Rhetoric and Reality: The Legitimation of American Intervention in Bosnia and

Kosovo

Allyson Ford
Columbia University
Please do not cite: comments welcome
af118@columbia.edu

Introduction: The Importance of Rhetoric

One cannot choose between rhetoric and reality, for rhetoric is reality,
although not the whole of reality to be sure. To leave it out, for one need
not discuss it at every turn, is to leave out a part of reality.
(Scott 1990)

The power of the words of an American president to shape international politics

has increased as Americas role as a great power has developed. As Mary Stuckey notes,

in the twentieth century, the rise of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson saw the

American presidency transformed from a strictly administrative role to a legitimating

role: in other words, a symbol of American national power. TR was the first president to

recognize the importance of the bully pulpit, by which he took his case directly to the

American people when Congress did not go along with his ideas. Prior to TR, presidents

focused their communication mainly on other branches of government. Wilson, in turn,

argued in his Constitutional Government that the only truly national voice in US

government is that of the president: in fact, the only way that a president can compel

Congress to act is by a presidential appeal to public opinion. (Gelderman 1997)

I argue that the impact that great powers have in international politics in postwar

worlds is ultimately shaped by the success of failure of presidential rhetoric to legitimate

an internationalist role for that state. This is not to deny the existence of and the

importance of the realities of the distribution of power or of the interests of great powers;
however, acting along these material influences are indeterminate. Arnold Wolfers noted

long ago that a states national interest is an ambiguous symbol, and material factors can

be interpreted in numerous ways. (Wolfers 1952) The process of defining a national

interestand an appropriate foreign policyultimately draws on ideational sources. A

foreign policy has to be publicly legitimated within the state in order for it to be effective

(George 1980). By legitimacy, I refer to something that is legitimate if it is in accord

with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group. This is

necessarily a subjective definition, relying on the point of view of the actors. (Zeldich

2000)

A legitimation process is thus an attempt to construct a rationale for action that is

consistent with the underlying values of ones society: it draws on these social facts to

make a preferred course of action seem natural and inevitable. This draws on the work of

John Searle, who argued that the world consists of both brute facts (which exist

independently of human consciousness) and social facts (which exist due to

intersubjective understandings among a group of people). (Searle 1995) The social facts

of a given environment are not established directly as a result of the realities of objective

and external factors; the effects of these are mediated by and dependent on the

interpretation given to them by people within a cultural framework. By its nature, the

rhetoric of a presidential administration is a social fact.

Analyzing the importance of rhetoric is not the same thing as rejecting the importance of

material conditions, nor does it deny the importance of military and economic factors in

international politics. However, I do argue that these material factors are unavoidably

viewed through the lens of social facts. As Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe explain
 The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an
event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now,
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is
constructed in terms of natural phenomena or expressions of the wrath
of God depends on the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is
not that objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different
assumption that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any
discursive condition of emergence. (Cited in Jaszinski 1998)

It is of course true that political rhetoric is famously used for purposes other than

giving a descriptively accurate account of real-world conditions. Policymakers can and

do lie, make misleading statements, or omit key factors that contradict their statements:

they may even be unaware of how their statements can be interepreted by the listener.

The purpose of looking at political rhetoric is not to take it as an accurate description of

either external conditions or of ones perceptions of these: rather, it is to examine the

social purposes to which this rhetoric is being put: this requires an analysis of the broader

context in which these ideas operate. (Billig 2001: Halliday 2000). At the same time, it

is also important to bear in mind what is not being said, and why. Early in 1934, perhaps

anticipating later critics, FDR admitted that he could not articulate his long-term goals in

American foreign relations: however, he added that even if he were able to do so, he

would not, after seeing what happened to Woodrow Wilson after he had done so.

(Bennett)

Rhetoric is often derided as mere words, in contrast to real conditions. Some

critics dismiss discourse analysis on the grounds that it focuses on mere words, while it

is ultimately actions that determine social life. Why study the rhetoric of politicians, who

often have reasons to make untruthful statements? Political leaders often wax poetic

about the virtues of democracy or equality while pursuing policies that fail to promote
these lofty goals. During the Cold War, as Tony Smith acknowledges, at the same time

that the United States spoke of promoting democratization it was also supporting several

authoritarian governments in the Third World. (Smith 1994) What difference then does

rhetoric make, if it does not reflect the actions of a state? How would one know which

discourse mattered?

One response is to say that the meanings of what people do are at least in part

determined by what they say (Bruner 1990). What it is to be an action, and what

defines meaningful actions in the world, is shaped by discourse. In fact, technically,

actions are also a part of discourse analysis: there is no reason to look solely at the

words of policymakers. A comprehensive interpretation of the post-Cold War era, for

example, shows that while Bush evidence more interest in foreign policy issues than Bill

Clinton did, both of them nevertheless succeeded at articulating convincing justifications

for a continued internationalist role for the United States. Finally, most state behavior is

in fact verbal: relatively little of what takes place in international politics involves pure

actions (Jervis 1967).

I argue that rhetoric is in fact a vital part of reality, even if not the whole of

reality. However, it can be argued that the very essence of politics is talk, or

interactive human communication (which can be formal or informal, verbal or nonverbal,

public or private). Communication is ultimately the vehicle of human action. (Denton

1982: Denton and Woodward 1985: Denton and Hahn 1986: Denton 1988) As Robert

Scott notes, one cannot choose between rhetoric and reality, for rhetoric is reality,

although not the whole of reality to be sure. To leave it outis to leave out a part of

reality. (Scott 1990:7)

 However, not all rhetoric is equal. While policymakers must draw on commonly

accepted ideas of legitimate action in order to establish a role for a state, at the same time

it is not quite true that people are the servants, rather than the masters, of their words.

Some people are in a position to have both more control over their words and to use

institutions and resources to empower their statements with credibility. (Burke 1998)

Consequently, I focus on the American presidency as a key site where internationalism is

legitimated.

As Max Lerner observed in his classic work, a president has the power not to be

a follower but a creator of public opinion since he can in large measure shape the

situations to which public opinion responds. (Lerner 1957/1987:923) More recently,

students of public opinion have noted that presidents can more easily manipulate public

opinion in foreign policy affairs, given the lack of direct experience with these issues on

the part of the public. (Page and Shapiro 1991)

Specifically, rhetoric uses the mechanism of identification to achieve its purposes.

If effective, the words of a president or policymaker ultimately sway the audience by

establishing a connection, either between the speaker and the audience (I was a farm boy

too) or between the policy proposed and previously established cultural norms that guide

a states actions. Regarding the first possibility, Kenneth Burke notes that while

politicians craft messages to appeal to the masses, they are also conscious of the tensions

inherent in our political structureIdentification is one mechanism, used here in a

courtship process, for creating political units while blunting unpleasant realities. In

other words, Identification is affirmed with earnest ness precisely because there is

division. (Burke 1969)

 In fact, the modern presidency as a whole has been described as a rhetorical

presidency (Tulis 1993). The president sets goals and provides solutions for a states

problems, the mass media highlight presidential statements (sometimes at the cost of

covering what presidents do), and the constant campaigning presidents conduct

encourages an emphasis on presidential image. (Kuypers 1998) Due to the position

occupied, a president must construct a position of power, myth, legend, and persuasion.

Everything a president does or says has implications and communicates something.

Every act, word, or phrase becomes calculated and measured for a response. (Denton

and Woodward 1985: 199-200)

Yet, even if individual presidentsor their key advisersare in a position to

shape policy, this is not the same thing as the ability to determine actions taken by a state.

They maintain this power to the extent that they are able to maintain social legitimacy.

This is particularly important for long-term decision-making, for it is unlikely that either

an individuals or a small groups ideas will be able to prevail over the social ones.

(Larsen 1996) In order to maintain this legitimacy, they have to frame their policy

preferences in terms that resonate within their cultural context. There is a link between

presidential rhetoric and the environment in which presidents operate. Presidential

rhetoric, to be effective, needs to draw on ideas and concepts that reflect the values and

culture of the public that they serve. They must draw on what is sometimes called the

accumulated wisdom of the people that serves as the authoritative ground for public

discourse. (Young and Launer 1988) If they fail to do this, they are likely to find that

their legitimations fail, and they will be less influential in shaping state policy.
Ultimately, a president must make use of the acceptable images of political reality

suitable for his/her people. (Heisey 1986)

Following the definition of Raymond Williams, A culture is common meanings,

the product of whole people, and offered individual meanings, the product of mans

committed personal and social experience. (Williams, cited in Bradford 2000) Culture

can be difficult to analyze, particularly in a state that is likely to have more than one

political culture: even if one simply looks at the culture of the policymaking elite,

variation among members of this group are likely to lead to significant differences here as

well. At the same time, however, there are likely to be some unifying themes as well. As

Stanley Hoffmann noted in his discussion of national style, unless the nation is a mere

fiction, a territory with central power but not really a community, there must be some

common values, if not about the polity, at least about society. (Hoffmann 1968)

Americans are diverse, yet at the same time are able to communicate with each other:

Americans have pursued and achieved common goals throughout history. While ideas

and ideologies may differ among Americans, enough of a common language exists to

make communicationand a national meaningpossible. (Spindler et al 1990)

Akira Iriye takes this logic one step further, asserting that while material

conditions such as military might and economic capabilities are interchangeable among

different states, a states culture makes the state distinct: each country is built upon

indigenous ideological foundations resulting from its history. (Iriye 1990)

Many have criticized the attempt to analyze international politics via cultural

analysis on the grounds that culture is a necessarily vague concept, and as such is

unlikely to yield a clear, coherent explanation for events in world affairs. However, this
problem is not unique to cultural approaches. In fact, effective cultural analyses have the

same structure as those that examine the impact of other forces on international politics.

Specifically, they need to set boundaries within which phenomena will be studies,

examine relevant evidence, and develop a plausible and clear narrative of the events they

wish to explain. Cultural analyses can then be evaluated in terms of how well they match

their theoretical claims to the empirical evidence. (Dean 2000)

Other critics have asserted that cultural studies of international politics examine

subjects that are peripherally related, at best, to the causal story of the events that they

wish to explain. Referring to cultural historians, Melvin Leffler states that they focus on

discourses rather than subjects, structures rather than actions, process rather than

agency, the construction of meaning rather than the definition of experience. However,

the distinctions Leffler is making here are very unclear. As Robert Dean responds,

[t]hese are false dichotomies. Each paired concept stands in reciprocal relation to its

mate. (Dean 2000)

If the study of culture sounds unavoidably relativistic, and subjective, in fact it is

intended to be neither. The point of studying culture is to transcend the opposition

between the subjective and the objectiveIt is, simultaneously, the objective foundation

of the subjectively meaningful experience and the subjective appropriation of the

otherwise inhumanly alien world. This is how Bauman discusses culture as a real

product of human praxis. (Bauman 1999)

This analysis of culture and rhetoric is consistent with realist social

constructionism. Under this method of post-positivist realism, Culture is understood as

both constructed (socially, linguistically, theoretically and so on) and real at the same
time. Their reality is constituted by their ability to refer outward to causally significant

features of the social world. (Mohatney 2000)

In the words of Zygmunt Bauman (1999)

Culture is as much about inventing as it is about preserving; about

discontinuity as much as about continuation; about novelty as much as
about tradition; about routine as much as about pattern-breaking; about
norm-following as much as about the transcendence of norms; about the
unique as much as the regular; about change as much as abut monotony of
reproduction; about the unexpected as much as about the predictable.

This ties culture to the social task or order-making. Baugman goes on to note

Order is the opposite of randomness. It stands for the trimming down of the range of

possibilitiesTo make order means to manipulate the probabilities of events. Culture

can thus be conceived of in terms of a workshop in which ht steady pattern of society is

repaired and kept in shape. This is how cultural mechanismsvalues, behavioral

norms, artifactsconstitute a system. Since the use of culture to affect social life

involves both managing and being managed by ones circumstances, the term culture is

unavoidably ambiguous. (Bauman 1999)

At the same time, culture is not simply a set of mechanisms used by humans to

assert order over their environment. The development of culture in social life is more

than a system of self-preservation: it has a broader purpose as well, namely to promote a

conception of the good life. It is in this manner that culture operates as a structure of

choices: a dynamic force in which continuity is possible, but only within a chain of

innovations. (Bauman 1999)

In the study of American politics, a focus on American culture is often linked to

ideas about American exceptionalism. If culture reflects what is local, rather than what is

universal, in social life, this seems to be reasonable. However, upon further inspection,
discovering what is exceptional about the US is a difficult task. Several of the

characteristics of American life that have been assumed to be unique to the US are no

longer so. Canada and Australia are also largely nations of immigrants, as are Argentina

and Brazil: Russia has also possessed a vase frontier, as well as questions about how

engaged with Europe it should be: American wealth, in terms of per-capita income, is not

dramatically higher than that of Western European nations. (Frye 1986)

What does stand out, however, in American culture is the idea that the US has a

duty to improve the world: in the words of H. W. Brands, this refers to the notion that

the United States has a peculiar obligation to better the lot of humanity. As far back as

the 1600s, John Winthrop spoke of the US as a city upon a hill, one that would

provide an example to the Old World of how best to conduct governance. Foreign policy

debates draw upon this idea of the US as a world paragon. Brands notes a division

between exemplarists, who argue that the US can best serve as an example by

concentrating on internal affairs, and vindicationists, who assert that active American

intervention in world affairs is necessary to preserve the American way of life. However,

nearly every commentator accepts the idea that the US can and/or should serve an

exemplary role in world politics. Victors in foreign policy debates tend to be those who

more convincingly argue that their policy preferences will maintain Americas leadership

role. (Brands 1998)

In the debates about American intervention in the Balkans, in both Bosnia and

Kosovo, these themesand Brands prediction of the eventual victorare evident. As

the rest of this paper will show, this is apparent in both the analysis of the legitimation of
post-Cold War internationalism in general and American intervention in both Bosnia and

Kosovo.

Empirical Evidence

Reconfiguring American Identity as an Internationalist Great Power

While there are important differences between the Bush and Clinton

administration, certain themes are common to both of them. In both presidencies, most

fundamentally, there is an attempt to legitimate an identity for America as an

internationalist great power; neither president attempts to make a case for disengagement,

and both refer derisively to those who do as isolationists, comparing them to the

isolationists of the 1930s. Moreover, while the specific words used differ, both of them

emphasize the importance of maintaining American primacy: neither president is willing

to rely on international institutions as an alternative to the imperative of maintaining

Americas power capabilities. Both Bush and Clinton make the assertion that

democracies do not fight each other. In addition, both of them define the potential threat

to American security in diffuse terms, referring to terrorism, drug trafficking, and the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, both of them would prove to be

reluctant to provide a detailed, step-by-step outline of the grand strategy of the United

States.

However, they also differed in important ways. The terms on which the United

States would interact with and rely on international organizations varies; Clinton would

prove to be more interested in promoting multilateralism as an end as well as a means.

The importance of economic power as a tool for foreign policy makers is another

difference; Clinton placed considerably more emphasis on this. One last important

difference is in the overlap of domestic and foreign policy issues; while Bush

occasionally recognized this, Clinton was more explicit in making this linkage, and in

using it as one justification for American internationalism.

The Bush Administration

As the freest and fairest and the most powerful democracy in the face of
the earth, we must continue to shine as a beacon of liberty, beacon of
justice, for all the people of the world.

George Bush (DOS Bulletin, April 1989:8)

The work of Americato perfect our society, to strengthen and extend

freedomis really never finished.

James Baker (Ibid:9)

On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech before the United

Nations, in which he challenged president-elect George Bush to end the Cold War. He

announced a large reduction of Soviet troops, including the withdrawal of ten divisions

from Eastern Europe, and challenged the US to cooperate with the Soviets in the trouble

spots of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and Angola. (Powaski 1998: 263) This was

plausible to some Reagan administration officials: speaking in October 1988, Reagans

Secretary of State George Shultz stated about the US-Soviet relationship that It will not,

in the future, be the same kind of rivalry that has taken center stage in world affairs for

the past 40 years. (DOS Bulletin, January 1989:6) Moreover,

Actions will be difficult, and results will take a while. But actions and
results start from ideas and words, whether called new thinking,
perestroika and glasnost, or just plain, pragmatic observation of what
worksLet us not be shy about it: the world is catching on to the
 American way. It is not just our ship that will catch the tide, its a whole
fleet of shipsand America is the flagship of that fleet. This means we
must stay engaged. (Ibid:8)

Bushs attitude toward grand strategizing, or what came to be known as the

vision thing, was notoriously derisive. He thought that the dramatic changes in external

conditions, combined with questions about the stability of these changes, meant that a

clear-cut guide for American foreign policy could not be designed. Speaking before the

American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1989, Baker said that the meaning of

the recent changes in world politics meant that Unlike the last 40 years, the task before

us is, therefore, more complex and it is more nuanced. It has become less susceptible to

the grand gesture, the single solution, or the overarching doctrine. (DOS Bulletin, June

1989:9)

Nevertheless, however fuzzy the details may have been, Bush did want to

maintain an American internationalist role. By the spring of 1989, Bush became

concerned that he was losing the initiative. During an Oval Office meeting on March 30,

he expressed concern that American leadership in Europe had been eroded by

Gorbachevs popularity, and told his advisers that he wanted a set of proposals that would

reassert Americas role as a leader. In Bushs words, If we dont regain leadership,

things are going to fall apart. (Gates 1996:461-62) The option of disengagementor

even of letting Gorbachev take the initiativewas unacceptable. On May 12, 1989, Bush

gave what was billed as an important statement of his foreign policy. Speaking before

students at Texas A&M University on the subject Change in the Soviet Union, Bush

said that We seek a friendship that knows no season of suspicion, no chill of distrust.

(DOS Bulletin, 8 July 1989:16) Later that month, speaking at Boston University, he said
that the West is being tested by complacencywe must never forget that to keep the

peace in Europe is to keep the peace in America. (Ibid:19)

Bushs foreign policy is often described as realist, but his administrations

rhetoric showed the influence of one liberal idea: the belief that democracies were more

peaceful. Speaking in May 1989 before the American Business Coalition in Singapore,

Vice-President Dan Quayle drew upon this idea. US Policy in Asia will also continue to

insist that democratic political institutions, with a commitment to openness and criticism,

are the surest means of building a national political consensusthe foundation of true

security. (DOS Bulletin, 2 June 1989:54) Secretary of State James Baker, a more

influential person in the Bush White House, also echoed these ideas: speaking before the

Senate Finance committee in October 1989, he argued that

Its in our long-term foreign policy interest for more people around the
globe to share our core valuesdemocracy and self-determination, respect
for individual rights and freedoms, economic liberty, reliance on a market
economy, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. (DOS Bulletin,
December 1989:24)
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 would test whether the Bush

administration would be successful in legitimating an internationalist role in the post-

Cold War era that included the use of force. Public opinion was split in the days of the

mobilization, with a nearly equal division between those who supported the use of force

and those who wanted to give sanctions more time. (Rielly 1994) Meanwhile, Congress

was also divided in the fall of 1990, and some members of Congress were threatening to

invoke the War Powers Act. (Weissman 1995) Attempting to rally Congress behind the

president, Secretary of State Baker offered a prepared statement to the House Foreign

Affairs Committee to explain Americas stake in the conflict. He asserted that we must

leave behind not only the Cold War but also the conflicts that preceded it. Moreover,
In this effort, America must lead, and our people must understand that. We remain the

one nation that has the necessary political, military, and economic instruments at our

disposal to catalyze a successful collective response by the international community.

(DOS Dispatch, September 10, 1990:71) Bush himself built upon that idea in his 1991

State of the Union address in which he said We are the only nation on this Earth that

could assemble the forces for peace. This is the burden of leadership and the strength

that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world. (DOS Dispatch,

February 4, 1991:67)

While economic incentives and the importance of oil resources played an

important causal role in the war, legitimations were also an important tool to sustain the

policy of standing firm against Saddam Hussein. In fact, one of the perceived benefits of

the quick victory in Iraq was, as Bush put it, that By God, weve licked the Vietnam

syndrome for once and for all. (Beschloss and Talbot 1994) In the future, Americans

historical memory of the Vietnam conflict would not restrict the use of force in the same

way as it had since the 1970s.

Despite this bold move in Iraq, Bush would prove to prefer order and stability in

international politics, even at the expense of seemingly desirable developments. While

Bush was willing to use force against a perceived aggressor state, and was willing to

press the Soviets on the fate of Eastern Europe, he proved to be less willing to risk

instability in the Baltic republics, or any of the republics of the Soviet Union that aspired

to independence. The Cold War was over when the Soviets left Eastern Europe: the

Baltics were not perceived as independent Eastern European states, however, but as

potential spoilers of the new world order. In a speech that was quickly dubbed the
Chicken Kiev speech by journalist William Safire, President Bush addressed the

Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in August 1991. In this

speech, he said that

When Americans talk of freedom, we refer to peoples ability to live

without fear of government intrusion, without fear of harassment by their
fellow citizens, without restricting others freedomsYet freedom is not
the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek
independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism.
They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based on
ethnic hatred. (DOS Dispatch, August 12, 1991:597)

However, even if American willingness to promote democratization and

independence movements was limited in scope, the importance of American involvement

in world affairs remained. Deputy Secretary Eagleburger noted at a Business Week

symposium that American disengagement would be as bad an idea now as it was in the

interwar years. (DOS Dispatch 1991) The question was what the terms of this

engagement would be. Wanting to leave behind a legacy for his time in the White House,

Bush made several speeches about the role of the United States in the post-Cold War

world. Speaking in December 1992 at Texas A&M University, Bush said

Today we are summoned again. This time, we are called not to wage a
war, hot or cold, but to win the democratic peacenot for half of the
world, as before, but for people the world over. The end of the Cold War,
you see, has placed in our hands a unique opportunity to see the principles
for which America has stood for two centuriesdemocracy, free
enterprise, and the rule of lawspread more widely than ever in human
history. (DOS Dispatch, 21 December 1992:894)

When he came to office, President Clintons foreign policy proclamations were

not terribly different than those of Bush. While the campaign emphasized the differences

between the two candidates, there were in fact many similarities between the two. Both

expressed the idea that the United States should be an internationalist great power, and
both agreed that the U.S. should cooperate with international institutions. Bushs 1992

quote on Americas purpose is very similar to Clintons 1995 declaration that

As we move from the industrial to the information age, from the Cold War world
to the global village, we have an extraordinary opportunity to advance our values
at home and around the world. (DOS Dispatch, 16 October 1995)

One of the main themes in Clintons rhetoric on foreign policy is that the division

between domestic and foreign policy issues was blurred. In his inaugural address in

1993, Clinton stated that There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and

what is domestic. Speaking in 1995 to a meeting at Freedom House, Clinton noted that

If I could do anything to change the speech patterns of those of us in public life, I would

almost like to stop hearing people talk about foreign policy and domestic policy, and,

instead, start discussing economic policy, security policy, environmental policyyou

name it. And if we could learn to speak differently about it, the very act of speaking and

thinking in the way we live, I believe, would make isolationism seem absolutely

impossible as an alternative to public policy. (DOS Dispatch, 16 October 1995:733)

Secretary Christopher also used the idea of an overlap between domestic and foreign

issues in his addresses abroad. Speaking at the Special Meeting of the North Atlantic

Council, he said that For our part, President Clinton intends to conduct what our great

post-war statesman, Dean Acheson, called total diplomacya diplomacy that views

domestic and foreign issues as inseparable. We recognize that only an America that is

strong at home can act as an effective partner abroad. (DOS Dispatch, 1 March

1993:119)

While it could be asserted that this connection was instrumental, meant to explain

Clintons focus on domestic affairs, it also responded to the domestic political conditions
the Clinton administration faced in 1993: while Americans did not want to abandon

internationalism, they were more concerned about the unsettled domestic condition at that

time. This added to the risks and uncertainties that Clinton faced when attempting to

define a stronger role for the United States in the Balkans. In fact, economics would be

central to the blurring of lines between domestic and foreign policy. Far more than

President Bush, the Clinton administration sought to have economic issues treated as

important in their own right. Speaking before the Senate confirmation hearings,

Secretary of State-designate Warren Christopher said that

Our strategy rests on three pillars. First, we must elevate Americas

economic security as a primary goal of our foreign policy. Second, we
must preserve our military strength as we adapt our forces to new security
challenges. Third, we must organize our foreign policy around the goal of
promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad. (DOS Dispatch,
25 January 1993:46)

In 1993, Clinton administration officials turned to the task of defining Americans

overall purposeand identityin the post-Cold War world. When it came to the

development of and implementation of Clintons strategy, in fact, there was a consistent

message sent out. America would act, under multilateral auspices whenever possible,

unilaterally in defense of vital interests if necessary. The role of international institutions

in this vision was to help the US maintain leadership at a reduced cost. Many observers

of the Clinton administration point to the guidelines and limitations placed on American

peacekeepers by the 1994 PDD-25, issued in the aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda, as

evidence of a shift away from American reliance on multilateralism. In fact, the Clinton

administration never committed the U.S. to participation in any multilateral forceUN,

NATO, or otherthat was not justifiable in terms of American interests. The 1993

policy guide, PDD-14, that had redefined the terms on which America would participate
in such operations clearly stated that the US would do so. Nor was this emphasis on

limited to the military. In 1993, US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright said we

cannot rely on the UN as a substitute guarantor for the vital interests of the United States.

The Berlin Wall would be upright today if we had relied on the UN to contain

communism. (DOS Dispatch, 27 September 1993:668) Appearing before the House

Foreign Affairs Committee in 1995, she noted that in many circumstances, the UN will

provide options for diplomatic, political, and military action we would not otherwise

have. It enables us to influence events without assuming the full burden of costs and

risks. (DOS Dispatch, 20 February 1995:128) As David Callahan has argued,

Presidential consensus regarding the need to maintain American primacy predates the

Cold War: it is rooted in changes in American thinking about the nature of world politics

in the interwar years and WWII. (Callahan 1994) Clinton maintained this consensus as

much as Bush had.

Clinton outlined his vision in February 1993 in an address given at American

University by pointing to five steps that the US should take to get a new direction at

home and to help create a new direction for the world. Of those five steps, four focused

on economic strategies: Clinton mentioned the need to strengthen Americas domestic

economy; to make trade a priority element of American security; to take the lead in

coordinating international economic growth; to promote the steady expansion of growth

in the developing world. The fifth step would also have an economic element, as Clinton

called for help in stabilizing the worlds new democracies, Russia in particular. (DOS

Dispatch 1993:116-118) Clinton justified this emphasis on economic matters as a

necessary step for America to maintain its influence in world affairs. In a time of
dramatic global change, Clinton told the American Society of Newspaper Editors, we

must define Americas broader purposes anew. And part of that purpose clearly consists

of reviving economic opportunity and growth here at home, for the opportunity to do well

here at home is the ultimate basis for our influence abroad. (DOS Dispatch, 5 April

1993:189) Ultimately, he added, We cant be strong abroad unless we are strong at

home. And we cannot be strong at home unless we are actively engaged in the world

which is shaping events for every American. (ibid:190) Echoing this sentiment,

Secretary Christopher noted on November 3, 1993, in a statement before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee that Security in the post-Cold War era will depend as

much on strong economies as on strong arsenals.

But foreign economic policy was not only important for its link to Americas

domestic well-being. It was also linked, in the eyes of the Clinton administration, to the

spread of democracy; the spread of democracies, in turn, was linked to Americas

security. At the 1993 American University speech, Clinton explained that

Our leadership is especially important for the worlds new and emerging
democracies. To grow and deepen their legitimacy, to foster a middle
class and a civic culture, they need the ability to tap into a growing global
economy. And our security and our prosperity will be greatly affected in
the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay
democraciesDemocracys prospects are dimmed, especially in the
developing world, by trade barriers and slow economic growth. (DOS
Dispatch, 1 March 1993:115)

And Clinton would draw on this presumed linkage when he approved Chinas

most-favored-nation trade status, despite the lack of progress by China in the area of

human rights. Clintons statement on the issue notes We are hopeful that Chinas

process of development and economic reform will be accompanied by greater political

freedom. (DOS Dispatch, 14 June 1993:425) Moreover, at times the Clinton

administration implied that progress in democratization was dependent on economic

liberalization, and vice versa. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake argued in an

address at SAIS/Johns Hopkins University Democracy alone can produce justice but not

the material goods necessary for individuals to thrivemarkets alone can expand wealth

but not that sense of justice without which civilized societies perish. (DOS Dispatch, 27

September 1993:658)

This speech was entitled From Containment to Enlargement, which would form

the basis for the Clinton Administrations strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:

enlargement of the zone of states with market economies and democratic political

systems, engagement in world affairs and with threats to international security. Lake

outlined the four components of the strategy of engagement. The first step was to

strengthen the core of the major market democraciesin other words, taking steps to

improve the US economy, pressing for free and fair trade, as well as updating the

purpose of NATO so that there continues, behind the enlargement of democracies, an

essential collective security. (ibid:660) The second component was to help democracy

and markets expand where the US had security concerns and where it could make the

greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to

see freedom take hold where that will help us the most. (ibid:661) Locations mentioned

here included Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.

The third component of the engagement strategy was to control backlash states, or

what have more recently become known as states of concern, since they were more

likely to sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The fourth
component was humanitarian concerns, and here the restraint was evident. Lake noted

that the criteria for American intervention would be that intervention could be

accomplished at a reasonable cost, that it was feasible, and that Americas help would

produce a permanent result. Moreover, the US would also require that regional and

international organizations would be willing to do their part, and that American actions

were likely to promote stability in the region. Consequently,

While there will be increasing calls on us to help stem bloodshed and

suffering in ethnic conflicts and while we will always bring our diplomacy
to bear, these criteria suggest that there will be relatively few intra-
national ethnic conflicts that justify our military intervention. Ultimately,
on these and other humanitarian needs, we will have to pick and choose.
(ibid:662)

Bosnia is important, but our other interests in Europe and Russia also matter.

American interests in Bosnia do not justify the extreme costs of taking unilateral

responsibility for imposing a solution. (Ibid) And in both Bosnia and Kosovo, Clinton

emphasized the importance of American leadership in partnership with European allies.

Bosnia

In the public rhetoric on Bosnia, the Bush administration was relatively consistent

in its opposition to American intervention in the region: they framed the conflict as one

that was both outside the scope of American interests and unlikely to be resolved by

third-party intervention. Clintons rhetoric, on the other hand, had called for greater

action on the part of America and the West in the region: but during the first two years of

his term, he was unable to construct a legitimation for American intervention that

convinced either the American public or the European allies. By the summer of 1995, as
the credibility of American leadership was increasingly called into question, the

importance of American action became more widely accepted.

Tensions in what was then Yugoslavia began to develop shortly after the fall of

the Berlin Wall, and these tensions erupted into violent conflict, as fighting broke out

between Serbian, Slovenians, and Croatian forces shortly after the latter two declared

independencecontrary to the expressed wishes of U.S. Secretary of State James

Bakerin 1991. While the Slovenes were able to turn back Serbian forces, Slobodan

Milosevic would prove to be more committed to fighting in Croatia, which had a

substantial Serbian minority, and conflict took place throughout 1991. As was widely

reported at the time, the Bush administrations response was not to engage in the conflict,

since weve got no dog in that fight. Instead, the Bush administration preferred to

allow European diplomats to attempt to find a solution to the conflict. Believing that the

end of the Cold War meant that Yugoslavia was of less strategic importance to the United

States, American officials maintained a consistent stance against American intervention

in the conflict.

In February 1992, an agreement to stop the fighting in Croatia was reached, and

UN peacekeepers were sent to the area. However, not only did the fighting in Croatia

continue, the fighting turned to Bosnia, and evidence uncovered during the summer of

1992 indicated that war crimes (in the form of death camps and rape camps) had taken

place, and that they were committed mainly by the Serbian side. On 2 August 1992, the

story about the camps broke in Newsday, and on 5 August, television images of some of

the evidence were broadcast. (S. Woodward 1995) Meanwhile, in the fall of 1992 NATO

became involved in the conflict for the first time, sending assistance to UNPROFORs
operations in the area by staffing the UNPROFOR headquarters in Bosnia-Hercegovina,

and providing air and naval enforcement of the arms embargo. The increase in

involvement of international organizations and increased media coverage made silence on

Bosnia difficult.

Candidate Bill Clinton, sensing an issue of vulnerability in Bushs foreign

policywhich had been presumed to be a Bush strengthbegan to attack the Bush

administration for its inaction and its lack of leadership on the issue. In late July of 1992,

Clinton called for American participation in UN-backed air strikes against the Serb forces

if they continued to block UN relief efforts in Bosnia. As one analyst pointed out at the

time, the idea was that by hitting Bush on Bosnia, Clinton would paint Bush as

unprepared to lead the post-Cold War World. Meanwhile, Bush was also facing criticism

in Congress, and a bipartisan effort rose in the Senate to authorize the shipment of $50

million in arms to the Bosnian government, which would break the arms embargo that

had been instituted against all parties in the Balkans. On 14 August, Clinton told an

audience in Los Angeles that he would work to make the United States the catalyst for a

collective stand against aggression. (Holbrooke 1998)

In response to his critics, in August Bush called upon the UN to use force if

necessary to deliver humanitarian aid to the region. Nevertheless, Bush remained

adamant in his opposition to American intervention in the conflict. Conditions for the

use of American force in Bosnia were not entirely favorable in 1992. Despite the

dramatic victory of U.S. troops in the Gulf War, Bush faced a tough re-election fight, and

the residual effects of the recession of the early 1990s enabled Clinton successfully to

argue that Bush was out of touch with the needs of the American people at home.
However, the framing of the conflict also played a large role: the Balkans region was

portrayed as an area where ancient hatreds had led to fighting in the region for

centuries. Picking up on this theme, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger

said in an October discussion that

This tragedy is not something that can be settled from outside and its about damn
well time that everybody understood that. Until the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats
decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about
it.

Also speaking in early October, Bush issued a statement on Bosnia that focused

on humanitarian relief efforts, asserting that

There is no easy solution to the Bosnian conflict, let alone the larger Balkan crisis.
So we will persist in our strategy of containing and reducing the violence, making
the aggressors pay, and relieving the suffering of victims, all the while lending
our full support for a settlement.

These views were entirely consistent with earlier expressed views on the nature of

the post-Cold War world. Interviewed in September 1989, Eagleberger said that the post-

Cold War world would not necessarily be a peaceful one: weapons of mass destruction

and nationalist hostilities were two potential threats to peace that he mentioned.

Meanwhile, in a February 1990 news conference, Bush remarked that the enemy is

unpredictability, the enemy is instability. Bosnia was consistently framed as a

dangerous place, one in which American intervention would be risky, and a location that

did not engage American interests. In September of 1992, General Colin Powell outlined

his restrictive criteria for the use of American military power abroad: the Powell

Doctrine reflected the view that the United States did not have an interest in intervening

in areas where conflict did not involve vital strategic interests of the US.
 Defending the actions of the Bush administration once it was out of office, Bushs

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney noted on CNN on 22 October 1993 that no one

could ever define a clear-cut mission for American action in the Balkans. Much of the

first term of the Clinton administration would involve an attempt to do exactly that.

Shortly after coming to office in 1993, Clinton ordered an interagency review of

American policy in the Balkans, which appeared to open the door to a change in

American policy in the region. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that Bosnia

does seem to be a place where the United States needs to be activist and internationalist

in our outlook. In late March 1993, after a Serbian assault on Srebrenica, Clinton

advisers met privately to discuss their options. However, these meetings have been

described as unproductive: Clintons advisers were split, and the meetings became an

existential debate over what is the role of America, etc. (Drew 1996)

By late April 1993, facing challenges from key elites such as Senator Joe Biden to

take a stronger stand in Bosnia after Serbs assaulted Srebrenica, Clinton voiced support

for lift and strike: lifting the arms embargo (which hurt the Bosnians and Croatians

more than the Serbians) and employing air strikes against Serbian targets. Even as he

toughened up the rhetoric, however, Clinton was careful not to mention any possible

involvement of American ground troops. Lift and strike appeared to be a solution to the

conflicting imperatives of increasing involvement without increasing risk: even the

dovish Colin Powell supported the policy. (Daaldler 2000)

However, when Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited European leaders

in an attempt to generate allied support for the policy, he found that the Europeans were
not supportive of either lifting the embargo or of striking Serbian targets. Christopher

attempted to reassure the Europeans that lift and strike did not represent a change in the

course of the war, but a tool to induce Serbian cooperation. (Daaldler 2000) However,

the concern among Europeans was that lift and strike was likely to lead to an increase in

violence, which could endanger the safety of European peacekeepers in the region. This

was a risk that they were unwilling to take in the absence of American ground troops.

Moreover, the Europeans were suspicious of lift and strike, viewing it as a way for the

US both to be internationalist and isolationist. (Halberstam 2001) Under instructions to

approach the European leaders in a conciliatory manner, Christopher did not press the

issue: that led the Europeans to conclude that the U.S. was not serious about lift and

strike. Some of Clintons critics charge that he should have aggressively attempted to get

European consensus on an American plan to engage in limited NATO strikes in 1993.

William Hyland, for example, argues that European diplomats were expecting pressure

from American negotiators and were surprised when the US did not apply more leverage

on the issue. (Hyland 2000: see also Daaldler 2000) However, as one account of the

inner workings of the Clinton administration notes, the Europeans had an interest in

making this claim. There was actually very little leverage available for Clinton to use to

induce the Europeans to change their mind on this point, given the presence of European

ground troops and concerns that their safety would be imperiled if NATO bombings

commenced. (Drew 1994)

Meanwhile, the United States could not enthusiastically support the European

alternative to lift and strike, the Vance Owen plan. Having campaigned against Bush on

the grounds that he had stood by when ethnic cleansing took place in Europe, the Clinton
administration was in no position to accept a peace plan that was based on explicit

partitioning of the ethnic groups involved in the conflict. By the arrival of summer, the

policy was that the U.S. would seek to contain the violence, preventing its spread

elsewhere in the Balkans, but would not intervene in an ongoing war. (Daaldler 2000)

As Warren Christopher described the situation in his memoirs, the focus turned to how

we could stop the problem from spreading and deal with the humanitarian problem it

created. (Christopher 1998:347) This led to American support for safe areas, zones

which were intended to serve as areas where Bosnians would be protected from Serbian

violence.

Even when taking tentative steps in 1993 to increase American activity on the

Bosnia issue, Clinton also indicated that he was not willing to take additional steps

beyond lift and strike. While Clinton spoke out against Serbian aggression, when asked

in April 1993 about comparisons between events in Bosnia and the Holocaust, Clinton

stated that

Theyre not identical, everyone knows that. But I think that the United States
should seek an opportunity to stand up against, or at least speak out against,
inhumanity.

The restraint in comments such as these fed perceptions of significant differences

between candidate Clinton and President Clinton on foreign policy led to early divisions

among foreign policy analysts. Clinton would be harshly criticized in 1993 and 1994 for

missteps in Bosnia, where he appeared to be ambivalent about the use of force and in

which he appeared to waffle. It appeared to many of his critics that there was a

disconnect between what Clinton said, as in his criticism of the Bush administrations

handling of the Bosnian crisis, and the lack of decisive action on the part of the Clinton
administration. In other words, there appeared to be a disconnection between Clintons

words and his actions.

In fact, the situation that Clinton faced was complicated by the existence of two

competing policy imperatives. In the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration faced

two competing pressures on Bosnia. The first was to take a tougher stand against the

violence in the Balkans, and in particular against Serbian aggression against the Bosnian

Muslims. At the same time, however, many expressed the concern that American action

in the region would lead to a creeping commitment to an unwinnable cause, and that

Bosnia would turn out to be another Vietnam. Members of Congress voiced this opinion

to the New York Times, as did Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in a Wall Street Journal op-ed.

Clinton had expressed, from early on in his administration, the belief that the United

States had to act in the Bosnian conflict: as he put it, If the United States doesnt act in

situations like this, nothing will happen. Moreover, a failure to do so would be to give

up American leadership. But the form of leadership would not challenge the other

policy imperative Clinton faced: avoiding American responsibility and involvement in a

drawn-out war. Clinton attempted to serve both of these policy goals: the result was

rhetoric that appeared contradictory at best. At the same time, it is worth noting that

European diplomats and UN forces on the ground in Bosnia faced a similar situation of

competing policy imperatives: was their mission to protect the sovereignty of Croatians

and Bosnian Muslims, or to uphold the norm of sovereignty through neutrality and

consent? (S. Woodward 1995)

Advocates of hawkish actions in Bosnia were upset by this restraint, although

there is evidence that it did reflect the public will. Polls taken in the spring of 1993
showed that most Americans were reluctant to use the American military to end the

conflict, and were particularly opposed to the introduction of ground troops. There was

also opposition within both Congress and the military brass. The fall of 1993 would see

the death of 18 American service personnel in Somalia, after which Clinton, fearing a

backlash in public support for the US mission in Somalia, ordered a withdrawal of

American forces. This reinforced suspicions that American military action in the Balkans

would not be effective in stopping the conflict, but instead would lead the US into a

quagmire. What Richard Holbrooke has termed the Vietnamalia syndrome worked

against American intervention. Or, as Clinton told adviser George Stephanopoulous after

events in Somalia went badly, Americans are basically isolationisttheyll back away

when the see the body bags. (Stephanopoulous 1999)

Violence in the Balkans had subsided for a while in 1993, but in late 1993 and

into 1994 Serbian aggression recommenced. NATO met in January 1994, only to reveal

deep splits among the allies: at this time, NATO unity, not NATO credibility, appeared to

be the primary crisis the alliance faced. Within the United States, meanwhile, Clinton

was continuing to assert that the United States would not engage its military power in the

region until after a peace settlement, saying I dont think that the international

community has the capacity to stop people within the nation from their civil war until

they decide to do it. (Daalder 2000:24) But after the 5 February 1994 Serbian assault

on Sarajevos marketplace, American and French policymakers drew up plans for limited

air strikes against Serbian targets, with the intention of establishing a DMZ around

Sarajevo. This led to a Serbian pullback from the immediate area, but it also resulted in

increased American participation in diplomatic efforts. The Contact Group, composed of

American, Russian, British, German, and French diplomats, was formed to construct a

peace settlement. On 18 March 1994, there was hope that the Bosnian conflict would

end, as the Washington Agreement established a Bosnian-Croatian federation to govern

the area. But in July 1994, Bosnian Serbs rejected a peace plan to divide Bosnia into

partitions, and European reaction to Clinton administration officials suggestion to use air

strikes met with the threat of the withdrawal of European peacekeepers from the region.

This would make Bosnia purely an American responsibility, precisely what Clinton

wanted to avoid. (Daaldler 2000) In the fall of 1994, violence again erupted in the

region. This time, however, Europeans blamed the Bosnian Muslims for instigating the

violence by initiating an ill-advised offensive against Bosnian Serbs.

Meanwhile, back at home, Clintons foreign policy rankings fell in 1994: a May

1994 New York Times-CBS poll found that Clintons foreign policy rating was 46%

positive, 48% negative. (Apple 994) This was the source of considerable frustration for

Clintons foreign policy team, who felt that Bosnia was distracting attention from the

successes of Clintons foreign policy: NATO enlargement and relations with other East-

Central European states, for example. Moreover, American diplomacy had succeeded in

preventing potential conflicts in a Greek/Albanian border dispute and over the fate of

Hungarian minorities in neighboring states. (Holbrooke 1998) However, as the violence

in Bosnia continued, the disconnection between the rhetoric of Candidate Clinton and the

actions of President Clinton contributed to a growing credibility gap. Even if a majority

of Americans did not want to intervene in the conflict, they were not comfortable with the

idea of an inconsistent American foreign policy.

When Clinton attempted to defend his foreign policy record on CNN, he was
asked about apparent flip-flops on Bosnia. His response was to assert that there have

been no constant flip-flops: rather, I underestimated the difficulty of putting a coalition

together. Despite this, he added, I did the best I could. I moved as quickly as I could.

Moreover, we have been much more active than my predecessor. (Friedman

1994:A12) Yet as one Clinton administration official confessed off the record, no

question that it was a mistake for Clinton to huff and puff on Bosnia. (Drew 1994) In

November 1994, midterm elections swept Republicans into both the House and Senate:

Clintons political survival was at stake, as was his increasingly unpopular policy reversal

on lifting the arms embargo. Shortly after the election, Clinton announced that he would

no longer enforce the embargo: however, facing severe divisions within NATO, he

decided not to press the allies on the use of air strikes (Daaldler 2000) By the 28th of

November, after NATO failed to reach an agreement on air strikes against the Serbs,

Secretary of Defense Perry stated that the Serbs were unstoppable and that further NATO

strikes would not make a difference. (Ramet 1999)

But the Clinton administration made a commitment that would begin to increase

the likelihood of American involvement in the crisis. As the belief that the UN

peacekeepers were an obstacle, not an aid, to the development of peace in the region,

support began to build for their withdrawal. Fearing for their troops safety, the leaders of

European countries with peacekeepers on the ground asserted that they were unwilling to

withdraw their troops without a commitment of American troops to protect them and

assist in their withdrawal: Clinton agreed to this condition.

In late 1994, former President Jimmy Carter negotiated a cease-fire, which was

conveniently timed to coincide with the winter weather. The Balkans were relatively
quiet in the early part of 1995, but in April, the Serbs announced that they would not

honor the cease-fire, and attacks on targets within Bosnia took place, most notably the

safe areas of Bihac and Srebrenica. Sarajevo also saw the introduction of Serbian tanks

and heavy artillery. In late May, responding to two NATO attacks, almost 300 UN

soldiers and humanitarian personnel were taken hostage in a series of Serbian actions.

Some of these hostages were taken to potential target sites to act as human shields to

protect Serbian targets from NATO attack. An attempt to respond to this was developed

by the Europeans in the form of the Rapid Reaction Force, but at the same time,

momentum in Congress was growing for a unilateral American lifting of the embargo.

As the European allies made clear, this would lead to a withdrawal of their peacekeepers.

While some assert that Clinton was later surprised to discover that he had made a binding

commitment to help the Europeans withdraw by offering American ground troops, he

openly discussed American promises to do so in the spring of 1995.

By July 1995, it was clear that, as Clinton himself stated, This policy is doing

enormous damage to the United States and to our standing in the world. We look weak.

For that matter, so did Clinton: House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) asserted that

there are twenty ways to solve this problem without involving a single American.

While domestically, Clinton increasingly believed the costs of inaction were beginning to

outweigh the risks of intervention, on the international scene chances that the allies would

take a tougher stance was increased by the arrival to power of Jacques Chirac, who was

beginning to argue to the European allies that Bosnia required the West to act. Now,

Clinton had another voice calling for a tougher stand to back him up. (Halberstam 2001)
 At that point, Clinton advisers began preparing for an endgame strategy in the

region, even as they were well aware that their plans might not succeed and that, as

Clinton said, Im risking my presidency on the issue. After securing European

agreement, in late August and early September 1995, NATO commenced the largest

military action since its formation, as NATO troops, with American participation,

engaged in air strikes against Milosevic. Combined with a successful Croatian offensive

on the ground, this turned the tide, and Serbian officials agreed to negotiate an end to the

hostilities at Dayton. In late November 1995, the Dayton Accords were developed,

calling for NATO troopsincluding Americansto enforce the peace agreement.

However, this agreement first had to be sold to a skeptical Congress and

American public. Its success was not a foregone conclusion: in 1995, Bill Clinton looked

weak, the Cold War had ended, divided government existed, and Republicans were

generally skeptical of American involvement in multilateral troop deployments.

Moreover, polls showed large majorities of Americans were opposed to sending US

troops to Bosnia. On 20 November 1995, Clinton told the press in the rose garden

American leadership, together with our allies, is needed to make this peace real and

enduring. Our values, our interests, and our leadership all over the world are at stake.

Two days later, Clinton signaled that he wanted and expected the military brasswhich

had been wary of American intervention in the regionto back the plan, privately telling

Shalikashvili I want everyone here to get behind the agreement. (Holbrooke 1998)

In the end, Congress assented to Clintons deployment of 20,000 troops to Bosnia

in 1995. In October 1995, before the Dayton Accords were finalized, a Sense of the

House resolution was passed that stated that the president should not assume he could
send troops to Bosnia without the authorization of Congress: the Senate passed a similar

resolution: this passed by a 3-1 ratio. The House also voted to give support to the

troops, not the policy. Yet this cautionary note did not mean that Congress would

actually stop deployment. When Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the

president did not feel that he was bound by the resolution, however, Senator Charles

Robb responded that he did not favor a resolution of that kind. (1995 CQ Almanac, pp.

253-254.)

Another action of the Clinton administration that helped convince members of

Congress to support the policy was to send a number of them, about 70 in total, to the

Balkans to observe conditions in the region. Representative Cynthia McKinney (D-GA),

whose emphasis as a legislator had been on domestic issues, told Richard Holbrooke the

trip changed my life. It made me realize that we have to undertake some of the same

responsibilities overseas that we have to do at home, and that we must find a way of

doing both. (Holbrooke 1998)

Moreover, Clinton had another advantage: when a peace agreement was reached

at Dayton in late 1995, President Clinton was able to present the Congress with a fait

accompli, rather than a plan for action that may or may not lead to peace. He argued that

with the Dayton agreement at hand, the credibility of the American government was on

the line, and that Congress should therefore approve the American-brokered deal for

American participation in a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia. This would prove

to be key for convincing Congress. The Republican majority, which had opposed Clinton

on numerous other issues, was not in a good position to do so on this one. Senator Bob
Dole, for example, had attacked Clintons Bosnia policy as too weak: how could he now

argue against American involvement? (Holbrooke 1998)

As Senator John McCain noted in explaining his support for the Clinton

administration

Our friends and enemies dont discriminate between Republican and Democratic
Presidents when the word of an American president is given. When the
presidents word is no longer credible abroad, all Americans are less safe. (1995
CQ Almanac, p. 10-15)

American credibility, and the importance of American leadership, won the day.

Thus, American participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation was set, despite

criticisms that American troops would not be able to withdraw within the promised one-

year time period. Meanwhile, Clinton was re-elected in 1996 (though he could not

prevent the Republicans from holding both houses of Congress.) Throughout his second

term, a relatively favorable economy bought him high job approval ratings. He would be

dogged in his second term by the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and it is difficult to know

what he might have done in foreign policy had he not been distracted by the need to

defend himself from the impeachment proceedings and the legal cases that were brought

against him. However, support for American internationalism remained high in 1999 in

public opinion polls, even as events in Kosovo would call once again upon the use of

American power. (Rielly 1999)

Kosovo

Throughout the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999, two main themes are apparent in the

Clinton administrations rhetoric. One is the humanitarian imperative of preventing

Milosevic from replicating the carnage that he had inflicted on Bosnia: the other focused

on the importance of maintaining NATO credibility and American world leadership.

These justifications helped advocates of intervention in Kosovo act more quickly than in

Bosnia: however, they were not universally convincing, and the desirability of American

intervention in Kosovo remained a subject of debate even as the mission was undertaken.

The possibility that the violence in the Balkans would spread to Kosovo was

raised publicly before Clinton came to the White House. In 1989, Milosevic revoked the

autonomy agreement under which Kosovo had been able to govern itself with relatively

little interference, and there was fear among the Kosovo ethnic Albanians that Milosevic

would attempt to obtain their territory (on which Serbians had fought an historic battle

against the Turks) by force, even though the Albanians constituted 90% of Kosovos

population. As early as 1990, Senator Robert Dole, Ambassador Zimmerman, and others

were expressing concern about the human rights situation for the Kosovar Albanians in

Yugoslavia. (S. Woodward 1995) In a Christmas 1992 proclamation, outgoing President

Bush put Milosevic on notice that the United States would use force in the event of a

Serbian attack on Kosovo. His letter to Milosevic stated that if conflict developed in

Kosovo as a result of Serbian behavior, the United States will be prepared to employ

military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper. (Sciolino and

Bronner 1999) This commitment to use American force in Kosovo stood in contrast to

the Bush administrations reluctance to do so in Bosnia: the question when Clinton came

to power was whether this commitment would be honored.

On the surface, Kosovo appeared to be of greater strategic importance than

Bosnia was, given its proximity to Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, Macedonia, and other areas
where hostilities could spread and directly involve American interests. At the same time,

however, the use of American military power was not inevitable. One key Bush official,

when asked if the president would have been likely to honor that commitment to Kosovo,

responded by noting Thats a good question. I just dont know. Moreover, both news

reports and administration officials perceived the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army as

a potential threat: one administration official likened the KLA to terrorists. At the same

time, however, Warren Christopher declared in February 1993 that We remain prepared

to respond against the Serbians in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian

action. (Sciolino and Bronner 1999)

In fact, Kosovo Albanians were disappointed that the 1995 Dayton Agreement

made no attempt to address their predicament. Two years later, the Albanian government

fell after a political scandal, and Albanias army was dissolved. Kosovars were able to

purchase guns for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was formed in 1993 and

whose goal was the independence of Kosovo from Yugoslavia. Since early 1995, the

KLA had been linked to car bombings, attacks on Serbian police stations, and political

assassinations. On 29 October 1997, large demonstrations in Kosovo resulted in attacks

on Serbian police officers and on pro-Serbia ethnic Albanians. In February of 1998,

Serbian police attacked and killed people connected with the KLA: this only served to

increase the popular appeal of the KLA among Kosovos ethnic Albanians. Whereas in

early 1997 the KLA was a small force, by early 1998 it had grown substantially and was

on the attack. (Halberstam 2001)

In the summer of 1998, fighting continued, and 250,000 Kosovar Albanians fled.

In September 1998, the Serbians said that their campaign against the Albanian separatists
was over: however, in late September of 1998, Serbian forces killed a large number of

Albanians in the village of Drenica. The following month, Richard Holbrooke met with

Milosevic and got him to agree to a reduction of Serbian troops in Kosovo and the

presence of an OSCE verification force to monitor peace in the region. Policymakers in

America and in NATO preferred a plan of autonomy for the Kosovo Albanian

population, and hoped that this compromise plan would provide peace for the region.

However, neither Milosevicwho considered Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia

nor the KLA and its supporterswho wanted independence, not autonomywere

satisfied. For a while, Milosevic was able to carry out low-level attacks against the

Kosovars, while the KLA lashed out against Serbians. Western intervention was avoided

by what some have termed the a village a day keeps NATO away strategy.

Throughout 1998, events in Kosovo increasingly appeared to American

policymakers to indicate that Milosevic was interested in instigating Serbian aggression

in Kosovo, similar to that he had conducted in Bosnia, and the question was what the

West was going to do about it. The timing, form a political strategists viewpoint, could

not have been worse: the president was involved in the Monica Lewinsky scandal, which

distracted the president and placed foreign policy issues on the back burner. Yet the

lesson of Bosnia loomed large in peoples minds, and supporters of a strong stance

against Milosevic, such as Madeline Albright, frequently analogized Kosovo both to

Bosnia and to Munich. Speaking to European colleagues in London in March 1998, she

said In this very room, our predecessors delayed as Bosnia burned, and history will not

be kind to us if we do the same. When her close adviser James Rubin suggested toning

down the rhetoric of a proposed Contact Group resolution condemning Serbian actions in
Kosovo, she snapped Where do you think we are, Munich? (Daalder and OHanlon

2000)

Yet other Clinton administration officials were more hesitant at first: for example,

Sandy Berger worried that NATO credibility would be questioned if the West promised

more (in the form of intervention) than it was prepared to deliver. Secretary of Defense

Cohen was more hesitant still: he had hoped to withdraw American peacekeepers from

Bosnia, and neither he nor the Joint Chiefs desired to intervene elsewhere in the Balkans.

(Halberstam 2001: Clark 2001) Cohen had once stated during a Senate debate that the

hearts that beat so loudly and enthusiastically to do something, to intervene in areas

where there is not an immediate threat to our vital interests, when those hearts that had

beaten so loudly see the coffins, then they switch, and they say What are we doing

there? (Halberstam 2001) To Cohen, Kosovo looked very much like the scenario he

had warned his Senate colleagues against.

However, by late December of 1998, Serbians were not withdrawing their heavy

weapons from the police: the KLA, for its part, had returned to some of the areas from

which they had been chased out and were resuming attacks on Serbian targets. It was in

response to one such attack that Milosevic committed an action that shifted the American

perspective of condition on the ground in favor of the hard-liners. In mid-January 1999,

reports about a mass killing of unarmed civilians were sent to policymakers. Serbian

attacks on the village of Racak enabled the advocates of American military intervention

to argue that Milosevic was up to his old tricks. It has been asserted that American

negotiators, following Secretary of State Albrights preference, were intentionally tough

on Milosevic so as to force him to reject a peace plan at Rambouillet and enable the West
to use military force against Serbia. (The Nation, 14 July 1999 op-ed). Whether this

specific allegation is true or not, the US did intervene with military force in Kosovo

considerably more quickly than it did in Bosnia. As Clinton administration officials

noted several times, while American action in Kosovo was risky, the risks of inaction

were both known and unacceptable: Kosovo would turn into another Bosnia. That would

create a humanitarian disaster: in Clintons words of 20 March, if we and our allies do

not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the

Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But action and resolve can stop armies and save

lives.

Moreover, inaction was framed as an implausible option. Special envoy Richard

Holbrooke asserted on 15 February that The dilemma for the United States now is that

we face a choice between a relatively early involvement, by which to prevent worse

tragedy, or a more costly involvement later, after tragedies even greater than weve

already seen.

But the humanitarian argument was not the sole reason for the shift in American

policy. More convincing to Cohen and others who were wary of American intervention

in the Balkans was the imperative to preserve NATO credibility. In mid-September

1998, Cohen met with Wesley Clark, with whom he had sparred over the need for

American intervention. Clark recounts in his memoir that when he told the Secretary

were running out of time to save NATO and our credibility, Cohens resistance faded.

On 29 September 1998, at a NATO press conference in Vilamoura, Portugal, Cohen

publicly stated I believe that the credibility of NATO really is on the line, that one

cannot continue to prepare for possible military action or indeed threaten military action
unless one is prepared to carry it out. In late January 1999. Cohen repeated I believe

NATO credibility remains on the line. (Clark 2001: Sciolino and Bronner 1999: Priest

and Trueheart 1999)

After Racak, while humanitarian concerns played a role in American justifications

of US intervention, they were neither the sole nor the dominant factors invoked. On

February 13, 1999, Clinton discussed four reasons for Kosovos importance to the United

States in his weekly radio address to the nation. The first point he made was that

America had learned throughout the century that it would not be secure if Europe was not

secure: World War II taught us that America could never be secure if Europes future

was in doubt. The second point was that Bosnia had taught the US and the world a

lesson in the need to act early to contain aggression: failure to do so will result in a larger

cost to be paid further down the road. In Clintons words, Bosnia taught us a lesson: In

this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater violence we will have

to oppose later at greater cost. The third reason focused on an articulation of American

interests in not seeing the conflict spread to Macedonia, Albania, or possibly even Greece

and Turkey. Finally, Clinton asserted that the US would inevitably be involved: the

question was not whether, but when, the US should act. If we wait until casualties

mount and war spreads, any effort to stop it will come at a higher price under more

dangerous conditions. The time to stop the war is right now.

On 24 March, Clinton added another reason for American action: a strong US-

European partnership is what this thing is all about. (Babington and Dewar 1999) This

backed up his contention in February 1999 that while Europeans would have to

contribute substantially to the operation, NATO is a partnership, and they have the right
to expect the United States, which has been the leader of NATO for 50 years now, to be

part of that. (Lippman 1999)

Yet Clinton would find it difficult to generate public support for the use of NATO

troops (mainly American ones) to attack Milosevic. At a town hall meeting in Columbus,

Ohio, Secretary of State Albright encountered unanticipated questions by a cynical

audience that questioned whether the United States should enter into the conflict in

Kosovo. Yet she consistently articulated justification for American action in Kosovo: in

a CNN interview on 21 February, she connected Americas need to act in Kosovo to the

long-term success of American policy in Bosnia, asserting that we have invested a great

deal in Bosnia and we believe that it is important to make sure that that very positive

process goes on. Moreover, she added another reason for the US to act: there is the

issue of NATO credibility. NATO is the prime military alliance of all time, and our

leadership in NATO depends on our supporting it and being part of a NATO operation.

Interviewed the next day on Fox Morning News, DOS spokesperson (and close aide to

Albright) James Rubin asserted that as Americans and as leaders of the world, we have

an interest in preventing humanitarian tragedies if we can at an appropriate level of cost.

However, the hard-liners still faced Congressional opposition. In the Kosovo

debate, members demonstrated considerable reluctance to support President Clintons

policy. Representative Sam Johnson (R-TX) voiced the concerns of many of them when

he noted Three years and more than $20 billion later, 6000 US troops are still in Bosnia.

The President must define a mission, a goal and an exit strategy for our troops before

sending them into that mess. (Priest 1999) Besides these issues, however, another

more partisan concern worked against American intervention: Republican opposition to

Bill Clinton. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) asserted that the intensity of the opposition to

American intervention in Kosovo was the result of a steady erosion of credibility that

this administration has suffered in Congress. Asked on 19 March about Congress

reluctance, Clinton noted that the US needed to act because there were 40,000 Serbian

troops in or near Kosovo, Serbian behavior in the region was provocative, and there is

the long unquestioned record of atrocity in Bosnia.

Yet Congress actions sent mixed messages regarding its willingness directly to

challenge presidential authority. The House refused to declare war, demanded the right

to vote before ground troops were sent, and would not ratify the bombing of Yugoslavia

already under way. At the same time, it would not pull out the troops in order to stop the

bombing, and (a day after refusing to ratify the bombing) a House committee proposed to

give the president twice as much money as he had earlier requested. House Minority

Leader Richard Gephardt described this as a low moment in American foreign policy

and the history of this institution. (Mitchell 1999) On 23 March, after last-ditch peace

talks failed, the Senate voted 58-41 to authorize air strikes against Serbian forces. Before

the House could vote, the bombing commenced. Senator Trent Lott (R-MS) muted his

opposition, noting Whatever the reservations about the presidents actions in the

Balkans, let no one doubt that the Congress and the American people stand united behind

our men and women who are bravely heeding the call of duty. (Watson and Kempster

1999) However, this desire to support Americans in battle did not entirely silence debate

on the issue.

One problem that the Clinton Administration faced early in the bombing

campaign was that, rather than deter the forced relocation of Kosovar Albanians, the
NATO bombing in fact appeared to be enabling Milosevic to succeed in his attempt to rid

the area of its non-Serbian population. Within weeks, a major refugee crisis developed,

with 1.6 million Kosovar Albanians having been displaced. While this was going on,

several reporters and critics questioned the wisdom of continuing NATOs operation,

given its apparent failure to deter the attacks. The response was that if not deterred,

Milosevic must at least be punished. Justification of American action in Kosovo for the

purpose of causing damage, not deterring humanitarian tragedy, was articulated from the

beginning. One day before the bombing began, 23 March, Secretary Albright was

interviewed on CNNs Larry King Live and was asked about the utility of bombing

Serbians, given that historically, bombing campaigns often failed. Her reply was that I

think it is very important for us to be able to do what I saiddeter and damage. I think

to damage his material can very well be done through air strikes. Later, Wesley Clark

told CNNs Christiane Amanpour that there was no way we were going to be able to

stop Serbian paramilitary forces who were going in and murdering civilians in villages.

(Clark 2001)

President Clinton himself echoed these ideas. Speaking on 1 April, when it was

clear that a week of bombing had not prevented the forced relocation of ethnic Albanians

in Kosovo, Clinton picked up on the justification of American action in terms of

punishing Milosevic: Had we not acted, the Serbian offensive would have been carried

out with impunity. We are determined that it will carry a very high price, indeed. We

also act to prevent a wider war. The following day, Clinton added We have to make

sure that Milosevic pays a heavy price for this policy of repression. We have to seriously

diminish his capacity to maintain that policy. In his radio address of 3 April, Clinton
told the nation that Our goal is to exact a very high price for Mr. Milosevics policy of

repression and to seriously diminish his military capacity to maintain that policy. The

assumption on the part of the Clinton administration, then, was that Milosevic would

continue to pursue ethnic cleansing of the region, just as he had in Bosnia: this required a

sustained bombing attack even if the attack did not prevent the humanitarian tragedy.

In fact, as Clinton explained on 15 April, The stand we have taken, first in Bosnia, now

in Kosovo, against organized ethnic hatred is a moral imperative. But it is also a strategic

imperative.

Nevertheless, this disconnection between a major legitimation of American

actionthe humanitarian imperativeand the results of the actual fighting helped

opponents of the policy argue that intervention had failed: this is one reason public

opinion polls show a decline in support for the bombing as the spring progressed.

Whereas a majority of Americans supported the air campaign during the first week, by

mid-May only about half of Americans did so, and the momentum was moving toward

the opposition. By early June, the public was evenly divided on the question of whether

the US did the right thing in getting involved in the military campaign against Serbia:

48% of respondents said the US had done the right thing, 47% said it had been a mistake.

There is some speculation, in fact, that the humanitarian argument may have been used in

part to convince the American people to support the policy: polltakers at the time noted

that Americans were more strongly convinced by these arguments than those that focused

on American interests. In a mid-March poll, half of the respondents said that American

interests were not at stake in Kosovo: however, 58% agreed that the US had a moral

obligation to preserve the peace in the region. (Brownstein and Gerstenzang 1999:
Morin 1999) If the humanitarian argument was used for this purpose, it threatened to

backfire and lead to a backlash against the conflict.

Responding to his critics, Clinton penned an op-ed in The New York Times on 23

May: again, he repeated the themes of humanitarianism and NATO/US credibility. We

cannot respond to such tragedies everywhere, but where ethnic conflict turns into ethnic

cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and that is clearly the case in

Kosovo. Clinton added NATO itself would have been discredited for failing to defend

the very values that give it meaning. (Clinton 1999)

By this time, the possibility of ground troopswhich Clinton had said in March

that he did not intend to usebecame more likely, and plans for their possible

deployment were developed. However, in early June, thanks in part to efforts by Russian

negotiators, Serbians agreed to a peace settlement that provided for the withdrawal of

Serbian troops from Kosovo, the presence of NATO peacekeepers, and the existence of

Kosovo as an international protectorate. On 9 June, the peace agreement was signed, and

after ten weeks of bombing, NATO concluded its operations. The next day, Clinton gave

a televised speech in which he stated I can report to the American people that we have

declared victory for a safer world, for our democratic values, and for a stronger

America.
Conclusion

Speaking in July of 2000, summarizing his administration in an interview with

Joe Klein, Clinton said that

I saw my challenges trying to, first of all, maximize Americas presence in

the information economy. Second, to try to maximize our influence in the
welfare of our country and like-minded people around the world in a
globalized society. And then, the third big thing for me was trying to
make people have a broader and deeper vision of the American
community and how to handle diversityI wanted to try to broaden the
notion in America of what foreign policy and national security was, to
include health issues, to includelike we made AIDS a national security
threatto include climate change; to include the globalized society, all
these issues we started talking about. <www.state.gov>

American intervention in both Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as American

internationalism in general, had to be legitimated repeatedly through presidential rhetoric.

The Clinton administration was able to succeed in promoting US involvement in the

region when it convincingly tied such intervention to Americas role as a world leader.

However, the difficulty of both tasks indicates that a debate about Americas role in the

world was very much alive at this time. This suggests that when and if the war on

terrorism comes to an end, the future of American internationalism and American

interventions will continue to be subject to debate and require a legitimation process.