Article III, Section 4
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, or the
right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
PRIOR RESTRAINT
Near v Minnesota
A publication published a
series of anti-Semitic articles
and became a nuisance. It was
permanently enjoined by the
Supreme Court from further
publication of the newspapers.
NY v US
NY times published excerpts
from a classified pentagon
study entitled history from
the US decision making
process on Vietnam policy
Nixon government claimed
such publication was a threat
to national security and seeks
injunction.
The statute is a judicial injunction which suppresses
publication and makes future publication punishable for
contempt. This is what makes it as prior restraint. Such action is
the essence of censorship.
Unless the owner/publisher is able to dispose and bring
competent evidence to satisfy judge that charges were true and
published with good motives and for justiciable ends, newspaper
and periodical is suppressed and further publication is punishable
as contempt.
Censorship or prior restraint is done by suppressing publication
and punishing as contempt further publication. In determining
the extent of constitutional protection, it has been generally
considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty of freedom
of press is to prevent previous restraints of publication.
Prior restraint principle is not an unbending rule. When prior
restraint can be applied:
1. During war, publication which obstruct the
government recruitment
2. Publication of obscene materials
3. Materials inciting to acts of violence to overthrow
government
4. Seditious speech
5. Censorship
6. Electoral process
The rule against prior restraints is not absolute; there are
exceptional cases where it is valid (such as when the security of
the community is at stake, as in times of war). Public scandal
CANNOT be considered as an exceptional case, thus the statute
holding such justification must fall.
SC did not grant injunction.
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the imposition of such a restraint.
The executive is endowed with enormous power in 2 areas
national defense and international relations.
The president has constitutionally independent power by which
the legislative and judicial branches cannot interfere.
In the absence of governmental checks and balances, in other
areas of national life, the only effective restraint LIES with an
 enlightened citizenry in an informed and critical public
opinion which alone can protect values of a democratic
government

There is no enlightened citizenry without an informed press.

Freedman v Maryland Standard for censorship to be valid

Freedman, a theatre owner,
was convicted for having
shown revenge at daybreak
without having submitted the
same to the board of censors
for prior review, as required
by the Maryland Motion Picture
censorship statute
Freedman contended that the
statute unconstitutionally
impaired freedom of
expression, particularly the
initial decision by a censorship
board without any judicial
participation.
The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor
The requirement cannot be administered in a manner which
would lend an effect of finality to the censors determination
whether a film constitutes a protected expression because
only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding
ensures the necessary determination suffices to impose a
valid final restraint
The procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial
decision to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and
possibly erroneous denial of a license
because only a judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of
expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination
suffices to impose a valid final restraint
NOTE: Compare with INC v CA

W/N the Maryland Statute was

an invalid previous restraint?
YES

Ayer v Capulong Balancing of Interests

The case involved the The court had to balance Enriles claim to the right to privacy
production of The Four Day against the producers freedom of expression. Motion pictures are
Revolution , a movie account important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and
of the bloodless coup that expression of artistic impulse
toppled the Marcos regime.
Juan Ponce Enrile, a principal
A limited intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded
actor in the event, sought to
as permissible where a person is a public figure and the
enjoin the use of his name or
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published
of any member of his family.
about him constitute matters of a public character. The right of
Enrile : insists right to privacy.
privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination
Ayer: insists right to freedom
of matters of public interest.
of expression.

The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and

1. Whether the film
dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to
is an exercise of
be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from
their freedom of
unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the
expression and
private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside
speech YES
the realm of legitimate public concern.
2. Whether Enriles
right to privacy
The invalidity of a measure of prior restraint does not mean that
was violated? NO
no subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person
claiming to exercise such constitutional freedoms. The right of

Eastern Broadcasting v
DANs (1985)
DYRE, a radio station, was
summarily closed on grounds
of national security (inciting
people to commit acts of
sedition from the petitioners
shift toward what it stated was
the coverage of public events
and the airing of programs
geared toward public affairs.
Although the case eventually
became moot and academic
due to the subsequent sale
and licensing of DYRE, the SC
went on to issue the guidelines
re: free expression for
broadcast media.
privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression
and the right to privacy, may be marked out in terms of a
requirement that the proposed film must be fairly truthful and
historical in presenting the events.
Lesser scope of protection for Broadcast media (Radio & TV) ;
Clear and Present Danger Test
New ground rules:
1. For broadcasting stations to be closed down, there must be
adherence to the admin proceedings in the Ang Tibay v. CIR
case. ** not that important, due process to. (In case she
asks, the radio station alleged that they were not given due
process, there was no trial or hearing before they were shut
down. Kaya may gantong rule na nilabas yung SC.)
2. It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling
and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an
unavoidable standard to which government action must
conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, in each appropriate case may be valid
3. All forms of media, print or broadcast, are entitled to
the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The limitations for it is still the clear
and present danger test. that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the law maker has a right to prevent
4. The clear and present danger test must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account. The
supervision of radio stations whether by government or
through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intellifent, and sophiscated handling
5. The clear and present danger test must take the particular
circumstances of broadcast media into account, as it is not a
simplistic and all-embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums.
a. Broadcasting has to be licensed
b. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among
qualified users.
c. A broadcast corporation cannot simply
appropriate a certain frequency without regard
for regulation or for the rights of others
6. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to tht
vitality of a representative democracy
7. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all
forms of media by the due process and the freedom of
expression clauses of the Constitution.
Freedom of expression for TV and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser than print media because of:
1. pervasiveness
2. accessibility
viewers/listeners have less time and opportunity to analyze the
content of what is shown and/or said. The impact of TV and radio
is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the

Alexander v US
Alexander was engaged in the
adult entertainment industry
for several years. He was
convicted for obscenity, as well
as for violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Law
(RICO). As a result, several of
his assets amounting to
millions of dollars, including
his porn and adult stores and
enterprises were foreclosed.
He alleged that the foreclosure
amounted to prior restraint
against his freedom of speech,
Whether the forfeiture of his
businesses constitutes prior
restraint and therefore violates
his freedom of speech? NO
Newsounds Broadcasting v
Dy
Petitioners are authorized by
law to operate radio stations in
Cauayan City, and had been
doing so for some years
undisturbed by local
TV and radio audience has less opportunity to cogitate, analyze,
and reject the utterances.
bookstores and movie theaters may be prohibited from making
certain material available to children, but the same selectivity
cannot be applied to broadcast media.
The limitation that is put on constitutional speech is the clear
and present danger test. The clear and present danger test--
words that are used in such circumstances and are of such
nature as to create clear and present danger that will bring about
the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
However, the clear and present danger test must take the
particular circumstances into account.
the government has a right to protect itself against broadcasts
which incite people to overthrow it. At the same time, the people
are entitled to the right to be informed.
Prior restraint vs. Subsequent punishment
There is a distinction between prior constraint and
subsequent punishment. Prior constraint forbids certain
communications when issued in advance of the time
that such communications are to concur, whereas
subsequent punishment refers to the punishment
imposed for past criminal conduct.
Unlike the injunctions in Near, Keefe, Vance, the
forfeiture order in this case imposes no legal
impediment to no prior restraint on petitioners ability
to engage in any expressive activity he chooses. He is
free to open an adult bookstore or engage in
production of erotic materials; he just cannot finance
these enterprises with assets derived from prior
racketeering offenses.
The term "prior restraint" is used "to describe
administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time
that such communications are to occur."
Eg. Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions- i.
e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are classic
examples of prior restraints.
The forfeiture order in this case does not forbid the petitioner to
engage in expressive activity in the future but only deprives him
of specific assets that were found to be related to his previous
racketeering violations.
Free speech and press : the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest
without censorship and punishment.
The mode of expression restrained in these cases
BROADCAST is not one which petitioners are
physically able to accomplish without interacting with
the regulatory arm of the government. It is hampered
by its utilization of resources of electromagnetic
authorities. Beginning in 2002,
in the renewal of their mayors
permit, respondents in their
official capacities impeded the
ability of petitioners to freely
broadcast, if not broadcast at
all.
These actions have ranged
from withholding permits to
operate to the physical closure
of those stations. Petitioner
were required to submit
requirements for the
reclassification of the land
wherein the said stations are
operating. Such requirements
then as required were never
listed in the list of
requirements in the
renewal/application of any
permit issued by Cauayan City.
And notably, petitioners had
never been required to submit
such paper before.
Whether the right of free
expression of petitioners were
violated by respondents
closure of station? YES
INC v CA
Certain episodes of ANG
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, the bible
TV program of the IGLESIA,
was given an X-rating by the
MTRCB for attacking the
dogmas of other religions and,
thus, were prevented from
being aired. Appealed to Office
of President and reversed
decision of board.
IGLESIA alleged GADALEJ on
the part of MTRCB. The Trial
Court ruled in favor of
IGLESIA, but the Court of
Appeals reversed and ruled
that MTRCB has jurisdiction
spectrum necessitated by the government intervention
and administration, and in return they agree to some
kind of regulation.
*NOTE: the internet and other print media is not subjected to
such regulation. Hence, broadcast media enjoys a lesser degree
of constitutional protection. (they can only enjoy less amount of
freedom of expression and speech)
There exists a tension between
1. freedom of expression
2. governments authority by law to regulate local enterprises
Kinds of regulation
Content-neutral Content-based
Concerned with the Based on the subject
incidents of speech, one matter of the utterance or
that merely controls the speech
time, place, or manner - generally treated as
and under well defined more suspect than
standards content-neutral because
of judicial concern with
- subject to lesser but still discrimination in the
heightened scrutiny regulation of expression
The action of the LGU requiring business proof
seems at first to be content-neutral but it turns
out it is actually content based. the closure of the
station was fueled by ill-motives on the part of
respondents because said station during 2001 elections
was aggressive in exposing of irregularities in Isabela.
It was only during 2002 after the elections that the
local government started to impose new requirements
substantiating the conversion of CDC property for
commercial use.
Content-based regulations are always subject to strict
scrutiny test. There must be compelling reason to
infringe the right to free expression
In the Philippines, contemporary Filipino
values were made unlike in the US standards,
Philippines have homogenous standards but not
necessarily true now.
1. Any regulation that does not justify or give compelling
evidence against restraint in freedom of religion must be
struck down
2. the INC only posed criticisms not attacks. CA wasnt able
to view the videotapes, stripping away their right to judge
the tapes as indecent, contrary to law, public morals, and
good customs.
3. The respondents cannot rely on the ground attacks
against another religion in x-rating the religious program of
petitioner. Its not among the grounds under Section 3 of PD
No. 1986 which justifies an order prohibiting the broadcast
of petitioners television program. The ground attack
against another religion was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules
and power to review the TV
program and that the Board
validly denied the episodes
that attacked other religions
4. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence
of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil
which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

The clear and present danger test is applied to four types

of speech namely:
1. That which advocates dangerous ideas
2. That which provokes a hostile audience reaction
3. Out of court contempt
4. Release of information that endangers a fair trial AND
It is not the task of the state to favor any religion
by protecting it against the attack by another
religion.

AS opposed to freedman v Maryland

we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for
Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial
power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce
its decision subject to review by our courts.
Court upheld Sotto v Ruiz: use of mails is a privilege
which can be regulated to prevent abuse
MTRCB has authority to decide what is immoral,
contrary to law, good customs, tend to cite subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, sedition, decisions are
executory unless stopped by court.

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINIONS

Padilla:
agrees with reversal, but is against the upholding of
the power of the respondent Board to subject
petitioner to prior restraint on its religious TV programs
giving authority to MRTCB may bend and stretch the
legislative standards given to it in censoring speech
and expression

Melo:
-Its religious programs must be accorded the
presumption that the same will instill moral values. Its
television programs, therefore, should not be equated
with ordinary movies and television shows which
MTRCB is bound by the law to monitor for possible
abuse.
The State can exercise no power to restrict the right to
exercise freedom to profess religious faith until the
exercise thereof traverses the point that will endanger
the order of civil society.
-MTRCB cannot use dangerous tendency rue (long abandoned by
court)

Kapunan:
I cannot agree with its opinion that respondent Board
has the power to review petitioners TV program
TV program enjoys the Constitutions guarantee of
freedom of religion, and of speech and expression, and
cannot be subject to prior restraint by the Board
significance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion is not diluted by the fact that films are
 designed to entertain as well as to inform, thus,
recognizing that motion pictures fell within the sphere
of constitutionally protected speech
the sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation
on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of
a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent.
It is claimed that the provisions of P.D. 1986 in any
case provide for a neutral standard applicable to all
religious sects. However, a regulation neutral on its
face poses free exercise problems when it creates or
has the potential of imposing undue burdens on
religion.
The ruling in Sotto vs. Ruiz cannot be invoked as
authority to allow MTRCB to review petitioners TV
programs. In that case, the Court held that the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Posts is vested with authority
to determine what mail matter is obscene, lewd, filthy
or libelous, pursuant to Section 1954 of the old
Administrative Code. Petitioners program cannot be
placed in the category of the printed matter proscribed
in the old Administrative Code.

SEPARATE OPINION: MENDOZA

Censorship may be allowed only in a narrow class of
cases involving pornography, excessive violence, and
danger to national security. Even in these cases, only
courts can prohibit the showing of a film or the
broadcast of a program. In all other cases, the only
remedy against speech which creates a clear and
present danger to public interests is through
subsequent punishment.
TV programs may validly be required to be submitted
for review before they may be shown or broadcast.
However, the final determination of the character of
the materials cannot be left to an administrative
agency. That judicial review of administrative action is
available does not obviate the constitutional objection
to censorship.
3(b) of P.D. No. 1986, which gives to the Board
limited time for review, to be valid,
3(c), under which the Board acted in this case in
censoring petitioners materials, to be, on its face and
as applied, unconstitutional.

SEPARATE (CONCURRING) OPINION: PANGANIBAN

the situation in our country, particularly the totality of
our cultural and religious milieu, is far different from
that in America.
INC contends that the MTRCBs authority extends only
to non-religious video materials but not to religious
programs. This position presents more problems than
solutions. For who will determine whether a given
canned material is religious or not? I would prefer that
the State, which is constitutionally mandated to be
neutral, continue to exercise the power to make such
determination, rather than leave it up to the producer.
I feel less discomfort with the idea of maintaining the
censors quasi-judicial authority to review such film
 materials, subject to appeal to the proper courts
MTRCB Must Use Constitutional Standard. The phrase
with a dangerous tendency in Sec. 3-c of P.D. 1986
should be struck down as an unconstitutional standard.
This is martial law vintage. The more appropriate
standard proffered by the law itself is contemporary
Philippine cultural values. This should be used in
determining whether a film or video program is (a)
immoral, (b) indecent, (c) contrary to law and/or good
customs, and (d) injurious to the prestige of the
Republic. On the other hand, when the question is
whether the material being reviewed encourages the
commission of violence or of a wrong or crime clear
and present danger principle should be applied
Was the banning of the Iglesia programs proper? We
cannot answer this question directly because the tape
was never submitted to the Court for viewing. In the
face of such inadequacy of evidence and basis, I see
no way that this Court could authorize a suppression of
a species of the freedom of speech. FOR THIS REASON
AND THIS REASON ALONE, I vote to GRANT the
petition.
the phrase contrary to law should be read together
with other existing laws such as, the Revised Penal
Code, particularly Article 201, which prohibits the
exhibition of shows that offend another race or
religion. Recent events indicate recurrent violent
incidents between and among communities with
diverse religious beliefs and dogma. The danger is past
mere apprehension; it has become a virtual reality and
now prevalent in some parts of the world.
prior censorship should not altogether be rejected just
because sanctions can later be imposed. It is more
prudent to have a deferment of an exhibition that may
be perceived to be contrary to decency, morality, good
customs or the law until the courts are given an
opportunity to pass upon the matter than. A delay is
not too high a price to pay for a possible damage to
society that may well turn out to be incalculable and
lasting.

Vitug
Ibelieve that the phrase contrary to law should be
read together with other existing laws such as, for
instance, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 201, which prohibits the exhibition
of shows that offend another race or religion. I see in
this provision a good and sound standard.
in order not to infringe constitutional principles, any
restriction by the Board must, of course, be for
legitimate and valid reasons. I certainly do not think
that prior censorship should altogether be rejected
just because sanctions can later be imposed.
Regulating the exercise of a right is not necessarily an
anathema to it; in fact, it can safeguard and secure
that right.
David v Arroyo
Facial challenge
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases or (in American Law)
first Amendment cases
I. Overbreadth doctrine cannot be applied to facially
review
PP 101
PP 1017 is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-
related conduct. It is a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress
all forms of lawless violence not necessary anymore
OD is not intended to test validity of a law that reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct (lawless
violence, insurrection, rebellion)
entertained only in cases involving spoken words;
cannot be invoked against ordinary criminal laws that
are sought to be applied to protected conduct
PP1017 remains a spectrum of conduct not
speech subject to state regulation

last resort test by court that invalidates the entire

statute ON ITS FACE and not merely as applied for

OD will require the court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint

its flaws and effects not on the basis of its actual operation to
petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression (deterrent to
chilling effect)

OD facial challenge is the most difficult to successfully mount

successfully because one has to prove that there can be no
instance when assailed law may be valid

II. Void for vagueness cannot also be applied

when men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth
litigant must challenge statute on its face only when all
its possible application is vague
--- petitioners did not establish this too

Article III violations

On freedom of speech and of the press (Daily Tribune)

The search was illegal did not follow Crim Pro, rule
126
Arrogant warning of government officials to media and
plain censorship

As applied doctrine was upheld

III. As-applied doctrine/challenges
Statute is challenged on case to case basis or specific
circumstances
PP 1017 violates the freedom of expression of
petitioners
Invalidity of the statute is only as applied to the
litigants in this particular case, it does not mean there
is a sweeping striking down will of all statute.

NOTE: A facial challenge / striking down something based

on facial challenge is the last resort. It is something that if
the court can avoid it will.
Chavez v Gonzales It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act
constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A
distinction must be made whether the restraint is content-neutral
or content-based

Content-neutral
- merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech.
- merely controls the time,
place, manner and under
well-defined standards
TEST TO BE USED
- to be valid, only a
substantial governmental
interest is required because
regulations of this type are
not designed to suppress
any particular message
- uses intermediate
approach somewhere
between mere rationality
that is required of any other
law and the compelling
standard applied to contest-
based restriction
- the Court will not merely
rubberstamp validity of law
but require the restrictions
be narrowly tailored to
promote an important or
significant governmental
interest that is unrelated to
the suppression of
expression
Content-based
- restraint or censorship.
- restriction based on the
subject matter or utterance or
speech.
- to be valid, the
governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or
press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny
- Clear and Present Danger
rule government has
burden of overcoming
presumed unconstitutionality
- government must show that
the type of harm the speech
sought to be restrained would
bring about the gravity
and imminence of the
threatened harm ;
proximity and degree
- the act must serve an
important or substantial
interest
- law is not overbroad or
vague

GMA v COMELEC

SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
People v Perez Dangerous Tendency Test

In a political discussion at the
town Municipio, Perez made a
remark that the head of
Governor General Woods
must be cut off by the Filipinos
for having recommended a
bad thing to the Philippine
that he has killed our
independence. Perez was
charged with a violation of the
Penal Code by criminally and
willfully insulting by words the
Governor without his
presence.
Justice Malcolm: Criticism on the Executive, Legislative and
Judiciary, no matter how severe, is within the range of
liberty unless the intention and effect be seditious. SC
ruled that the remark made by Perez had such intention and
effect.
The Treason and Sedition Law must not be interpreted to abridge
the freedom of speech and the right the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances
as criticism is permitted to penetrate the Government unless the
intention and effect be seditious.

Dennis v US Clear and Present Danger Test

In 1948 Eugene Dennis,
general secretary of the
Communist Party of America,
along with several other high-
ranking communists, were
arrested and convicted of
having violated the Smith Act.
The Act made it unlawful to
knowingly conspire to teach
and advocate the overthrow or
destruction of the United
States government.
Party leaders were found
guilty and lower courts upheld
the conviction, despite the fact
that no evidence existed that
Dennis and his colleagues had
encouraged any of their
followers to commit specific
violent acts.
Freedom of speech is not an unlimited, unqualified
right, but that societal value of speech must, on
occasion, be subordinated to other values and
consideration.
Free speech can be inhibited if it causes clear and
present danger that will bring about substantive evils
that Congress has to prevent. In this case, the
overthrow of government or conspiracy to do so is an
abuse of the freedom of speech.
It was in this case that the Court nuanced the Clear and
Present Danger Test some more. In each case, the Courts
must ask whether the gravity of evil discounted by its
improbability (chance that its not going to succeed)
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger
NOTE: gravity of evil improbability of evil = to warrant
restriction of freedom of speech

Gonzales v COMELEC MINORITY OPINION (Subsequent Punishment) Justice Castro:

However useful the CPD doctrine in the appraisal of a specific
situation, it is not a rule of universal applicability and validity.
Petitioners challenge the
There is a need for careful scrutiny of the features of a given
validity of 2 new sections in
situation and evaluation of the competing interests involved.
the Revised Election Code
prohibiting the early
In this case, there is a need for judicial balancing of the
nomination of candidates and
conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
limiting the period of election
ascendancy in legislation that restricts expression. The
campaign and partisan
balancing of interests approach is more appropriate in
political activity. They claim
determining the constitutionality of the assailed provisions.
that these provisions violate
their right to free speech,
MAJORITY OPINION (Speech and Electoral Process): The freedom
freedom of assembly, and
of expression is not absolute. There are other social values that
freedom of association.
press for recognition. The test as a limitation of freedom of
expression is justified by the imminent danger of a substantive
The Court is faced with the
evil that the State has a right to prevent.
reconciliation of 2 values. One
is freedom of expression and
Clear and present danger test: means that the evil
the other is safeguarding the
consequence of the comment or utterance must be
equally vital right of suffrage.
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
The COMELEC asserts that the
extremely high' before the utterance can be punished.
assailed provision is an
The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive
exercise of police power
evil' sought to be prevented." It has the advantage of
designed to insure a free,
establishing according to the above decision "a definite
orderly, and honest election.
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to
Congress has determined that
what words may be public established."
such acts, if unrestrained and
carried for a long period of
Dangerous tendency rule: If the words uttered create a
time, are harmful because
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
they entail huge expenditures
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
of funds, precipitate violence,
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of
and results in corruption.
force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms.
Nor is it necessary that the language used be

US v Obrien
O'Brien burned his Selective
Service registration certificate
before a sizable crowd in order
to influence others to adopt
his anti-war beliefs. He was
indicted, tried, and convicted
for violating 50 U.S.C.App.
462(b), a part of the Universal
Military Training and Service
Act, subdivision (3) of which
applies to any person "who
forges, alters, knowingly
destroys, knowingly mutilates,
or in any manner changes any
such certificate,"
The District Court rejected
O'Brien's argument that the
amendment was
unconstitutional because it
was enacted to abridge free
speech and served no
legitimate legislative purpose.
The Court of Appeals held
the 1965 Amendment
unconstitutional under the
First Amendment as singling
out for special treatment
persons engaged in protests,
on the ground that conduct
under the 1965 Amendment
was already punishable, since
a Selective Service System
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.
Balanced Interest Test (from Castro dissent): a wide
range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining
the point or line of equilibrium. Among these are (a)
the social values and importance of the specific aspect
of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation;
(b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether
the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance
of the public interest sought to be secured by the
legislation the reference here is to the nature and
gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent;(d)
whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and (e) whether the
necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved
may be achieved by some other measure less
restrictive of the protected freedom.
This Court has held that, when "speech" and "nonspeech"
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which
must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive
terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount;
cogent; strong
Incidental Restriction on the Freedom of Speech must
pass the
OBRIEN TEST:
1. it is within the constitutional power of the government
2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest
3. if the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression
4. if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest
regulation required registrants
to keep their registration
certificates in their "personal
possession at all times," 32
CFR 1617.1, and willful
violation of regulations
promulgated under the Act
was made criminal by 50
U.S.C.App. 462(b)(6).
The court, however, upheld
O'Brien's conviction under
462(b) (6), which, in its
view, made violation of the
nonpossession regulation a
lesser included offense of the
crime defined by the 1965
Amendment.
Blue Ribbon Committee v
Majaducon
Roxas v Zuzuarregegui
Contempt proceeding
The Supreme Court held
herein Petitioner Atty Roxas in
indirect contempt for writing a
letter addressed to the
ponente (AJ Chico Nazario) of
a previous case decided
against him and a co-
petitioner, which ordered them
to return P17m to herein
respondents De Zuzuarregui.
The letter contained
allegations that the ponente
was biased and partial and
that the decision rendered the
SC a dispenser of injustice,
among other things. Another
letter was sent to CJ
Panganiban urging him to
conduct an investigation on
The newspapers act of publishing excerpts of the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee against an RTC Judge is within the freedom
of the press so long as they are relevant to a matter of
public interest.
It is the publisher thereof which decides which news events will
be reported in the broadsheet. In doing so, it is allowed the
widest latitude of choice as to what items should see the light of
day so long as they are relevant to a matter of public
interest, pursuant to its right of press freedom.
The power to declare a person in contempt of court must be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the
corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment.
Roxas stated in writing the letter that he was merely exercising
my right to expressa legitimate grievance or articulate a bona
fide and fair criticism of this Honorable Courts ruling. If the
nature of my criticism/comment or the manner in which it was
carried out was perceived to have transgressed the permissible
parameters of free speech and expression, I am willing to submit
myself to the sound and judicious discretion of this Honorable
Court.
A letter addressed to all members of the Supreme Court
containing allegations of bias and partiality as well as invoking
that the Supreme Court was a dispenser of injustice was not
only disrespectful towards all the Justices, especially to the
ponente of the case which was the subject of the letter, but
constituted an abuse of the rights to free expression and speech.
By his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario,
and his mocking of the Court for allegedly being part of a
wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice, he abused
his liberty of speech.
Under the circumstances, we find Atty. Romeo G. Roxas guilty of
indirect contempt of court under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure
the matter.
Fortun v Quinsayas
A disbarment complaint was
filed against petitioner Atty.
Fortun, Ampatuans counsel in
the Maguindanao Massacre
Case, for allegedly misleading
the prosecution and trial court.
The complaint was distributed
to the media by Atty.
Quinsayas, one of the
complainants to the
disbarment case, after which
the media published several
articles and even broadcasted
on television the details
regarding the disbarment
case.
Petitioner asserts respondents
violated the confidentiality rule
of the Rules of Court by
prematurely publishing the
case details.
WON the respondents are
guilty of indirect contempt for
having violated the
confidentiality rule YES
WON Rule violates freedom of
press - NO
SPEECH AND ELECTORAL PROCESS
Sanidad v COMELEC Resolution is null and void.
Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of Sec. 19 of
The Confidentiality Rule is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not
prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of
a disbarment complaint. Otherwise, members of the media must
preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its
pendency.
The Court recognizes that publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.As a
general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential
in nature until their final resolution and the final
decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing
of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a
matter of public concern considering that it arose from
the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his
involvement and participation as defense counsel in
the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of
public interest, legitimate media had a right to
publish such fact under freedom of the press. The
Court also recognizes that respondent media groups
and personalities merely acted on a news lead they
received when they reported the filing of the
disbarment complaint.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is
not a restriction on the freedom of the press.
If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not
prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news
report restriction on the freedom of the press
If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not
prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news
report of a disbarment complaint.
In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a
disbarment complaint, members of the media must
preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings
during its pendency. Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers must still remain private and confidential until
their final determination. Only the final order of this
Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.
As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty.
Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature
of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of
preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas
disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner to members of the media
which act constitutes contempt of court.
The Constitution did not grant COMELEC the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media
COMELEC Resolution No.
2167 which provides that:
During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day
before and on plebiscite day,
no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer, or
personality shall use his
column or radio or television
to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues. As it violates
freedom of expression and of
the press
COMELECs contention:
valid implementation of
the power of the Comelec
to supervise and regulate
media during election or
plebiscite periods
it does not absolutely bar
petitioner from expressing
his views and/or from
campaigning for or
against the Organic Act.
He may still express his
views or campaign for or
against the act through
the Comelec space and
airtime.
NPC v COMELEC
COMELEC TIME
The issue was the validity of
Sec. 11 of Republic Act
6646, prohibiting: any
newspapers, radio
broadcasting or television
station, other mass media, or
any person making use of the
mass media to sell or to give
free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to
the Commission
any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate
for any effective public office
practitioners of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Section 19 of the aforementioned
resolution has no statutory basis. While the limitation
does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the
forum where he may express his view. No reason was
advanced by COMELEC to justify such abridgment.
neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section
11(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression
during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are
no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore,
Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no
statutory basis.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners
freedom of expression,(sabi ng COMELEC there are
other methods thru which he can expres his opinion) it
is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he
may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and
importance. The peoples right to be informed and to
be able to freely and intelligently make a decision
would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a
forum for expression but they do not guarantee full
dissemination of information to the public concerned
because they are limited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
Petitioners contentions:
Law invades and violates constitutional guaranteed
freedom of expression
Amounts to censorship because it selects and singles
out suppression and reppresion with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular content
(media-based election/political propaganda during
1992 election)
The prohibition is in derogation of medias role,
function, and duty to provide adequate channels of
public information and public opinion relavant to
election issues
HELD
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by
the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or
permits for the operation of media of
communication and information.
shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during
the campaign period.
ISSUE:
WON the assailed legislative or
administrative provisions
constitute a permissible
exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of
the operations of
communication and
information enterprises during
an election period?
whether such act has gone
beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of
media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of
speech and freedom of the
press? -YES
1. Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its
applicability and enforceability.
limited in its applicability in time to election periods.
2. scope of application
purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including
purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space
and air time for campaign or other political purposes.
does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or
commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their
qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least
as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for.
Distinguished from Sanidad
Sanidad
Declared unconstitutional sec 19 of COmelec Reso 2167which
restricts mass media, columnists, commentator, announcer,to
use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues, during plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before or on the plebiscite day itself.
The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a
restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad,
a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, for no
justifiable reason.
3. exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to
the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time
Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and
equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for
elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station.
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section
11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates
themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or
unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b)
to prevent media reporting of and commentary on
pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates
themselves.
5. Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media,
especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded.
The paid political advertisements introjected into the
electronic media and repeated with mind-deadening
frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so
much to inform and educate as to condition and
manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and
objective appraisal of candidates qualifications or
programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties

Adiong v COMELEC
In this case, what is being
challenged is the prohibition
on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places
whether public or private
except in authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC
ABS-CBN v COMELEC
EXIT POLLS
Petition assaling COMELEC
Resolutuon No. 98-1419
banning the holding of exit
polls.
The main issues is whether
the COMELEC may totally ban
exit polls. COMELEC argues
of the captive and passive
The right of the general listening and viewing public to
be free from such intrusions and their subliminal
effects is at least as important as the right of
candidates to advertise themselves through modern
electronic media and the right of media enterprises to
maximize their revenues from the marketing of
packaged candidates.
Clear and Present danger test
In order allow the prohibition of certain acts which infringe upon
constitutional rights the reasoning MUST be based on clear and
present danger, MUST NOT suffer from over breadth, and MUST
NOT impair equal opportunity.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE :
o Danger patently clear and presently present
but the evil sough to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over ones
mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed
by the questioned prohibition is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party. The
regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car,
to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner
agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like
cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger
any substantial government interest. There is no
clear public interest threatened by such activity so as
to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizens right
of free speech and expression
Balancing of Interest
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of
expression calls all the more for the utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage
Clear and Present Danger
The Exit Polls conducted by ABS CBN was found to be
valid because there was no Clear and Present Danger.
Comelecs fears that the Exit Polls would interfere with
the official counting was unfounded since the said Exit
Polls merely showed the probable winners and was
only shown after people have voted.
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their
results through mass media constitute an essential
part of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the
that the exit surveys has a
clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and
integrity of the electoral
process.
It admitted that the conduct
of an exit poll and the
broadcast of the results
thereof are an exercise of
press freedom, but may be be
curtailed if the exercise
thereof creates a clear and
present danger to the
community or it has a
dangerous tendency.
SWS v COMELEC
Content-Neutral Regulation
Petitioner, Social Weather
Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a
private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution
conducting surveys in various
fields brought this action for
prohibition to enjoin COMELEC
from implementing Resolution
3636, pursuant to Section 5.4
of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election
Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be
published 15 days before
an election and surveys
guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible
elections. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or
suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit
polls, without transgressing in any manner the
fundamental rights of our people.
The Court held that the absolute ban by COMELEC
cannot be justified. It does not leave any open
alternative channel of communication to gather
the type of information obtained through exit
polling. COMELEC's concern with possible disorder and
confusion in the voting center does not justify the total
ban, absent any showing or evidence that presence of
exit polls or means to interview cause chaos in voting
centers or confuse the voters. Moreover, the
prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of
exit poll data and their use for any purpose.
Used Obrien test :
Justification for a restriction
It is within the constitutional power of
government
1. It furthers an important or substantial
government interest
2. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression
3. If the incidental restriction on alleged First
amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest
The interest of the state in reducing disruption is
outweighed by the drastic abridgement of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the
electorate. Instead of being a disruption, exit polls can be a
vital tool for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible
elections; and elimination of election-fixing, fraud, and electoral
ills.
Yes. Sec 5.4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and
(3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring
"equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates
of charges for the use of such media facilities
"public information campaigns and forums
among candidates." Section 5.4 of the Fair
Election Act did not pass the OBrien test which
is the most influential test for CONTENT-
NEUTRAL REGULATION.
In United States v. O 'Brien it was held that a
government regulation is sufficiently justified granted
affecting local candidates
shall not be published
seven 7 days before an
election.
COMELEC contends that the
prohibition on the publication
of election survey results is
intended for the prevention of
the debasement of the
electoral process resulting
from manipulated surveys,
bandwagon effect, and
absence of reply and that the
impairment of freedom of
expression is minimal, the
restriction being limited both
in duration and in scope as it
does not prohibit election
survey results but only require
timeliness.
Osmena v COMELEC
COMELEC SPACE
Content-Neutral regulation
Emilio Osmena and Pablo
the following requisites:
1. it is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
2. if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest;
3. if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
4. if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest
Sec 5.4 fails to meet criterion 3 of the O 'Brien test.
because the causal connection of expression to
the asserted governmental interest makes such
interest "not related to the suppression of free
expression."
By prohibiting the publication of election survey
results because of the possibility that such publication
might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4
actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while
allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion
takers.
In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject
matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion
to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression means that "the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."
Sec 5.4 fails to meet criterion 4 of the O 'Brien test.
even if the governmental interest sought to be
promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech
and the resulting restriction of free expression is only
incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4]
of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not
greater than is necessary to further the governmental
interest.
As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-
minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and
resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-
bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation
might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of
the fundamental right of expression, when such aim
can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful
acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that
such speech creates the danger of such evils.
YES. There is actually no suppression of political ads
but only a regulation of time and manner of
advertising. The term political ad ban is actually
misleading, as although the provision prohibits the sale
or donation of print space and air time to political
candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and
itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the
media. In this case, there is no total ban on political
ads, much less restriction on the content of the speech
Garcia, candidates for public
office in the 1998 elections,
seek to invalidate provision of Note: In this case, petitioner Osmena did not present any
RA 6646 (Electoral Reform evidence, only theoretical arguments. What the Supreme Court
Law of 1987), which did is simply revisited the prior ruling in NPC v. Comelec in
prohibits mass media from relation to Section 11 of RA 6646.
selling or giving free of
charge print space or
airtime for campaign or
other political purposes,
except to the COMELEC.

They contend that the ban

has not only failed to level the
playing field, but actually
worked to the grave
disadvantage of the poor
candidates by depriving
them of a medium which
they can afford to pay
while their affluent rival
scan always resort to other
means of reaching voters

Diocese of Bacolod

Ejercito v COMELEC Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero

San Luis filed for
disqualification against Ejercito
for the position of Provincia
Governor of Laguna Ejercito
argues that the exceeding of
his election expenditures
should not make him
accountable given that he did
not have knowledge nor did he
give his consent to the third
party who contributed to his
election expenses excess and
consequently becomes a
ground for disqualification.
o Voting is speech. We speak of it as the
voice of the people. The notion that the
government may restrict the speech of
some in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is not new in the
Philippine constitution, but is widely the
used principle in the US.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to
the candidates allowable limit of election expenses
does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters
rights of speech and of expression under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution.
As a content-neutral regulation, the laws concern
is not to curtail the message or content of the
advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to
ensure equality between and among aspirants with
deep pockets and those with less financial resources.
Any restriction on speech or expression is only
incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve
the substantial governmental interest of promoting
equality of opportunity in political advertising.
Estrada cannot claim he has no knowledge or consent
because R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast
advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be
broadcasted without the written acceptance of the
candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising
contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and
that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be
signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the
duly authorized representative of the political party.

Rappler v Bautista LEONENs concurrence :

Freedom of speech is affected when government

1-United v COMELEC
Davao City v Aranjuez
Petitioners work for Davao
City Water District(DCWD)
and are members of a union.
They have been picketing and
airing grievances over the
non-fulfillment of the
Collective Negotiation Act
(CNA) during lunch breaks.
General Manager of the DCWD
sent a memo regarding the
34th anniversary via
celebration in the form of a
motorcade and fun run
wherein the employees were
allowed to wear any sports
attire.
During the event the members
of union wore t-shirts with
inscriptions regarding the CNA
and continued to wear them
during work while also posting
posters at the motor pool
area. GM instituted
administrative charges in
violation of office memoranda
but petitioners answered that
they were expressing their
Constitutional right to freedom
of speech and freedom of
expression.
ISSUE: Government
employees Constitutional
rights to freedom of speech
may be limited?
grants benefits to some media outlets, i.e. lead
networks, while unreasonably denying the same
privileges to the others. This has the effect of
stifling speech especially when the actions of a
government agency such as the Commission on
Elections have the effect of endowing a monopoly
in the market of free speech.
While the Commission on Elections does have the
competence to interpret Section 6, it must do so
without running afoul of the fundamental rights
enshrined in our Constitution, especially of the
guarantee of freedom of expression and the right
to suffrage.
Not only must the Commission on Elections have the
competence it must also be cognizant of our doctrines in
relation to any kind of prior restraint
Government employees freedom of speech may be limited
but not completely removed
It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun
run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was
not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As
pointed out by the respondents, they followed the
advice of GM Gamboa to be there at the fun run.
Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run.
They were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay
required, to wear. Else, government employees would
be deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. This, then, being the fact, we have to rule
against the findings of both the CSC and Court of
Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with grievance
inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable
Office Rules and Regulations.
GSIS v Villaviza
wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not
amount to a concerted activity or mass action
proscribed above. It is correct to conclude that those
who enter government service are subjected to a
different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak
their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of
expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by
reason of their employment.
Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment
must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.
But there are some rights and freedoms so
fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained
away in a contract for public employment. It is the
Courts responsibility to ensure that citizens are not
deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government.
LEONEN, CONCURRING

COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Central Hudson Gas v PSC
\The Public Service
Commission of New York
(PSC), in the interest of
conserving energy, enacted a
regulation that prohibited
electric utilities from
promoting electricity use. The
PSC's regulation distinguished
promotional advertising from
informational advertising, the
latter being permitted
W/N PSCs ban on advertising
violate freedom of speech
(commercial speech)
Four part analysis
1. W/N speech is illegal or misleading NO
2. W/N there is substantial public interest YES
3. W/N there such regulation directly advances the substantial
government interest
This case involves freedom of expression in the context
of airing workplace grievances on employment benefits
in the public sector, the constitutional right to self-
organization, and peaceful concerted activities.
Specifically, during their office anniversary
celebrations, respondents wore matching t-shirts that
stated their plea for payment of CNA incentive: CNA
Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa na!
Exercising ones right to air grievances in relation to
employment in the public sector, as in this case, should
also be given protection but with the added
requirement that the exercise of the guarantee of
freedom to express does not unduly deter the
government agencys primary functions.
Thus, the pronouncements in this case must be limited
only to its context, that is, expressions in t-shirts
during the office anniversary where there was no
showing that that exercise obstructed or eroded the
public functions of the government agency involved.
The First Amendment protects commercial speech from
unwarranted governmental regulation
NOTE: The Constitution accords a lesser protection
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression.
The U.S. Court rejected the highly paternalistic view
that the government has complete power to
suppress or regulate commercial speech
(regulation must not be more extensive than
necessary to further the asserted governmental
interest)
For commercial speech to come within the First
Amendment:
1) It must concern lawful activity and not be misleading
2) It must be determined whether the asserted
governmental interest to be served be the restriction on
commercial speech is substantial
3) If the answers to both inquiries are positive, it must then
be decided whether the regulation directly advances the
asserted governmental interest and whether it is NOT
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest
Even if the central Hudson is a monopoly in the
area,the information provided by them is important in
providing the consumers the information they need to
make an informed decision
Energy conservation : controlling the promotion of
consumption during peak hours
Fair and efficient rates: promoting the consumption of
energy during peak hours might shift the burden of
shouldering the excess rates to consumers
Energy consumption YES: there is an immediate
connection between demand and advertising
Fair and Efficient rates NO: highly speculative
 because there are other factors affecting rates
4. W/N it is more extensive than necessary YES
It is more extensive because it also includes
promotional advertising for better alternatives such as
the heat pump

Pharmaceutical v Duque Although the advertising and promotion of breastmilk

substitutes fall within the ambit of
commercial/economic speech which is not accorded
the same level of protection like the protected
speeches in our Constitution, it is nonetheless entitled
to protection.
The absolute ban on advertising of breast milk
substitutes is unduly restrictive and is more than
necessary to further the avowed governmental interest
of promoting the health of infants and young children

Central Hudson four-part Application to the case at bar

analysis
It must concern lawful It is not claimed that the
activity and not be advertisement at issue is an
misleading unlawful activity or is
inaccurate

Both the International Code

and Milk Code recognize and
and concede that there are
instances where breast milk
substitutes may be necessary

It must be determined The government interest in

whether the asserted
governmental interest to be
served be the restriction on
commercial speech is
substantial
providing safe and adequate
nutrition to infants and
young children is substantial
Such interest is expressed as
a national policy in the
fundamental law of our land
and is also embodied in
various international
agreements to which the
Philippines is a party.

If the answers to both There is an undeniable causal

inquiries are positive, it must
then be decided whether the
regulation directly advances
the asserted governmental
interest
relationship between the
government interest and the
advertising ban
Breast feeding is the tested
and proven method of
providing optimal nutrition to
infants and young children
 Rationale prevent
mothers from giving in to
suggestive and misleading
marketing and propaganda
which may be contained in
advertisements of breast milk
substitutes

It must be determined The absolute ban on

whether it is NOT more
extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest
advertising prescribed under
Sections 4(f) and 11 of the
RIRR is unduly restrictive
and is more necessary to
further the governmental
interest of promoting the
health of infants and young
children

Ex. Strictly informative ads of

such products banning
such would be deep cuts on
free speech

The governmental interest in

promoting the health of
infants and young children
cannot justify the absolute,
overarching ban

US SC struck down a law prohibiting advertising of

prices of prescriptions drugs as price information was
important to customers and the right to receive
information is protected. Consumers have a strong
First Amendment interest in the free flow of
information about goods and services available in
the marketplace and any state regulation must
support a substantial interest.
Ladue v Gilleo ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTONAL

Respondent was a resident of
Ladue who placed a sign by
her residence saying For
Peace in the Gulf expressing
her opposition to a war in the
Persian Gulf The sign
disappeared and so she
erected another which, to her
surprise, disappeared as well.
Respondent then decided to
go to the police to report the
incidents and it was there she
was infromed that the City of
Lague had issued an ordinance
banning ALL residential signs
but those falling within one of
ten exemptions, for the
Although cities have a right to regulate the placement
of signs, they cannot enforce an ordinance selectively
based on the messages contained in the signs.
Discrimination is assumed because the ordinance
restricts too little speech and the exemptions provided
are on the basis of the signs messages, or on the
ground that it prohibits too much protected
speech. Petitioners have barred an important and
distinct medium of political, religious and personal
expressio.
Other alternatives such as handbills and newspapers
are inadequate substitutes A sign in ones own
residence is distinct because it provides information
about the speakers identity, which is an important
component of attempts to persuade
Residential signs are also a cheaper and more
convenient form of communication
The intended audience, the neighbotrs, are not easily
reached by other methods
principle purpose of
minimizing the visual
clutter associated with
such signs.
Rubin v Coors
In 1987, Coors applied to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms (BATF), for
approval of proposed labels
and advertisements that
disclosed the alcohol content
of its beer. BATF rejected the
application on the ground that
the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act (FAAA)
prohibited disclosure of the
alcohol content of beer on
labels or in advertising.
Section 5 (e)(2) Federal
Alcohol Administration Act
(FAAA or Act prohibits beer
labels from displaying alcohol
content. Respondent filed suit
for relief on the ground that
the relevant provisions of the
Act violated the First
Amendment's protection of
commercial speech. The
Government contended that
the ban was necessary to
suppress the threat of
"strength wars" among
brewers. Without such the
regulation, brewers would
seek to compete in the
marketplace based on alcohol
strength. The District Court
invalidated the labeling ban,
and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Disini v SOJ
Whether or not Section 5 (e)(2) violates first amendments
protection of commercial speech. YES
Yes.The Court laid guidelines in the Central
Hudson case to determine whether a regulation
of commercial speech survives the First
Amendment scrutiny:
a. Does it concern a lawful activity and is it
not misleading?
b. Is the asserted governmental interest
substantial?
c. If both inquiries yield positive answers, it
must be determined whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest
asserted and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest
(THIRD REQUISITE NOT MET)
In this case the interest the government intended to
protect by banning the alcoholic content on beer labels
would prevent such social harms. The regulation also
does not directly advance the suppression of strength
wars, especially since other provisions of the FAAA
directly counteract its effects. Finally, the Court held
the regulation was more extensive than necessary,
since there were available and effective alternatives
that would not violate the First Amendment.
The labeling ban cannot be said to advance the
governmental interest in suppressing strength wars
because other provisions of the FAAA and
implementing regulations prevent Section 205(e)(2)
from furthering that interest in a direct and material
fashion. Although beer advertising would seem to
constitute a more influential weapon in any strength
war than labels, the BATF regulations governing such
advertising prohibit statements of alcohol content only
in States that affirmatively ban such advertisements.
Government regulations also permit the identification
of certain beers with high alcohol content as "malt
liquors," and they require disclosure of content on the
labels of wines and spirits.
There is little chance that 205(e)(2) can directly and
materially advance its aim, while other provisions of
the same Act directly undermine and counteract its
effects. In other words, there are contradictory
provisions.
Moreover, there are other alternatives that are less
intrusive to the First Amendments protection of
commercial speech.
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered a concurring
opinion emphasizing the regulation is unconstitutional
because it did not increase consumer awareness but
instead blinded the public to the truth of alcoholic
content
Unsolicited Communication or Spam Violation of Freedom of
Expression with respect to commercial speech; unconstitutional
The provision Sec 4(c)(3) penalizes the transmission of
unsolicited commercial communications, also known as

RE: Request Radio-TV
coverage of the trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the
plunder cases against
Joseph Estrada
the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP),
an association representing
duly franchised and authorized
television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a
letter requesting this Court to
allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the
plunder and other criminal
cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan in
order to assure the public of
full transparency in the
proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our
history.
spam.
GOVERNMENTs argument: The government,
represented by the Solicitor General, points out that
unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a
nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the
efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes
with the owners peaceful enjoyment of property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones
privacy since the person sending out spams enters the
recipient domain without prior permission.
The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less
protection in law
Ruling: unconstitutional
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech
which is not accorded the same level of protection as
that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
The state cannot rob him of this right without violating
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression
LEONENs dissent: valid governmental restraint
In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court
held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of
a criminal defendant.
Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media
into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the
constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and
decorum that the impartiality imposed by due process
of law
A public trial is not synonymous with publicized
trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open
to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable number
of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large
as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions,
In case of seeming conflict, the rights of the
accused under criminal trial prevail over the
rights of others to free expression or information
on matters of public concern.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied
freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It, also approves of medias exalted power
to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and
in acquainting the public with the judicial process in
action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the
overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process
COURT STATED FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT

RE: Petition for Radio-TV
coverage of the Ampatuan
trials
In Re: Petition to Annul 98-
7-02 S (1998)
Assails En Banc Resolution
A.M. 98-7-02 which states
TRIAL : Commentaries, tv effects of cameramen,
editing of the video, Lawyers may become preoccupied
with the cameras which interferes with their devoting
full attention to the factfinder at trial. Additional duties
for trial judge, ensure that the media do not disrupt
proceedings,
In the motion for reconsideration: Audio-visual recording was
allowed by the Court.
Considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the
importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court
believes that there should be an audiovisual recording
of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live
or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes
The indication of serious risks posed by live media
coverage to the accuseds right to due process, left
unexplained and unexplored in the era obtaining in
Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of
press freedom and the right to public information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was
shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon
of a feared speculation which no scientific study in the
Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may
be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under
existing rules and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a winwin
situation that shall not compromise rights in the
criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press
freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the
integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in
a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested
parties, whether private complainants or accused, is
unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself
commands that a reasonable number of the general
public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes
place inside the courtroom.
Technology tends to provide the only solution to break
the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
Law and technology can work to the advantage and
furtherance of the various rights herein involved,
within the contours of defined guidelines.Indeed, the
Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has
to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key
constitutional precepts into the workable context.
Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the
use and regulation thereof that need finetuning. Law
and technology can work to the advantage and
furtherance of the various rights herein involved,
within the contours of defined guidelines.
The Supreme Court can promulgate rules to assure the people of
an impartial and orderly administration of justice as long as it
does not curtail substantive rights.
that: Demonstrators,
picketers, rallyist and all other
similar persons are enjoined
from holding any activity on
the sidewalks and street
adjacent to, in front of, or
within a radius of 200 meters
from, the outer boundary of
the Supreme Court Building,
any Hall of Justice, and any
other building that houses at
least 1 court sala. Such
activities unquestionably
interrupt and hamper the
working conditions in the
salas, offices and chambers of
the courts.
United States v Grace
(1983)
Zywicki and Grace, on
separate occasions, were
found on the sidewalks in front
of the US Supreme Court
distributing pamphlets,
leaflets, handbills, and
displaying signs showing the
text of the First Amendment.
On all occasions, they were
apprehended for violating Title
40 of the US Code, particularly
Sec. 13k, which states that
a) it is unlawful either to
parade, stand, or move in
processions or assemblages in
the SC Building or grounds, or
b) to display therein any
flag, banner, or device
designed or adapted to bring
into public notice any party,
organization, or movement.
They filed an injunction
before the District Court,
which dismissed their petition
on procedural grounds. On
appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the CA struck down
the statute for infringing on
First Amendment freedoms.
The State appealed this ruling
before the SC.
Issue:
1. W/N it is an invalid exercise of legislative power
SC has right to promulgate rules to assure the people
of an impartial and orderly administration of justice
The new constitution assets the power of the court to
promulgate rules for the protection of rights
2. W/N against the freedom of expression
Narvasa Courts view. Curtailment of assemblies
outside court premises does not diminish substantive
rights and may be done by Court without waiting for
Congress to act
In public forums, the Government may enforce time,
place and manner regulations but additional
restrictions like an absolute prohibition of a particular
type of expression will be upheld only if it they are
done to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest
Additional:
(a) The conduct of each appellee falls into the statutory ban, and
hence it is proper to reach the constitutional question involved.
(b) As a general matter, peaceful picketing and leafletting are
expressive activities involving "speech" protected by the First
Amendment. "Public places," such as streets, sidewalks, and
parks, historically associated with the free exercise of expressive
activities, are considered, without more, to be "public forums." In
such places, the Government may enforce reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations, but additional restrictions, such
as an absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression, will
be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling
governmental interest.
(c) The Court grounds are not transformed into "public forum"
property merely because the public is permitted to freely enter
and leave the grounds at practically all times and is admitted to
the building during specified hours. But where the sidewalks
forming the perimeter of the grounds are indistinguishable from
any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C., they should not be
treated any differently, and thus are public forums for First
Amendment purposes.
(d) Insofar as it totally bans specified communicative activity on
the public sidewalks around the Court grounds, 13k
cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction. A
total ban on carrying a flag, banner, or device on the
public sidewalks does not substantially serve the purposes
of the statute of which 13k is a part to provide for the
maintenance of law and order on the Court grounds .
 Nor do 13k's prohibitions here at issue sufficiently
serve the averred purpose of protecting the Court from
outside influence or preventing it from appearing to
the public that the Court is subject to such influence or
that picketing or marching is an acceptable way of
influencing the Court, where, as noted, the public
sidewalks surrounding the Court grounds are no
different than other public sidewalks in the city.

LIBEL

WHAT IS LIBEL?
Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code provides that libel is a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending to cause
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354, of the Revised Penal Code provides that every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown,

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS TO LIBEL?

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
3. The DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT?

The DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt
is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, NEVERTHELESS, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable; it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on false supposition. If
the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it may reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Borjal
vs. CA)

. . . honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated
from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or
public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e. with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. (NY Times vs. Sullivan)
In summary there are two allowable limits of criticism of public officers namely:
1. Public acts may be made the subject of comment and criticism. And if made in
good faith, they are qualified privileged.
2. A persons mental, moral and physical fitness for office may be the subject of
comment and criticism. But such are privileged only when fair.

WHAT DOES FAIR IN FAIR COMMENT MEAN?

FAIR here meaning that the comment is true. If it is false then:
1. The comment must express the real meaning of the author.
2. The opinion of the author was formed with a reasonable degree of care and on
reasonable grounds.
3. Good faith is a valid defense.

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE TERM PUBLIC FIGURE?

A public official or even if the person is a private individual, as long as the person is involved in a
public issue, e.g., a candidate for public office.

A private individual can be considered a public figure when The publics primary interest is in the
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance
of the conduct, not the participants prior anonymity or notoriety. (Rosenbloom v. Metromedia)

WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL?

The case of Vicario v. CA provides for the following elements:

1. Imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another;
2. Publication of the imputation
3. Identity of the person defamed -- It is essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he he named. It is also not sufficient that the
offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed but it must be
shown that atleast a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication. (Borjal v. CA)
4. Existence of malice -- Ill will must be personal (Vicario vs. CA)

Policarpio v Manila Times Newspapers can publish information about official

Atty. Lumen Policarpio was
UNESCO National Commission
Executive Secretary with
Herminia Reyes as her
subordinate. Policarpio
caused Reyes to be separated
from the service and in
retaliation Reyes filed counter-
charges against Policarpio for
alleged malversation of public
funds and estafa thru
falsification of public
documents.
A picture was published in the
Manila Times along with the
story of the raps against
Policarpio being initiated by
the Presidential Complaints
and Action Commission. A
similar article was published in
the Daily Mirror. Policarpio
sued for damages in the CFI.
proceedings given the right of the public to know the
truth as long as these are not confidential in nature. If
the articles should contain derogatory remarks, it must
be true, fair and made in good faith. Otherwise, it
shall be presumed malicious and thus, libelous.
YES. There is no question that the subtitle of the first
article is not true. Manila Times contend that the
inaccuracy as to who filed the complaint was
immaterial. It appears, however, that defendants
could have ascertained the details had they wanted
to.
Newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion
in determining the manner in which a given event
should be presented to the public, and the imporatnce
to be attached thereto, as a news item and that its
presentation in a sensational manner is not per se
illegal.
Newspapers may publish news items relative to
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which
are not of confidential nature, because the public is
entitled to know the truth with respect to such
proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential
are open to public consumption.
BUT, TO ENJOY IMMUNITY, A PUBLICATION
CONTAINING DEROGATORY INFO MUST BE NOT ONLY
TRUE, BUT, ALSO FAIR, AND IT MUST BE MADE IN
GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT COMMENTS. Also,
according to Art. 354 of the RPC, the defamatory
imputations contained in said article are presumed to
be malicious.
If the publisher is unaware, when under the facts the
truth could have been verified, the publisher is guilty of
negligence and was liable for libel

Lopez v CA

YES. While press freedom is assured by the judiciary, a

THIS WEEK, a weekly
reasonable care is required from the publisher. Since it
magazine published by the
is a weekly magazine, beating a deadline is no
Manila Chronicle, made a
justification to exonerate the petititoners from liability.
mistake of publishing the
wrong picture in its Hoax of
the Year article which
supposedly was to feature
Fidel Cruz, Babuyan Islands
sanitary inspector who tricked
a U.S. Air Force plane to
giving him a radio and to send
troops to the islands to stop a
series of killings.
It was later found to be a
hoax and that he only needed
to hitch a ride home to Manila.
The said article, however,
carried the picture of a Fidel
Cruz, a businessman-
contractor from Bulacan who
was appearing in a different
article in the same magazine.
A libel case was filed against
the Manila Chronicle who
contended that it was an
honest mistake and that it was
rectified by the prompt
apology and correction by the
paper in the subsequent
issues.
An apology only mitigates the damages caused.
Libel and other forms of defamation have both civil and
criminal aspects. Civil damages are awarded to
compensate for the defamed persons reputation, while
criminal liability is incurred in the form of fines because
of the breach of public peace.
The majority opinion says that for liability in damages
to arise from an alleged libelous publication, without
offending press freedom, there is need to prove that
the publication was made with actual malicethat is,
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not.
No liability would be incurred should it be
demonstrated that it comes within the scope of
freedom of press. The items as such should be relevant
to a matter of public interest yielding to truth to
unavoidable inaccuracies.
An action for libel would lie arising from a publication
in a weekly magazine of the plaintiffs photograph as
being responsible for the hoax of the year, even though
the publisher made a correction of their mistake
immediately upon discovery thereof.
Pressure of deadline not a defense in libelous
publication in a weekly magazine.While a newspaper
should not be held to account for honest mistakes
owing to pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such
pressure to meet, and no occasion to act with haste in
a weekly magazine
A subsequent publication for the purpose of
rectification or clarification does not wipe out the
responsibility arising from the publication of a libelous
article, although it may and should mitigate it.

DISSENT, Dizon
Actual malice must be proved.For liability in damages to arise
from an alleged libelous publication, without offending press
freedom, there is need to prove that the publication was made
with actual malicethat is, with the knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Borjal v CA
IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A LIBEL SUIT:
1. victim must be identifiable although it is not
Between May and July 1989,
necessary that he be named.
columnist Art Borjal of the
2. It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized
Philippine Star ran a series of
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must
articles dealing with alleged
be shown that at least a third person could identify him
anomalous activities of an
as the object of the libelous publication.
organizer of a conference
without naming or identifying
HOWEVER, the court finds no conclusive evidence to
who. It was believed by a
show that Wenceslao was the one being alluded to by
certain Francisco Wenceslao
Borjal. The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate
that he was the one being
that private respondent was the person referred to
alluded to by the said article
therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were
since he was an executive
millions of heroes of the EDSA Revolution and anyone
director of the organizers of
of them could be self- proclaimed or an organizer of
the First National Conference
seminars and conferences. Here the court found that
on Land Transportation. It
the identification is grossly inadequate when even the
was at that time he was
alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was
soliciting sponsors for the said
the object of the verbal attack.
event.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS:
He filed a complaint with the
National Press Club and then
Absolutely privileged Qualifiedly privileged
with the RTC against Borjal
charging him that he is using those which are not Containing efamatory
his column for character actionable even if the author imputations are not
assassination & libel. But the has acted in bad faith actionable unless found to
Asst. Prosecutor dismissed the have been made without
complaint for insufficiency of good intention or justifiable
evidence. Wenceslao later motive.
filed a civil case.

Borjals comments are not covered within the

exceptions of Art. 354 of the RPC. However this
does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. The comments of Borjal are covered by
the DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in
the freedom of the press. Public policy, the welfare of
society, and the orderly administration of government
have demanded protection of public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.

Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in

response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of
the person defamed and implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or
bad motive. It is the essence of libel.

In this case however Wenceslao was not able to

prove with preponderant evidence that petitioner
was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable
harm on his reputation. Identification is grossly
inadequate when even the alleged offended party is
himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal
attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the
identity of the person alluded to came not from
petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself
 when he supplied the information through his 4 June
1989 letter to the editor.

DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENTARIES

Privileged communications must, sui generis, be
protective of public opinion. Is a valid defense against
charges of libel and slander.Adhering to democratic
theory of free speech essential ot collective self-
determination and protecting right to self-expression
Individualistic ethos
CA by not considering fair and true
reports without comments or
remarks defeat the objective of
privileged communications and
suppresses the healthy emergence
of public debate and opinion
o fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander.
o doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable.
o In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be
false allegation of fact or
comment based on a false
supposition.
If the comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken,
as long as it 24 might reasonably
be inferred from the facts
Such also, is a matter of public interest (The declared
objective of the conference, the composition of its
members and participants, and the manner by which it
was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its
activities as being genuinely imbued with public
interest

NY times v Sullivan
The U.S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. ruled against Sullivan holding that honest criticisms
on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated
from libel judgments.
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press
prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.
REASON: to require critics of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on
 pain of libel judgments would lead to self- censorship,
since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing
out their criticisms even if such were believed to be
true, or were in fact true.

BURDEN OF PROOF
While, generally, malice can be presumed from
defamatory words, the privileged character of a
communication destroys the presumption of malice
The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff,
private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring
home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the
existence of malice as the true motive of his
conduct
Wenceslao failed to prove by preponderant evidence
that petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict
unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the
articles were written and published without good
motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find
petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith.

WHEN IS THERE MALICE

the libelous statements must be shown to have been
written or published. with the knowledge that they are
false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false
or not.In this case, while some of the written
information be not necessarily true they are based on
reasonable grounds formed after several personal
interview considering documentary evidence.
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are
false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does
not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are
inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and
debate.
Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the
press should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in
the choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment.
Margin errors must be tolerated to avoid self-
censorship.

Vasquez v CA To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of

the Revised Penal Code, the following elements
must be proved:
Case is the liability for libel of
1. the allegation of a discreditable act or
a citizen who denounces a
condition concerning another
barangay official for
2. publication of the charge;
misconduct in office. An article
3. identity of the person defamed;
covering the meeting Vasquez
4. existence of malice.
had with the NHA regarding
RPC provides that if the defamatory statement is made
their complaint against Brgy
against a public official with respect to the discharge of
Chariman Olmedo who
official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegedly accused for land-
allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to
grabbing. Olmedo filed libel
acquittal
charges against him and RTC
held Vasquez guilty of liable
but SC stated otherwise. There is publication if the material is communicated to
a third person. It is not required that the person
defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark.
What is material is that a third person has read or
heard the libelous statement, for a mans
 reputation is the estimate in which others hold him,
not the good opinion which he has of himself.
In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case,
petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo
Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-
interest but engaging in the performance of a civic
duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully
and well by those on whom such duty is incumbent.
The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen
in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement
placing on him the burden of proving that he acted
with good motives and for justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is
false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves
that the statement was made with actual malicethat
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of
showing the truth of allegations of official
misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable
ends for making such allegations would not only
be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal
Code. It would, above all, infringe on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their
duties as members of a self-governing community

The liability for libel of a citizen who denounces a

barangay official for misconduct in office if the
contents of such statement are proven to be true.
In order that there must be actual malice
(thereby constituting libel), the statement must
be made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Time Inc, v Firestone The standard enunciated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, which bars media liability for defamation of a
public figure absent proof that the defamatory
statements were published with knowledge of their
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth is not
applicable in the case.
Gertz v Welch Inc;(a) respondent was not a public
figure since she did not occupy a role of especial
prominence in the affairs of society. And had not been
thrust to the forefront of particular controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved
The Rule in New York Times DOES NOT automatically
extend to all reports or proceedings regardless of
whether the party plaintiff is a public figure who might
be assumed to have voluntarily exposed himself to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.
No finding was made by the divorce court that
respondent was guilty of adulteries petitioner had
reported although petitioner contends that it faithfully
reproduced the precise meaning of the judgement, the
jurys verdict, upheld on appeal, declared the report as
inaccurate.
In defamation/libel cases, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc,
imposes the constitutional limitations that

Hustler Magazine v Falwell
JAL v Simangan
JAL is not entitled to its
counterclaim for damages.
This case involved Simangans
ejectment from the Japan
Airlines due to alleged falsified
travel documents which was
later on verified. Simangan
filed a complaint against JAL,
claiming breach of contract of
carriage.
During the trial, JAL presented
a witness who testified that
JAL suffered further damages.
Respondent allegedly
caused the publications of
his subject complaint
against JAL in the newspaper
for which JAL suffered
damages.
WON respondent is entitled to
moral and exemplary damages
YES
WON JAL is entitled to its
counterclaim for damages
NO
1) compensatory awards be supported by competent
evidence concerning the injury
2) liability cannot be imposed without fault [2nd re
A publisher of defamatory falsehoods about an
individual who is neither a public official nor a public
figure may not claim the NY times protection against
liability for defamation.
Outrageousness in political and social discourse has an inherent
subjectiveness which cannot form the basis for an award for
damages
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander.
The rule on privileged commentaries on matters of
public interest applies to JAL since it applies not
only to public officials but extends to a great
variety of subjects, and includes matters of
public concern, public men, and candidates for
office. It is prohibited from claiming damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with
actual malice.
JAL is a common carrier. JALs business is mainly with
the traveling public. It invites people to avail
themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers
Since JAL deals with the public, its bumping off of
respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public
attention and generated a public issue.
Doctrine of fair comment
while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every
false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable.
o In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.
o If the comment is an expression of opinion, based
on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
Pursuant to the Borjal case, there must be an actual
malice in order that a discreditable imputation to a
public person in his public capacity or to a public
official may be actionable.
*Malicious statements the libelous statements shown
to have been written or published with the knowledge
that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether
they are false or not.
Considering that the published articles involve matters
of public interest and that its expressed opinion is not

Arafiles v Philippine
Journalists Inc,
Morales, a reporter of Peoples
Journal reported the case of
Emelita Despuig in the hands
of her employer who filed a
complaint
for forcible abduction with
rape and forcible abduction
with attempted rape. He
interviewed her and eventually
wrote an article published as
headline on Peoples Journal
Tonight.
Year after, Arafiles filed
complaint in RTC asking for
damages arising from it
because of the grossly
malicious and overly
sensationalized reporting in
the news item. He claimed
that his reputation was injured
and he became an object of
public
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in
holding that the publication of
the news item was not
attended with malice to thus
free respondents of liability for
damages. - NO
malicious but based on established facts, the
imputations against JAL are not actionable. Therefore,
JAL may not claim damages for them.
The article must be construed as an entirety including
the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict
or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted
by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends
upon the scope, spirit and motive of the publication
taken in its entirety.
A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read
and construed in the sense in which the readers to
whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it.
Petitioners anchoring of his complaint for damages on
a charge of malicious sensationalization of fabricated
facts thus fails. The presentation of the news item
subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good
name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had
violated said right or abused the freedom of the press.
The newspapers should be given such leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable
care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of word
Baguio Midland Carrier
Courier v Ca
WON the articles subject of
the case libelous or privileged
OBSCENITY
Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke
public interest to justify the publication since he was
not yet a public official at that time. This argument is
without merit since he was already a candidate for City
mayor of Baguio. As such, the article is still within the
mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of
expression provided in the Constitution since it is the
publics right to be informed of the mental, moral and
physical fitness of candidates for public office.
the rule only applies to fair comment on matters of
public interest, fair comment being that which is true,
or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the
author based upon reasonable degree of care and on
reasonable grounds. The principle, therefore, does not
grant an absolute license to authors or writers to
destroy the persons of candidates for public office by
exposing the latter to public contempt or ridicule by
providing the general public with publications tainted
with express or actual malice. In the latter case, the
remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof
that an article was written with the authors knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not. While the law itself creates the
presumption that every defamatory imputation is
malicious, nevertheless, the privileged character of a
communication destroys said presumption. The burden
of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff,
private respondent herein.
In the present case, private respondent was unable to
prove that petitioner Afables column was tainted with
actual malice. Verily, the records are replete with
evidence that, indeed, private respondent incurred an
obligation which had remained unpaid until the time
the questioned article was published.
The Court held that Afables article constitutes a fair
comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with
the character of private respondent who was running
for the top elective post in Baguio City at the time.
Considering that private respondent assured his would-
be constituents that he would be donating millions of
his own money, petitioner Afables column with respect
to private respondents indebtedness provided the
public with information as regards his financial status
which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst to them
at that time.
Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some
members of the electorate from voting in favor of
private respondent but such is the inevitable result of
the application of the law. The effect would have been
adverse to the private respondent but public interest in
this case far outweighs the interest of private
respondent.
WHAT ARE THE FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PUBLICATION IS OBSCENE?
1. Its purpose or predominant appeal is to prurient interest;
2. The work must not have any serious redeeming social value;
3. The work must be considered as a whole;
4. Must consider normal and present standards (in determining contemporary normal
standards, one should consider the standard of the given community since
standards vary from one community to another; it must be gauged using an
average adult as a basis, e.g. Cyril)

Miller v California Miller v. California, which

expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established basic 23
guidelines, to wit:
a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law;
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Gonzales v Katigbak

Board of Review for Motion
Pictures classified the movie
"Kapit sa Patalim" as "for
adults only" because of some
obscene episodes in the film.
The petitioners in this case
who are behind the production
of the movie questions the
validity of the board's
discretion to classify films and
the test upon which it based
its classification.
Obscene material is that which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interest. What is seen or
perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless
there is a showing that the product of his talent
rightfully may be considered obscene. This ruling
however is limited to motion pictures.
A less liberal approach is given for television since
everyone; including children have easier access to
television.
In this case, the Board may call for the
censoring of certain aspects of a movie or the
adult classification of a movie if it seems to be
contrary to public morals and health. There are
stricter rules on the classification of obscenity
when it comes to television due to its ease of
access to younger viewers. (no payment, all
they need is a TV)

Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak, following trends in the United States, adopted the test:
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant 18 theme of
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.

Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured
obscenity in terms of the dominant theme of the work, rather than isolated passages, which
were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that contemporary community
standards are the final arbiters of what is obscene). Kalaw-Katigbak
make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to
temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers
Soriano v Laguardia
Pita v CA
The mayor of Manila launched
an anti-smut campaign
against obscene materials and
subsequently seized and
confiscated from newsstands
what it considered as covered.
The publishers of said
materials assailed the acts of
the mayor for being
unconstitutional alleging the
seizure was made with out a
valid search and seizure
warrant.
YES, the Court is not
convinced that the private
respondents have shown the
required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of
the literature for which
mandatory injunction had
been sought below. First of all,
they were not possessed of a
lawful court order:
(1) finding the said materials
to be pornography,
(2) authorizing them to carry
out a search and seizure, by
way of a search warrant.
On the issue of obscenity, the
Court was not able to arrive at
a proper definition of what is
obscene. they held that:
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore
or literature comes within the
ambit of free expression,
although not its protection. In
free expression cases, this
Court has consistently been on
the side of the exercise of the
right, barring a "clear and
present danger" that would
warrant State interference and
action. 0 But, so we asserted
in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 31 "the
burden to show the existence
of grave and imminent danger
that would justify adverse
action ... lies on the. . .
authorit[ies].
There must be objective and
convincing, not subjective or
conjectural, proof of the
The paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship
character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media over rights of freedom of speech and
religious freedom.
The Supreme Court held that contemporary community
standards are the arbiter of what is obscene. The
following 3 tests are to be applied.
1. Whether or not an average person applying
contemporary community standards finds the
work as a whole appealing to prurient interests.
2. Whether or not the work patently offends sexual
conduct.
3. Whether or not the work lacks literary, artistic,
political and scientific value.
Obscenity is not protected by the constitution. The
burden is upon the officials to prove obscenity. The
conduct of the mayor in enforcing the anti-smut
campaign was illegal for 2 reasons; there was no
court determination as to the materials obscenity;
the mayor had no authority to seize the allegedly
obscene materials.
The SC provided the following procedure to be
adhered to in enforcing the anti smut campaign.
1. Application for a search warrant
2. Officers must prove obscenity of things to
be confiscated
3. Judge to determine obscenity
4. Judge issues a search warrant
5. Filing of the case against culprits for
violation of the RPC or ordinance
6. Conviction and appeal.
FROM CASE:
1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search
warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity
rap is in order;
2. The authorities must convince the court that the
materials sought to be seized are obscene, and pose
a clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action;
3. The judge must determine whether or not the same
are indeed obscene: the question is to be resolved on
a case- to-case basis and on His Honors sound
discretion.
4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists,
may issue the search warrant prayed for;
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court
may assess whether or not the properties seized are
indeed obscene.
The CA may determine whether or not the materials are obscene
or not.
What mayor or authorities must do is to secure a
warrant and convince the court or judge with
existence of such clear and jurisdiction that the materials sought to be seized are
present danger. It is essential obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an
for the validity of ... previous evil substantive enough to warrant State interference
restraint or censorship that and action
the ... authority does not rely
solely on his own appraisal of
what the public welfare, peace
or safety may require. To
justify such a limitation, there
must be proof of such weight
and sufficiency to satisfy the
clear and present danger test.

Barnes v Glen Theatre The state has the constitutional authority to regulate the
freedom of expression (in this case, dancing), as it furthers a
substantial government interest in protecting the morality
and order of society

The court found that Indianas public indecency statute is

justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive
activity

Applying Obrien:

1. The traditional police power of the State is defined as the

authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals. The
statute reflected moral disapproval of people appearing in the
nude among strangers in public places

2. the public indecency statute furthers a substantial government

interest in protecting order and morality

3. what Indiana prohibited was not dancing as a communicative

element but simply its being done in the nude

4. Indianas requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties

and a g-string is modest and the bare minimum necessary to
achieve the States purpose.

FCC v Pacifica Obscene materials have been denied the protection of the First
Amendment because their content is so offensive to
contemporary moral standards

Stricter rules on obscenity must be followed especially because

its pervasive quality and the interest in the protection of children.
The prohibition against censorship denies the Commission power
to edit proposed programs in advance and to excise material
considered inappropriate.

HOWEVER, the prohibition has never been construed to deny the

commission the power to review the content of COMPLETED
broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory powers. The
commission has the right to take not of past program content

Renton v Playtime
Zoning regulation
Bethel School District v
Fraser
Hazelwood school district v
Kuhlmeier
Reno v American Civil
Liberties Union
Ashcroft v Free speech
coalition
when considering a licensees renewal application.
Generally, laws enacted for the purpose of regulating speech or
expression based on its content are void; however, there is a
legitimate and substantial government interest to
preserve the quality of urban life in this case.
The proximity of such adult theaters to wholesome areas has
produced various ill effects and the city must be given reasonable
opportunities to formulate solutions to such problems.
Dealing with adult entertainment that does not ban adult
theatres altogether IS NOT INVALID being properly analyzed as
a form of time, place, and manner of regulation. Content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as
they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest
and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication.
The right conferred to adults to utter certain forms of
offensive expressions does NOT necessarily extend to
children. Constitutional rights of students in school are not
automatically coextensive with the right of adults in other
settings.
A school does NOT need to tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with its basic educational mission even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside of
school. A students right to free expression is NOT co-
extensive with an adults right under the First Amendment.
Schools have authority to censor if it could affect the education
of others. This case led that the censorship in schools was only
acceptable if it were for valid educational purpose. Stricter
rules should be followed for speech in school because of the
nature of the community that is involved and the relationship
between school ad parents.
Laws which limits the freedom of speech should NOT be
overbroad or vague
Sections 2256 8B and 2256 8D of The Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 are unconstitutional for violating the
overbreadth doctrine. The CPPA bans materials that are neither
obscene under Miller v. California nor produced by the
exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber
US v American Library
Association
Fernando v CA
Navarro v Villegas
PBM Employees v PBM
JBL Reyes v Bagatsing
JBL Reyes and the Anti-Bases
Coalition filed a case of
mandamus with the SC, to
compel the Mayor of Manila
Ramon Bagatsing to issue
them a permit to hold a rally
in front of th US Embassy in
Roxas Blvd.
The Mayor invoked Ord. 7295
which prohibits the holding of
assemblies in front of
consulates and embassies in
the City of Manila and
intelligence reports that
terrorists planned to infiltrate
the rally and cause chaos. He
instead proposed that the rally
be held in the Rizal Memorial
Coliseum or some other
enclosed complex.
Congress may impose certain conditions when it
appropriates funds for the public benefit. Congress can
require public libraries to install filtering programs on the use of
the internet to prevent minors from accessing harmful materials.
It does not violate the freedom of speech or of the press since it
is the most fitting way to attain the objective of protecting
minors from obscenity and it still protects the rights of its adult
patrons by providing an exception. Furthermore, library
computers are public property made available to the people,
thus the government may impose reasonable regulations for
their utilization.
The mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or
specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in
order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder
and maintain public safety and order.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well
as their right of assembly and of petition, they were fighting for
their very survival utilizing only the weapons afforded by the
Constitution.
The primacy of human rights over property rights has been
sustained.
The right to assembly can only be intruded upon when there is
clear and present danger with substantive evil in the use of
this freedom. See the rules on assembly and petition as
enunciated in the HELD/RATIO portion.
GR: a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of
their choice
E: another place may be designated by the licensing
authority if it be shown that there is a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil if no such change
were made.
However, the Mayor in this case misapplied the
doctrine in Navarro vs. Villegas, since, no clear and
present danger was proven. The basis of the decision
was purely on speculation.
For a permit to issue:
1. The applicant should inform the licensing authority of
the date, the place and time when the rally will take
place.
2. The application should be filed well ahead of time to
enable the public official concerned whether there may
be valid objections to granting the permit or to grant it
but for another public place.
3. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be
 the standard for the decision reached.
4. Should said official refuse, judicial recourse is
available.
5. If the place to be used is a private place, then all that
is needed is the consent of the owner.
6. As a general rule, a permit should recognize the right
of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public
place of their choice. The licensing authority only on
the basis of a clear and present danger may designate
another place. (In this case, the mere assertion that
subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not suffice as a clear and present
danger.)
7. In this ruling, a mayor may refuse or modify the
application, but only based on the clear and present
danger rule.

What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not

advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach
rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns
on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort
to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be
avoided. The utmost calm though is not required.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence

of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on
the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace
rally would start.
* NOTE: APPLICATION FOR PERMIT can only be denied
on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
safety, morals, and health.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and
in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not,
in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
That conclusion was inevitable in the absence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public
interest. There was no justification then to deny the exercise
of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
To repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially
so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor
is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the
permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the
freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving
rise to an equal protection question.
In fairness to respondent Mayor, he acted on the belief that
Navarro v. Villegas and Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (PMP) v. Bagatsing, called for application. While the
general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of
the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of
their choice, another place may be designated by the
licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
made.
In the Navarro and the Pagkakaisa decisions, this Court was
persuaded that the clear and present danger test was
satisfied. The present situation is quite different. Hence the

Malabanan v Ramento
Malabanan et al. were officers
of the Supreme Student
Council of the Gregorio
Araneta Univerity Foundation.
They were given by the school
authorities a permit to hold a
meeting from 8 to 12 p.m. on
August 27, 1982 at the
Veterinary Medicine & Animal
Science basketball court but
instead the Gen. assembly at
the basketball court.
In the said gathering, they
aired their vigorous opposition
to the merger of the Inst. of
Animal Sciences with the Inst.
of Agri. at 10:30 a.m. They
marched toward the Life
Science Bldg. w/c ws outside
of the permit. The
demonstration disrupted
classes. The school ordered
them the same day to explain
why they should not be held
liable for an illegal assembly.
This was challenged in the CFI
of Rizal and the MECS. NCR
Director Ramento found them
guilty of violating par. 146(c)
of the Manual for Private
Schools. They were penalized
with a suspension for one
year.
Bayan v Ermita
decision reached by the Court. The mere assertion that
subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators
does not suffice. Not that it should be overlooked.
Injunction granted
Students do not lose their constitutional rights to peaceful
assembly and freedom of speech in the halls of the classroom.
Although they are subject to the disciplinary authority of their
schools, respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable
assembly and free speech emphasizes that the penalty to be
imposed should not be disproportionate to the offense
committed.
The court held that the right to peaceable assembly and right to
free speech are embraced in the concept of freedom of
expression which is identified with the liability to discuss publicly
& truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment and which the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest w/o censorship or
punishment and which is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has the right to prevent.
In holding an assembly on a private property: The applicants
should only acquire the consent of the owner or the one entitled
to its legal possession.
Therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to
be violative of constitutional safeguards. But conduct by the
students in or out of the classroom which materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the right
of others is not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.
What was called by the government as calibrated preemptive
response to demonstration and rallies has no place in the
constitutional system.
The proper response is maximum tolerance prescribed in
Batas Pambansa 880, which is a codification of the JBL Reyes
case. Moreover, BP 880 also orders political units to set up
freedom parks.
Maximum tolerance the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police, and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe
during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same
Application for a permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
morals, or public health.

FREEDOM PARKS -

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments,

are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permitshall be required
to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and
petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or
municipality that has not yet complied with
Section 15 of the law.
Article III, Section 5

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof.

The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.

No religious tests shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.

Freedom of religion

- designed to protect the broadest possible libery of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with liberty of others and with the common good.

A. Non-etablishment clause

WHAT IS MEANT BY NON-ESTABLISHMENT?

The non-establishment clause means that:

1. The State is prohibited from establishing or making any religion the official
religion of the country.
2. The State may not directly support or discriminate against any religion or
non-religion.
3. It is basically government neutrality. It calls for a separation of Church and
State, not just treating all religions equally. Rather it should be equal non-
treatment.
4. Non-establishment bars a State from passing laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions or prefer one religion over another.
5. It also requires them to show no partiality to any one group: none
favored, none commanded and none inhibited.
6. Here there is no need to prove any coercion, all that is needed to be
shown for there to be a violation is that the State favors or discriminates
against a certain sect or religion in general.
7. The determination of whether or not a ritual or activity possesses religious
character rests with the courts
8. Separation of Church and State does not mean hostility.

HOW CAN GOVERNMENT VALIDLY EXTEND SUPPORT TO SECTS?

There are three requisites, namely;
1. If the statute has a secular purpose;
2. Its principal or primary effect does not advance nor inhibit religion; and
3. The law does not foster excessive entanglement with religion.

WHY ARE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT EXEMPT FROM TAX?

The constitution had provided the exemption in furtherance of the separation of church
and state. It is so as to avoid excessive entanglement with religion and the recognition of
its influence in human affairs or recognizing certain groups which have harmonious and
beneficial relationships with the community at large.

During holy week, cyril feeling penitent and sinful for all his reading of
pornographic materials over the net asks ferdie to have him crucified as his
form of penitencia. As ferdie nailed cyril to the cross, cyril died. Is ferdie
liable?
Yes. Religious freedom does not mean civil immunity. In this situation,
criminal liability may arise. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society and this is applicable even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction.

Is the appointment by pres. Estrada of bro. Mike velarde of the el shaddai as his
spiritual adviser a violation of the non-establishment clause, since, it may seem
that the president is favoring a particular sect which is the el shaddai and the
catholic church which is a part of it?
I believe it is not. Being a spiritual adviser is not a cabinet position, since, it
involves a personal attachment between the President and Bro. Mike. It is but proper
that in their relationship, the discussions are limited to purely personal matters and not of
affairs of the state.

DISTINGUISH ALLOWABLE FROM NON-ALLOWABLE AID.

1. must have a secular legislative purpose
2. must have a primary effect that neither advances nor prohibits religion
3. must not require excessive entanglement with recipient institutions

Aglipay v Ruiz LAW: Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. -- AN ACT
appropriating the sum of sixty thousand pesos and making the
The Director of Posts same available out of any funds in the insular treasury not
issued a stamp otherwise appropriated for the cost of plates and printing of
commemorating the postage stamps with new designs, and for other purposes.
celebration of the 33rd
International VALID
Eucharistic Celebration
of the Roman Catholic REASON:
Church. Aglipay claims Religion is a profession of faith to an active power
this as a violation of
that binds and elevates man to his Creator. And in
non-establishment.
so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles
of morality, its influences are deeply felt and highly
appreciated
The release of the stamp is valid. The court held
that:
Religious freedom in the Constitution doesnt mean
a denial of its influence in human affairs. The
primary purpose of the issuance of the stamp was
secular which means that it was released so as to
advertise the Phil. to tourists. The Government
shouldnt be embarrassed by its activities simply
because of incidental results -- the main purpose
should not be frustrated by subordination to
mere incidental results.

The Court allowed for the issuance of religious

commemorative stamps, even if there were
incidental benefits to the Church, since those
benefits, if any, were NOT the primary aim and
purpose of the issuance of the stamps, the main
purpose being to generate profit and boost
tourism.

Garces v Estenzo VALID

The barangay council of It does not violate religious freedom since the funds for the
Ormoc City declared statue were private funds. the SC held that the declaration of
April 5 as the feast day said feast day by saying: The fiesta is a socio-religious affair.
of San Vicente Ferrer Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
and raise private funds The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of
by solicitation to build a the masses.
statue of the patron
saint. A statute by a local government intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition of an
Does such violate image) is neither illegal nor violative of the doctrine of
religious freedom? separation of church and state. The church cannot also take
 custody over an item if its not acquired by church
money/property.

The resolutions were NOT enacted for the purpose of

favoring the church or any religion, NOR did it authorize
the allocation of public funds for religious purposes. In
fact, private funds were used to purchase the image.
Since the Barangay is the owner of the said image, then it has
the right to determine who shall exercise custody over it.

School District v INVALID

Schempp
The government should be neutral about religion; it
protects all but cannot promote or favor any. The State
cannot forbid but it cannot likewise aid in the performance of
religious functions.

Ceremoniously reading from the Bible and reciting The

Lords Prayer are clearly exercises of religion, and to
require their performance would violate the rights of the
students.

Board of Education v VALID

Allen
Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function,
perform the task of secular education, and, on the basis of
this meager record, the Court cannot agree with appellants
that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the
intertwining of secular and religious training is such that
secular textbooks furnished to students are in fact
instrumental in teaching religion.

The law merely makes available to all children the

benefits of a general program to lend school books free
of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the
pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to
parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents
and children, not to schools.

Lemon v Kurtzman INVALID BOTH STATUTES

Subject: Teachers
Both statutes were declared unconstitutional as violative of
Two State laws were the religious clauses:
questioned in this case, The entanglement in the RI law arises because of
one was a Rhode the religious activity and purpose of the church-
Island law called the affiliated schools. These schools are under the
Salary Supplement church and at the same time is supervised closely
Act w/c provides for by the state in their purely secular aspect. T
a 15% salary he entanglement in the Penny law suffers from the
supplement to be entanglement problem as well in view of the
paid to teachers in a surveillance and restrictions necessary to ensure
nonpublic school and that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role.

Pennsylvanias Non- Political division along religious lines was one of the evils at
public Education Act which the First Amendment aimed, and in these programs,
w/c directly where successive and probably permanent annual
reimburses those appropriations that benefit relatively few religious groups are
non-public schools involved, political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious
for teachers salaries lines are likely to be intensified.
and materials made
for non-secular Unlike the tax exemption for places of religious worship upheld
subjects. in Waltz vs. Tax Commission w/c was based on a practice of
200 years, these innovative programs have self-perpetuating
and self-expanding propensities which provide a warning
signal against entanglement between government & religion.

LEMON TEST

FACTORS CONSIDERED TO ASSESS EXCESSIVE

ENTANGLEMENT
1. character and purpose of the benefited institutions
2. nature of the aid that state provides
3. resulting relationships between the government and
religious authority

Tilton v Richardson Lemon test was applied.

Subject: Facilities 1. It reflects a secular legislative purpose inspire fuller

development of higher education
US Congress passed
federal grants and loans
institutions of higher 2. Does not foster excessive entanglement nor does it advance
education for any religion or inhibit any religion.
construction of a wide
variety of academic the facilities themselves are religiously neutral. The
facilities as long as they nature of the institution was defined.
do not use such for Colleges and universities are more inclined in
sectarian, religious providing the students with secular education unlike
worship, or programs of the primary and secondary parochial schools that
a divinity for a period of require participation with religious activities. This
20 years. reduces the risk that government aid will in fact
serve to support religious activities.
The schools introduced evidence that they made no
attempt to indoctrinate students. The four schools
subscribed to a well-established set of principles of
academic freedom and nothing in this record shows
that these principles are not in fact followed.

However! INVALID IN SO FAR AS - The 20 year restriction

opens the door for religious use AFTER the grace period.
Hence it violates the Establishment Clause. Grace period must
be struck down.

Compared to Allen, there are no continuing financial

relationships nor dependencies, annual audits and no
governmental analysis of an institutions expenditures on
secular as distinguished from religious activities Inspection as
to use is a minimal contact.

Cases from Everson to Allen have permitted church-related

schools to receive government aid in the form of secular,
neutral, non-ideological services, facilities, or materials that
are supplied to all student regardless of affliation of the school
which they attend.
Country of Allegheny PARTLY VALID; PARTLY INVALID
v ACLU
Meaning of constitutionally advances any religion
The case involves two Endorsement, favoritism, preference, promotion
recurring holiday
displays located on
public property. The
crche (Catholic), and
the menorah
(Hannukha, jewish)

INVALID - The crche display violates the Establishment

clause. The Court may celebrate Christmas but not in a way
that enforces Christian doctrine. Allegheny County
transgressed the line.

VALID - The menorah display

did not have the prohibited effect of endorsing a
religion, given its particular physical setting. Its
combined display with a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty did not impermissibly endorse both
the Christian and Jewish faiths, but simply
recognized that both Christmas and Hannukah are
part of the same winter-holiday season, which has
attained a secular status in US society.
The governments association with a religious
symbol does not represent sponsorship of religious
beliefs, but simply recognition of cultural
diversity

DISSENT
- Both displays are NOT violative
- it does not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or exercise
- it may not in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to a religion in such a degree
that, in fact, establishes a state religion or tends to do so
- where the governments act of recognition of accommodation
is passive and symbolic, any intangible benefit to religion is
unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment. The use of
both displays is permissible

Zobrest v Catalina VALID

Zobrest claims he is Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to

entitled to have an citizens without reference to religion do not violate the
interpreter (because he
Establishment Clause. The child is the primary beneficiary,
is deaf) under the not the school, and whatever benefit may accrue to the
Individuals Disabilities latter [the school] is merely incidental.
Education Act provided
by the Catalina Foothills
School District (his The service here is part of the general government program
former school) when he that benefits ANY child qualifying as disabled under IDEA
transferred to Salpointe without regard to the sectarian/nonsectarian, or public/non-
Catholic High School public nature of the school the child attends. Since there is no
(present school). financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an
interpreters presence there cannot be attributed to state
WON Catalinas decision-making.
providing of interpreter
would promote his By according parents freedom to select a school of their
religious development choice, the statute ensures that a government-paid interpreter
and benefit the will be present in sectarian school only as a result of the
parochial school at private decision of individual parents. The sign-language
governmental expense? interpreter will neither add to nor subtract from that
environment, hence the provision of such assistance is not
barred by the Establishment Clause.

Agostini v Felton VALID

This case challenges A federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial

district courts ruling instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is
upholding the decision NOT invalid under the Establishment clause when
in Aguilar to prohibit 1. Such instruction is given on the premises of
public school teachers sectarian schools by government employees
from teaching in 2. Under a program containing adequate safeguards
parochial schools for
disadvantaged children
as a violation of the Ball presumptions abandoned
Establishment Clause - public employees placed on parochial schools grounds will
(as such was excessive inevitably inculcate religion or that their presence constitutes
entanglement of the symbolic union between government and religion
church and the state). there is no evidence that NY City instructor teaching
on parochial school premises attempted to inculcate
religion in students
- all government aid directly aids the educational function of
religious schools are invalid

Aguilar court made an error in concluding that the program

resulted in excessive entanglement between church and the
state
The presumption that the presence of public
employees in parochial institutions tends to benefit
the latter has been abandoned in Zobrest hence,
pervasive monitoring is no longer required.
Overall, the program does not result in
indoctrination, it does not discriminate based on
religion, and it does not create excessive
entanglement, no pervasive monitoring no longer
needed; hence it is not abhorrent to the
Establishment Clause.

FACTORS CONSIDERED TO ASSESS EXCESSIVE

ENTANGLEMENT
1. character and purpose of the benefited institutions
2. nature of the aid that state provides
3. resulting relationships between the government and
religious authority

3 criteria in Agostini: Whether government aid has the

effect of advancing religion:
results in governmental indoctrination
defines its recipients by reference to religion
 creates an excessive entanglement

Grounds for conclusion Reason for striking down

The program will require
pervasive monitoring by
public authorities to ensure
that employees did not
inculcate religion
Program required
administrative cooperation
between government and
parochial schools
Program might increase
dangers of political
divisiveness
ground
The jurisprudence set by
Zobrest abandoned the
presumption that publci
employees will inculcate
religion simply because they
happened to be in a
sectarian environment.
Therefore pervasive
monitoring is NO longer
required.
Insufficient to create
excessive entanglement
Insufficient to create
excessive entaglement

Mitchelle et al. v VALID; private choice principle

Helms
Agostini modified lemon test by examining only the 1st and
Chapter 2 is a law 2nd of the factors, recasting the entanglement inquiry as
which lends educational simply one criterion relevant to determining a statutes effect.
materials and 1. has secular purpose
equipment to public and 2. has primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion
private elementary and
secondary schools to 3 CRITERIA IN AGOSTINI:
implement secular, Whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion:
neutral, non-ideological (focuses on first 2 from Lemon)
programs. 30 % of 1. results in governmental indoctrination
funds goes to Jefferson - whether any indoctrination that occurs
Parish Louisiana and could reasonably be attributed to
are allocated for private governmental action
schools most of which -
Catholic or religiously - Court makes use of Neutrality Principle
affiliated aid offered to a broad range of group or
persons without regard to religion. Aid is
Chapter 2 as applied in allocated to both religious an dsecular
Jefferson Parish, is not beneficiaries on nondiscriminatory basis
a law respecting of
religion because many 2. defines its recipients by reference to religion
of the private schools
receiving Chapter 2 aid
in the parish are 3 criteria for DETERMINING STATUTES EFFECT :
religiously affliated 1. results in governmental indoctrination
2. defines its recipients by reference to religion
3. creates an excessive entanglement

NOTE: because District court does not challenge its secular

purpose, only its effect need be considered. Further in
determining the effect, it does not also challenge its excessive
entanglement.

Questions How to answer

 Whether the aid results to Answer to indoctrination will
governmental resolve the question
indoctrination? whether an educational aid
program subsidizes
religion.

Neutrality principle, whether

Whether an aid program
defines its recipients by
reference to religion?
any governmental aid to a
religious institution results
from the genuinely
independent and private
choices of individual parents
(private choice principle)
Whether the criteria for
allocating the aid create a
financial incentive to
undertake religious
indoctrination?

Not present where aid

allocated on basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neither
favor nor disfavor is made
available to both religious
and secular beneficiaries

The courts new rules to assess whether Chapter 2 has

effect of advancing RELIGION:
1. the direct, non-incidental aid to religious schools can
be allowed
if aid (even direct) is neutrally available
and first passes through hands (literally or
figuratively) of private citizens who are
not free to direct aid elsewhere, the
government has NOT provided any
support of religion
whether program is direct/indirect is an
arbitrary choice that does not further
constitutional analysis.
2. provisions which grant to religious aid that is
divertible to religious use can be allowed
the issue is not divertibility, but whether
the aid itself has impermissible content
(aid must be secular, neutral, non-
ideological)
in this case, the record indicates that
Louisiana SEA and Jefferson Parish have
complied with aid requirements.
A concern for divertibility is misplaced
because it is boundless, enveloping all
aid no matter how trivial, and does not
bring about any realistic concern for
preventing the establishment of religion
Based on past decisions, the Court has
not accepted the argument that all aid is
forbidden because aid to one aspect of an
institution frees it to spend its other
resources on religious ends
Zelman v Simmons- VALID ; private choice principle
Harris
It passes the test of valid government aid program:
State of Ohio
implemented Pilot
Project Scholarship It has secular Enacted to provide educational
Program that provides legislative assistance for poor children in a
tuition aid to students purpose demonstrably failing public school
in Cleveland City School system
District
Have primary Neutral because it is offered to a broad-
Program offers two effect that class of citizens with the only
kinds of assistance : neither preference for the low-income families
- tuition aid based on advances nor
financial need, parents inhibits religion
can choose any of *the fact that aid reaches religious
participating schools schools is INCIDENTAL to the objective
- tutorial aid for those of the program and the CHOICE
who choose to remain depends on their parents where to send
in public schools children to school (religious/non-
religious schools) directing
it showed that 82% of government aid to religious schools
participating private wholly as a result of their own genuine
schools had religious and independent private choice
affiliation and 96% of
students who Does not Parents are FREE TO CHOOSE were to
participated in the require send kids once they acquire scholarship
program were enrolled excessive
in religious affiliation entanglement
schools with recipient
institutions

DOES NOT PROMOTE ENROLLMENT IN PRIVATE

RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS

1. Provides financial disincentives

- private schools gets half of what community schools get.
- if parents choose private school, they pay half of tuition
- tutoring aid is offered only in public schools

2. Preponderance of religiously affiliated schools DID

NOT RESULT from program: there are more private
religious schools in the district

3 Whatever incidental advancement of religious missions

of the parochial schools cannot be attributed to the
government whose sole aim was to distribute benefits
among students
Capitol Square VALID; secular private expression
Review Board v
Pinette and KKK Whether state violates establishment clause when it allows a
private party to display an unattended religious symbol in a
Ohio state law makes traditional public forum located next to seat of govt. = NO
Capitol Square a forum
for discussion of public The display sought by the Ku Klux Kulan belongs to
questions and for public protected speech as a secular private expression
activities. In order to to be made in a place designated as a public
use square, groups forum. The reasonable observer could NOT
should fill out possibly interpret the symbol to be endorsed by
application form and the government given the public nature of
meet several speech
neutral criteria.
 Capitol Hill
Ku Klux Klan wanted to
place an unattended Religious expression cannot violate the
cross on the square. Establishment Clause where it
1. is purely private
Capitol State said it 2. occurs in a traditional or designated
violates Establishment public forum, publicly announced and
clause because the open to all on equal terms.
square was near seat of Capital Square is a traditional public forum.
govt and might be seen The board may ONLY regulate concern of Klans
as a favoring of one expression ONLY if such restriction is necessary and
religion. KKK however serves a compelling interest. NO compelling
stated it was part of justification presented by state.
their freedom of - nothing prevents Ohio from requiring private
speech. displays in the square to be identified but it may
not, on the claim of misperception of official
endorsement, ban all private religious speech form
the square.

Endorsement Test cannot be applied.

- asks whether the subject of the text was an
expression of the government itself or else
government action alleged to discriminate in favor
of religious expression or activity
1. Capitol square was a public forum
2. Open to all on equal terms
3. Erroneous conclusion of endorsement of
state do not count.

GR: Endorsement
Exception: Plurality per se rule there are
certain circumstances in which an intelligent
observer would reasonably perceive private
religious expression in a public forum to imply
governments endorsement of religion

Reasonable observer test

- personification of a community ideal of reasonable
behavior, determined by effective social judgement
- to be considered:
Not only limited to - information
from viewing challenged display but
also,
General history of the place
where display appears
- reasonable observer would not
fairly interpret the states tolerance
of Klans religious display as an
endorsement of religion. There is an
awareness that the square is a
public space in which a multiplicity
of secular and religious groups
engage in expressive conduct.

Board had alternative means which would not

have infringed on free exercise of religion and
expression. Board could have included a disclaimer
to preclude any interference that the cross
demonstrated endorsement
The conditions are satisfied here, and therefore the
State may not bar respondents cross from Capitol
 Square

Islamic Dawah v INVALID; classification a religious function

Executive Secretary
Petitioner: IDCP claims that such law violates separation of
EO 46 created Phil. church and state
Halal Certification
Scheme authorizing
Office on Muslim Affairs Respondents: states that OMA deals with the societal, legal,
to oversee its political and economic concerns of Muslim communities as a
implementation and national cultural community and not a religious group. OMA
had exclusive authority seeks to protect and promote muslim health and health
to issue halal consciousness
certificates. IDCP lost
revenue lost revenue The classification of food as halal is a religious
when food corporations function (drawn from Quran and Islamic beliefs)
stopped securing and CANNOT be done by the State.
certificates from them That would mean the Muslim community would
adhere to state interpretation of the Quran and
the Sunnah -- which is unconstitutional. The
government, in granting OMA exclusive authority to
perform the classification, clearly encroached
upon the free exercise of religion.
Freedom of religion can be infringed upon when
preventing immediate and grave danger to security
and welfare of communities (govt to show
immediacy and seriousness)
State cannot deprive muslims of their right to
classify what is halal.

Taruc v dela Cruz
Taruc et al was
excommunicated. They
file with RTC for
damages on the ground
they were invalidly ex-
communicated
Is it within the courts
purview to resolve?
In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the
State to be separate and distinct from each other
The expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution or organization is a matter best
left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws
and canons, of said institution or organization.
It is not for the courts to exercise control over
church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for
the members of religious institutions/ organizations
to conform to just church regulations.

Victoriano v Elizalde INC member was sought to be dismissed because of

closed shop clause. SC ruled that the law allowing
his exemption was valid because it assured the
freedom of religion by people like Victoriano. The
free exercise of religion is held superior over
contractual rights.

We upheld the exemption of members of the INC

from the coverage of the closed shop agreement
between their employer and a union because it
would violate the teaching of their church not to join
any labor group. It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of
the land; but when general laws conflict with
scruples of conscience, exceptions ought to be
 granted unless some compelling state interest
intervenes.

The court upheld the validity of a provision in the

Industrial Peace Act excluding from application and
coverage of a closed shop agreement employees
belonging to any religious sect which prohibits
affiliation of their members with any labor
organization asserting that freedom of

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

B. Free exercise of religion

WHAT DOES FREE EXERCISE MEAN?

Free exercise is composed of two aspects namely:
1. Freedom to believe or not to believe; and
2. Freedom to act on ones beliefs.
To show abridgment of free exercise, coercion on the part of the State must be
shown. Coercion to believe or not to believe; coercion to act or not to act, or to act in a
certain way.

WHAT DOES THE CLAUSE OF NO RELIGIOUS TEST MEAN?

It simply means that no law shall be passed which would require a person to profess
a certain religion to qualify in the exercise of his civil and political rights

WHAT IS THE FREEDOM TO BELIEVE OR NOT TO BELIEVE?

Since this freedom is internal, this freedom is absolute, as long as the belief or
non-belief is confined within the realm of thought; The State may not dictate, restrict or
interfere, in any degree, with an individuals choice of whether or not to believe in
religion; and if one so chooses to believe, which sect to believe in.

WHAT IS THE FREEDOM TO ACT?

This freedom however is not absolute since this involves putting into action
your internal beliefs. They become concrete and external acts that will
inevitably affect other people. The inherent police power can be exercised to
prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction. The abridgment of
this right must pass the clear and present danger test or the balancing of
interest test. The Constitution gave religious freedom, not civil immunity. The
essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Freedom to disseminate religious beliefs through the sale and circulation of
religious literature is a part and parcel of freedom to act on ones beliefs.

Castwell v INVALID
Connecticut
The statute violated the free exercise clause. A state may not
Castwell and 2 sons by statute, wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate
were Jehovahs religious views.
witnesses and were
going house to house GR: general regulation, in public interest of solicitation, which
and played records. If does not involve religious test and does not unreasonably
records were played obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to any
they ask the person to
buy book described and constitutional objection, even though the collection be for
if one refused, he religious purpose.
solicited such
contributions towards Act gives discretion to Secretary of public welfare
the publication of the council which is prone to abuse
pamphlets as the Act however! Requires application to the secretary
listener was willing to
of public welfare council. HE is to determine
make. Pamphlet then
whether cause is a religious one or not. This
will be delivered upon
constitutes a formation of opinion and exercise of
condition that it will be
judgment violating the rights of liberty and
read.
providing a censorship of religion. He may act
arbitrarily depending on the nature of cause to
State SC : it was the
which the solicitation depends.
solicitation that made
Statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct
the act within the
under a general and indefinite
purview of the Law
characterization, leaving to the executive and
which prohibits any
judicial branches too wide a discretion in its
person to solicit
application
money etc. for any
TO require the appellants to obtain a certificate as a
alleged religious,
charitable and condition of soliciting support for their views amount
philanthropic cause. to prior restraint on the exercise of their religion
The law protects the within the meaning of the Constitution.
public against fraud,
and imposition in the There is inadmissable prior restraint
solicitation of funds for The law gives the Council too much discretion
what purported to be in its application and is thus obnoxious to the
religious, charitable, or free exercise of religion. It also amounts to prior
philanthropic cause. restraint. The functions of the Council (in
approving or denying authorization) were not
merely ministerial but were discretionary.

As regards the breach of public peace/order

There was no apparent threat or menace to the
public peace and order; there was no showing
that his deportment was noisy, truculent,
overbearing or offensive. there was only an attempt
to persuade willing listeners to embrace, or at least,
contribute to his religious cause. He has a right to
peacefully impart his views to others
We find in the case that no assault or threatening
bodily harm, no trunculent bearing, no intentional
discourtesy, nor personal abuse. We find only an
effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a
book or contribute money in the interest of
what Cantwell, however misguided others think
him, conceived be true religion.

US v Ballard VALID; good faith

Respondents were ISSUE: Should the truth of the representations concerning

convicted for using the respondents religious doctrines/beliefs be submitted to the
mails to defraud. They jury?
were alleged to
perpetuate a scheme Dual aspect of First Amendment :
called the I AM 1. Forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of
movement claiming to any creed or the practice of any form of worship
be designated by the (Freedom to believe) absolute
ascended masters and 2. Safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
Saint Germain to be the religion (Freedom to Act) not absolute
messenger of their
words. Freedom of though includes freedom of religious belief.
 They also claimed to
be able to heal people
even of incurable
diseases. The allegedly
false representations
covered their religious
beliefs.
A demurrer was filed to
quash the counts since
they attacked the
religious beliefs of the
respondents and sought
to restrict the free
exercise clause. The
charge was limited to
the question of good
faith in believing those
things.
SC does not agree that the truth of the doctrines
should have been submitted to the jury. The 1st
amendment prohibits such a course.
Men may believe what they cannot prove but
it can hardly be supposed that they could be
tried before a jury charged with determining
whether the teachings contained false
representations. If one could be sent to jail
because the jury found the belief false, that would
be the end of religious freedom.
The truthfulness or falsity of religious beliefs is not
for the courts to determine; hence a jury should not
be charged with the duty to determine whether the
teachings of a particular religion contained false
representations.
The jury, as a trier of facts, is not to test the
veracity of Ballards claims, but merely has to
determine if he acted in good faith. No man may
be put to the proof of his religious beliefs or
doctrines. The law knows no heresy.
The district court ruled properly when it withheld
from the jury all the questions concerning the truth
or falsity of the religious beliefs of the respondents

American Bible INVALID; imposition of LICENSE TAX, valid business

Society v City of permits but not applicable to ABS
Manila
ISSUE: does the ordinances restrains free exercise and
The societys agent has enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of
been distributing and appellant?
selling books
throughout the Ordinance 2529 license fees , Ordinance 3000 obtain
Philippines and business permit before conducting businesses
translating them to
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
dialects.
enjoyment of religious profession and worship
In 1953, the city carries with it the right to disseminate religious
treasurer of manila information.
informed the society
Any restraint should be upon a showing of a clear
that it was required to
and present danger. Here, the imposition of a
obtain a mayors
license tax on the exercise of the freedom is an act
permit and to pay
of censorship which should be struck down.
municipal license.
Society paid the P5,821 SC has repeatedly struck down the power to tax on
under protest. The the exercise of religious freedoms because it is a flat
municipal ordinances license tax levied and collected as a condition to the
were assailed by the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed
society as illegal and by the Constitutional liberties of press and religion
unconstitutional.
The fact that the bibles and other religious
pamphlets were sold at a price a little bit higher
than is cost does not make ABS engaged in business
or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit.
The sale of the bibles and pamphlets were for the
purpose of dissemination and NOT for business
 The procurement of license or permit is a form of
prior restraint and cannot apply to the case at bar

Ordinance 3000 not unconsittutional BUT does not

apply to ABS; It does not impose any charge upon
enjoyment of right.

The State may NOT require a license for dissemination

of religious literature, unless it is done as a business
operation for profit

Ang Ladlad v Ang Ladlad partylist qualifies for registration as party-

COMELEC list

It was grave violation of the non-establishment

clause for the COMELEC to utilize the bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad [used
Romans..]

I. religion as the basis for refusal to accept Ang Ladlads

petition for registration

Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality

recognizes that the government must pursue its

secular goals and interests but at the same time
strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional limits
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interest

II. Public Morals as a ground to deny Ang Ladlads

petition for registration

Resolutions have not identified specific OVERT

immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. OSG argues
that a person may be sexually attracted to a
person of the same gender, or more than one
gender, but mere attraction does not translate
to immoral acts. There is a a divide between
thought and action. Respondent fails to
explain what are the social ills that tare sought
to be prevented or why special protection is
required for the youth
The denial of Ang Ladlags registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval among homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further substantial public interest
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5
that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-
 establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilise the
Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must
have a secular purpose.

Ebralinag v Division VALID EXEMPTION due to religious belief

Superintendent
Exempting small group of students will not
Petitioners in the two
shape the globe and will not result in the
cases were expelled
production of students who will not show
from their classes by
reverence to the Philippine flag. The students
public school authorities
only asked for an exemption from the flag
in Cebu for refusing to
ceremony and they did not request to be
salute the flag, sing the
removed from the school where they can
national anthem, and
concur with the Constitution in other ways
recite the patriotic
they can show their respect to the flag.
pledge as required by
Coercing these people to participate in the
RA 1265 on account of
flag ceremonies will not be conducive to the
religious belief
goal of the law which is to have law abiding
(Jehovas witness)
citizens.

Concurring opinion: It is only right to overturn the ruling in

the Gerona case which upheld the expulsion of the students
because they refused to show reverence to the phil. Flag.

Right to religious profession and worship has a 2- fold

aspect.

1. Freedom to believe absolute; CANNOT be

regulated as such belief is confined within the realm
of thought
2. Freedom to act on ones belief not absolute;
CAN be regulated if belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.

Petitioners stress that they do not engage in

external acts or behavior that would offend
countrymen. They just simply stand and show
respect for those who choose to participate. They do
not engage in disruptive behavior, and therefore
does not warrant expulsion.

The only justification for restraints or

limitations upon the free exercise of religion is
the presence of a clear and present danger.
When the laws conflict with the scruples of
conscience, certain exceptions may be granted,
provided that NO compelling state interest
intervenes.

Petitioners only seek exemption from flag salute and

not schools in general. Schools are where they are
taught the democratic way of life, arts, sciences,
Phil. History and culture and the virtues of
patriotism, respect for human rights, duties of
citizenship, moral and spiritual virtues.
Forcing a small religious group through the iron
hand of law, to participate in ceremonies that
violates religious beliefs will hardly be conducive to
 love of country or respect for duly constituted
authorities.
Exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovahs
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag
ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however bizarre those beliefs may seem to others.
The right not to participate does not give them right
to disrupt patriotic exercises.
Employment Division The USE of peyote violates the law regardless of
v Smith religious/non-religious purpose (work-related
violation). Denying compensation DOES NOT VIOLATE
Smith and black were FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
fired by a private drug
rehabilitation due to
their ingestion of When a state has enacted a general statute, the
peyote, a hallucinogenic purpose and effect of which is to advance the
drug for sacramental States secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does
purposes at a ceremony not require the State to conform the statute to the
of their Native dictates of religious conscience of any group. Where
American Church. a law is valid and religiously neutral criminal law,
the conviction of person using peyote must be
They filed for upheld.
compensation. State of
Oregon denied, CA of The Us Supreme Court determined that the state
Oregon affirmed and could deny unemployment benefits to a person fired
the State SC affirmed. for violating a state prohibition on the use of peyote,
even though the use of the drug was part of a
religious ritual. Although states have the power to
accommodate otherwise illegal acts done in pursuit
of religious beliefs, they are not required to do so.

The Dangerous Drugs Law is NOT specifically

directed to religious practice and is applied
equally to all regardless of whether they do
the act for religious or non-religious purpose
State law stated the reasons that drugs cannot
be used even for religious purposes

Respondents claim for a religious exception from the

Oregon Law. Such claim cannot be evaluated under
balancing test because the governmental actions
that substantially burden a religious proactive must
be justified by compelling state interest.

BALANCING TEST is inapplicable to across-the-

board criminal prohibition on a particular form
of extraordinary right to ignore generally
applicable laws that are not supported by
compelling governmental interest on the basis
of religious belief.

Although it is constitutionally permissible to exempt

sacramental peyote use from the operation of drug
laws, it is not constitutionally required.
Wisconsin v Yoder INVALID; Wisconsin law violates right to religious
exerise and that adhering to it would endanger
Respondents were salvation of children
convicted by the
Wisconsin courts for However strong the states interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by NO means absolute to
violation of the
the exclusion or subordination of all other interest
compulsory school
attendance law which
required the
respondents to send
their children to school
until the age of 16.
The respondents were
of the Amish faith and
maintained that
requiring such
attendance was
contrary to the Amish
religion and would
endanger their own and
their childrens
salvation. The values
taught in secondary
school are in marked
variance with the Amish
way of life.
The states right to enforce compulsory education
must be balanced with Free Exercise and the rights
of the parents to the religious upbringing of their
children. Only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance
such legitimate claim to free exercise. The Amish
way of life is deeply rooted in religious conviction,
not merely of preference. Modern secondary
education is alien to the Amish way of life. The
Wisconsin law compels them to perform acts against
their religious beliefs.
The States claim of parens patriae CANNOT
prevail over the free exercise claim of the
Amish Community in the absence of a
compelling state interest. In this case, the Amish
Sect has established that there is NO apparent
danger to the welfare of the children should
they be deprived of the 2 years of additional
education.

Pamil v Teleron VALID disqualification reason ; however Admin Code

relied upon is unconstitutional on its face as it poses a
religious test contrary to 1935 Constitution
Father Gonzaga was
elected to the position Admin Code : no case shall there be elected or appointed to a
of municipal mayor of municipal office, ecclesisastics.. soldiers for public works of the
Alburquerque, Bohol. A municipality.
suit for quo warranto
was filed by Pamil who 1935 constitution: No religious test shall be rquired for
was himself an exercise of civil and political rights.
applicant for said office.
He based his suit on the RTC: sustained right of Fr. Gonzaga based on the statutory
disqualification on the ineligibility that was impliedly repealed by Election Code of
administrative code. 1971

The court had no choice but to vote for the

reversal of the lower-court decision because 7
members wre in view that judgment should not be
affirmed because the challenged provision was no
longer operative and 5 member ssaid prohibition is
not tainted with constituional infirmity. (5 members
being the minoriy the vote of 7 is not sufficient to
render provision ineffective)
The challenged provision of the administrative code
is inconsistent with the declaration of the
constitution since to exclude would be to impose a
religious test.
The ban imposed by the Administrative Code is
incompatible with the Constitution because it
amounts to a religious test for the exercise of
a political right.
However, the prohibition against appointment
to public office remains valid. (Majority Opinion)
Torcaso v Watkins : No religious test ought
ever to be required as a disqualification for
any office or proifit or trust in the State other
 than a declaration of belief in the existence of
GOD
Torcaso Pamil
Here, it was the lack Here, being an
of belief in God that ecclesiastic and
was the ground of therefore
disqualification professing a
religious faith
suffices to
disqualify for a
public office.
Hence, such
provision is held
inoperative.

Teehankee, dissent:
No religious state clause bar the state from
disqualifying non-believe, atheist or agnostic from
voting or being voted for a public office for it is
tantamount to a religious test and compelling them
to profess a belief in God and religion; to disqualify
them (admin code) is to exact a religious test
The question on whether the priest or cleric should
exercise political right of seeking public office,
national , or local is best left to the church and his
own judgment
Respondent even resigned as parish priest before
holding of elections. Ecclesiastic is free to seek
public office and place his personal merits and
qualifications for public service before electorate
who will pass judgment upon him

Mcdaniel v Paty INVALID law : the law disqualifies ministers of the Gospel or
priest or any denomination whatever from being a delegate to
Super opposite to the constitutional convention
Pamil TSK TSK
Though the constitutional provision is NOT primarily
Paty is a candidate for
directed at religious belief BUT at the status, acts,
delegate to a Tennesse
and conducts of the clergy, it is still in violation of
Constitutional
the Free Exercise of religion clause.
Convention. He sought
The provision conditions the right to free exercise of
for the disqualification
religion on the surrender of right to seek office;
of Mcdaniel, a Baptist
it establishes a religious classification which
minister, his rival
inhibits religion in the violation of the Free Exercise
candidate based on a
clause. Tennessee has failed to show that the
Tennessee Constitution
election of public office members of the clergy will
provision.
lead to the promotion of the interest of a sect.
Religion cannot be used as basis of
classification for the imposition of benefits,
penalties, or privileges.

Goldman v Weinberg VALID law (majority opinion)

Goldman was a Jew and The prohibition is valid. A military regulation

was also the
prohibiting the wearing of a yarmulke while on duty
commissioned officer of
and in uniform does not violate ones freedom to
the US Air Force.
exercise his religious beliefs, pursuant to the
Goldman seeks to
militarys perceived need for uniformity
declare the regulation
Here, the Air Force had drawn the line essentially
of the Air Force that between religious apparel that is visible and that
prohibits him from which is not, and the challenged regulation
wearing his yarmulke reasonable and even handedly regulates dress in
(which covers his head the interest of the militarys perceived need for
before the omnipresent uniformity
God).
Majority
ISSUE: Whether such
Discipline is jeopardized
regulation violated his
when exceptions to military
freedom to exercise
regulation is granted
religious belief.
- fighting forces shall slip
down the treacherous slope
toward unkempt appearance,
anarchy and ultimately
defeat
Military has an important
interest in complete dress
uniformity
- fosters spirit de corps,
loyalty to service that
transcends individual bonds
- there will be a strong
wedge of divisiveness
between members of the
service
The group identity of the Air
Force would be threatened if
Orthodox Jews were allowed
to wear the yarmulkes with
their uniforms
If the Court will allow
regulation, then the Air Force
must also allow other forms
of dress and grooming like
turbans to Sikhs and
J. Brennans rebuttal
The Air Force has not offered
any rational basis for it
It cannot defend the rule by
insisting that discipline
depends upon adherence to
whatever established rule
Air forces dress code states
that neither the Air force nor
the public expects absolute
uniformity of appearance
- each officer has a right to
express their individuality
provided that his overall
image is not so extreme,
unusual or faddish, as to
destroy public confidence in
him
- the dress code even allows
men to wear 3 rings and 1
identification bracelet of neat
and conservative design even
if such relate to a religious
order
- the military allows other
manifestations of religious
diversity (attending religious
service, wearing crosses,
some forms of religious
garments, among others.
There is no reasonable and
striking basis for prohibiting
the wearing of yarmulkes
A yarmulke worn with a
military uniform shows that
the shared public identity of
a military officer embraces
and unites religious and
ethical pluralism
The military could always
provide a reasoned basis
for preventing certain
practices or clothing (like Air
Forces very own, neat and
 dreadlocks to Rastafarians conservative standard which
it uses for judging jewelry

There is no rational basis

provided as to why
yarmalukes with uniforms
cannot be judged by the air
Forces near and conservative
standard

Austria v NLRC Relationship of the church as an employer and the

minister as an employee is purely secular in nature
because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines of the church. Such affairs are governed by labor
laws; the Labor Code applies to ALL establishments,
whether religious or not.

Centeno v Villaon-
Pornillos STAT CON
Centeno and Yco
allegedly violated the
Solication permit law
because they were
soliciting for the
renovation of the
chapel of Barrio Tikay in
Bulacan. POLICE POWER
Whether religious
purpose is included in
solicitation for
charitable purpose as
required under the
Solicitation Permit Law?
NO
contributions designed to promote the work of the
chuch are charitable in nature; however,
religious purpose is not interchangeable with the
expression charitable purpose.
Acts of petitioners CANNOT be punished under the
said law because the LAW does NOT contemplate
solicitation for religious purposes.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be
subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. The State has authority
under the exercise of its police power to determine
whether or not there shall be restrictions on
soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy
causes or for fraudulent purposes.
Certainly the solicitation of contributions in
good faith for worthy purposes should not be
denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power
to determine within reasonable limits the worthy
from the unworthy.
Solicitations for religious purposes may be subject
to the proper regulation by the state. However, in
the case at bar, considering that the solicitations
intended for a religious purpose are not covered by
the law.

Lee v Weisman INVALID invitation of rabbis in a public school

graduation
Principals of public
middle and high schools Whether the act of the principal violated the establishment
are permitted to invite clause of petitioners
members of the clergy
to give invocations and
benedictions at schools The directions may have been given in good faith
graduation ceremonies.
Petitioner Lee invited a
rabbi to offer such
prayers at grad
ceremony.
Church of the Lukumi INVALID LAW; no compelling reason to justify the law
v City of Hialeach
Petitioner church and
congregants practice
Santeria religion which
practices animal
sacrifice as one of its
devotion.
An ordinance however
was passed prohibiting
animal sacrifices and
unnecessary
slaughtering for any
type of rituals
Lambs Chapel v INVALID; subject matter of law are not reasonable and
School District viewpoint neutral
New York law
authorized local school
boards to adopt a
reasonable regulation
on the use of school
property after school
attempt to make prayers acceptably to most
persons but does not make prayers acceptable to
most persons does not resolve the dilemma caused
by the schools
Such presents an indirect pressure on attending
students to maintain respectful silence during the
invocation and benediction which can be understood
as a form of participation
The purpose of the establishment clause is to
prevent the government from establishing an official
or civic religion to ensure that a religion with more
specific creeds will not be established.
Inviting a rabbi or anyone part of a clergy to lead
the prayer at a public school graduation violates
such clause because it presents an indirect pressure
on students to participate in the prayer.
State legislatures opening is different from
graduation. Graduation ceremonies require students
to attend given its nature as an important school
occasion
A graduation ceremony, a personal milestone cannot
be equated with routine sessions of Congress which
have opening prayers where adults can freely enter
and leaves
A law that burdens religious practice can only be
justified if it is neutral and is of general
applicability.
However, where such law is NOT characterized by
neutrality and general applicability, it MUST BE
justified by a compelling government interest
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that
interest.
- the ordinances were NOT neutral. they suppress
much more religious conduct than is necessary to
achieve their stated ends
- there is NO compelling interest to justify
restriction
These ordinances are substantially under inclusive
with regard to the citys public health interests in
preventing the disposal of animal carcasses in open
public places and consumption of uninspected meat
Ordinances did not meet Smith standards. They are
not narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted
governmental interests. All four are overbroad or
under inclusive in substantia respects because the
proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to
analogous religious conduct
The district may preserve the property under its
control and need not have permitted after hours use
for any of the uses permitted under state law
Access to non-public forum can be based on
subject matter or speaker identity so long as
hours. 10 cases were
allowed except it did
NOT include meetings
for religious purposes.
Lambs chapel
requested twice to use
the school facility for a
religious oriented film
on family values and
child rearing but was
denied twice by the
respondent District
Whether the rule 7 is
the denial of the District
to use the Church
violates the Freedom of
Speech clause. - YES
Long v Basa VALID expulsion; the by-laws of the church should
prevail
Petitioners were
members of the The
CHURCH in QC
Incorporated. A
registered corporation
under the Securities
and Exchange
Commission. Some
members were
exhibiting conduct
contrary to the
teachings and doctrines
of the CHURCH which
were not based on the
bible. They ignored the
warning and as such,
they were expelled with
prior notice and
hearing.
There was the CHURCH
by laws stating that the
Board of Directors have
absolute power to
expel/admit members.
Whether the expulsion
of the CHURCH was
lawful
- YES
MELOs dissent
- courts may intervene in cases where their civil and political
rights are invaded, bad faith, oppression, or fraud or that if
there is violation of the laws, constitution.
the distinctions drawn are 1) reasonable and
2) view point neutral
That Rule 7 treats all religions and religious
purposes alike does not make application in case
view point neutral. However, for it discriminates on
the basis of view point by permitting school property
to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and child rearing expect those dealing
with the subject from a religious standpoint.
It denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible
subject.
The 3 part test show of Lemon does not show it is
an establishment of religion
The film would not have been shown during
school hours hence it would not be seen as a
state sponsored showing, as such is open to
the public. There would be no realistic danger that
the community would think that the district was
endorsing a religion or any particular creed.
In matters purely ecclesiastical, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon
the civil tribunals.
Laws, such as the Corporation Code, recognize this
peculiarity of religious organizations by declaring
that the expulsion of members of such shall be
terminated in the manner provided by its by-laws.
Leave disciplining of members to the church
authorities.
A church member who is expelled from the
membership by the church authorities, or a
priest or minister who is by them deprived of his
sacred office, is without remedy in the civil
courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of
the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals.
The by-laws of the CHURCH clearly states that
members have given The Board of Directors
the ABSOLUTE power to expel/admit
members. The By-laws do NOT require prior notice
and hearing for an expulsion to be valid. (members
do acts contrary to their beliefs)
- members are constructively bound by the by-laws
even if they do not know.
- the board of directors can issue a resolution
expelling the members without giving prior notice or
reason. The members have waived their right of
prior notice because of their membership. Hence,
They can expel outright.
The nature of a religious organization is different
from an ordinary organization as the basis of the
relationship in the former is the adherence to a
common-religious belief.
Intramural religious disputes
The civil courts are very wary when it comes to dealing with the internal
workings of a particular religion. Brought to life in recent times in the goings on
in the Iglesia ni Kristo
TARUC, AUSTRIA, LONG
INC v Ca
Iglesia ni Cristo has a
TV program entitled
ANG IGLESIA NI
CRISTO every Sunday.
MTRCB X-rated some of
the series of programs
which INC submitted to
the board for review
before airing them.
The X-rated
classification was based
on the opinions of the
members of the board
that such programs are
offensive to the other
religions, particularly to
the Catholic faith.
Estrada v Escritor
Complainant Estrada
filed the charge against
Escritor as he believes
that she is committing
an immoral act (living
with a man not her
husband) that tarnishes
the image of the court.
Thus she should not be
allowed to remain
employed within the
Judiciary. Judge
Caoibes set a
preliminary conference
wherein Escritor
admitted that she has
been living with Luciano
Quilapio, Jr. without the
ISSUE:
benefit of marriage for
W/N respondent should be found guilty of the administrative
20 yrs. but as a
charge of gross and immoral conduct.
member of the religious
The X-rating of the MTRCB constitutes prior restraint
and that any act that restraints speech is hobbled
by the presumption of invalidity. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be
justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil. In this
case, the MTRCB has not overturned the
presumption of invalidity.
OBITER DICTUM: Only judicial determination in an
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary
sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring judicial determination suffices
to impose a valid final restraint. But, the SC held
that the MTRCB, an administrative body, has the
power to review.
Certain programs of the INC were given an x-rating
by the MTRCB for attacking the dogmas of other
religions and were thus prevented from being aired.
The right to religion has been accorded a preferred
status but the free and outward exercise of religion
may be regulated by the State when it will bring
about a clear and present danger of some
substantive evil and if it is inimical to society.
The conduct of the MTRCB clearly amounted to
prior restraint in this case. Simply criticizing other
religions does not pose a clear and present danger,
and the MTRCB cannot prohibit such criticisms, no
matter how unclean they are, in the absence of such
danger. The clear and present danger test was not
properly applied in this case.
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a
31
given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, this
court described morality as how we ought to live
and wh
Escritor was charged administratively for immoral
conduct for co-habiting w/ Quilapio w/o the benefit
of marriage Escritor and Quilapio were members of
the Jehovahs Witness. They secured a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness signifying their churchs
approval of their union in accordance w/ their
religious beliefs. The State must undertake the
burden of satisfying the compelling state interest
test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed
upon Escritor, thus, the case must be remanded to
the Court Administrator and the Solicitor General
should intervene.
sect known as the
Jehovahs Witnesses HELD:
and the Watch Tower NO. The state interest sought to be upheld is the preservation
and Bible Tract Society, of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks
their conjugal a high standard of morality and decency.
arrangement is in
conformity with their However, there is nothing in the OCAs memorandum to the
religious beliefs. In Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling
fact, after 10 yrs. of that it should override respondents plea of religious freedom
living together, she nor is it shown that the means employed by the government
executed on July 28, in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondents
1991 a Declaration of religious exercise.
Pledging
Faithfulness. NOTE:
The case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
The Jehovahs Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to
congregation requires intervene in the case where it will be given the
that at the time the opportunity
declarations are (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
executed, the couple respondents claimed religious belief and practice;
cannot secure the civil (b) to present evidence on the states compelling
authorities approval of interest to override respondents religious belief
the marital relationship and practice; and
because of legal (c) to show that the means the state adopts in
impediments pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
Consequently, Deputy respondents religious freedom.
Court Administrator
Lock found Escritors
defense of freedom of This court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of
religion unavailing to benevolent neutrality should be applied. Under the test of
warrant dismissal of the benevolent neutrality, religious freedom
charge of immorality.
is weighed against a compelling state interest:
Accordingly, he
recommended that Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
respondent be found pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time
guilty of immorality and strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
that she be penalized possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
with suspension of 6 morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
mos. and 1 day without neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
pay with a warning that religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests
a repetition of a similar
act will be dealt with
more severely in RATIO:
accordance with the The claim of religious freedom must be subject to
Civil Service Rules. the compelling state interest test from a
benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. entertaining
the possibility that respondents claim to religious
freedom would warrant carving out an exception
from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense
of religious freedom will be unavailing should the
government succeed in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondents right to religious freedom has been
burdened.
There is no doubt that choosing between keeping
her employment and abandoning her religious belief
and practice and family on the one hand, and giving
up her employment and keeping her religious
practice and family on the other hand, puts a
 burden on her free exercise of religion. The burden
on respondent in the case at bar is even greater as
the price she has to pay for her employment is not
only her religious precept but also her family which,
by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands
honorable before God and men.

The second step is to ascertain respondents sincerity in

her religious belief.

Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious

belief and practice and is not merely using the
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness to avoid
punishment for immorality. She did not secure the
Declaration only after entering the judiciary where
the moral standards are strict and defined, much
less only after an administrative case for immorality
was filed against her. It is also worthy of notice that
the Report and Recommendation of the investigating
judge annexed letters of the OCA to the respondent
regarding her request to be exempt from attending
the flag ceremony in accordance with her religious
beliefs. Also, she is a practicing member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers
testified that she is a member in good standing

DOCTRINE:
Government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society and not because the conduct is proscribed by
the beliefs of one religion or the other.

The Philippine constitutions religion clauses prescribe not a

strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and
interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious
liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

DISSENTS: Escritors conduct constitutes the felony

of concubine clearly w/in the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Religious beliefs, no matter
how sincere, cannot exempt from liability under the
RPC for criminal acts.

Perfecta v Esidra
Under the circumstances, respondent judges second
Petitioner Eladio marriage and her alleged affair with her second
Perfecto filed an husband were not of such depravity as to reduce
administrative confidence in the Rule of Law. The Court held that
complaint against Judge Esidera is not guilty of falsifying the
respondent Judge Alma document as she did not participate in the filling in
Consuelo Desales- the required details. She is not also guilty of
Esidera for falsification disgraceful and immoral conduct under the Code of
of public documents
and dishonesty
Petitioner alleged that
respondent Judge was
first married to Richard
Tang Tepace on May 7,
1987. Her marriage was
then declared void on
January 27, 1992.
Pending the declaration
of the first marriage
void ab initio, on
October 3, 1990,
respondent gave birth
to a daughter with
Renato Verano Esidera.
Based on the records,
respondent married
Renato on June 3,
1992.
Petitioner alleged that
Judge Desales-Esidera
falsified her daughters
birth certificate to make
it appear that she and
Renato Esidera were
married on March 18,
1990 and that their
daughter was a
legitimate child. No
marriage took place on
that date based on a
certification of no
marriage issued by the
Civil Registrar of
Paranaque City.
Petitioner prays for
Judge Desales-Esideras
dismissal from office for
her alleged dishonesty.
Respondent contends
that everything she did
was legal and in
accordance with her
religious beliefs. She
was, indeed, married to
her second husband in
1990 but only
recognized under
Catholic rites. The
priest who officiated
their marriage had no
authority to solemnize
marriages under civil
law. She further argued
that while her religious
Professional Responsibility
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is
independent of any divine moral prescriptions. What
is good or right at a given circumstance does not
derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from
the independent moral sense shared as humans.
The court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, should remain neutral and to limit the
bases of its judgment on secular moral standards.
When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality,
courts should be careful not to overlook the
distinction between secular and religious morality if
it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative
liability of lawyers and judges, immoral conduct
should relate to their conduct as officers of the
court. To be guilty of immorality under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyers conduct must
be so depraved as to reduce the publics confidence
in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding
whenever this court decides the administrative
liability of lawyers and persons under this courts
supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only
persuasively on us.
While we do not find respondent judge
administratively liable for immorality, we can
determine if she is administratively liable for
possible misconduct. The Code of Professional
Responsibility directs lawyers to obey the laws and
promote respect for the law
We cannot conclude that, for purposes of
determining administrative liability, respondent
judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she
and her second husband conducted a marriage
ceremony on March 18, 1990. Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or
subsequent marriage before the legal dissolution of
a first marriage
Thus, unless respondent judges act of participating
in a marriage ceremony according to her religious
beliefs violates other peoples rights or poses grave
and imminent danger to the society we cannot rule
that respondent judge is administratively liable for
her participation in her religious marriage ceremony.
benevolent neutrality and claims of religious
freedom cannot shield respondent judge from
liability for misconduct under our laws. Respondent
judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with
her first husband. She knew its effects under our
laws. She had sexual relations with her second
husband while her first marriage was subsisting.
Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in
sexual relations with another person during the
subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her
marriage was done religious expression. Legal implications and
prior to the declaration obligations attach to any person who chooses to
of nullity of her first enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how civil
marriage, the prevailing marriages are treated in that persons religion.
jurisprudence at that
time was there was no
need for a judicial
decree to establish the
invalidity of void
marriage.

The Office of the Court

Administrator
recommended that we
find respondent judge
guilty of immoral
conduct based on,
among others, her
alleged affair and her
failure to comport
herself according to the
Roman Catholic faith.

Whether the judges

acts constitute
immorality for
purposes of
administrative
liability? NO

BUT GUILTY for

violating CPR canon
1 on law against
bigamy