SECOND DIVISION

[G. R. No. 137881. December 21, 2004]

ISAAC DELGADO and FERNANDO DELGADO, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ZACARIAS LIMPANGOG, REMEGIO LAGUNA,
SANTIAGO BALORO, CAMILO EVANGELISTA, NEMESIO AMORES and
RUSTICO RUIZO, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court which assails the resolution[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on November 18, 1998,
outrightly dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 49074 on ground of
insufficiency in form and substance, and the resolution[2] dated
March 4, 1999 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The factual background of the case is aptly stated by the

Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in its
decision dated January 9, 1998, as follows:

Plaintiffs[3] alleged that they are duly registered and recognized,

as tenants, by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Region
VIII, Tacloban City on parcel of ricelands owned by defendant
Isaac Delgado, duly administered by his son, defendant Fernando
Delgado[4] and situated at Barangay Tabunok, Palompon, Leyte.
They started plowing and tilling these ricelands sometime in 1962
upon the authorization of defendant Isaac Delgado wherein they
were appointed as tenants.

From 1962 up to 1981, plaintiffs and defendant Isaac Delgado

shared the produce of the ricelands through their labor and
hardship on a 50-50 basis. The sharing arrangement was, later
on, changed, sometime in 1982, to 1/43/4 basis, in favor of the
plaintiffs. The new sharing agreement, however, was not
accepted by the defendants inspite (sic) of the fact that it was in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act (RA) 3844, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) 6389. Because of defendants
refusal, plaintiffs were compelled to sell their share and deposited
the proceeds with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Ormoc City
Branch, for its safekeeping.

After the effectivity of Presidential Decree (PD) 27 on October 21,

1972, the subject land being devoted to the production of rice,
was covered by Operation Land Transfer for distribution to
qualified beneficiaries. Plaintiffs were identified by the DAR as the
qualified beneficiaries on their respective portion of the land. As
a consequence, Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), in their
respective names, were generated and issued (see Annexes A to
F, pp. 52-A to 52-E, Rollo).

Last January 1985, for no apparent reason, defendants destroyed

and razed to the grounds the newly sprouted rice plants, which
they planted, to their great prejudice and embarrassment.
Defendant Fernando Delgado threatened them, by pointing a gun,
and warned them to stop tilling and cultivating the subject land
resulting in their ejectment thereon. Because of these unlawful
acts, plaintiffs were deprived of their share of the produce of the
land.
In 1987, the DAR issued to the plaintiffs their Emancipation
Patents (EPs) covering their respective portion of the land (see
Annexes G to L, pp. 3-F to 53-L). The issuance of EPs, in their
respective names, is a recognition of the fact that they are the de
jure tenants on the subject land. But they cannot exercise their
rights of possession and cultivation thereon. Because, until now,
defendants are preventing them from doing so. This prompted
plaintiffs to file the present action against defendants for
Reinstatement with Damages.

In their Answer, defendants contended that as early as 1972, the

land in question was sold to and partitioned by the children of
defendant Isaac Delgado. They denied that plaintiffs Remegio
Laguna, Camilo Evangelista and Rustico Ruizo are tenants on the
subject land because they abandoned their landholdings
sometime in the year 1971 when they left for Butuan, Agusan.
The three (3) plaintiffs never returned to work again to their
respective landholdings.

On the other hand, respondents also controverted the claim of

plaintiffs Zacarias Limpangog, Santiago Baloro and Nemesio
Amores. According to them, these three (3) remaining plaintiffs
voluntarily left their respective landholding sometime in the year
1984 after they each received the sum of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) from the children of defendant Isaac Delgado. In
addition, they illegally appropriated the six (6) cavans of palay
harvested without giving any share to the landowners.

Moreover, defendants argued that all the plaintiffs acquired their

respective CLTs and EPs fraudulently and in bad faith.

Finally, defendants raised that the present action should be

dismissed on ground of res judicata. Defendants pointed out that
plaintiffs, on June 18, 1987, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Palompon, Leyte a case for Reinstatement with Damages against
them involving the subject land (see Exhibit I, pp. 81-A to 81-D,
Rollo). This case was subsequently dismissed on June 28, 1988
(see Exhibit 2, p. 81-E, Rollo). Thereafter, on May 27, 1987,
plaintiffs filed the same action for Reinstatement with Damages
before the Lower Board.

On July 27, 1993, after careful perusal of the evidence

adduced by the parties, the Provincial Adjudicator a quo
rendered a decision adverse the defendants, the
dispositive portion of which is reproduced in full as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered,

to wit:

1. Finding plaintiffs as lawful tenant-beneficiaries and now

owners of the lands in question located at Barangay Tabunok,
Palompon, Leyte, to wit:

a). Zacarias Limpangog-OCT No. OE-1186 and EP No. A-045799,

with an area of .3836 ha.

b). Remegio Laguna OCT No. OE-1189 and EP No. A-045800,

with an area of .4169 ha.

c). Santiago Baloro OCT No. OE-1193 and EP No. A-045796,

with an area of .3770 ha.
d). Camilo Evangelista OCT No. OE-1192 and EP No. A-045798,
with an area of .3690 ha.

e). Nemesio Amores OCT No. OE-1183 and EP No. A-045451,

with an area of .3698 ha.

f). Rustico Ruizo OCT No. OE-1184 and EP No. A-045453, with
an area of .3929 ha., all issued and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Leyte on October 7, 1987 and April 22, 1988,
respectively.

2. Ordering defendants and their agents or persons in

possession to vacate from the landholding in question and to
place thereon plaintiffs in peaceful possession and cultivation.

SO ORDERED.

On August 16, 1993, defendants seasonably filed a Motion for

Reconsideration. The Lower Board, on February 9, 1994, granted
the Motion for Reconsideration and modified its previous decision
as follows:

In fine, this Office holds that by virtue of the dismissal of the

action in the RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, at the instance of
the complainant, the latter, in legal contemplation have
abandoned their rights and obligations relative to their
farmholding, the consequence is the forfeiture of their titles and
the landholding covered and reallocation of the land to other
tenant farmer in accordance with aforesaid guidelines.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of July 27, 1993
is hereby reconsidered and modified as follows:

1. Finding that the complainants[5] have forfeited their rights to

the land in question as tenant beneficiaries; and

2. Ordering the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of

DAR, Palompon, Leyte, to effect the reallocation of the subject
landholding to other tenant-farmers in accordance with the
provisions of PD 27, and Memorandum Circulars and Rules and
Regulations.

SO ORDERED.[6] (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents appealed to the DARAB. Reversing the Provincial

Adjudicator, the DARAB, in its decision dated January 9, 1998,
ruled that herein respondents did not abandon the possession and
cultivation of the subject land; set aside the challenged order
dated February 9, 1994; reinstated the decision dated July 27,
1993 issued by the Provincial Adjudicator and affirmed the same.

Petitioners then filed in the CA, a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49074. It was
dismissed outright per the CAs herein assailed resolution
promulgated on November 18, 1998, to wit:

It appearing that the petition for review is insufficient in form and

substance:
1. Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping is signed
by counsel, not by the parties (Rollo, p. 18);

2. There are no affidavit of service and explanation on mode of

service; and

3. Copy of the assailed decision attached as Annex A is a

mere Xerox copy (Rollo, p. 20).

the Court resolves to DISMISS this case outright.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On petitioners motion for reconsideration, the appellate court

denied the same, ruling that there was no attempt on the part of
the petitioners to rectify the above-mentioned insufficiencies; that
although in their Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners attempted to comply with the verification and
certification on non-forum shopping requirements, only petitioner
Fernando Delgado signed the same; and that the petition for
review was not accompanied by pleadings and other material
portions of the records as would support the allegations of the
petitions, such as the motion for reconsideration dated January
31, 1998 of the Decision of January 9, 1998, Order dated February
9, 1994 and the Decision of July 27, 1993 of the DARAB Board,
Tacloban City; Resolution dated June 29, 1998 of DARAB, Diliman,
Quezon City; the Complaint for Reinstatement with Damages
dated May 27, 1987; the Reply on the Complaint, and the Motion
for Reconsideration of DARAB, Tacloban City Decision of July 27,
1997.[8]
Petitioners filed herein petition raising the sole issue, thus:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WAS

CORRECT IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE RULES NOTWITHSTANDING
PETITIONERS MERITORIOUS CASE.[9]

After respondents filed their Comment, the parties filed their

respective memoranda.

However, in their Memorandum, petitioners raise different issues,

thus:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ONLY PROPERTY OF PETITIONERS WITH AN

AREA OF 2.9320 HAS. IS COVERED BY THE MANDATE OF PD 27.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE RIGHT OF

RETENTION AS PROVIDED FOR BY PD 27.

III

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER

THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SUBSISTS IF ITS COVERAGE UNDER PD 27
WAS ERRONEOUS.[10]
while respondents raise the following issues in their
Memorandum:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION IS FRIVOLOUS AND

DILATORY.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS PETITION

FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI FOR THEIR PATENT FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES OF
COURT WAS DONE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT PETITION COULD BE TAKEN

COGNIZANCE WITH (sic) CONSIDERING THAT THIS IS FILED IN LIEU
OF THE LOST REMEDY OF APPEAL.

4. GRANTING FOR PURPOSES OF INTELLECTUAL DISCUSSIONS

THAT THIS PETITION HAS MERIT, WHETHER OR NOT THE RES
JUDICATA LEGAL PRINCIPLE HAS SET-IN IN THE INSTANT CASE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE THE ABSOLUTE

OWNERS OF THE LAND AWARDED TO THEM BY THE GOVERNMENT
THRU THE OPERATION OF THE LAND REFORM LAW.

6. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO

DAMAGES.[11]

At the outset, it is necessary that herein petition filed with the

Court be given its proper perspective. Originally filed as a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the same should be considered as a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as there is nothing to review
on the merits of CA-G.R. SP No. 49074, due to its outright
dismissal by the CA, for being insufficient in form and substance.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a

decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the
recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to
the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari[12] Inasmuch as the
present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on
ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a
quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
under Rule 65 of the said Rules.

The basic question in the present petition is: should the Court
require the CA to give due course to CA-G.R. SP No. 49074 despite
the failure of herein petitioners to comply with the formal
requirements of the Rules of Court in filing a petition for review
under Rule 45, as pointed out earlier by said appellate court?

Based on the attachments of herein petition, an examination of

the merits of the reinstatement case filed with the Provincial
Adjudicator and appealed to the DARAB reveals that had the CA
been given the opportunity to peruse the same attachments
which, unfortunately, were not appended to the petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 49074, it would have known that the petition involved
the sole substantial issue: whether the dismissal of Agrarian Case
No. PK-0001 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon,
Leyte, on motion of herein respondents, plaintiffs in said case,
constituted res judicata. The CA would have then been able to
determine whether the petition deserved to be given due course.
As it is, petitioners failed, among other things, to attach the
pertinent pleadings and other material portions of the records
that would support the allegations of the petition even in their
supplement to their motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
the CA was given no other choice but to dismiss the case outright
and deny the motion for reconsideration. It committed no grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners
have lost their appeal.

Should this Court proceed to determine the other issues raised in

petitioners memorandum? Ordinarily, the answer is in the
negative. Certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal.[13] As held
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[14] time and again, we have
emphasized that the perfection of appeals in the manner and
within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional, and that the failure to perfect an appeal renders the
decision of the trial court final and executory. This rule is founded
upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due
process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. Neither can petitioners invoke the doctrine that rules of
technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial
justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an
appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality.
It raises a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court
of jurisdiction over the appeal.[15] Petitioners lost their remedy of
appeal upon their failure to comply with the requirements of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court in filing their petition for review in the CA.

However, in order to lay all the issues at rest considering the

number of years that the reinstatement case had been pending,
suffice it to be stated that the only reason of the Provincial
Adjudicator in reversing himself on a motion for reconsideration is
that he was of the opinion that the prior dismissal of the case by
the RTC on motion of respondents constitutes res judicata; and in
effect, an abandonment of their rights and obligations relative to
their farmholding.

The order of dismissal dated June 28, 1988, in Agrarian Case No.
PK-0001 of RTC (Branch 17) Palompon, Leyte, simply recites:

On motion of the plaintiffs,[16] let this case be dismissed with

cost de oficio.[17]

There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the RTC case

that the dismissal was without prejudice. In accordance,
therefore, with the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Dismissal by the order of the court. Except as provided

in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action
shall not be dismissed against the defendants objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order,
a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice.

such dismissal is without prejudice. As held in Vallangca vs. Court

of Appeals,[18] a dismissal order is generally deemed to be
without prejudice to the filing of another action. The only
instance when dismissal of an action is with prejudice is, when the
order itself so states. Stated differently, when the court issues,
upon the plaintiffs instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to
whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the case at bar,
the presumption is, that it is without prejudice.[19]

Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the decision of

the DARAB reversing the Provincial Adjudicators Order dated
February 9, 1994 and reinstating the latters earlier decision
dated July 27, 1993. The dismissal of the agrarian case by the
RTC on motion of plaintiffs-respondents did not constitute res
judicata inasmuch as the dismissal order was not a decision on
the merits but a dismissal without prejudice.[20]

The principle of res judicata does not apply when the dismissal of
the earlier complaint, involving the same plaintiffs, same subject
matter, same theory and the same defendants, was made without
prejudice to its refiling at a future date,[21] or in a different
venue, as in this case. The dismissal of the case without
prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and
leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent
action as though the dismissal action had not been commenced.
In other words, the discontinuance of a case not on the merits
does not bar another action on the same subject matter.[22]

Neither can respondents be held guilty of abandonment.

Abandonment may be said to result where there is concurrence of
two (2) elements: the first being the intent to abandon a right or
claim and the second being the external act by which that
intention is expressed and carried into effect.[23] There must be
an actual, not merely projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the
right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of
being appropriated by another.[24] The intention to abandon
implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.[25] These requirements are clearly lacking in the
present case. There is nothing in the record to show a deliberate
intent to discontinue the suit without intention of refiling the
same. This inference of abandonment is belied by the fact that
respondents filed the proper case in the Provincial Adjudication
Board. Abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of the same
action in the appropriate forum.

Thus, the DARAB correctly reversed the Order dated February 9,

1994 of the Provincial Adjudicator and reinstated the latters
decision dated July 27, 1993.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs

against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Tinga, and Chcico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.

[1] Penned by Justice B.A. Adefuin de la Cruz (now retired) and

concurred in by Justices Consuelo Ynares Santiago (now Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now
Court Administrator).

[2] Ibid.
[3] Herein respondents.

[4] Herein petitioners.

[5] Herein respondents.

[6] Rollo, pp. 36-40.

[7] Id., p. 46.

[8] Id., pp. 49-50.

[9] Rollo, p. 14.

[10] Rollo, p. 110.

[11] Id., pp. 79-80.

[12] Donato vs. Court of Appeals, 417 SCRA 2I6, 223 (2003).

[13] Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81, 87 (2000).

[14] Id., pp. 87-88.

[15] Id., p. 90.

[16] Herein respondents.

[17] Rollo, p. 21.

[18] 173 SCRA 42 (1989).

[19] Id., pp. 53-54. See also Vergara vs. Ocumen, 114 SCRA 446,
451(1982).

[20] Barcelona vs. CA, 412 SCRA 41, 52 (2003); Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals, 363 SCRA 207, 219 (1991).

[21] Segura vs. Segura, 165 SCRA 368, 372 (1988).

[22] Meliton vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 485, 495-496 (1992).

[23] Estolas vs. Mabalot, 381 SCRA 702, 709-710 (2002); Corpus
vs. Grospe, 333 SCRA 435, 437 (2000); Medrana vs. Office of the
President, 188 SCRA 818, 826 (1990).

[24] Estolas vs. Mabalot, supra, p. 710; Medrana vs. Office of the
President, supra.

[25] Corpus vs. Grospe, supra; Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals,

216 SCRA 692, 699 (1992).
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