EXPORT CONTROLS

A 2005-2006 Debate Topic Paper Presented by;

Justin Stanley

Malcolm Gordon

With assisted research by

Matt Vega
 EXPORT CONTROLS

The following is a general position paper in support of an intercollegiate debate topic in

favor of a resolution discussing export controls. Their has been a general consensus among the
community over the past several years to create a topic that preserves generic negative ground
while simultaneously providing a resolution facilitating a nuanced level of case debate. Through
our research we believe that an export controls topic provides for both of these concerns. We
also believe that potential application of export controls in a resolutional context will allow
debaters to focus on timely, pertinent, and important geopolitical issues.

General Overview of the Topic Area

What are Export Controls

Export controls imposed on U.S. exporters by the United States government can
take a variety of forms. They can take the form of prohibitions (blockades,
embargoes, boycotts, sanctions) or they can take the form of limitations
(licensing requirements). Likewise, export controls can be product-specific or
they can be based on end-use, end user or ultimate destination. 1

Essentially, export controls can either ban entirely a product or implement strict
regulations over where a product can be exported. This can entail either blanket
bans/requirements or applied bans and restrictions of certain products to a specific country.

At the national level in the U.S., the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the
Department of State (DOS) are primarily responsible for licensing the export of
strategic goods, including space technologies. The DOS deals with those
technologies which are inherently military, while the DOC is concerned with dual
use items. The Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) are the main statutes in the U.S. export control regime2.

The literature delineates between three types of export controls; military, commercial, and
dual-use technologies. For the purpose of next years topic we feel that a resolution should focus
primarily on military and dual-use technology export controls, but that can certainly be addressed
by the topic committee in formulating specific resolution wordings.

Export Controls in the Status Quo

1
Margaret M. Gotti, Overview of Current Export Controls Article first appeared in the 1998
Official Export Guide. Findlaw.com
http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00345/006173/title/Subject/topic/International
%20Law_Foreign%20Trade%20Restrictions/filename/internationallaw_1_778
2
Waldrop in 2k4 (Major Elizabeth Seebode, Integration of military and civilian space assets:
legal and national security implications, The Air Force Law Review, LN)
 It is also important to realize that export controls are only a shadow of what they
were during the cold war. Since 1989, applications to the Commerce Department
have dropped by roughly 90%. Cases have fallen from nearly 100,000 in 1989 to
8,705 in 1996 and 11,472 in 1997. The reason is simple: fewer items are
controlled, so fewer applications are required. Nor does export licensing take
much time. The Commerce Department is meeting its licensing deadlines for
97% of its applications. After cutting export controls to the bone to reflect the end
of the cold war, we now need to strengthen controls to combat proliferation, the
main threat of the post-cold war era.3

There is a general trend in the literature that President Bush is relaxing export controls in
the Status Quo in order to promote a free trade oriented agenda. The general implications of the
uniqueness question indicate that the resolution should be worded so that affirmatives have the
obligation to tighten export controls. Upon reading the literature, however, the topic committee
may decide to have affirmatives relax export controls. It is also possible to make the topic
bidirectional, having affirmatives change export controls. Varying limiters on the resolution will be
addressed later in this paper.

Dual-Use/Military Distinction

Through the AECA, the DOS licenses the commercial export of exclusively
military items and related technical data. Promulgated by the DOS, the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs) are the implementing
regulations for the AECA. Items such as weapons, ammunition, and civilian
articles designed, adapted, or modified for military or intelligence uses are
monitored and controlled if they are included on the United States Munitions List
(USML). Effective 15 March 1999, commercial satellites were placed on the
USML (under the AECA) and therefore require DOS approval for export. The
1999 law also requires the DOD to approve any satellite export.

The EAA is the statute through which the DOC licenses exports of non-military,
dual use technology. The technologies covered under the EAA include many
difficult-to-classify, dual use items (which may or may not also be regulated under
the AECA), listed on a lengthy, very technical Commerce Control List (CCL) that
covers such items as high-speed computers, navigation devices, and other items
which have potential military and civilian application with little or no modification.
A result of continued disagreement over export controls, the EAA lapsed again in
August 2001 but, as has been the case on many occasions in the recent past,
the export control system is being kept alive by Presidential invocation of
emergency powers.4

This means that the resolution could focus on two types of export controls. If military only
export controls are chosen affirmatives would be required to strengthen or relax controls on
munitions, small armaments (tanks, helicopters, guns, etc), or technology only used for weapons
of mass destruction. If dual-use technology is focused on the topic will be centered around
3
Gary Milhollin, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance April 14, 1999.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1999/4-14.html
4
Waldrop in 2k4 (Major Elizabeth Seebode, Integration of military and civilian space assets:
legal and national security implications, The Air Force Law Review, LN)
technologies that do not have a clear delineation between military and commercial use.
Examples are launch pads, communication technology, computer encryption technology, lasers,
etc.
The military/dual-use distinction is discussed in the literature as a term of art that will
apply a valuable limiting term to the topic if the topic committee so chooses to go in that direction.
More specific limiting terms that could be applied to a possible resolution will be discussed below.

The Importance of Limiting the Topic

By now all of you reading have assumed that with an improper wording of the resolution
this topic has the potential to become too large to be debated effectively. First, keep in mind that
UMKC wrote this paper and we are not interested in a large topic as Malcolm must spend most of
his time eating instead of cutting cards. Second, the topic committee will have an important
obligation to limiting the resolution. Here are what we believe are some possible ways to limit this
resolution. It is important to keep in mind that the resolution can be crafted in such a way to
provide limited specific affirmative ground while maintaining generic negative strategies and
ample specific case debate.

Geopolitics as a limiting function

Resolutions in the past several years such as the Sanctions topic, African development
assistance, and Southeast Asia have proven that geography can be an effective tool for topic
limiting. This especially true in the context of export controls because, as noted above, export
controls are often implemented towards a specific country or region. Specifically, export controls
can be limited to a specific region or specific countries in regions of geopolitical importance. For
example, We could have a resolution that strengthens/establishes export controls to one country
(China, for instance), a list of countries (China, India, Pakistan, Taiwan) or a geographic region
(Northeast Asia, Central Asia). While we discuss specific affirmatives later in the paper, here are
four countries which are of significance to our foreign policy, but have largely been ignored as a
focus of a debate topic. Many will argue that we have debated many of these countries, but
these countries have never been the primary focus of a debate resolution. The purpose of this
discussion is not to prove that ample affirmative ground exists on export controls to these
countries as that will be addressed later in the paper, but instead we wish to demonstrate the
importance of these regions as targets of our foreign policy and thus our resolution.

China/Taiwan:
China is the most populous country in the world with one of the fastest growing
economies and is second to only the United States in current defense expenditures. They are
rapidly trying to modernize their military in order to close the technological achievement gap
between China and the United States. Because China is a rising superpower one of the key
questions discussed in the literature is whether or not they will become a strategic partner or
strategic rival to the United States similar to what the Soviet Union was during the cold war. At
the center of this question is how the United States can simultaneously promote economic growth
while restricting rapid military modernization. By their very nature export controls lie at the very
heart of this question.
The primary near-term threat of an expanded Chinese military modernization program is
toward Taiwan. China still views Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory and is prepared to wage
war to maintain it. The United States has pledged to defend Taiwan as part of the Taiwan
Relations Act. This is widely regarded as one of the most likely scenarios for nuclear war.

Although overshadowed during the run-up to Bush's trip by more pressing

differences on Middle East policy, the stakes involved in strengthening China's
military are potentially enormous. With Beijing increasingly determined to bring
Taiwan under its control and the U.S. committed to defending the island
 democracy just 100 miles from the mainland, there is a possibility of armed
conflict, although not imminent, specialists said. If you look where the United
States could come into conflict with a genuine nuclear power, the only place is in
the Taiwan Strait," said David M. Lampton, director of Chinese studies at the
Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "You can imagine what the
[political] impact would be if technology that originated in the United States and
sold by the Europeans to China was used to kill American troops." 5

The primary purpose of limiting exports in military or dual-use technology in this region
specifically is to maintain a balance in forces. Many experts fear that advanced arms sales to
Taiwan will be perceived by China as provocative thereby increasing the risk of conflict while
simultaneously hurting U.S.-China Relations.
We would like to reiterate that China/Taiwan have not been the focus of the topic in many
years. Furthermore, it was eight years ago when the region was debated heavily as per the
Southeast Asia topic of 1997. It is time that such area of geopolitical importance deserves its
place as a primary focus of a topic. This is not to say that a China/Taiwan war will be the only
aspect discussed under an export control topic, but it does go to show that the generic impacts
are substantive and large thus providing ground for the affirmative and negative.

India/Pakistan:
Oddly enough the story for the importance of debating India and Pakistan is very similar
to that of China/Taiwan. India is the second most populous country in the world and like China
India has one of the fastest growing economies. One key distinction is although the
China/Taiwan area of the topic has advantage ground based upon U.S. being involved in the
conflict, the India/Pakistan part of the topic will primarily focus on the propensity for conflict strictly
between those two countries. For example, under a topic area dealing with China you will have
advantages claimed off of U.S./China competition for weapons or space development but in India
and Pakistan the conflict will be mostly focused between these two countries. Additionally,
evidence discussing how this is the most likely spot for a nuclear war are a dime a dozen. These
two countries are in conflict over a particular region known as Kashmir. The exportation of
military or dual-use technology often fuels economic and military modernization that makes
conflict over this region more likely. Thus, one of the primary advantage areas other than the
buildup of conventional arms will be nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
Terrorism is a second important advantage area that could be discussed in the context of
export controls and this particular region. The United States has to walk to a fine line between
maintaining strong trade relations with these two countries and exporting sensitive technology
that could be transferred to terrorists.

The Direction of Export Controls as a Limiting Function

If the community decides against a topic that limits itself based on geography, the
committee can use the direction of export controls as an effective limiter on affirmative and
negative ground. Affirmatives can be required to increase, decrease, or change export controls

5
Marshall 2005 (Tyler, LA Times 2/27/2k5, LN)
(obviously the modifier change would make the topic bidirectional, making it more of a delimiting
term). Another important distinction that should be discussed is the requirement of affirmatives to
make new export controls versus strengthening existing control requirements. Ample ground
exists for both, and if the a strongly limited topic is our goal, such a distinction should be
considered.

Types of Export Controls as a Limiting Function

The distinction between military and dual-use export controls has been discussed above,
and is well supported in the literature. One route the committee can take in reducing the topic
area also involves the type of export control addressed. The government subdivides export
controls. In its 2005 Foreign Policy Report, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and
Security outlines all of the subdivisions of export controls. The more relevant areas are defined
below

Crime Control/Human Rights

This area deals with exports used for crime control. The US restricts exports to some countries
now because of human rights violation (all crime control equipment is banned from export to
China, for instance). Crime control is generally restricted because it is used as a tool of
oppression in certain areas. This area also includes export controls on torture devices.

Regional Stability
Regional stability (RS) controls ensure that exports and reexports of controlled items do not
contribute directly or indirectly to a countrys military capabilities in a manner that would alter or
destabilize a regions military balance contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.
These controls traditionally cover items specially designed or modified for military purposes and
certain dual-use commodities that can be used to manufacture military equipment.

Toxic Chemicals, Chemical Precursors and Associated Equipment, Technology and Software
The U.S. Government maintains export controls on certain chemicals, equipment, materials,
software, technology, and entire plants to further U.S. foreign policy, which opposes the
proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The U.S. Government implements these controls in
coordination with the Australia Group (AG), an informal forum of 38 nations that cooperate to halt
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. (See Appendix II for a complete list of AG
members.) The United States fulfills its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) by maintaining controls on certain chemicals.

Biological Agents and Associated Equipment and Technology

The U.S. Government exercises export controls over certain microorganisms, toxins, biological
equipment, and related technology to further U.S. foreign policy interests in opposing the
proliferation and use of biological weapons. The U.S. Government implements these export
controls multilaterally in coordination with the Australia Group (AG), a forum of 38 nations
cooperating to halt the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The U.S. Government
also supports international efforts to effect a total ban on biological weapons in compliance with
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC).

Missile Technology Controls

MTCR Guidelines and the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex form the basis for U.S.
missile technology controls. The MTCR Guidelines provide licensing policy, procedures, review
factors, and standard assurances on missile technology exports. The Annex is the list of missile-
related items and is divided into two categories. Category I items include missile systems and
major subsystems, production facilities, and production equipment for missile systems capable of
delivering a 500 kg payload to at least a 300 km range. Category II items include materials,
components, and production and test equipment associated with Category I items, as well as
missile subsystems, production facilities, and production equipment for missile systems with a
300 km range, regardless of payload.

High Performance Computers

The United States maintains controls on high performance computers (HPCs) in recognition of
the strategic and proliferation significance of HPCs, including related software and technology.
Such controls are adjusted from time to time to reflect advances in computer technology and
expanding worldwide availability.

Encryption
Encryption items can be used to maintain the secrecy of information, and therefore may be used
by persons abroad to harm U.S. national security, foreign policy, and law enforcement interests.
The U.S. Government has a critical interest in ensuring that persons opposed to the United
States are not able to conceal hostile or criminal activities, and that the legitimate needs for
protecting important and sensitive information of the public and private sectors are met.

Since the transfer of dual-use encryption items from the United States Munitions List to the
Commerce Control List (CCL) on December 6, 1996, export controls on encryption have evolved
in response to electronic commerce developments and national security and law enforcement
concerns. U.S. encryption export policy continues to be directed by three fundamental principles:
technical review of encryption products prior to sale, streamlined post-export reporting, and
license reviews of proposed transactions involving strong encryption to certain foreign
government end-users and countries of concern.

Nuclear Nonproliferation
The U.S. Government maintains controls on exports of nuclear-related items under the authority
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) in order to further the United States nuclear
nonproliferation policy. Although these controls are primarily based on the NNPA, and, therefore,
are not subject to this report, information is included here on their controls because these controls
are usually grouped with other nonproliferation controls referenced in this report. Controls based
on nuclear end-uses and end-users are maintained under the authority of Section 6 of the Export
Administration Act (the Act), as part of the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI). EPCI
controls are described in detail in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of this report. 6

Our Suggestions

Geography should be used as a limiter

Because the US has some form of export controls on virtually every sector of the defense
industry, and regulates them to virtually every country in one way or another, we believe
geography should be one of the limiters on the topic. Our first inclination is to stay away from
countries covered under the sanctions topic. If we are using a country list (not tied to a
geographic region), our primary candidates are: China, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil,
and Russia. These are in no way the only countries literature exists on, but they are areas that
will generate substantive impact debates and have largely been ignored as the focus of a topic.
As for regions of the world that may generate interest: Northeast Asia, Central Asia, South or
Central America, and the Middle East.

Bidirectionality is not an option

6
All definitional explanations gathered or quoted from the Bureau of Industry and Security, Foreign Policy
report 2005, http://www.bxa.doc.gov/PoliciesAndRegulations/05ForPolControls/index.htm
 The resolution should require all affirmatives to increase or decrease, and not give
affirmatives a choice in which they do. The only way a bidirectional topic should be considered is
if the type of export control and country is strictly limited. Modifying terms could be as follow:
The USF should strengthen export controls, establish, lift, and relax are a few terms supported in
the literature. If a bidirectional topic is chosen, change is the most fitting modifier.

Possible resolutions
Now we will present possible resolutions. The wording of these resolutions is very
preliminary, and is only meant to give an idea of the intent of what the resolution can be, not what
the wording of the resolution will be. First, here are some resolutions that dont limit based on
geography.

Resolved: the united states federal government should substantially

change/strengthen/relax foreign policy-based export controls on military and/or dual-use
technology.

Resolved: the united states federal government should establish foreign policy-based
export controls on military and/or dual-use technology.

Resolutions like these would be huge. Negatives would have to be prepared to debate against
affirmatives that regulate (or deregulate) any type of military or dual use technology to any
country. Does not sound fun. Here are some resolutions that only deal with geography as a
limiting function.

Resolved: the united states federal government should substantially change foreign
policy-based export controls on military and/or dual-use technology toward one or more of the
following countries: India, Pakistan, Taiwan, China, Brazil, Israel, Russia.

Resolved :that the united states federal government should substantially change foreign
policy-based export controls on military and/or dual-use technology toward one or more of the
following countries in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan.

These resolutions are more limiting than the first set, and depending on the literature base for the
countries chosen may be manageable as a topic. This will require careful research on the part of
the committee to ensure the countries chosen have a very limited amount of affirmatives. The
bidirectional nature of the topic (change as a modifier) will probably overly expand the number of
cases regardless of the country list. Here are some resolutions limited by direction and
geography.

Resolved: the united states federal government should substantially limit foreign policy-
based export controls on military and/or dual-use technology toward one or more of the following
countries: India, Pakistan, China, Taiwan.

Other possible modifiers to cause a decrease in export controls are: lift, relax, abolish, decrease.

Resolved: the united states federal government should establish/strengthen foreign

policy-based export controls on military and/or dual-use technology toward one or more of the
following countries in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan.

Now were getting somewhere. A topic with one direction that also limits the region or countries
affected is much more manageable. Requiring that the literature be unidirectional about the
change to export control policy combined with the country to be regulated will limit affirmatives to
a few core plans with predictable advantage areas.
This final group of resolutions will present a potential wording that incorporates subgroupings of
export controls.

Resolved: the united states federal government should establish foreign policy based
export controls on military and/or dual-use technology in one or more of the following areas:
Crime Control/Human Rights, Missile Technology Controls, High Performance Computers,
Encryption.

Resolved: the united states federal government should substantially limit foreign policy-
based export controls on military and/or dual-use technology in one or more of the following
areas: Crime Control/Human Rights, Missile Technology Controls, High Performance
Computers, Encryption.

Resolved: the united states federal government should substantially strengthen foreign
policy-based export controls on military and/or dual-use technology in one or more of the
following areas: Crime Control/Human Rights, Missile Technology Controls, High Performance
Computers, Encryption. These export controls should be toward one or more of the following
countries: India, Pakistan, Taiwan, China, Brazil, Israel, Russia.

The last resolution is the most limiting. It limits affirmatives to strengthen controls, specifies the
possible area, and limits the affirmative to certain countries. This type of resolution can easily be
crafted to keep the topic narrowed down to a select few affirmative cases.

The exact terminology and affected countries or groups of exports are all to be determined by the
committee, but we hope these resolutions give the community an idea of what the intent of
affirmatives will be under an export controls topic.
 Possible Affirmative Approches

Depending on how the resolution is constructed several different option are available to
affirmatives in constructing an affirmative case. If the resolution is focused on limiting exports or
putting in place specific export controls towards a particular region of country then affirmatives
would need to research loopholes in current export laws that allow the exportation of sensitive
technology to those countries

There are specific types of technology that is not stringently regulated now that deserves
attention.

1. Super Computers

Export Controls are supercomputers are weak

Milhollin in 1998
Gary, Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, July 9,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1998/7-9.html

In January 1996, the Clinton Administration decided to slash controls on supercomputers. It

abolished controls on computers operating at less than 7,000 Mtops (million theoretical
operations per second) to most countries. It did so on the strength of a government-sponsored
study in 1995 that predicted that computers operating at 7,000 Mtops would become so common
by 1997 that it would no longer be feasible to control them for export.

U.S. companies are exporting these supercomputers to Weapons programs in China and
Russia because of decreases in Export Controls

Milhollin in 1998
Gary, Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, July 9,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1998/7-9.html

The result of the decontrol was a series of scandals, in which IBM and Silicon Graphics were
caught outfitting Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, Russia's key nuclear weapons laboratories,
and Silicon Graphics was caught supplying the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a leading Chinese
nuclear and missile research site. In addition, IBM and the Digital Equipment Corporation have
supplied supercomputers to the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, one of India's main
missile research sites.

These Supercomputers are key to Nuclear Weapons Development

Milhollin in 1998
Gary, Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, July 9,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1998/7-9.html

Supercomputers are the most powerful tools known for designing nuclear weapons and the
missiles to deliver them. They can model the thrust of a rocket, calculate the heat and pressure
on a warhead entering the Earth's atmosphere and simulate virtually every other force affecting a
missile from launch to impact. Because of the billions of computations needed to solve these
problems, a supercomputer's speed is invaluable for efficiently finding design solutions.
2. Satellites

Transfer of Satellite Export controls from the dept. of state to Commerce has led to the
removal of U.S. satellites subject to sanctions for missile proliferation

Milhollin in 1998
Gary, Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, July 9,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1998/7-9.html

This Committee is aware of the fact that the Clinton Administration has transferred licensing
authority over satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department. That process is
now complete. It occurred under great pressure from the satellite industry and, as the industry
expected, it will allow trade interests to dominate national security in U.S. export policy.

One of the main effects of this transfer has been to remove satellites from the list of items that are
subject to U.S. sanctions for missile proliferation. In effect, the transfer has given Chinese firms a
green light to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan. Chinese companies can now sell
components for nuclear capable missiles without worrying about losing U.S. satellite launch
contracts

Executive transfer of control over satellites exports leads to arms transfers from China to
Iran and Pakistan

Milhollin in 1998
Gary, Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, July 9,
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/1998/7-9.html

Our sanctions laws, as written by Congress, are based on a simple idea. A foreign company
cannot import American missile technology with one hand and proliferate missile technology with
the other. If a Chinese company decides to sell Iran or Pakistan a nuclear-capable missile or the
means to make one, that company has to forget about importing any missile-related American
technology. U.S.-made satellites were originally part of this equation, because they contain
missile-related American components.

That simple idea has now been abandoned by the executive branch. When the Administration
transferred licensing authority over satellites from the State Department to the Commerce
Department, satellites were effectively removed from the list of U.S. exports subject to missile
sanctions.

3. Human Rights/Crime Control

Export Controls on Technology that is used for torture is not regulated properly

Arms Trade News in 2001

http://www.clw.org/cat/atn0201.html
Critics say that legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate to regulate the export of dual-use
equipment would loosen controls on items commonly used for torture. In a new report, Amnesty
International reveals that over the past decade more than 80 American corporations
manufactured, marketed, and exported equipment used for torture by several close U.S. allies.
The organization is concerned the new legislation will liberalize export controls on future exports
of that equipment.

Senators Mike Enzi (R-WY), Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Phil Grahm (R-TX) and Tim Johnson (D-
SD) introduced the Export Administration Act of 2001 on January 23. The bill would reauthorize
the law, which expired in 1994, that governed dual-use exports. President Clinton kept regulations
on dual-use goods in effect by issuing executive orders under the auspices of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act

4 India Specific high technology export controls

United States Exports Controls do not cover microprocessors, encryption technology or

nano-technology

United States Embassy New Delhi India, June 9 2003

Export Controls not impending U.S. Indian High-tech trade
http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwhpr0610a.html

Dual-use licensing data show that, since the lifting of sanctions by the Bush Administration in
September 2001, only a very small percentage of total trade with India is even subject to such
controls. In fiscal year 2002 - that is, from October 1, 2001 to September 30, 2002, which was the
period directly following the lifting of U.S. sanctions - U.S. exports to India that were subject to
licensing requirements totaled merely $38 million, or approximately 1 percent of total U.S. trade
with India. License denials in fiscal year 2002 totaled only $11 million, or less than one-half of 1
percent of total U.S. trade with India. And the data for the first half of fiscal year 2003 show that
these trends are continuing.

Not only do the quantitative data show that very few U.S. exports to India are subject to licensing
requirements, but a qualitative analysis shows that the relevant licensing requirements are fairly
circumscribed and generally apply only to items that are controlled under the multilateral regimes
relating to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technology. These are generally
not sectors that are engines for high-technology growth. U.S. export controls do not meaningfully
restrict exports to India of products such as high performance computers, microprocessors, or
encryption software, or affect key sectors of high technology such as information technology, life
sciences, and nanotechnology.

5. Chines High Technology Exports

United States Embassy New Delhi India, June 9 2003

Export Controls not impending U.S. Indian High-tech trade
http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/wwwhpr0610a.html

My point that U.S. export controls are not inhibiting high-technology growth in India is further
supported by examining the U.S.-China trade and high-technology relationship. The United
States maintains a more restrictive dual-use export control policy toward China than it does
India. Nonetheless, U.S.-China trade - including trade in high-technology - has thrived. U.S.
exports to China in 2002 were over five times greater than U.S. exports to India, and China
was the fourth largest trading partner of the United States. Clearly, the more restrictive export
controls on China have not impeded or prevented the emergence of a vibrant U.S.-China
high-technology relationship
 6. Nanotechnology

The Washington Times, Nov. 6 2004

By Charles Q. Choi United Press International,
http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041104-010910-7296r.htm

The export control laws (administered by the Department of Commerce and other agencies) were
not drafted with nanoscale materials and devices in mind," Miller said. "For example, there are
references to 'carbon fibers.' Does that include carbon nanotubes? There are also specific
regulations on microprocessors. Does that include nanoscale circuits?"

The President's Export Council's Subcommittee on Export Administration, or PECSEA, is

launching a study on the need for nanotech export controls. The study will go to the full council for
review, then be forwarded to President George W. Bush. It will examine, among other things, the
state of nanotech in foreign countries, potential export-control parameters and the effect of
imposing such controls on nanotech items.

7. Space related Dual-use Technology

Space technology an important form of dual-use tech, it can be used for military purposes
and ICBMs

Waldrop in 2k4 (Major Elizabeth Seebode, Integration of military and civilian space assets: legal
and national security implications, The Air Force Law Review, LN)

Because of the "dual use" nature of space technology, States must be concerned about who receives
this technology. In this regard, space launch technologies are a special concern for two reasons. First,
new launch technology may be used directly for military purposes -- the identical launch pad and launch
vehicle may be used by the recipient nation to launch military, as well as civilian, payloads. Even in the
93
U.S. , military launch facilities support both government and commercial launches.
The greatest concern, however, is that space launch vehicles essentially are ballistic missiles, capable
of delivering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, of mass destruction rather than "peaceful"
payloads. In fact, many of today's space launchers are slightly modified intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). 94 The Chinese Long March space launch vehicles, for example, are manufactured by the
same company that makes its nuclear ICBMs and "have the same staging mechanism, air frames,
95
engines and propellants and employ similar payload separation and guidance system hardware." As
such, the issue of which States have access to space launch technology is of great concern. A State
possessing launch technology must address its proliferation concerns and, at the same time, ensure its
domestic space launch industry is strong enough to guarantee its State access to space
Possible Generic Affirmative Advantage Areas

Nanotech Bad
Chinese Taiwan Conflict
India Pakistan Conflict
Terrorism
Human Rights Credibility
Non-Proliferation Credibility
U.S. Hegemony
Space Militarization
U.S. space dominance
Israeli Proliferation
Chinese Proliferation
Biochemical Proliferation
United States Modeling prevents dangerous exportation by other countries
 Negative Ground

With an Export Controls topic the negative will be provided with a tremendous amount of
ground both specific to the affirmative approach and generic to the resolution.

Here is a generic argument list that will prove useful in most debates

Proliferation Good General

Chinese Proliferation Good
India or Pakistan Proliferation Good
Economy/Competiveness/Industry Specific Disads
Nanotech.Good
Space Colonization Good/Bad
United States Space Militarization Bad
Modernization Key to X Economy
U.S. Relations with country X Disads
China/Taiwan Relation Disads
India Pakistan Relations Disads
Politics Disads with a particular industry lobby as the link

Counterplans
Consultation Counterplans
Executive Order Counterplans
Agency Delegation Counterplans
Alternate Country Counterplans
Condition Counterplans
Export to Country X but not Country Y (Country PICS)
PICs over specific items (ban x but not y)

Kritiks
Generic State Action Links would apply
Affirmative would place regulations on companies Link Critiques
Capitalism Bad
Neoliberalism Kritiks
Foucault
Empire
Agamben
Ks of Human Rights Credibility
Kritiks of Realism
 Concluding Remarks

Presented in this paper is a very general outline of what we believe could be both a very
educational and extremely competitive topic for the 2005-2006 Intercollegiate debate resolution.
As with any general topic proposal, there are certainly going to be difficulties within this area in
crafting a resolution that divides affirmative and negative ground equally. The best aspect of this
topic is that it allows students to engage in issues that are of critical importance to the geopolitical
realities that exist in the status quo. We have talked a lot about trade over the past several years
but have yet to discuss the specific export regulations related to that trade. We have discussed
China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Israel as it relates to other areas of the topic, but we have not had
a topic that engaged all of these issues simultaneously. This topic is a way to limit the debate to a
particular solvency mechanism while allowing advantages that fall within the areas discussed
above to be presented. These are advantages that are of critical importance to the current
context of international relations and deserve attention for this reason. This topic provides for both
Critical and Policy oriented affirmative approaches while simultaneously ensuring that specific
case debates remain prevalent.
Further Available Research

Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Arms Export Control Reforms Date unknown
http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/control.html.
This webpage provides links to 30+ websites that discuss United States Export control
policies.

Federation of American Scientists Fast Facts Date unknown

http://www.fas.org/asmp/fast_facts.htm
This webpage summarizes currently and questionable military specific transfers currently
underway by the United States.

Council for a livable World, Waiving Restrictions on U.S. arms Exports 2002
http://www.clw.org/atop/indiapak.html
This webpage gives links to specific webpage that give you detailed information about
United States export policy towards specific countries.

Feffer, John. Asia Times, April 7, 2004. :U.S. Pushing Arms, Reforming Export Controls
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/FD07Dj03.html
This article outlines specific changes to United States export control policies that have led
to easy transfer of specific dual-use technology.

Holland and Hart, July 31, 2005. U.S. Export Control Laws International Practice Group.
http://www.hollandhart.com/articles/exportcontrols.pdf
This paper describes current United States Export laws, what agency of the government
regulates what exports, and what is regulated versus what is unregulated

Arms Control Association. 2002 Arms Control Today

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/briefsnov02.asp
This webpage discusses current and past export controls related to arms transfers from
the United States to other countries.

Center for Defense Information. Matt Schroeder, Research Associate, Arms Sales Monitoring
Project, Export Control Murkiness Jan. 15, 2003
http://www.cdi.org/issues/armstrade/exportcontrol.cfm
This article outlines some of the proposed changes Bush is looking to make in regard to
export controls.