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OTHERBODIESANDOTHERMINDSIN
EDITHSTEIN:
OR,HOWTOTALKABOUTEMPATHY
JUDYMILES
projection. My aim here is to show that it is not only correct to talk about
problems about the Other that any other view of empathy would leave
untouched.
contemplation.Thisdefinitionhasitsoriginintheaestheticsofthe19thcentury
GermanpsychologistTheodorLippsanditwashisworkthatservedasthebasis
forEdithSteins1916phenomenologicalanalysisofempathy.Lippspromoteda
theoryofEinfhlung(translatedasempathy)thataccountedforhowwecan
comprehendanaestheticexperienceoraworkofart.Heclaimedthatweproject
1
ourselves into the work in order to understand it. Arnulf Zweig summarizes
sympathetic projection into objects or persons distinct from the agent. 1 Stein
points out in her autobiography, Life in a Jewish Family, that What Husserl,
detailedexactlywhatempathyis,EdithSteinsetouttodoso.Shespellsouther
methodinthefirstparagraphofherdissertation:
Allcontroversyoverempathyisbasedontheimpliedassumptionthatforeignsubjects
and their experience are given to us. Thinkers deal with the circumstances of the
occurrence, the effects, and the legitimacy of this givenness. But the most immediate
undertaking is to consider the phenomenon of givenness in and by itself and to
investigateitsessence.3
Steinconcludesthissectionbysaying,
All these data of foreign experience point back to the basic nature of acts in which
foreignexperienceiscomprehended.Wenowwanttodesignatetheseactsasempathy,
regardless of all historical traditions attached to the word. To grasp and describe these
actsinthegreatestessentialgeneralitywillbeourfirstundertaking.4
SoempathyforSteinistheactofgraspingforeignexperienceandshe
aimstodescribewhatthisgraspingconsistsin.Shedescribestheessenceof
empathybycomparingitwithotheracts:
Letustakeanexampletoillustratethenatureoftheactofempathy.Afriendtellsme
thathehaslosthisbrotherandIbecomeawareofhispain.Whatkindofanawarenessis
this?IamnotconcernedherewithgoingintothebasisonwhichIinferthepain.Perhaps
hisfaceispaleanddisturbed,hisvoicetonelessandstrained.Perhapshealsoexpresses
his pain in words. Naturally, these things can all be investigated, but they are not my
2
concernhere.Iwouldliketoknow,nothowIarriveatthisawareness,butwhatititself
is.5
certainlyhavenoouterordirectperceptionofanotherspain.Ourexperienceof
our own pain is what Stein calls a primordial or firsthand experience. Our
awarenessofanotherspainisnonprimordialorsecondhandbuttheexperience
we have of becoming aware of his pain (our awareness of our awareness ofhis
pain) is itself, of course, primordial for us. So the empathized experience the
painoftheOtherinthiscaseisnonprimordialforus.Buthispainthatwhich
wearetryingtograspisofcourseprimordialforthepersonwithwhomweare
primordial one. Our own experiences, too, can be nonprimordial for us when
they are given in memory, expectation or fantasy. Stein describes this in the
followingexample:
Iactivelybringtomindaformerjoy,forexample,ofapassedexamination.Itransfer
myselfintoit,i.e.,Iturntothejoyfuleventanddepictittomyselfinallitsjoyfulness.
SuddenlyInoticethatI,thisprimordial,rememberingI,amfullofjoy.Irememberthe
joyfuleventandtakeprimordialjoyintherememberedevent.However,thememoryjoy
andthememoryIhavevanishedor,atmost,persistbesidetheprimordialjoyandthe
primordialI.Naturally,thisprimordialjoyoverpasteventscanalsooccurdirectly.This
wouldbeamererepresentationoftheeventwithoutmyrememberingtheformerjoyor
makingatransitionfromtherememberedtotheprimordialevent.Finally,Imaybe
primordiallyjoyfuloverthepastjoy,makingthedifferencebetweenthesetwoacts
especiallyprominent.6
3
Noticethatthisisallaboutonesreflectionononesownexperience.The
verysameprocedure,however,occurswhentheobjectofreflectionissomeone
elsesjoy.Steincontinues:
Nowletustaketheparalleltoempathy.Myfriendcomestomebeamingwithjoyand
tellsmehehaspassedhisexamination.Icomprehendhisjoyempathically;transferring
myselfintoit,Icomprehendthejoyfulnessoftheeventandamnowprimordiallyjoyful
over it myself. I can also be joyful without first comprehending the joy of the other.
Shouldtheexaminationcandidatestepintothetense,impatientfamilycircleandimpart
thejoyfulnews,inthefirstplace,theywillbeprimordiallyjoyfuloverthisnews.Only
whentheyhavebeenjoyfullongenoughthemselves,willtheybejoyfulovertheirjoy,
orperhapsasthethirdpossibility,bejoyfuloverhisjoy.Buthisjoyisneithergiventous
asprimordialjoyovertheeventnorasprimordialjoyoverhisjoy.Ratheritisgivenas
thisnonprimordialactofempathythatwehavealreadydescribedmoreprecisely. 7
Severalcontemporarywomenwritershaveraisedobjectionstothiswayof
talking about empathy, however. We have seen that the Oxford English
Dictionarydefinesempathyasthepowerofprojectingonespersonalityintothe
the masculine point of view. They write, this phallic imagery may capture the
forexampleasapeculiardescriptionoffeelingwith.8Empathizingrequires
knowing what the feelings the Other is having feel like, but it does not require
thatonesimultaneouslysharethosefeelingsassympathydoes.Myobjectionto
thesewomensobjectionliesintheirclaimthattheOEDsdefinitionofempathy,
4
which involves mental projection, somehow favors the masculine experience of
empathy.Itakethemtomean,whentheycomplainaboutphallicimagery,that
experienceinvolvingmentalprojectionnecessarilyfavorsmales.
Thisargumentseemstomeunsoundforatleasttworeasons.First,itdoes
not follow that empathy, which involves mental projection, has anything to do
with the (stereotypic) male experience of sex. I take the kind of projecting
whichempathyinvolvestobeverymuchliketheexperienceanactresshaswhen
portray and imagines what it would be like to be that person. She imagines
herself in the others place. This is necessary to being able to portray a role
convincinglyandonesskillatdoingthisiswhatdistinguishesgoodactingfrom
bad.Ifitiscorrecttomodelactsofempathyonactsofsexuality,andifempathy
is necessary to good acting, then it would seem to follow that women would
generally be better actors than men. But acting seems to be one of the few
professionsinwhichthereneverhasbeenanyclaimofagenderwarregarding
skill.Wejustdontsaythatsomeoneislikelytobegoodatactingbecauseofhis
orhergender.
5
My second point about the objection to seeing empathy as projection is
that, if one redefined empathy so that it favored the feminine point of view
(whateverthatmightbe),onewouldstillbefavoringonegenderovertheother.
Mencouldthenclaimthatthedefinitionunfairlyfavoredthefemaleexperienceof
empathyandhencedisadvantagedthem.Thiswouldnotmeanthatthedefinition
had been improved; it would only mean that men and women had exchanged
placesasthevictimsofinjustice.Thiswouldhardlybeprogress.
NelNoddings,however,doeswanttosuggestthattoredefineempathyin
favorofwomenwouldbeanimprovementovertheOEDsdefinition.Sheobjects
thatempathyisdefinedintheOEDasprojectionandclaimsthatthisisafalse
description. She says empathy (again, feeling with on her view) is more like
receptionthanprojection.Idonotproject.Ireceivetheotherintomyself,andI
seeandfeelwiththeother.9Whiletheideaofreceivingtheotherintomyself
might seem a kinder, gentler image than that of projection I think that
Noddingsdescriptionisactuallythewrongwaytotalkaboutempathyandnot
SteinsortheOEDs.
Noddings also wants to object to the claim that we put ourselves in the
othersplaceinempathizing.Butthisjustiswhatweseemtodo.Itscertainly
notthattheOtheriscomingintooursituation,asthedescriptionreceivingthem
6
into ourselves suggests. The point is that we are trying to understand another
mindoutsideourselvesamindthatisoutsideusandthatremainsitselfwhile
beingunderstoodbyus.Theexampleofanactressgettingintocharacterserves
wellagainhere.Whenwetrytounderstandanotherwetrytoputourselvesin
thatpersonsmindorsituation.Howbettertodescribethismentalactivitythan
byprojection?Steinsexampleofbeingjoyfuloversomeoneelsesjoyisclearlya
caseofputtingourselvesinthatpersonsplacenotofbringingthemintoours.
Furthermore,whileNoddingsobjectstotheimagesthewordprojectioncreates,
there is good reason to object to the image of taking the Other into myself. It
suggeststhattheOtherisbeingenvelopedbymeandthattheOthersidentityis
beingalteredorevenobliteratedastheOther.Butthisispreciselywhatwedont
want to bring about. Wedont wantto bechanging the Other in the process of
trying to comprehend the Other for then empathy would not be a way of
knowing another mind; it would simply be a way of altering it. This is the
allows one to understand a mind outside our own while permitting that other
mindtoremainasubjecttoremainitself.
SowhatnowistheadvantageofsayingwearereceivingtheOtherinto
ourselvesoversayingweareprojectingourselvesintotheOther?Simplythat
7
of getting away from the word projection. I think this redefinition is well
intentionedatbestandabsurdatworst.
So what does all this amount to? What does it really matter whether
empathyisdescribedintermsofprojectionorreception?Well,thepointIhave
just made about empathy (as traditionally defined) leaving the Other intact is
one very important implication of the definition. What is so useful about the
withoutalteringitatthesametime.Thereneedstobesuchaprovisionforusto
communicateatall,anditseemsthatempathy,astraditionallyconceived,isthe
Extensionalitysummarizessomeofhismostrelevantpointsconcerningtherole
empathyplaysinlanguageacquisition.IwillconcludebyshowinghowQuines
examplesofempathyprovidefurtherreasonforseeingempathyinthewayStein
hasdescribedit.
attitudes.Claimslike
xbelievesthatp,xhopesthatp,xsaysthatp,andtherestareinconspicuous
violationofextensionality.Wemaywellbelievethatpandnotthatq,thoughbothbe
true.
8
Whatisworse,evenscandalous,isthattheseidiomsviolatethesubstitutivityofidentity:
theputtingofequalsforequals.Howcansomethingbetrueandfalseofthesamething
underdifferentnames?
Yettheseidiomsareusefultothepointofindispensability.Moreover,Ithinktheyare
rootedintheearlieststagesoflanguage.Ipicturetheearliestidiomofpropositional
attitudeasxperceivesthatp,wherepstandsforanobservationsentencesuchasIts
raining,Thatsmilk,Thatsadog.Whenthemotherismonitoringthechilds
utteranceofsuchasentence,shehastoempathizewithhim.Sheimaginesherselfinhis
place,facinginthesamedirection,andthencheckswhethershe,thusoriented,feels
movedtovolunteerthesentenceherself.Inshort,shechecks,howeverinarticulately,
whetherthechildreallyperceivesthatitsraining,thatitsmilk,thatitsadog.This
muchinthewayofanidiomofpropositionalattitude,allunspoken,isessentialtothe
veryhandingdownoflanguagefromgenerationtogeneration;forobservationsentences
arethechildsenteringwedgetolanguage.10
QuinegoesontosaythatwhenFregewasconfrontedwiththeproblemof
recalcitrant terms have changed their reference and taken to referring to what
Quineclaimsthatempathycanhelpansweraphilosophicalquestionaboutthis
failure of substitutivity and his example suggests that he also sees empathy in
termsofputtingoneselfintheothersplace.Hecontinues:
A better solution is suggested by the mothers relation to the child in monitoring his
observationsentence;namelyempathy.Whensomeoneascribesapropositionalattitude
tosomeone,heimpersonatesthatpersontosomedegree.Thesubordinateclauseofthe
constructionisutteredfromthesubjectspointofview,somewhatasiffromthesubjects
mouth. No wonder substitutivity ofidentity fails; the subject, poor fellow, didnt know
the things were identical. Likewise for failure of extensionality: the subject would have
beenunpreparedtointerchangethetwocoextensiveclausesinquestion,simplybecause
hedidntknowtheywerecoextensive.11
9
I do not have time to discuss the full implications of Quines claim that
empathymaybetheanswertothepuzzleaboutthefailureofsubstitutivitybutI
wanted at least to mention his examples because his suggestions are such
interesting ones and because they offer further evidence that empathy is
ordinarilyunderstoodtobeprojectionandnotreception.
own. I suspect she would deny that the Other is altered or obliterated when
takenintooneself.
ButeveniftheOtherisntaltered,receptionjustdoesnotseemtobeas
natural or accurate a word for the process our minds go through in what we
typically call empathy. Projection, rather, comes up over and over in the
ourselvesintotheexperienceoftheotherasSteinsaysorweputourselvesin
theothersplaceasanactresssaysorweimpersonateorutterasiffromthe
subjectsmouthasQuinesays.
Thesedescriptionshavearingoftruthwhichdescriptionsofempathyas
receptionlack.
NOTES
10
1.EncyclopediaofPhilosophy,NewYork:Macmillan,1967,Vol.4,p.485.
2.EdithStein,LifeinaJewishFamily,Washington,DC:ICSPublications,1986,p.
277.
3.EdithStein,OntheProblemofEmpathy,3d.rev.ed.Washington,DC:ICS
Publications,1989,p.3.
4.Ibid.,p.3.
5.Ibid.,p.6.
6.Ibid.,p.13.
7.Ibid.,pp.1314.
8.MaryFieldBelenky,BlytheMcVickerClinchy,NancyRuleGoldberger,and
JillMattuckTarule,WomensWaysofKnowing,NewYork:BasicBooks,1986,p.
122.
9.NelNoddings,Caring,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984,p.30.
10.W.V.Quine,PromotingExtensionality,Synthese,98(1994),p.145.
11.Ibid.
11