfer 1989; Phillips 1989). The House put the sanc-
tions in a foreign aid authorization bill (HR 2655) that died in the Senate. The
Senate attached its own version of sanctions to the routine State Department
authorization bill (HR 1487) that President Bush vetoed for other reasons. A
Table 3.2 Members of Congress who introduced ten or more China bills (excluding amendments), 19732006
EXP FA HR MFN Other TAM Tibet Trade Taiwan Total
House
Gerald Solomon (R-NY) 6 4 4 11 1 1 10 37
Tom Lantos (D-CA) 6 4 3 2 3 18
Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) 1 4 1 6 1 2 1 1 17
Stephen Solarz (D-NY) 1 1 1 2 12 17
Chris Smith (R-NJ) 10 1 2 1 1 1 16
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) 2 4 7 13
Christopher Cox (R-CA) 1 4 1 4 10
Trent Lott (R-MO) 10 10
Dawson Mathis (D-GA) 1 9 10
Senate
Jesse Helms (R-NC) 3 10 3 4 2 22
Claiborne Pell (D-RI) 1 7 3 11
substitute bill (HR 3792) was never reported out of the Senate due to juris-
dictional dispute (CQ Almanac 1989: 1642, 3261).
The second example concerns Congresss failed attempt to strip China of
its MFN status. Between 1990 and 2001, the House voted each year on a joint
resolution to disapprove of presidential renewal of Chinas MFN status. The
Senate, by contrast, voted only once on such a resolution. Meanwhile, the
House twice passed bills conditioning MFN renewal on Chinas human
rights progress, and twice it garnered enough votes to override presidential
vetoes. But because the Senate on both occasions sustained the vetoes, the
two bills never became law.
In a word, bicameralism has had profound impact on Congresss China
policy. No matter how active the lower chamber was, its legislative initiatives
regarding China would have had little chance of being enacted into binding
legislation unless the upper chamber had been equally active and agreed with
these initiatives. Moreover, my ndings about inter-chamber dierences are
not unique to China policy, but reect a general pattern of House activism in
congressional policy-making. To the extent that the founding fathers were
wary of an active House churning out one piece of legislation after another,
my ndings seem to justify their concerns and to vindicate their decision to
set up a second chamber as a restraining force.
Congressional committees
To what extent has the committee structure aected Congresss China policy?
Part of the answer is shown in Figure 2.1, which shows that only 259 out of a
total of 875 China bills were reported out of committees to the oor. It
should be noted that the numbers in Figure 2.1 include amendments, but
House rules severely limit amendment opportunities.
Therefore, I retabulate the oor status of bills excluding amendments, and
nd that 119 (or 16.8 percent) of the 708 China bills were reported out of
committees. It is worth noting that my estimate is not unique to China bills,
but seems to be representative of bills in general. For example, Ripley (1983:
145146) found that only a nearly identical 16 percent of the 26,566 bills
introduced in the 89th Congress were ever reported out of committees. My
nding plus Ripleys illuminate the enormous power of committees as gate-
keepers: on average, about 84 percent of bills introduced in Congress die in
committee rooms. It is no wonder that Woodrow Wilson (2006: 63) called
committees the dim dungeons of silence from which few bills will ever
return alive.
What about the nal status of those 119 China bills reported out of com-
mittees? According to the new institutionalism, committee-approved bills will
almost always prevail on the oor (e.g., Crombez et al. 2006; Denzau and
Mackay 1983; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Weingast and Marshall 1988).
Consistent with this perspective, it turns out that 105 China bills were passed
and only 14 were rejected on the oor. That means the probability of a
committee-approved China bill being passed on the oor is close to 0.88
(105 divided by 119). Ripley (1983: 200) reported that an average of 70 per-
cent of committee-reported bills were passed unamended on the oor.3
Of the 14 rejected bills 13 (12 in the House and one in the Senate) were joint
resolutions to disapprove of presidential renewal of Chinas MFN status,
and the remaining one was a House bill. The oor majority approved all the
concurrent resolutions and simple resolutions reported out of committees.
Of the 64 House amendments, 51 were passed and 7 rejected; of the 103
Senate amendments, 63 were approved and 19 voted down.
My analysis so far provides strong support for theoretical claims about
committee power, that is, the power to block policy alternatives and the
power to prevail on the oor. In what follows, I will give a few concrete
examples of how committee members used gatekeeping rights to inuence
China policy.
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), former chairman of the full Senate Finance
Committee (20012003) and its Subcommittee on International Trade (1991
1994), has been a staunch supporter of free trade in general and U.S.China
trade in particular (Baucus 1994a, 1994b, 1996; Gugliotta 1991). He played
an instrumental role in maintaining Chinas unconditional MFN status.
Since MFN legislation falls within the jurisdiction of International Trade,
Baucus used the prerogative of his chairmanship to successfully block any
joint resolution to disapprove of unconditional MFN from being reported to
the Senate oor. In addition to trade, Baucus was also actively involved in
Taiwan policy. When the House passed HR 1838 to shore up U.S.Taiwan
military relations, Baucus promised to put a hold on the bill. Since a hold is
the equivalent of a libuster threat, the bill was doomed.4
Senator Craig Thomas (R-WY), former chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacic Aairs (19952001), has
also been a strong advocate of friendly U.S.China relations (U.S. Congress
1999, 2001d). Since 1995 he has played a role similar to that of Baucus,
fending o eorts by religious conservatives in the Senate to attach human
rights conditions to MFN renewal. In 1998, he prevented the passage of
several anti-China resolutions in the Foreign Relations Committee before
Clintons state visit to China (CQWR 1998: 3206). Partly because of the two
Senators inuence, the Senate never directly voted on a joint resolution to
disapprove of MFN renewal. The Senate voted only once on the issue and
that was in 1999. By a vote of 1287, it overwhelmingly rejected a motion to
discharge from the Finance Committee S.J.Res.27 that would revoke Chinas
MFN for one year.
While these two Senators epitomize the power of committee chairmen to
block certain policies, Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) exemplies the power of
committee chairmen to propose new policies. Being the chairman of the
House International Relations Committee from 1995 to 2000 and a staunch
supporter of Taiwan, Gilman had profound impact on U.S.Taiwan policy.
Under his chairmanship, six resolutions rearming U.S. commitment to
Taiwan were reported out of the committee, and he managed to have them all
approved on the House oor under suspension of rules.5 In addition, the
committee marked up six bills in 1997 that aimed to deny visas to Chinese
ocials who are involved in religious persecution, increase the number of
human rights monitors stationed in China, authorize more funding for Radio
Free Asia, punish China for alleged missile sales to Iran and push develop-
ment of a missile defense system to protect Taiwan (CQ Almanac 1997:
838). All six bills were passed in the House. Had Gilman refused to schedule
hearings or committee votes on these bills, they probably would not have been
reported out of the committee and passed on the oor.
To conclude, the congressional committee structure has had profound
impact on Congresss China policy. From the perspective of Beijing, however,
this impact has been mostly positive, as the vast majority of anti-China
bills died in committees. Had it not been for committees serving as gate-
keepers, many more China bills would undoubtedly have been passed (in one
chamber or both chambers), and Congresss China policyand U.S.China
relations for that matterwould probably have been quite dierent. Also, it
should be noted that my ndings are not specic to congressional policy-
making toward China, but conform to the general pattern of committee
power in congressional policy-making.
Presidential veto
There have been three presidential vetoes and three unsuccessful congres-
sional overrides respecting China policy.6 The rst took place in the immedi-
ate aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Congress attempted to provide
protection for Chinese students who were then studying in the U.S., hence the
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act (HR 2712). The bill, sponsored
by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), would waive for four years the
requirement that they rst return to China before applying for new visas or
permanent residency. The bill passed the House by a unanimous vote and the
Senate by a voice vote. President Bush vetoed the Act on November 30 1989,
on the grounds that the Chinese had threatened to cut o all educational
exchanges if the bill were enacted into law. In its stead, the president issued an
executive order granting Chinese students similar protections. The House
voted overwhelmingly (39025) to override Bushs veto, but the Senate failed
by four votes (6237) (see Yang 2000: 7680; Mann 1999).
The other two vetoes took place in 1992. The rst concerns HR 2212, or
the U.S.China Act of 1991. Sponsored by Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi
(D-CA), the bill attached strict human rights conditions for the extension of
MFN in 1992. It would bar the president from extending MFN in 1992 unless
Beijing accounted for and released all political prisoners arrested during the
Tiananmen Incident. It also required China to make signicant progress in
other human rights areas before it could be granted MFN. The bill passed the
House 313112 on July 10 and the Senate 5544 on July 23 1991. The Senate
did not pass the conference report until February 1992, and Bush promptly
vetoed it on March 2. The House quickly voted 35761 to override Bushs
veto on March 11, but the Senate failed by a vote of 6038 (Yang 2000:
90107).
Several months later, Donald Pease (D-OH) and Nancy Pelosi introduced
HR 5318, or the U.S.China Act of 1992. It is similar to HR 2212 in that it
requires presidential certication of overall Chinese progress in human rights
before the granting of MFN. However, it is signicantly dierent from HR
2212 in one aspect: instead of imposing non-MFN taris on all Chinese
goods, it would target only goods made by Chinas state-run enterprises. On
July 21 1992, the House passed HR 5318 by a vote of 33962, and the
Senate passed it by voice vote on September 14. Two weeks later, President
Bush vetoed the bill. While the House voted 34574 to override the veto on
September 30, the Senate upheld Bushs veto the next day by a vote of 5940
(Yang 2000: 107111).
Regardless of why the three vetoes were sustained, which will be discussed
later on, the three unsuccessful overriding attempts convey two important
points. First, the two-thirds majority requirement essentially guarantees that
the president will prevail most of the time in his battles against Congress.
Second, bicameralism further enhances presidential dominance. If there were
only one chamber, then Bushs three vetoes almost certainly would have been
overridden. Yet the Senate consistently sustained Bushs vetoes, nullifying
whatever victory the House scored vis--vis the president.
The three veto ghts also raise an important question: Why did President
Bushs China policy preferences dier sharply from those of many members
of Congress? Bushs background as the former U.S. liaison ocer in Beijing
in 19741976 is often cited as a key factor behind his determination to pre-
vent Congressat almost any political costfrom inicting irrevocable
damage to a relationship that had been carefully nurtured since 1972 (e.g.,
CQ Almanac 1989: 14111414). That is, since Bush was personally and
intimately involved in the normalization process, he is supposed to have
strong incentives to maintain and promote friendly U.S.China relations
regardless of the policy preferences of Congress.
However, a close look at executive-legislative interactions in China policy
reveals that Bush is merely one of the many presidents whose policy prefer-
ences diverged from those of Congress. In the late 1940s, Congress insisted on
providing military and economic aid to Chiang Kai-shek despite Trumans
objection (Tsou 1963; Westereld 1955: Chapter 12, Chapter 16; Grasso 1987;
Purifoy 1976; Rourke 1983: 130145); Carter established diplomatic relations
with China despite strong congressional opposition (Sutter 1983; Tierney
1979); and Clintons engagement policy was widely criticized on Capitol Hill
(Lampton 2001; Mann 1999; Suettinger 2003). Thus a general question arises:
Why does the president often disagree with Congress in China policy?
Party politics appears to be the major factor that induces executive-
legislative disagreements in China policy. Inter-party electoral competition
often motivates members of the opposition party to attack the presidents
China policy for political gains, particularly when the presidents party has a
minority in Congress. The new Republican majority in 1947 and 1995
launched incessant criticism of Truman and Clintons China policy, and the
Democratic majority mercilessly attacked Bushs China policy between 1990
and 1992.
Another reason probably has something to do with institutional dier-
ences. By constitutional design, members of Congress are expected to be
responsive to parochial interests within their districts, while the president
follows national interests. Moreover, the two institutions are electorally
independent of each other. That is, the president does not owe his oce to
Congress, nor does he have the authority to appoint or remove a member of
Congress. Thus members of Congress frequently advocate foreign policies
that are dierent from or contrary to those of the presidents. Take human
rights, for example. Congress initiated the human rights campaign in the
early 1970s, but the targets of the campaign were mostly U.S. allies. Out of
national security or other strategic concerns, however, the executive branch
was unwilling to jump on the congressional bandwagon and criticize its
allies for human rights violations (e.g., Cohen 1979; Forsythe 1988; Hehir
1992). In the case of China policy, Congress was most outspoken in its
condemnation of the Tiananmen Incident, but President Bush was deter-
mined to maintain normal relations with China, a country in which the
U.S. has a wide range of vital interests: cultural, economic, strategic, and
political.
In a word, because of partisan politics and institutional dierences,
Congress and the president often disagree with each other in China policy
in particular and foreign policy in general.
More bark than bite?

In the end, primarily because of the various institutional constraints, Congress
has rarely been successful in enacting its policy preferences into binding legis-
lation. Table 3.3 shows freestanding China bills that were enacted into law
between 1973 and 2006. A total of merely 15 China bills became binding
legislation. A denominator is needed in order to calculate the proportion of
China bills that were enacted into law. As I pointed out in Chapter 2, 410
China bills were non-binding resolutions that would not have become law
even if they had passed. Then there were 167 amendments. Even if an
amendment is passed, it is not freestanding legislation. If these two types of
bills are excluded, the total number of China bills that could have been
enacted into law is 298. Thus a mere 5 percent (15 divided by 298) of eligible
China bills were fortunate enough to pass the two chambers and have the
blessing of the presidents signature!
Of these 15 public laws, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is arguably the
most important. It has been the bedrock of U.S.Taiwan relations since 1979;
Table 3.3 Freestanding China bills enacted into law, 19732006
Congress Year Bill Public law Purpose
93 1973 S1315 PL 9322 Extend diplomatic privileges and

immunities to the Liaison Oce
of Peoples Republic of China
and to members thereof
93 1974 S3304 PL 93287 Indemnication for any loss or
damage to archaeological
objects on exhibition in U.S.
96 1979 HR2479 PL 968 Taiwan Relations Act
S245
96 1979 S1916 PL 96327 Authorize OPIC operations in
China
96 1980 HR6440 PL 96445 Establish priorities in the
payment of claims against China
99 1985 SJR238 PL 99183 Approve and implement the
agreement for nuclear
cooperation between China and
the U.S.
101 1990 SJR275 PL 101299 Designate May 13, 1990, as the
National Day in Support of
Freedom and Human Rights in
China and Tibet
102 1991 S1216 PL 102404 Provide for adjustment of
immigration status for certain
Chinese nationals
106 1999 HR1794 PL 106137 Support Taiwans participation
in international organizations,
particularly the WHO
106 2000 HR4444 PL 106286 Grant China permanent normal
trade relations
107 2001 HR428 PL 10710 Endorse and obtain an observer
status for Taiwan at the WHO
107 2001 HR2739 PL 107158 Amend PL 10710 to endorse
and obtain an observer status for
Taiwan at the WHO
108 2003 HR441 PL 10828 Amend PL 10710 to endorse
S243 and obtain an observer status for
Taiwan at the WHO
108 2004 HR3793 PL 108235 Endorse and obtain an observer
HR4019 status for Taiwan at the WHO
S2092
109 2005 HR4562 PL 109287 Award a congressional gold
S2784 medal to Tenzin Gyatso, the
Fourteenth Dalai Lama
it has also been the primary source of major conicts in U.S.China relations,
the most recent being the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 19951996.
There were ve public laws enacted between 1999 and 2004 that urged the
executive branch to endorse and obtain an observer status for Taiwan in the
World Health Organization. Compared with the TRA, however, these laws
have had little impact on the WashingtonTaipeiBeijing triangle. Then there
were two public laws that declared congressional support for human rights
in Tibet. The other laws were either neutral/technical or favorable toward
China, such as authorizing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) to operate in China and granting China permanent normal trade
relations status.
To conclude, the preponderance of evidence indicates that, despite its activ-
ism and antagonism, Congress has had minimal success in transforming
its policy preferences into binding legislative outcomes. To put it bluntly,
Congresss China policy appears to be more bark than bite. This nding
raises two more questions. First, if most China bills were never enacted into
law due to inter-chamber disputes, committee screening, and presidential
veto, why did members of Congress nonetheless introduce so many of them?
Second, does Congress matter in China policy and how? While my answers to
these questions may appear to be China-specic, the logic underlying them is
applicable to congressional policy-making in general.
Why so many China bills?

Short of becoming binding legislation, these bills serve a variety of useful
purposes. First, they allow members to stake out positions on issues of
potential interest to their constituents, campaign donors, and interest
groups (e.g., Mayhew 1974). Consequently, the signicance of these bills
depends less on their fate on the oor and more on the political signals they
send out.
For example, Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), one of the harshest critics of Chinas
human rights on Capitol Hill, sponsored a number of bills conditioning
MFN renewal on Chinas human rights. Fully aware that she was ghting an
uphill battle against pro-trade moderates and the president, Pelosi neverthe-
less introduced these bills because they made her look good among Asian
immigrants and Bay Area liberals (Yang 2000: 88). The ght for human
rights is an ethic in San Francisco, make no mistake about that, she asserted
(quoted in Sandalow 1994). Partly because of her relentless crusade for
human rights in China, Pelosi had become a rising political star in the early
1990s, which paved the way for her eventual rise to the House Democratic
leadership.
Second, even if it is a non-binding resolution passed in only one chamber
(or both chambers), it nonetheless conveys to the outside world the collective
preferences of Congress. If the vote margin is bigoverwhelming or unani-
mousthen other policy-makers in Washington and Beijing should be fully
aware of the potential cost of acting against the collective will of Congress. In
other words, though most bills do not appear to have teeth in them, they can
induce desirable actions from relevant political actors. This is the law of
anticipated reactions (Friedrich 1941). In May 1995, the House unanimously
passed a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res.53) urging President Clinton to
grant a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the former Taiwanese president. Two months
earlier, the Senate passed the same resolution with only one dissenting vote.
In anticipation of even stronger congressional actionmandatory legislation
and a successful override if it is vetoedPresident Clinton reneged on his
promise to the Chinese government and decided to issue a visa to Lee (see
Mann 1999: 320326).
Last but not least, though most China bills were never reported out of
committees or enacted into law, addressing merely a small number of them
could exhaust the administration. As Lampton incisively pointed out:
Even if most of the proposed bills stand little chance of becoming

law, the administration must devote so much scarce human resources
and leadership attention to putting out the bushres that in its exhaus-
tion it gives in somewhere simply to extinguish the most damaging
proposals.
(2001: 338)
In 1993, President Clinton had to expend a considerable amount time lobby-

ing against the Murkowski Amendment declaring that the TRA supersedes
the 1982 Communiqu governing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (Yang 2000: 189
190). In 1997, in the midst of congressional debate about MFN renewal and
prior to Clintons summit meeting with the former Chinese President Jiang
Zeming, Christopher Cox (R-CA) initiated 11 separate pieces of legislation
on China (CQWR 1997: 2865, 2777). Faced with such a legislative ood,
Clinton had no choice but to compromise by increasing funding for Radio
Free Asia and stationing more U.S. diplomats in China to monitor human
rights, the two options that were least damaging to U.S.China relations
(Lampton 2001: 338).
Does Congress matter in China policy?

Since Congress is a legislative body, one is tempted to assess its inuence in
foreign policy by counting the number of substantive laws it passes. Yet
binding legislation is merely one indicator of congressional inuence.
Through other and less formal means such as creating situations that gener-
ate desired reactions from the executive branch, enacting procedural legisla-
tion, and framing public opinion, Congress has rmly established itself as a
formidable player in China policy. What Lindsay and Ripley wrote about how
Congress inuences U.S. foreign policy in general also applies to U.S. China
policy in particular:
But xating on substantive legislation obscures the fact that Congress
inuences policy by various indirect means: by setting up situations that
generate desired reactions by the executive, by changing the way
decisions are made in the executive branch, and by framing public and
elite opinion about foreign policy.
(Lindsay and Ripley 1993: 18)
The rule of anticipated reactions predicts that rational actors will behave
strategically, adjusting their actions in anticipation of reactions from other
actors (Friedrich 1941). Because of strategic behavior, it is misleading to
judge the relative inuence of the president or Congress by merely what meets
the eye. The president may deter Congress from taking certain actions by
making known his policy preferences (e.g., his intention to use the veto).
Conversely, Congress can deter the president from taking certain actions by
signaling its collective preferences through actual or promised passage of
legislation. Thus, Lindsay and Ripley (ibid.: 25) wrote, The existence of such
strategic behavior has important implications for the study of defense and
foreign policy: the relative power of Congress and the president cannot be
judged solely on the basis of observed behavior.
Examples of anticipated reactions abound in Congresss China policy.
Lee Tenghuis visit to the U.S., which was discussed shortly before, is a
good example of anticipated reactions. Another example comes from U.S.
sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan. In 1999, the Clinton administration
seemed reluctant to approve sales of long-range early warning radars to
Taiwan. Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), then chairman of the House International
Relations Committee, wrote to President Clinton to urge his approval. He
also wrote to Secretary of State Madeline Albright, threatening to introduce
legislation approving such sales. In the end, the administration agreed in
principle to sell early warning radars to Taiwan (Kan 2002: 5). Meanwhile,
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) co-sponsored S 693 (the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act), a bill that was two months later introduced in the House
as HR1838 and which eventually passed the House in 2000. Though the
bill never became public law because of sti opposition from a number of
Senators, it created an environment in which it became hard for Clinton to
reject Taiwans arms purchase requests (CQWR 1999: 26052607; CQWR
2000: 262, 953; Lampton 2001: 333334).
It is worthwhile saying a few more words about Senator Jesse Helms, who
exercised enormous inuence on China policy during his tenure as chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 19952000 (see Berke and
Myers 1997). His preferences on China policy and his toughness were so well
known on Capitol Hill that he often exercised inuence by doing nothing
(e.g., U.S. Congress 1997b, 1998c, 2000a, 2000c).7 As Lampton (2001: 339,
italics original) pointed out, In politics as well as in life, fear can be a
powerful force; simply being tough and dedicated deters both the executive
branch and other legislators from even attempting to pursue certain courses
of action. In the 1999 search for a U.S. ambassador to China, for example,
several candidates were ruled out simply because they were presumably
unacceptable to Helms. In a word, because of strategic behavior resulting
from anticipated reactions, [t]he inuence of legislators like Helms . . . often
is measured as much by what did not happen as by the legislation they eventu-
ally shepherd into law (ibid.: 339, italics original).
Instead of prescribing (or proscribing) policy actions for the executive
branch, as substantive legislation does, procedural legislation establishes the
processes by which policy decisions are made within the executive branch
(Lindsay and Ripley 1993). Through procedural legislation like reporting
requirements or the creation of new agencies, Congress has rmly put its
imprint on many aspects of China policy. The annual State Department
report on Chinas human rights, which was rst mandated by Congress in
1980, forces the administration to include human rights as an important
aspect of U.S. China policy. Because the report always oers unattering
assessments of the overall human rights situation in China, the Chinese
government has never failed to rebut the report (e.g., BBC Chinese 2004,
2005, 2006). In fact, starting from 1999 Beijing began to issue an annual
report on U.S. human rights. As a result of Congresss procedural legisla-
tion, the annual State Department report and the Chinese report have
become the symbol and a major source of U.S.China confrontations on
human rights.
Another example of procedural legislation is the creation of the Oce of
the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Aairs within the State Department
under Public Law 107228. A number of legislators, including some of the
heavyweights on Capitol Hill like Jesse Helms, Bob Dole, and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, have been strong supporters of human rights in Tibet.8 Congress
has also held a number of hearings on alleged Chinese human rights viola-
tions in Tibet (e.g., U.S. Congress 1988, 1997a, 2001b, 2002). The executive
branch, by contrast, has been largely quiescent on the issue, except when the
State Department issues its annual report on human rights China, which
includes human rights in Tibet. To ensure that the executive branch includes
Tibet in its overall China policy and to provide access to human rights groups
and Tibetans, Congress created the Oce in 1997. Since Beijing has claimed
sovereignty over Tibet since 1949, it condemns the creation of the Oce as
another instance of U.S. interference in Chinese domestic aairs (e.g., BBC
Chinese 2001; Peoples Daily 1997).
Probably the best example of procedural legislation is the JacksonVanik
Amendment that prohibits the president from granting MFN to Communist
countries unless he waives the requirement. Originally enacted to punish
the former Soviet Union for its restrictions on Jewish emigration, the
Amendment became the statutory tool with which a frustrated Congress tried
to shape China policy in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident. Because
of this procedural requirement, the president and Congress locked horns
over China policy each year between 1990 and 2000, and twice the president
had to use his veto power to save unconditional MFN for China. While the
president always managed to renew unconditional MFN for China, the
annual debate nonetheless caused many uncertainties in and considerable
damage to U.S.China relations. Moreover, the annual debates on MFN
renewal forced the administration to treat human rights as a top priority in
China policy.
By holding public hearings in which legislators as well as outside groups
and experts testify on relevant policy issues, members of Congress can greatly
shape public preferences, which in turn can inuence the presidents policy
options. As Lampton (2001: 336) aptly pointed out, Often televised, hear-
ings can cumulatively help shape media, congressional, and ultimately popu-
lar discourse and create boundaries that the executive branch will itself
decide not to transgress. In a series of high-prole hearings held in 1966,
Congress discussed the state of U.S.China relations and came to the conclu-
sion that the U.S. should readjust its foreign policy by reaching out to China
(CQ Almanac 1966: 424429). These hearings laid the critical foundation of
public support for a normalized relationship with China, which in turn
encouraged and facilitated the KissingerNixon initiatives to form a strategic
alliance with China.
One reason that human rights has remained a top priority in U.S. China
policy since 1989 is frequent congressional hearings. Christopher Smith
(R-NJ), former chairman of the House International Relations Subcommit-
tee on International Operations and currently chairman of the Subcommittee
on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, is one of
the most vocal critics of Chinese human rights on Capitol Hill. He has
held the largest number of hearings on human rights in China (e.g., U.S.
Congress 1998a, 1998b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006a, 2006b). According to
Lampton (2001: 336), Smith held at least ve sets of hearings on Chinas
human rights in 1995, the rst year of his chairmanship. In a February 2006
hearing, Smith blasted the top executives of U.S. internet companies for
allegedly aiding the Chinese government in cracking down on political dis-
sent (U.S. Congress 2006b) He even invited Chinese ocials to testify
before his hearings. Each time the Chinese would refuse, and Smith would
view it as Chinese unwillingness to cooperate on human rights issues, hence
more hearings on Chinese human rights (Lampton 2001: 336337). These
hearings undoubtedly have contributed to the salience of the issue among
American people and their support for a strong human rights policy toward
China.
In a word, it is misleading to judge Congresss impact on China policy by
simply counting the number of bills enacted into law. Congress has signi-
cantly inuenced China policy through procedural legislation, creating situ-
ations that generate desired reactions by the executive branch, and by framing
public opinion. On balance, then, Congresss inuence lies not so much in
telling the executive branch what to do as in setting up road blocks in U.S.
China relations. Sutter thus wrote:
The overall eect of such strong congressional criticism has been to act
as a drag on forward movements in U.S.China relations. The constant
critiques divert administration policy-makers from other tasks, forcing
them to defend and justify their China policies before skeptical and
sometimes hostile Congress.
(2001: 108)
4 Congress and U.S.China
trade relations1
Congress, of course, is oriented not to academic theory but constituencies

where voices, nancial contributions, and votes carry decisive weight in elec-
tions. In trade matters, as a result, it tends to listen to well-organized groups
that have a clear focus of concern, strong local support, and a situation sus-
ceptible to ready emotional understanding: the loss of jobs of automakers in
Detroit or steel workers in Pennsylvania or garment and apparel workers in
North Carolina.
(Mark Bisnow 1990: 283)
When we trade with other countries, we export more than farm equipment,
soybeans, or computer chips. We export part of our society. Part of our Amer-
ican values and ideals [sic]. This is good for the WTO. It is good for China.
It is good for the United States. And I believe it will help keep the peace.
(Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Congressional Record 2000: S791)
Do my colleagues know that . . . China has still not accounted for those
missing or detained in connection with the 1989 Tiananmen Square demon-
strators? Eleven years . . . And this administration and this Congress wants
[sic] to grant China permanent trade status? Shame.
(Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA), Congressional Record 2000: H514)
Booming economic ties

While strategic cooperation formed the foundation of U.S.China relations
during the latter part of the Cold War, today economic ties are the bedrock of
the bilateral relationship. Some statistics on bilateral trade will illuminate the
growing interdependence between the two economies. China is the third larg-
est trading partner of the U.S. and the U.S. is Chinas top trading partner.
Total bilateral trade has grown at an exponential rate, from $2.3 billion in
1979 to $343 billion in 2006 (see Table 4.1). U.S. exports to China have
increased from $1.7 billion to $55.2 billion, with an estimated 199,000 high-
paying American jobs dependent on exports to China (Scott 2005: 4).
Meanwhile, U.S. imports from China have increased at an even higher rate,
from $592 million in 1979 to $287.8 billion in 2006 (see Table 4.1). The
Congress and U.S.China trade relations 61
Table 4.1 U.S.China trade in goods, 19732006 (millions of dollars)
Year U.S. exports U.S. imports Total trade U.S. balance
1973 689 63 752 626

1974 806 114 920 692
1975 303 157 460 146
1976 134 201 335 67
1977 171 200 371 29
1978 820 324 1,144 496
1979 1,724 592 2,316 1,132
1980 3,754 1,058 4,812 2,696
1981 3,602 1,865 5,467 1,737
1982 2,912 2,283 5,195 629
1983 2,176 2,244 4,420 68
1984 3,004 3,064 6,068 60
1985 3,855 3,861 7,716 6
1986 3,106 4,771 7,877 1,665
1987 3,497 6,293 9,790 2,796
1988 5,021 8,510 13,531 3,489
1989 5,755 11,989 17,744 6,234
1990 4,806 15,237 20,043 10,431
1991 6,278 18,969 25,247 12,691
1992 7,418 25,727 33,145 18,309
1993 8,762 31,539 40,301 22,777
1994 9,281 38,786 48,067 29,505
1995 11,754 45,543 57,297 33,789
1996 11,992 51,512 63,504 39,520
1997 12,862 62,557 75,419 49,695
1998 14,241 71,168 85,409 56,927
1999 13,111 81,788 94,899 68,677
2000 16,185 100,018 116,203 83,833
2001 19,182 102,278 121,460 83,096
2002 22,127 125,192 147,319 103,065
2003 28,367 152,436 180,803 124,069
2004 34,721 196,699 231,420 161,978
2005 41,925 243,470 285,395 201,545
2006 55,224 287,773 342,997 232,549
Source: 19731984, Harding (1992: Table A-2); 19852004, U.S. Census Bureau.
U.S. alone absorbs about one-third of all Chinese exports to the world. For
example, China has been the top supplier of footwear and toys to American
consumers since 1991; in 2005, Chinese imports alone accounted for 71 per-
cent of total U.S. footwear imports and 78 percent of total U.S. toys imports.
Since 2003, China has been the leading source of American apparel
importsboth knit and not-knit (see Table 4.2).
As a result, the U.S. has been running an enormous trade decit with
China. In fact, the last time the U.S. had trade surplus was back in 1982.
Between 1983 and 2006, U.S. trade decit with China increased from an
insignicant $68 million to $232.5 billion (see Table 4.1). The inux of
Table 4.2 U.S. imports of selected commodities from China in 19892005 (billions of dollars)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Footwear, gaiters etc. and parts thereof

US Total 8.39 9.58 9.56 10.17 11.18 11.72 12.11 12.75 14.02 13.88 14.07 14.85 15.24 15.39 15.60 16.51 17.93
From China 0.72 1.48 2.53 3.40 4.52 5.26 5.82 6.39 7.41 8.01 8.43 9.19 9.76 10.23 10.57 11.35 12.72
China % 9 15 26 33 40 45 48 50 53 58 60 62 64 66 68 69 71
US Total
Ranking 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Toys, games and sport equipment; parts and accessories
US Total 7.80 8.47 8.18 10.09 10.94 11.10 12.29 13.96 16.58 17.84 18.23 19.25 20.27 21.44 21.04 21.96 24.45
From China 1.73 2.14 2.61 3.69 4.17 5.15 6.22 7.50 9.36 10.55 11.08 12.38 12.22 14.44 16.10 17.22 19.14
China % 22 25 32 37 38 46 51 54 56 59 61 64 60 67 77 78 78
US Total
Ranking 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Apparel articles and accessories, knit or crochet
US Total 8.58 8.62 8.85 10.29 10.63 12.19 13.89 15.06 18.65 21.65 23.71 26.41 26.86 27.82 29.72 31.58 33.29
From China 1.07 1.09 1.13 1.40 1.51 1.57 1.38 1.51 1.84 1.86 2.02 2.03 2.28 2.62 3.20 4.10 6.58
China % 12 13 13 14 14 13 10 10 10 9 9 8 8 9 11 13 19
US Total
Ranking 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1
Apparel articles and accessories, not knit etc.
US Total 13.36 14.36 14.89 17.97 19.86 21.06 22.22 22.87 25.99 28.14 28.69 32.80 31.69 30.90 33.19 35.29 37.51
From China 1.59 2.11 2.30 3.07 3.79 3.51 3.28 3.51 4.16 3.81 3.75 4.17 4.15 4.48 5.49 6.62 10.23
China % 12 15 15 17 19 17 15 15 16 14 13 13 13 14 17 19 27
US Total
Ranking 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Source: Oce of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Chinese products arguably have had tremendous negative impact on American
jobs and wages. Unable to compete with cheap Chinese imports, many
American manufacturing businesses were forced to close, resulting in the loss
of thousands of jobs. According to one estimate, U.S. trade with China
eliminated a net 1,460,000 jobs in 19892003 (Scott 2005: 4).
The astronomical trade decit with China has put both the White House
and Congress under political heat, but for two reasons the political heat has
been particularly intense for Congress.2 First, of the three branches of gov-
ernment, only Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate foreign
trade. Second, because of the electoral connection, constituents adversely
aected by Chinese importsmostly blue-collar workers and labor unions
have put increasing pressure on members of Congress to address skyrocket-
ing trade decit (see Sostek 2006; Trumka and Hughes 2006). And Congress
has indeed been actively pursuing various legislative measures aimed
at reducing trade decit. In 2005, Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) co-sponsored a bill that would impose a 27.5 percent
tari on Chinese imports unless Beijing appreciates its allegedly undervalued
currency, which is believed to be partly responsible for the huge trade decit
(see MacLeod 2006; Marquand 2006). In the House, representatives from the
manufacturing belt like Tim Ryan (D-OH), Mike Rogers (R-MI), and Phil
English (R-PA) also introduced similar bills.
Congress and U.S.China trade

Even before the two countries had diplomatic relations, bilateral trade was
on the mind of a handful of members of Congress. As early as 1973, Sen-
ator Thomas J. McIntyre (D-NH) sponsored a joint resolution requiring
Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce to report on proposed grain sales
to China, including the possible eects of such sales on U.S. domestic grain
market, consumers, and farmers. In 1974, Senator Mike Manseld (D-MT)
introduced a bill calling on the president to grant Most Favored Nation
(MFN) trade status to China.3 In the following year, Senator Richard Stone
(D-FL) introduced a resolution calling for conclusion of trade agreements
between the two countries. In 1977, Congressman Les Aucoin (D-OR) spon-
sored four bills authorizing the ExportImport Bank to extend credit to
China.
No sooner had the two countries exchanged diplomatic recognition than
Congress began to consider legislation on trade with China. On December 13
1979, the House Ways and Means Committee, by a 248 vote, approved
a three-year trade agreement negotiated between the Carter administration
and the Chinese government. The full House approved the agreement by a
29488 vote on January 24 1980, and the Senate approved it the same day
with a 748 vote. In addition to granting China MFN, the trade agreement
also encouraged business relations between the two countries (including the
establishment of consulates and the promotion of visits by business groups),
64 Congress and U.S.China trade relations
committed each country to protect the patents, trademarks, and copyrights
of the other country, and provided for timely consultations to resolve issues
like market disruptions caused by imports (CQ Almanac 1980: 356357; CQ
Almanac 1979: 160).
In the decade after normalization of relations, Congress appeared to be
uninterested in regulating bilateral trade, conceding most initiatives to the
executive branch and the business community. The handful of bills and
amendments (ve in total) introduced during this period were mostly aimed
at accelerating the ow of goods across the Pacic. In 1981, Representative
Sam Gibbons (D-FL) introduced a bill permitting the importation of
Chinese fur, and Representative Ralph Regula (R-OH) introduced in 1984
an amendment designating China as a friendly country in a program that
sells dairy products acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation.
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) sponsored an amendment in 1985 that urged
Commerce and State to increase U.S.China trade, with a view toward
creating more American jobs and increasing the American share of the
Chinese import market. The exceptions were two billsintroduced by
Representatives Richard Schulze (R-PA) and Philip Crane (R-IL) respect-
ively in 1982 and 1983that disapproved of presidential renewal of Chinas
MFN status.
Just as U.S.China trade was heading into a period of unprecedented
growth, the Tiananmen Incident took place. Outrage against Beijing plus
frustration with President Bushs policy of business as usual prompted
Congress to reexamine its trade policy toward China. If Congress had the
authority to approve MFN for China, then it apparently had the authority
to disapprove it or to attach conditions to its renewal. What ensued was a ten-
year battle between the White House and Congress over MFN renewal in
particular and China policy in general that, as President Clinton lamented,
divided our foreign policy and weakened our approach over China (Public
Papers of the Presidents 1993: 770).
Amidst the annual ritual of congressional-executive skirmish over MFN,
the U.S. and China signed an agreement on Chinas accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on November 15 1999. Failure to reach a trade
agreement with the U.S.due to a host of issues such as market access, IPR,
and export subsidyhad been the major barrier to Chinas eorts to rejoin
the WTO.4 Things started to speed up when the Chinese premier Zhu Rongji
visited Washington in April 1999 and oered an attractive package of con-
cessions. However, against the backdrop of Republican-led investigations of
alleged Chinese theft of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets and illegal Chinese
campaign contributions, President Clinton turned down Zhus oer (CQ
Almanac 1999: 23: 37; Mufson and Blustein 1999). But the barrage of
criticism from supporters of Clintons engagement policy, in particular the
pro-trade moderates in Congress and the business community, coupled with
the administrations concern about sending Chinas preeminent reformer
home empty-handed, forced Clinton to reverse his initial decision and to
pledge quick resumption of the WTO talks (Blustein 1999a, 1999b). Tough
negotiations resumed, but it was not until November 15 that the two coun-
tries reached the landmark agreement.
Now it was up to Congress to approve the trade agreement. More specic-
ally, Congress needed to remove China from the JacksonVanik Amendment
and grant it permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) if the two countries
wanted to reap the full benets of Chinas WTO membership.5 The House
approved Chinas PNTR by a narrow vote of 237197 on May 24 2000,
with better than one-third of Democrats (73138) voting alongside nearly
three-quarters of Republicans (16457).6 The bill encountered much less
opposition in the Senate, and attempts by the bills opponents to amend the
bill failed. The full chamber approved it 8315 on September 19 (Republican
468, Democrat 377) (CQ Almanac 2000: 20: 324).
Legislative battle over PNTR

This brief review of congressional involvement in U.S.China trade relations
raises an important question: Why did some members support trade with
China while others oppose it? To answer this question, I examine the 2000
House vote on PNTR. It is arguably the only China-related House vote that
dealt with issues primarily concerning U.S.China trade relations such as
taris, market access, and special import protection. HR 4444 originally con-
tained certain provisions concerning monitoring human rights in China,
Taiwans accession to the WTO, and Chinese forced labor products, but none
of these provisions were enacted into law (see CQ Almanac 2000: 20: 12). The
Senate also voted on PNTR, but the vote was too lopsided (8315) to be
suitable for statistical analysis.
Apart from the PNTR vote, there were dozens of votes on the renewal of
Chinas MFN status. However, one can argue that these votes were primarily
concerned with Chinas human rights and only secondarily with U.S.China
trade. Since it had rst approved MFN for China in 1980, Congress had never
objected to presidential renewal until 1990, one year after the Chinese crack-
down on pro-democracy demonstrators on the Tiananmen Square. Outraged
by Beijings actions and frustrated by the Bush administrations China policy
(e.g., the two secret missions to reestablish relationship with Beijing immedi-
ately after the Tiananmen Incident), Congress turned to MFN renewal in an
attempt to bring about Chinese human rights progress in particular and to
shape U.S.China policy in general (see Harding 1992; Lilley and Willkie
1994; Mann 1999; Yang 2000). Thus the whole MFN debate should be
viewed in the context of congressional attempts to change Chinas human
rights practices in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident.
Moreover, as Nokken (2003) forcefully argued, the MFN votes and the
PNTR vote were probably dierent because the rules and procedures govern-
ing them were dierent. Under the rules governing MFN, presidential success
is virtually guaranteed from the outset, since a joint resolution to disapprove
of presidential renewal must be passed in both chambers andeven if
passedis subject to presidential veto. Faced with such an institutional struc-
ture, members nonetheless scheduled these recorded votes because these votes
provided them with the opportunity to secure publicity for their cause [espe-
cially human rights] and to garner position-taking points with voters back
home (ibid.: 155). What resulted was a coalition of ideological ends voting
against the middle, or what he called EATM voting. The PNTR, he argued, is
a normal piece of legislation that requires majority approval in Congress as
well as White House support to be enacted into law. Nokken found that when
it came up for a vote, many members changed positions, with Republicans
switching to support and Democrats to opposition. The result was less
EATM distribution on the vote. Nokken thus concluded, When the outcome
was uncertain, and when the matter facing the House was a straightforward
policy vote that would be dealt with by the Senate and president, the EATM
distribution subsides noticeably (ibid.: 165).
Excluding these MFN votes, there were merely six House votes on trade
issues relating to China. Three of them were unanimous.7 The other three
votes (all in 1997) were contested votes, but a close look indicates that they
were not pure trade votes. The rst of the three votes was on an amendment
that directed the ExportImport Bank to give preferences to U.S. companies
in China that had voluntarily adopted a code of conduct consistent with
international human rights. The remaining two votes appeared to be parlia-
mentary tactics, as both of them were on motions to table the appeal of the
ruling of the Chair of the Ways and Means that a motion to recommit was
irrelevant.8
As a result of these considerations, I treat the MFN votes as votes on
human rights and analyze them in Chapter 6. In this chapter, I examine only
the PNTR vote.
Hypotheses
After the two countries signed the trade agreement on Chinas accession to
the WTO in late 1999, the Clinton White House immediately started a well-
organized and high prole campaign for its approval by Congress (CQWR
2000: 1121; Smith 2000). China is not simply agreeing to import more of our
products. It is agreeing to import one of democracys most cherished values,
economic freedom, said the president (quoted in CQWR 2000: 552). He
appointed Commerce Secretary William M. Daley and Deputy White House
Chief of Sta Steve Ricchetti to launch an all-out campaign. Clintons cam-
paign on Capitol Hill focused on House Democrats who appeared to be
reluctant to support a trade deal opposed by labor unions. In order to woo
wavering members, Clinton also arranged trips to China so that these
members could see with their own eyes the positive changes that had occurred
in that country since 1989 (Smith 2000). Two weeks before the scheduled
House vote, Clinton arranged a star-studded ceremony to tout the benets of
U.S.China trade. The guests included former presidents Gerald Ford and
Jimmy Carter, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and Minnesotas
Independent governor Jesse Ventura (CQWR 2000: 1121).
Hypothesis 1: Because of pressure from President Clinton, Democrats

will be more likely to vote for PNTR than Republicans, other things
being equal.
Since constituency interests are arguably most clearly dened on trade issues,
I expect signicant constituency inuence on the PNTR vote. In particular,
the interests of farmers, big retailers and wholesalers, and labor unions are
expected to have signicant impact on the vote.
The U.S. has been the worlds leading exporter of agricultural products.
In the early 1980s, it alone accounted for nearly one-third (32 percent to be
exact) of the worlds agricultural export market, and its share in 1999 was
18 percent (Economic Research Service 2001b: 1). In the same year, the over-
all export share of U.S. agricultural production was 15 percent (Economic
Research Service 2000: 1). In 2000, the U.S. exported $51.6 billion worth of
agricultural products, which generated 740,000 full-time civilian jobs (includ-
ing 444,000 jobs in non-farm sectors), and a third of U.S. cropland went into
export channels (Economic Research Service 2001a).
China has been a leading market for American farmers since the two
countries established diplomatic relations in 1979. It was the seventh largest
foreign market for U.S. farm products between 1997 and 2001; if Hong Kong
is included, then China became the fourth largest (Becker and Hanrahan
2002: 1). The U.S. is the largest supplier of agricultural products to China,
accounting for an average of 24 percent of Chinas agricultural import
market between 1997 and 1999. In 1999, U.S. share of Chinas imports of
soybean, soy oil, hides, and poultry meat was 58 percent, 39 percent, 44
percent, and 64 percent respectively (Foreign Agricultural Service 2001: 14).
With signicantly reduced tarishence more market access for American
farmersonce it was admitted into the WTO, China was expected to import
more U.S. agricultural products, raising average U.S. farm prices from
0.5 percent to 3 percent over the 20022009 baseline. And U.S. exports and
net farm income could increase by US$900 million and US$800 million,
respectively, by 2009 (Becker and Hanrahan 2002: 2).
Given the high stakes American farmers have in U.S.China trade, it is not
surprising that members from farm districts seemed to be particularly sup-
portive of PNTR. For example, Greg Walden (R-OR) supported PNTR
because the Oregon Potato Commission estimated that Chinese imports of
frozen French fries would increase from 15,000 metric tons in 1997 to 250,000
metric tons in 2005 (U.S. Congress 2001c: 13). Fully aware of the importance
of Chinese consumers for Iowa soybean growers, Senator Chuck Grassley
(R-IA) also championed Chinas WTO membership (Congressional Record
2000: S791).
Hypothesis 2: Support for PNTR will be positively associated with farm
employment in a congressional district.
In addition to agriculture, other export-competitive industries have also

beneted from the China market. The Boeing Company is an illuminating
case. By the end of the rst quarter of 2006, 61 percent of Chinas passenger
aircrafts were Boeing-made. And the China market is still growing, as an
estimated 2,600 new passenger aircrafts worth US$213 billion will be needed
for the next two decades (Boeing Company 2006). Other big companies like
GE and Microsoft have also reaped enormous prots from the China market.
Thus, generally speaking, the more a district exports to China, the more likely
its representative is expected to vote for PNTR.
Hypothesis 3: The magnitude of a districts exports to China will be

positively associated with support for PNTR, holding other variables
constant.
American retailers and wholesalers also have enormous stakes in U.S.China

trade. According to Zakaria (2005), Wal-Martthe largest retailer in the
worldalone imports US$18 billion worth of goods from China annually.
Eighty percent of Wal-Marts suppliers6,000 in totalare located in
China. Cheap Chinese products like footwear, toys, and apparel (see Table
4.2) have saved American consumers more than US$600 billion in the past
decade (ibid.: 29). In his testimony before Congress, Robert Hall, Vice
President of the National Retail Association, cited estimates from the Trade
Partnership that U.S. imports of consumer goods alone from China in 1996
supported more than 2.4 million American jobs in such high-paying sectors
as manufacturing (cash registers and trucks to transport the goods to store),
nance and insurance, transportation, wholesaling, and retailing (U.S. Con-
gress 1997c: 185). Admittedly, what is good for retailers and wholesalers may
not be good for their employees. For example, criticism of Wal-Marts alleged
exploitation of workerslow wages, no health benets, etc.attests to con-
icting interests between employers and employees. Nonetheless, employ-
ment in retail/wholesale industries is a relatively good, indirect measure of the
political inuence of retail/wholesale industries in a particular congressional
district.
Hypothesis 4: Employment in retail/wholesale industries will be posi-

tively associated with support for PNTR, controlling for other factors.
While American farmers and retailers/wholesalers have generally beneted

from trade with China, labor unions seemed to have been most adversely
aected by it and hence were most vocal in their opposition to PNTR
(Connolly 2000; CQWR 2000: 90711; Greenhouse 2000; Kahn 2000b).
According to one estimate, nearly 1.5 million jobs were eliminated due to U.S.
trade with China in 19892003 and many of these lost jobs were in the heavily
unionized manufacturing industry (Scott 2005: 4).
The plight of the textile and apparel industry perhaps best illustrates the
adverse impact of Chinese imports on American jobs. In 2004, Chinese textile
and apparel exports to the U.S. were valued at about $17 billion, or about 20
percent of all American clothing imports (Barboza 2005). Between 1989 and
2003, 59,577 textile jobs and 91,617 apparel jobs were allegedly lost due to
Chinese imports; they accounted for 13.4 percent of all manufacturing
jobs lost to China trade (Scott 2005: 15). In the rst three months of 2005,
Chinese exports increased by more than 63 percent over a year ago, largely
due to the abolition of the global textile quota in January 2005. As a result,
an additional 17,000 jobs were reportedly displaced in the rst three months
of 2005 due to the closure of 11 textile and apparel plants (Barboza 2005;
Iritani and Lee 2005).
Consequently, labor union leaders were steadfastly opposed to PNTR. The
top three union leadersJohn J. Sweeney of A.F.L.-C.I.O, Jay Mazur of
United, and Lenore Miller of Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Unionresigned from a presidential panel on PNTR out of frustration with
the administrations China trade policy (Kahn 2000a). John Sweeney called
it disgustingly hypocritical for the White House to posture for workers
rights in the global economy at the same time it prostrates itself for a deal
with China that treats human rights as a disposable nuisance (quoted in
Kaiser 1999).9 Labor unions organized massive grassroots campaigns and
brought nearly 13,000 members to Capitol Hill in April 2000 to put pressure
on Congress (CQWR 2000: 90711).10 Some union leaders even threatened
to campaign against Democrats who voted for the trade bill (Jordan 2000).
For some Democrats, the threat was not a blu but a real one, as labor
PACs signicantly reduced campaign contributions to Democrats who
voted for the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 (Engel and
Jackson 1998).
Hypothesis 5: The higher the percentage of unionized labor in a district,

the more likely a member from that district is to vote against PNTR,
other things being equal.
Moreover, the Democratic Party is expected to be more responsive to the

interests of labor unions than the Republican Party.11 Given the high stakes
of constituency interests involved in trade policy, the two parties have trad-
itionally adopted rather distinct positions roughly corresponding to the
broad interests of their respective electoral bases. Republicans tend to be
more attentive to business interests and more supportive of free trade,
whereas Democrats are more inclined to support labor unions and hence
protectionist policies (Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; Gibson 2000; OHalloran
1994). This is what Bailey and Brady (1998: 528) called interparty hetero-
geneity of electoral strategies. Thus, in the nal analysis, partisanship can be
viewed as constituency dierences translated into issues (Davidson and
Oleszek 1990: 130).
Hypothesis 6: Since Democrats are expected to be more likely to oppose

PNTR due to pressure from labor unions, the coecient for the inter-
action term Democrat Union Strength should be signicant and
negative.
Also, it should be noted that both parties had a hard time forming a unied
front on PNTR. On the Democratic side, opponents of PNTR were mostly
human rights activists and environmentalists from the liberal wing of the
party, and on the Republican side, social conservatives and defense hawks
from the conservative wing of the GOP (CQWR 2000: 89; CQ Almanac 1998:
23: 3). As a result, pro-trade Republicans and Democrats found themselves
in opposition to the ideological wings of both parties on the PNTR debate.
A CQ Weekly Report sta writer vividly captured the political scene:
In any other context, it might have seemed surreal, as long-time political

enemies from the political left and right chatted amiably. Rep. Christo-
pher H. Smith, R-N.J., who is best known for his anti-abortion activism,
complimented his frequent opponent on that issue but ally against the
China bill, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif . . . But all had a belief in com-
mon: that their adversaries would sell out Americas moral standingits
desire to export basic freedoms, decent working conditions and environ-
mental protectionto make a buck.
(CQWR 2000: 910)
Hypothesis 7: The ideological wings of both parties will be more likely to

vote against PNTR than moderates, controlling for other factors.
Finally, it is worth noting that many members opposed PNTR because they
believed that the annual review of MFN gave Congress crucial leverage on
human rights in China. Chris Smith (R-NJ), a strong critic of Chinas human
rights, argued that the annual debate and the possibility of MFN revocation
are arguably the most important leverage the U.S. still has to inuence human
rights situation in China and that the permanent surrender of our MFN
leverage ought to be unthinkable at this point (U.S. Congress 2000b: 3,
2001c: 24). Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-MO) also felt uncomfort-
able with just taking away a process that is in place, that does provide some
pressure on China, and leaving nothing to replace it (CQWR 2000: 850).
David Bonior (D-MI) said, If you reward China with permanent trade status,
you lose all leverage (quoted in Shesgreen 2000).
Data and methodology
Due to the lack of district-level data, I use state-level data for two variables:
Union Strength and Exports to China. Union Strength is the percentage
of unionized workers, and Exports to China is the proportion of exports to
China out of a states total exports. Data for the other two constituency
variables are district-level and come from the 2000 census. Farm Employment
is the total number of farmers and farmer managers divided by civilian labor
force. Similarly, Retail/Wholesale Employment is the percentage of retail and
wholesale workers in civilian labor force. Presidents Party is coded 1 if a
member belongs to the presidents party and 0 otherwise.
To test the hypothesis that the ideological wings of both parties are more
likely to vote against PNTR than pro-trade moderates, I use the absolute
value of the commonly used DW-NOMINATE score (hereafter referred
to as DW score) (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Since the original value of DW
score almost always ranges from 1 to 1, its absolute value ranges from 0 to 1.
Because both liberals (negative scores) and conservatives (positive scores) are
expected to vote against pro-trade moderates, high absolute DW scores
should be positively associated with nay votes. In other words, the absolute
value of DW score is expected to have a negative sign.
Given the usually high correlation between party and ideology, on the one
hand, and constituency variables, on the other hand, including both in the
same regression may dampen the eects of one or the other.12 Thus I rst
run a regression with only Union Strength, Farm Employment, and Retail/
Wholesale Employment. Then I add party and ideology, the interaction term,
and Exports to China sequentially. I treat Exports to China dierently from
the other three constituency variables because data on state exports are avail-
able only after 1999, which means that when I analyze roll call votes on U.S.
Japan trade in the 1980s in Chapter 7, I will not be able to include state
exports to Japan. Yet it is essential to have the same set of variables if I want
to compare congressional roll voting on trade across dierent countries. On
the other hand, it is also important that I use the best available data to explain
roll call behavior. As a result, I include Exports to China here, but only after
I have run regressions with the other three constituency variables that will be
included in regression analyses in later chapters. Data sources are contained
in the Appendix.
Since the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on only
binary values (1 or 0), I use logit regression. The coecients of a logit regres-
sion represent logarithm of odds, not probabilities. To convert them into
probabilities, I use the SPost module in STATA developed by Long and
Freese (2003). More specically, I use the post-estimation command
prchange to arrive at the changes in probabilities when the value of
an independent variable increases by one standard deviation, holding other
variables at their means. This is the method that will be used in later
chapters too.
Statistical ndings
Table 4.3 reports the coecients of logit regression and Table 4.4 reports
probabilities converted from these coecients. Model 1 is the basic model
with three constituency variables. Members from farm districts seemed to be
aware of the potential benets of an even more open China market for their
constituents, as the probability of voting for PNTR increases by 0.122 if a
districts farming employment increases by one standard deviation, holding
other variables at their means.
However, neither Union Strength nor Retail/Wholesale Employment is
statistically signicant, even though both of them are in the hypothesized
direction. This is a rather surprising nding, particularly in light of strong
labor pressure on members of Congress. State-level data might be responsible
for the poor performance of Union Strength. More important, perhaps, is the
possibility that many Democratsthose who believed that China did not
deserve PNTR due to its human rights and environmental problems and that
free trade would do more harm than good to Americawould have voted
against PNTR without pressure from labor unions. Also notice that the
explanatory power of Model 1 is rather weak, as indicated by the low pseudo
R2 (0.043). This suggests that constituency interests as measured by the three
variables did not have much impact on the PNTR vote.
Party and ideology are added to Model 2. The rst thing to notice is that
with the addition of these two variables, pseudo R2 increases considerably to
Table 4.3 Logit analysis of the House vote on HR 4444
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Union strength .024 .023 .013 .013

(.017) (.018) (.028) (.028)
Retail/wholesale .083 .098 .091 .096
employment (.065) (.077) (.077) (.077)
Farm employment .244** .165* .162* .156*
(.068) (.068) (.068) (.069)
Presidents party 1.914** 1.001 1.051
(Democrat) (.244) (.578) (.584)
Absolute DW score 3.342** 2.910** 3.039**
(.765) (.804) (.812)
Democrat union .066 .067
strength (.039) (.039)
Exports to China .247*
(.110)
Log likelihood 286.082 244.223 242.740 240.065
Pseudo R2 .043 .179 .184 .193
N 434 432 432 432
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
** Signicant at 0.01; * Signicant at 0.05.
Table 4.4 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in
independent variables (HR 4444)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Union strength
Retail/wholesale employment
Farm employment .122 .083 .081 .078
Presidents party (Democrat) .440
Absolute DW score .126 .110 .114
Democrat union strength
Exports to China .067
Note: Only signicant coecients are reported.
0.179, as opposed to 0.043 in Model 1. It appears that party and ideology, not
constituency interests, exerted the primary inuence on members votes.
Contrary to my expectation, the presidents party has a negative sign. This
means that being a Democrat actually decreases the probability of voting
for PNTR by a hefty 0.44, when other variables are held at their means. The
enormous pressure from labor unions might have caused the defection of
nearly two-thirds of Democrats despite an all-out campaign by their presi-
dent. Yet this explanation is problematic because Union Strength is con-
trolled for and is not statistically signicant in either Model 1 or Model 2.
Also, the correlation between Union Strength and Presidents Party is merely
0.172 (signicant at 0.01), which rules out the possibility that high correlation
between the two variables washed out the eects of Union Strength.
Furthermore, Bailey and Brady (1998) reported evidence that controlling
for ideology and other variables, Senate Democrats were more likely than
Republicans to vote for NAFTA and GATT under the Clinton presidency.
They argued that this nding might reect eorts by President Clinton to
either persuade or move Democrats on trade votes (ibid.: 534). Gartzke and
Wrighton also found that House Democrats were more likely to vote for
GATT than Republicans, controlling for ideology and constituency interests.
They thus wrote:
Democrats were more interested in bolstering the legislative record of a

president from their own party than they were in maintaining a trad-
itional opposition to free trade agreements. Republicans tended to
oppose legislation from the opposition, rather than supporting a bill
advancing long-held principles.13
(1998: 47)
So why did House Democrats support Clinton on GATT but abandon him
on PNTR? Two factors appear to be responsible for the Democrats dierent
positions on the two votes. First, the House voted on GATT in the immediate
aftermath of Democratic loss to Republicans in the 1994 mid-term election.
Foreseeing Republican challenges to their president, who was just two years
into his rst term, many Democrats may have decided to rally around Clinton
by voting for GATT. By contrast, the PNTR vote took place in 2000, the last
year of Clintons presidency. Thus there was less urgency for Democrats to
rally around their president. Second, the GATT deals with international
trade in general, whereas the PNTR bill addresses U.S. trade with one parti-
cular country. By 2000, U.S. trade decit with China had grown to US$83.8
billion from US$29.5 billion in 1994 and China had replaced Japan as the
largest decit-trading partner of the U.S. The high salience of Chinathe
astronomical U.S. trade decit plus human rights, weapons proliferation,
etc.may have induced many House Democrats to vote against a bill cham-
pioned by Clinton.
Absolute DW score is highly signicant and has the correct sign. If it
increases by one standard deviation, that is, as a member becomes more
liberal or conservative, the probability of voting for PNTR decreases by
about 0.13, holding other variables at their means. This evidence suggests that
the ideological wings of both parties were indeed united in their opposition
to PNTR, while the pro-trade moderates of each party joined hands in their
support for the trade deal. As in Model 1, Farm Employment is statistically
signicant. One standard deviation increase in farm employment is associ-
ated with an increase of 0.08 in the probability of voting for PNTR, holding
other variables at their means.
Model 3 tests the hypothesis of inter-party heterogeneity in electoral strat-
egies. The interaction term Democrat Union Strength is not statistically
signicant, nor is party. On the one hand, this should not be a surprising
nding, given that interaction terms are usually highly correlated with the
original variables. In my case, the correlation between party and the inter-
action term is 0.864 and signicant at 0.01. On the other hand, this is a
surprising nding because it is inconsistent with evidence produced by Bailey
and Brady (1998).
One explanation for this discrepancy, which was discussed above, is that
many Democrats would have voted against PNTR without labor pressure.
This explanation has two further implications. First, inter-party hetero-
geneity in electoral strategies may exist, but only on general trade policy, not
on country-specic trade legislation, as Bailey and Brady (1998) analyzed
votes on GATT and NAFTA. Alternatively, such electoral heterogeneity may
exist on trade policy toward some countries, but not on trade policy toward
Chinaa country against which many Democrats seemed to have a number
of grievances: human rights, forced labor, environmental problems, etc.
Another explanation is simply that Bailey and Brady (1998) analyzed Senate
votes. In other words, it is possible that inter-party electoral heterogeneity
exists in the Senate, but not in the House, which suggests inter-chamber
dierence in foreign trade voting.
With the addition of the interaction term, only Farm Employment and
Absolute DW Score are statistically signicant, and they both have the
hypothesized sign. More specically, one standard deviation increase in the
former increases the probability of voting for PNTR by 0.08, but a similar
increase in the latter decreases the probability by 0.11, holding other variables
at their means.
Model 4 includes an additional constituency variable, namely, Exports to
China, which turns out to be statistically signicant and in the hypothesized
direction. One standard deviation increase in Exports to China leads to an
increase of 0.067 in the probability of voting for PNTR. Again, Farming
employment and Absolute DW are both statistically signicant and have the
correct sign.
Discussion
My analysis adduced evidence that party was the most important determin-
ant of the PNTR vote. Republicans tended to be much more supportive of
PNTR than Democrats. On the one hand, this nding is consistent with many
previous studies that have examined the relationship between party aliation
and support for free trade (e.g., Baldwin 1985; Coughlin 1985; McArthur and
Marks 1988; Tosini and Tower 1987; Wink et al. 1996). On the other hand, it
is inconsistent with my expectation that Democratsout of loyalty to and
pressure from Clintonwould be more likely to vote for PNTR than Repub-
licans (or more likely to vote for it than if they faced a Republican president).
Moreover, a few scholars have adduced evidence that Democrats were more
likely to support free trade agreements during the Clinton years (Bailey and
Brady 1998; Gartzke and Wrighton 1998). These seemingly conicting nd-
ings suggest that the relationship between party aliation and support for
free trade is not xed but varies according to the political and electoral
context as well as the particular country that is involved in a trade bill.
As far as ideology is concerned, the absolute value of DW score is consist-
ently signicant andexcept in Model 2has the largest impact. Thus lib-
erals and conservatives, instead of voting against each other as they normally
do, were closely united in opposition against pro-trade moderates on the
PNTR vote. My ndings thus provide further support for Nokkens (2003)
thesis of EATM voting.
My study does not provide support for Bailey and Bradys (1998) theory of
inter-party heterogeneity of electoral strategies, as the interaction term
Democrat Union Strength is not statistically signicant in any of the
models. This is a rather surprising nding in light of the electoral ties between
labor unions and the Democratic Party in general and intense lobbying of
Democrats by labor groups before the vote. The high correlation between
party and the interaction term may be partly responsible for this nding. It
is also possible that inter-party heterogeneity of electoral strategies exists in
the Senate, but not in the House, as all the ve votes (two on NAFTA and
three on GATT) analyzed by Bailey and Brady were Senate votes.
Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that many Democrats would
have voted against PNTR because of other considerations, regardless of
whether labor unions launched massive campaign against it. These Demo-
crats may have subscribed to the view that China does not deserve PNTR
because of its poor human rights record and environmental problems, that
trade with China was responsible for the loss of American jobs, or that free
trade in general has done more harm than good to America. That Union
Strength does not have any signicant impact in any of the regressions seems
to support this explanation. To be sure, state-level data could have resulted
in the poor performance of this variable, but scholars have usually relied on
state-level data due to the lack of district-level data and they have reported
evidence that Union Strength had signicant negative impact on support for
free trade (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Conley 1999; Gartzke and Wrighton
1998). In a word, that neither Union Strength nor the interaction term
is statistically signicant strongly suggests that many Democrats opposed
PNTR because of their own preferences.
Of the three basic constituency variables, Farm Employment is the only
one that is statistically signicant in all four regressions. This is strong
evidence that members of Congress were especially responsive to the eco-
nomic interests of American farmers. Since the U.S. is the largest supplier
of agricultural products to China and since Chinas WTO membership prom-
ises an even bigger and more lucrative China market, it is no wonder that
the electoral connection appears to be particularly strong in the vote. The
fourth constituency variable, that is, Exports to China, also has signicant
impact on members votes. Together these ndings suggest that members of
Congress were particularly responsive to export interests.
Also notice that Retail/Wholesale Employment does not reach statistical
signicance in any of the four models. Moreover, except in Model 1, it has a
negative sign. What this suggests is that controlling for party and ideology,
retail and wholesale workers are actually more likely to oppose PNTR. In
other words, Retail/Wholesale Employment should probably be viewed as a
measure of constituency opposition tonot support fortrade with China.
Though I did not analyze the Senate vote on PNTR, its lopsided nature
indicates that there was a strong consensus among Senators on the desir-
ability of free trade with China. In fact, passage [of PNTR] by the more
internationalist Senate was never in doubt, and both sides expected an exped-
itious vote there (CQ Almanac 2000: 20). That the Senate passed PNTR by
landslide margins, compared with the narrow margin of victory in the House,
illustrates sharp inter-chamber dierence on trade policy toward China.
Moreover, recall that a few years before the PNTR vote, the Senate also
easily passed two important trade bills: NAFTA (6138) and GATT (7624).
The relative ease with which the three important trade bills sailed through
the Senate and the intense opposition they encountered in the House strongly
suggest that the upper chamber is in general more pro-trade than the
lower chamber. Just as the House has become increasingly opposed to free
trade agreements and renewal of fast track authority (Bailey 2001; Conley
1999; Gibson 2000), the Senate has transformed itself into a bastion of free
trade.14
The Senates distinct pro-trade stance can be attributed to several factors.
First, Senators usually come from much larger and hence more hetero-
geneous districts than House members. The need to serve a greater number
and variety of constituency interests makes them less likely to be swayed by
narrow interests. In other words, a House member may be more responsive to
the immediate concerns of his/her constituents adversely aected by free
trade and vote against it, but a Senator may decide that his/her constituency
in the wholeexporters, importers, labor unions, and blue-collar workers,
etc.will in the long run benet from free trade and hence vote for it.
Second, the longer tenure of Senators enables them to be somewhat tem-
porarily insulated from constituent pressure, whereas House members are
perennially on a short leash because of their two-year term. Third, Senators
may be more acquiescent to presidential initiatives in foreign trade than
House members. This is so because, with multiple committee assignments,
larger number of constituents, and sometimes the pursuit of the presidency,
Senators have much less time to acquire policy expertise than House members
and hence are more dependent on executive guidance (Kernell 1973: 341,
see also Pressman 1966). Last but not least, the Senate may have been more
pro-trade than the House simply because there were more Republicans than
Democrats.15 Republicans have been strong supporters of free trade and they
have been the majority in the Senate since 1994.
Finally, the passage of PNTR merely means that Congress cleared a major
hurdle to unfettered trade between the two countries. It does not mean that
Congress henceforth would wash its hands of matters relating to bilateral
trade. Since 2003, some members have been pressuring Beijing to appreciate
its currency in the hope of slowing down the growth of U.S. trade decit with
China. The SchumerGraham iniative in 2005 is a case in point. Because of
the enormous stakes of constituency interests in U.S.China trade, on the one
hand, and the strength of the electoral connection on trade issues, on the
other, more congressional initiatives on U.S.China trade should be expected.
Moreover, even without the astronomical trade decit, many members of
Congress still have a variety of reasons to oppose trade with China: human
rights, weapons proliferation, environmental issues, Taiwan, religious free-
dom, abortion, etc. In a word, due to a number of factors, trade with China
will remain a highly controversial topic on Capitol Hill. The good news for
those promoting U.S.China trade is that they can almost always count on
the White House andto a lesser extentthe Senate to neutralize attempts
to set roadblocks in the development of one of the worlds most bilateral
trade relationships.
5 Congress and Taiwan
It seems to me that our administration . . . merits criticism for continuing an

unprincipled and spineless policy towards our friends on Taiwan. I think it is
long overdue that we stop kowtowing to the Communist butchers in Beijing,
and to stand on our own principles.
(Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA) Congressional Record 1995: H4451)
I ask that the President take every measure necessary to ensure that the pur-
suit of democracy and democratic practices [in Taiwan] are not fettered by
Chinese intimidation and aggression.
(Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID), Congressional Record 1996: S2626)
The upper chamber, with its tradition of careful deliberation more insulated
from the winds of populist enthusiasm, should conclude that, yes, Americans
love Taiwan, but this legislation [HR 1838] needlessly stirs up trouble. The
House has had its fun, but to continue this dangerous game would be
counterproductive.
(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2000)
The U.S.Taiwan relationship is not only a unique relationship, but also one
of the most controversial relationships in the world today. It is unique
because
perhaps for the rst time in the history of modern foreign aairs, a state
had broken relations with another, only to create a new legal arrange-
ment [the Taiwan Relations Act] so as to maintain virtually all the rela-
tionships that had existed before.
(Myers 1989: 13)
It is controversial because the relationship has been a constant source of

disputes and conicts in the WashingtonTaipeiBeijing triangle. Moreover,
the relationship is an emotional one that is unlike U.S. relations with most
other countries, wrote Feldman (1989: 42). Only the U.S. relationship with
Israel contains as much emotional resonance.
Congress and Taiwan 79
Despite the unocial nature of the relationship, U.S.Taiwan economic,
cultural, political, and military ties are extremely extensive and strong. Taiwan
is the eighth largest trading partner of the U.S., and the latter is the top
trading partner of Taiwan. In 2006, total bilateral trade was US$61.2
billion, of which U.S. imports were US$38.2 billion and exports US$23 bil-
lion (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). In 2004/2005, Taiwan was ranked sixth with
25,914 students studying in U.S. institutions of higher learning (Institute of
International Education 2006). Taiwan has established sister state relation-
ship with 42 U.S. states (Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council). The U.S.
has been Taiwans most important political and military ally, supporting
its membership in international organizations, repeatedly rearming U.S.
commitment to its security, and providing it with advanced weapons on an
annual basis.
The U.S.Taiwan relationship has its origin in the Chinese civil war in the
1940s when the U.S. supported the Nationalists against the Chinese
Communists. In late 1949, the defeated Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek,
ed to Taiwan and established a political regime. Plagued by corruption,
ineciency, and cronyism, the Nationalist regime was not expected to last
long, nor did the Truman administration intend to continue its support of
Chiang.1 Yet just as Chiangs fate seemed to be sealed and the U.S. relation-
ship with the Chinese Communists would likely have embarked on a dierent
course, the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel.2 In response, the U.S.
interposed the seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, Taiwan has
remained an entity separate from China and has developed strong political
and military ties with the U.S., as embodied in the U.S.Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty, the Formosa Resolution, and the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA).
This chapter oers an in-depth analysis of Congresss Taiwan policy. The
rst section oers a brief review of congressional involvement in Taiwan
policy, and the second section analyzes two House roll call votes related to
U.S.Taiwan relations. Despite congressional activism and inuence in U.S.
Taiwan relations, it is rather surprising that no study to my knowledge has
examined roll call voting on Taiwan. That the overwhelming majority of
Taiwan votes were lop-sided or unanimous is perhaps the most important
disincentive. Yet there were indeed a few contested votes, and quantitative
analysis of them may shed important light on why members voted as they did
on Taiwan policy.
Historical ties between Congress and Taiwan

Congress has been the most powerful and most active supporter of Taiwan.
In fact, it is not too much exaggeration to say that any study of U.S.Taiwan
relations is essentially incomplete without considering the crucial role
Congress has played in the formulation and implementation of U.S.Taiwan
policy. And to study Congresss role in Taiwan policy, it is necessary to
examine Congresss China policy before the Nationalists ed to the island,
since Congresss support for Taiwan stemmed largely from its support for the
Nationalist regime on Mainland China prior to 1949.
For starters, there was the World War II alliance between the U.S and
China (Feis 1953; Schaller 1979; Tsou 1963; Tuchman 1970). Regardless of
Chiangs actual contribution to the Pacic Theatre, the alliance and Chiang
himself enjoyed immense popularity on Capitol Hill. Congressman Mike
Manseld (D-MT) proclaimed in 1945:
Chiang is the one man who can make Chinese unity and independence a
reality. His faults can be understood when the complexities of the Chinese
puzzle are studied and they are no more uncommon than the faults of
other leaders of the United Nations. We are committed to Chiang and we
will help him to the best of our ability. He alone can untangle the present
situation because in spite of the things he has done, he is China.
(quoted in Purifoy 1976: 13)
Second, Madame Chiang, the Wellesley-educated wife of Chiang Kai-shek

and the symbol of Chinas heroic sacrices in the war, was extremely popular
and inuential on Capitol Hill. On 18 February 1943, she became the rst
Chinese and the second woman to address a joint session of Congress. Her
address electried Washington, winning billions of dollars in aid (Faison
2003). Third, a number of congressmen, Representative Walter Judd (R-MN)
being one of the notables, had prior experiences (missionary or otherwise) in
China that enhanced the personal and emotional ties between Congress
and China (see Bachrack 1976; Edwards 1990). Last but not least, Chiang
had been ghting the Chinese Communists since 1927. His awless record of
anti-Communism proved pivotal in securing congressional support for the
Nationalists in the Chinese civil war that resumed immediately after the
defeat of Japan.
The Truman administrations approach to the Chinese civil war, however,
diverged from that of Congress, particularly after the failure of the Marshall
Mission and the beginning of the Nationalist debacle (see Finkelstein 1993;
Grasso 1987; Purifoy 1976; Tsou 1963). Basically, the administration per-
ceived Chiangs cause to be hopeless and intended to gradually detach the
U.S. from the Chinese civil war, with an eye toward eventually having
accommodation with the Chinese Communists. The China bloc in Congress,
a group composed mostly of right-wing Republicans, launched bitter attacks
on Trumans China policy and insisted on an all-out eort to save Chiang
(Kraft 1991; Rourke 1983; Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983).3 Since the China bloc
had the potential to hold hostage the administrations European programs
(i.e., the Marshall Plan), President Truman compromised by submitting a
China aid program, hence the China Aid Act of 1948 (see Tucker 1983;
Westereld 1955: 262266).
The ow of economic and military aid could not prevent the total collapse
of Chiang, however. Keenly aware of the political fallout of Chiangs defeat,
the State Department published the China White Paper, a chronological col-
lection of ocial documents aimed at exonerating the administration from
the defeat of Chiang. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared in the
letter of transmittal, The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the omin-
ous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the United
States (U.S. Department of State 1967: xvi). Instead of warding o domestic
criticism, the China White Paper inadvertently provided ammunition to the
China bloc for the rancorous debate about who lost China, a debate that
eectively made it impossible for the Truman administration (Bachrack 1976;
Finkelstein 1993; Koen 1974; Tucker 1983) and his successors (Bueler 1971;
Kraft 1991; Rourke 1983) to initiate a new China policy until 1971. In the
meantime, Congress remained steadfast in its support of Chiang and the
regime he established on Taiwan. In 1955, Congress ratied the U.S.Taiwan
Mutual Defense Treaty and passed the Formosa Resolution, thus formally
establishing a military alliance with Taiwan.
When President Carter decided to sever ties with Taiwan in order to
normalize relations with Beijing, Congressangered by Carters secret dip-
lomacy and determined not to abandon a long-time allyresponded by
enacting the TRA (Copper 1992; Crabb 1985; Javits 1981; Kraft 1991; Sutter
1983; Tan 1992). As Congressman Thomas Manton (D-NY) noted, the TRA
gives the Congress a well-dened statutory role in conducting United States
foreign policy toward Taiwan (quoted in Yang 2000: 63). By revising the
Taiwan legislation submitted by the executive [Congress] established its role
as a China policymaker, wrote Tan (1992: 25). In a word, the TRA estab-
lishes Congress as a legitimate and important guardian of Taiwans interests
from either administration negligence or Chinese intimidation.
The decade following the passage of the TRA witnessed a relatively
inactive Congress in Taiwan policy, but congressional inaction turned out to
be short-lived. As Mann (2001: 201) wrote, One of the most distinctive
phenomena of American China policy in the 1990s has been the renewed
strength and importance of congressional support for Taiwan. Congress
forcefully reasserted itself in Taiwan policy by attempting to strengthen U.S.
political and military ties with Taiwan, endorsing Taiwans membership in
international organizations, urging high-level ocial visits, and pushing for
sales of advanced weapons (e.g., Bush 2001; Mann 2001).
The number of Taiwan bills introduced in Congress testies to congres-
sional activism in Taiwan policy (see Figure 5.1). As mentioned in Chapter
2, a total of 247 Taiwan bills (including amendments) were introduced in
Congress between 1973 and 2006, with 167 in the House and 80 in the Senate.
That amounts to an annual average of 4.9 and 2.4 bills respectively in each
chamber. Of the 247 bills, only 11all introduced by liberal Democrats in the
early 1980swere critical of Taiwan, that is, its human rights problems.4 The
other bills invariably declared U.S. support for Taiwan or attempted to
strengthen U.S.Taiwan military and political ties.
Figure 5.1 Time trend of Taiwan bills introduced in each chamber, 19732006.
Congressional attempts to enhance U.S.Taiwan relations

Why has Congress been so supportive of Taiwan? To answer this question, I
analyze two House votes related to U.S.Taiwan relations. I could not exer-
cise much discretion in selecting which votes to analyze because they were
the only non-unanimous, substantive votes between 1980 and 2006. The
Senate did have two more contested Taiwan votes during the same period
(both in the mid-1980s). Since data on many variables are not available until
the late 1990s, I decide against analyzing the two Senate votes. The same
data problem prevents me from examining some contested votes on Taiwan
policy that occurred before 1980, such as votes on the TRA in both
chambers.
The rst vote was on passage of the U.S.Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile
Defense Cooperation Act in 1997. The purpose of the bill, which passed 301
117 on 6 November, was to consider developing an anti-ballistic missile
defense system to protect Taiwan from potential missile attacks by Beijing.
The second vote was on passage of HR 1838, or the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act, sponsored by House Majority leader Tom DeLay (R-TX)
in 1999. The bill requires, among other things, the Secretary of Defense
to establish direct military communication with Taiwans military forces
and to increase the number of Taiwanese military ocials trained at U.S.
military academies (CQ Almanac 2000: H-4). It passed the House 34170 on
February 1 2000.
In addition to the two substantive votes, there were two contested proce-
dural votes in the House. The rst was on Doug Bereuters (R-NE) motion to
table the Frank Pallone (D-NJ) motion to reconsider the vote on HR 2386.5
Pallones motion was tabled 245175. The second was on David Boniors (D-
MI) motion to recommit HR 4444the bill that grants PNTR to Chinato
the House Ways and Means and International Relations with instructions to
add language revoking Chinas PNTR if China invades, blockades, or attacks
Taiwan.6 The motion was defeated 176258 on May 24 2000.
Admittedly, the distinction between procedural and substantive votes is
more conceptual than practical, as most votes involve both procedural and
substantive questions. Even a motion to adjourn, for example, can be a sub-
stantive maneuver if it is intended to delay action on a bill. And recommittal
motions are almost wholly substantive in intent (Froman and Ripley 1965:
57). In fact, [o]nly at the extremes are issues either purely procedural or
purely and identiably substantive (ibid.: 56). The same can be said of these
two procedural votes, which could have substantive policy implications.7
However, according to the idea of parties as procedural coalitions, parties are
monoliths when it comes to procedural votes, hence high party unity in most
procedural votes (Froman and Ripley 1965: Table V; Jones 1964: 5; Schickler
and Rich 1997: Table 1).8 Indeed, controlling for other factors, party has
decisive impact on the two votes.9 Since procedural votes amount to nothing
but a show of party discipline, I exclude them.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, a Republican is more likely than
a Democrat to support strong U.S.Taiwan relations.
Scholars who studied U.S.China relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s
usually single out partisanship as the most important factor behind congres-
sional support for China (and Taiwan after Chiang Kai-sheks defeat in 1949)
and criticism of Trumans China policy.10 Exiled from the White House since
1932, the Republicans desperately needed a campaign issue to beat the seem-
ingly unbeatable Democrats. Moreover, the 1946 mid-term election put
Republicans in control of Congress, greatly boosting their condence in
defeating Truman in the upcoming 1948 election. Tucker (1983: 162163)
wrote, The largest number in Congress participated in the China contro-
versy for partisan reasons. These Republicans lacked genuine interest in
China but needed a campaign issue to defeat the seemingly unbeatable
Democrats who had monopolized the White House since 1932, added
Tucker (1994: 31).
However, Truman scored a surprise win at the polls. Trumans reelection
coincided with the beginning of Chiangs debacle and congressional
Republicans increasingly saw the deteriorating China situation as a poten-
tial issue and arena of attack of Trumans foreign policy (Rourke 1983: 74).
By 1949, the China bloc consisted largely of Republicans for whom the
China question was primarily a matter of party politics [and who adopted a]
gloves-o approach and promoted the Nationalist cause for their own polit-
ical purposes (Borg 1980: 174).11
Nearly three decades later, partisan passions ared up again, and this time
the center of contention was the TRA.12 The Republicans in general were
more vociferous than Democrats in their criticism of Carters decision to
abrogate the U.S.Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (see CQ Almanac 1979:
112113; Sutter 1983).13 Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) (1979: 20) called it con-
stitutionally and morally objectionable to abandon a staunch and faithful
ally, denouncing Carters decision as an ignominious act. Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ) (1979: 23) condemned Carters normalization announce-
ment as a short speech . . . which history may well record as ten minutes that
lived in infamy. Goldwater even led a case in a federal court, claiming that
Carters unilateral decision to abrogate the defense treaty was unconsti-
tutional (CQ Almanac 1979: 100).
Just have a glance at party line-up on the 22 roll call votes, and one can tell
the extent to which the two parties were divided on the details, if not the
fundamentals, of the TRA (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). Eleven of the thirteen
votes in the House and six of the nine votes in the Senate were party votes,
that is, votes in which the majority of the two parties voted against each
other. Furthermore, the intensity of party division was extraordinary. In the
House, seven of the eleven party votes witnessed at least 75 percent of one
party voting against at least 75 percent of the other party; in the Senate, four
of the six party votes were so divided. Notice that all but one partisan vote
were on amendments or motions that were sponsored mainly by Republicans
and which contained language that would have restored U.S.Taiwan military
alliance under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Such language would almost cer-
tainly have delayed normalization because of Beijings objection. In a word,
despite the broad bipartisan consensus on the desirability of continuing
U.S.Taiwan relations, as reected in the smooth passage of the TRA in both
chambers, the two parties disagreed sharply over the exact nature of future
U.S. relations with Taiwan.
In the decade after normalization, Republicans largely deferred to the
White House on Taiwan policy. For President Reagan did not need to be
prodded by Congress to be a staunch supporter of Taiwan (see Buttereld
1980; MacDonald and Kaiser 1980).14 President George H. W. Bush also
encountered little pressure from Congress on Taiwan.15 However, Republicans
became much more active in Taiwan policy during the Clinton years. In July
1993, Senator Frank MurKowski (R-AK) introduced an amendment to
the annual Foreign Relations Authorization Act, declaring that the TRA
should supersede the 1982 Shanghai Communiqu on U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan (Congressional Record 1994: S 29432944, S 5024). Despite the
Table 5.1 House roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act
Vote Republicans Democrats Presidents Vote Bill summary

count position outcome
Yea Nay Yea Nay
149221 107 27 42 194 Nay Rejected Kramer amendment to retain language from the 1955 mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan regarding U.S. response to hostile
action toward Taiwan.
169197 120 14 49 183 Nay Rejected Lagomarsino amendment to state that the U.S. would consider
withdrawing recognition of China if it were to attack Taiwan.
172181 113 13 59 168 Nay Rejected Quayle amendment to conduct relations with Taiwan through a
government liaison oce, rather than through the unocial
American Institute on Taiwan.
171239 135 14 36 225 Nay Rejected Ashbrook amendment to make employees of the American
Institute on Taiwan employees of the U.S. government.
146256 100 44 46 212 Nay Rejected Edwards amendment to add the islands of Quemoy and Matsu to
the denition of Taiwan.
179225 124 21 55 204 Nay Rejected Solomon amendment to establish relations with Taiwan on a
consular basis.
204193 14 132 190 61 Agreed Zablocki motion to end all debate on the bill at 5 p.m. in an
attempt to cut o further amendments.
110295 98 51 12 244 Nay Rejected Bauman motion to strike the enacting clause (thus killing the bill)
182221 134 16 48 205 Nay Rejected Dannemeyer amendment to conduct relations with Taiwan
through a quasi-governmental agency entitled U.S. Commission
in Taiwan.
141264 118 32 23 232 Nay Rejected Edwards amendment to require approval by both houses before
the president could notify Taiwan that a treaty or agreement with
Taiwan would be terminated.
226174 144 4 82 170 Adopted Ashbrook amendment to require the authorization and
appropriation by Congress of any U.S. government funds for the
American Institute on Taiwan.
34555 104 41 241 14 Yea Passed Passage of the bill.
33950 105 37 234 13 Yea Adopted Adoption of the conference report.
Source: CQ Almanac (1979).

Table 5.2 Senate roll call votes on the Taiwan Relations Act
Vote Republicans Democrats Presidents Vote Bill summary

count position outcome
Yea Nay Yea Nay
3362 28 12 5 50 Nay Rejected Dole amendment to provide for unocial United States
relations with Taiwan rather than with the people of
Taiwan, which was the phrasing sought by President
Carter.
5738 10 30 47 8 Yea Agreed Glenn motion to table the Humphrey amendment to
conduct U.S. relations with Taiwan through a
governmental liaison oce.
4549 1 39 44 10 Yea Rejected Bryd motion to table the Percy amendment to declare
that hostile action against Taiwan would be a threat to
the security interests of the United States.
4250 35 5 7 45 Nay Rejected Percy amendment to declare that hostile action against
Taiwan would be a threat to the security interests of the
United States.
4936 30 7 19 29 Nay Agreed Morgan motion to table the Church amendment to
Boren amendment allowing Taiwan to have embassy
(Churchs amendment would have allowed the courts to
resolve the issue).
5438 7 32 47 6 Yea Agreed Biden motion to table the Dole amendment to require
Senate conrmation of the director of the American
Institute on Taiwan.
7421 22 18 52 3 Yea Agreed Church motion to table the Humphrey amendment to
make the eective date of the bill contingent on written
assurances from China that it would not attack Taiwan.
906 34 5 56 1 Yea Passed Passage of the TRA
854 33 2 52 2 Yea Adopted Adoption of the conference report of TRA.
Source: CQ Almanac (1979).

administrations objection, a watered-down version of the amendment was
passed by the conference committee and signed into law by Clinton in April
1994 (Yang 2000: 189190). Republicans became even more assertive in
Taiwan policy after the 1994 mid-term election. By threatening mandatory
legislation, the new Republican majority in 1995 successfully forced President
Clinton to grant a visa to Lee Teng-Hui for his visit to Cornell University
(Mann 1999: Chapter 17; Mann 2001; Yang 2000: Chapter 6).
A close look at Figure 5.1 also suggests that Congresss Taiwan policy was
inuenced by partisan politics. While there were only a few Taiwan bills during
the 1980s and early 1990s, there was a conspicuous and sudden rise in the
number of Taiwan bills since the mid-1990s. And this surge was simultaneous
with the inauguration of the new Republican majority. Also, by my count,
during the Reagan and Bush years there was no recorded vote on Taiwan in
the House and only two votes in the Senate, yet the House voted twelve times
and the Senate four times on Taiwan policy during the Clinton years.
Hypothesis 2: Liberals and conservatives will be more supportive of

Taiwan than moderates, other things being equal.
Nokkens (2003) study and my ndings in Chapter 4 adduced strong evidence

that a coalition of ideological wings existed in roll call voting on trade with
China. This seemingly strange coalition could also exist on Taiwan policy.
Before the 1990s, the most vocal supporters of Chiang and Taiwan were
generally conservatives such as members of the China bloc in the Truman
years and Goldwater-type Republicans during Carters presidency. Liberals,
by contrast, were far more critical of the authoritarian regime on Taiwan.
Since the mid-1970s, liberals began to scrutinize Taiwans human rights
record. When the TRA was under oor debate, Congressmen James Leach
(R-IA), Donald Pease (D-OH), and Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) managed
to insert language on human rights into the TRA, which gives Congress the
statutory power to oversee human rights progress in Taiwan (Bush 2004:
Chapter 6; U.S. Congress 1987).16
The 1980s witnessed the peak of liberal criticism of and pressure on
Taiwans authoritarian regime, led by Steve Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the
House Foreign Aairs Subcommittee on Asia and Pacic from 19811992
(see Bush 2004: Chapter 6). In 1986, Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA),
Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Carl Levin (D-MI) and congressmen Steve Solarz (D-
NY) and Jim Leach (R-IA) formed the Committee for Democracy on Taiwan
(Congressional Record 1987: S9935). Partly because of congressional pres-
sure, Taiwan began to implement political reform in the late 1980s. By the
mid-1990s, Taiwan had successfully transformed itself from an authoritarian
regime into a burgeoning democracy. In 1996, Taiwan held its rst competi-
tive, multi-party presidential election.
Since many liberals were personally involved in Taiwans political reforms,
they had added incentives to support Taiwan when it became a edgling
democracy. Indeed, liberals almost always cited Taiwans democracy as a key
reason for their support. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) supported Taiwans
admission to the United Nations because Taiwan has made signicant pro-
gress in developing democratic representative institutions (Congressional
Record 1992: S13655). That Taiwan has come so far [in political reform] in
such a short time is truly impressive and is a great compliment to the people
of Taiwan and to their current leaders, said Senator Pell (D-RI) (Congres-
sional Record 1996: S11422). During congressional debate over Lees 1995
visit to Cornell, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) pointedly asked,
Why . . . the President, the democratically elected President of Taiwan . . . is
not allowed to come? (Congressional Record 1995: H4452).
Conservatives also touted political reform in Taiwan. Taiwan is a dem-
ocracy, yet its President cannot visit our Nation, said an outraged Benjamin
Gilman (R-NY) (Congressional Record 1995: H4451). Gerald Solomon
(R-NY) denounced Clintons refusal to permit Lees visit as an assault
against his [Lees] dignity and our morality [and] a blatant contradiction of
our eorts to promote democracy around the world. He added, Here is one
important instance in which American interests and American morality go
hand in hand (ibid.: H445152). After the House passed the resolution
regarding Lees visit, Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) observed:
Today we are extending a hand of friendship to President Lee of the

Republic of China . . . because his government on Taiwan has liberal-
ized, has reached out to the opposition and permitted rights [that] we as
Americans believe should be the rights of citizens of everywhere.
(ibid.: H4452)
Frank Murkowski (1996), an unwavering supporter of Taiwan, declared,

Congress should congratulate the people of Taiwan for their continued steps
to democracy. Tom DeLay also praised Taiwan as a shining example of
freedom and democracy in a part of the world sorely in need of role models
(Congressional Record 1998: H5888).
These remarks by liberals and conservatives suggest that they were united
in their support for Taiwan because of the latters democratic transition. By
contrast, the business-minded moderates adopted a more cautious approach
lest disputes with Beijing over Taiwan would disrupt U.S.China economic
ties. Doug Bereuter (R-NE), then chairman of the House International Rela-
tions Asia and Pacic Subcommittee, mounted serious opposition to HR
1838 and succeeded in securing some concessions on the bill (see CQWR
1999: 26052606).
Hypothesis 3: Controlling for other factors, hawks will be more likely to

vote for strong U.S.Taiwan relations than doves.
Previous scholars have adduced strong evidence that hawkishness has

signicant impact on foreign policy voting (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981;
Cobb 1969). Cobb (1969: 360361) dened hawkishness as a jingoism scale
that reects components of compulsive anti-Kommunism [sic], aggressive-
ness and belligerency, and a willingness to intervene in the aairs of other
nations. In general, hawks tend to be more supportive of a militant foreign
policy than doves. In the case of Taiwan policy, hawks are expected to be
more supportive of strong U.S.Taiwan relations than doves.
Hypothesis 4: The more dependent a district is on the military-industrial

complex, the more likely its representative will cast a pro-Taiwan vote,
other things being equal.
Past research on foreign policy voting almost exclusively focuses on the inu-
ence of a particular constituency, namely, the military-industrial complex. As
Patrick Morgan (quoted in Ray 1981: 439) pointed out, a huge military estab-
lishment inevitably breeds . . . civilian institutions and numerous citizens
[who] prosper on the manna of massive defense expenditures, which in turn
produces a political componenta corps of local, regional, and national
politicians whose political self-interests now dictate promotion of or at least
acquiesce in such spending on behalf of constituents. In a word, the military-
industrial complex model leads to the expectation that a positive relationship
exists between constituency dependence on the military-industrial complex
and support for military spending (or hawkish foreign policy for that matter).
The military-industrial complex has important economic stakes in U.S.
Taiwan relations because Taiwan has been a leading market for U.S. weap-
ons manufactures (see Table 5.3). Moreover, defense contractors and their
Table 5.3 U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwans

ranking among U.S. arms sales to foreign
countries
Year Value (millions of Ranking

dollars)
19501990 4,939 7
1990 455 4
1991 549 4
1992 711 5
1993 816 4
1994 845 4
1995 1,347 3
1996 834 3
1997 2,555 2
1998 1,487 2
1999 2,526 2
2000 923 4
Source: U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

subcontractors are usually among the largest employers in local com-
munities.17 Consequently, one shouldnt be surprised to see local residents
and their representatives in Congress push for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
because of the jobs and prots at stake. That the Texas delegation was
actively lobbying for the sales of 150 F-16 ghter jets to Taiwan on the eve of
the 1992 election illuminates the intimate connections between defense con-
tractors (General Dynamics), constituency interests (an estimated 6,000
jobs), and Taiwan policy (Bush 2001; Bush 2004; Friedman 1992; Mann
1999; Schmitt 1992).
Hypothesis 5: Exports to China will be negatively associated with the

likelihood of casting a pro-Taiwan vote, controlling for other factors.
It is crucial to bear in mind that in the WashingtonTaipeiBeijing triangle,

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is inevitably and intimately connected with its
policy toward China. That is, congressional (in)action in one policy area will
almost certainly have some repercussions in the other. If Congress had voted
to restore ocial relations with Taiwan, for example, Beijing would most
certainly have terminated its diplomatic ties with Washington. On the other
hand, if Congress had repealed the TRA, then China would in all likelihood
have pursued a more aggressive policy of reunication. Thus members of
Congress are expected to balance the consequences of alternative policies
regarding Taiwan and Beijing. It is possible that those whose constituencies
have huge stakes in U.S.China relationsparticularly in bilateral trade
will be less willing to antagonize Beijing by voting for strong U.S.Taiwan
relations. For example, since China has been a crucial market for Boeing,
members from the state of Washington should be less likely to vote for
pro-Taiwan bills, other things being equal.
Hypothesis 6: Exports to Taiwan will be positively associated with the

likelihood of casting a pro-Taiwan vote, when other factors are con-
trolled for.
Last but not least, though U.S.Taiwan relations are primarily strategic and
political in nature, there are also signicant constituency economic interests
at stake. To begin with, Taiwan is the eighth largest trading partner of the
U.S. and the latter is the top trading partner of Taiwan. Though U.S.Taiwan
trade is only about one-fth of U.S.China trade today, back in the 1980s the
former was much larger than the latter.18 Only after 1994 did U.S.China
trade surpass U.S.Taiwan trade. Moreover, Taiwan has been an important
export market for U.S. companies, and American exports to Taiwan were
larger than its exports to China until 2001. Even after 2001, American
exports to China have been only slightly bigger. Thus many members may
have incentives to support U.S.Taiwan relations out of pure constituency
economic interests.19
Data and methodology
I use voting scores compiled by the Center for Security Policy (CSP) to
operationalize hawkishness.20 The CSPs mission is to promote international
peace through American strength. As such, it selects votes on critical defense
and foreign policy issues. The higher the score, the more pro-national security
and hence more hawkish a member is. Because the CSP combines the votes
for 19982000, I use this aggregate voting score for the 2000 vote.21 CSP
compiles a separate voting index for 1997 and that is used for the 1997 vote.
To test the hypothesis that both liberals and conservatives tend to vote
for strong U.S.Taiwan relations, I use the absolute value of the DW-
NOMINATE score, as I did in Chapter 4. Also, I expect the coecient for the
absolute value of DW score to be statistically signicant and positive. That is,
high absolute value of DW score will be associated with pro-Taiwan votes,
since both liberals (negative scores) and conservatives (positive scores) are
expected to cast such votes.
Constituency dependence on the military-industrial complex is oper-
ationalized as the amount of military awards for supplies, services, and con-
struction with a net value of over US $25,000 within each state in a scal
year.22 I use state-level data because there is no district-level breakdown of
military awards. Granted that oftentimes a state in which a prime contractor
is located is not the same state where subcontract work is done, this measure
is still a good indicator of the economic importance of defense contracts to a
particular state. For without such awards, the prime contractors would prob-
ably shut down. Constituency interests in U.S.China (Taiwan) trade are the
percentages of exports to China (Taiwan) out of total state exports. I use the
1999 data for the 1997 vote because that it is the earliest year for which state
export data is available. In addition to these constituency variables, I also
include three basic constituency variables, namely, Union Strength, Farm
Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment.
For the two votes, a yea vote is treated as a pro-Taiwan vote and coded 1,
and a nay vote is coded 0. For each vote, I rst run a regression with the three
basic constituency variables, and then add party and absolute DW score.
Subsequently, I add exports to China, exports to Taiwan, and military awards,
followed by hawkishness.
Statistical ndings
Logit regression results for the vote on HR 2386 are presented in Table 5.4,
and the probabilities calculated from logit coecients are presented in Table
5.5. Surprisingly, none of the three variables in Model 1 is statistically signi-
cant, suggesting that constituency interests measured by these variables did
not have any impact on the vote. In Model 2, the three constituency variables
still fail to reach statistical signicance, but the two added variables are highly
signicant. Consistent with my expectation, being a Republican increases the
Independent Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

variables
Union strength .023 .007 .027 .062**

(.014) (.018) (.019) (.022)
Retail/wholesale .018 .004 .067 .063
employment (.045) (.060) (.060) (.067)
Farm employment .068 .088 .088 .139
(.052) (.066) (.069) (.076)
Republican 3.874** 4.352** 1.116
(.425) (.490) (.654)
Absolute DW score 4.188** 4.863** 2.249*
(.941) (1.030) (1.1.5)
Exports to China .408* .513**
(.187) (.188)
Exports to Taiwan .157 .259
(.164) (.183)
Military awards .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Hawkishness .066**
(.012)
Log likelihood 244.792 158.904 144.251 126.999
Pseudo R2 .012 .359 .394 .467
N 418 418 395 395
** Signicant at 0.01; * signicant at 0.05.

variables
Union strength .057

Retail/wholesale
employment
Farm employment
Republican .549 .597
Absolute DW score .082 .093 .040
Exports to China .050 .058
Exports to Taiwan
Military awards
Hawkishness .238

probability of voting for HR 2386 by a remarkable 0.549, holding other
variables at their means. Contrary to my expectation, however, Absolute DW
Score has a negative sign. As one becomes ideologically more extreme, one is
less likely to support strong U.S.Taiwan relations. To be exact, if Absolute
DW Score increases by one standard deviation, the probability of voting for
HR 2386 decreases by 0.082.
My explanation for this surprising nding about Absolute DW Score is
that controlling for other factors and in spite of a pro-Taiwan consensus
across the ideological spectrum, liberals were still less likely than conservatives
to support a bill that aimed to strengthen U.S.Taiwan military relations. In
other words, increase in Absolute DW Score leads to more nay votes among
liberals than among conservatives. To nd out if this is indeed the case, I
compare vote distribution among liberals and conservatives. I dene liberals
loosely as those whose raw DW scores are above 0, and conservatives below 0.
Of the 222 conservatives, only 7 voted against the bill. By contrast, of the
199 liberals, 110 voted against the bill. The vote distribution strongly suggests
that liberal opposition was responsible for the negative sign of Absolute DW
Score. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that 80 liberals voted for the bill.
If only a handful of liberals had done so, then Absolute DW Score would not
be statistically signicant because high scores would be associated with both
yea and nay votes.
Model 3 includes three more constituency variables, but only Exports to
China is statistically signicant and has the hypothesized sign. With one
standard deviation increase in a states exports to China, the probability of
casting a yea vote decreases by 0.050. Republican and Absolute DW Score
remain highly signicant and have the same sign as in Model 2. Moreover, the
magnitude of their respective impact is largely the same as that in Model 3.
Model 4 includes the other measure of ideologyhawkishness. Notice that
with the addition of hawkishess, party is no longer statistically signicant. The
high correlation between the two variables (r = 0.853 and signicant at 0.01)
must have dampened the estimated eects of party.23 Also, Union Strength
now reaches statistical signicance. That is, controlling for hawkishness and
other variables, a member is more likely to support strong U.S.Taiwan
relations if the percentage of unionized workers increases in his district. The
inclusion of hawkishness does not aect Exports to China, which remains
highly signicant and has about the same impact as it does in Model 3.
Hawkishness itself is statistically signicant and has the correct sign. One
standard deviation increase in hawkishness is associated with an increase of a
solid 0.238 in the probability of voting for HR 2386, holding other variables
at their means. Since the dovishhawkish continuum generally overlaps with
the liberalconservative spectrum, that is, liberals tend to be dovish and
conservatives hawkish, this nding suggests that controlling for party and
other variables, liberals were less supportive of the bill than conservatives.24
Thus it provides further support for my explanation for the negative sign of
Absolute DW Score.
Finally, it should be noted that the inclusion of party and Absolute DW
Score in Model 2 increase pseudo R2 by an enormous 0.347, and the inclusion
of hawkishness in Model 4 by 0.073. By contrast, the addition of three more
constituency variables in Model 3 increases pseudo R2 by merely 0.035. Thus
party and ideologynot constituency interestsappear to be the most
important determinants of the vote. Moreover, a comparison of Model 2 and
Model 3 suggests that party has much bigger impact than ideology.
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 present the results for the vote on HR 1838.
Though Union Strength and Retail/Wholesale Employment are statistically
signicant in Model 1, neither of them is statistically signicant in the other
three models where party, ideology, and other constituency variables are
controlled for. Besides, the overall explanatory power of Model 1 is rather
weak, as indicated by the rather small pseudo R2 (0.052).
With the addition of party and Absolute DW score in Model 2, pseudo R2
increases markedly to 0.205. Being a Republican increases the probability of
casting a yea vote by 0.253, whereas one standard deviation increase in Abso-
lute DW Score decreases the probability by 0.060. As in the case of HR 2386,

variables
Union strength .049* .037 .050 .048

(.023) (.026) (.028) (.029)
Retail/wholesale .268** .071 .105 .023
employment (.086) (.096) (.104) (.105)
Farm employment .117 .231** .240** .219*
(.061) (.080) (.086) (.092)
Republican 2.378** 2.277** .098
(.406) (.417) (.572)
Absolute DW score 3.973** 3.659** 1.211
(1.039) (1.133) (1.210)
Exports to China .503* .598*
(.236) (.258)
Exports to Taiwan .221 .173
(.149) (.157)
Military awards .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Hawkishness .053**
(.011)
Log likelihood 177.718 147.660 140.896 127.897
Pseudo R2 .052 .205 .211 .284
N 411 410 389 389

variables
Union strength .040 .057

Retail/wholesale .056
employment
Farm employment .044 .047 .037
Republican .252 .236
Absolute DW score .060 .055
Exports to China .056 .057
Exports to Taiwan
Military awards
Hawkishness .120
liberal opposition seems to be responsible for the negative sign of Absolute

DW Score. Following my loose denition of liberals and conservatives, I nd
that 202 out of 211 conservatives voted for the bill, while 138 liberals out of a
total of 198 did so. In a word, even though support for HR 1838 was generally
strong across the ideological spectrum, liberals were still less supportive of it
than conservatives.
After controlling for party and the absolute DW score, Farm Employment
reaches statistical signicance, and if it increases by one standard deviation,
the probability of voting for HR 1838 decreases by 0.044. Members from
farm districts appear to be unwilling to support a bill that would likely disrupt
access to a leading market for American farmers.
The inclusion of three more constituency variables in Model 3 increases
pseudo R2 only marginally from 0.205 to 0.212. As in Model 2, Republican,
Absolute DW Score, and Farm Employment are all statistically signicant
and have the same sign. Moreover, their respective impact is nearly identical
to that in Model 2. Surprisingly, Exports to China now has a positive sign,
and it continues to have a positive sign in Model 4. That is, members whose
constituencies were more dependent on the China market were actually more
supportive of a bill that, if enacted into law, almost certainly would antagonize
Beijing and disrupt American access to the China market. One might think
that districts relatively dependent on exports to China also tend to elect
conservative or Republican members who are usually strong supporters of
Taiwan.25 But this explanation becomes problematic in light of the fact that
Exports to China consistently has a negative sign in the vote on HR 2386.
Three factors appear to be responsible for this puzzling nding. First, since
the bill was introduced against the backdrop of U.S.China negotiations for
the latters accession to the WTO, many pro-trade members were determined
to delay its passage lest Beijing retaliated by refusing to sign the WTO deal.
Doug Bereuter (R-NE), chairman of the House Asia and Pacic Subcommit-
tee of the International Relations Committee (CQWR 1999: 2607) said:
I did everything I could to delay this legislation [because] I did not want
to give the Chinese an excuse for not reviving an agreement with the U.S.
on WTO accession, or give Clinton a reason for striking a WTO deal.
As a result of sti opposition from pro-trade members, the bill was stripped
of its most controversial language, including authorization to sell Taiwan
advanced weapons such as missile defense systems, air-to-air missiles, and
diesel-powered submarines. Thus members from states with large exports to
China may have hoped that the passage of a largely innocuous bill would
appease Taiwan supporters and induce them to vote for the trade deal with
China. In other words, for these members a vote for HR 1838 was actually a
strategic vote for PNTR.
By the same token, the vote could be an empty gesture, designed to protect
Republicans from attacks by party conservatives who see China as a military
threat (CQWR 2000: 262). That is, many Republicans may have treated the
vote as one on which to stake out their pro-Taiwan position. Weve had our
vote here, said House Rules Committee Chairman David Dreier (R-CA).
Now lets get on to dealing with permanent [normal trade relations], which
is the important thing (ibid.). Furthermore, strong opposition from the
Senate to the original bill and its watered-down version, plus Clintons threat
of veto, doomed the bill from the outset. This provides further incentives for
members to view the vote as a position-taking vote. In a word, the various
factors could have induced many membersincluding those whose constitu-
ents were heavily dependent on the China marketto vote for HR 1838,
hence the positive sign of Exports to China.
Finally, the high correlation between party and hawkishness (r = 0.748 and
signicant at 0.01) must have dampened the estimated eects of party, which
is no longer statistically signicant in Model 4. Farm Employment remains
signicant. With the inclusion of hawkishness, pseudo R2 increases consider-
ably from 0.212 to 0.284.
Discussion
Since no Senate votes on U.S.Taiwan relations could be analyzed, I cannot
explore inter-chamber similarities and dierences in roll call voting on Taiwan.
Moreover, the lack of data for many variables prior to the 1990s makes it
impossible to nd out whether there has been any change over time in Taiwan
policy voting. Finally, since both votes took place under divided government,
it is hard to know whether members would have voted dierently under
unied government. These shortcomings aside, my analysis still sheds some
important light on roll call voting on U.S. Taiwan policy in particular, and
foreign policy voting in general.
The military-industrial complex has no impact at all. Previous studies have
similarly reported little or no relationship between constituency dependence
on military spending and members votes on foreign/defense policy (e.g.,
Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman
1985).26 Thus it seems that constituency constraint [on foreign policy] is
quite loose (Lindsay 1990: 956). Several reasons may be responsible for the
minimal impact of constituency interests on roll call voting. Since many
foreign policy issues are not salient to most Americans (e.g., Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996), legislators enjoy a signicant degree of freedom in roll call
voting. Also, people tend to be more deferential to politicians when national
interests are invoked than when parochial, domestic interests are involved.
Moreover, When members agree with their constituents on most issues but
disagree with them on some, wrote Lindsay (1990: 951), a vote contrary to
constituent opinion often does not pose great costs. Last but not least, since
a legislators reelection constituency can be dierent from the geographic
constituency (see Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1973; Wright 1989), he/she may more
actively shape and reect the preferences of the former but not the preferences
of the latter. This can lead to non-signicant ndings about the inuence of
geographic constituency.
Meanwhile, two constituency variables perform relatively better. Exports
to China and Farm Employment are negatively associated with support for
HR 2386 and HR 1838 respectively. Thus some members of Congress
appeared to be mindful of the possible negative repercussions of a pro-Taiwan
policy for U.S.China relations, in particular U.S.China trade. If so, as eco-
nomic ties between the U.S. and China continue to grow, more members will
perhaps be more cautious in their approach to U.S.Taiwan relations. How-
ever, this electoral connection should not be blown out of proportion. It does
not mean that members will sacrice Taiwans security on the altar of
U.S.China economic ties. Moreover the potential threat to Taiwan from
Chinas growing military power will in all likelihood reinforce lawmakers
determination to safeguard Taiwans security.
Above all, Taiwans democratic transition has changed its bond with
Congress, from one based on anti-Communism in the Cold War to one
underpinned by shared democratic values and institutions. A China hand at
the State Department observed,
As Taiwans economic prosperity has advanced and its democratization

has proceeded, it has had an easier and easier task of selling itself in the
United States, since it has, in fact, become increasingly admirable as a
society, and its natural anities with Americans have grown, rather than
diminished.
(quoted in Tucker 2001: 399)
The former director of the American Institute on Taiwan, Nat Bellocchi, also
said, [They] are a democracy, and they have turned their human rights thing
around so completely, so they have a very broad spectrum of support up on
the Hill (quoted in Bush 2004: 479). As Bush (2004: 223) predicted, This
new consensus in favor of Taiwan as a fellow democracy would become a
signicant factor in future policy debate. In a word, regardless of growing
economic interdependence between Beijing and Washington, there will
probably be strong, bipartisan support for Taiwan in the foreseeable future.
I will conclude this chapter by saying a few words about the legendary
China lobby and its successor, the Taiwan lobby. Scholarly studies of U.S.
China relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s generally agree that the China
lobby, which included the powerful China bloc in Congress, signicantly
shaped U.S.China policy, as evidenced by the China Aid Act of 1948 and
vehement congressional opposition to the recognition of China and its
admission to the United Nations (Bachrack 1976; Koen 1974; Tsou 1963;
Tucker 1980, 1983, 1994).27 As Tucker (1994: 3) wrote, The Nationalists
might not have practiced democracy at home but found it expedient and
rewarding to exploit Washingtons division of powers and sensitivity to
public opinion.
Since Taiwan was expelled from the UN in 1971 and particularly after the
dust had settled over normalization and the TRA, the China lobby gradually
faded from public attention. In the 1990s, the Taiwan lobby, as opposed to
the old China lobby, attracted extensive attention, as it was widely believed to
be the driving force behind the sudden surge of congressional support for
Taiwan on a wide range of issues, notably Lees visit to Cornell in 1995
(Pomfret 2002; Sciolino 1996; Shenon 2000). According to one former Foreign
Service ocial involved in China policy, They [Taiwan] have by far the most
professional and skilled congressional-relations sta of any foreign regime
represented here (quoted in Tucker 2001: 338). Manns (2001) study also
revealed the sophistication, strong message, and long history of the Taiwan
lobby. Thus a critical question arises: To what extent has the Taiwan lobby
inuenced congressional support for Taiwan since the 1990s?
It appears that the inuence of the Taiwan lobby on Capitol Hill derives
primarily from Taiwans democratic transition, and only secondarily from
Congresss historical ties with China and Chiang Kai-shek (i.e., the old China
lobby). To put it in a dierent way, being a democracy itself is the necessary
condition for the Taiwan lobbys political clout. Nancy Tucker (quoted in
Landay 1997) made this point crystal clear: What [mainland Chinese] dont
understand about the success that Taiwan has had with lobbying is that
Taiwans lobbying became much more successful as Taiwans political system
changed.
Remarks by ocials involved in the executive-legislative skirmish over
Lees 1995 visit appear to corroborate Tuckers claim. I dont think they
[Taiwan lobbyists] would be making a dent if Taiwan were not such a success
story, one senior administration ocial observed (quoted in Mann 2001:
209). Stanley Roth, who was then on the National Security Council, rejected
the argument that Cassidy, a Washington lobby rm hired by Taiwan, played
a major role in drumming up congressional support for Lees visit. Taiwan
had enormous support in the U.S. Congress to begin with, he asserted. The
nature of the event, combined with the perception of Taiwan as good, as a
role model, I think was more than enough to shore up congressional support,
and I would say Cassidys role in the Congress was marginal (quoted in
ibid.). In a word, an undemocratic Taiwan would probably not have enjoyed
so much support on Capitol Hill since the 1990s regardless of how powerful
its lobbies were.
Nevertheless, the Taiwan lobby should not be dismissed as politically
insignicant. It helps Taiwans cause by bringing Taiwan-related issues to the
attention of members of Congress. There are myriad issues crying for a
members attention. In most cases, it is incumbent upon alert interest groups
to bring a particular issuesuch as arms sales to Taiwan or Lees visitto
his attention. In some cases a member may keep a close eye on an issue due to
strong personal or policy interest (see Sutter 2001).28 Moreover, a members
attention often shifts to another issue once certain legislative actionhearing,
resolution, or billhas been taken. In order to make the issue constantly
salient to the member, he/she has to be reminded of the issue from time to
time. The Taiwan lobby has performed the two tasks extremely well through
institutionalized lobbying, as embodied in endowed professorships, donations
to universities, Taiwan-related research institutes, and sister-city networks.
These institutions ensure that Taiwan policy will remain a topic in American
academic and political discourse and a salient one if circumstances require.
6 Congress and Chinas
human rights
If the United States refusal to recognize the PRC after 1949 was one of the
great blunders of our time, so too must be the exemption of China from the
international human rights standards applicable to other nations.
(Roberta Cohen 1987: 451)
In practical terms, conditioning MFN is like putting a hair trigger on an

economic nuclear bomb. When it goes o, it will vaporize not only commerce
but also our leverage with China on security, the environment, and human
rights.
(Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) 1994a)
Had it not been for Congress, the advancement of human rights would not
have become a top priority in U.S. foreign policy. The human rights move-
ment originated in the early 1970s, when Congress was frustrated by an
imperial president in the Vietnam War and a deant Secretary of State prac-
ticing realpolitik in Chile (Cohen 1979; Fraser 1979; Hehir 1992). Since the
power of the purse is the surest way for Congress to gain a point of leverage
in the foreign policy process (Hehir 1992: 237), Congresss central strategy
was to pass legislation that linked human rights to the provision of U.S.
economic and/or military assistance (Fraser 1979: 248250; Forsythe 1988:
Chapters 4 and 5). President Jimmy Carter took the human rights mantle
from Congress and made it a central tenet of his foreign policy. Since then,
human rights has remained an integral and important element of U.S. foreign
policy. In a word, Congress fundamentally transformed U.S. foreign policy by
incorporating the promotion of human rights.
In so far as China is concerned, two aspects of Congresss human rights
policy stand out. First, the Tiananmen Incident is the dividing line. Before
Tiananmen, Chinas human rights record was largely exempt from congres-
sional scrutiny (Cohen 1987; Shirk 1977). Tiananmen abruptly ended con-
gressional silence and since then Congress has become the most outspoken
critic of Chinas human rights practices. Second, while Congress enacted some
general and country-specic human rights laws in the 1970s (see Forsythe
Congress and Chinas human rights 101
1988: Chapters 35), it has not been able to pass any similar laws respecting
China. Thus Congresss human rights policy toward China appears to be
more bark than bite.
In this chapter, I analyze Congresss human rights policy toward China. In
the process I attempt to answer three questions. First, why had Congress,
in its worldwide campaign for human rights, largely neglected China up until
1989? Second, why has Congress been extremely active in promoting human
rights in China since 1989? Third, what factors have inuenced roll call votes
on legislation targeting Chinas human rights?
I argue that the international environment holds the key to the rst ques-
tion. U.S. weakness vis--vis the former Soviet Union and hence the need to
form a strategic alliance with China necessarily constrained Congress from
scrutinizing Chinas human rights prior to 1989. As to the second question,
the Tiananmen Incident certainly spurred Congress into action, but it alone
was insucient to explain sustained congressional activism in Chinas human
rights since 1989. The other two important factors are the international
environment and partisan politics. The end of the Cold War reduced Chinas
strategic importance and enabled members of Congress to criticize its human
rights practices without fearing strategic consequences. The Democratic
majority in Congress used Chinas human rights to club a Republican presi-
dent who was determined to salvage U.S.China relations from the deadly
blow of Tiananmen. To answer the third question, I analyze roll call votes
on a set of bills that aimed to punish Chinas human rights violations by
revoking its Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status.
Before Tiananmen: China as the exception

If there was any U.S. human rights policy toward China in the years before
1989, it was the glaring exemption of China from the otherwise strict human
rights standards that the U.S. applied to many other countries. Henry Kiss-
inger, Secretary of State under President Nixon, refused to discuss human
rights even when Chinese ocials brought up the topic, asserting that they
were Chinas internal aairs (Kissinger 1994: 750751). Despite the Carter
administrations high-prole human rights campaign, it treated China gin-
gerly. Richard Holbrooke, Carters Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacic Aairs, later told Congress, We could not, and did not,
raise Western concepts such as due process of law in . . . the Peoples Republic
of China (U.S. Congress 1983a: 12). When ocials from the Bureau of
Human Rights gave unattering testimonies about Chinas human rights,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Negroponte and Holbrooke rushed
to Chinas defense (Cohen 1987: 478, fn. 122; U.S. Congress 1981: 3738, 43).
The Reagan administration pursued the same policy of exemption. We
dont necessarily see a great advantage in banging them [Chinese] over the
head with it [human rights], they are very sensitive people, said James Lilley,
then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacic Aairs,
102 Congress and Chinas human rights
in a 1985 congressional hearing on political developments and human rights
in China (U.S. Congress 1986: 179).
Congress was no more assertive than the executive branch. It was not until
1977four years after Congress started its worldwide human rights cam-
paignthat the rst resolution on Chinas human rights (H.Con.Res.395)
was introduced. Sponsored by Representative Dawson Mathis (D-GA), the
resolution denounced the Chinese governments suppression of the expres-
sion of political thought and its violation of the rights of the individual, and
urged the president to take eective measures. At a series of congressional
hearings on human rights and U.S. foreign policy held in 1979, members paid
particular attention to human rights in South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan,
and Sri Lanka, but mentioned China only in passing (U.S. Congress 1979).
One year later, Congress held its rst hearing on human rights in China
(U.S. Congress 1981). In the same year, Congress began to require the State
Department to submit an annual human rights report on China. Two more
rounds of hearings were held in 1982 and 1985 respectively, but there was
no harsh condemnation of Chinese human rights nor discussion of specic
legislation targeting China (U.S. Congress 1983a, 1986).
Executive and legislative inaction on Chinas human rights did not escape
the attention of scholars and journalists. Hardly a word has been said about
China in recent discussions of human rights and American foreign policy,
deplored Shirk (1977: 109) on the eve of normalization. Despite a strong
stand promoting human rights globally, the administration has been
exceptionally reserved about criticizing the Chinese, lamented the Washing-
ton Post (1978b). The defense of human rights was one of the signature
elements in the Carter administrations foreign policy elsewhere in the world,
but not when it came to China, noted Mann (1999: 100). Indeed, Carter
and his aides gave China virtually a blanket exemption from the human rights
policies that they so readily applied everywhere. Another scholar arrived at
a similar conclusion: Human rights concerns were seen as only one element
in American policy toward China, and a subsidiary one at that (Harding
1992: 200).
A number of factors contributed to Congresss glaring silence on Chinese
human rights, but two of them stand out as arguably the most signicant.1
The rst has something to do with Congresss strategy to promote human
rights. Since [h]uman rights initiatives are assumed to depend on diplomatic
leverage and the amount of foreign assistance available (Cohen 1987: 472),
Congress paid most attention to human rights in countries that were recipi-
ents of U.S. military and/or economic aid. It enacted several laws prohibiting
such aid to countries engaged in consistent patterns of human rights viola-
tions (Forsythe 1988: Chapter 3). Congress also adopted legislation targeting
specic countries (ibid.: Chapters 4 and 5; Fraser 1979).2
However, this strategy becomes problematic in the case of China, which
was not a recipient of U.S. military or economic aid. In fact, the two coun-
tries did not have diplomatic ties until 1979. Because Congress did not have
any economic or political leverage over China, it largely left out China in
its worldwide human rights campaign. Donald Fraser (D-OH), one of the
architects of Congresss human rights policy, openly admitted this dilemma:
We dont really have leverage on countries such as those in the Communist
World because we rarely have any relationships which give us leverage (U.S.
Congress 1979: 304).
The second and perhaps most important constraint on congressional activ-
ism in Chinese human rights appears to be the international environment. On
the one hand, bogged down in Vietnam and faced with the Soviet oensive
around the world, the U.S. found itself in an increasingly unfavorable stra-
tegic position. On the other hand, the sharp deterioration in SinoSoviet
relations in the 1960sas evidenced by a series of border clashes in 1969
provided the U.S. with a golden opportunity to form an alliance with China
against the former Soviet Union (e.g., Ross 1986, 1995). Confronted with the
new international strategic environment, Washington began to adjust its
foreign policy by reaching out to China. Nixons landmark visit to Beijing
represented the beginning of a temporary strategic alliance between two
countries that had heretofore been avowed enemies.
Because the U.S.China relationship was premised almost exclusively on
strategic cooperation, there was little room for non-strategic concerns such as
human rights. Where human rights policy conicts with incontrovertibly
more compelling security interests, the human rights policy must give way,
editorialized the International Herald Tribune (1980). China is pivotal in the
world power balance . . . the Peoples Republic is, de facto, the most import-
ant single ally of the United States, the editorial continued, implying that
Chinas strategic importance should override all other concerns, human
rights included. Even though U.S.China relations witnessed rapid develop-
ment after Nixons visit, policy makers, mindful of the fragility of U.S.
relations with the leadership of the Peoples Republic, are loath to raise issues
[like human rights] that might jeopardize the progress made in the last six
years (Shirk 1977: 109). Particularly during the Carter administration, the
desire for normalization put on ice any impulse to protest Chinas human
rights violations (Cohen 1987: 461).
Now that the U.S. and China were strategic allies, Congress adjusted its
China policy accordingly. Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) best illustrates
Congresss human rights policy toward China in the new strategic environ-
ment. A staunch anti-Communist and leading proponent of human rights,
the Senator was best known for the JacksonVanik amendment that estab-
lishes annual review of MFN status for Communist countries (Willkie 1994:
121). Because of the amendment, the former Soviet Union was never granted
MFN status.3
Yet when it came to China, Jackson adopted a completely dierent stand-
ard. As early as November 1969, he was calling for full normalization of
relations with China. He visited the country four times between 1971 and
1983, which deepened his commitment to the realization of a dynamic and
prosperous China with close ties to the United States (ibid.: 125). He was
instrumental in the passage of the Carter administrations trade agreement
with China that includes, among other things, the extension of MFN. Jackson
thus explained why he opposed MFN for the former Soviet Union but
supported MFN for China:
China and the Soviet Union are two very dierent countries at dierent
stages of development, with dierent interests and ambitions, dierent
associates and allies, and dierent relations with this country. They
should be treated on separate tracks and, in our own national interest,
they cannot be treated alike.4
(quoted in ibid.: 126)
Nonetheless, not every member of Congress was ready to buy the strategic
argument and to turn a blind eye to Chinas human rights. Why is there this
tolerant attitude toward the obvious defects of the PRC? Why is it that they
seem to enjoy tolerance from academics as well as diplomatic and journalistic
sources on their many defects? asked an exasperated congressman Edward
Derwinski (R-IL) (U.S. Congress 1981: 149). If we dont apply some human
rights standards to China, even if . . . it will perhaps have a marginal, neg-
ligible eect, or no eect at allit makes us hypocritical when we apply
pressure to any place else in the world, warned Robert Dornan (R-CA) (U.S.
Congress 1983a: 360). Some members denounced the unwarranted sensitiv-
ities to Chinese culture and traditions. We are so much more careful and
thoughtful and sensitive when we deal with the subject of human rights in
China than we are with other countries in Asia who also have traditions
and customs, said Representative Joel Pritchard (R-WA) (U.S. Congress
1983a: 344).5
These few dissenting voices aside, most members of Congress remained
silent on Chinese human rights. A more specic indicator of congressional
reticence is the number of bills respecting human rights in China that were
introduced in Congress prior to 1989. By my count, in the 16 years between
1973 and 1988, a total of only 35 such bills were introduced. Of these bills,
19 were about generic human rights topics such as political dissent and
religious freedom, 8 about human rights in Tibet, 8 about Chinas family
planning policy and U.S. funding to the UNPF. This number is only a small
fraction of the 289 human rights bills (including generic human rights,
UNPF, MFN, Tiananmen, and human rights in Tibet) introduced in the
16 years between 1989 and 2006.
Tiananmen: the dividing line

The Tiananmen Incident in the summer of 1989 fundamentally changed
U.S.China relations. The optimistic decade of the 1980s in U.S.China
relations ended in one of the most dramatic crises in Chinas history, a crisis
that produced equally sharp repercussions for Chinese-American under-
standing, observed a senior foreign service ocial (quoted in Tucker 2001).
A close observer of Congress wrote, A carefully staged process of improving
relations between the United States and China, built during the last two
decades, has been frozen and may have been permanently damaged by the
Chinese governments brutal repression of mass dissent (CQWR 1989:
1411). Winston Lord, ambassador to China from November 1985 through
April 1989, later observed:
For two decades, through ve administrations, the United States enjoyed

broad bipartisan consensus on dealing with China, that important com-
plex nation, but the slaughter of innocent patriots in Beijing last spring
and the subsequent repression have led to the rst heated debate on
China since the early 1970s.
(quoted in U.S. Congress 1990: 7)
Perhaps nowhere was the impact of Tiananmen more keenly felt than in the
halls of Congress. The Tiananmen Incident destroyed the reservoir of good
feelings toward China that had been accumulating among members of
Congress, particularly since the beginning of Chinas economic reform in
1978 and after Dengs popular visit to the Capitol Hill in 1979. Congresss
reaction was swift and emotional. The American honeymoon and love fest
with China started in 1971 by Richard Nixon is over, declared Congressman
Bill Richardson (D-NM) (Congressional Record 1989: 10787). No dangling
of strategic advantage, or eort to invoke geopolitical calculations will deter
the Government of this country from expressing its revulsion at their [Chi-
nese] actions, said an outraged Congressman Barney Frank (D-MA) (ibid.).
A deeply disappointed Les AuCoin (D-OR), who was proud of having taken
a constructive approach to China, was on the rst trade delegation to
China, and was opposed to two-China policy, said that China has disgraced
itself (Congressional Record 1989: 10804). Congressman Dave McCurdy
(D-OK) denounced the violence against students as an act of desperation by
tyrants out of touch with reality, and Leon Panetta (D-CA) called it an
oense against humanity (ibid.: 10805).
Congressional outrage naturally found its outlet in legislative actions. On
June 6 1989, each chamber unanimously adopted a resolutionH.Con-
.Res.136 and S.Res.142 respectivelyto condemn the crackdown. Frustrated
by Bushs slow and cautious approach, the House unanimously voted on
June 29 for sanctions against China that were more stringent than those
already announced by the president (CQWR 1989: 1642, 1800). Someone
in this governmentand today its the Housemust take a more forceful
action, said House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) after the
vote (quoted in Phillips 1989). The Tiananmen Incident also spurred congres-
sional scrutiny of a plethora of human rights problems in China that other-
wise had been ignored or downplayed in the past, such as forced abortion
(e.g., U.S. Congress 1995, 2005b) and prison labor (e.g., U.S. Congress 1992,
1994, 1998a).
Figure 6.1 illustrates legislative activism in human rights policy in the
aftermath of Tiananmen. As I mentioned above, only 35 human rights bills
were introduced between 1973 and 1988. In 1989 alone, 33 bills directly
related to Tiananmen (e.g., condemning the crackdown or proposing sanc-
tions) were introduced in Congress. But after 1989, Tiananmen disappeared
from the radar screen of Congress, as only 11 bills relating to the Incident
were introduced between 1990 and 2006. Meanwhile, generic human rights,
human rights in Tibet, and funding to the UNPF became the prime targets of
legislative actions, and the total number of bills for each issue is 118, 41, and
11 respectively.
Moreover, the various NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, which had been quiescent about Chinas human rights prior to
1989, now became extremely active. They began to keep close track of human
rights violations in China, publish regular reports, and testify frequently at
congressional hearings (e.g., Human Rights Watch 1993; Amnesty Inter-
national USA 1990). Joining these NGOs were Chinese human rights lobbies
in the U.S. that were formed after Tiananmen. They became immensely
Figure 6.1 Bills concerning Chinas human rights, 19892006.

inuential on Capitol Hill. For example, the National Committee on Chinese
Students Aairs, led by Zhao Haiching, a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard
University, was instrumental in devising the strategy to link human rights
with MFN (Mann 1999: 229233).6 These NGOs and Chinese human rights
lobbies have played an important role in sustaining Congresss interest in
Chinas human rights even when the images of Tiananmen are no longer on
the front pages.
Nevertheless, the impact of Tiananmen should not be overestimated. It
certainly triggered o congressional activism, but it is merely one of the
several factors that are responsible for congressional activism. Another cru-
cial factor is the international environment. Tiananmen took place against
the backdrop of political turmoil in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the
former Soviet Union in 1991. In the new international environment the U.S.
no longer needed the China card against the Soviet Bloc. As a result, Con-
gress could be tough on Chinas human rights without worrying about the
strategic consequences of such criticism.
Remarks by some members indicate that they were keenly aware of the
implications of the Soviet demise for China policy. Senator DeConcini
(D-AZ) said that President Bush would be sadly mistaken if he intended
to play the China card in the new world order (Congressional Record 1992:
S 3847). Senator Harris Woord (D-PA) voiced similar sentiment: The col-
lapse of the Soviet Union rendered the China Card, the notion that we need
to support China as a balance to the Soviet Union, obsolete (ibid.: 7495).
Now, in the 1990s when we turn over the China card, it is a deuce, asserted
representative Edward Markey (D-MA) (Congressional Record 1990: H
10507). While conceding that the U.S. had played the China card in the Cold
War, Gerald Solomon (R-NY) contended that the China card was over.
Now it is time to stand up to this rogue regime in Beijing and let them know
that we are not going to take it anymore, he urged (Congressional Record
1997: H 4245). We no longer need the China Card as leverage against a
belligerent Communist enemy in the Soviet Union, declared representative
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) (Congressional Record 1993: E 2005).
Another factor that contributed to congressional activism in Chinas
human rights was partisan politics, especially during the Bush years when
Democrats controlled both chambers. Knowing that the president was
determined to continue normal relations with China in spite of what hap-
pened in Tiananmen Square, the Democratic majority persistently pushed
human rights to the frontlines, with the aim of making the president look bad
before the public. The three failed congressional attempts to override Bushs
three vetoes, for example, illuminate the likely partisan motives behind
Democratic activism in human rights. The Democratic leadership relished
the veto ghts; even if its side lost legislatively, it might win big politically,
wrote Richard Bush (1995: 151). This was a victory for President Bush and
the Chinese leadership that was responsible for Tiananmen Square, said a
bitter Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) after Bushs veto of HR 2712, the
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act. It was a defeat for human
rights (quoted in Friedman 1990). Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) said he hoped
the vote will be discussed in the 1990 mid-term election (CQWR 1990:
245). As Mann pointed out:
China was an issue where the Democrats in Congress could oppose the
Republican administration and know, with certainty, that they had
public opinion on their side . . . If George Bush wasnt going to convey
the countrys outrage over Chinese repression, then the Democrats in
Congress would happily volunteer.
(1999: 199)
To sum up, the shock of Tiananmen, Chinas reduced strategic importance in

the post-Cold War world, the activities of human rights groups, and partisan
politics have all combined to contribute to congressional activism since 1989.
More specically, Tiananmen triggered o congressional activism, but
Congress would almost certainly have been active in Chinas human rights
without the shock of Tiananmen. For the demise of the former Soviet Union
removed the strategic straitjacket that had prevented most members of Con-
gressand human rights groups to a lesser extentfrom openly criticizing
Chinas human rights. Nonetheless, the intensity and timing of congressional
activism would probably have been dierent if Tiananmen had not happened.
Meanwhile, partisan politics under a divided government gave the Democrats
added incentives to be actively involved in human rights policy toward China,
in the hope that they could weaken Bush by portraying him as being soft
on human rights. Finally, Tiananmen also brought about unprecedented and
sustained involvement of human rights groups in Chinese human rights,
which helps keep China as a salient issue on Capitol Hill.
MFN renewal and congressional eorts to change human

rights in China
Renewal of Chinas Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status lies at the
heart of Congresss human rights policy toward China since 1989. Since
China was not a recipient of U.S. economic or military assistance that could
be suspended or terminated, Congress had to devise a new strategy to deal
with Chinas human rights. Among the tools available, the JacksonVanik
Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act appears to be the most eective. The
amendment prohibits a president from granting MFN to a Communist coun-
try unless he waives a requirement that denies MFN to any Communist
country that restricts free emigration.7 Congress can pass a joint resolution to
disapprove of MFN renewal, subject to presidential veto. While the Jackson
Vanik Amendment ostensibly sets free emigration as the only condition for
MFN renewal, Congress has adopted a broader interpretation of the law to
include human rights in general.
Executive-legislative skirmishes over Chinas MFN
Figure 6.2 illustrates congressional activism in Chinas MFN. Between 1973
and 1988, only four bills relating to Chinas MFN were introduced. By con-
trast, the 16 years after 1989 witnessed a total of 75 such bills, with 46 in the
House and 29 in the Senate. Not surprisingly, the two years after Tiananmen
witnessed the largest number of such bills18 and 16 respectively. As
Tiananmen gradually faded from public and congressional debate, the
number of bills also decreased markedly. Since 1995, on average about two
MFN bills were introduced annually. Of these bills, Congress voted on more
than one-third of them (27 to be exact). For example, each year between 1990
and 2001, the House voted on a joint resolution to disapprove of MFN
renewal and, with three exceptions, the resolutions were all defeated (see
Table 6.1).
The White House wanted to engage China in spite of the Tiananmen
Incident and therefore opposed revocation of or conditional MFN. As Presi-
dent George H. W. Bush argued in his veto message attached to the U.S.
China Act of 1992, engagement with China through democratic, economic,
and educational institutions instead of confrontation oers the best hope
for reform in China and MFN is the foundation we need to engage the
Chinese (quoted in CQ Almanac 1992: 159). While sharing the goals of
conditional MFNto see greater Chinese adherence to international
standards of human rights, free and fair trade practices, and international
non-proliferation normsPresident Bush nonetheless believed that adding
broad conditions to Chinas MFN renewal would not lead to faster progress
Figure 6.2 Time trend of bills relating to Chinas MFN status, 19732006.
Table 6.1 House roll call votes on joint resolutions to disapprove of Chinas MFN,
19902001
Bill Totalsa Democrats Republicans
H.J.R.467, October 18 1990

Yea 247 166 81
Nay 174 84 90
H.J.R.263, July 10 1991
Yea 223 171 51
Nay 204 92 112
H.J.R.502, July 21 1992
Yea 258 181 76
Nay 135 56 79
H.J.R.208, July 21 1993
Yea 105 41 63
Nay 318 210 108
H.J.R.373, August 9 1994
Yea 75 38 36
Nay 356 215 141
To Table H.J.R.96, July 20 1995b
Yea 321 143 178
Nay 107 54 52
H.J.R.182, June 27 1996
Yea 141 75 65
Nay 286 119 167
H.J.R.79, July 3 1997
Yea 173 93 79
Nay 259 112 147
H.J.R.121, July 22 1998
Yea 166 87 78
Nay 264 115 149
H.J.R.57, July 27 1999
Yea 170 98 71
Nay 260 110 150
H.J.R.103, July 18 2000
Yea 147 91 54
Nay 281 117 164
H.J.R.50, July 19 2001
Yea 169 105 62
Nay 259 102 157
Notes: a: Totals included Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Virgil Goode (I-VA in 2000).
b: A yea vote is a vote in support of MFN renewal.
Source: CQ Almanac.
in advancing our goals, but instead would severely damage the Western-
oriented, modernizing elements in China, weaken Hong Kong, and
strengthen opposition to democratic and economic reform (quoted in
ibid.: 158).
Notwithstanding his campaign rhetoric accusing Bush of kowtowing
to Beijing and his 1993 executive order linking MFN renewal to human
rights progress, President Clinton largely continued his predecessors policy.
Revoking MFN and, in eect, severing our economic ties to China, would
drive us back into a period of mutual isolation and recrimination that would
harm Americas interests, not advance them, he said. MFN renewal is not a
referendum on all Chinas policies, it is a vote for Americas interests (Public
Papers of the Presidents 1996: 778). For both Bush and Clinton, then, trade
is the primary vehicle of engagement, a force for change in China, exposing
China to our ideas and our ideals and integrating China into the global
economy (Public Papers of the Presidents 1998: 871).
Many members of Congress from both parties were strongly opposed
to unconditional MFN because they wanted to punish Beijing for its human
rights violations. Representative Richard Schulze (R-PA) best characterized
the prevailing mood in Congress: I want the outrage that is ringing through-
out the world to ring through the halls of Congress (CQWR 1990: 2570).
Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) denounced Bushs decision to renew
MFN as a hideously wrong message to send to the world (ibid.: 1686).
Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) characterized unconditional MFN
as a base hunger for cheap electronics and inexpensive consumer goods at
the price of Americas historic thirst for liberty and justice (U.S. Congress
1997c: 22).
For some members, antipathy toward Communism reinforced their moral
outrage against Beijing and their determination to oppose unconditional
MFN. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) regarded the policy of unlinked granting of
MFN as tantamount to appeasement to Communist China (CQWR
1990: 9). Frank Wolf (R-VA) opposed MFN renewal because They [China]
are the evil empire (CQ Almanac 1999: 23: 7). Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC)
characterized Clintons China policy as painstaking eorts . . . to cater to
Red Chinas every whim and wish (CQWR 1999: 2605).
From the opponents perspective, revoking or putting conditions on
Chinas MFN status seemed to be the easiest and most eective unilateral
punishment of China. Without MFN, Chinese exports to the U.S. would be
subject to much higher taris and hence would decrease precipitously. The
average tari on Chinese products would rise from 3.5 percent to an average
of nearly 40 percent. The 6 percent tari on apparel and footwear would
jump to 60 percent and 35 percent respectively (CQWR 1990: 1775; CQWR
1994: 1055). Considering that the U.S. is the destination of nearly one-third
of Chinese exports, revocation of MFN would have had a disastrous impact
on the Chinese economy.
Other members supported MFN for a variety of reasons. First, some of
them shared the opponents concerns about Chinas human rights, but
believed that engagement through trade was the best way to inuence Chinese
behavior and to help the democratic forces in China. The more trade, the
more democratization, asserted Congressman Robert T. Matsui (D-CA), a
leading pro-trade Democrat (CQWR 1990: 2571). To these members, the
alternative would be an isolated China with ill will toward the U.S. The
choice is clear, said Representative Tim Roemer (D-IN). Are we going to
have a constructive engagement policy with China or a new evil empire?
(CQWR 1999: 1898).
Second, many members were worried that revocation of MFN would hurt
American businesses, particularly the big exporters and importers. Senator
Bob Dole (R-KS) made it crystal clear in 1990: The Chinese consume about
20% of wheat exportsa commodity in which I and many other senators
have a special interest (CQWR 1996: 1232).8 In 1991, Senator Max Baucus
(D-MT), along with ve Democratic senators from farm states, signed a letter
to President Bush urging him to take actions in other areas so as to lessen
congressional pressure on MFN (CQWR 1991: 1737; Gugliotta 1991). If
MFN were cut o, China would probably retaliate by stopping its purchase
of wheatthe major export of these statesand the price of wheat would
collapse. Finally, some members simply didnt believe that the various condi-
tions attached to MFN were attainable. We will end up with a bill that will
be popular in the U.S. Congress but will harden the Chinese governments
resolve, warned Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL)
(CQWR 1991: 1739).
Each year since 1990, the president and Congress locked horns over
Chinas MFN. Initially, Congress attempted outright revocation, which
requires approval by both chambers of a joint resolution denying presidential
renewal. The threat of presidential veto and Senate reluctance to take action
forced House advocates of outright revocation to change their tactics and
adopted conditional MFN. As Nancy Pelosi (1994) put it, Conditioning
MFN for China provides the US with the best leverage to improve human
rights because preferential access to the US market is critical to Chinas
authoritarian regime. Besides, conditional MFN could win support from
those in Congress who might be afraid of the consequences of outright revo-
cation, but who wanted to do something about repression in China (Mann
1999: 232).
However, the unintended but inevitable consequence of such an approach
is that almost every group and organization with an interest in China policy
wanted to be part of the action in drafting the specic MFN conditions
(Mann 1999: 232). In addition to human rights, which was initially the pri-
mary concern of MFN opponents, other issues such as weapons prolifer-
ation, Taiwan, Tibet, intellectual property rights (IPR), and unfair trade
practices were also added, making MFN renewal the institutionalized
vehicle by which China policy, in all of its dimensions, was discussed each
year (Lampton 1994: 15). As Representative Sam Gibbons (D-FL), then
chairman of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, said of the
Pelosi bill (HR 2212), I guess Pelosi is just becoming a garbage truck.
Everybody throws in everything they can think of (CQWR 1991: 1739).
Allied with the White House were big exporters and importers such as
Boeing and Wal-Mart that had reaped huge prots from the China market
(Zakaria 2005; Zeng 2004: 96114). Joining congressional critics of China
were labor unions, religious groups, human rights groups, and environmental-
ists (CQWR 1997: 1390; CQWR 2000: 90). Labor unions opposed MFN
because of the thousands of jobs allegedly displaced by Chinese imports
(Shorrock 1994, 1996; U.S. Congress 1997c: 186189; Behr 1994). Religious
groups had grievances against Chinas family planning policy and the lack of
religious freedom (CQWR 1997: 1206, 1390; Devroy 1997). The MFN debate,
Gilbert (1997) wrote, created a peculiar political stew of labor unions, pro-
tectionists, religious activists, some liberals, some conservatives . . . ghting
an uphill battle against a coalition of exporters, retailers, pro-trade members
of Congress, and the White House.9
House votes to disapprove of MFN

In this section, I conduct quantitative analysis of the determinants of the ten
House votes between 1990 and 1999 on joint resolutions to disapprove of
presidential renewal of MFN (see Table 6.1). The two votes in 2000 and 2001
are excluded because they took place after the House had voted to remove
China from annual review of MFN.
There are three major reasons why I decided on the ten votes.10 First, all the
supposedly pure human rights votes were almost always unanimous.11 These
bills usually condemned the Chinese government for its gross violation of
human rights, urged the executive branch to raise human rights issues with
Chinese ocials, or called on the Chinese government to release individuals.
While unsuitable for statistical analysis, these lopsided votes nonetheless con-
stitute convincing evidence that members of Congress had little disagreement
over whether to promote human rights in China.
Second, Congresss human rights policy has essentially been a linkage pol-
icy whereby it uses U.S. economic, military, or diplomatic leverage to bring
about human rights progress in a particular country. In the case of China,
withdrawing MFN or putting conditions on its renewal appeared to be the
most eective leverage Congress had, given that China was not a recipient of
U.S. military or economic aid. Moreover, votes on these joint resolutions
turned out to be highly contested, suggesting that members disagreed with
each other on how to promote human rights in China.
Finally, I will analyze the same type of votes related to other countries in
Chapter 7. Congress also voted on the extension of MFN to Romania, Hun-
gary, and Vietnam. This provides a good opportunity to nd out if the causal
factors underlying roll call voting on Chinas MFN are unique or represent a
general pattern of roll call voting on MFN extension.
Hypotheses
Since the hypotheses to be tested were already alluded to in the various
sections of this chapter or earlier chapters, I simply list them here:
Hypothesis 1: Members of the presidents party should be more likely to

oppose revocation of MFN than members of the opposition party, other
things being equal.
Hypothesis 2: Since both liberals and conservatives should be more likely

to vote for MFN revocation, the absolute value of DW score should have
a positive sign.
Hypothesis 3: Employment in farming and retail/wholesale should be

negatively associated with support for MFN revocation, controlling for
other factors.
Hypothesis 4: The strength of labor unions will be positively correlated

with support for MFN revocation, other things being equal.
Statistical ndings
Since the ten votes took place under two presidents, I present the results
separately for the three votes under President Bush and the seven votes under
President Clinton. For each vote I rst run a model with Union Strength,
Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment. After that, I add
party and Absolute DW Score. Table 6.2 presents logit coecients for the
three votes under President Bush, and the probabilities calculated from these
coecients are presented in Table 6.3.
Despite intense campaigns by labor unions against MFN renewal,
Union Strength is not statistically signicant in any of the regressions. The
other two constituency variables are consistently signicant and have the
correct sign in all models. If Farm Employment increases by one standard
deviation, the probability of voting for MFN revocation decreases con-
siderably by about 0.12 across the six models, holding other variables at
their means. Similarly, such an increase in Retail/Wholesale Employment
leads to a decrease of roughly 0.09 in the probability of supporting MFN
revocation.
Being a Republican is consistently and negatively associated with support
for MFN revocation. To be exact, being a member of the presidents party
decreases the probability of casting a yea vote (i.e., a vote in support of
revoking MFN) by a solid 0.165 in 1990, a remarkable 0.333 in 1991, and an
impressive 0.252 in 1992. These numbers constitute strong evidence of party
loyalty. However, as I cautioned in Chapter 1, it is hard to clearly distinguish
loyalty to ones president from electorally-induced inter-party dierence on
Table 6.2 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of Chinas MFN under Presi-
dent Bush
Independent 1990 1991 1992

variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength .009

.009 .000 .002 .026 .027
(.013)
(.013) (.013) (.014) (.014) (.015)
Farm employment .144**
.122** .225** .185** .184** .156**
(.038)
(.039) (.045) (.047) (.041) (.042)
Retail/wholesale .151**
.135** .171** .161** .216** .215**
employment (.049)
(.051) (.049) (.054) (.056) (.061)
Republican .684** 1.386** 1.142**
(.215) (.230) (.239)
Absolute DW score .988 2.695** 2.155**
(.651) (.702) (.753)
Log likelihood 270.091 264.584 272.190 246.694 232.974 218.453
Pseudo R2 .053 .073 .079 .163 .078 .134
N 421 421 427 426 393 392
Notes: Cell entries are logit coecients. Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
independent variables (votes under Bush)
Independent 1990 1991 1992

variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength
Farm employment .102 .086 .163 .134 .120 .100
Retail/wholesale .082 .073 .094 .089 .104 .102
employment
Republican .165 .333 .252
Absolute DW score .114 .078
trade, because for many Republicans, a vote in support of Bush was also a
vote consistent with their traditional pro-trade stance.
Notice that the estimated impact of party was at its lowest in the 1990 vote.
The vote took place one year after the Tiananmen Incident, and many
Republicans (81 out of a total of 171) may have decided to vote for the bill
(hence against Bush) because their outrage against Beijing had not subsided.
The vote outcomes of two China bills in 1990 provide further indication
about the prevailing sentiment among Republicans. On January 24, the
House voted 39025 to override President Bushs veto of the Emergency
Chinese Immigration Relief Act. Only 25 Republicans voted against the over-
ride. By a 38430 vote, the House passed HR 4939 on October 18, a bill that
set strict conditions for MFN renewal for 1991. Only 19 Republicans voted
again the bill.
Absolute DW Score is statistically signicant and has the hypothesized
sign in two votes. If it increases by one standard deviation, then the prob-
ability of voting for MFN revocation increases by 0.114 in 1991 and 0.078 in
1992. For these two votes at least, there was indeed a coalition of the ideo-
logical ends against the middle. However, Absolute DW Score appears to
have no impact on the 1990 vote. My explanation is similar to the one I
oered above about the reduced impact of party. That is, because passions
about the Tiananmen Incident were probably still running high when mem-
bers cast their votes in 1990, many moderates also decided to support the bill
in spite of their general inclination to oppose such bills.
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 present results for the seven votes under President
Clinton. As in the case of the three votes under Bush, Union Strength is not
statistically signicant in any of the regression. Of the other two constituency
variables, Farm Employment consistently has the correct sign, but it is not
statistically signicant in the two votes in 1997 and 1998. Also, when party
and ideology are controlled for, it loses statistical signicance in the 1995 vote
and the 1999 vote. Even though Farm Employment does not perform as well
as it did in the three votes under Bush, the ndings nonetheless indicate that
members of Congress were generally opposed to any bill that would aect
access to China, a leading market for American agricultural products. To be
exact, on average, one standard deviation increase in Farm Employment is
associated with a decrease of about 0.07 in the probability of voting for MFN
revocation. Retail/Wholesale Employment performs rather poorly, as it
reaches statistical signicance only in Model 2 of the 1998 vote.
Party is statistically signicant in the 1993 vote and has the correct sign.
That is, being a member of the presidents party decreases the probability of
casting a yea note (hence a vote against Clintons position) by a solid 0.137.
Recall that under President Bush, being a Democratic actually increased the
likelihood of casting such a vote. That House Democrats voted dierently on
the same issue under Bush and Clinton is a strong indication that they used
MFN renewal as a political issue to beat Bush. Once Bush was out of oce
and a president of the same party was elected, Democrats immediately
changed their votes so as not to embarrass their own president who was
opposed to MFN revocation.
Nevertheless, Democratic loyalty to their president did not extend beyond
1993, as party does not have any signicant impact on the three votes in 1994,
1995, and 1996. Furthermore, in 1997 and 1999, House Democrats were actu-
ally more likely to vote against their president than Republicans, controlling
for other factors. To be exact, being a Democrat increases the probability of
Table 6.4 Logit analysis of House votes to disapprove of Chinas MFN under President Clinton
Independent 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

variables
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Union strength .008 .005 .009 .013 .026 .028 .000 .000 .011 .014 .010 .013 .010 .016
(.014) (.014) (.016) (.017) (.014) (.015) (.013) (.014) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.013) (.012) (.013)
Farm employment .185** .218** .180* .172* .133* .109 .143* .118* .080 .083 .085 .091 .098* .096
(.064) (.069) (.080) (.082) (.063) (.064) (.058) (.059) (.047) (.050) (.049) (.052) (.049) (.050)
Retail and .010 .040 .017 .026 .035 .023 .078 .057 .063 .083 .076 .010* .058 .077
wholesale (.041) (.045) (.049) (.051) (.044) (.043) (.044) (.043) (.041) (.044) (.043) (.046) (.042) (.045)
Democrat .681** .365 .352 .429 .503* .468* .836**
(.231) (.273) (.248) (.227) (.210) (.213) (.220)
Absolute DW score 1.322 1.994* 3.745** 3.364** 3.462** 3.640** 4.189**
(.704) (.838) (.775) (.720) (.713) (.722) (.732)
Log likelihood 247.78 240.641 .195.69 189.65 236.40 221.88 264.08 249.91 288.28 272.85 282.78 266.52 284.75 260.69
Pseudo R2 .002 .045 .018 .040 .018 .073 .025 .073 .011 .061 .014 .068 .013 .094
N 423 422 431 430 428 427 427 426 432 431 430 429 430 429
Table 6.5 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes under Clinton)
Independent 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength
Farm .087 .101 .059 .054 .058 .073 .059 .055
employment
Retail and .063
wholesale
Democrat .137 .120 .109 .195
Absolute DW .043 .106 .115 .126 .130 .154
score

casting a yea vote by 0.120, 0.109, and 0.195 respectively for the three years.
Accusations of illegal Chinese campaign donations in the 1996 presidential
election, Clintons alleged relaxing of satellite export license in exchange for
Chinese donations, and investigations of alleged Chinese thefts of U.S.
nuclear secrets, among other things, were probably responsible for the posi-
tive sign that party has in the three votes between 1997 and 1999. Even
though Republicans initiated these allegations and investigations, they prob-
ably had converted many Democrats into opponents of Clintons engage-
ment policy, for which unconditional MFN was the foundation.
Finally, Absolute DW Score is consistently signicant and has the correct
sign in all but one vote. Clintons executive order linking MFN and human
rights probably reduced the incentives for the ideological wings of both par-
ties to form a coalition on the 1993 vote. After Clinton repealed the executive
order in 1994 and became a supporter of unconditional MFN, the ideological
wings banded together again. As a result, increase in Absolute DW score is
associated with increased probability of supporting MFN revocation in all
votes but the 1993 vote.
What is most striking is that the eects of Absolute DW Score were on a
steady rise during this seven-year period, from a marginal 0.043 in 1994 to a
solid 0.154 in 1999. In other words, the strength of what Nokken (2003)
called EATM voting (i.e., the ideological ends against the middle) actually
increased over time. Recall that in the 2000 vote on HR 4444 that removed
China from annual review of MFN and granted it permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR), Absolute DW Score has a negative sign. If it increases
by one standard deviation increase, the probability of voting for PNTR
decreases by 0.126 (see Table 4.4, Model 2). It seems that the strength of
EATM voting slightly decreased between the 1999 vote on MFN renewal and
the 2000 vote on PNTR.
This nding of decreasing EATM appears to support Nokkens (2003)
argument that rules and procedures aect legislative behavior. Because of the
special rules governing MFN renewal, policy outcome (i.e., MFN renewal)
became certain. Consequently, legislators treated these votes as opportunities
to garner position-taking points with voters at home, which in turn led to
strong EATM voting. Once these special rules were removed in the PNTR
vote, policy outcome became uncertain and legislators were more likely to
vote sincerely than to stake positions, hence decreased EATM voting.
On the other hand, increasing EATM voting between 1994 and 1999 also
seems to support my contention that the source of this seemingly strange
ideological coalition lies in the peculiar nature of China policy, not in the
dierent rules governing the two types of votes. Over the years, Chinas
human rights problems, its rapidly growing economic and military power and
hence the potential threat to U.S. interests in Asia (e.g., Taiwan), the soaring
U.S. trade decit with China, and Beijings alleged proliferation of missile
technology have provided increasing ammunition to critics from both ends of
the ideological spectrum.
Discussion
Since the early 1970s, a central question facing U.S. policy-makers has been
how to balance human rights with other foreign policy goals. As Richard
Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State under Bush senior, pointed out, U.S.
foreign policy has been an eort to balance the competing demands of hard-
nosed national interests and our national values, aspirations and ideals (U.S.
Congress 1990: 225). Don Bonker (D-WA), former chairman of the House
International Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations,
commented, I really nd it very frustrating in trying to implement the
human rights policy in view of its fundamental conict with our other
national security and foreign policy values (ibid.: 30). Bill Clinton aptly
summarized this challenge in China policy: I believe the question, therefore,
is not whether we continue to support human rights in China, but how we can
best support human rights in China and advance our other very signicant
issues and interests (quoted in Lampton 1994: 603).
In the struggle to promote human right and simultaneously advance other
foreign policy goals, the U.S. has been accused of adopting a double stand-
ard. The case of China aptly illustrates the double standard. During the latter
part of the Cold War, because of the U.S.China strategic alliance against the
former Soviet Union, the U.S. largely exempted China from the otherwise
strict human rights standards applied to the Soviet bloc. In the aftermath of
Tiananmen and after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. did not push hard for
human rights progress in China either, partly because of the latters economic
importance. This is what Neier (1996) called the new double standard, as
opposed to the old double standard in the Cold War. In the clash between
economic interests and human rights, the former usually prevailed, prompt-
ing some critics to assert that U.S. China policy has reached the point . . .
where the most ardent defenders of Chinese communism are U.S. capitalists
(U.S. Congress 1997c: 148).
Yet due to the electoral connection, it is utterly unrealistic to expect many
members of Congress to sacrice constituency economic interests on the
altar of human rights. Indeed, my analysis of the ten votes on joint resolu-
tions to disapprove of MFN produced evidence that many members voted
against MFN revocation partly because of constituency inuence, particu-
larly inuence from farmers, retailers, and wholesalers. This should not come
as a surprise, because China has been a leading destination for American
agricultural products and the major source of cheap products for American
retailers and wholesalers.
However, had Congress indeed revoked Chinas MFN, it would have faced
another dilemma, that is, it would have no leverage to extract human rights
concessions from China. On the other hand, if Congress has the leverage but
never uses it, then it is not leverage any more. Thus Congress is caught in a
Catch-22 situation. As Holly Burkhalter of Asia Watch noted, Unless the
Congress really means it and has the votes then to deprive China of MFN
and accept all of those consequences at such as they [sic]were not to have
met your conditions, then it is a blu (U.S. Congress 1990: 106). Beijing
didnt have a chance to call Congresss blu because Congress never passed a
law conditioning MFN on human rights, but it did call Clintons blu in
1994, and Clinton retreated from his 1993 executive order linking MFN with
human rights.
There is one more problem with Congresss linkage policy. Even if the U.S.
is prepared for the economic consequences of trade sanctions against China,
the sanctions themselves, in order to be eective, have to be almost uni-
versally enforced. Otherwise, as Dittmer (2001: 433434) pointed out, the
sacrices endured by the enforcer become prots to be enjoyed by nonobserv-
ers of the sanctions (free riders, who may endorse sanctions rhetorically),
while the deviant suers only the minor inconvenience of shifting trade part-
ners. Steve Solarz (D-NY) admitted, The prospect of any other country
joining us are probably somewhere between nil and negligible (U.S. Con-
gress 1990: 120). Winston Lord agreed: One of our biggest problems in
China is that our friends in Europe and Japan hold our coats while we take on
the Chinese and they gobble up the contracts (U.S. Congress 1997c: 64).
Indeed, fully aware of the non-enforceability of U.S. trade sanction, China
has not hesitated to use market access and purchase orders to play one coun-
try o against another. For example, China has manipulated the competition
between Airbus and Boeing to its advantage, attempting to silence European
and American critics. China has been able to turn the tables: It now uses
economic pressure against those who venture to criticize hits human rights
practices, said an outraged Neier (1996: 97).
In the end, using a double-edged weapon such as trade sanctions to pro-
mote human rights has largely failed in the case of China.12 And, in 2000,
Congress ultimately decided to give up such a policy by voting to grant China
permanent normal trade relations. Dittmer summarized the lesson for U.S.
policy-makers:
Whereas realist means [trade sanctions] can be used in support of realist

ends (such as trade or, in the case of the 19951996 Taiwan Strait crisis,
security issues), the use of such means in support of idealist ends is
logically contradictory and inherently self-defeating. Paradoxically, the
free play of domestic interests makes pluralist systems perhaps least able
to enforce human rights eectively. When mutually benecial material
interests are fully engaged, only idealist means [such as moral condemna-
tion or international forums] may be employed to implement idealist
ends.
(2001: 459)
7 Beyond the case of China
Congresss approach to foreign aairs is heavily colored by local and domestic

considerations vis--vis a commitment to the national interest.
(Cecil Crabb and Pat Holt 1984: 249)
Like a vast picture thronged with gures of equal prominence and crowded
with elaborate and obtrusive details, Congress is hard to see satisfactorily and
appreciatively at a single view and from a single stand-point.
(Woodrow Wilson 2006: 57)
So far, I have presented a comprehensive analysis of Congresss China policy.

I examined not only the impact of legislative rules and procedures on policy
outcomes, but also the determinants of roll call voting on U.S.China trade
relations, U.S.Taiwan relations, and Chinas human rights. The various nd-
ings shed some important light on the dynamics underlying congressional
policy toward China.
Nevertheless, some readers may not be satised because as important as
the case of China may be, they would contend it does not suciently
illuminate congressional foreign policy-making in general. In other words,
since my study examines only the case of China, it is hard to ascertain
whether the same dynamics that help explain congressional policy-making on
China-related issues also explains congressional policy-making toward other
countries generally. Without a relevant set of comparison cases, I cannot
answer this question; instead I can only make statements about what factors
are relevant for the U.S.China case. This chapter addresses this challenge. I
analyze roll call votes on two issues involving six countries similar to China in
relevant aspects, and compare ndings from these six countries with those
ndings from China. Such a comparative analysis marks the rst step in
building a general theory of roll call voting on dierent countries.
It should be noted that scholarly research on foreign policy voting tends
to neglect country-specic legislation and instead focuses on general legisla-
tion such as GATT (e.g., Bailey and Brady 1998; Gartzke and Wrighton
1998), renewal of fast track authority (e.g., Conley 1999), and human rights
Beyond the case of China 123
(e.g., Avery and Forsythe 1979). This scholarly neglect is understandable
because regardless of how important a piece of country-specic legislation is,
the ndings may not be generalized to other countries. But with a sucient
number of cases, studying such legislation can help us go beyond country-
specic variables and identify systematic patterns in congressional policy-
making. After all, Congress routinely legislates on similar issues involving
many countries, and these countries dier from each other in many respects:
political regime, relations with the U.S., economic strength, and strategic
importance, etc. Thus it would be both theoretically and empirically desirable
to nd out whether there is systematic variation in congressional policy-
making across dierent countries on similar issues.
Selection of cases
Which cases are selected partly depends on the specic issues that I intend to
examine. I have examined roll call voting on three issues: trade, Taiwan, and
human rights. Because of the highly unusual nature of U.S.Taiwan relation-
ship, I decide not to pursue any comparative analysis of it. First, even though
the U.S. and Taiwan do not have diplomatic relations, their relationship con-
stitutes a de facto diplomatic relationship. Second, since 1949, China has
regarded Taiwan as a renegade province over which it claims sovereignty, and
this claim of sovereignty is almost universally recognized. No country or
entity in the world today has such a relationship with the U.S.
In so far as U.S.China trade is concerned, two characteristics stand out as
forming the primary criteria for case selection. First, the two countries have
extremely extensive trade relations. Second, bilateral trade is extremely unbal-
anced, as U.S. imports from China are much larger than its exports to China
(see Table 4.1). Only Canada, Mexico, and Japan are somewhat similar to
China in terms of the two characteristics. Each of the three countries has
been a top trade partner of the U.S. and each of them has been running a
huge trade surplus with the U.S. (see Table 7.1).
My analysis of Congresss human rights policy toward China focused
exclusively on congressional attempts to revoke Chinas MFN trade status.
Consequently, it is most appropriate to focus on MFN in comparative analysis.
Because the JacksonVanik Amendment applies to all Communist countries,
Congress also voted on the MFN status of many other countries like Albania
and Mongolia. Frequently Congress inserted in a general trade bill provisions
respecting MFN status for some countries. For example, the Trade and
Development Act of 2000 (HR 434) contained provisions authorizing the
president to extend MFN to Albania and Kyrgyzstan, and the Miscellaneous
Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999 (HR 435) authorized the
president to grant MFN to Mongolia by proclamation (Pregelj 2000). I
decided not to analyze votes on these general bills because it is hard to ascer-
tain whether a members vote on these bills was aected by MFN provisions
or non-MFN provisions. On a few occasions, Congress did consider
Table 7.1 Total U.S. trade and decit with Japan, Canada, and Mexico, 19852006
(billions of dollars)
Japan Canada Mexico
Year Total Balance Total Balance Total Balance
1985 91.4 46.2 116.3 21.8 32.8 5.5

1986 108.8 55.0 113.6 22.9 29.7 4.9
1987 112.8 56.3 130.9 11.3 34.9 5.7
1988 127.2 51.8 153.0 9.8 43.9 2.6
1989 138.0 49.1 166.8 9.1 52.1 2.2
1990 138.3 41.1 175.1 7.7 58.4 1.9
1991 139.6 43.4 176.2 5.9 64.4 2.1
1992 145.2 49.6 189.2 8.0 75.8 5.4
1993 155.1 59.4 211.7 10.8 81.5 1.7
1994 172.6 65.7 242.8 14.0 100.3 1.3
1995 187.8 59.1 271.6 17.1 108.4 15.8
1996 182.8 47.6 290.1 21.7 131.1 17.5
1997 187.2 56.1 319.0 15.5 157.3 14.5
1998 179.7 64.0 329.9 16.7 173.4 15.9
1999 188.3 73.4 365.3 32.1 196.6 22.8
2000 211.4 81.6 409.8 51.9 247.3 24.6
2001 183.9 69.0 379.7 52.8 232.6 30.0
2002 172.9 70.0 370.0 48.2 232.1 37.1
2003 170.0 66.0 391.5 51.7 235.5 40.6
2004 184.0 75.6 446.2 66.5 266.7 45.1
2005 193.5 82.5 502.3 78.5 290.5 49.7
2006 207.7 88.4 534.0 72.8 332.4 64.1
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
free-standing legislation targeting a particular countrys MFN status. To my

knowledge, Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam are the only three countries
whose MFN status was considered under free-standing legislation.1 Hence
they are selected for comparison with China.
Trade
Japan
While the U.S. trade decit with China dominates headlines and political
debates these days (see Chapter 4), U.S. trade decit with Japan was on the
front burner from the late 1970s through the 1980s (e.g., Cohen 1985; U.S.
Congress 1980a, 1980b, 1982, 1983b) (Figure 7.1). Then as now, the largest
component of U.S. decit with Japan involves automotive products. Table 7.2
depicts total U.S. decit with Japan in automotive trade and its share of total
U.S.world decit and U.S.Japan trade decit between 1986 and 2006. The
numbers are quite astonishing. Total U.S. automotive decit with Japan
Figure 7.1 U.S. trade decit with Japan, 19622006 (billions of dollars)
Source: 19621984, available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/; 19852006, U.S. Census Bureau,
available from www.census.gov.
averaged US$37.7 billion per year during the 21-year period, accounting for
on average 60.8 percent of total U.S. trade decit with Japan. Notice that
even though total U.S. automotive decit has increased from US$32.6 billion
in 1986 to US$56.8 billion in 2006, its share of total U.S.world decit
has undergone a sharp decline from the record-high of 47.6 percent in 1991 to
6.9 percent in 2006. The rise of China as a leading international exporter,
which replaced Japan as the largest decit-trading partner of the U.S. in 2000,
was almost certainly a major factor behind the precipitous decline of U.S.
Japan automotive decits share of total U.S.world trade decit because
Chinese automotive exports were largely negligible during this period.
Under increasing pressure from the Big Three and United Auto Workers
(UAW) union, Congress began to take a series of legislative actions to curb
auto imports from Japan. On December 15 1980, by a vote of 31757 the
House passed H.J.R. 598 authorizing the president to negotiate an agreement
limiting sales of foreign (chiey Japanese) cars and trucks in the U.S. But the
measure didnt go anywhere because the Senate did not take any action on it
(CQ Almanac 1980: 303304). Two years later, the House passed HR 5133 on
a 215188 vote. The bill would have set domestic content ratios for foreign
automakers based on their sales in the U.S. For example, Toyota and Nissan
would have been required to have 7075 percent domestic content in their
cars by 1985 (CQ Almanac 1982: 5556). The following year, the House
passed a similar bill (HR 1234) by a vote of 219199. The bill would have set
Table 7.2 U.S.Japan trade and automotive decit, 19862006 (billions of dollars)
Year Total U.S. Total U.S. U.S.Japan Share of total Share of

World trade Japan trade automotive U.S.World U.S.Japan
decit decit decit decit (%) decit (%)
1986 138.2 58.6 32.6 23.60 55.60

1987 152.1 59.8 33.3 21.90 55.70
1988 118.7 51.8 32 26.90 61.70
1989 109.4 49.1 32.4 29.60 66.00
1990 101.7 41.1 30.8 30.30 75.00
1991 66.7 43.4 31.8 47.60 73.20
1992 84.5 49.6 31.2 37.00 63.00
1993 115.6 59.4 33.4 28.90 56.30
1994 150.6 65.7 36.8 24.40 56.00
1995 158.8 59.1 32.9 20.70 55.60
1996 170.2 47.6 29.6 17.40 62.20
1997 180.5 56.1 31.5 17.40 56.10
1998 229.8 64.1 33.8 14.70 52.80
1999 330 73.9 39.9 12.10 54.00
2000 434.3 81.3 44.2 10.20 54.30
2001 411.4 69 42 10.20 61.00
2002 468.3 70 46.2 9.90 66.10
2003 532.4 66 43.9 8.20 66.50
2004 650.8 75.2 46.4 7.10 61.70
2005 766.8 82.5 50.2 6.50 60.80
2006 818.1 88.4 56.8 6.90 64.20
Source: Oce of Aerospace and Automotive Industries, U.S. Department of Commerce.
a maximum of 90 percent domestic content on companies selling more than

900,000 autos in 1987 and beyond. The House approved the bill despite an
announcement by the Japanese that they would voluntarily restrict U.S.
exports to 1.85 million cars for the year beginning in April 1984 (CQ
Almanac 1983: 257259).
Canada
Canada has been the largest trading partner of the U.S. for at least two
decades. Yet unlike Japan, the U.S. trade decit with Canada has generally
been much smaller. The annual U.S. trade decit with Japan in 19852006
was on average 3.35 times larger than its decit with Canada. For the seven
years between 1987 and 1993, the average ratio was as high as 5.72. Because
of the much smaller decit, U.S.Canada trade has rarely generated as much
controversy as U.S. trade with China or Japan. When Congress voted on
U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988, for example, there was little
objection in either chamber. The bill passed 36640 in the House and 839 in
the Senate.
One of the rare occasions on which Congress debated U.S.Canada trade
involved the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 (HR 9042) that was
designed to implement an agreement signed by President Lyndon Johnson
and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson on January 16 1965. The
agreement called for the removal of U.S. and Canadian tari duties on cars
and car parts. As a corollary of the agreement, U.S. car manufacturers promi-
sed to increase their production in Canada, which in turn promised to elimi-
nate its taris on U.S. cars. The bill had the support of U.S. automakers and
the UAW, but was opposed by many independent parts manufacturers who
argued that that the bill would encourage U.S. automakers to shift produc-
tionhence jobsto Canada. Despite a heated debate in both chambers,
particularly in the Senate, the bill won House approval on June 21 by a
vote of 280113, and it passed the Senate on September 27 by a 5418 vote
(CQ Almanac 1965: 509512).
Mexico
Before the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into eect
in 1994, U.S.Mexico trade was signicantly smaller than U.S. trade with
Canada or Japan. Between 1985 and 1993, total U.S.Mexico trade was on
average about one-third of U.S. trade with Canada and half of U.S.Japan
trade. The U.S. trade decit with Mexico was even smaller, averaging about
one-fourth of its decit with Canada and one-sixteenth of its decit with
Japan between 1985 and 1990. For the three years between 1991 and 1994, the
U.S. actually ran a small surplus with Mexico. Since 1995, the U.S. has been
running a growing decit with Mexico, which appears to be catching up with
its decit with Canada and Japan.
Because of the much smaller volume of U.S. trade and decit with Mexico
prior to NAFTA, Congress did not act on any trade measure concerning that
country. But the enactment of NAFTA put Mexico on the front burner.
Because the U.S. had already signed a free trade agreement with Canada in
1988, the whole controversy surrounding NAFTA focused primarily on U.S.
trade with Mexico and only secondarily on U.S.Canada trade. Labor groups
were most vocal and persistent in their opposition to NAFTA because they
feared the inux of cheap Mexican products, coupled with probable reloca-
tion of many American companies to Mexico to take advantage of cheap
Mexican labor, would displace thousands of American jobs. While it is
beyond the scope of this chapter to detail the legislative battle about
NAFTA, suce it to say that it was one of the most controversial debates
about Americas trade policy in the twentieth century. In the end, Congress
narrowly approved the trade agreement (i.e., HR 3450) on November 18
1993. The vote was 234200 in the House and 6138 in the Senate.
Human rights
Romania
MFN status was rst granted to Romania in 1975 and had been renewed by
the president without congressional objection until 1979. In that year, the
House voted on a resolution (H.Res.317) to disapprove of it. Representative
Richard Schulze (R-PA), sponsor of the resolution, accused Romania of
repeatedly violating the requirements of the JacksonVanik Amendment by
abusing the Hungarian minority within its borders, running labor camps for
political dissidents and religious activists, restricting emigration to Israel, and
erecting new barriers to emigration. Opponents of the resolution, on the
other hand, argued that MFN had brought about more emigration and that
continuing MFN would encourage Romania to be more independent from
the former Soviet Union. The full House rejected the resolution on July 25 by
a 126271 vote (CQ Almanac 1979: 161).
The House voted twice more on Romanias MFN status.2 In 1986, Philip
Crane (R-IL) introduced H.Res.475 opposing President Reagans decision to
continue MFN for Romania, but the resolution was not reported out of Ways
and Means. Crane led a motion to discharge it from Ways and Means, but a
motion by Sam Gibbons (D-FL) to table Cranes discharge motion passed on
a 216190 vote, thus killing Cranes attempt to overturn Reagans decision.
Crane and others opposed MFN renewal on the ground that Romania was
guilty of human rights violations, including restrictive emigration practices
(CQ Almanac 1986: 350351). In 1987, Frank Wolf (R-WV) introduced
an amendment to the Omnibus Trade Bill (HR 3) to deny MFN status to
Romania for six months and to require a review of Romanias compliance
with the JacksonVanik Amendment every six months. The amendment was
adopted 232183 (CQ Almanac 1987: 642).
Hungary
Congress voted twice on Hungarys MFN status in 1989. In response to
President George H.W. Bushs decision to extend MFN status to Hungary for
ve years, Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) led a motion to approve the presidents
decision under suspension of rules. His motion was defeated on June 27 by a
242172 vote (a two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required
for passage under suspension of rules). In the end, by a 221169 vote the
House passed HR 1594 granting three years of MFN to Hungary (CQ
Almanac 1989: 40-H, 74-H).
Vietnam
The U.S. did not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam until 1995. Three
years later, President Clinton issued an executive order extending MFN
status to Vietnam (U.S. Congress 2001a). Congress rst acted on Vietnams
MFN status in 1999, when the House failed by a 130297 vote to pass
H.J.R.58 to disapprove of Clintons decision to renew it. In 2000, the lower
chamber again failed to pass a similar resolution (H.J.R.99) by a vote of
91331. In 2006, the House failed by a 228161 vote to passunder suspen-
sion of rulesHR 5602 to authorize one more year of MFN for Vietnam.
Theoretical expectations
Without theoretical guidance, comparing China with six countries on two
distinct issues could be a confusing process full of ad hoc explanations.
Instead, I seek a clearly dened analytical approach that can facilitate sys-
tematic explanations with broad applicability. In this section, I propose three
broad theoretical expectations that will guide my analysis.
Hypothesis 1: Constituency interests will generally have a bigger impact

on trade votes involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico than on those
involving China, because the former are democratic countries and allies
of the U.S.
Even though Japan, Canada, and Mexico are quite similar to China in terms
of their extensive economic ties with the U.S., they dier from China in two
key aspects, that is, they are all democratic countries as well as allies of the
U.S. As a result, congressional debates about trade with these countries are
expected to focus almost exclusively on the economic dimension, particularly
the potential gain or loss of American jobs resulting from trade with these
countries. China, by contrast, is an authoritarian regime under Communist
control. The Tiananmen Incident, which is arguably the single most import-
ant event in bilateral relations since Nixons 1972 visit, has reinforced
antipathy toward China among many members of Congress. Besides, China
is not an ally of the U.S. Rather, due to its rising economic and military
power, China is widely perceived to be a potential threat to the U.S. Con-
sequently, anti-Communism, human rights, and strategic concerns are all
likely to aect voting on trade with China, which in turn may dampen the
potential impact of constituency interests.
Hypothesis 2: In roll call voting on granting MFN status to Hungary,

Romania, and Vietnam, constituency interests should have smaller
impact, compared with roll call voting on the extension of MFN to
China, because the former are not economic powers and do not have
extensive economic relations with the U.S.
Like China, Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam used to be or still are under
Communist rule. Yet unlike China, none of them isor has ever beenan
economic power, nor does any one of them have as extensive economic
relations with the U.S. as China does. This helps explain why MFN renewal
for these three countries never caused much stir on Capitol Hill. Table 7.3
shows total trade and decit between the three countries and the U.S. In 2006,
U.S. trade with Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam totaled US$3.8 billion,
US$1.7 billion, and US$9.7 billion respectively, and the U.S. decit with them
was US$1.4 billion, US$.57 billion, and US$7.5 billion respectively. By con-
trast, the U.S. trade decit with China stood at US$232 billion in 2006. In
terms of trade relations with the U.S., these countries are dwarfs compared to
the China giant. Because constituency economic interests in U.S. relations
with these three countries are quite small, they are not expected to have much
impact on roll call voting.
Hypothesis 3: The ideological ends will not form a coalition against mod-
erates in votes involving the six countries. In other words, the absolute
value of DW score will not be a signicant predictor of roll call votes.
Japan, Canada, and Mexico are all democratic countries and U.S. allies. Thus
the ideological factors of human rights, anti-Communism, and strategic
Table 7.3 Total U.S. trade and decit with Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam (millions
of dollars)
Hungary Romania Vietnam
Year Total Balance Total Balance Total Balance
1985 312.8 123.8

1986 323.2 127
1987 374.1 183.7
1988 369.1 216.9
1989 449.8 206.6
1990 504 191.2
1991 623.3 110.7
1992 642 52 335.7 160.9 4.6 4.6
1993 835.3 34.3 392.7 254.3 7 7
1994 779.5 161.3 534.3 144.9 223.4 122.4
1995 842.2 251.8 475.5 30.9 451.3 53.3
1996 1006.8 345.2 514.2 17 948.4 284.8
1997 1564.2 593.6 657.8 141.8 675.1 101.7
1998 2049.2 1084 729.9 56.5 828 280.2
1999 2396.6 1388.6 618.5 266.3 899.9 316.9
2000 3284.4 2145.8 705.5 239.9 1188.8 453.8
2001 3650.2 2279 894.2 145.6 1513.6 592.8
2002 3325.5 1949.5 943.4 447 2974.8 1814.8
2003 3634 1767.4 1097.1 363.3 5878.6 3231
2004 3715.2 1430 1378.4 327.6 6439.6 4111
2005 3584.5 1537.9 1816.5 598.7 7824.4 5438
2006 3769.3 1392.9 1669 568.8 9666.5 7466.1
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.

concerns, which are so important with China, are expected to be largely
absent from a members calculus when he or she votes on U.S. trade relations
with these three countries. When it comes to Hungary, Romania, and Viet-
nam, none of them was or is a geopolitical power, nor has any one of them
had close economic ties with the U.S. Consequently, strategic concerns and
economic considerations are expected to have little impact on members votes
on MFN extension to these countries. Instead, only ideological and human
rights concerns are expected to impact members votes. In a word, congres-
sional voting on these six countries is expected to focus primarily on one
dimensionjobs in the case of trade and anti-Communism (or human
rights) in the case of MFN extension. In a one-dimensional world, liberals
and conservatives are not expected to be bedfellows.
China, by contrast, has a laundry list of issues that attract criticism from
both ends of the ideological spectrum. Its poor human rights record and
environmental problems have energized hard-core liberals, while its one-child
policy and restrictions on religious freedom have been a constant source of
complaints among conservatives. Meanwhile, the soaring trade decit has
made China a primary target for some liberals with close ties with labor
unions, and its growing military capabilities have unsettled many conserva-
tives. Thus liberals and conservatives have many reasons to unite on issues
involving China.
Table 7.4 lists the House votes that will be used to test the three hypotheses.
All these votes were mentioned earlier in my brief discussion of each case. Here
I explain why some votes were excluded. Congress voted on the U.S.Canada
Free Trade Agreement in 1988, but that vote was too lopsided (36640) to be
suitable for statistical analysis. For the same reason, I exclude the 2000 vote
on H.J.R.99 to disapprove of MFN for Vietnam (91331). I exclude the 1986
vote on Gibbons motion to table Cranes motion to discharge from the Ways
and Means H.Res.475, because discharge motions as parliamentary tactics
are routinely defeated. Of the two votes on Hungarys MFN status, the rst
vote was on Rostenkowskis motion to pass HR 1594 (which granted ve
years of MFN) under suspension of rules and the second vote was on passage
of the nal version of HR 1594 that granted only three years of MFN. I
select the second vote on passage of the nal version of the bill.
As in the previous three chapters, I run two logit regressions for each vote.
The rst regression has only three constituency variables: Union Strength,
Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment. The second regres-
sion includes Presidents Party and Absolute DW Score. This method allows
me to compare voting across issues and dierent countries. All the variables
are coded exactly the same way they were in the previous three chapters.
Findings
The rst thing to notice in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 is that Union Strength
performs quite well, as it is statistically signicant and in the correct direction
Table 7.4 House roll call votes on trade and MFN extension for selected countries
Year Bill Count Bill summary
Trade
Japan 1982 HR 5133 215188 Require automakers to use set percentages of U.S. labor and parts in automobiles they sell in the
United States
1983 HR 1234 219199 Require xed levels of U.S. labor and parts in automobiles sold in the U.S.; phase in domestic
content levels beginning in 1985 and reaching maximum levels in 1987
Canada 1965 HR 9042 280113 Remove tari duties on Canadian automobiles and parts for original equipment
Mexico 1993 HR 3450 234200 Approve the North American Free Trade Agreement and make the necessary changes to U.S.
statutory law to implement it
MFN
Romania 1979 H.Res.317 126271 Disapprove the presidents request to extent for 12 months a waiver of the JackonVanik
Amendment with respect to Romania
1987 HR 3 232283 Frank Wolf amendment to deny to Romania MFN status for six months and to require review of its
compliance with JacksonVanik Amendment every six months
Hungary 1989 HR 1594 221169 Approve for three years most-favored-nation status to the products of Hungary
Vietnam 1999 H.J.R.58 130297 Disapprove presidential waiver of the JacksonVanik Amendment for Vietnam
2006 HR 5602 228161 Suspend the rules and pass the bill to authorize the extension of MFN to Vietnam.
Source: CQ Almanac.
Table 7.5 Logit analysis of House roll call votes on trade with Japan, Canada, and Mexico
Independent variables Japan 1982 Japan 1983 Canada 1965 Mexico 1993
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength .054** .095** 6.707** 10.508** .008 .008 3.841** 4.258**
(.011) (.015) (1.398) (1.802) (.011) (.013) (1.263) (1.367)
Farm employment 10.599** 7.978* 25.772** 20.800** 3.816 2.241 9.431* 8.346
(3.184) (3.701) (5.021) (5.638) (2.212) (2.331) (4.675) (4.879)
Retail/wholesale 8.233 8.616 18.747** 18.128** 3.966 6.360 7.515 2.207
employment (4.691) (5.461) (5.300) (6.331) (5.371) (5.596) (4.161) (4.099)
Presidents party 2.735** 2.796** 1.121** 1.613**
(.296) (.297) (.243) (.229)
Absolute DW .538 1.104 1.119 1.348*
(.751) (.797) (.779) (.666)
Log likelihood 251.318 191.959 249.103 189.482 232.071 220.810 287.073 257.694
Pseudo R2 .097 .309 .155 .357 .008 .056 .041 .137
N 403 402 426 426 393 393 434 433
Table 7.6 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes on Japan, Canada, and
Mexico)
Independent variables Japan 1982 Japan 1983 Canada Mexico
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength .133 .232 .136 .210 .078 .086

Farm employment .103 .077 .183 .148 .055
Retail/wholesale .103 .099
employment
Presidents party .594 .601 .235 .373
Absolute DW .055
Note: Only signicant coecients are reported here.

in all but the Canada vote.3 One standard deviation increase in Union
Strength increases the probability of voting for the two bills on automobile
domestic content by 0.133 and 0.136 respectively in Model 1. Once party and
ideology are controlled for in Model 2, the magnitude of Union Strength
actually increases to 0.232 in the 1982 vote and 0.210 in the 1983 vote. A
similar increase in Union Strength decreases the probability of voting for
NAFTA by 0.078 in Model 1 and 0.086 in Model 2, controlling for other
variables. Moreover, except in one regression (Model 1 of the 1983 vote on
Japan), Union Strength has the second largest impact.
Farm Employment performs fairly well. If it increases by one standard
deviation, the probability of voting for the two domestic auto content bills
decreases by 0.103 and 0.183 respectively in Model 1. Once party and ideol-
ogy are controlled for, the impact of Farm Employment decreases slightly. A
similar increase in Farm Employment increases the probability of voting for
NAFTA by 0.055 in Model 1. Retail/Wholesale Employment does not per-
form as well as the other two constituency variables, as it is statistically sig-
nicant only in the 1983 Japan vote. One standard deviation increase leads to
a decrease of 0.103 and 0.099 respectively in Model 1 and Model 2.
All in all, constituency interests, particularly labor unions and farmers, had
considerable inuence on these four trade votes. Recall that in my analysis of
the House vote on HR 4444 that granted permanent normal trade relations
(PNTR) to China, neither Union Strength nor Retail/Wholesale Employ-
ment is statistically signicant. A comparison of these ndings seems to
support my prediction that constituency interests will generally have a bigger
impact on trade votes concerning Japan, Canada, and Mexico than on trade
votes involving China.
The above ndings about Union Strength also call into question my ori-
ginal explanation about why it is not statistically signicant in the vote on HR
4444. I suggested that state-level data might be responsible for the statistical
insignicance of this variable. Now it seems that it is not so much state-level
data as the nature of U.S. relations with a particular country that aects the
performance of this variable. Members of Congress may focus mostly on
economic issues when they vote on trade legislation involving countries that
are U.S. allies and democratic countries, hence the much better performance
of Union Strength, a variable that captures constituency interests in foreign
trade. If a country is not an ally of the U.S. or a democratic one, then other
considerations like human rights, national security, and ideology (e.g., anti-
Communism) may also inuence voting decisions and hence dampen the
eects of Union Strength.
One is tempted to argue that the varying intensity of labor opposition to
U.S. trade with these countries also aects the performance of Union
Strength. In other words, it is possible that labor unions were especially
opposed to Japanese auto imports and NAFTA, but not to trade with China.
This argument on its surface seems plausible, but a close examination
of congressional documents, journalistic accounts, and scholarly research
strongly indicates that it cannot hold water. As I described in some detail in
Chapter 4, labor unions were vehemently opposed to PNTR and launched
massive campaigns to defeat HR 4444. In the case of Japan, the United Auto
Workers (UAW) union played a critical role in drafting and passing the two
bills. In 1982, lobbyists for the UAW lined the halls outside the House
chamber throughout the debate. The bills passage could be attributed
almost solely to the UAW, which had pushed tirelessly for the measure since
1981 (CQ Almanac 1982: 56). The 1983 bill was again a creation of the
UAW, which lobbied heavily for its passage (CQ Almanac 1983: 258). Due to
the constraint of space, I will not document labor opposition to NAFTA, but
suce it to say that labor unions were as muchif not moreopposed to
NAFTA as to PNTR for China (e.g., Balz and Cooper 1993; Conley 1999;
Engel and Jackson 1998; Mintz 1993; Vaillancourt 1993; Wink et al. 1996;
U.S. Congress 1993). Thus the evidence does not appear to support the con-
tention that the impact of Union Strength varies by the intensity of labor
opposition to a particular trade bill.
Presidents Party is statistically signicant in each of the four trade votes.
Besides, it has the correct sign in all but one vote (the NAFTA vote). To be
exact, being a Republican decreases the probability of voting for the two auto
domestic content bills by 0.594 and 0.601 respectively, controlling for other
factors. Given President Reagans opposition to the two bills and the general
tendency to support free trade among Republicans, the remarkable impact of
party does not seem surprising. Similarly, being a Democrat increases the
likelihood of voting for the 1965 trade agreement by a solid 0.235. However,
being a Democrat actually decreases the probability of voting for NAFTA by
an impressive 0.372. Recall that in the case of China, being a Democrat is
also negatively associated with support for PNTR. And these ndings about
party hold true even when Union Strength is controlled for. Thus Democrats
appear to be generally much less supportive of free trade than Republicans.
Finally, except for the NAFTA vote, Absolute DW Score is not statistically
signicant. This nding is highly consistent with my expectation that the
ideological ends will not form a coalition on trade issues involving these
countries. Still, the nding about NAFTA is puzzling. Why did the ideo-
logical ends unite on this particular vote? A paragraph from the CQ Almanac
seems to provide the answer.
The issue [NAFTA] scrambled political alliances in ways rarely seen.

Perot joined with conservative Republican Pat Buchanan and liberal cru-
sader Ralph Nader in opposing the agreement. Organized labor and
some environmental groups, which rarely agreed on anything, opposed it
as well. Farmers in the Midwest were avidly for it, but growers in Florida,
California and North Dakota were against it.
(CQ Almanac 1993: 172)
Even though only outside forces involved in the NAFTA debate are depicted
in the paragraph, it is reasonable to surmise, on the basis of the electoral
connection, that similar alliances probably also existed within Congress,
which in turn helps explain why Absolute DW Score is statistically signicant
and has a negative sign.
It should be pointed out that the conguration of political forces in the
NAFTA battle is quite similar to that in the legislative battle over Chinas
PNTR. This similarity raises a question: Should Mexico be viewed dier-
ently from Japan and Canada and, if so, on what ground? One might argue
that Mexico has more in common with China than with Japan or Canada
because both Mexico and China are developing countries that have many
problems with environmental protection and labor standards. On the other
hand, one might argue, as I did, that Mexico is quite dierent from China
because it is a democratic country and a U.S. ally. Consequently, many issues
(e.g., human rights and strategic concerns) that can potentially aect con-
gressional policy-making toward China may not aect congressional policy-
making toward Mexico. One way to answer this question is to examine roll
call voting on U.S. trade with developing countries and compare it with roll
call voting on trade with industrialized countries. If the absolute value of
DW score has a statistically signicant impact and a negative sign in the
former but not in the latter, then Mexico should perhaps be viewed as similar
to China.
The results for the ve votes on MFN extension are presented in Table 7.7
and Table 7.8. Neither Farm Employment nor Retail/Wholesale Employment
is statistically signicant in any of the regressions. Yet in the case of Chinas
MFN status, Farm Employment reaches statistical signicance and has the
correct sign in eight out of ten votes, and Retail/Wholesale Employment in
four votes (see Table 6.2 through Table 6.5). Union Strength is not statistic-
ally signicant in any of the ten votes on Chinas MFN, but it is in the 1987
Romania vote and the 1989 Hungary vote. On balance, then, the ndings
provide some support for my prediction that constituency variables will gen-
erally have smaller impact on MFN votes involving these three countries.
Though I did not expect a coalition of ideological ends against the middle
(i.e., EATM) to emerge on any of these votes, it actually appeared on three of
them. If Absolute DW Score increases by one standard deviation, the prob-
ability of supporting temporary suspension of Romanias MFN status (i.e.,
the Wolf Amendment) actually decreases by 0.071. My explanation for this
puzzling nding is that the ideological ends might have voted strategically on
this vote. That is, they might have voted against the Wolf Amendment in
order to propose a bill or amendment that would either permanently suspend
Romanias MFN or attach conditions to its renewal. The other puzzling
nding concerns the two votes on Vietnams MFN status. While Absolute
DW Score does not have any signicant impact on the 1999 vote, it does on
the 2006 vote.
Increase in Absolute DW Score is actually positively associated with sup-
port for a three-year extension of MFN status to Hungary. Because the bill
Table 7.7 Logit analysis of House votes on extension of MFN to Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam
Independent variables Romania 1979 Romania 1987 Hungary 1989 Vietnam 1999 Vietnam 2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength .576 .760 4.928** 6.239** 2.489 4.198* 1.149 .006 .008 .016
(1.163) (1.417) (1.295) (1.485) (1.311) (1.626) (1.321) (1.415) (.013) (.014)
Farm employment 4.916 1.778 4.826 2.387 6.310 1.463 3.646 8.130 .070 .064
(2.679) (3.262) (3.698) (4.038) (3.713) (4.365) (4.832) (5.529) (.052) (.054)
Retail/wholesale 8.436 6.222 4.511 2.196 5.589 4.946 2.777 2.117 .023 .032
employment (4.903) (5.853) (4.676) (5.248) (4.770) (5.876) (3.957) (4.274) (.039) (.040)
Presidents party 2.588** 1.943** 2.682** 1.415** 1.037**
(.265) (.251) (.273) (.249) (.234)
DW Absolute 1.286 1.763* 1.946* 1.324 2.078**
(.789) (.709) (.777) (.731) (.669)
Log likelihood 244.806 186.618 274.273 237.727 262.369 199.902 261.897 238.842 262.711 249.838
Pseudo R2 .013 .248 .039 .167 .020 .253 .003 .087 .004 .050
N 397 397 416 416 391 391 428 427 389 388
Table 7.8 Increases in probabilities associated with one standard deviation increase in independent variables (votes on MFN extension to
Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam)
Independent variables Romania 1979 Romania 1987 Hungary 1989 Vietnam 1999 Vietnam 2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Union strength .099 .125 .083

Farm employment
Retail/wholesale
employment
Presidents party .527 .432 .584 .277 .246
DW Absolute .071 .079 .086
Notes: Only signicant coecients are reported here.

granted only three yearsas opposed to ve years requested by President
Bushof MFN status to Hungary, a yea vote in this particular case can be
viewed as a vote against MFN extension. Taken together, my ndings about
Absolute DW Score in the ve votes appear to provide rather weak support
for my expectation that it will not have any signicant impact on MFN votes
involving these countries.
Party is consistently signicant and has the largest impact in all ve votes.
Moreover, except for one vote (the 1987 vote on Romania), members of the
presidents party are more likely to support their presidents position on
MFN extension. Being a Democrat decreases the probability of voting for
H.Res.317 (rst Romania vote) and H.J.R.58 (Vietnam) by 0.527 and 0.277
respectively. Being a Republican decreases the probability by 0.584 on the
Hungary vote but increases the probability by 0.217 on the 2006 Vietnam
vote. As discussed shortly before, President George H. W. Bush originally
asked for ve years of MFN extension for Hungary, but the nal version of
HR 1594 granted only three years. Hence many Republicans may have voted
against the nal version of the bill out of loyalty to their president.
In the second Romania vote (i.e., Wolf Amendment), however, being a
Republican is actually positively associated with support for suspension of
that countrys MFN status for six months. Many Republicans decided to
oppose Reagan on this vote because of continuing human rights violations in
Romania. That the amendment was introduced by a Republican (Frank
Wolf) speaks much about the prevailing sentiment among some Republicans.
In fact, another Republican, Philip Crane, tried in vain in 1986 to reverse
Reagans decision to renew MFN status for Romania (CQ Almanac 1986:
350351).
By contrast, party has signicant impact on seven of the ten China votes.
Besides, members of the presidents party were actually more likely to vote
against the presidents position on MFN in three China votes. Furthermore,
only in the three years under Bush and the two years under Clinton (1993 and
1999) did party have the largest impact. However, the impact of party on
these China votes is generally much smaller. Only in two China votes did the
magnitude of party surpass 0.200 (in terms of probabilities), whereas the
magnitude of party was bigger than 0.200 in all the ve votes involving
Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam. This comparison strongly suggests that
party loyalty was stronger on MFN votes involving these three countries than
on MFN votes involving China.
To sum up, whereas the ideological ends were almost always united against
the ideological middle when it comes to China, this coalition appeared less
frequently in so far as the other six countries are concerned. Furthermore,
constituency variables, particularly Union Strength, performed better in
trade votes involving Japan, Canada, and Mexico than in those involving
China. Finally, when it comes to extension of MFN, constituency variables
with the exception of Union Strengthoften had much bigger impact on
China votes than on votes involving Hungary, Romania, and Vietnam. Even
though these ndings provide only mixed support for my expectations, they
nonetheless point to several key elements to be considered in a general theory
of congressional policy-making.
The rst is the nature of political regime of a particular country. Being one
of the oldest democracies in the world and having been arguably the most
consistent and powerful promoter of democracy, the U.S. has always had a
natural anity with democratic countries, but often animosity toward non-
democratic ones. Congress, in particular, has often been regarded as the
guardian of values-based U.S. foreign policy. Thus when members of Con-
gress vote on trade legislation involving democratic countries (which often
turn out to be U.S. allies), they are expected to focus almost exclusively on
economic issues (e.g., jobs). By contrast, when a piece of trade legislation
targets a non-democratic country, particularly if it is a Communist one like
China, additional considerations like human rights and anti-Communism
may enter into their voting decisions. Consequently, the impact of constitu-
ency variables may be dampened in the latter case.
The second element is closely related to the rst. When a single issue-
dimension (economic or otherwise) dominates voting decisions, liberals and
conservatives are expected to vote in opposite ways, as predicted by the
conventional model of spatial voting. However, as the number of issues
increases, as in the case of China, the opportunities for liberals and conserva-
tives to form a coalition against the middle also increase. The former may
oppose trade with a foreign country on the ground of human rights or
environmental concerns, and the latter on the ground of anti-Communism or
national security. In a word, it seems that an increase in the number of issues
in U.S. relations with a particular country will tend to increase the probability
and intensity of what Nokken (2003) called EATM voting.
Finally, the nature and number of issues involved in U.S. relations with
another country can also aect the impact of party. Out of electoral con-
siderations, members of the presidents party generally tend to be more sup-
portive of his policy agenda than members of the opposition party, other
things being equal. However, when a piece of legislation involves signicant
constituency interests and when a presidents preferences dier signicantly
from those of their constituents, members of Congress may be tempted to
defect from their own president, as many Democrats did in the case of China.
On the other hand, in the absence of clearly dened and immediate constitu-
ency interests, as in the case of MFN extension to Hungary, Romania, and
Vietnam, members may be more likely to rally around their own president.
8 Conclusion
In every relationship between nations there is a horse and a rider, Bismarck

once noted, and one should endeavor to be the rider. American policy toward
China today almost guarantees that we will be the horse.
(Robert Kagan 1996)
Our separation of powers system, the powers that the Constitution confers on
Congress, the campaign nancing system, the existence of immigrant com-
munities, and a variety of other factors guarantee that the legislative branch
will play a role on any major foreign policy issue and a number of minor ones
as well.
(Richard Bush 2004: 220)
It is convenient when writing about Congress to treat the institution as a

monolith. Yet Congress does not speak with a single voice, for its every action
testies to the ideological, partisan, regional, and personal divisions within it.
Thus . . . it is worth remembering that any signicant foreign policy debate on
Capitol Hill features the clash of myriad ideas, interests, and perspectives.
Congress is truly a they not an it.
(James Lindsay and Randall Ripley 1993: 18, italics original)
No scholar to my knowledge has applied the new institutionalism to the

study of congressional policy-making toward China. Moreover, a few scholars
have conducted analyses of roll call voting on U.S.China relations, but the
scope and depth of these studies are rather limited. Last but not least, instead
of comparing roll call voting across dierent countries and issues, previous
studies tend to focus on what I called country-blind general legislation.
This book is an attempt to make signicant contributions to the three aspects
of research on congressional foreign policy-making.
Legislative institutions and their impact on China policy

Legislators are rational actors who have goals and preferences. Policy out-
comes depend not only on what their goals and preferences are, but also how
Conclusion 143
these goals and preferences are aggregated into policy outcomes. I adduced
ample evidence that as processes of preference aggregation, committee struc-
ture, bicameralism, and presidential veto have had profound impact on
Congresss China policy.
Because of gatekeeping rights, committees become monopoly supplier of
policy alternatives. That the vast majority of China bills died in committees
attests to the latters power to set the legislative agenda. The combination of
intense policy preferences and agenda-setting power enabled the chairmen
of a number of committees and subcommitteessuch as Craig Thomas,
Benjamin Gilman, Max Baucusto single-handedly decide the life-or-death
of China bills. Since most China bills contained punitive actions targeting
China, committees have servedat least from the perspective of those who
are interested in promoting friendly relations between the two countriesthe
positive role of reducing potential disputes, conicts, and confrontations in
bilateral relations.
Structural dierences between the two chambers guarantee that they more
often than not disagree with each. And under bicameralism, it takes only one
chamber to stall or kill a piece of legislation. In particular, the founding
fathers expected the Senate to be the counterweight to the more numerical
and presumably more activist House. In the case of China policy, far more
China bills were introduced and voted on in the House than in the Senate.
Regardless of how active the lower chamber is, legislative productivity (e.g.,
more binding legislation regarding China) will not increase unless the upper
chamber becomes equally active and simultaneously agrees with policy
proposals initiated by it.
The presidential veto poses another formidable obstacle to lawmaking.
Fearful of the concentration of all powers within one branch, the consti-
tutional framers set up a delicate system of separate branches sharing powers.
To guarantee the institutional independence of each branch, they provided
for presidential veto and congressional override. However, the supermajority
requirement for congressional override determines that the president as a
unitary actor will almost always prevail against a lawmaking body composed
of two chambers and 535 members. That President Bushs three vetoes in
China policy were all sustained illuminates the impact of supermajority
requirement on the legislative process.
It should be noted that the ndings about the impact of legislative institu-
tions are not unique to Chinaa country about which many members
of Congress have intense preferencesbut represent the general patterns
of congressional policy-making. That is, most bills are never reported out of
committees; the House is legislatively more active than the Senate; and
presidential vetoes are almost always sustained. While each of these three
legislative institutions constitutes a formidable hurdle to lawmaking, they
combine to make it extremely dicult, if not altogether impossible, for legis-
lators to transform their policy preferences (domestic or foreign) into desired
policy outcomes. This is true even in the case of China, which provides fertile
144 Conclusion
ground for legislative action due to the myriad issues like Tiananmen, human
rights, weapons proliferations, and astronomical trade decit.
The international environment and Congresss China policy

Even though the international environmentbroadly dened to include both
international balance of power at a particular moment and discrete inter-
national eventsis not the focus of this study, it apparently had decisive
impact on certain aspects of Congresss China policy. During the latter part
of the Cold War, the U.S. forged a temporary, strategic alliance with China
against the former Soviet Union. Primarily out of strategic concerns, Congress
largely exempted China from its worldwide campaign for human rights, des-
pite widespread reports of human rights violations in that country. As Kagan
(1996) put it: In such a world, the strategic value of American rapprochement
and then partnership with a Communist China seemed to outweigh the sacri-
ce of American ideals such a relationship required.
Two events fundamentally changed the strategic relationship between the
U.S. and China. The rst was the Tiananmen Incident, which plunged the
relationship into an abyss. It dashed any hope members of Congress may
have had about a politically reformed China. It also signicantly reduced the
strategic value of China to the U.S., because China now became a strategic
liability in a world characterized by increasing democratization. Above all, it
handed Congress a carte blanche to rewrite U.S. China policy, particularly
human rights policy that had heretofore been subordinated to strategic
considerations.
The second event was the demise of the former Soviet Union, which
deprived the U.S.China relationship of its strategic rationale. The collapse of
the Soviet Union and its Communist empire swept away the original founda-
tion on which the Sino-American rapprochement was built in the early
1970s, declared Kagan (1996). For members of Congress, the end of the
Cold War means that they no longer made China policy in a straitjacket and
hence could legislate on a number of issueshuman rights being the most
prominentthat were otherwise ignored during the strategic marriage.
The Cold War also aected U.S.Taiwan policy. From the 1970s until the
1980s, when the strategic alliance with China was deemed crucial, Congress
downplayed the military, political, and historical ties between the U.S. and
Taiwan. When the U.S. decided to recognize China and to terminate its
diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, Congress did make earnest attempts to
keep U.S.Taiwan relationship intact, as evidenced by the Taiwan Relations
Act (Javits 1981; Sutter 1983; Tierney 1979). Nonetheless, it is not a dis-
tortion of history to say that Congress opposed not so much U.S. recognition
of China as the cost of recognition. And in the 1980s, Congress largely
excluded itself from Taiwan policy, raising little objection to the 1982 arms
sales communiqu.
If the U.S.China alliance against the Soviet Union necessitated setting
Conclusion 145
aside the sentimental ties between the U.S. and Taiwan, the disappearance of
the common enemy entailed readjustment of Taiwan policy. Bushs decision
to sell 150 F-16 ghter jets to Taiwan in 1992 despite Beijings vehement
opposition can be viewed as part of the readjustment. As Mann (1999: 269)
observed, It [sales of F-16] illustrated, more than any other event of the
early 1990s, how the end of the Cold War had altered the relationship
between the United States and China. Meanwhile, Taiwans transformation
from an authoritarian regime to a prosperous democracy also called for
readjustment of U.S. policy. In so far as Congress is concerned, the readjust-
ment is embodied, among other things, in the Murkowski Amendment, Lee
Teng-huis visit to Cornell, the U.S.Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Mutual
Defense Act, and the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (see Bush 2001,
2004; Mann 2001).
Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy
Partisanship
Partisanship in Congress has two dimensions. On the one hand, partisanship
means loyalty to the president of ones own party, for the president is by
default the leader of his party and his leadership extends to the legislative
arena. Party loyalty entails supporting the presidents policy agenda regardless
of ones own preferences. On the other hand, partisanship also means
electorally-induced inter-party dierences. Because of electoral competition
and historical circumstances, the two parties have developed relatively stable
and usually distinct positions on a number of issues, and these party positions
generally reect the preferences of their respective electoral bases. When
members take positions along party lines dened by electoral competition, it
can also be viewed as partisanship.
My analysis indicates that both dimensions of partisanship inuenced
Congresss China policy. The three failed attempts to override Bushs vetoes
vividly illustrate Republican loyalty to President Bush. While Democrats
overwhelmingly voted for the override, most Republicans voted against it
despite their serious misgivings about Bushs China policy (see CQWR 1990:
245; CQWR 1992: 1594; Friedman 1990; Yang 2000: 90111). In fact, many
Republicans rst voted for the three bills that Bush later vetoed. I also
reported evidence that Republicans were signicantly more likely to vote
against MFN revocation during the Bush years. Democrats rallied around
Clinton during his rst year in oce. After that, they showed little loyalty to
their president. Between 1997 and 1999, they were actually more likely to vote
against their president on the MFN issue. In 2000, they were again more
likely to vote against Clinton on the PNTR issue. On balance, then, party
loyalty appeared to be stronger among Republicans than among Democrats.
The ip side of rallying around ones president is that the majority party
has political incentives to embarrass the president of the minority party. I
146 Conclusion
reported evidence that Democrats were signicantly more likely to vote for
MFN revocation under Bush. I also found that more China bills were intro-
duced when a Republican majority in the House faced a Democratic Presi-
dent. Meanwhile, scholars who studied U.S.China relations in the late 1940s
adduced evidence that the Republican majority criticized President Trumans
China policy primarily because of partisan considerations (Grasso 1987;
Rourke 1983: 7476, 1345; Tsou 1963; Tucker 1983, 1994; Westereld 1955:
Chapter 12, Chapter 16). Thus for both Republicans and Democrats, pure
partisanship appears to have inuenced their approaches to China policy.
When members voted in 2000 on the bill to grant China PNTR, inter-party
dierence in trade policy, not loyalty to ones president, seemed to be the
decisive factor, since Democrats were actually more likely to vote against the
bill (hence against their own president) than Republicans. Yet a few years
before the PNTR vote, Democrats in both chambers were more supportive of
GATT than their Republican counterparts (Bailey and Brady 1998; Gartzke
and Wrighton 1998). The context of the PNTR vote (i.e., the last year of the
Clinton presidency) and the soaring trade decit with China help explain why
many Democrats decided to abandon their president and instead vote accord-
ing to their partys traditional stance on trade.
It is hard to distinguish the two dimensions of partisanship in roll call votes
on the two bills that aimed to strengthen U.S.Taiwan relations. On the one
hand, since the late 1940s, Republicans in general have been steadfast in
their support for Taiwan. Democrats, by contrast, have generally been more
cautious in their approach to U.S.Taiwan relations. In fact, they were highly
critical of Taiwans authoritarian regime and played an important role in
bringing about political reform on the island in the 1980s. Even though
Taiwans appeal to Democrats has increased considerably since it trans-
formed itself into a edgling democracy in the 1990s, Republicans still appear
to be more supportive of the island. On the other hand, Republicans became
extremely active in Taiwan policy after they secured majority party status in
Congress in 1994. It seems likely that Republicans used the Taiwan issue as a
political weapon to beat President Clinton.
Ideology
Because the commonly used measures of ideology (e.g., hawkishness or DW-
NOMINATE score) usually have high correlation with party, I did not
include any of them in my analysis, except in the case of Taiwan policy where
I included hawkishness. Not surprisingly, hawkishness turned out to be highly
signicant while party had no impact at all. Since most previous studies
included both party and a similar measure of ideology, this may explain why
they reported ideology to be the best predictor of foreign policy voting (e.g.,
Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay
1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
Instead, I used the absolute value of DW-NOMINATE score. My expectation
Conclusion 147
was that since both liberals and conservatives had good reasons to be critical
of China, they should be united on China policy. As expected, the ideological
ends were more likely to vote against PNTR and to support revocation of
Chinas MFN status. Whats more, the strength of this coalition steadily
increased over time on the MFN issue. I contended that Chinas growing
military and economic power, its potential threat to Taiwan, and the soaring
U.S. trade decit with China, among other factors, made both liberals and
conservatives increasingly uneasy about U.S.China relations, thence the
growing strength of the coalition.
My ndings provide further support for Nokkens (2003) thesis of EATM
voting (i.e., the ideological ends against the middle). However, Nokken
attributed EATM voting to the special rules governing MFN renewal, and he
reported decreasing EATM voting in the case of the PNTR vote where the
special rules were removed. By contrast, I argued that the peculiar nature of
U.S.China relations was responsible for the emergence of such a coalition,
and I reported evidence of increasing EATM voting between 1994 and 1999
on the MFN votes. But I did nd decreasing EATM voting between the 1999
MFN vote and the 2000 PNTR vote.
Constituency interests
Despite the strong economic ties between the U.S. and China, constituency
interests generally had only weak impact on members votes. Union Strength
had signicant impact in only one model, and Retail/Wholesale Employment
in only four of the ten MFN votes. Two constituency variables performed
rather well. Exports to China was negatively associated with support for
strong U.S.Taiwan relations but positively associated with support for
PNTR. Farm Employment was positively associated with support for PNTR
but negatively associated with support for strong U.S.Taiwan relations. In
eight out of the ten MFN votes, Farm Employment was negatively associated
with support for MFN revocation.
My ndings about Farm Employment illuminates a key challenge to
Congress in its campaign for human rights, namely, how to balance human
rights with competing interests. The record of Congresss human rights policy
clearly suggests that with few exceptions, human rights has been subordinated
to other interests (Avery and Forsythe 1979; Cohen 1987; Dittmer 2001;
Forsythe 1988; Neier 1996). Whereas during the Cold War strategic and
security concerns eectively killed most congressional initiatives in human
rights, since the end of the Cold War human rights has often been down-
played or sacriced by many members for the sake of economic benets
(Neier 1996).
Despite strong economic ties between the U.S. and Taiwan since the late
1970s and the millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars worth of annual
weapons sales to the island, neither Exports to Taiwan nor Military Awards
had any impact on members votes. It seems probable that the dominance of
148 Conclusion
strategic and ideological considerations in U.S.Taiwan relations have over-
shadowed economic ties. On the other hand, this nding is entirely consistent
with previous studies, most of which reported little or no evidence of con-
stituency inuence on defense policy (e.g., Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb
1969; Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
In order to nd out whether these ndings are unique to China or represent
a general pattern of congressional roll call voting on foreign policy, I also
analyzed roll call votes on six countries that are similar to China in relevant
respects: trade for Japan, Canada, and Mexico, and MFN extension for
Romania, Hungary, and Vietnam. A comparison of ndings from these six
countries with those from China suggests a theory of roll call voting on
dierent countries.
One component of this theory is the political regime of a particular country.
Being a democracy itself, the U.S. usually has close diplomatic, political, and
military ties with democratic countries. Consequently, when members of
Congress vote on trade legislation involving democratic countries, they tend
to focus on a single dimensioni.e., the economic impactof the pend-
ing legislation. In one-dimensional politics, liberals and conservatives are
not expected to form a coalition. By contrast, when members consider trade
legislation involving non-democratic countries like China, they are likely to
consider not only economic issues, but also ideological and/or strategic
issues. As the number of issues increases, the opportunities for liberals and
conservatives to form a coalition also increase. For a liberal may oppose the
legislation from one perspective and a conservative from another perspective.
In other words, in a multi-dimensional world the conventional model of
spatial voting may not work. And statistical ndings provide support for this
expectation. Whereas the ideological ends were almost always united in
China policy, this coalition appeared far less frequently on votes involving the
six countries.
Second, the nature of political regime may also aect the impact of con-
stituency interests. When a trade bill targets a democratic country, members
are expected to focus on economic issues. As a result, constituency interests
should be particularly salient to them. When deciding on trade legislation
involving non-democratic countries, they will likely consider not only the
economic dimension, but also the ideological and/or strategic dimension of
that legislation, and the latter may well dampen the eects of the former. I
adduced evidence that Union Strength, which is a measure of constituency
interests in foreign trade, did not have any signicant impact on the vote on
Chinas PNTR, but it had signicant impact on the two votes on U.S.Japan
trade and the vote on U.S.Mexico trade.
Finally, the magnitude of constituency interests can also aect party loyalty.
Out of electoral considerations, the presidents fellow partisans generally
tend to be more supportive of his policy agenda than members of the oppo-
sition party, other things being equal. However, when a piece of legislation
involves signicant constituency interests and when a presidents preferences
Conclusion 149
dier signicantly from those of their constituents, members of Congress
may be tempted to defect from their own president, as many Democrats did
in the case of China. On the other hand, in the absence of clearly dened and
signicant constituency interests, as in the case of MFN extension to Hungary,
Romania, and Vietnam, members may be more likely to rally around their
own president. In fact, except for the 1987 vote on Romanias MFN status,
members of the presidents party were consistently more likely to support his
position than members of the opposition party, controlling for other factors.
Yet it should be pointed out that it is impossible to control for political
regime in roll call analysis. Besides, it is very dicult to measure the number
of issues involved in a piece of legislation or in U.S. relations with another
country. Even if this is plausible, the various measures may be so highly
correlated as to make statistical inference problematic. Historical-comparative
analysis based on qualitative evidence oers one potential solution to the two
problems. Regardless, my analysis makes a small but important step in building
a theory of congressional policy-making.
Policy implications
Now what are the implications of my study for policy-makers in Beijing and
Washington? More specically, what they should and should not do with
respect to Congress in order to successfully manage and promote this import-
ant but highly controversial relationship?
Focus on the Senate

First and foremost, American and Chinese policy-makers interested in pro-
moting friendly U.S.China relations should perhaps deemphasize the House
and instead focus their eorts on the Senate. Under bicameralism, it takes
only one chamber to paralyze the legislative process. While it may seem
logical to work on the more activist House, such an endeavor is inherently
much more dicult given the size of the House. The Senate, by contrast, is
much smaller in size and hence more manageable. More importantly, because
of the important foreign policy powers granted by the Constitution (e.g.,
ambassadorial appointments and treaty ratication), the six-year tenure, and
larger constituency, Senators tend to have a broader view of U.S. foreign
policy than their House counterparts. As a result, the Senate can be a
restraining force against the more activist and parochially-oriented House.
Indeed, by refusing to act on House-passed bills, the Senate has eectively
prevented many China bills from becoming binding legislation that would
have either caused disputes in U.S.China relations or embroiled the president
and Congress in a tussle over China policy. However, as Fenno (1982: 5)
pointed out, The Senate is as likely to initiate heatedly as the House; the
House is as likely to be the cooling saucer as the Senate. Indeed, a handful of
Senators like Jesse Helms were among the most vocal critics of China and
150 Conclusion
were unusually active in China policy. Most recently, Senators Lindsey
Graham and Charles Schumer have introduced bills to impose sti tari on
Chinese imports unless the latter appreciates its allegedly undervalued cur-
rency (see Andrews 2006; Blustein 2006a, 2006b; MacLeod 2006; Magnier
and Lee 2006). But in general, senators have been much less active than the
House in China policy. Therefore, American and Chinese ocials interested
in promoting friendly bilateral relations should spend more time cultivating
good will among Senators so as to check House activism and punitivism.
Dont overreact to partisan bickering over China policy

The Chinese should recognize that electoral dynamics in a competitive two-
party system will inevitably have some impact on foreign policy. Indeed,
throughout the history of U.S.China relations both parties have used China
policy on various occasions as a partisan club to beat the other. Back in the late
1940s, the newly empowered Republican majority launched bitter criticism of
Trumans China policy in the hope of defeating him in 1948. In the aftermath
of Tiananmen, Democrats mercilessly attacked George H. W. Bushs China
policy and voted overwhelmingly to override his three vetoes.1 When Clinton
took oce, the majority of Democrats immediately switched position and
voted for unconditional MFN renewal. After Republicans became the major-
ity in 1995, they launched incessant criticism of Clintons engagement policy.
With its rising economic and military power and the myriad potential chal-
lenges that Chinas rise poses to U.S. strategic interests, China is likely to be a
favorite topic for partisan politics, especially when there are high-impact
events such as the 19951996 missile crisis and the plane collision in 2001.
Yet the key thing to bear in mind is that partisan politics, by denition, is
driven primarily by electoral competitionto embarrass and defeat the
incumbent president or the majority partyand only secondarily by genuine
policy concerns. This is true for China policy as well. Democrats attacked
Bush in 1992, but they voiced little criticism of Clinton whose China policy
was not much dierent from that of his predecessor. Republicans tried to
dismantle Clintons engagement policy through high-prole investigations of
alleged Chinese campaign donations, nuclear thefts, and threats to Taiwan,
yet they did not challenge George W. Bush who followed largely the same
policy of engagement. The two examples also illuminate an important point:
regardless of their campaign speeches, presidents eventually adopt a policy of
engagement with China, and his fellow partisans in Congress almost always
defer to him out of party loyalty.
In conclusion, it is not only futile but also counterproductive for the Chinese
to launch a diatribe against each and every China policy initiative motivated
by party politics. It is futile because partisan politics is inherent to the
American two-party system. It is counterproductive because members of
Congress will probably regard such rhetorical aggressiveness as further proof
of Chinese intransigence and ill will.
Conclusion 151
Keep low key on Taiwan
Taiwan has been the central issue in U.S.China relations, and Congress has
been most outspoken in its support for Taiwan due to historical ties, ideo-
logical beliefs, partisan motives, and genuine policy concerns. The strength of
congressional support for Taiwan will likely increase as the island becomes a
prosperous democracy and China remains under Communist one-party rule.
Moreover, it seems very unlikely that Congress will sacrice Taiwan on the
altar of U.S.China economic relations, despite the growing importance of
the latter. This is especially true for Republicans who have been consistently
supportive of strong U.S.Taiwan relations (and hawkish foreign policy for
that matter) and close U.S.China economic ties (and free trade in general) at
the same time. Consequently, the Chinese should not use bilateral economic
relations to leverage congressional concessions on Taiwan policy.
In a word, the Chinese should never underestimate Congresss commitment
to Taiwan. It appears that the best strategy for the Chinese is to keep a low
key on Taiwan policy and wait for the U.S. executive branch to rein in the
pro-Taiwan Congress. So far the executive branch has been largely successful
in getting Congress on board a policy that accommodates most of Chinas
demands on Taiwan, e.g., the three communiqus and Clintons Three Nos.
When China was openly belligerent in its Taiwan policy, as it was in the
missile exercises in 19951996 and the passage of the Anti-Secession Law in
2006, Congress became even more adamant in its support for Taiwan.
For their part, members of Congress should never underestimate the
importance of the Taiwan issue in Chinese domestic politics and hence
Beijings determination to use whatever means necessary to keep the island
from becoming an independent entity. Since one of the cornerstones of the
Chinese Communist Partys legitimacy is national reunication, any move by
Taiwan toward de facto or de jure independence will be resolutely countered
by the Communist Party. Moreover, Taiwan has become the single issue
around which almost all Chinese are unied, and Chinese nationalism,
whether spontaneous or manipulated by the government, has grown in pro-
portion with Chinas economic and military power. The immense popularity
of books advocating hard-line foreign policy toward the U.S. illuminates, to
some degree, popular support for reunication of Taiwan (e.g., Peng 1996;
Song 1996, 1997). Thus Congress should be cautious in its approach to Taiwan
if it does not intend to involve the U.S. in an armed conict in the Taiwan
Strait.
Non-confrontational approaches to human rights

Human rights, particularly when it is narrowly dened to include only
political rights like freedom of speech, freedom of press, and religious free-
dom, lies at the heart of the American creed; it is what Americans fought for
in the Independence War and what America stands for. As such, members of
152 Conclusion
Congress have strong incentives to be viewed as champions of American
political values. On the other hand, unless there are major human rights crises
like the Tiananmen Incident or pressure from ethnic groups, human rights
will not be a salient issue to most Americans most of the time.2 The two
factors together suggest that human rights is a position-taking issue for most
members. It never hurts to speak in support of human rights or to vote for
bills criticizing authoritarian regimes.3
What this means is that the Chinese, with their myriad human rights prob-
lems, should expect incessant criticism from members of Congress. If they
want to avoid such criticism, then they should implement more political
reform and, whenever possible, should engage congressional critics in human
rights talks. VIP visits of congressional delegations to China, whether organ-
ized by Beijing or U.S. domestic groups, are not likely to have much impact
on members human rights stances.4 These visits have so far reinforced
congressional support for continued trade relations and other economic
exchanges with China, but have had less eect on congressional criticism
of China regarding human rights (Sutter 2001: 92).
On the other hand, the good news is that rhetoric aside, many members
have subscribed to the view, either out of constituency economic stakes in
U.S.China relations or out of policy beliefs, that the best way to promote
human rights in China is through trade. These members (e.g., Max Baucus
and Craig Thomas) played a pivotal role in keeping Chinas MFN status and
in the passage of HR 4444. Outright denial of human rights problems, the
use of political prisoners as bargaining chips, or denunciation of American
hypocrisy will in all likelihood alienate these key members supportive of
engagement with China and harden the animosity of China critics. In a word,
the Chinese should improve their own human rights conditions, engage
in constructive talks with congressional critics, and remain optimistic that
Congress will not sacrice economic relations on the altar of human rights.
In so far as Congress is concerned, the best strategy to promote human
rights in China should be one of private and soft talk, not public confrontation
or economic sanctions. The Dalai Lama, widely regarded as the symbol of
Chinese human rights oppression in Tibet, made this point quite clear:
I feel that on issues such as human rights and religious freedom, it is

better to engage Chinese leaders directly, without public condemna-
tion. . . . Once you state a critical view publicly, then the Chinese gov-
ernment, even if it wants to change, would nd it more dicult.
(quoted in Lampton 2001: 111)
Senator Max Baucus (1994a) also supported non-confrontational ways to

promote human rights. He wrote, Angry speeches and stormy meetings
get headline. But working at local levelsteaching individuals about law,
communications, foreign languages, helping them understand the world
betterdoes much more.
Conclusion 153
The failure of conditional MFN proves the futility of economic sanctions
to achieve human rights goals. Economic levers were often eective tools to
achieve economic ends and sanctions sometimes were useful in achieving
nonproliferation objectives; however, such measures were least eective in
the domain of individual rights, concluded Lampton (2001: 112). The
reluctance of American allies like Japan and the European Union to jump on
the bandwagon makes economic sanctions an ineective tool. To quote
Lampton (ibid.: 154) again, using economic threats to achieve human rights
objectives can create so much collateral damage to allies and nationalistic
backlash among those you are seeking to assist that sanctions become dem-
onstrably counterproductive.
Play the constituency card

Policy-makers in Beijing should recognize that since the end of the Cold War
era, bilateral relationship has been built primarily upon mutual economic
benets and only secondarily on strategic cooperation. And on economic
issues, U.S. politicians are usually highly responsive to constituency demands
due to the electoral connection. As Nivola (1997: 255) wrote, The nations
economic fortunes, or those of particular rms and workers, were seldom
very far from the minds of politicians, even during the darkest days of the
Cold War, and surely no realistic observer can expect them to be subordin-
ated today.
As bilateral trade keeps expanding and mutual investment continues to
grow, the Chinese should learn to play the constituency card. That is, they
should highlight the economic benets of bilateral relations to the American
people in general and members constituents in particular. It is one thing to
place billions of dollars worth of purchase orders as gestures of good will
every time the top Chinese leadership visits the U.S., and it is quite another to
organize PR campaigns to tout the benets of such orders to certain members
districts. If the Taiwanese, despite the much smaller volume of their trade
with the U.S., have gone to great lengths to publicize constituency benets
from trade with Taiwan, then the Chinese have no excuse to be sluggish in
such PR campaigns.5
Yet the Chinese should not only learn to play the constituency card, but
also beef up lobbying eorts on Capitol Hill in general. The inuence of the
Taiwan lobby should have long since galvanized the Chinese into action. As
Sciolino (1996) pointed out, On this battleeld, however, even a nuclear
power of 1.2 billion people and the fastest-growing economy in the world is
no match for a small island of 20 million inhabitants that has assiduously
worked Washington for decades. Its hard to think of anybody who does
this kind of thing [lobbying] worse, said Stanley Roth, a former senior Asia
specialist during Clinton years (quoted in ibid.). The fact that China does
not have an active lobby in this town or does not have a lobby is a ter-
rible oversight, lamented Charles Freeman, a former assistant U.S. Trade
154 Conclusion
Representative (quoted in Ma 2006). The lack of active lobbying had made
it hard for Beijing to counter the rise of China-bashing ahead of the mid-term
elections, he added.
These Washington insiders comments indicate the urgency for the Chinese
to develop and maintain an eective lobby on Capitol Hill, especially con-
sidering that American businesses stopped lobbying on Chinas behalf after
the latters accession to the WTO in 2000. In addition to organizing VIP trips
or lobbying on a case-by-case basis, the Chinese should do what Stanley Roth
suggested: compete in the realm of ideas . . . [and] recognize that the key to
lobbying is education over time (quoted in Sciolino 1996). In light of the
ideological and political divide between the two countries, the myriad disputes
on a wide range of issues, and the prevailing attitude toward China on Capitol
Hill, the Chinese should be well prepared for the amount of time and
resources needed to cultivate good will among members of Congress. Last
but not least, the Chinese should avoid another Donorgate and instead lobby
within the American legal boundaries. Otherwise, their lobbying will be
viewed as invidious eorts by a foreign government to buy inuence in
Washington, which in turn could add fuel to congressional activism in China
policy.
A look into the future

Having analyzed the past, it is time to pause for a moment and look ahead at
the future of U.S.China relations and the prospective role Congress will play
in China policy. A number of factors determine that Congress will almost
certainly continue to be an active and inuential player in the development of
an important relationship that is fraught with controversies and challenges.
The end of the Cold War has had and will continue to have signicant
impact on U.S.China relations. During the latter part of the Cold War, the
U.S. and China were drawn together almost exclusively for strategic neces-
sity, despite the crucial fact that the two countries didnt possess a common
ideology, or similar political or economic systems, or shared cultural tradi-
tions (Ross 1998: viii). As Mann (1999: 8) perceptively wrote, The relation-
ship between the United States and China established by Nixon, Kissinger,
and their successors [was] a strategic marriage of convenience and the classic
example of Kissingers obsession with geopolitics. The end of the Cold War
and the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. in the post-Cold War world
largely eliminated the strategic rationale underlying U.S.China relationship.
To be sure, the U.S. still needs Chinese cooperation on a variety of issues of
grave concern to Americansstability in Asia, nuclear non-proliferation,
environmental protection, and the war on terrorismbut Chinese cooper-
ation is by no means as urgent as it was back in the Cold War. As a result, the
U.S. is much less likely to compromiseon Taiwan or human rightsfor the
sake of Chinese cooperation.
More importantly, with its fast-growing economy, enormous population,
Conclusion 155
and increasingly modernized military, China has become, in the eyes of many
American scholars and policy-makers, the major rival of the U.S. in the
immediate future (e.g., Bernstein and Munro 1997; Gertz 2000; Kaplan 2005;
U.S. Department of Defense 2006).6 The soaring U.S. trade decit with
China, the 19951996 missile crisis, the airplane collision in 2001 all appear to
justify the thesis of China threat. As a result, in the foreseeable future
U.S.China relations will probably be characterized by mutual suspicion and
occasional open confrontation on the one hand, and mutual cooperation on a
number of issues on the other.
In so far as Congress is concerned, the absence of overriding national
security concerns and the dominance of non-security issues like trade in
U.S.China relations in the post-Cold War world give it a much bigger role to
play in China policy. Congress is more likely to start its own China policy
initiatives or to challenge the presidents policies. Lampton thus described the
changing executive-legislative dynamics in the post-Cold War world:
The U.S. Constitution vests Congress with signicant powers in the trade
area (e.g., to set tari levels). In contrast, when security is the dominant
concern, as it was during the cold war, constitutional prerogatives and
the need for quick response favor presidential dominance. Thus, moving
from a security-centered to an economics-centered relationship with
Beijing put the relationship more substantially into the congressional
domain.
(Lampton 2001: 116)
More specically, as the breadth and depth of economic cooperation between

the two countries keep growing, Congress will in all likelihood be more
involved in trade policy due to constituent inuence. On the one hand, there
probably will be more Graham-Schumer-type initiatives to address the eco-
nomic woes of certain constituencies. On the other hand, the beneciaries of
growing economic interdependence will almost certainly ght to maintain
and promote their interests. If the past is any indication of the future, free
trade supporters, backed by the White House, may successfully prevent
Congress from taking any major legislative action restricting the ow of
goods, technology, and people across the Pacic.
Human rights will undoubtedly remain a major source of disputes in
bilateral relations. Wrote former Congressman Lee Hamilton (1996),
Human rights will remain, for the immediate future, a problem of special
urgency in our relations with China. For one thing, the Tiananmen Incident,
as the enduring symbol of Chinas human rights, will continue to motivate
many members of Congress to champion human rights progress in China. As
Suettinger (2003: 414) noted, Tiananmen will endure as a subject of conten-
tion between the United States and China, at least as a subtext of other
issues, particularly human rights. For another, there are still many human
rights problems in China that need to be addressed (e.g., U.S. Department of
156 Conclusion
State 2005, 2006). Unless there is solid evidence indicating signicant progress
in human rights in China, congressional attitudes toward China will remain
highly critical.
In so far as Taiwan is concerned, Congress will almost certainly continue to
be its most powerful and most reliable supporter. Chinas growing military
power and its potential threat to U.S. interests in East Asia will be a major
factor behind congressional support for strong U.S.Taiwan relations. An
equally, if not more, important factor is Taiwans democratic system. As long
as Taiwan remains a prosperous democracy, Congress has little reason to
question or suspend its long-time commitment to the island. On the other
hand, Taiwans democratization can also be a liability to Congress. Domestic
politics in Taiwan may force Taiwanese leaders to adopt certain policies that
are unpalatable to Beijing, and if Congress throws itself rmly behind such
leaders, confrontations between Beijing and Washington will likely ensue.
The 19951996 missile crises illuminate the real danger of unconditional
congressional support for Taiwan.
Thus it seems that Congress will most likely remain active and inuential in
China policy in the foreseeable future. However, institutional structures and
procedures as well as the electoral connection almost guarantee that Congress
may not succeed in bringing about major policy shifts in China policy.
Instead, it will probably be most successful in inuencing the agenda of U.S.
China policy. That is, members of Congress will be mostly concerned with
highlighting the misdeeds, falsehoods, and shortcomings of the PRC

regime, faulting the presidents policies for not being able to change
Chinas behavior patterns, preventing signicant improvement in bilateral
ties without certain conditions being met, and forcing the administrations
attention on Taiwan or Tibet.
(Suettinger 2003, 328329)
Appendix
Sources
Source of China bills and coding scheme

I identied China bills from Thomas, the online database of legislative infor-
mation from the Library of Congress (http://www.thomas.loc.gov). All the
China bills were retrieved between December 17 and 19, 2006. Thomas allows
searches for bill summary and status from the 93rd Congress (19731974)
until the most recent Congress. For each bill, Thomas lists its chief sponsor(s)
and co-sponsor(s), the committee(s) to which the bill was referred, the latest
legislative action on the bill, and a summary of the bill by the Congressional
Research Service.
I checked the accuracy of Thomas using statistics on legislative activity
published in Congress and the Nation. Thomas reports the number of concur-
rent resolutions, resolutions, joint resolutions, bills, and amendments (start-
ing from the 97th Congress) introduced in each Congress. I added up all types
of bills (except amendments because Congress and the Nation does not report
amendments) to arrive at a total number of bills for each Congress. Then I
compared them with statistics from Congress and the Nation. For nine Con-
gresses, the two sources do not comport with each other, but the discrepancy
is so small as to be insignicant. That is, for eight Congresses the discrepancy
is less than 10 bills, and only 101st Congress has a discrepancy of 37 bills.
Meanwhile, the average number of bills in each Congress is around 13,600. In
a word, it seems safe for me to use Thomas as the sole source of China bills.
Using keyword search (i.e., China, Chinese, Taiwan, Taiwanese), I identi-
ed 875 China bills between 1973 and 2006. Table A.1 illustrates my coding
scheme. The cells are by no means exhaustive; they merely illustrate the major
issues that these China bills address.
Sources of other quantitative data
Favorability rating
Favorability rating has probably the longest time series in surveys. The major
survey houses across the nation have elded such questions with slightly
158 Appendix: Sources
Table A.1 Examples of coding of China bills
Policy type Specic issues
Taiwan 1. Support Taiwans membership in international organizations

2. Urge arms sales to Taiwan
3. Demand peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue
4. Declare U.S. commitment to Taiwans security and democracy
5. Allow Taiwanese ocials to visit the U.S.
6. Advocate ocial relations with Taiwan
7. Authorize negotiation or conclusion of commercial treaties with
Taiwan
8. Repeal the Formosa Resolution
9. Criticize Taiwans human rights
Generic 1. Prohibit importation of certain goods from China
trade 2. Prohibit Export-Import Bank from extending credit to exports to
China
3. Impose quota on Chinese products
4. Authorize negotiation or conclusion of trade agreements with China
5. Establish agencies to promote U.S.China trade
6. Reduce taris on certain Chinese exports
MFN 1. Deny MFN to China
2. Attach conditions to MFN renewal
3. Extend MFN to China
WTO 1. Attach conditions to Chinas WTO
2. Withdraw Chinas WTO membership if it attacks Taiwan
3. Call for U.S. approval of Chinas admission to WTO
Generic 1. Call for release of religious prisoners
Human 2. Call for release of political prisoners
Rights 3. Demand progress in human rights
4. Sponsor resolutions criticizing Chinas human rights at the UN
Tibet 1. Criticize Chinas Tibet policy
2. Support Dalai Lama
3. Establish agencies for Tibetan aairs
UNPF Prohibit or withdraw funding for UNPF unless it ceases its operations
funding in China
Tiananmen 1. Condemn Tiananmen crackdown
2. Support student activists
3. Commemorate Tiananmen
4. Give Chinese students special immigration status
Export 1. Prohibit U.S. satellites from being launched on Chinese vehicles
control 2. Deny licenses to exports to China
3. Prohibit the transfer of certain technologies
4. Place arms embargo on China
5. Criticize Chinas alleged transfer of missile and nuclear technology
to Middle East countries
6. Prescribe punishment if China violates non-proliferation regimes
7. Treat China more favorably than other controlled countries
8. Shorten review period for license application
9. Allow third countries to export high-tech products to China
Appendix: Sources 159
Foreign 1. Deny or reduce foreign assistance to China
assistance 2. Prohibit international institutions from giving loans to China
3. Authorize foreign assistance to China by U.S. or international
agencies
Other 1. Any combination of the above policies
2. Establish agencies or commissions to carry out China policy
3. Appropriate funds for these agencies
4. Establish exchange programs
5. Furnish assistance to express condolence to Chinese victims of
natural disasters
6. Deny visas to Chinese ocials
dierent wording and response categories. The questions usually have either
four response categoriesvery favorable, mostly favorable, mostly
unfavorable, and very unfavorable, or a 10-point-scale running from +5
to 5. A third type of questions has three categoriesgenerally favorable,
generally unfavorable, and neutral. Hirshberg (1993) was among the rst
to collect and organize data on American publics favorability rating of
China. His data covered 19541991, and most of the questions in his data
have 10-point-scale response categories.
I selected the rst two types of questions, i.e., four-category and 10-point
scale questions. I collapsed very favorable and mostly favorable into
favorable, and very unfavorable and mostly unfavorable into
unfavorable. For those 10-point scale questions, I collapsed + 1 to +5 into
favorable and 1 to 5 into unfavorable. I used the percentage of Ameri-
cans having favorable opinion of China as the measure of favorability. For
years in which multiple survey houses asked the same questions, I take the
average of the percentages. For missing years, I take the average of the previ-
ous and following years percentages. I updated Hirshbergs data by including
more recent data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research avail-
able online at www.lexisnexis.com. For exact question wording, see T. Xie
(2004: Appendix 1) and Hirshberg (1993: 249250).
Ideology
DW-NOMINATE score: www.voteview.com.
Hawkishness: The Center for Security Policy.
Constituency variables
Union Strength, Farm Employment, and Retail/Wholesale Employment
(before 1998): Adler, E. Scott. Congressional District Data File, [congres-
sional term]. University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
Farm Employment and Retail/Wholesale Employment (after 1999): I used
the 2000 Census CDs at the Government Section of Northwestern University
Library to arrive at the percentages.
160 Appendix: Sources
Union Strength (after 1999): Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson,
Union Membership and Coverage Database from the Current Population
Survey: Note, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, January
2003, pp. 349354.
State Export to China: Oce of Trade and Industry Information, Manu-
facturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce.
Military Awards: U.S. Department of Defense, Atlas/Data Abstract for the
United States.
Notes
Introduction
1 Though Congress passed legislation (HR 2676) in 1998 changing MFN to
NTR, MFN is still commonly used in international trade negotiations. Besides,
MFN is the term used in most congressional documents, scholarly works, and
journalistic accounts. Thus MFN instead of NTR will be used throughout the
book.
2 Scholars sometimes draw a distinction between foreign policy and defense policy
(Lindsay and Ripley 1992; Ripley and Lindsay 1993). The former generally
includes diplomatic and strategic relations with other countries and trade policy,
whereas the latter refers exclusively to defense spending like military bases,
weapons purchase, and payment for military personnel. Thus dened, the three
policy issues in U.S.China relations that will be examined in this study belong to
foreign policy.
3 To be sure, there are many otherand perhaps equally importantquestions
about Congresss role in foreign and defense policy, such as who decides the con-
gressional agenda, the role of interest groups, the impact of constituency opinion,
and the consequences of congressional activism (for the most comprehensive
review of the literature, see Lindsay and Ripley 1992). Nonetheless, answers
to the three questions form the foundations on which other questions can be
pursued. For example, one cannot adequately address the question of who decides
Congresss foreign policy agenda without rst addressing executive-legislative
interactions in foreign policy or the decision-making process in Congress.
4 Many studies approach Congresss relative power vis--vis the president in
foreign policy from the legal-constitutional perspective. They focus on Congresss
constitutional prerogatives, particularly the war powers (e.g., Adler 1988; Crovitz
and Rabkin 1989; Deering 1991; Fisher 1985; Fisher 1988; Fisher 1991; Franklin
1987; Schlesinger 1989).
5 Since it was published, the two presidencies thesis has been at the center of
scholarly debate. For a review of the debate, see Fleisher and Bond (1988); Shull
and LeLoup (1981); Sigelman (1979); and Wildavsky (1975).
6 In the nal analysis, Schlesinger seems to be reluctant to completely reject presi-
dential dominance in foreign policy. To restore the constitutional balance, it is
necessary in this period to rebuke presidential pretensions, as it has been necessary
in other periods to rebuke congressional pretensions, he cautioned (1972: 108).
But in demythologizing the presidency we must take care not to remythologize
the Congress, he hastily added (ibid.: 109).
7 I borrowed the term contingency from public opinion research. Based on
interviews with a representative sample of House members, Cook (1992) con-
tended that congressional responsiveness to public preferences on welfare policy is
162 Notes
contingent upon the particular issue. See Manza and Cook (2002) for a review of
the literature on the contingency view.
8 According to Lindsay and Ripley (1993: 19), crisis policy is characterized by the
perception of an imminent threat to the U.S. national interests, usually one involv-
ing the use or potential use of force. Strategic policy species the goals and
tactics of defense and foreign policy. It includes what is commonly called foreign
policy plus those aspects of defense policy that specify the basic mix and mission
of military forces. Finally, structural policy governs how resources are used and
mostly clearly resemble decision making on domestic, distributive politics.
9 To my knowledge, Burgin (1991) is the only scholar who has systematically stud-
ied the extent of legislative participation in foreign policy. She constructed a scale
of participation and then divided members into four dierent categories based on
the participation scale: leaders, activists, position-takers, and voters. She examined
the impact of constituent interests on whether to participate in a foreign policy
issue and the extent of participation. Hall (1996) oers the most comprehensive
study of legislative participation in Congress, but his focus is participation in
general, not foreign policy issues in particular.
10 The Act was repealed in 1943 by the Magnuson Act, but large-scale Chinese
immigration didnt occur until after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965.
For the most recent account of the history of Chinese immigration, see Lee (2003).
11 Since almost all bank notes in China were backed by silver, large-scale purchase by
the U.S. depleted Chinas silver reserve and led to sharp appreciation of the cur-
rency. As the Chinese currency appreciated, exports became more expensive and
imports cheaper, resulting in more outow of silver. Meanwhile, banks began to
withdraw notes from circulation, which resulted in credit stringency and deation.
The Silver Purchase Act appeared to be the major cause of the nancial crisis in
China in the 1930s.
12 Three sentences from the 1971 CQ Almanac best summarize the intensity of
congressional opposition to Chinas admission to the UN. From 1950 to 1970,
Congress expressed its opposition to the seating of Communist China in the
United Nations at least 30 times. Every year, statements expressing this opposition
have been attached to appropriations bills and enacted into law. Every year, that is,
until 1971 (CQ Almanac 1971: 364).
13 When Deng visited Washington, 85 Senators and 70 House members met with
him, with another dozen accompanying him to Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle.
Many House members avidly sought invitation for a meeting with Deng and
members of both chambers stood in line to shake Tengs [sic] hand and even to
get his autograph. Senator Henry Jackson was so impressed by Deng that he
predicated that Deng would be kissing a lot of babies here (CQ Almanac 1979:
207208).
14 For example, Mann (2001) and Crabb (1985) examined congressional support for
Taiwan. Nokken (2003) analyzed roll call votes on MFN renewal. Yang (2000)
oered a detail account of MFN renewal and Taiwan policy in the Bush and
Clinton years. Xie (1993) conducted an in-depth analysis of roll call voting on the
Taiwan Relations Act and the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of
1989.
1 The new institutionalism and legislative behavior

1 The rational choice theory is a broad name that subsumes a variety of theories
built upon the assumption of individual rationality. Social choice theory, theory
of collective action, and principal-agent theory all belong to the rational choice
theory. For a review of scholarly debate about the rational choice theory, see
(Barry 1978; Chong 2000: Chapter 1; Friedman 1996; Green and Shapiro 1994).
Notes 163
2 Admittedly, the number of committees, committee jurisdiction, chamber rules,
party rules, and committee rules may be considerably dierent from one Congress
to another, as in the case of House reforms in the 1970s and Republican reform
after 1995. Nevertheless, the fundamental structures and procedures such as bill
referral, seniority, the libuster, and the germaneness rule have largely remained
intact since they were rst instituted (see Deering and Smith 1997).
3 For a dierent view about the committees ex post veto power, see Crombez et al.
(2006) and Krehbiel et al. (1987).
4 In addition to gatekeeping, other terms commonly used to describe committee
power include veto power, proposal power, and agenda-setting power. According
to Crombez et al. (2006: 323):
an early-acting individual or group of individuals is said to possess a gate-
keeping right if the governing procedures of the body allow the individual or
group not to act on specic proposals, and if the certain consequence of such
inaction is that an exogenously determined status quo policy remains in
eect.
They oered a distinction between gatekeeping right and gatekeeping power, argu-
ing the former is a necessary condition for the latter.
5 For example, in 1999 the Senate voted on a motion to discharge from the Finance
Committee S.J.Res.27 that would revoke Chinas MFN for one year. The motion
was overwhelmingly rejected by a vote of 1287.
6 The three dominant theories of legislative organization have dierent predictions
about committeeoor relationship. The informational theory predicts that
committees should be representative of the oor majority (Krehbiel 1991). The
distributive theory contends that committees should be composed of preference
outliers (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Finally, the partisan theory argues that
committee preferences should be similar to those of the majority party (Cox and
McCubbins 1993).
7 Cox and McCubbins (1993: 260262) reported evidence that bills sponsored by
majority party members were most likely to be reported out of committee.
8 For some scholars, it is not so much structural dierencesand the resulting
dierences in policy preferencesas sequential actions that enable the Senate to
serve as a check to the House. Fenno (1982: 45) thus wrote,
By setting up two distinct and dierent bodies, they made it necessary that the
Senate and the House take separate action. . . . Separate action means, at a
minimum, sequential action, and sequential action very likely means dierent
actions. That is because sequential action implies the passage of time and
with it the changing of relevant contexts. Dierent contexts very likely lead to
dierent behavior.
9 The cooling saucer originates from an anecdote about the Senate. Thomas
Jeerson, who was absent at the constitutional convention due to his mission to
France, asked George Washington why he had consented to a second chamber.
Why did you pour that coee into your saucer? asked Washington. To cool it,
said Jeerson. Even so, we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it,
said Washington (quoted in Fenno 1982: 5). Under the original arrangement of
bicameralism, the Senate may have been more likely to cool down the legislative
process by blocking or amending House-passed bills because Senators were elected
indirectly by state legislatures. But the 17th Amendment brought about a new
bicameralism under which Senators, like their House counterparts, are elected
directly by the people (Binder 1996: Chapter 2; Fenno 1982). For more recent
assessments of the impact of 17th amendment on legislative behavior, see Crook
and Hibbing (1997) and Bernhard and Sala (2006).
164 Notes
10 Cronin and Fordhams (1999) analysis of Senate voting on foreign policy between
1947 and 1993 produced evidence that challenges the notion of ideological coher-
ence and stability. They concluded:
Above all, a successful treatment of ideology must not assume that issue
linkages can be traced to a logically coherent and unchanging set of prin-
ciples. Preferences on a wide range of issues may be linked to the cleavage
between liberals and conservatives, but the content of these ideologies is not
consistent over time. Something other than enduring principles determines
what it means to be a liberal or conservative in American politics.
(ibid.: 987988)
11 This appears to be true only at the individual level, however. There is convincing
evidence that aggregate or collective opinion is remarkably stable, coherent, and
meaningful (Page 2006; Page and Shapiro 1992).
12 Students of American politics have constructed various measures of constituency
opinion, including demographic variables, small-sample estimates, presidential
election results, and referenda voting (for a review, see Ardoin and Garand 2003;
McDonagh 1993; Stone 1979), but none of these directly concern China policy.
2 Congressional efforts to punish China

1 A modied version of this chapter and Chapter 3, entitled Congress and China
Policy: An Analysis of China Bills, were originally published in Journal of
Contemporary China, 2008, 17: 54, 141165.
2 Members attach riders to non-China-specic bills such as authorization bills
because these bills are more likely to pass than freestanding China bills. For
example, those opposed to Chinas abortion policy often turn to foreign oper-
ations authorization bills, adding language that prohibits U.S. contribution to any
international agencyparticularly the UNPFthat is involved in family planning
programs in China. These bills are more likely to pass than independent legislation
barring U.S. contribution to international agencies because they deal with routine
authorization of funds necessary for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.
Some of the most controversial congressional policies are found in these author-
ization bills. In 1995, Jesse Helms introduced a state department authorization bill
to which he added language that the Taiwan Relations Act should supersede the
1982 joint communiqu regarding arms sales to Taiwan.
3 Following my logic, Congresss policy toward Hong Kong and Macao should
also be included as part of its China policy, since both Hong Kong and Macao are
now special administrative zones under Chinese sovereignty. I do not include
China bills respecting the two entities because the numbers are rather small: 26
bills respecting Hong Kong and three bills respecting Macao.
4 The controversy over funding to the UNPF arose because UNPF was allegedly
involved in coercive abortion in China. Given the intense passions evoked by
abortion in U.S. domestic politics, it is not surprising that the battle over appropri-
ations for the UNPF has repeated itself each year since 1985, when Congress
adopted the KempInouyeHelms amendment that prohibits U.S. funding to
any organization that supports or participates in the management of a program
of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. One year before the passage of
the amendment, the Reagan administration announced a new policy at the Second
United Nations International Conference on Population in Mexico City, which
denies assistance to any foreign, non-governmental organization that performs or
actively promotes abortion as a method of family planning. This became known
as the Mexico City policy (CQWR 2001: 236). Because UNPF funding is
Notes 165
usually attached to the annual State Department authorization bill, the battle
oftentimes stalled the passage of the authorization bill, creating chaos on Capitol
Hill, at the State Department, and in the White House (CQWR 1998: 579; CQWR
1999: 563, 2326; CQWR 2002: 197). Crane and Finkle (1989) oer the best
analysis of the domestic politics linking UNPF funding with Chinas population
control programs.
5 U.S. companies must obtain a license before they can export high-power com-
puters, missile technology, or satellite technology to China. Export control respect-
ing China became a high-prole issue in 1998 amidst allegations of Chinese thefts
of U.S. nuclear secrets and Republican accusation of Clinton issuing export
licenses in exchange for Chinese campaign donations. Later that year Congress
formed a Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns with the Peoples Republic of China, chaired by Republican Christo-
pher Cox, and the Committee issued the highly controversial Cox Report in early
1999 (e.g., CQWR 1998: 1375, 1400, 1402, 18861889).
6 In the House, no member may oer an amendment to a bill under oor consider-
ation unless the bill is granted an open rule or the amendment is pre-approved by
the Rules Committee. More importantly, a particular rule of the Houseeective
since April 1789requires that amendments be germane to the bill under con-
sideration. A ruling of non-germaneness can beand frequently ischallenged
on the oor, but it is virtually unprecedented for the membership to overrule its
presiding oce in order to consider a proposition that has been ruled nonger-
mane (Bach 1982: 343). Unlike the House, the Senate does not have any general
requirement of germaneness, unless an amendment is oered to an appropriations
bill, a budget bill, or a measure on which cloture has been invoked. As a result,
Senators have much greater latitude than their House counterparts in amending
a bill.
7 The numbers in Figure 2.1 include amendments. Some ocial sources of legislative
activities like Congress and the Nation report only bills (i.e., bills, concurrent reso-
lutions, simple resolutions, and joint resolutions). With amendments excluded,
then the total number of China bills introduced in the rst session of each Con-
gress is 481, and the gure for the second session is 227. This results in an aggre-
gate inter-session ratio of 2.12. Based on statistics from Thomas, between 1973
and 2006 the total number of bills introduced in the rst session is 153,695 and
that for the second session is 78,203. This leads to an aggregate inter-session ratio
of 1.97, which is strikingly similar to that for China bills. However, unlike the ratio
for bills in general, which stabilizes around 2 from one Congress to another, the
ratio for China bills has considerable variations.
8 Another reason may be that all House members and one-third of Senators have
to campaign in their home districts for reelection in the second session of each
Congress and hence spend less time on Capitol Hill. A third reason is that if
voters tend to pay more attention to their representatives immediately after an
electionand the rst session is temporally closer to the election than the second
sessionthen members have incentives to be seen as legislatively active.
9 Back in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Republicans made up the overwhelming
majority of the China bloc that supported Chiang and opposed recognition of
China and Chinas admission to the UN (Bachrack 1976; Koen 1974; Tsou 1963;
Tucker 1983). In the 1990s, Republicans like Gerald Solomon (NY), Tom DeLay
(TX), and Benjamin Gilman (NY), to name just a few, were among the most vocal
supporters of Taiwan and critics of China because they still bear animus toward
the last outposts of global communism (CQWR 1996: 712).
10 Since the dependent variable is the number of times a specic event (i.e., a China
bill is introduced) in each chamber each year, it can only take values that are non-
negative integers. Moreover, the event occurs at most a few dozen times per year. A
166 Notes
very exible modeling approach often used for dependent variables with these
characteristics is to assume that they follow a negative binomial probability distri-
bution. Unlike the classical regression model (e.g., ordinary least squares), the
negative binomial model explicitly builds the special characteristics of the depend-
ent variable into the analysis. As such, it can make better use of the available
information than classical techniques, and will not make invalid use of informa-
tion in the data (e.g., the lack of negative observations), as classical procedures
would. The parameter estimates in a negative binomial model govern the rate at
which the expected number of events changes in response to a change in any given
independent variable, but (unlike in the classical regression model) are not them-
selves estimates of the slope of a line. More specically, in event count models the
eect of an independent variable with coecient is , where is the expected
value of the dependent variable (King 1988: 857; Mayer 1999: 199; Shields and
Huang 1995: 567).
3 Effects of congressional activism on China policy

1 Another way to control for chamber size is to compare the ratio of China bills to
all bills in each chamber, but the major problem with this method is that the
denominator is so big as to make the ratio close to zero. The mean of all bills
(excluding amendments) introduced in the House in each Congress during the
studied period is 9596.8 and the mean for China bills (excluding amendments) is
28.2. The corresponding gures for the Senate are 4041.9 and 13.5.
2 Apparently, Table 3.2 does not answer why a member is active in a particular
policy issue. For example, why is Chris Smith active in human rights but not in
MFN or Taiwan policy? To answer this question, one would need to conduct
in-depth analysis of each members personal background, constituents, and the
circumstances under which he or she served in Congress.
3 It is possible that some China bills were amended on the oor before their passage,
and the inclusion of these bills may be responsible for the higher estimate I
arrived at.
4 The tradition of individualism and extended debate in the Senate greatly empower
individual Senators to inuence the legislative process. One common practice is to
le an objection to unanimous consent agreement (UCA) request regarding a
piece of legislation pending oor debate. This is called a hold. Since most Senate
legislative business is done through UCA, putting a hold is in eect a threat to
libuster. Unless the Senator who puts the hold is satised, the bill is likely to stay
in the committee (see Sinclair 2006: 204211).
5 The six resolutions are: H.Con.Res.148 in 1996, H.Con.Res.270 and 301 in 1998,
H.Con.Res.56 and H.Res.297 in 1999, and H.Con.Res.292 in 2000.
6 President Jimmy Carter used the fourth veto. In 1977, both houses passed HR
2521, a bill that provides for mandatory federal inspection of rabbit meat. Carter
vetoed it on the ground that [r]equirements for on-site inspection of foreign
processing facilities by Department of Agriculture employees would strain rela-
tions with the Peoples Republic of China, a major exporter of domesticated
rabbit meat to the United States (Carter 1977). Congress did not attempt to
override Carters veto.
7 According to former Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS), They are afraid
of him. Jesse runs a pretty tight ship (quoted in Berke and Myers 1997). Senator
Joseph Biden (D-DE), the ranking Democrat on the Committee, said, Hes pre-
pared to be mean. Hes prepared to be disliked. Hes prepared to be ostracized
(quoted in ibid.).
8 Supporters of human rights in Tibet come in dierent party labels and ideological
hats. In a reception held in the honor of the Dalai Lama in Washington, D.C., the
Notes 167
guests present included senators John Kerry, Jesse Helms, Bob Dole, and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan as well as representatives Benjamin Gilman, Charlie Rose, Tom
Lantos, and John Porter (Glassman 1991).

1 A shorter version of this chapter, entitled Congressional Roll Call Voting on
China Trade Policy: MFN and PNTR, was published in American Politics
Research, 2006, 34: 6, 732758.
2 For example, the AFL-CIO led a petition to the Bush administration in April
2006, the second since 2004, urging the U.S. Trade Representatives oce to
launch probes into Chinas suppression of labor rights, which was believed to
be a major factor behind the cheap prices of Chinese imports that have resulted
in soaring trade decit and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of
Americans jobs (see Greenhouse 2006; Reuters 2006).
3 It should be noted that in the early years of U.S.China trade, it was the United
States that demanded MFN status from China. Following Chinas defeat in the
Opium War in 1840, the Chinese government signed the infamous Nanking Treaty
in 1842 with Britain that granted the latter many trade privileges. Two years later,
the U.S. signed the Wanghia Treaty with China, securing MFN status from the
Chinese government. Despite its name, MFN does not oer preferential treat-
ment. The U.S. grants MFN to nearly all its trading partners. Moreover, MFN is
not the lowest tari status. More than 125 developing countries pay even lower
tari under the Generalized System of Preference (CQ Almanac 1992: 157;
CQWR 1990: 177476). Under the JacksonVanik amendment to the 1974 Trade
Act, an amendment that has the former Soviet Union as its prime target, the
president cannot grant MFN to a Communist country unless he waives a require-
ment that denies MFN to any Communist country that prohibits free emigration.
MFN status expires July 3 each year, and if the president wants to renew it, he
must notify Congress by June 3. Congress has until September 3 to pass a joint
resolution to disapprove of the renewal, subject to presidential veto.
4 China was one of the 23 contracting members of the General Agreement on
Trade and Tari (GATT), founded in 1948 and the predecessor of the World
Trade Organization. The nationalist regime on Taiwan, the ocial representative
of China in the UN until 1971, withdrew from the GATT in 1950. In 1982, China
was granted observer status in the GATT. In July 1986, the Chinese government
requested resumption of its contracting party status on the ground that the with-
drawal from the GATT by Taiwan was null and void. The GATT established the
Working Party on Chinas Status in the following year, which began Chinas
15-year process to rejoin the international trade organization. In 1994, the GATT
concluded its eighth round of multilateral negotiationsthe Uruguay Round
and created the World Trade Organization the next year.
5 China can join the WTO without congressional approval of PNTR. However, if
China is not removed from the JacksonVanik amendment, the U.S. will be in
violation of Article II of the GATT, which requires unconditional MFN for mem-
bers, and hence subject to trade sanctions. Meanwhile, the U.S. has to invoke non-
application of the GATT, which means China would be able to withhold benets
of the 1999 trade agreement from the U.S., such as market access, special import
protection, and the right to enforce Chinas commitments through WTO dispute
settlement (U.S. Congress 2001c: 3).
6 Two factors stand out as contributing to the better-than-expected vote outcome.
First, the LevinBereuter provisions, which addressed members concerns about
human rights, labor abuses, compliance, etc., made the vote much easier for many
members. It is estimated that the LevinBereuter provisions secured as many as
168 Notes
40 votes (CQ Almanac 2000: 20: 48). Second, Charles Rangel (D-NY) switched
from No to Yes, the single most important pro-permanent NTR event of the last
month (ibid.: 20:8). Rangels conversion had the most impact on the New York
delegation, in the Congressional Black Caucus, and among Ways and Means
members.
7 The rst vote was on passage of HR 2195 in 1997 that authorized US$2 million
for the U.S. Customs Service and the State Department to enforce a U.S. ban on
Chinese prison labor products. The bill passed 4192. The second vote, which took
place in 2003, was on adoption of a resolution (H.Res.414) under suspension of
rules that encouraged China to fulll its international trade commitments. The
vote count was 4111. The third vote occurred in 2004, and again it was on
adoption of a resolution (H.Res.576) under suspension of rules that urged China
to improve its protection of intellectual property rights. The resolution passed
4163.
8 The recommitting motions would ask Ways and Means to report the bill (HR
2195 and HR 2605 respectively) back with an amendment to require that the total
amount of taris paid to China for U.S. exports be adjusted quarterly to equal the
total amount China pays to the U.S. for Chinese exports.
9 Frutiger (2002) oered a dierent perspective on AFL-CIOs opposition to
Chinas PNTR. He argued that AFL-CIOs China policy amounts to nothing
less than a revival of . . . [u]nconstrained economic nationalism [and] an anti-
Communist agenda that had guided AFL-CIOs policy agenda through the Cold
War up until John Sweeneys election in 1995 (ibid.: 72).
10 Labor unions vehement opposition to PNTR potentially threatened Al Gores
presidential campaign, as Gore rmly endorsed Chinas accession to the WTO. On
the other hand, union leaders knew that it was in their interest to have a Democrat
in the White House, and a Democratic majority in Congress if possible. Thus the
challenge for John Sweeney was to devise a strategy that would simultaneously
defeat PNTR and put Gore in the White House (Connolly 2000; Edsall 2000;
Mufson 2000).
11 To help colleagues who planned to vote for the China bill in spite of labor union
opposition, a group of moderate House Democrats organized fundraisers and
raised $160,000 from the business community in two months. Boeing, America
Online, and Microsoft were among the donators at the fundraisers (CQWR 2000:
907).
12 This does not seem to be a big problem in my case because I use the absolute value
of DW score. Party has the highest correlation with retail/wholesale (0.259,
signicant at 0.01), and the absolute value of DW score has the highest correlation
with farming employment (0.124, signicant at 0.01). The correlation between
party and the absolute value of DW score is 0.134 and signicant at 0 .01.
13 However, Garzke and Wrighton (1998) also found that Senate Republicans were
more supportive of GATT than Democrats, and Wink et al. (1996) reported evi-
dence that House Republicans were more likely to vote for NAFTA than Demo-
crats. Thus it appears that there is no conclusive evidence on the direction of
partisanship on trade votes.
14 For example, in 1997 President Clinton asked for renewal of fast track authority,
but over 80 percent of House Democrats opposed it. In the end, Clinton suered a
stinging blow to his prestige when the House Republican leadership canceled
the vote on fast track authority (Conley 1999: 786).
15 This point is based on Kernells (1973) nding that party composition of each
chamber was the central determinant of inter-chamber dierence in policy liberal-
ism. It is also possible that there is something special about the Senate as an
institution that makes it more liberal than the House. Grofman et al. (1991) exam-
ined Senators and representatives who have identical constituencies, that is, they
Notes 169
come from states that have only one representative in the House. It turns out that
Senators were still a little more liberal than representatives despite the fact that
they have identical constituency.

1 On January 5 1950, President Truman made it clear that the U.S. would not
intervene militarily on Chiangs behalf. This hands-o policy amounted to
abandonment of Chiang. A week later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered
a speech to the National Press Club, reiterating Trumans China policy (see
Finkelstein 1993: 27274; Grasso 1987: 123).
2 Before the outbreak of the Korean War, Secretary of State Dean Acheson
seemed to be optimistic about U.S. relations with Communist China. He believed
that Chinese Communism was of a dierent strain from Stalinist Communism,
hence his hopes for the emergence of a Chinese Tito. Even after the interposition
of the Seventh Fleet, Acheson wanted to signal to the Communists that the
U.S. had no intention of grabbing Taiwan (see Finkelstein 1993: 334336).
3 The China bloc is not a formal organization within Congress. Rather, it is a loose
conglomeration of members who were instrumental in China policy in the late
1940s and early 1950s. It is part of the legendary China lobby. The China bloc,
wrote Koen (1974: 29) in his classic study of the China lobby, merely used the
China issue as an aid in their battle against the Roosevelt and Truman Administra-
tions or the Democratic party. Tucker (1983: Chapter 5) also studied the role of
the China bloc in U.S. China policy. After the founding of the Peoples Republic
of China, the China bloc opened another front: opposing Chinas admission to
the United Nations and U.S. recognition of China (see Bachrack 1976).
4 I will not examine in detail Congresss role in Taiwans human rights. First, only
a handful of members were actively involved in the issue and only for a relatively
short period of time. Second, the issue is of minor importance in U.S.Taiwan
relations. Suce it to say, policy-makers in Washington had long been cognizant
of the authoritarian nature of the Taiwan regime, but the strategy of containment
in the Cold War resulted in a policy that valued the strategic potential of Taiwan
too highly to risk undermining mutual condence by insisting upon the kind of
liberalization that Americas principles and traditions in theory demanded
(Tucker 1994: 77). The year 1977 marked the beginning of earnest eorts by liberal
members to address Taiwans human rights. In June, Congress held its rst public
hearing on human rights in Taiwan, convened by Representative Donald Fraser
(D-MN) (U.S. Congress 1977). In retrospect, Congress, particularly the handful
of liberal Democrats, played an important role in persuading Taiwan to dem-
ocratize (Mann 2001: 204). For a detailed account of Congresss human rights
initiatives regarding Taiwan and a dierent assessment of Congresss inuence on
Taiwan, see Bush (2004: Chapter 6).
5 If adopted within two days in the House (or three days in the Senate), a motion to
reconsider requires the original vote to be held again. Members seek to reconsider
a vote because they want to change a close outcome in a vote. They also le such a
motion as a delaying tactic to use up oor time. In daily practices, however, the
motion to reconsider is routinely tabled or killed (C-SPAN 2006).
6 A motion to recommit returns a bill to committee. Recommittal motions can take
two forms: a simple motion to recommit or a motion to recommit with instruc-
tions. A simple recommittal motion gives the minority party a nal opportunity
to kill the bill. When adopted, the bill goes back to committee and is considered to
have been rejected. Motion to recommit with instructions provides the minority a
last opportunity to amend a bill. If adopted, the bill goes back to committee with
binding directions to the committee which is required to report the bill back with
170 Notes
an amendment specied in the instructions. Most recommittal motions contain
instructions. The right to oer the motion to recommit is the prerogative of a
minority party representative who is opposed to a bill (Mulvihill 1997).
7 If the motion to reconsider had been agreed to, members would have had to vote
on HR 2386 again and the bill could have been defeated. In and of itself, the
rejection of the bill does not entail any fundamental change in Taiwan policy, but
its failure does signify that Congress as a collective decision-making body was not
willing to consider such a missile defense system for Taiwan. This would be bad
news for Taiwans supporters in Congress and for the political leadership in Tai-
wan. Similarly, if the motion to recommit HR 4444 had been agreed to, the bill
would have been returned to committee and reported back to the House oor with
language conditioning Chinas PNTR on its promise not to attack Taiwan. Beijing
would almost certainly have protested against such language and withdrawn itself
from the trade agreement. Meanwhile, given their objections to placing conditions
on U.S.China trade, pro-trade members would likely have voted against the bill,
delaying if not killing Chinas bid to rejoin the WTO. Thus it seems likely that this
recommitting motion was a parliamentary tactic used by opponents of HR 4444
to stop its passage. Because the bill is expected to pass, albeit with narrow margins,
the opponents led the motion in order to add a new dimension to the bill, a
dimension on which they expected to win, knowing that there was a strong
bipartisan consensus in support of Taiwan in Congress.
8 Party leadership demands strong party loyalty on procedural issues such as elec-
tion of the Speaker of the House and the majority leader, committee jurisdictions,
rules governing oor debate, and committee assignments. There is a huge literature
on procedures and rules in Congress, their inuence on legislative behavior and
legislative outcomes, and the forces underlying changes in rules and procedures
(e.g., Cox 2000; Evans 1999; Shepsle and Weingast 1984; Shepsle and Weingast
1994). The biggest controversy in the current scholarly debate surrounds when,
how, and why rules and procedures change. One school argues that procedures are
stacked in favor of the majority party (e.g., Binder 1996; Cox and McCubbins
1993; Sinclair 1994). Another school contends that rule changes are decided by
oor majority (e.g., Schickler 2000; Schickler and Rich 1997).
9 The probability of a Republican voting against the Pallone motion was 0.791
higher than that of a Democrat, holding other variables at their means. By con-
trast, being a Republican decreases the probability of voting for the Bonior
recommitting motion by 0.80.
10 Scholars also identied other factors that contributed to partisan disputes over
China policy during this period. The growing illness of Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI),
the pillar of postwar bipartisanship, contributed to party polarization over China
policy, according to Crabb (1957: 110). But the decisive factor in the situation,
contended Westereld (1955: 245), was that the administration failed to associate
prominent Republicans with its conduct of ChineseAmerican relations, on a
basis either of educational indoctrination or of mutual compromise.
11 According to Bachrack (1976: 3839), Tsou (1963) mentioned six Senators and
ve Representatives in his assessment of the China blocs inuence in Congress:
Senators William Knowland (R-CA), H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), Pat McCarran
(D-NV), Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE), Owen Brewster (R-ME), Styles H. Bridges
(R-NH), and Representatives Walter Judd (R-MN), John M. Vorys (R-OH),
James G. Fulton (R-PA), Robert B. Chipereld (R-IL), and Donald L. Jackson
(R-CA). Judd, Vorys, and Bridges were instrumental in the passage of the China
Aid Act of 1948. Conspicuously, there was only one Democrat in Tsous list.
Dulless (1972: 7374) list included not only Judd, Vorys, Knowland, Bridges, and
McCarran, but four more Republican Senators: Ferguson (MI), Jenner (IN),
Wiley (WI), and Butler (MD).
Notes 171
12 Few scholars have paid sucient attention to the role of partisanship in congres-
sional debate about the TRA. Even those who did often ended up claiming that
the TRA was the result of bipartisan cooperation. For example, Ripley (1985: 99)
contended that the TRA stands as an outstanding example of bipartisan
collaboration in the foreign policy eld.
13 There appears to be a signicant element of institutional struggle for power in the
executive-legislative skirmish over the TRA. The struggle has something to do with
the DoleStone amendment to the International Security Assistance Act that
was adopted ve months before Carters announcement of normalization. The
amendment stated, It is the sense of Congress that there should be prior consult-
ation between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed policy
changes aecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.
Apparently, President Carter paid only lip service to the amendment. As Senator
John Glenn said, Calling a few of us in one hour before he goes on television
doesnt seem like much consultation (quoted in Gayner 1979: 334). Senator Jacob
Javits (D-NY) (1981: 55), a key member involved in the TRA, lamented that
Neither on the manner and timing of the decision or on the substance of the
understandings reached had there been eective consultation. These complaints
indicate that congressional assertiveness was directly attributable to the lack of
consultation by the Carter administration (see also Sutter 1983). However, under
the American constitutional structure, it is extremely dicult to clearly distinguish
the institutional from the partisan. As Crabb (1957: 67, italics original) observed,
Relations between the presidency and the Congress as institutions are bound
to have a direct and often decisive bearing upon the relations between the
party in power and the opposition, if for no other reason than that the
President is automatically the leader of his party and that his leadership
extends into the sphere of legislation.
14 During his campaign, candidate Reagan sent his running mate, George H. W.
Bush, to Beijing to reassure the Chinese that he did not intend to make any
changes in U.S.Taiwan relations. On August 25, 1980, the day Bush returned
from China, Reagan held a news conference at which he issued a major statement
on U.S.China relations. After arming his interest in developing U.S.China
relations, he declared, I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship
we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not ocial (quoted in
Washington Post 1980). After he was sworn in, Reagan began to discuss sales of
FX ghter jets to Taiwan. With strong warnings from Beijing, however, Reagan
backed down and signed a communiqu with Beijing on August 17, 1982, which
papered over disagreements over arms sales to Taiwan for the time being but did
not solve the issue to the satisfaction of either side (see Barnett 1981; Harding
1992: 10819; McClaran 2000). The communiqu also became a sore in the eyes of
die-hard Taiwan supporters on Capitol Hill who have since repeatedly tried in vain
to introduce legislation declaring that the TRA supersedes the communiqu on
arms sales to Taiwan.
15 Bushs 1992 decision to sell Taiwan 150 F-16 ghter jets had something to do with
congressional pressure, but Congresss role in the sales appeared to be marginal
(Mann 1999: 264268; Yang 2000: 176185). Mann (2001: 207) pointed out that
Congress was not the driving force behind the sale and that legislative involve-
ment was limited almost exclusively to the Texas delegation. Texas legislators,
most notably Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Representative Joe Barton, lobbied hard
for the sales after Bush announced his decision, because thousands of jobs at
Texas-based General Dynamics would be saved. However, the primary reason
behind Bushs decision seems to be Taiwans deteriorating security vis--vis
China, with the latter having acquired advanced Su-27 ghter jets (Bush 2004:
172 Notes
184). Nonetheless, the timing of the sales was largely determined by the pressure
of Bushs 1992 presidential campaign (Friedman 1992; Schmitt 1992), as Texas is
Bushs home state with a large number of electoral votes. In the nal analysis,
then, Bushs decision appears to be a mix of security concerns, constituency inter-
ests, and electoral politics.
16 The language in the TRA reads as follows:
Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United
States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the
approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and
enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby
rearmed as objectives of the U.S.
17 Wichita, Kansas, is perhaps the best example of local dependence on the military-
industrial complex. Known as the Air Capitol, Wichita is home to four major
aircraft manufacturers: Boeing, Cessna, Raytheon, and Bombardier-Learjet. They
turned out be among the ten largest employers in Wichita in 2004, with Boeing
topping the list. Together, the four manufacturers employed 30,000 people,
or more than 10 percent of non-agricultural labor force in Wichita (Frank 2004:
5556; Thomson 2006; Wikipedia 2006).
18 Back in the 1980s, the U.S. ran a huge trade decit with Taiwan, which reached a
record high of US$17 billion in 1987. Among Taiwans exports to the U.S., textile
products made up a large proportion17 percent of the total at the peak year of
1982. Under pressure from textile industries, some members began to propose
tough measures to address their woes, and Taiwan, along with the other three
Asian Tigers, was often singled out in legislation aimed at curbing textile imports
(CQ Almanac 1985: 256; CQ Almanac 1987; 640641).
19 However, not all constituency economic interests will lead to congressional support
for Taiwan, as illuminated by congressional actions respecting a seemingly peri-
pheral issue: driftnet shing. Running as deep as 30 feet and as long as 40 miles per
stretch, driftnet poses serious dangers to marine life as well as navigation. Taiwan,
among others, had a large driftnet shing eet. Fishermen from Alaska, Washing-
ton, Oregon, and California complained that their salmon were pirated by these
driftnets and pressured Congress to take actions. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska,
albeit a strong Taiwan supporter, introduced an amendment to the National
Defense Authorization Act of 1991 that would suspend U.S. military sales to
Taiwan until the driftnet issue was resolved. The other Senator from Alaska,
Frank Murkowski, who was also a staunch supporter of Taiwan, expressed his
support for the Stevens amendment because of constituency interests (Yang 2000:
159161). As insignicant as this episode may appear in U.S.Taiwan relations, it
clearly shows the extent of constituency inuence on members of Congress, even
on those who otherwise have been long-time supporters of Taiwan.
20 Scholars have used a variety of interest group ratings such as National Journals
foreign policy scale (Leogrande and Brenner 1993) and American Security Coun-
cils (ASC) National Security Index (Lindsay 1990; Ray 1981). The published ASC
ratings go back to 1998 (Sharp 2000) and the ASCs website has only ratings for
the 108th Congress.
21 The aggregate voting score for 19982000 is based on 25 selected votes in the
House. They include the vote on HR 1838, which is also one of the two Taiwan
votes I examine. For this reason, I recalculated the voting score excluding the vote
on HR 1838. This does not change the statistical ndings.
22 Scholars have used a wide variety of measures of the militaryindustrial complex
(Clotfelter 1970; Cobb 1969; Gray and Gregory 1968; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985). I
tried federal defense expenditure in each state and federal expenditure for salaries
of civilian and military personnel, and the results remain the same.
Notes 173
23 This explains why in most previous studies of defense policy voting, hawkishness
or similar measures of ideology (e.g., jingoism or ADA scores) have the largest
estimated impact, whereas party usually has marginal or no impact at all (e.g.,
Bozeman and James 1975; Cobb 1969; Leogrande and Brenner 1993; Lindsay
1990; Ray 1981; Wayman 1985).
24 The correlation between raw DW score and hawkishness is 0.894 and signicant at
0.01. This is strong evidence that liberals tend to be doves and conservatives to be
hawks. This also explains why I do not include the two variables in the same
equation.
25 There is evidence for this speculation. I construct an aggregate voting index for
each state delegation in the House on the basis of the two votes and the PNTR
vote. It turns out that the most consistent and strongest supporters of free trade
with China and U.S.Taiwan relations are IA, KS, LA, MT, NE, SD, TX, and WY,
all of which are strongholds of the Republican Party and rely signicantly on
China for their agricultural exports.
26 One explanation for the weak eects of the military-industrial complex is that
military spending is deliberately steered away from states with dovish congressmen
to states with hawkish representatives. Another explanation is that voters in states
with signicant stakes in military spending may elect hawkish members. Lindsay
(1990: 944945) oered persuasive rebuttal of the two arguments.
27 For example, the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Commun-
ist China to the United Nations, an inuential China lobby organization, had
its headquarters on Capitol Hill and a number of Congressmen including Repre-
sentatives Walter Judd (R-MN) and Francis Walter (D-PA) and Senators Paul
Douglas (D-IL) and Kenneth Keating (R-NY) served on its Steering Committee
(see Bachrack 1976).
28 Senator William Knowland (R-CA) and Representative Walter Judd (R-MN) are
perhaps the best examples. Knowland is known as the senator from Formosa due
to his staunch support of Taiwan, and Judd devoted his life to a crusade for China
and Taiwan because of his missionary years in China (see Bachrack 1976; Edwards
1990).

1 Cohen (1987) oers the best and most comprehensive analysis of U.S. human
rights policy toward China in the 1970s and 1980s and her focus is on the executive
branch, not Congress. She singled out the information gap, sheer numbers,
absence of a lobby, and prejudices in Chinas favor as the primary factors for
the exemption of China from U.S. human rights policy. Under the prejudices in
favor of China, she included strategic cooperation between the two countries,
which muted congressional criticism of Chinas human rights. Another factor,
which at that time was emphasized more by administration ocials than by mem-
bers of Congress but which will have decisive impact on congressional debate on
MFN renewal after 1989, is the potential loss of trade resulting from an aggressive
human rights policy.
2 For example, in 1975, a one-year ceiling was placed on military aid to South
Korea. Since 1975, ceilings had been placed on economic aid to Chile and military
aid was prohibited. Military aid to Uruguay was prohibited in 1976. Congress
prohibited all military aid, including military training, to Argentina in the early
period of the Carter administration. Military aid to Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Brazil was also prohibited after the three countries voiced objection to congres-
sional criticism of their human rights practices. Congress also cut back military
grant aid to the Philippines and prohibited military aid to Nicaragua.
3 The U.S. and the former Soviet Union signed a trade agreement on October 18,
174 Notes
1972, that would have granted MFN status to the latter. Shortly before the trade
agreement was concluded, the Soviets imposed a prohibitively expensive exit tax
on emigration. Since most Soviet emigrants were Jews, this exit tax became a
formidable restriction on Jewish emigration. In reaction, Senator Jackson
launched a relentless campaign against granting MFN to the Soviets, hence the
JacksonVanik Amendment to the 1974 Omnibus Trade Bill. In January 1975, the
Soviets notied Washington that they would reject the trade agreement, including
MFN status. It was not until June 1990 that the Soviet Union was granted MFN
(see Willkie 1994: 119124).
4 According to Willkie (1994), geopolitical considerations were only part of Jacksons
dierential treatment of China. Jackson repeatedly expressed his concerns about
using China for short-term strategic advantages vis--vis the former Soviet Union.
He seemed to have a long-term version of China, a potentially powerful country
with which the U.S. should establish a constructive, and enduring . . . relation-
ship (quoted in ibid.: 126).
5 Congress did take some actions. For example, the Congressional Friends of
Human Rights Monitors took up the case of a Chinese dissident in 1984. In the
same year a member of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus introduced a
resolution respecting Chinese persecution of Christians (Cohen 1987: 525).
6 According to Mann (1999), it was the Chinese students studying in the U.S., not
members of Congress, who rst came up with the idea of revoking Chinas
MFN. No student at that time would have realized that they were starting a
series of annual legislative battles that would continue through most of the decade
and would prove far more enduring than the Chinese student movement itself
(ibid.: 231).
7 Emigration has never been a major issue for China in the MFN debate. When it
was rst brought up during Dengs 1979 visit to Washington, D.C., Deng said to
President Carter, If you want me to release ten million Chinese to come to the
United States, Id be glad to do so(quoted in Cohen 1987: 458). That eectively
ended any further discussion about Chinas emigration policy. In fact, given
Chinas enormous population, many administration ocials were wary of a literal
interpretation of the JacksonVanik amendment.
8 Senator Bob Dole is arguably the most famous supporter of Chinas MFN. He
has consistently extolled the commercial benets of extending MFN for China,
particularly for his home state of Kansas (CQWR 1996: 1232).
9 It should be noted that the Chinese government also adopted various tactics to
keep its MFN status. On the one hand, Beijing signed a six-month contract with
Hill and Knowlton, a Washington-based PR rm, to boost its images among
lawmakers (Lee 1991). On the other hand, China initiated a series of buying
sprees to demonstrate the importance of the Chinese market. For example, in early
1993 the Chinese purchased nearly US$1 billion worth of planes, cars, and oil
equipment (Southerland 1993). The ultimate purpose of dangling large contracts
in front of American businesses is to motivate American business community to
exert political inuence over their own government. This is the so-called strategy
of play barbarians o against barbarians, used by the Chinese back in the
colonial times. And the strategy has proven very eective, as reected in the emer-
gence of a new China lobby on Capitol Hill representing Boeing, GE, Wal-Mart,
wheat growers and the like and in the lobbys success in keeping Chinas MFN
status (Weisskopf 1993).
10 In addition to the 12 votes on joint resolutions to revoke MFN, there were 11
House votes on three bills that set conditions for MFN renewal: three votes on
HR 4939 in 1990, four votes on HR 2212 in 1991 and 1992, two votes on HR 5318
in 1992, and two votes on HR 4590 in 1994. The Senate had nine MFN-related
votes. I will not give details about the Senate votes because I analyze only House
Notes 175
votes. Readers who are interested in the determinants of roll call voting on HR
2212 are encouraged to see my article in American Politics Research (Xie 2006).
11 There were 32 House votes on Chinas human rights in the House. With the
exception of the six votes on funding to the United Nations Population Fund,
three votes on denying visas to Chinese ocials involved in religious persecution
or forced abortion, and one vote on inter-chamber dierence on the Emergency
Chinese Immigration Relief Act (HR 2712), all the votes were unanimous or
nearly unanimous.
12 Andrew Nathan (1994) had a dierent assessment of the usefulness of MFN
linkage, based on the fact that the Chinese strongly protested against conditional
MFN or outright revocation, made concessions like release of political prisoners
days before presidential renewal of MFN, and used various lobbying tactics to
maintain unconditional MFN, including hiring PR rms (Lee 1991) and placing
high-prole purchase orders (Southerland 1993). He thus concluded, But the
vigor of Chinese rhetoric and lobbying against MFN withdrawal and the timing
of major Chinese concessions show that the MFN threat has been the single most
important element in the eectiveness of Western policy (Nathan 1994: 89).

1 In 2005, Congress passed HR 1053 authorizing presidential extension of MFN to
Ukraine, but the vote was a nearly unanimous 4172, which leaves no room for
analysis of variation in voting. Hence I do not include the case of Ukraine.
2 In 1983, Congress postponed indenitelythus killingresolutions to deny
Reagans renewal of MFN status for China, Hungary, and Romania. The House
postponed H.Res.256 rejecting MFN for Romania by a vote of 279126 and post-
poned resolutions on China and Hungary (H.Res.257 and H.Res.258 respectively)
by voice votes (CQ Almanac 1983: 264265).
3 The UAW, as well as U.S. automobile companies, supported the U.S.Canada
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, while independent parts manufacturers
opposed the trade bill on the ground that it would increase the dominance of the
Big Three (CQ Almanac 1965: 510). This may explain why Union Strength is not
statistically signicant in this vote.
8 Conclusion
1 In retrospect, there appears to be more to it than merely partisan motivations in
Democratic criticism of Bushs China policy. Some Democrats, notably George
Mitchell, Nancy Pelosi, and Dick Gephart stuck to the same position on China
policy even after Clinton took oce. Take George Mitchell, for example. Mitchell
would later become nearly as much of a problem for a Democratic president, Bill
Clinton, as he had been for the Republicans, Mann observed (1999: 199). He
was genuinely outraged by the Chinese repression; he believed in what he was
doing. But for many others Democrats, the conclusion seems inescapable that
. . . the MFN disputes of the Bush years had been primarily an issue of partisan
politics.
2 The case of Taiwanese-Americans is one example of ethnic pressure. While the
number of Taiwanese-Americans is very small, they are well organized and have
easy access to Congress because of the historical ties between Taiwan and the U.S.
In the 1980s, a number of Taiwanese groups lobbied Congress to pay more atten-
tion to Taiwans human rights conditions and they were successful in bringing
Congress to bear on the political regime on the island (Bush 2004: Chapter 6).
3 There are some members who pursue human rights for personal or partisan
reasons. Steven Solarz and George Mitchell are examples of the former, while
176 Notes
Ron Brown and other Democrats in the Bush years are examples of the latter.
Moreover, Congresss human rights crusade in the 1970s was also partly motivated
by a desire to rein in the runaway executive branch in Vietnam and Latin America.
As Forsythe (1988: 26) wrote,
In short, what an observer may fairly and properly call a human rights vote
may not be seen as a purely human rights vote by any given member of
Congress. A member may view it as a test of power between Congress and the
president, or of national versus international jurisdiction, or of economic
versus idealistic considerations, or of security versus morality, and so on.
Nevertheless, these various motivations do not refute the observation that it is in
the interest of members to take a pro-human rights position.
4 Keller (1997a; 1997b) oered some journalistic accounts of Chinese lobbying by
organizing congressional delegations.
5 Commenting on the strength and sophistication of the Taiwan lobby, Charles
Freeman (quoted in Tucker 2001: 338) described how Taiwan skillfully played the
constituency card. Even if it was a Q-Tip cotton swab, according to Freeman, the
Taiwanese made sure that the congressman from the district where cotton was
grown knew Taiwan bought the cotton swab. By contrast, in 1980, the Chinese
were buying one out of seven bales of cotton produced in the U.S. but no one was
aware of this, except the Board of Trade at Chicago and the cotton traders.
6 For a good review of the arguments about the China threat, see Roy (1996). For a
more benign view of the rise of China, see Spence (2005) and Zakaria (2005). For
a critical view of how the China threat is played up by the neoconservatives, see
Klare (2005). Pei (2005) is much more pessimistic about the rise of China, arguing
instead that Chinas political system prevents it from becoming a real superpower.
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Index
Acheson, Dean 81, 169 with 124, 126127

AFL-CIO 167168 Capitol Hill 15, 30, 34; anti-Communism
Albright, Madeline 56 36; Chiang Kai-shek 80; Chinas
American Institute on Taiwan 8586, 97 human rights 58, 108; Chinas PNTR
anti-Communism: Chiang Kai-sheks 66, 69; Chinese human rights lobbies
record of 80; impact on roll call voting 106107; Chinese lobby 154, 174;
129131, 135, 141; measure of 38; criticism of engagement policy 51;
Taiwans bond with Congress 97 critics of Chinas human rights 54, 58;
anti-secession 6, 151 Deng Xiaopings visit to 105; Jiang
arms embargo 6, 32, 40, 158 Zemins visit to 26; Madame Chiang
Asia and Pacic, Subcommittee on Kai-shek 80; MFN renewal for China
8788, 96 30, 130; Taiwan lobby 9899, 153, 171,
AuCoin, Les 63, 105 173; trade with China 9, 77
Carter, Jimmy: establishment of
Baucus, Max 49, 100, 112, 143, 152 diplomatic relations with China 34, 51,
Bellocchi, Nat 97 84, 171; human rights policy toward
Bereuter, Doug 38, 83, 88, 96, 167 China 100104; meeting with Deng
bicameralism 9, 10, 14, 43, 48, 51, 149; Xiaoping 174; promotion of PNTR
cooling saucer 163; policy implications 67; secret diplomacy 81, 171; U.S.-
of 17; presidential dominance 51; China trade agreement 63; veto of HR
structural dierences 17, 143 2521 166
Biden, Joseph 86, 166 Cassidy 9899
Bonior, David 70, 83, 170 Center for Security Policy 91, 159
Bonker, Don 120 Chiang Kai-shek: military and economic
Bush, George H.W.: Democratic aid to 51; wife of 80
criticism of 150; kowtowing to Beijing China Aid Act 1, 5, 80, 98, 170
111; MFN extension to Hungary 128, China bloc 36, 8081, 84, 87, 98, 165, 169
140; policy of business as usual China card 107
6465; pressure from Congress on China lobby 98, 169, 173174
Taiwan policy 84; renewal of Chinas China White Paper 81
MFN 109, 111112, 145146, 162; Chinese Exclusion Act 1
Republican loyalty to 145; sales of F- Chinese Foreign Ministry 7
16 jetghters to Taiwan 145, 171172; Clinton, Bill: arms sales to Taiwan 56;
veto and override, 46, 5052, 107, 114, campaign for Chinas PNTR 6467,
116, 143, 145 96; engagement with China 64, 111,
Bush, George W. 40, 150, 167 119, 150; executive order linking MFN
Byrd, Robert 64 and Chinas human rights 119, 121,
128; illegal Chinese campaign
Canada: roll call votes on 132; U.S. trade donations 30, 119, 165; lobbying
200 Index
against Murkowski amendment 55, Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief
8687; MFN renewal for China 64, Act 50, 108, 116, 162, 175
150; MFN renewal for Vietnam 129; English, Phil 63
renewal of fast track authority 168; European Union 6, 32, 40, 153
summit with Jiang Zemin 2627, 49, evil empire 111112
55; Taiwan policy 8487; Three-Nos export control 12, 28, 158, 165; bills
151; visa to Lee Teng-hui 35, 55, regarding 2931, 34
8788; votes on Chinas MFN renewal Export-Import Bank 63, 66, 158
114, 116119, 140, 145; votes on
Chinas PNTR 7375, 145 fast track authority 76, 122, 168
Committee for Democracy on Taiwan 87 libuster 49, 163, 166
Committee of One Million against the Finance, Committee on 49, 68, 163
Admission of Communist China to forced abortion 2627, 32, 105, 175
the United Nations 173 forced labor 65, 74
Constituency inuence 3, 19, 22; defense foreign assistance 28, 32, 45, 102,
policy 148; foreign policy 2223; see 159
also electoral connection Formosa Resolution 5, 79, 81, 158
Constituency interests 10, 67 129, 135, Frank, Barney 105
147149; congressional responsiveness Fraser, Donald 103, 169
to 22; foreign trade 69, 77; impact on free trade: constituency interests 77; fast
roll call voting 4, 11, 19, 24, 7273, 94, track authority 76; House-Senate
97; measures of 72, 91; Taiwan policy dierence 7677; impact on American
90, 172; U.S.-China trade 91 jobs 76; labor union 21, 69; Max
Constituency opinion: impact on roll Baucus 49; opposition to 76; party
call voting 2425, 161; measures of division over 2021, 69, 73, 136, 151;
164; methodological issues concerning support for 49, 7577, 155
24 Freeman, Charles 153, 176
Cox, Christopher 35, 47, 55, 165
Cox Committee 7 Garn, Jake 84
Cox Report 7, 35, 165 gatekeeping rights 1516, 49, 143, 163
Craig, Thomas 49, 143, 152 GATT (General Agreement on Trade
Crane, Philip 64, 128, 131, 140, 165 and Tari): Chinas membership in
167; party division over 7374, 168;
Dalai Lama 53, 152, 158, 166 roll call votes on 75
DeConcini, Dennis 107 Gephardt, Richard 26, 70, 105
decit, U.S. trade: Canada 126; China 9, Gibbons, Sam 64, 112, 118, 131
32, 6163, 74, 77, 119, 130, 147; Japan Gilman, Benjamin 47, 4950, 56, 88, 143,
125126; Mexico 127; Taiwan 172; the 165, 167
world 126 Glenn, John 8, 86, 171
DeLay, Tom 26, 82, 165 Goldwater, Barry 84, 87
Democratic Party 20, 69, 75, 169 Gore, Al 168
Deng Xiaoping 5, 105, 162, 174 Graham, Lindsey 6, 63, 77, 150, 155
Derwinski, Edward 104 Grassley, Chuck 60, 67
divided government 35, 39, 41, 96, 108
Dixon, Alan 108 Hamilton, Lee 155
Dole, Bob 57, 112, 166167, 174; hearings 15, 19, 2728, 50; on Chinas
amendment by 86 human rights 5758, 102
Dole-Stone amendment 171 Helms, Jesse 36, 47, 5657, 111, 149, 164,
Dornan, Robert 104 167
Dreier, David 96 Holbrooke, Richard 101
Hong Kong 34, 67, 111, 164
electoral connection: House-Senate human rights: bills regarding 29, 31, 104;
dierence 22; human rights 120; campaign for 52, 101103, 176;
Taiwan policy 97; trade issues 77 Chinese violation of 30, 57, 101, 103,
Index 201
106, 128; conict with other policies impact on roll call voting 67, 135;
120, 147; double standards 121; NAFTA 135136; PNTR 66, 6869,
exemption of China from 101104; 76, 136, 168
impact on roll call voting 135, 137, Lantos, Tom 47, 78, 167
141; Jimmy Carter 101; lobbies Leach, James 87
106107; Richard Nixon 101; roll call Lee Teng-hui 35, 55, 87
votes on 113, 175; Romanian Lenovo 6
violation of 128, 140; strategies to Levin, Carl 87, 167
promote 102, 113, 152; Taiwan 29, 34, Lieberman, Joe 88
87, 158, 168169, 175; Tibet 54, 57, Lilley, James 101
104, 166 Lord, Winston 105, 121
Hungary: MFN renewal for 128, Lott, Trent 47
148149; roll call votes on 128,
131132; U.S. trade with 130 Macao 164
Hyde, Henry 6 majority cycling 15
Manseld, Mike 63, 80
ideology: attributes of 2122, 164; Manton, Thomas 81
correlation with party 24, 71; impact Markey, Edward 107
on roll call voting 34, 1112, 24, 73, Mathis, Dawson 47, 102
94, 173; measure of 93, 146, 173; Matsui, Robert 112
predictor of foreign policy voting 146; McCurdy, Dave 105
sources of data on 159 McIntyre, Thomas 63
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 12, 21, Mexico: comparison with China 137; roll
32, 64, 112 call votes on 132; U.S. trade with 124,
interest group 54, 99, 161, 172 127
International Operations, Subcommittee Mexico City policy 164; see also
on 58, 120 KempInouyeHelms amendment
International Relations, Committee on MFN: bills regarding 2932; executive
27, 49, 56, 83 order 111, 119, 121, 128; Hungary
12830; joint resolutions to disapprove
Jackson, Henry 103, 162, 174 of 11, 3031, 109110, 113, 120, 174;
Jackson-Vanik Amendment: emigration linkage with human rights 4849, 54,
requirement 57, 108, 128, 174; former 111112, 119, 121, 153; opposition to
Soviet Union 103, 173174; 111, 128; presidential veto 48, 5052,
procedures of 167; removal of China 108109, 112; Romania 128, 132, 137;
from 65, 167 unconditional renewal of 49, 58, 111,
Japan: economic sanctions against China 119, 150, 175; Vietnam 128129,
153; roll call votes on 132; U.S. trade 131132
with 124127; UAW 136 military-industrial complex 89, 91, 97,
Javits, Jacob 171 172173
Jiang Zemin: meeting with members of Miller, Clem 16
Congress 26; summit with Bill Clinton missile technology 30, 119, 165
55; visit to the U.S. 7, 27, 34 Mitchell, George 175
Johnson, Lyndon 127 Moynihan, Patrick 57, 111, 167
Murkowski, Frank 84, 88, 172
KempInouyeHelms amendment 164; Murkowski Amendment 55 145
see also Mexico City policy
Kennedy, Edward 87, 107 NAFTA (North America Free Trade
Kissinger, Henry 58, 67, 101, 154 Agreement): congressional debate
Knowland, William 170, 173 about 127, 136; labor union opposition
Korean War 36, 169 to 135136; Mexico 127; party division
over 73; roll call votes on 7475;
labor union: Chinas MFN renewal Senate passage of 76
113114; Democratic Party 21, 69, 75; Nanking Treaty 167
202 Index
National Oshore Oil Corporation Republican Party 20, 69, 173
(NOOC) 6 Richardson, Bill 105
Negroponte, John 101 Roemer, Tim 112
new institutionalism 12, 13, 48; Rogers, Mike 63
application of 4, 9, 10, 142; insights Rohrabacher, Dana 47, 88, 107
from 14; prediction of 10 Romania: MFN renewal for 128, 137;
Nixon, Richard: visit to China 5, 37, 103, roll call votes on 132, 140; U.S. trade
129 with 130
normalization 5, 34, 42, 64, 84, 102103; Rose, Charlie 167
Bushs involvement in 51; Congresss Rostenkowski, Dan 112, 128, 131
role in 8 Roth, Stanley 98, 153154
North Korea 12, 79 rule of anticipated reactions 5557
nuclear secrets: Chinese theft of 7, 30, Ryan, Tim 63
119, 165
nuclear technology: Chinese transfer to sanctions 27, 46, 105106, 121, 152153,
Iran 26; Chinese transfer to Middle 167
East countries 158; transfer to China Sasser, James 8
27 Scarborough, Joe 26
Schulze, Richard 64, 111, 128
OPICO (Overseas Private Investment Schumer, Charles 6, 63, 77, 150, 155
Corporation) 5354 Shanghai Communiqu 55
Silver Purchase Act 21, 162
Pallone, Frank 83, 170 Smith, Chris 26, 47, 70, 111, 166;
Panetta, Leon 105 hearings on Chinas human rights 58
party leadership 4, 19, 23, 170 Smith, Gordon 6
Pease, Donald 51 87 Solarz, Stephen 47, 87, 121, 175
Pell, Claiborne 47, 8788, Solomon, Gerald 47, 85, 88, 107, 111,
Pelosi, Nancy 26, 70, 112113, 175; 165
sponsor of China bills 5051, 54; Solomon, Richard 120
Taiwan 88 Soviet Union (former) 2, 101; demise of
PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade 11, 107108; MFN status for 57,
Relations): Bill Clinton 64, 73; linkage 103104, 167, 173174; strategic
with Taiwan policy 83; opposition to alliance against 11, 103, 120, 128, 144
6970, 76, 136, 168; support for 6768, Stevens, Ted 172
136, 147; votes on 65 Stone, Richard 63
Porter, John 167 substantive legislation 19, 5657
Pritchard, Joel 104
procedural legislation 19, 55, 5758 Taiwan: anti-secession law 6; arms sales
public opinion 17, 108, 161; favorable to 12, 55, 84, 144, 8990, 99, 164, 171;
toward China 36, 38, 4041; framing bills regarding 3032, 34, 47; 82;
of 19, 55, 58; impact on China policy congressional support for 5, 24, 30, 98,
25, 3637; impact on public policy 24, 151, 156; 162, 172; constituency
36; measure of 25; responsiveness to interests 91, 172, 176; democratization
24, 37, 98; signicance of 24 24, 97, 156; Frank Murkowski 55, 84,
88 145, 172; human rights 29, 34, 87,
Radio Free Asia 27, 50, 55 169, 175; Lee Teng-hui 35, 55, 87;
Rangel, Charlie 168 lobby 9899, 153, 176; roll call votes
Reagan, Ronald: human rights policy on 8283, 8586; U.S. military
toward China 101; Mexico City policy relations with 49, 81, 84, 93; U.S. trade
164; opposition to auto domestic with 29, 90, 172; Walter Judd 80, 173;
content bills 136; renewal of MFN William Knowland 170, 173
status for Romania 128, 140, 175; Taiwan Relations Act: arms sales under
support for Taiwan 5, 84, 171 55, 164; bipartisan support for 84, 171;
Regula, Ralph 64 congressional debate of 34, 87;
Index 203
executive-legislative skirmish over 81, U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile
84, 171; Jesse Helms 164; language on Defense Cooperation Act 11, 35, 82
human rights 87, 172; partisan division U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty 79,
over 84; roll call votes on 8586; 81, 84
signicance of 81
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act 11, Vandenberg, Arthur 170
35, 56, 82, 145 veto 911, 14, 1718, 42, 163; George
tari: Generalized System of Preference H.W. Bush, 5052; impact on China
167; on Chinese products 6, 51, 63, policy 112, 143; Jimmy Carter 166
111, 150, 158 Vietnam: MFN renewal for 128129,
Three Nos 151 131; roll call votes on 132, 137, 140;
Tiananmen Incident: bills introduced U.S. trade with 130
before and after 10, 3233; impact on
Congress 5, 11, 3334, 3637, 40, Walden, Greg 67
105106; 144; passions about 116; Walter, Judd 80, 170, 173
symbol of Chinese human rights 152, Wanghia Treaty 167
155 War Powers Act 18
Tibet: bills regarding 29, 3132, 34, 47, Ways and Means, Committee on 63, 66,
53; Dalai Lama 152; human rights 54, 83, 112113, 128, 131, 168
57, 104, 106, 152, 166 weapons proliferation 74, 77, 112, 144
Truman, Harry: aid to Chiang Kai-shek White House: alliance with free trade
36, 51, 80, 169; comparison with supporters 113, 155; disagreements
Clinton 52; reelection of 83; with Congress on China policy 35, 64;
Republican criticism of 35, 40, 52, 80, engagement with China 109; party
8384, 146, 150, 169 control of 3738
WHO (World Health Organization) 54
UAW (United Auto Workers) 125, 127, Wilson, Woodrow 13, 1517, 43, 48, 122
136, 175 Woord, Harris 107
Unied government 35, 96 Wolf, Frank 6, 60, 111, 128, 140;
United Nations: Chinas admission to 5, amendment by 132, 137, 140
36, 98, 169; Taiwans admission to 88 WTO (World Trade Organization):
Unocal Corporation 6 Chinas accession to 28, 6467, 76,
UNPF (United Nations Population 9596, 154, 158, 168; Taiwans
Fund): bills regarding 2931, origin of accession to 65; withdrawal of 158; see
the controversy 164165 also PNTR
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 126,
131 Zablocki, Clement 28, 85
U.S.-China Act: of 1991 50; of 1992 51 Zhu Rongji 64

US-China Relations China Policy On Capitol Hill PDF

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U.S.

Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China

Hong Kongs Tortuous Democratization

Chinas Business Reforms

Challenges for Chinas Development

New Crime in China

Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China

Globalization and the Chinese City

The Politics of Chinas Accession to the World Trade Organization

Politics in China Since 1949

International Human Resource Management in Chinese Multinationals

China and Africa

Gender and Education in China

Human Security and the Chinese State

Gender and Work in Urban China

Chinas State Enterprise Reform

Cultural Heritage Management in China

Paying for Progress

Hong Kong, China

China Turns to Multilateralism

Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition

Chinas Emerging Cities

China-US Relations Transformed

The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century

Political Change in Macao

Chinas Energy Geopolitics

Regime legitimacy in contemporary China

ISBN 0-203-89014-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0415776880 (hbk)

1 The new institutionalism and legislative behavior 13

2 Congressional eorts to punish China 26

3 Eects of congressional activism on China policy 43

4 Congress and U.S.China trade relations 60

5 Congress and Taiwan 78

6 Congress and Chinas human rights 100

7 Beyond the case of China 122

Appendix: Sources 157

2.1 Classication of China bills (including amendments),

2.1 House China bills by policy and type, 19732006 29

In the process of researching the book, I have accumulated an enormous debt

While the executive branch is constitutionally charged with the management

The U.S.China relationship is arguably the most important international

Congress and foreign policy2

But especially after 1989, Congresss involvement in China policy was

In May 2006, under pressure from Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA),

Not surprisingly, Beijing has consistently viewed Congress as the anti-China

Contributions of the book

Structure of the book

When anyone refers to a congressional view on a matter such as this

Starting with Mayhews (1974) path-breaking work, the study of Congress

The new institutionalism

The fate of bills committed is generally not uncertain. As a rule, a bill

Moreover, gatekeeping rightsalong with possible committee-oor similar-

But the general security against a graduate concentration of the several

The Constitution that was ratied in 1787 epitomizes Madisons theory of

Determinants of roll call voting on foreign policy

Collection of China bills

Number and nature of China bills

Table 2.1 House China bills by policy and type, 19732006

Concurrent Simple Joint Bill Amendment Total

Taiwan 112 21 5 22 7 167

Concurrent Simple Joint Bill Amendment Total

Figure 2.1 Classication of China bills (including amendments), 19732006.