En Banc: Synopsis

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149453. October 7, 2003.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR. CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and
CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO,
petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plainti-appellee.

Fortun Narvasa & Salazar and Saguisag Carao & Associates for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this
Court which granted the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Respondent
alleged that Sec 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (which
took eect on December 1, 2000) should be given not only prospective but also
retroactive eect so as to bar the re-ling of the criminal cases against him
which had since long been terminated, solely on the basis of its being favorable
to the accused.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court ruled, among
others, that: (a) Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be applied retroactively to
respondent's case for to do so would result in "absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and the victims of crimes and their heirs"; and (b)
respondent failed to comply with the essential pre-requisites of Section 8, Rule
117 particularly that of accused's "express consent" to the provisional dismissal.
The Court directed the consolidation of the criminal cases and ordered the re-
raing of the same to a special heinous court.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8,

RULE 117 THEREOF; APPLICATION; TIME BAR UNDER NEW RULE WAS FIXED
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE STATE AND THE ACCUSED, NOT FOR THE ACCUSED
ONLY. The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply
because it is favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was
approved by the Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was
xed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benet of the State and the accused; not for the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
accused only. aSHAIC
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO

PROMULGATE RULES CARRIES WITH IT THE POWER TO DETERMINE WHETHER
TO GIVE SAID RULES PROSPECTIVE OR RETROACTIVE EFFECT. The Court
approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph
5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it
the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules prospective or
retroactive eect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court
may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the
former procedure shall apply. DcTSHa
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; SHOULD BE

CONSTRUED AS IS CONDUCIVE TO FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, AND IN HARMONY
WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. The absence of a provision in
Section 8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the prospective
application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court intended the new rule to be
given retroactive and prospective eect. If the statutory purpose is clear, the
provisions of the law should be construed as is conducive to fairness and justice,
and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be
construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such end or purpose. A statute
derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is approved. To construe it in a
manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. In
this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be
applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were
otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to
give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of
the State's right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply
the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists,
considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir,
Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took eect on December 1, 2000. A
retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs. ITcCaS
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; EXPRESS

CONSENT OF ACCUSED TO THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE, A PRE-REQUISITE TO BAR A REVIVAL THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. When the
respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial determination of
probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the essential requisites
of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent. The respondent's contention that his
admissions made in his pleadings and during the hearing in the CA cannot be
used in the present case as they were made in the course of a dierent
proceeding does not hold water. It should be borne in mind that the proceedings
before the Court was by way of an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, from the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present recourse is but a
mere continuation of the proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a new
trial, but a review of proceedings which commenced from the trial court, which
later passed through the CA. The respondent is bound by the judicial admissions
he made in the CA, and such admissions so hold him in the proceedings before
this Court. . . . While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss
a criminal case if it nds no probable cause, absent the express consent of the
accused to such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section
8 to bar a revival thereof. AEIDTc
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; SUPREME COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS;
RESOLUTION OF FACTUAL ISSUES REQUIRES SUBMISSION OF EVIDENCE
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT; CASE AT BAR. Under the Constitution, this Court
resolves "cases in which only an error or question of law is involved." It is
therefore not a trier of facts. The Court itself in the April 1, 2003 Resolution
summarized the facts to be resolved. . . The determination of whether or not the
above rule applies in this case entails factual issues. Has the two-year period
expired? Was the dismissal of the cases with the express consent of the accused?
Was there notice to the oended party? By their very nature, these questions
justify a remand to the trial court. . . The facts to be resolved requires submission
of evidence. They are material facts because proof of their actuality is needed to
enable the Court to render judgment on the basic issues raised. Evidence to prove
the facts in issue have to be introduced in accordance with the principles of
substantive law and the rules of pleading, practice and procedure. The facts are in
dispute because one party alleges their existence while the other denies them,
both with some show of reason. If the unanimous judgment in 2002 is to be
reversed by a new majority, a remand to ascertain these facts outlined is
imperative. Facts have to be established by evidence, not by inferences, not by
suppositions, and certainly not by the augury of divination. Yet, the majority
precisely proceeded to do it that way. If the facts material to the Court's
judgment were found by the new majority from the records, how could the
unanimous Court have missed so many of these signicant facts in 2002? If
doubts are to be resolved and suppositions and fallacies avoided, every method
of getting the truth through adversarial proceedings before a trial court must be
explored. Let the Regional Trial Court which is a trier of facts do the job.
HIEASa
2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; REFERS TO RIGHTS

OF THE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD NOT BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE AWESOME
POWERS OF THE STATE; PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 8, RULE 117
OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IS COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF A CITIZEN AGAINST OVERZEALOUS
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. The new majority rules that the time bar [in Rule
117] should apply only prospectively. I nd this decision disturbing if it is
indicative of a novel approach to individual liberties. The Bill of Rights is a
statement of the liberties of individuals protected against exertions of
government power. The ponencia seeks to protect the "rights" of the State
against its citizens and invokes the Bill of Rights in the process. The Bill of Rights
refers to fundamental individual rights and the guaranteed protection is against
Government or any of its ocials. It cannot be invoked against actions of private
parties unless private action is backed by government power. Government
exercises powers not rights. When the Constitution provides that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," the
"person" referred to is not the State. When we mention in our decisions that the
State also deserves due process, it is merely a quaint way of saying that the law
and the rules should be followed if intended to protect State interests. But never
should the rights of a citizen be weighed against the non-existent rights of the
State which should be recognized and denominated as the powers of the State.
There is sometimes a balancing of individual rights against State power where
public interest is involved. The individual is always at a terric disadvantage
when a basic right is weighed against the awesome powers of a State. There is
no need for balancing in this case. If the issue involved is protection of a citizen
against overzealous criminal prosecutions the reason for ruling against him
should never be due process rights of the State. The Dissenting Opinion of Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno in the April 1, 2003, with which I also concurred,
discusses the origin of the amended rule, its nuances and reasons for being, and
the inexibility of the permanent time bar once the two-year period is reached.
The Rule is intended to protect the rights of the accused, not to make it easier for
the Government to prosecute him. Here, the Court wants us to allow the use of a
protection for the citizen against that citizen. Its enactment becomes counter-
productive. The extensive and learned discussion of the Honorable Chairman of
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court is glossed over. It should be
re-read. TIDcEH

RULE 117 THEREOF; PURPOSE; SIMPLE JUSTICE DICTATES A RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE RULE FOR IT TO BE ENJOYED BY AN ACCUSED WHOSE
TRIAL HAS DRAGGED FOR YEARS WITH A RECENT ACCUSED. The amended
rule is intended to prod the Government into a more faithful and accountable
performance of duty, to avoid the tyrannical Damocles' sword hanging
indenitely over a person whom the Government wants to coerce into
indeterminate submission, and to stop the malaise of public ocers who are
shiftless and lethargic and who are prodded into action only after the passage of
interminable time or when revenge or a desire to vex and oppress suddenly
surfaces. If the rule is a just rule, its objectives are salutary and if its
enforcement will mean an enlargement of individual rights, why should a recent
accused enjoy it to the exclusion of those with pending cases when it was
enacted? Justice should be for everyone especially those accused where
prosecution and trial have dragged for years and years. A rule should not protect
the incompetence or lethargy of Government prosecutors. I submit that the new
rule should be made retroactive. This interpretation is in line with simple justice.
The statement of the majority that the due process protections of the State and
those of the individual should be equal is dangerous for a Supreme Court to utter.
DTEIaC
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLICATION; GENERALLY

CONSTRUED AS APPLICABLE TO ACCRUED OR PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION AT
THE TIME OF THEIR PASSAGE; EXCEPTIONS; CASE AT BAR. Regardless of the
characterization of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689, I submit that
Rule 117, Section 8 should be given retroactive application, consistent with the
principles of statutory construction of procedural rules. Procedural laws, by
denition, prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to
criminal law, procedural law as distinguished from substantive law is that
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. In interpreting procedural rules, this Court, in the 1927 case of Hosana
v. Diomano, laid down the rule that procedural rules will be construed as
applicable to causes of action accrued, and actions pending and undetermined, at
the time of their passage, unless: (1) such actions are expressly excepted; or (2)
vested rights would be disturbed by giving them a retroactive application. The
causes of action in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 in which the
Informations alleged essentially the same operative facts as those alleged in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, with the primary dierence
that respondent is charged as a principal and no longer as an accessory had
undoubtedly already accrued as of December 1, 2000, the eective date of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, whether the criminal actions in
question were "pending", or the causes of action had merely "accrued", the
retroactive application of the RRCP is called for. Undoubtedly, there is no express
exception to the retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8. Thus, unless
vested rights are disturbed, its retroactive application is clearly mandated.
cHaADC
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A PERSON HAS NO VESTED RIGHT IN ANY RULE OF LAW.
On this point, it has been held that the retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
aected. This is because of the fundamental principle that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws. This is a principle that
we have enunciated in a long line of cases. A person has no vested right in any
rule of law which entitled him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benet. SIAEHC
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PROCEDURAL DUE

PROCESS CONSTRUED AS PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS; APPLYING RULE 117,
SECTION 8 OF THE RRCP RETROACTIVELY IS NOT PROCEDURALLY UNFAIR; CASE
AT BAR. Stripped to its basics, procedural due process is a matter of nothing
more or less than procedural fairness. There would be nothing procedurally unfair
about giving a retroactive application to, Rule 117, Section 8. Precisely, this Court
is specically empowered by the Constitution to promulgate such rules of
procedure and in the past we have had no qualms about applying such rules of
procedure retroactively, ruling rmly that no vested rights are impaired even if
the eect of the retroactive application of such rules would be to divest a court or
tribunal of its jurisdiction. In such instances, we have advised the party-litigants
that their rights have not been impaired. There is no cogent reason to depart
from this principle even if, in this case, the People is one of the party-litigants.
Departing from the fundamental principle in this case seems to be an instance of
selective statutory construction to achieve the desire to attain a particular result.
If anything, the fact that the People is one of the party-litigants should call for a
more vigilant application of the Rules strictly against the People or the State and
liberally in favor of the private individuals who might be beneted by the
retroactive application of the procedural rule. Although it is true that the
prosecutors would have no inkling, as of the provisional dismissal of the case on
March 29, 1999, that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure would contain Rule
117, Section 8, they undoubtedly had notice as of the eective date thereof on
December 1, 2000. From that date, they had almost four months in which to
revive Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, had there been a need to
do so. In cases involving purely private litigants, we have not hesitated in
dismissing cases when a party or parties have not been vigilant in protecting
their rights. At the risk of being repetitive, there is no reason to depart from this
principle simply because the State is a litigant. CaEIST
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; STATUTES AND
RULES CANNOT PLACE ANY LIMITATION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL; CASE AT BAR. My rst dissent rests mainly on the premise that
the circumstances surrounding respondent's case, i.e., the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 and their reling two years after, eectively elicit a
speedy trial analysis or inquiry. The time interval between the dismissal of the
initial charges and the subsequent reling thereof had crossed the threshold
dividing ordinary from "presumptively prejudicial" delay, thus, before anything
else, respondent's predicament should be weighed on the basis of the
Constitutional provisions on speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. Section
8, Rule 117 must come second only. At this juncture, it bears reiterating that
statutes (and with more reason, rules) cannot be eective to place any limitation
on the constitutional right, and therefore they should not be regarded as
"denitions" of the constitutional provision, but merely as implementing statutes
passed pursuant to it. It is thus conceivable that the constitutional provision may
be violated although an implementing statute is not. With this Court's xation
on Section 8, Rule 117, it in eect missed the bigger picture. Respondent's
repeated invocation of his constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition of cases was drowned by arguments on the applicability of the rule
only implementing such right. Contrary to the express provision of Section 10,
Rule 119 of the same Rules that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule
implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of
the right to speedy trial guaranteed by Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, Section 8, Rule 117 eectively operates as a bar to respondent's
bid for a speedy trial analysis or inquiry.
HDcaAI
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REVISED PENAL CODE; PENAL LAWS ARE GIVEN

RETROACTIVE EFFECT WHEN FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED; SECTION 8, RULE
117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY; CASE AT BAR. Settled in our jurisprudence is the principle
that when a new law will be advantageous to the accused, the same shall be
given retroactive eect. (As provided in Article 22 of our Revised Penal Code).
Favorabiliab sunt amplianda, adiosa restrigenda. (Penal laws that are favorable
to the accused are given retroactive eect) . . . This article is of Spanish origin
and is based on Latin principles, thus, in the interpretation thereof, this Court
must have recourse to Spanish or Latin jurisprudence. That the term "penal laws"
or "leyes penales" as employed in Article 22, relates not only to laws prescribing
penalties but also to limitations upon the bringing of penal actions, was
pronounced in the early case of People vs. Parel. Thus, to justify the retroactive
application of Section 8, Rule 117 on the basis of Article 22 is in order.
Considering its genesis and its underlying principles, there is no doubt that
whenever a new statute dealing with crimes establishes conditions more lenient
or favorable to the accused, the statute becomes retroactive and the accused
must receive the benets of the new condition. As long as this provision so
remains in force, it is of general application to all penal statutes, past, present,
future and furnishes the rule for determining to what extent they are retroactive
or merely prospective. And unless a penal or criminal statute, expressly or by
necessary implication, provides that it shall not be regarded as retroactive, it
becomes subject to the rule laid down by that article. Evidently, by ruling against
the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 117, the majority casts aside one of
most basic principles in our legal system. EDHTAI

RULE 117 THEREOF; NEW RULE TO BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION TO
REMEDY THE INJUSTICE TO THE ACCUSED CAUSED BY A SUSPENDED
PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; CASE AT BAR. Section 8, Rule 117 was introduced
owing to the many instances where police agencies have refused to issue
clearances, for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to persons having
pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of such cases by the court was
merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such provisional dismissal,
more often than not, had been done ve or ten years ago. Obviously, Section 8,
Rule was introduced not so much for the interest of the State but precisely for
the protection of the accused against protracted prosecution. This Court's
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court clearly saw the prejudice to the
rights of the accused caused by a suspended provisional dismissal of this case .
Hence, if we are to follow the majority's line of reasoning that Section 8, Rule
117 "must be read according to its spirit or intent", then the logical conclusion is
the retroactive application of the rule. Certainly, it is the construction that will
advance the object and secure the benets intended. This Court, in setting a limit
to the State's right to re-prosecute, has recognized the injustice and the evil
accompanying suspended provisional dismissals. It has impliedly acknowledged
that the situation sought to remedied is unjust and undesirable. Now, is it not
inconsistent for this Court to suspend the application of the new rule to
respondent's case just because the rule was passed after the provisional
dismissal of his case? Note that the situation sought to be remedied is present in
respondent's case. To my mind, if this Court will refuse to extend the benet of
the new rule to respondent, it will be guilty of an inconsistency in view of its
implied admission that the situation sought to be remedied has caused injustice
to respondent. ADEaHT
4. ID.; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO 7-74; CASE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED

WHEN REFILED SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE BRANCH TO WHICH THE
ORIGINAL CASE PERTAINED; CASE AT BAR. Finally, I nd the re-raing of
respondent's cases to a special heinous court unnecessary. Supreme Court
Circular No. 7-74 expressly provides that "when a case is dismissed for any
cause or reason whatsoever and the same is re-led, it shall not be included in
the rae anymore but shall be assigned to the branch to which the original case
pertained. If, by mistake or otherwise, such case is raed and assigned to
another branch, the latter must transfer the case to the branch to which it
originally belonged, in which event another case shall be assigned by rae as
replacement.'' Considering that a provisional dismissal of a criminal case does
not terminate it, it is more consistent with the majority's theory that Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 be simply referred back to the branch to which
they originally belonged. acHDTE
RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J : p
Before the Court are the following motions of the respondent, to wit: (a)
Omnibus Motion; 1 (b) Motion for Reconsideration; 2 (c) Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration; 3 (d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments. 4
The Omnibus Motion
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this
Court which granted the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The respondent
thereafter prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to
voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is
in order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any
manner, participating in the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration. The respondent points out that the
aforenamed members of the Court were appointed by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments and after the case
at bar was submitted for the decision of the Court. He asserts that although A.M.
No. 99-8-09-SC 5 specically provides that it applies only to the divisions of the
Court, it should likewise apply to this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution
of this Court which set aside its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, apart from the
constitutional issues raised by the respondent in his motion for reconsideration
and its supplement. As such, according to the respondent, the instant case should
be unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raed to any other member of the
Court.
The Court resolves to deny the respondent's motion for lack of merit.
The records show that as early as May 24, 2002, the respondent led an urgent
motion for the recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez for the reason that they were appointed to the Court after the February
19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate in the integral portions of the
proceedings. Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to inhibit themselves
and decided to participate in the deliberation on the petition. 6 On March 18,
2003, the respondent led a motion with the Court for the recusation of Justice
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition when the case was
pending before the Court of Appeals.
On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the respondent's
Motion dated March 18, 2003. The respondent thereafter led his motion for
reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in which he prayed,
inter alia, for the inhibition of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC and
that the case be re-raed to another member of the Court who had actually
participated in the deliberation and the rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution.
The respondent likewise sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and
Adolfo S. Azcuna, again for the reason that they were appointed to the Court
after the oral arguments on February 19, 2002 and after the case had already
been submitted for decision.
On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution denying the aforesaid motions
of the respondent. 7 The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC is applicable only
to cases assigned to the divisions of the Court:
The respondent's reliance on Supreme Court Circular No. 99-8-09
misplaced. As admitted by the respondent, the said circular is applicable
only to motions for reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions of
the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the
Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the
Court, his replacement will act upon the motion for reconsideration of a
party and participate in the deliberations thereof. This is the reason why
Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired Justice De Leon, prepared the
draft of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court. 8
The Court also ruled that there was no need for its newest members to inhibit
themselves from participating in the deliberation of the respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration:
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and
Adolfo S. Azcuna were not yet members of the Court during the February
18, 2002 9 oral arguments before the Court, nonetheless they were not
disqualied to participate in the deliberations on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the
instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Justice Callejo, Sr.
disqualied to prepare the resolution of the Court on the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent. When the Court deliberated on
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales,
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. Azcuna were already members of the
Court.
It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the

February 18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of the parties are parts of
the records of this case. Said transcripts are available to the parties or to
any member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. Saguisag and Felix
Carao, Jr. may not yet have been the counsel of the respondent on
February 18, 2002 but by reading the said transcripts and the records of
this case they are informed of what transpired during the hearing and
oral arguments of the parties. 10
It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the respondent in his omnibus motion
had already been passed upon and resolved by this Court. The respondent did not
make any new substantial arguments in his motion to warrant a reconsideration
of the aforesaid resolutions.
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of Justices Conchita C. Morales and
Adolfo S. Azcuna only after they had already concurred in the Court's Resolution
dated April 1, 2003. Case law has it that a motion for disqualication must be
denied when led after a member of the Court has already given an opinion on
the merits of the case, the rationale being that a litigant cannot be permitted to
speculate upon the action of the Court, only to raise an objection of this sort after
a decision has been rendered. 11
The Motion to Set the Case
for Oral Arguments
The Court denies the motion of the respondent. The parties have already
extensively discussed the issues involved in the case. The respondent's motion
for reconsideration consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the
supplement to his motion for reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners'
comment on his motion. There is no longer a need to set the instant case for oral
arguments. HDTSCc
The Issue as to the Application of

the Time-bar under Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure Whether
Prospective or Retroactive
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the
Court and thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28, 2002.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing

judicial practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and retroactively
without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused. He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws
should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The
respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new
provision to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on the State to prosecute criminal
cases diligently and continuously, lest it loses its right to prosecute the accused
anew. The respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of
procedure, there can be no other conclusion: the rule should have retroactive
application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively.
Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in eect give the petitioners
more than two years from March 29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal
cases, thus violating the respondent's right to due process and equal protection
of the law.
The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to
provide relief to the accused. In this case, the State had been given more than
sucient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew after the March 29,
1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before
the RRCP took eect on December 1, 2000. According to the respondent, the
petitioners led the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial,
and that such ling was designed to derail his bid for the Senate.
In their comment on the respondent's motions, the petitioners assert that the
prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure which
the Court may promulgate shall not diminish, increase or modify substantial
rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should
not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such
right to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a
procedural rule. According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule impairs a vested
right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a retroactive
application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or
disposition of the criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases
and not to cases already dismissed. The petitioners assert that the "reling of the
cases" under Section 8 should be taken to mean as the ling of the criminal
complaint with the appropriate oce for the purpose of conducting a preliminary
investigation, and not the actual ling of the criminal complaint or information in
court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the oended parties
must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases under
Section 8 since the provision so expressly states. Thus, if the requisite notices to
the heirs of the deceased would be taken into consideration, the two-year period
had not yet even commenced to run.
In his consolidated reply to the comment of the petitioners, the respondent
asserts that the State is proscribed from reling a criminal case if it can be shown
that the delay resulted in a violation of the right of the accused to due process. In
this case, there was an inordinate delay in the revival of the cases, considering
that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the State in March 1999 are the
same witnesses in 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to rele the cases
before the two-year bar but failed to do so because of negligence; and perhaps
institutional indolence. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the respondent
posits that the revival of the cases contemplated in Section 8 refers to the ling
of the Informations or complaints in court for trial. The operational act then is
the reling of the Informations with the RTC, which was done only on June 6,
2001, clearly beyond the two-year bar.
The Court nds the respondent's contentions to be without merit.
First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to its power under Article VIII,
Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution which reads:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplied and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
eective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is

favorable to the accused. It must be noted that the new rule was approved by the
Court not only to reinforce the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of the case. The time-bar under the new rule was xed by the Court
to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice
system for the benet of the State and the accused; not for the accused only. The
Court emphasized in its assailed resolution that:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has xed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with
a priori notice to the oended party. The time-bar may appear, on rst
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, in xing the time-bar, the Court
balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly
and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the
State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both
the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the
oended parties. The time-bar xed by the Court must: be respected
unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insucient that
the rule becomes a denial of justice. 12
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the

interest of justice, may make the rule prospective where the exigencies of the
situation make the rule prospective. The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a
rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on
which the dictate is based. Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its
own distinct functions, its own background or precedent, and its own impact on
the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must
inevitably vary with the dictate involved. 13
Matters of procedure are not necessarily retrospective in operation as a statute.
14 To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court per Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
the Court in dening the limits of adherence may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relating forward. 15
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under Article VIII, Section 5,
paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to promulgate rules
carries with it the power, inter alia, to determine whether to give the said rules
prospective or retroactive eect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court,
the Court may not apply the rules to actions pending before it if in its opinion
their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event,
the former procedure shall apply. 16
The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it prospective application only does
not proscribe the prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court
intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective eect. If the
statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of the law should be construed as is
conducive to fairness and justice, and in harmony with the general spirit and
policy of the rule. It should be construed so as not to defeat but to carry out such
end or purpose. 17 A statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is
approved. To construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to
nullify or destroy the law. 18 I n Cometa v. Court of Appeals, 19 this Court ruled
that "the spirit rather than the letter of the statute determines its construction;
hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent." 20 While we may
not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right
to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the
"letter that killeth" but to the "spirit that vivieth, to give eect to the
lawmaker's will." 21
In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be
applied prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were
otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to
give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the accused. It would be a denial of
the State's right to due process and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply
the new rule retroactively in the present case as the respondent insists,
considering that the criminal cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir,
Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took eect on December 1, 2000. A
retroactive application of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC) provisionally dismissed a criminal
case with the express consent of the accused in 1997. The prosecution had the
right to revive the case within the prescriptive period, under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. On December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under
Section 8 took eect, the prosecution was unable to revive the criminal case
before then.
If the time-bar xed in Section 8 were to be applied retroactively, this would
mean that the State would be barred from reviving the case for failure to comply
with the said time-bar, which was yet to be approved by the Court three years
after the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. In contrast, if the same case
was dismissed provisionally in December 2000, the State had the right to revive
the same within the time-bar. In ne, to so hold would imply that the State was
presumed to foresee and anticipate that three years after 1997, the Court would
approve and amend the RRCP. The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure
to comply with a rule yet to be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that
the institution and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules
and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that
Section 8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court.
The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the new rule.
In holding that the petitioners had until December 1, 2002 within which to
revive the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29,
1999, this Court explained, thus:
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March
31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution
of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to
revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took eect
on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively,
the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31,
2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of
the two-year period xed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the
time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from
December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the
cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in xing
the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the
administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 22 should be

excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule
prescribing it was not yet in eect at the time and the State could not be
expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the
State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or
that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period
under the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Justice
Felix Frankfurter, in Grin v. People, 351 US 12 (1956):
We should not indulge in the ction that the law now announced
has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not
avail themselves of it waived their rights . . .
The two-year period xed in the new rule is for the benet of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely
to benet the accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice of
hardship" to the State and adversely aect the administration of justice in
general and of criminal laws in particular. 23
Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Grin v. People, 24 he said,

"it is much more conducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the
considerations that give prospective content to a new pronouncement of law.
That this is consonant with the spirit of our law and justied by those
considerations of reason which should dominate the law has been luminously
expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo shortly before he came here and in an opinion
which he wrote for the Court."
Parenthetically, the respondent himself admitted in his motion for
reconsideration that Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to comply with
the notice requirement under the new rule when it yet had to exist:
99. Respondent submits that the records are still in the same state of
inadequacy and incompletion. This however is not strange considering
that Section 8, Rule 117 had not existed on March 29, 1999, when the
criminal cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did not have its text
to guide his actions. How could the good judge have complied with the
mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had to exist? 25
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense
and to that extent, procedural laws are retroactive. 26 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 had long been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the new
rule took eect on December 1, 2000. When the petitioners led the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001,
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 and Q-99-81689 had long since been
terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule should not be reckoned from the
March 29, 1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but
from December 1, 2000 when the new rule took eect. While it is true that the
Court applied Section 8 of Rule 110 27 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to
cases still pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with
nality.
The records show that after the requisite preliminary investigation conducted by
the petitioners in accordance with existing rules, eleven Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were led with the RTC on June 6, 2001,
very well within the time-bar therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his
right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases as enshrined in the
Constitution had been violated. 28
The respondent's plaint that he was being singled out by the prospective
application of the new rule simply because before the Court issued its April 1,
2003 Resolution, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of the Republic
for the 2004 elections has no factual basis whatsoever. 29 The bare and
irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where the issue of the
retroactive/prospective application of the new rule was rst raised before the
Court. The ruling of the Court in its April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today
would be the same, regardless of who the party or parties involved are, whether
a senator of the Republic or an ordinary citizen.cHITCS
The respondent's contention that the prospective application of the new rule
would deny him due process and would violate the equal protection of laws is
barren of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the new rule was
approved by the Court solely for his benet, in derogation of the right of the
State to due process. The new rule was approved by the Court to enhance the
right of due process of both the State and the accused. The State is entitled to
due process in criminal cases as much as the accused.
Due process has never been and perhaps can never be precisely dened. It is not
a technical conception with a xed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. The phrase expresses the requirement of fundamental fairness, a
requisite whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. 30 In
determining what fundamental fairness consists of in a particular situation,
relevant precedents must be considered and the interests that are at stake;
private interests, as well as the interests of the government must be assessed. In
this case, in holding that the new rule has prospective and not retroactive
application, the Court took into consideration not only the interests of the
respondent but all other accused, whatever their station in life may be. The
interest of the State in the speedy, impartial and inexpensive disposition of
criminal cases was likewise considered. aTSEcA
The Respondent Failed to Comply

with the Essential Prerequisites of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure
The respondent argues that the issue involved in the Court of Appeals is entirely
dierent from the issue involved in the present recourse; hence, any admissions
he made in the court below are not judicial admissions in this case. He asserts
that the issue involved in the CA was whether or not he was placed in double
jeopardy when he was charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 despite the dismissal of Criminals Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689; whereas the issue in this Court is whether the prosecution of Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the
RRCP. The respondent avers that the proceedings in the appellate court are
dierent from those in this Court.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in giving considerable weight to the
admissions he made in his pleadings and during the proceedings in the CA. He
stresses that judicial admissions may only be used against a party if such
admissions are (a) made in the course of the proceedings in the same case; and
(b) made regarding a relevant fact pursuant to Section 4, Rule 129 and Section
26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the ruling of
the Court, when he led his motion for the judicial determination of probable
cause in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, he thereby prayed for
the dismissal of the said cases. His motion carried with it, at the very least, the
prayer for the dismissal of the criminal cases. Absent a nding of probable cause,
Judge Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the criminal cases. Moreover, the
respondent avers that his motion included the general prayer "for such other
reliefs as may be equitable in the premises." The respondent also points out that
the public prosecutor agreed to the averments in his motion as the latter did not
even le any motion for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, Jr.'s order dismissing
the cases.
The respondent further contends that the Court is not a trier of facts. It has no
means to ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims of the parties on the
factual issues, a function best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. He posits
that there is a need for the case to be remanded to the RTC to enable him to
present evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. complied with the notice
requirements of Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of this Court, the
respondent contends that it is not fair to expect the element of notice under
Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., for the said rule was not yet in
existence at the time he led his motion for a determination of probable cause.
The respondent avers that the requirement for notices to the oended parties
under Section 8 is a formal and not an essential requisite. In criminal cases, the
oended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to
the determination of the civil liability of the accused. According to the
respondent, notice to the prosecution provides sucient safeguard for the private
complainant to recover on the civil liability of the accused based on the delicts;
after all, the prosecution of the oense is under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor.
The contentions of the respondent have no merit.
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the CA and in this Court are the same.
To recall, in Civil Case No. 01-100933, 31 the respondent 32 sought injunctive
relief from the RTC of Manila on his claim that in conducting a preliminary
investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, the petitioners
thereby placed him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule 117 of the RRCP. 33
When the RTC denied his plea for injunctive relief, the respondent led his
petition for certiorari in the CA, again invoking his right against double jeopardy,
praying that:
13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the "preliminary investigation" was
dismissed for the reasons mentioned, there currently exists no complaint
upon which a valid investigation can be had in light of the clear provisions
of Rule 110 which requires the existence of a "sworn written statement
charging a person with an oense" as basis for the commencement of a
preliminary investigation under Rule 112.
For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly the same oenses over
which he had been duly arraigned and a plea validly entered before the
Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 57) before its remand to
the QC RTC. Hence, to proceed therewith on similar charges will put him in
jeopardy of being twice punished therefor (Article III, 21, Constitution).
34
The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal

Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr. amounted to a
judgment of acquittal; hence, he could no longer be charged and prosecuted
anew for the same oense without violating his right against double jeopardy.
However, the respondent led a second amended petition wherein he invoked for
the rst time Section 8 of Rule 117 of the RRCP:
(e) the new criminal cases for Murder led by respondents against
petitioner and the other accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and pending before respondent
Judge Yadao (Annex B) is dismissible on its face as they involve exactly the
same accused, facts, and oenses which had previously been dismissed
by the QC RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on March 29,
1999, hence, can no longer be revived two (2) years after such dismissal
in accordance with the clear provisions of Section 8, Rule 117. 35
Indeed, the CA granted the respondent's petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of
the RRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the same rule and the
Constitution. Thus, during the oral arguments in this Court, the respondent,
through counsel, admitted that he was indeed invoking Section 8 anew and the
provisions of the Constitution on double jeopardy:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You are saying that Sen. Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for
that crime, for the killing of the 11 in 1995?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is my submission, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Let us see your reason for it?
ATTY. FORTUN: 36
First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: 37
Allow me to qualify the eects of double jeopardy occur with permanent

dismissal that is my submission.
ATTY. FORTUN: 38
No, no, I am not talking of the eects, I am talking of the doctrine, you
are not invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Your Honor, double jeopardy does not apply Section 8, 117 they, are
(interrupted)
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
That is right.
ATTY. FORTUN:
They are two dierent claims.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
That is what I am trying to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it.
ATTY. FORTUN:
Very well, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You are not invoking double jeopardy?
ATTY. FORTUN:
As I mentioned we are saying that the eects of a permanent dismissal
vest the eects (interrupted)
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
No, I am not talking of the eects, I am asking about the application, you
are not asking the Court to apply the doctrine of double jeopardy
to prevent a prosecution of Mr. Lacson?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Because the element of double jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
So, the answer is yes?
ATTY. FORTUN:
No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal

vests the rights of double jeopardy upon the accused who invokes
it.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
What you are saying is the eects, I am not asking about the eects, I
will ask that later.
ATTY. FORTUN:
They are two dierent (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Later, I am asking about doctrines. Since you are not invoking the
doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting your case win or lose,
sink or sail on the application of 8, 117?
ATTY. FORTUN:
On the constitutional right of the accused under Section 16 of Article 3
which is speedy disposition of cases which implemented 8, 117,
that is our arguments in this bar.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Are you not resting on 8,117?

ATTY. FORTUN:
That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
So, you are resting on 8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Not exclusive, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN:
The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To speedy disposition?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Can a Court, let us see your theory then your theory rest on two
provisions: rst, the Rules of Court 8,117 and Second, the
Constitution on speedy disposition?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. 39
Second. The respondent's answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josena

Salonga during the hearing in the CA where he admitted, through counsel, that
he gave no express conformity to the dismissal of the cases by Judge Agnir, Jr.,
were in relation to Section 8 of Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on
double jeopardy, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Do we get it from you that it is your stand that this is applicable to the
case at bar?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It is my submission, that it is, Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my
proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the rule on double
jeopardy as well, because he had already been arraigned before the
Sandiganbayan prior to the case being remanded to the RTC.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
You are referring to those cases which were dismissed by the RTC of
Quezon City.
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional
in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the
onset was simply a judicial determination of probable cause for
warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, [Jr.] upon the
presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those
who had withdrawn their adavits, made one further conclusion
that not only was this case lacking in probable cause for purposes
of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify
proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be

provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the express conformity
of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the oended party.

ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or
any statement which would normally be required by the Court on
pre-trial or on other matters, including other provisional dismissal.
My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught
me that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional
dismissal. In fact, they ask the accused to come forward, and the
judge himself or herself explains the implications of a provisional
dismissal. 40
The respondent, through counsel, even admitted that despite his plea for
equitable relief in his motion for a judicial determination of probable cause in the
RTC, he did not agree to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The respondent
insisted that the only relief he prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that
warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a nding of probable cause. He
asserted that the judge did not even require him to agree to a provisional
dismissal of the cases:
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?

ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which
the good Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in criminal
law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or the matter of
Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you led a motion, the other accused then led a motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no
probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that
we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular motion, and if I
may read my prayer before the Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is
respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable
cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be
conducted, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the
prosecution to present private complainants and their witnesses at
the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for
the arrest of the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until resolution of this incident."
JUSTICE GUERRERO:

There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Don't you surmise Judge Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court,
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to
dismiss the case because what would be the net eect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without
dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but
what is plain is we did not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither
were we asked to sign any assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal, did you not le any
motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the
case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my
client had already been arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as
far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge
Agnir operated to benet me, and therefore I did not take any
further step in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter
further because it probably could prejudice the interest of my
client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue. 41
In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral argument led with the Court of Appeals,
the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the
Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were
remanded to the QC RTC. Upon rae, the case was assigned to Branch
91. Petitioner and the others promptly led a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for
his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the
Informations, contrary to respondent OSG's claim. 42
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her

attorney, in the course of judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact
from the eld of controversy. It is a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a
party's attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in
pleadings made by a party. 43 It may occur at any point during the litigation
process. An admission in open court is a judicial admission. 44 A judicial admission
binds the client even if made by his counsel. 45 As declared by this Court:
. . . [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of
attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his
client. When such admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing
with proof of some fact, . . . they bind the client, whether made during, or
even after the trial." 46
When the respondent admitted that he did not move for the dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause, and that he did not give his express consent to
the provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact admitted that one of the
essential requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.
The respondent's contention that his admissions made in his pleadings and
during the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present case as they were
made in the course of a dierent proceeding does not hold water. It should be
borne in mind that the proceedings before the Court was by way of an appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from the proceedings in the
CA; as such, the present recourse is but a mere continuation of the proceedings
in the appellate court. This is not a new trial, but a review of proceedings which
commenced from the trial court, which later passed through the CA. The
respondent is bound by the judicial admissions he made in the CA, and such
admissions so hold him in the proceedings before this Court. As categorically
stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Company: 47
. . . [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact, including those made by
counsel on behalf of a client during a trial, are binding "for the purpose of
the case . . . including appeals."
While it may be true that the trial court may provisionally dismiss a criminal
case if it nds no probable cause, absent the express consent of the accused to
such provisional dismissal, the latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar a
revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so simply because the public
prosecutor did not object to a motion of the accused for a judicial determination
of probable cause or le a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal
of the case. Even a cursory reading of the respondent's motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause will show that it contained no allegation that
there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the respondent's
arrest as a prayer for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only asking
the court to determine whether or not there was probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance
of the said warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for equitable relief is of no
avail, unless the petition states facts which will authorize the court to grant such
relief. 48 A court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it power to decide question
except as presented by the parties in their pleadings. Anything that is resolved or
decided beyond them is coram non judice and void. 49

Third. There is no need for the Court to remand the instant case to the trial court
to enable the respondent to adduce post facto evidence that the requisite notices
under Section 8 had been complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has
thoroughly examined the voluminous records from the Sandiganbayan and the
RTC 50 and found no proof that the requisite notices were even served on all the
heirs of the victims. The respondent himself admitted that, as held by this Court,
in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, "Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with the
mandate under Section 8 because said rule had yet to exist." 51
One nal matter. The records show that Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112 were assigned, through the customary rae of cases, to Branch 81 of
the RTC of Quezon City, the same branch which dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
99-81679 to 99-81689. 52 In the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City was directed to try and
decide Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with reasonable dispatch.
The Court notes, however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-96 it designated
six branches of the RTC of Quezon City 53 as special courts, exclusively to try and
decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659. Since the accused in the said
cases are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act No. 7659, is classied as a
heinous crime, the above cases should be consolidated and re-raed by the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a
special court, exclusively to try and decide heinous crimes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Panlo M. Lacson's Omnibus
Motion and Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED. The respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED
to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 and to RE-
RAFFLE the same with dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City designated as a special court, exclusively to try and decide
heinous crimes.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., maintains his dissent.
Vitug, J ., maintains his dissent and reiterate his opinion on the Court's resolution
of 28 May 2002.
Carpio and Tinga, JJ ., took no part.
Corona, J ., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:
This is to reiterate my dissent to the unbelievable about-face by the Court in the

April 1, 2003 Resolution conrmed and renewed in its latest Resolution.
The reasons for this continuing dissent are basically similar to those expressed in
three Dissenting Opinions to the April 1, 2003 Resolution. 1 Nothing has changed
in the history of the charges against Senator Panlo M. Lacson except the
disturbing and unusual ruling of this Court now.
If the charges against Senator Lacson are to be relentlessly pursued, the pursuit
must be done in a constitutional and fair manner. It is the use of legal short-cuts,
pained reasoning and the hasty procedure after several years of inaction which
constrain this dissent. If Senator Lacson is to be found guilty of participation in
multiple murder, it should be only after due process is followed.
The new majority Resolution is a volte-face, a complete turn-around from the

previously unanimous judgment dated May 28, 2002. SECcAI
The 2002 Resolution of the Court remanded the Government's petition to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to ascertain important factual issues. The
Resolution was concluded beyond doubt or ambiguity without any dissenting
vote.
The issues sought to be revived were all resolved two years ago. What the Court
unanimously retired should be allowed to rest. Instead, the Court now wants to
allow the use of the strong arm of the law to oppressively prosecute and
persecute.
If the petitioners can show strong compelling reasons, newly discovered, or some
deeply held convictions based on a genuine sense of justice or irresistible
considerations of equity, I could concur to ignore established procedure.
Unfortunately, all I can discern here is allowing the use of the strong arm of the
law to oppressively prosecute a public ocer whom the powers-that-be detest
and whom they seek to render completely ineective. 2
In the April 1, 2003 Resolution, I concurred with Mme. Justice Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez who, like me, started her long judicial career as a municipal trial judge
and, later, judge of a regional trial court. I agreed with the conclusion that the
petitioner's right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases were violated
and the ling of new informations constitute persecution. I concurred that in the
prosecution of an accused he must not be perceived as an intractable enemy, and
that the over-eagerness to prosecute respondent is a clear example of
persecution.
There is nothing in the pleadings after our dissent to the April 1, 2003 Resolution
or in the discussions of the respondent's motion for reconsideration that shows
our May 28, 2002 Resolution was wrong or that the Court was correcting an
injustice when it suddenly reversed itself.
Respondent stresses the need for compliance with the rule of law, the primacy of
the Constitution over acts of State, and the independence of the judiciary. When
respondent urges the Court to remember that it is not a trier of facts, he raises a
fundamental threshold question. It involves the application of what has been
described as an immutable principle of justice, 3 the essence of ordered liberty, 4
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental, 5 a canon of civilized decency, 6 a guarantee against the oppressions
and usurpations of royal prerogatives, 7 and a responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason and obedience to the dictates of justice. 8 He is asking for due process.
Under the Constitution, this Court resolves "cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved." 9 It is therefore not a trier of facts.
The Court itself in the April 1, 2003 Resolution summarized the facts to be
resolved:
1. Whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express
consent of the accused;
2. Whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the oended
party;
3. Whether the two-year period to revive it has already lapsed;
4. Whether there is any justication for the ling of the cases
beyond the two year period;
5. Whether notices to the oended parties were given before the
cases were dismissed by then Judge Agnir;
6. Whether there were adavits of desistance executed by the
relatives of the three other victims; and
7. Whether the multiple murder cases against respondent are being
revived within or beyond the two-year bar. 10
The facts to be resolved requires submission of evidence. They are material facts
because proof of their actuality is needed to enable the Court to render judgment
on the basic issues raised. Evidence to prove the facts in issue have to be
introduced in accordance with the principles of substantive law and the rules of
pleading, practice and procedure. The facts are in dispute because one party
alleges their existence while the other denies them, both with some show of
reason. 11 If the unanimous judgment in 2002 is to be reversed by a new
majority, a remand to ascertain these facts outlined is imperative.
Facts have to be established by evidence, not by inferences, not by suppositions,
and certainly not by the augury of divination. Yet, the majority precisely
proceeded to do it that way.
If the facts material to the Court's judgment were found by the new majority
from the records, how could the unanimous Court have missed so many of these
signicant facts in 2002?
If doubts are to be resolved and suppositions and fallacies avoided, every method
of getting the truth through adversarial proceedings before a trial court must be
explored. Let the Regional Trial Court which is a trier of facts do the job.
If, for instance, the Court suddenly discovers that there has been no trial, not
even a pre-trial in the almost two decades a case has been pending; if the
questions raised are complicated, complex and tricky; if there is no evidence in
the records, no transcripts of stenographic notes and no exhibits; the Court would
have to refer the factual issues to a trial court. It should not arrive at a summary
judgment based on the pleadings before it. This is what the new majority has
done.
A key factual issue is the applicability to the cases against respondent of the rule
on provisional dismissal found in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section
8 of Rule 117 thereof provides:
Provisional Dismissal A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except
with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the oended
party.
The provisional dismissal of oenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a ne of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after the issuance of the order without the case
having been reviewed. With respect to oenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revised.
The determination of whether or not the above rule applies in this case entails
factual issues. Has the two-year period expired? Was the dismissal of the cases
with the express consent of the accused? Was there notice to the oended party?
By their very nature, these questions justify a remand to the trial court.
The new majority rst tackles the application of the two-year time bar in Rule
117 to this case. The criminal cases were dismissed by then Judge Wenceslao
Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took eect
the following year on December 1, 2000. If the new rule is not applied
retroactively, would the old rule, where there was no time bar, apply?
The new majority rules that the time bar should apply only prospectively. I nd
this decision disturbing if it is indicative of a novel approach to individual
liberties. The Bill of Rights is a statement of the liberties of individuals protected
against exertions of government power. The ponencia seeks to protect the
"rights" of the State against its citizens and invokes the Bill of Rights in the
process.
The Bill of Rights refers to fundamental individual rights and the guaranteed
protection is against Government or any of its ocials. It cannot be invoked
against actions of private parties unless private action is backed by government
power.
Government exercises powers not rights. When the Constitution provides that
"no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law ," 13 the "person" referred to is not the State. When we mention in our
decisions that the State also deserves due process, it is merely a quaint way of
saying that the law and the rules should be followed if intended to protect State
interests. But never should the rights of a citizen be weighed against the non-
existent rights of the State which should be recognized and denominated as the
powers of the State.
There is sometimes a balancing of individual rights against State power where
public interest is involved. The individual is always at a terric disadvantage
when a basic right is weighed against the awesome powers of a State. There is
no need for balancing in this case.
If the issue involved is protection of a citizen against overzealous criminal
prosecutions, the reason for ruling against him should never be due process
rights of the State. The Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the
April 1, 2003, with which I also concurred, discusses the origin of the amended
rule, its nuances and reasons for being, and the inexibility of the permanent
time bar once the two-year period is reached. The Rule is intended to protect the
rights of the accused, not to make it easier for the Government to prosecute him.
Here, the Court wants us to allow the use of a protection for the citizen against
that citizen. Its enactment becomes counter-productive. The extensive and
learned discussion of the Honorable Chairman of the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court is glossed over. It should be re-read.
The amended rule is intended to prod the Government into a more faithful and
accountable performance of duty, to avoid the tyrannical Damocles' sword
hanging indenitely over a person whom the Government wants to coerce into
indeterminate submission, and to stop the malaise of public ocers who are
shiftless and lethargic and who are prodded into action only after the passage of
interminable time or when revenge or a desire to vex and oppress suddenly
surfaces.
If the rule is a just rule, if its objectives are salutary and if its enforcement will
mean an enlargement of individual rights, why should a recent accused enjoy it
to the exclusion of those with pending cases when it was enacted? Justice should
be for everyone especially those accused where prosecution and trial have
dragged for years and years. A rule should not protect the incompetence or
lethargy of Government prosecutors.
I submit that the new rule should be made retroactive. This interpretation is in
line with simple justice. The statement of the majority that the due process
protections of the State and those of the individual should be equal is dangerous
for a Supreme Court to utter.
With all due respect, the justications in the ponencia display an insensitivity to
individual liberties. The spirited defense of the powers of the State in the context
of individual freedoms is bewildering to say the least. It is hoped that such a
cavalier approach to the Bill of Rights is a passing aberration and that the Court
will again stand rmly as the constitutional bulwark against State power and
oppression. The Court should not remain silent and, more important, should take
a rm stand when a citizen is harassed and persecuted by the formidable powers
of Government.
The statement that the ruling of the Court in 2003 and any ruling today would
be the same, regardless of who the parties involved are, whether a Senator,
presidentiable, or an ordinary citizen is, in the light of our judgment in this case,
is not believable.
The bedrock issue underlying all aspects of the about-face decision sought to be
reconsidered involves the correct approach to the Bill of Rights. If the
interpretation of the amended rule shows a back-sliding of the Court's traditional
approach to individual liberty, that interpretation must be avoided. The history of
approach to individual liberty, that interpretation must be avoided. The history of
the due process clause goes back to the beginning of the era of enlightenment. It
traces the step-by-step wresting of rights from absolution and monarchy. There is
no monarchy today but claims of authority against liberty are vested in State
power. The ponencia unwittingly dilutes a guarantee of liberty against a
misinterpretation of State power.
In the resolution of whether the rule should be applied retroactively, we must
divorce the issue from the various personalities involved, and focus simply on the
principles of interpretation that have governed this Court since its inception.
The ponencia declares that there is no express requirement for the revised rule
to be given retroactive application. It states that under Rule 144 of the Rules of
Court, the Rules shall not be applied "to actions pending before it if in its opinion
their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event,
the former procedure shall apply." 12 Rule 144, for ready reference, provides:
These rules shall take eect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all
cases brought after they take eect, and also all further proceedings in
cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court
their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
event the former procedure would apply. (emphasis supplied.)
In the same breath, the ponencia expresses that "[s]tatutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent,
procedural laws are retroactive." 13 Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689 are then characterized as having been long dismissed before the new rule
took eect on December 1, 2000. The ponencia goes on to state that:
[w]hen the petitioners led the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 on June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689 had long since been terminated. The two-year bar in the
new rule should not be reckoned from the March 29, 1999 dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1,
2000 when the new rule took eect. While it is true that the Court applied
Section 8 of Rule 110 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only to cases still
pending with this Court and not to cases already terminated with nality .
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.) 14
There is a fundamental inconsistency in the foregoing statements. If one were to

apply Rule 144, as the ponencia has done, this would mean characterizing
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as being pending proceedings as
of the eective date of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, since this is
what a plain reading of Rule 144 would require. This would go completely
against the statement of the same ponencia that characterizes Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 as having long since been terminated when the
petitioner led the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
101112. Were the proceedings pending as of the eective date of the Revised
Rules, or had they already been terminated? It is not pure legal quibbling to
demand a consistent characterization of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689. One cannot characterize these cases as pending, invoke their
pendency as basis for the non-retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8, and
then characterize them as having been terminated in order to similarly deny the
retroactive application of the new procedural rules. The ponencia's bases for the
non-retroactive application of the revised rule are completely impossible to
reconcile.
Regardless of the characterization of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689, I submit that Rule 117, Section 8 should be given retroactive application,
consistent with the principles of statutory construction of procedural rules.
Procedural laws, by denition, prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress. They include rules of pleadings, practice and
evidence. As applied to criminal law, procedural law as distinguished from
substantive law is that which provides or regulates the steps by which one
who commits a crime is to be punished. 15
In interpreting procedural rules, this Court, in the 1927 case of Hosana v.
Diomano and Diomano, 16 laid down the rule that procedural rules will be
construed as applicable to causes of action accrued, and actions pending and
undetermined, at the time of their passage, unless: (1) such actions are expressly
excepted; or (2) vested rights would be disturbed by giving them a retroactive
application. 17
The causes of action in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 in which
the Informations allege essentially the same operative facts as those alleged in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, with the primary dierence
that respondent is charged as a principal and no longer as an accessory had
undoubtedly already accrued as of December 1, 2000, the eective date of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, whether the criminal actions in
question were "pending", or the causes of action had merely "accrued", the
retroactive application of the RRCP is called for.
Undoubtedly, there is no express exception to the retroactive application of Rule
117, Section 8. Thus, unless vested rights are disturbed, its retroactive
application is clearly mandated.
On this point, it has been held that the retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
aected. 18 This is because of the fundamental principle that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws. This is a principle
that we have enunciated in a long line of cases. 19 A person has no vested right in
any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benet. 20
The ponencia seems to hold that vested rights would indeed be disturbed if Rule
117, Section 8 were given retroactive application. Specically, this argument
focuses on the State's right to due process, which purportedly would be violated
by the retroactive application of the questioned procedural rule. Thus, the
ponencia asserts that:
when the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were
otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which it was intended,
namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the
provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the
accused. It would be a denial of the State's right to due process and a
travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule retroactively in the
present case as respondent insists, considering that the criminal cases
were provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 19, 1999 before
the new rule took eect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application
of the time-bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences
to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
xxx xxx xxx

The State would thus be sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule
yet to be approved by the Court. It must be stressed that the institution
and prosecution of criminal cases are governed by existing rules and not
by rules yet to exist. It would be the apex of injustice to hold that Section
8 had a platonic or ideal existence before it was approved by the Court.
The past cannot be erased by a capricious retroactive application of the
new rule. 21
In making these assertions, the ponencia has undoubtedly placed a premium on

the State's right to procedural due process.
The State's right to due process must be viewed from proper perspectives. It
cannot be said that such right would be violated by a retroactive application of
Rule 117, Section 8. It appears clear that the invocation of due process is an
attempt to cloak a awed argument using a Constitutional precept. As earlier
intimated, the ponencia is unable to pinpoint with specicity exactly how the
"due process right" of the State had already vested as of the passage of the
Revised Rules, and how this "vested right" could be violated by the retroactive
application of Rule 117, Section 8.
Stripped to its basics, procedural due process is a matter of nothing more or less
than procedural fairness. There would be nothing procedurally unfair about giving
a retroactive application to Rule 117, Section 8. Precisely, this Court is specically
empowered by the Constitution to promulgate such rules of procedure, and, in
the past, we have had no qualms about applying such rules of procedure
retroactively, ruling rmly that no vested rights are impaired even if the eect of
the retroactive application of such rules would be to divest a court or tribunal of
its jurisdiction. In such instances, we have advised the party-litigants that their
rights have not been impaired. 22
There is no cogent reason to depart from this principle even if, in this case, the
People is one of the party-litigants. Departing from the fundamental principle in
this case seems to be an instance of selective statutory construction to achieve
the desire to attain a particular result.
If anything, the fact that the People is one of the party-litigants should call for a
more vigilant application of the Rules strictly against the People or the State and
liberally in favor of the private individuals who might be beneted by the
retroactive application of the procedural rule.
Although it is true that the prosecutors would have no inkling, as of the
provisional dismissal of the case on March 29, 1999, that the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure would contain Rule 117, Section 8, they undoubtedly had
notice as of the eective date thereof on December 1, 2000. From that date,
they had almost four months in which to revive Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
to Q-99-81689, had there been a need to do so. In cases involving purely private
litigants, we have not hesitated in dismissing cases when a party or parties have
not been vigilant in protecting their rights. 23 At the risk of being repetitive, there
is no reason to depart from this principle simply because the State is a litigant.
Moreover, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws
are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 24
Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. 25
By way of example, we have not hesitated in the retroactive application of such
laws as Republic Act No. 7659, which lowered the penalties for certain crimes,
insofar as the lower penalty was favorable to the accused. In the cases of People
v. Simon, 26 People v. Manalo, 27 Danao v. Court of Appeals, 28 an d People v.
Piasidad, 29 judgment had already been rendered by the respective trial courts
against the respective accused individuals in question. Pending appeal of the
cases, the legislature passed R.A. 7659, eective December 31, 1993. In addition
to re-imposing the death penalty, R.A. 7659 lowered the penalty imposable on
individuals who had violated the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court invariably
applied the lower penalty retroactively, even if the crimes had been
consummated, prosecution had been initiated, and a decision had in fact already
been rendered by the trial courts while the higher penalties were still imposable.
As a more extreme example, in the 1996 case of Cruz v. Correctional Institution
for Women in Mandaluyong, 30 the accused therein was already serving a nal
and executory penalty of reclusion perpetua. During her service of this sentence,
R.A. 7659 was passed, lowering the penalty imposable for the crime for which
she was convicted. Even if her sentence was already being served, this Court
retroactively applied R.A. 7659 and ordered her immediate release since she had
already served the maximum of her sentence.
From a particular perspective, granting the retroactive application of penal laws
would likewise impair the "vested" rights of the State in seeing to it that
criminals are given just retribution. In such instances, though, we have not
hesitated in putting a primacy on the rights of the private individuals. The
retroactive application of Rule 117, Section 8 is thus called for.
We move on to another factual issue to illustrate that, if we have to change our
minds and I repeat that our Resolution dated May 28, 2002 correctly resolved
the issue the Court should get the factual answers through a remand.
Did the accused give express consent to the provisional dismissal of his case?
The Court in its rst Resolution stated that "(i)t was respondent Lacson himself
who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then,
Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express
consent."
Now, the majority nds the motion to dismiss as an inadequate mode of
expressing consent. Obviously, the Court wants a formal manifestation led in
court where an accused has to declare, "I hereby consent to the provisional
dismissal of my case."
The majority is asking too much. The amended Rule does not provide for a rigidly
precise wording of consent. There are no required magic words whose non-
utterance would be fatal. There are no xed and supererogatory incantations, no
pigeon-holes of ritual where set formalities must be tted. When an accused
moves that his case be dismissed, that is a stronger mode of consent than
merely saying, "I hereby consent." When the respondent's counsel answered
"none" to the question, "was there an express conformity?", he was referring to
a formal manifestation of "yes, your Honor, the accused consents." There was no
such pleading or manifestation. However, the lawyer's so-called "admission,"
taken out of context, cannot overrule the indubitable fact that the accused
moved for a dismissal of his case. An implied admission of counsel cannot be
given greater weight than a consent given through a formal motion to dismiss.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo said long ago: "The law has outgrown its primitive stage of
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was
fatal. It takes a broader view today. " 31
The majority is abetting harassment and oppression when it rules that a motion
to dismiss is not a consent to dismissal. I have to dissent on this issue.
Was there notice to the oended party?
This is another factual issue that is best determined at the trial level. It calls for
evidence. The ponencia again relies on an ambiguous admission of counsel in the
course of tricky cross-examination that there was no formal notice.
It is probable that there was no formal notice in the form of a letter with a
registry return card accomplished by the recipient. The purpose of notice under
the Rule is to let the oended party know and to avoid complicity to prejudice
the oended party. If the oended party was informed and had knowledge of the
forthcoming provisional dismissal, there was notice to him.
The matter of notice should be elicited from the oended party during trial. If the
ponencia refuses to treat a notice to the lawyer as a notice to his client, it should,
at least, ask the client himself to arm or deny that he was informed about the
provisional dismissal. The remand is called for in this regard. If a lawyer is given
notice on a material issue, he is assumed to have passed on the notice to his
client. The rule that notice to a lawyer is notice to the client should apply when
the basic protection of the accused is involved and the protection is part of the
package of rights of an accused. There may be instances in civil law or mercantile
law where a formal notice, duly acknowledged by the addressee, is required. In
criminal law, any statute or rule intended to protect the rights of an accused
should be interpreted in his favor.
There is no question that the amended rule on provisional dismissal of criminal
cases is intended to protect the rights of an accused. The majority overlooks the
fact that if the rule was supposed to help or favor the State, there would have
been no reason to introduce the amendment. The rule should have been left the
way it was. The rule was intended to curb inaction and abuses by government
prosecutors.
In deciding cases of constitutional signicance, the Court should be more
concerned with substance rather than form 32 or some other consideration, with
general principles than technical points, to support judgments.
In one eloquent dissent of Mr. Justice Hugo Black of the United States Supreme
Court, he stated that not the least of the virtues of a provision of the Bill of
Rights is the protection given to each member of the smallest and most
unorthodox minority. 33 Respondent in the present case may not belong to the
smallest minority but he is clearly unorthodox and a member of the minority
political party. We must avoid not only any political color in our work but also the
appearance of political color.
Appearances are unfortunately important in our functions and somehow, the
public image of the Court will suer because of the way the Court has decided
the motion for reconsideration of the respondent who has become the target of
powerful personalities in the political arena. Equating the awesome powers of
the State with individual freedoms and formally extending the protections of the
Bill of Rights to the State is not a healthy development. The Court should not
give the impression that Bill of Rights protections such as due process should
equally extend to and protect the State in the same way that they protect
individual persons. Again, this is not only error; it is also not healthy for the
development of the law of the Constitution.
At any rate it is well to listen to Mr. Justice Black when he says that laws aimed
at one political group and I may add, at one political personage, however rational
these laws may be in their beginning, generate hatred and prejudices which
rapidly spread beyond control. Too often it is fear which inspires such functions
and nothing is more reckless or contagious.
In the present case, the concern involves not a law enacted by Congress but a
judgment rendered by the Supreme Court. The importance of these kinds of
decisions on national institutions and the development of law cannot be ignored
or denied.
WHEREFORE, I dissent from the majority resolution. I vote to grant the
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and to reinstate the Court's Resolution
dated May 28, 2002.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:
"A new law is always enacted in the persuasion that it is better than the
former one. Its ecacy, therefore, must be extended as far as possible, in
order to communicate the expected improvement in the widest sphere." 1
On April 1, 2003, I stood apart from the rest of my brethren in granting

petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated May 28,
2002. 2 So engrossed was the Court then in determining the applicability of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
respondent's case that it seems to overlook the more fundamental concept of
speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases the very foundation of
respondent's right to be permanently discharged of the criminal cases led
against him.
My rst dissent rests mainly on the premise that the circumstances surrounding
respondent's case, i.e. the dismissal of Criminal Cases No. Q-99-81679 to 89 and
their reling two years after, eectively elicit a speedy trial analysis or inquiry. 3
The time interval between the dismissal of the initial charges and the
subsequent reling thereof had crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from
"presumptively prejudicial" delay, thus, before anything else, respondent's
predicament should be weighed on the basis of the Constitutional provisions on
speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases. Section 8, Rule 117 must come
second only.
At this juncture, it bears reiterating that statutes (and with more reason, rules)
cannot be eective to place any limitation on the constitutional right, 4 and
therefore they should not be regarded as "denitions" of the constitutional
provision, but merely as implementing statutes passed pursuant to it. 5 It is thus
conceivable that the constitutional provision may be violated although an
implementing statute is not. 6 With this Court's xation on Section 8, Rule 117,
it in eect missed the bigger picture. Respondent's repeated invocation of his
constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases was drowned
by arguments on the applicability of the rule only implementing such right.
Contrary to the express provision of Section 10, Rule 119 of the same Rules that
"no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule implementing the same shall be
interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of the right to speedy trial
guaranteed by section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution," Section 8,
Rule 117 eectively operates as a bar to respondent's bid for a speedy trial
analysis or inquiry. This is very unfortunate.
Having fully articulated in my rst dissent the primordial reason why I cannot
join the majority, I am taking this second occasion to expound on the nagging
issue of whether Section 8, Rule 117 applies to respondent's case.
In denying respondent's present Motion for Reconsideration, the majority ruled
that: (a) Section 8, Rule 117 cannot be applied retroactively to respondent's case
for to do so would result in "absurd, unjust and oppressive consequences to the
State and the victims of crimes and their heirs; " and (b) respondent failed to
comply with the essential pre-requisites of Section 8, Rule 117 particularly that
of accused's "express consent" to the provisional dismissal.
I dissent.
I Section 8, Rule 117 should
be applied retroactively
Settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that when a new law will be
advantageous to the accused, the same shall be given retroactive eect. 7
Favorabiliab sunt amplianda, adiosa restrigenda. (Penal laws that are favorable
to the accused are given retroactive eect). 8 For a long period, this has been the
settled doctrine in countries whose criminal laws are based on the Latin system.
Article 22 of our Revised Penal Code reads:
"Art. 22. Retroactive eect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have
retroactive eect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who
is not a habitual criminal, as this term is dened in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a nal
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same."
This article is of Spanish origin and is based on Latin principles, thus, in the
interpretation thereof, this Court must have recourse to Spanish or Latin
jurisprudence. 9 That the term "penal laws" or "leyes penales" as employed in
Article 22, relates not only to laws prescribing penalties but also to limitations
upon the bringing of penal actions, was pronounced in the early case of People
vs. Parel. 10 Thus, to justify the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 117 on
the basis of Article 22 is in order. Considering its genesis and its underlying
principles, there is no doubt that whenever a new statute dealing with crimes
establishes conditions more lenient or favorable to the accused, the statute
becomes retroactive and the accused must receive the benets of the new
condition. As long as this provision so remains in force, it is of general
application to all penal statutes, past, present, future and furnishes the rule for
determining to what extent they are retroactive or merely prospective. And
unless a penal or criminal statute, expressly or by necessary implication,
provides that it shall not be regarded as retroactive, it becomes subject to the
rule laid down by that article. 11 Evidently, by ruling against the retroactive
application of Section 8, Rule 117, the majority casts aside one of most basic
principles in our legal system.
Now, in an attempt to justify its position, the majority resorted to the alleged
statutory purpose of Section 8, Rule 117. It argues that "when the Court
approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the
very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two
years from notice of the provisional dismissal of criminal cases with the express
consent of the accused." I believe the purpose cited is inaccurate. Section 8, Rule
117 was introduced owing to the many instances where police agencies have
refused to issue clearances, for purposes of employment or travel abroad, to
persons having pending cases, on the ground that the dismissal of such cases by
the court was merely provisional, notwithstanding the fact that such provisional
dismissal, more often than not, had been done ve or ten years ago. 12 Obviously,
Section 8, Rule 117 was introduced not so much for the interest of the State but
precisely for the protection of the accused against protracted prosecution. This
Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court clearly saw the prejudice to
the rights of the accused caused by a suspended provisional dismissal of his case.
Hence, if we are to follow the majority's line of reasoning that Section 8, Rule
117 "must be read according to its spirit or intent," then the logical conclusion is
the retroactive application of the rule. Certainly, it is the construction that will
advance the object and secure the benets intended.
The Court, in setting a limit to the State's right to re-prosecute, has recognized
the injustice and the evil accompanying suspended provisional dismissals. It has
impliedly acknowledged that the situation sought to be remedied is unjust and
undesirable. Now, is it not inconsistent for this Court to suspend the application
of the new rule to respondent's case just because the rule was passed after the
provisional dismissal of his cases? Note that the situation sought to be remedied
is present in respondent's case. To my mind, if this Court will refuse to extend
the benet of the new rule to respondent, it will be guilty of an inconsistency in
view of its implied admission that the situation sought to be remedied has
caused injustice to respondent.
In several cases, we applied the provisions of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure retroactively. 13 The same should be done with Section 8, Rule 117
considering that it is merely a reinforcement of the constitutional right to speedy
trial and speedy disposition of cases. With or without it, petitioners are duty
bound under the Constitution to proceed with speed in prosecuting respondent's
cases. Consequently, all the time prior to the promulgation of Section 8, Rule
117, petitioners were not precluded from re-ling the cases against respondent.
It may be recalled that Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 were dismissed on
March 29, 1999. 14 The Department of Justice (DOJ) re-investigated the cases
only upon its receipt on March 29, 2001 of General Leandro Mendoza's letter
indorsing the adavits of P/S Ins. Abelardo Ramos and P/Ins. Ysmael Yu. On June
6, 2001, new Informations were led against respondent. Clearly, from March
29, 1999 to March 29, 2001, petitioners had the opportunity to rele the new
Informations against respondent. That they failed to do so, even after acquiring
knowledge of the rule on December 1, 2000 and onwards, only speaks of ocial
negligence and lethargy. It cannot therefore be argued that the State's right to
prosecute within the two-year period has been reduced and would cause injustice
to it and the oended parties. If at all, what was reduced was the State's
lackadaisical attitude borne by this nations years of tolerance and indierence.
Surely, I cannot countenance "ocial indolence" by holding that if only the State
had known it would lose its right to prosecute after the lapse of the two-year
period, it would have immediately reled the new Informations against
respondent. To hold so is to advance the view that the State's duty to prosecute
promptly depends on the threat of a punitive rule and not on the mandate of the
Constitution.
Corollarily, while there is truth to the statement that in determining the
retroactivity of legislation, elementary considerations of fairness dictate that
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.
However, legislations readjusting rights and burdens cannot be adjudged
unlawful simply because it upsets settled expectations, even if it imposes a new
duty or liability based on past acts. 15 That the State settled expectation, i.e. its
entitlement to the two-year period, was to be disrupted by a retroactive
application of Section 8, Rule 117 does not necessarily result to injustice. Section
8, Rule 117, by limiting the state's right to re-prosecute, partakes of the nature
of a statute of limitations which is really "an act of grace or amnesty" that must
be liberally applied in favor of the accused. Wharton, in his work on Criminal
Pleading and Practice, 9th ed., says in section 316:
"We should at rst observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying

to statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been
given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes,
however, are essentially dierent. In civil suits the statute is interposed by
the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In
the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be
made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other, there
is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions of
construction are to be made. But it is otherwise when a statute of
limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the
oense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a
statute of process, to be scantily or grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the oense;
that the oender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume
his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to
preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence, statutes of limitations are to be liberally construed in
favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction
belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence
of the statute is a recognition and notication by the legislature of the
fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it xed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of
guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in
instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State,
but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by
mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law
that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes enforcing such
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts
of grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best
evidence that can be obtained."
The necessity, therefore, of applying the favorable new rule to respondent rests
upon the principle that the sovereign power cannot exercise its right to punish
except only within those limits of justice which that sovereign power has
established as being just and equitable at the time of exercising that right.
Signicantly, it has been held that the constitutional provision barring the
passage of retroactive laws protects only the rights of citizens; hence, a state
may constitutionally pass a retroactive law that impairs its own rights. 16 Only
private, and not public, rights may become vested in a constitutional sense. 17
Otherwise stated, there is a distinction between the eect to be given a
retroactive statute when it relates to private rights, and when it relates to public
rights, public rights may always be modied or annulled by subsequent
legislation without contravening the Due Process Clause. 18
II The statement of respondent's
counsel during the proceedings
in the Court of Appeals that the
dismissal of respondent's case
was without his express consent
cannot be taken as a judicial admission.
The statement of respondent's counsel during the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals that the dismissal of respondent's case was without his express consent
cannot be taken as a judicial admission. For one, the statement was uttered
merely to support a legal argument. One thing clear from the pleadings of the
contending parties is their vacillation on whether or not respondent gave his
express consent to the dismissal. When respondent's counsel was invoking
double jeopardy, he submitted that respondent did not give his express consent
to the dismissal. It was the Solicitor General who was arguing otherwise. Clearly,
respondent's counsel made the statement as a legal strategy to justify the
respondent's counsel made the statement as a legal strategy to justify the
application of double jeopardy. That this was his intention is evident from his oral
argument in the Court of Appeals. Surely, this Court is duty-bound to determine
the truth. The inconstancy in the positions taken by both the prosecution and the
defense only renders imperative a more probing inquiry on the matter of express
consent.
For another, the statement was not made for the purpose of avoiding the
necessity of proof. It has been held that an admission of fact by counsel for
accused, to be admissible, must be voluntarily and purposely made to avoid
necessity of proof, 19 or it must be distinct and formal made for the express
purpose of dispensing with proof of a fact on the trial. 20 An admission made by
counsel in argument does not take the place of testimony, 21 and is not sucient
to justify the trial court in assuming that accused admitted such matter.
Otherwise stated, only those admissions made by the attorney during the trial of
the case, which are solemnly and formally made for the purpose of eliminating
the proof of the fact admitted, that will bind the client. This is without question
the just and proper rule to be followed, for human life and liberty are too
important to depend on the slip of an attorney's tongue during the pressure and
rapidity of the trial. Thus, the accused is not bound by the admissions made by
his attorney in the course of his argument. 22 His rights cannot be prejudiced by
any statement made by his counsel or any admission he may attempt to make
23 and that an attorney cannot admit away the life or liberty of accused in the
face of a plea of not guilty. 24
Corollarily, the majority's view that "a cursory reading of the respondent's
motion for judicial determination of probable cause (led with the trial court)
will show . . . that respondent was only asking the court to determine whether or
not there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and in
the meantime, to hold in abeyance the issuance of said warrant" and not to
dismiss the case is hardly convincing. It appears from the Resolution 25 dated
March 29, 1999 of the trial court that respondent's prayer was for that court to
"(1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants in
the meantime; and (3) dismiss the cases should the court nd no probable
cause." Clearly, this third plea is a manifestation that the dismissal of the cases
was with respondent's consent. While it is true that what he led was a mere
motion for the judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses, the same was anchored on the case of Allado vs. Diokno.
26 There, we ruled that "[I]f upon the ling of the information in court, the trial
judge, after reviewing the information and the document attached thereto, nds
that no probable cause exists, he must either call for the complainant and the
witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the
accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the
crime when no probable cause exists." With this as respondent's premise, I
believe it is safe to conclude that the dismissal was with his express consent. He
would not have anchored his case in Allado vs. Diokno if he did not desire its
legal consequences.
Finally, I nd the re-raing of respondent's cases to a special heinous court
unnecessary. Supreme Court Circular No. 7-74 27 expressly provides that "when a
case is dismissed for any cause or reason whatsoever and the same is re-led, it
shall not be included in the rae anymore but shall be assigned to the branch to
which the original case pertained. If, by mistake or otherwise, such case is
raed and assigned to another branch, the latter must transfer the case to the
branch to which it originally belonged, in which event another case shall be
assigned by rae as replacement." Considering that a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case does not terminate it 28 it is more consistent with the majority's
theory that Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 be simply referred back to the
branch to which they originally belonged.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT respondent's motion for reconsideration.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 15631570.
2. Id. at 13911491.
3. Id. at 15131529.
4. Id. at 1493.
5. Rules on Who Shall Resolve Motions for Reconsideration in Cases Assigned to the
Divisions of the Court, eective April 1, 2000.
6. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1179.

7. Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1496.
8. Id. at 1501.
9. February 18, 2002 should read February 19, 2002.

10. Id. at 15001501.
11. Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 83 (1988).
12. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1342.

13. Stovall v. Denno, 18 L.Ed.2d. 1199 (1967).
14. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Company v. United States , 52 L.Ed. 804 (1908).
15. Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil & Rening Company , 77 L.Ed.
360 (1932).
16. Rule 144, Rules of Court, as amended:

These rules shall take eect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought
after they take eect, and also all further proceedings in cases then pending,
except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application would not
be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure shall
apply.
17. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 92 So. 193 (1921).
18. Pilipinas Kao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 372 SCRA 548 (2001).
19. 351 SCRA 294(2001).

20. Id. at 304.
21. Id.
22. November 30, 1999 should read November 30, 2000.

23. Resolution dated April 1, 2003, pp. 2526; Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 13431344.
24. Supra.
25. Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1448.
26. Tan v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.
27. SEC. 8. Designation of the oense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the oense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the oense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the oense, reference shall be
made to the section of the statute punishing it.
28. U.S. vs. Panczko, 367 F. 2d. 737 (1966).
29. In its April 29, 2003 Resolution, the respondent's allusion of loud whispers caused
by a suspicion that this Court or any member of this Court had been
manipulated by politics in this government was rejected by the Court, thus:
"The respondent's allusion of loud whispers caused by a suspicion that this Court or
any member of the Court had been manipulated by politics in this government
when it resolved to set aside its 28 May 2002 Resolution is downright
irresponsible. Not too long ago, a distinguished member of the Court said:
Those who wear the black robes are enrolled in a noble mission; become dierent
persons; forfeit their past activities, friends and even relatives; and devote full
time, attention and eort to the rather reclusive and exclusive world of decision-
making. . . .
Quoting Rufus Choate, in part, a judge or justice in administering justice "shall know
nothing about the parties; everything about the case. He shall do everything for
justice; nothing for himself; nothing for his friend; nothing for his patron;
nothing for his sovereign." All members of the Court acted on and resolved
petitioners' motion for reconsideration as well as respondent's motion to recuse
Justice Callejo, Sr. in light of their respective study of the records and the
relevant laws and rules after due deliberation. . . . (Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1499).
30. Lassite v. Department of Social Services , 68 L.Ed.2d. 640 (1981).
31. Entitled and docketed as Lacson v. Department of Justice, Civil Case No. 01-
100933 for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order. (CA Rollo,
p. 29).
32. There were 27 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Except for Inspector Manuel Alvarez, the said accused were also charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. Only the respondent led his
petition in said case.
33. SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sucient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the oense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any oense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the oense charged in the
former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for
an oense which necessarily includes the oense charged in the former
complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the greater oense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same
act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser oense was made without the consent of the
prosecutor and of the oended party except as provided in Section 1(f) of Rule
116.
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satises or serves in whole or in
part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction
for the graver oense.
34. CA Rollo, pp. 89. (Emphasis supplied).
35. Id. at 110.
36. This should read "Justice Panganiban."

37. This should read "Atty. Fortun."
38. This should read "Justice Panganiban."
39. TSN, 19 February 2002, pp. 220225. (Emphasis supplied).

40. TSN (CA Rollo), 31 July 2001, pp. 1214. (Emphasis supplied).
41. Ibid., pp. 1518. (Emphasis ours).
42. Memorandum of Petitioner; CA Rollo, p. 378.

43. Am Jur, Evidence, 770.
44. Ibid. 771.
45. Glick v. White Motor Company, 458 F.2d. 1287 (1972).
46. People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25 (1996), citing 31 C.J.S. 537.

47. 797 F.Supp. 381 (1992), citing Glick v. White Motor Co., supra.
48. Branz v. Hylton, 265 N.W. 16 (1936).
49. 15 Ruling Case Law, 854 and 328.

50. The records from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC which were elevated to this
Court consisted of 11 volumes plus 11 additional folders per Letter dated April
26, 2002.
51. Motion for Reconsideration, p. 33; Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1423; Consolidated Reply, p.
28.
52. Rollo, Vol. I, p. 465.
53. Branches 76, 86, 95, 102, 103 and 219.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1. Separate Dissenting Opinions of Justices Reynato S. Puno and Angelina Sandoval-
Gutierrez, with which I concurred, and of Justice Jose C. Vitug.
2. See Salonga v. Hon. Pao, et al., G.R. No. 59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438.
3. Twining v. New Jersey , 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
4. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
5. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 219 U.S. 97 (1934).
6. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
7. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).

8. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor , 127 Phil. 306
(1967).
9. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (e).
10. Resolution, April 1, 2003, p. 3.
11. Ponce v. Sagario, 85 Phil. 84 (1949).

13. Constitution, Art. III, Section 1.
12. Resolution, p. 10.
13. Id., p. 14, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 136368, 16 January 2002, 373
SCRA 524.
14. Id., pp. 1415.
15. Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640, 650 (1948); Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2,
G.R. No. 37364, 9 May 1975, 63 SCRA 546; Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334
Phil. 346, 35556 (1997); Tan v. Court of Appeals , supra.
16. 56 Phil. 741 (1927).
17. Hosana v. Diomano and Diomano, supra, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, p.
265. See also Oas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85999, 2 October 1989, 170
SCRA 261.
18. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals , 135 Phil. 224 (1968); Tinio v. Mina, 135 Phil. 504
(1968).
19. Billiones v. CIR, 122 Phil. 25 (1965); Systems Factors Corporation, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 143789, 27 November 2000, 346 SCRA 149; Unity Fishing
Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145415, 2 February 2001, 351
SCRA 140; Serrano v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 139420, 15 August 2001, 363
SCRA 223.
20. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 (1956); Laurel v. Misa, 76
Phil. 372 (1946).
21. Resolution, pp. 1112.
22. Hosana v. Diomano and Diomano, supra; Oas v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

23. Hodges v. Yulo, 81 Phil. 622 (1954).
24. People v. Estapia, 37 Phil. 17 (1917); People v. Jackson, 54 Phil. 176 (1929); People
v. Yu Jai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956); People v. Terrado, 211 Phil. 1 (1983); People v.
Deleverio, 352 Phil. 382 (1998).
25. United States v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 (1917); United States v. Madrigal, 27
Phil. 347 (1914); People v. Atop, 349 Phil. 825 (1998).
26. G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555.

27. 315 Phil. 547 (1995).
28. 313 Phil. 354 (1995).
29. 331 Phil. 274 (1996).
30. 331 Phil. 40 (1996).
31. Quoted in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gregorio Perfecto in Contreras and
Gingco v. Felix and China Banking Corp., 78 Phil. 570, 583 (1947).
32. Fidelity Bank v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123.
33. American Communications Association (CIO) v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
1. F. C. von Savigny, Private International Law and the Retrospective Operation of
Statutes, p. 344.
2. This Resolution remanded the present case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81,
Quezon City for a determination of several issues relative to the application of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal
of respondent's Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89.
3. While there are jurisprudence to the eect that once the charges are dismissed, the
speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable, (State vs. Marion, 404 U.S. 307;
Dillingham vs. United States, 423 U.S. 64; Barker vs. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514),
however, I am convinced that the peculiar facts of the present case render said
jurisprudence inappropriate. On its face, the Constitutional provision seems to
apply to one who has been publicly accused, has obtained dismissal of those
charges, and has then been charged once again with the same crime by the
same sovereign. Nothing therein suggests that an accused must be
continuously charged in order to obtain the benets of the speedy trial right. A
natural reading of the language is that the Speedy Trial Clause continues to
protect one who has been accused of a crime until the government has
completed its attempts to try him for that crime. In Klopfer vs. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, the prosecutor entered a "nolle prosequi with leave" after the rst
trial ended in a mistrial. Under that procedure, the defendant was discharged
from custody and subjected to no obligation to report to the court. It was held
that the indenite postponement of the prosecution, over defendant's objection,
"clearly" denied the defendant the right to a speedy trial. The Court reasoned
that the defendant may be denied an opportunity to exonerate himself in the
discretion of the solicitor and held subject to trial, over his objection, throughout
the unlimited period in which the solicitor may restore the case to the calendar.
During that period, there is no means by which he can obtain a dismissal or
have the case restored to the calendar trial. The prosecutor was required to
take armative steps to reinstate the prosecution; no charges were "actively"
pending against Klopfer, nevertheless, the court held that the speedy trial right
applied.
4. 21 Am Jur 2d 1031, citing Ex parte State ex rel. Atty. Gen., 255 Ala. 443, 52 So.
2d 158 (1951); Hicks vs. People, 148 Colo. 26, 364 P. 2d 877 (1961); State vs.
Strong, 8 Kan. App. 2d 589, 663 P. 2d 668 (1983); State vs. Stimson, 41 Was.
App. 385, 704 P. 2d 1220 (Div. 3 1985).
5. State vs. Kuhnhausen, 201 Or. 478, 272 P. 2d 225 (1954).

6. Barela vs. People, 826 P. 2d 1249 (Colo. 1992) State vs. Russel, 108 Idaho 58, 696
P. 2d 909 (1985); State vs. Strong, supra.
7. Article 22, Revised Penal Code.
8. Both consistency and sound legal principles demand that we seek our precedents
in Latin rather than in American jurisprudence. In United States vs. Cuna (12
Phil. 241 [1908]), it was held that "neither English nor American common law is
in force in these islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon
our courts, save only insofar as they are founded on sound principles
applicable to local conditions, and are not in conict with existing law."
9. People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437, 441 (1923).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV, 2001 Ed. at 660.
13. People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, January 21, 2001, 350 SCRA 679.
14. Rollo at 93102.
15. 16B Am Jur 2d 690, citing In re Lancy, 208 B. 481, 30 Bankr. Ct. dec. (CRR) 1018
(Bankr. D. Ariz, 1997); DIRECTV, Inc. vs. F.C.C., 110 F. 3d 816 (d.c. Cir. 1997);
State vs. L.V.I. Group, 1997 ME 25, 690 A. 2d 960 (Me. 1997).
16. 16B Am Jur 2d 697, citing Rousselle vs. Plaquemines Parish School Bd., 633 So.
2d 1235, 90 Ed. Law Rep. 519 (La. 1994) reh'g denied (Apr. 21, 1994); Town of
Nottingham vs. Harvey, 120 N.H. 889, 424 A 2d 1125 (1980).
17. Bradford vs. Suolk Country, 257 A.D. 777 15 N.Y.S. 2d 353 (2d Dep't 1939),
judgment armed as modied, 283 N.Y. 503, 28 ME 2d 932 (1940).
18. Holen vs. Minneapolis-St. Apul Metropolitan Airports Commission, 250 Minn.
19. State vs. Thomas, 15 P. 2d 723, 726, 136 Kan. 400.
20. State vs. Redman, 8 S.E. 2d 623, 217 N.C. 483.
21. State vs. Marx, 60 A. 690, 78, Conn. 18.
22. Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 2, 12th Edition, 415.
23. 22A C.J. S. 739, citing State vs. ShuI, 72 P. 664, 9 Idaho 115.
24. Id., citing Pruitt vs. State, 294 P 629, 37 Ariz. 400.
25. Rollo at 93103.
26. G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 192.
27. September 23, 1974.
28. Jaca vs. Blanco, 86 Phil. 452 (1950).

En Banc: Synopsis

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

En Banc: Synopsis

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149453. October 7, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,

The Solicitor General for plainti-appellee.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8,

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; SUPREME COURT'S POWER TO

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; SHOULD BE

4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL; EXPRESS

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:

2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; REFERS TO RIGHTS

3. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8,

4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLICATION; GENERALLY

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PROCEDURAL DUE

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:

2. CRIMINAL LAW; REVISED PENAL CODE; PENAL LAWS ARE GIVEN

3. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECTION 8,

4. ID.; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO 7-74; CASE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

It bears stressing that transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the

The Issue as to the Application of

He asserts that pursuant to a long line of jurisprudence and a long-standing

The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is

In criminal litigations concerning constitutional issue claims, the Court, in the

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 22 should be

Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Grin v. People, 24 he said,

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to

The Respondent Failed to Comply

The respondent (petitioner therein) contended that the dismissal of Criminal

First, are you saying that double jeopardy applies or not?

Allow me to qualify the eects of double jeopardy occur with permanent

Very well, Your Honor.

You are not invoking double jeopardy?

No, Your Honor, we were saying that precisely a permanent dismissal

They are two dierent (interrupted)

Are you not resting on 8,117?

That and the constitutional provision, Your Honor.

And the Constitution?

The Constitution which gave life to 8,117.

Second. The respondent's answers to the questions of Madame Justice Josena

And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be

That is correct, Your Honor.

And with notice to the oended party.

That is correct, Your Honor.

You represented the petitioner in this case?

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

This is to reiterate my dissent to the unbelievable about-face by the Court in the

The new majority Resolution is a volte-face, a complete turn-around from the

There is a fundamental inconsistency in the foregoing statements. If one were to

xxx xxx xxx

In making these assertions, the ponencia has undoubtedly placed a premium on

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:

On April 1, 2003, I stood apart from the rest of my brethren in granting

"We should at rst observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying

1. Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 15631570.

6. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1179.

9. February 18, 2002 should read February 19, 2002.

12. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 1342.

16. Rule 144, Rules of Court, as amended:

19. 351 SCRA 294(2001).

22. November 30, 1999 should read November 30, 2000.