Political Concepts

Basic Political Concepts
This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
Basic Political Concepts
Paul deLespinasse
Copyrigh t 2008 by Paul deLespinasse
Edited by Ma risa Drexel
For any questions about this text, please email: drexel@uga.edu
The Global Text Project is funded by the Jacobs Founda tion, Zurich, Switzerland
Basic Political Concepts 2 A Global Tex t

Table of Contents
Towards a Systematic Conceptualization of Politics....................................................................4
1. Concepts of Decision-Making and Action..................................................................................6
2. Concepts of Human Association...............................................................................................14
3. Developing Conceptual Acuity..................................................................................................26
3
Towards a Systematic
Conceptualization of Politics
Political science is the systema tic study of governments, of the meth ods by which governments s eek to control
people, and of th e techniques through which people try to infl uence government. It is a science that attempts to
connect th e "micro" level of individual lives and actions with the "macro" level of coll ective circums tances an d
consequences.
Like th e other social sciences, political science focuses on all three basic types of social power: th e pen, th e
purse, and the sword. Unlike the other social sciences, it gives special attention to the power of th e sword: wielded
coll ectively in the form of war and threats of war, wielded against individualsideally in th e more civilized form
of laws.
Every body of knowledge has a t least a few basic words that students had better understan d in the fullest
possible sense. For the ph ysicist, "force" must equal mass times accel eration. Accountants must understand tha t
"assets" are equal to liabilities plus owners' equity (capital) and must be able to classify pa rticular transactions into
the proper categories. Music th eoris ts must know the difference between a second inversion and a secondary
dominant. Political science is no exception to this general need for funda mental concepts.
Unfortunately, political scientists and law yersthe two main professions concerned with analyzing government
have not identified a small set of simple, core concepts whose permuta tions and combinations get to th e essence
of the matter. Instead, both professions are blessed (or cursed!) with a grea t multiplicity of terms and concepts, all
of roughly equal importance, whose mutual relations and meanings are extremel y compl ex.
As a result of its lack of funda men tal conceptual clarity, political science increasingly suffers from an inferiority
complex. Chemistry an d physics have produced a continuous and accelerating s trea m of spectacular
accomplish ments which are reflected, for better or for worse, in the everyday material en vironment: computers,
synthetic fabrics, lasers, microwa ve ovens, TV, atomic bombs, pesticides. . . . A similar takeoff in biological science
appears to be shaping up. But where do w e see any signs that political science is having an impact on the world?
It is true that in the political sphere, too, many new techniques and ins titutions have appea red, but our
professional inferiority complex is neverthel ess bas ed on an embarrassing fact. Major innovations in 20th century
government ha ve not originated in political science. The pattern is quite unlike that in the natural sciences, where
breakthroughs in fundamental analysis (e.g. Eins tein's E = mc squared) are placed on a pra ctical basis by the
engineers (e.g. the Manhattan Project). In public life, by contras t, the breakth roughs are ma de by the "engineers"
(active politicians: elected officials, administra tors, revolutionaries) and later, often much la ter, political scientists
get around to noticing them, describing them, and criticizing th em.

Th e goal of Basic Political Concepts is to provide exactl y wha t the title sugg ests: a small set of carefully defined
an d interrelated words that can be used to describe and analyze a wide range of political phenomena and issues.
Chapter 1 focuses on concepts useful in analyzing individual decisions and actions, which surel y are th e basic "s tuff"
of politics. Chapter 2 introduces concepts related to associations, th e relationships between individuals that are
created by their actions. Chapter 3, "Developing Con ceptual Acuity", illustrates some ways in which we can
systematically increase our ability to think sys tematically about politics. It is an invita tion for th e student to think
creatively, to join in th e continual rethinking of political issues that is a prerequisite of progress.
5
1. Concepts of Decision-
Making and Action
The elements of ad hoc rational action
Let us consider the possibilities implicit in the following expression:
A X+ Y
(Imagine that th ere is a larg e ca pital C surrounding th e letter A in this expression. To simplify transmitting this
book via th e World Wide Web, it is not explicitly stated here.)
Th e elements of th e ex pression are (shown in Table 1):
Ta ble 1: Key for elements in expression
X a goal
A an action
C the circums tances of the action
Y side effects produced by th e action
causation or expected causation
In plain English, the expression says: Action A, taken within circumstances C in pursuit of goal X, also ca uses
side effects Y.
For example, wh en US President Gerald Ford took th e action of pardoning US President Richard Nixon, during
the pos t-Watergate witch hunt, to try to get public atten tion back on serious issues, a side effect of his action was to
decrease his own chances for winning in 1976. (There are, of cours e, other possible in terpretations of Mr Ford's
reasons for th e pa rdon.)
As the C in our expression indicates, all actions take place within specific circums tances. But initially we can
ignore circumstances, since the situation at any one point in time is a given and th erefore cannot be manipulated. A
simplified version of our expression is therefore
AX+Y
lea ving the circumstances within which action A is taken implicit.
Clearly there are exactly three el ements which can be manipulated: the action A, th e goal X, and the side effects
Y. Pos tulate an actor whose goal X can be attained via action A, but who strongly dislikes the side effects of taking
action A. What are her options?

Th e first possibility is to seek a different action, A1 , which will also produce goal X but with different side effects
Y1:
A1 X + Y1
Perhaps th e new side effects are less unsatisfactory to the actor. The cost-benefit ratio Y1 /X of action A1 ma y be
acceptable wh ere that of the original proposal A was not.
For exa mple, US President, Andrew Jackson, discovered that John McLean, his inherited Postmaster General,
did not approve of the spoils system. Yet the US Post Office was a principal loca tion of pa tronage jobs in those days.
One solution would be to fire McLean, but the political side effects would have been considerable. So Jackson
instead appointed McLean to th e Supreme Court!
Th e secon d possibility is to modify goal X to X1. The somewha t different goal ma y be achievable by actions which
would not deliver the original goal, an d at an accepta ble price:
A2 X 1 + Y 2
Compromise of course is a pervasive political phen omenon in its own right, and exa mples are not hard to find.
Take Emperor Pedro II of Brazil, sa y, who wan ted to g et rid of sla very but coul d not figure out how to do so without
committing political suicide since slave holders were a social bulwark of the monarch y. Instead of forth rightly
abolishing slavery, he therefore took steps to destroy it bit by bit, buying up and freeing some sla ves, banning future
importation, and making children born to slaves free a t birth. (But in 1889 Pedro II went to Europe for medical
treatment. His daughter, Princess Isabel, a militant abolitionist, took advan tage of her reg ency to seek the
unmodified goal: freedom now! Sure enough, the monarchy was immediately overthrown.)
Another apparen t possibility is to take th e original action A, without unaccepta ble side effects Y, and also take
some oth er action A3, one of the results of which is to cancel out th e disliked parts of side effects Y:
AX+Y
A3 -Y + Y3
-----------------------------------
A + A3 X + Y 3
For example, buy a desired Cadillac even though it wipes out your bank account, but then put your spouse to
work to build it back up. But th e combination of actions A and A3 can be regarded as two compon ents of a single,
compound action. Rather than a third possibility, therefore, this is just another exampl e of the first (e.g. fin d an
action which produces the sa me goal but different side effects).
Still another possibl e manipulation allowed by expression A X + Y is not just to modify the goal X but to
aban don it completely. In a way this too is just a va riation on a previously noted possibility: the ultimate possible
modification of the goal, X 0.
7
Th e third basic option is to stick to the original project: A X + Y. If no alterna tive actions A1 can be found
which will produce goal X with more accepta ble side effects, and if goal X cannot be usefully modified, it does not
necessarily follow tha t goal X mus t be abandoned. If the actor prefers X + Y to (not X) + (not Y) then she can hold
her nose, make her "bargain with the devil", and take action A. Reg ret tha t s uch a price as Y mus t be paid to achieve
X does not necessarily impl y unwillingness to do so if necessary. (As King H enry IV put it: "Pa ris is worth a mass. ")
One final possible manipulation of th e basic expression requires explicit consideration of the circumstances C
within which action A takes place (remember to visualize th e implicit capital C around th e letter A here):
AX+Y
Achievement of goal X always lies in the future, compared to th e time of action A, though it need not be very fa r
into tha t future. Although action must always take place within present circumstances, one possible goal tha t one
can pursue via present actions is to secure improvemen ts in future circumstances. C 1 is a possible X:
A C1 + Y
Circums tances are important for two reasons. First, they ma ke some conceiva ble actions possible and oth ers
impossible. Second, they affect the s pecific consequences which those actions which are possibl e will produce.
Action in th e pres ent aimed at improving the future circumstances within which one will be acting is th erefore an
investment in the profoundest and most general sense of the term.
Perhaps US President Taft was investing when he promoted an aging, conserva tive south ern Democra t, Edward
Douglass White, to be Chief Justice in 1910, rather than appointing a younger person with views clos er to his own.
Taft ultimately wanted th e job for himself, and this appointment created the possibility of an early future vacancy.
If this was Taft's game, his inves tment paid off brillian tly!
Present actions can also change the future circumstances within which other people act, making some actions
possible and others impossible for them. Indeed, as we will see in Cha pter 2 of this book, a concept of social
ca usation which is fully compa tible with free will lies precisely in this: such ca usa tion consists of causing
possibilities and impossibilities for others, within which th ey can freely choose, rath er than causing their actions.
Rational action in specific contexts

Our basic ex pression for the elements of action and decision is not merely manipulatable. It can also serve as a
model or pattern for a series of transforma tions, each pertaining to a different major type of action. In the con text
of the transformations, the original expression also acquires a special meaning which is dis tinguishable from its
role as a gen eral model.
Th e six variations of the ex pression (again taking the circumstances of action as implicit) a re (shown in Table 2):
Ta ble 2: Six variations of th e ex pression
A X +Y An a d hoc or "retail" decision
RX+Y Th e act of making a rule, or a "wholesale" decision
O X +Y Th e act of organizing, or a "super wholesale" decision

SX+Y Th e "act" of s peaking
D X +Y Th e act of defining a word
T X+Y Th e act of translating
Each of th ese six variations can be manipulated in exactly the sa me ways as the basic ex pressions, but we need
not go into this here.
Since th e examples given above, in discussing the basic expression, were all drawn from the realm of ad hoc or
retail decision-making, no s pecific discussion of A X + Y as one of the six varia tions of the gen eral model is
needed here.
The act of creating a rule: principled decisions

Variation tw o, R X + Y, refers to a "wholesale" decision, the act of making a rule. Rule-making is wholesale in
the sense that on e is not merely deciding how to act in a pa rticular case, but rather in a whole set of possible cases.
(The distinction between th e logic of A X + Y and R X + Y is analogous to that made by some philosophers
between "act utilitarianism" and "rule utilitarianism".)
When th ere is a rule R that has th us been arrived at, by evalua ting th e benefits and side effects that observing it
is expected to produce, action A in a specific case is not determined by considering goals and side effects as it is in
the case of a d hoc action. Ins tead, the specific action is deduced from, or at least limited by, the rule. (Note that the
broken arrow in th e following expressions stan ds for logical implication rath er than th e causation indica ted by the
"solid" arrow.)
R - - > A ... Under circumstances C rul e R implies or requires us to take action A.
(O r)
R - - > C ... Rule R requires tha t we act within certain limits, as if th ere were artificial circumstances C in
addition to any na tural limits to our action.
As an example of th e situa tion depicted by R - - > A consider the double jeopardy claus e in the Fifth
Amen dment. As interpreted by th e courts, it is an absolute bar to retrying a person who has been tried and
acquitted of a given charge. If, under such circumstances, the federal government attempts to retry the person on
the sa me charge, the judg e would be obliged by this rule to dismiss the indictment.
An example of th e meaning of R - - > C can be foun d in a judg e who is fixing a sentence governed by rul e R. His
decision is not deduced from the rule, but is chosen on one g roun d or another from among the set of actions
compatible with th e rule. The legal punishment for a certain crime may be expressed as a set of upper limits, "not
more than USD 10,000 fine and 5 years in jail", to what a judge can do to th e convicted person. Sometimes the rule
will also provide a floor as well as a ceiling to the judg e's alternatives.
Th e differences between th e action A which results from an ad hoc decision, A X + Y, and from a rule,
9
R - - > A, etc., are by no means minimal. For example, when a hijacking or kidnapping has occurred, the best action
in th e specific case ma y seem to be to capitula te to th e terrorists' demands. Otherwise, lives may be lost. However
the best rule for dealing with hijackers may be to refus e to deal, beca use dealing en courages more of the same bad
type of actions, increasing insecurity and risk to life in general. Rule-making forces us to consider the broader
picture and ramifications of our individual actions.
One furth er characteristic of arriving a specified actions via rul es rather than from direct evaluation of th eir
expected consequences is that the roles of rule-maker and rule-applier can be separated. The sepa ration between
the legislative an d judicial pow ers in the US Constitution reflects a decision tha t in govern men t this separa tion of
roles ought to be the case.
The act of organizing: constitutive decisions

Variation three, O X + Y, refers to the act of organizing things in a certain way.
By organizing in particular ways, we create important pa rts of the circumstances within which future actions of
all types ta ke place. We thereby infl uence these future decisions. The act of organizing is thus a super wholesale
approach to decision and action.
Organizations can be seen as collections of offices or rol es, and roles in turn can be seen as sets of rules
regarding proper an d improper actions by the occupants of th ese roles. In this sense, also, the act of organizing can
be regarded as a wholesale or indirect approa ch to rule-making and, thus, a super wholesale or doubly indirect
approach to deciding how to act in specific cases.
Th e American Constitutional Con vention of 1787 was one of history's most drama tic examples of acting to
organize. It is thought to have greatl y infl uenced on th e s ubsequent course of events in America. Likewise, the
decisions by Lenin and his associa tes regarding the pre-revol utionary organization of the Commun is t Party
continued to have important consequences as th e Soviet Union approached the end of the twentieth century, more
than 70 years later. Actually, decisions about how to organize (and reorganize) are constantly going on at all levels
of society, and in all kinds of contexts. While mos t such decisions are not as dramatic as the above exa mples, taken
as a whole they are a very important pa rt of the decisions and actions going on in the world.
The "act" of speaking: lies as political language

Th e fourth varia tion, S X + Y, refers to the very special "a ction" of speaking or communica ting with fellow
human beings. Communications are such a special type of action, if indeed they are "action" in th e proper sense of
the term, that they require th eir own version of the general expression.
Th e implica tions of analyzing th e act of sa ying a pa rticular thing in terms of goals an d side effects are troubling.
If we decide what to say by projecting the costs and benefits of alternative communications S, truth and candor can
easil y get lost in the sh uffle in the interest of expediency. Indeed, it is possible to arg ue that we should act in this
regard according to a rule that we shoul d not decide in this wa y how to speak!
Ethical considerations being placed aside, however, th ere is no doubt that a g reat deal (hopefully not all!) of
human communica tions can be well understood in terms of the ex pression S X + Y and its possible
manipulations. This is not l east so in th e realm of politics. Phenomena such as demagoguery, sycophancy,

ca mpaign oratory, and propaganda clearly lend th emselves to anal ysis in these terms, so does censorship, ja mming,
an d oth er methods of preventing communications.
Th e s pecial importance of th e act of communica ting in human life is implicit in the history of the struggle for
freedom of s peech. Organizationall y, this has been embodied in th e free speech clause of the First Amendment.
Proba bly the single most important change in the Soviet Union in th is light was th e rise of glasnost after 1985.
The act of defining: conceptual engineering

Variation four, D X + Y, refers to th e act of defining a word in a certain way. We a re talking here about wha t is
sometimes known as a "stipulative" definition. It is not a claim that this is what the word means when it is used by
people in general or even how it is used by any other particular people. That is to say it is not a descriptive
definition, of the type to be foun d in dictionaries.
Ra ther, a s tipulative definition is merely a statement of what the decision maker in tends to mean when using th e
word in question. "When I use this word", he or she is wa rning us, "this is what I mean, no more, no l ess." Of course
the person creating the definition may hope that if people find the definition useful it will ca tch on and pass into
general usage.
Imagine that you, as a w riter or speaker, have worked out a specific definition for which, it appears, there is
presently no word in your language which has exactly this meaning. The concept specified by the definition is a
useful one, but in order to us e it conveniently you need a word with which to point to it. What are your options?
One option is to invent a new word to poin t to the definition, or get someone else to do so. For exa mple, many
years ago I came up with the following definition:
"Con flict over how to divide up th e benefits produced by cooperation."
It was clear that this type of conflict is a funda men tal cha racteristic of voluntary associations (a concept which
will be explained in Cha pter 2 of this book). It is especially visible and importan t in labor manag ement rela tions.
One of my students, Doug Cha mberlin, kindly invented a new word to point to my definition: coop etition.
Th e other option is to borrow an already exis ting word whose gen eral meaning is close to your new definition,
an d announce that when you use this word, this is what you mean. This is what I am doing in Cha pter 2 of this book
when I define laws as general rul es of action enforceable by sanctions.
Th e point to be emphasized by including varia tion four, D X + Y, however, is that the act of defining is one
which is in purs uit of a goal, and tha t this kind of decision has side effects. Ones goal may be to clarify though, to
help people make a distinction that is usually glossed over or ignored, or it may be th e antithetical goals of
confusing though t or of getting people to forget about a distinction that they are now inclined to make. Side effects
are particularl y importan t when one is defining sets of related words, since defining one of the related terms in a
certain way ma y have side effects (an d not necessarily helpful ones!) for all of th e oth er terms in th e system.
Therefore alternate definitions may need to be considered, in order to achieve our goals without causing problems
elsewhere in th e sys tem, goals may need to be modified or abandoned under some circumstances, etc.
11
The act of translating: hijacking authority1

Finally, the fifth va riation, T X + Y, refers to the act of translating a th ought from one language to another.
Since literal "one to one" transla tions are often impossible, or produce meaningless gibberish, choices must be
made, and as with all choices th e usual el ements of decision and actiongoals, side effects, circumstancesall come
into pla y.
Th e translator's goal ma y be to convey the meaning expressed by the words being translated as closely as
possible. In this event he or she may have to decide which of several possible meanings of the words is th e meaning
for this purpose, and will also have to determine which al terna tive translations will best convey tha t meaning.
These decisions are not, how ever, political decisions.
On th e oth er hand th e translator ma y be prima rily interested in manipulating th e beha vior of people via th e
power of words. The a uthenticity of th e translation then becomes of seconda ry importance at best, and the principal
issue becomes: what words, labeled as th e res ults of translation, will be most likely to encourage th e people who
read th em to act in the ways desired by th e transla tor?
Th e most obvious potential for this second kind of translationtranslation with a hidden agenda exists when
the words being translated come from a document which people tend to rega rd as authoritative. 2 When th e
document being "transla ted" is in the same language as that it is translated into, we normally use the term interpret
rather than translate, but here too there are abundan t opportunities for a hidden agenda. 3
Misinterpreta tions and mistranslations of authoritative documen ts, documents which are widely revered or
respected, may be seen as efforts to hijack authority. Th ey are efforts to gain automa tic or unthinking approval of
new ideas by portraying th em as old. The use of this technique, or course, does not prove that the new ideas thus
packaged are necessarily untrue or bad.
Decisions, decisions!
Th ere are two very important questions of "ough t" that come up in thinking about politics:
1. What ought to be?
2. What ought to be done?
Unfortunately, these questions are frequentl y con fused with each other. It is very important that we recognize
them as sepa rate, even th ough th ey are often closel y related.
1 Th e idea for this variation came to me while listening to a lecture by my colleague, George Aichele, Professor of
Philosoph y/Religion at Adrian College.
2 The Bible is probabl y th e most obvious targ et for translations based on a "hidden agenda". It is interesting to
watch the curren t efforts to "desex" references to God in the Bible and in Bible-derived materials like hymns. But
on e need not assume that translations in this spirit necessarily have the effect of perverting the true meaning of
an originally a uthentic document. In the case of the Bibl e, for example, it seems a t least conceiva ble tha t th e
meanings added via delibera te mistransla tion constitute a constantly improving a pproximation of the divine
mind. Revelation can be gradual as well as sudden!
3 An a uthoritative document frequently subjected to hidden agenda transla tions is the US Constitution.

What ought to be? refers to s ta tes of affairs, to arrangements, institutions, organizations. Which is th e better
way to arrange a legislature, unica meral or bicameral? Shoul d there be an Eminent Domain clause in th e US
Constitution? Is poverty bad? Should the US be in the United Na tions? These are all questions about what ought to
be.
What ought to be done? refers to present or future actions. Should we try to send anoth er man to the moon?
Should we convict th e defendan t? For whom shoul d I vote?
Th e difference between what ought to be and what ough t to be done can be gra phically illus trated by imagining
that you have been shipw recked on a small island. The islan d is one on which you can survive, but not much more
than tha t. Not far away, however, is another islan d. Studying it with binoculars, you conclude tha t it would be a
much better place to live. Therefore, you ought to be on the oth er island.
But what ought to be done? Consider the following possible facts: Firs t, you cannot swim. Second, there is
nothing on your present island with which to construct a boat. Third, th e waters between the islands are teeming
with sharks. Un der these circumstances, it is quite reasona ble to say both:
1. What ought to be? I ought to be on the other island.
2. What ought to be done? I ough t to sta y right where I a m.
In terms of our analysis of decision and action, A X + Y, the only immedia te actions that coul d deliver the goal
X (being on the other island) a re either unavailable or are likely to produce unaccepta ble side effects Y. You would
rather be on your present islan d and in good health than to drown or be devoured trying to get to th e other one.
An d this is in spite of the fact that the other island is a much better place to be. Although the two questions appear
to be very similar, deciding what ought to be does not tell us what ough t to be done.
13
2. Concepts of Human
Association
Th e concepts of decision and action in troduced in Chapter 1 relate to all decisions. They can equally w ell be used
to analyze the decisions of a Robinson Crusoe, living and acting on an obscure island in total isolation from other
people, an d to analyze decisions ma de by individuals living in a social environ men t, that is, in the pres ence of other
individuals. Only in this second case, however, do we find politics.
Th e presence or absence of other people is certainly an important part of the circums tances C within which all
decisions must be made. If there are other peopl e present, as is usually th e cas e, one of the side effects Y which the
decision-maker may need to consider is how these other people will react to various possible actions tha t are being
considered.
One way to try to predict how another person will react to a given action on our pa rt is to imagine how we woul d
act if we were in that other person's shoes, given his or her values an d circums tances. Note tha t the complexity of
such a calculation may soon become un manageable, since the other person in turn could be taking in to accoun t
how we will react to his or her reaction!
Associations as we will be defining them here arise when the satisfaction of one person is changed by the action
of another pers on. Since not all actions produce changes in other people's satisfaction, actions do not always
produce associations, but associations a re on e possibl e result of actions. We will be particularly interested in
organizations, which we will see are one pa rticular type of association, since governmentsthe central focal point of
political scienceare organizations.
Let us approach the concepts of human association cautiously and systema tically:
Satisfaction, social power, and association

Satisfaction
Sa tisfaction can be defined as the ratio between an individual's perceived attainments and desires:
perceived attainments
satisfaction=
desires
Ap
S=
D
An individual's satisfaction can change as th e result of several th ings:
1. events in the natural environ ment
2. that individual's own actions

3. actions by other peopl e
Storms, earthquakes, erupting volcanoes, etc., can affect a person's attainments. By changing th e person's
attainments, th ey thereby increase or decrease sa tisfaction.
A person who is cold can put on a sweater or dial up the furnace, thereby increasing his own attainments which
in turn (everything else being equal) increas es his own sa tisfaction. O r the individual, holding his a ttainments
constant, can change his satisfaction by changing what is desired. Increased desires, as the formula shows, decrease
satis faction, whereas decreases on desires increase satisfaction.
Finally, on e person's attainmentsand th ereby satis factioncan be changed by the actions of oth er people. It is
this fact which renders possible human associations and organizations, including governments.
Social power and social causation

Since the actions of oth ers can affect our satisfaction, one thing that we desire may be to get these other people
to act in certain ways. Social power is our ability to get another person to act as we desire.
Th ree kinds of social pow er can be dis tinguished. Metaphorically, we can call them the power of the pen, the
power of th e sword, and th e power of the purse.
Th e power of th e pen g rows out of our ability to say and to refrain from sa ying things. Of course "pen" is only a
convenient meta phor. Un der modern conditions it includes the power of the typewriter, the microphone, and the
ca mera.
We can employ pen-power overtl y to persuade others to do wha t we want. We may try to convince th em tha t
they will like the consequences of the action we ha ve prescribed or to convince th em to change their values so that
consequences already ex pected will be attractive.
Th e power of the pen can also be used covertly, although the exact bounda ry between overt persuasion and
covert manipulation is unclea r. Manipula tion clearly includes cas es in which th e power of the pen is used
negatively. For example, if we delay s ending a message to someone until it will be too late for him to react in a way
we disfa vor, that is ma nipula tion ra ther than persuasion.
Th e power of the pen is vitally important in politics. It is not always true tha t th e pen is mightier than the sword,
but this old saying still has some validity. The power of the sword may prevail in the short run, but decisions about
using it a re bas ed on ideas which have been propagated by the pen.
Th e pow er of th e sword is based on our a bility to act so as to reduce th e attainments of another person so tha t
they are less than th ey would have been if we had taken no action at all. Diagra mming the other individual's
satis faction with th e aid of a "n umber line", point 0 marks tha t individual's satisfaction in the absence of any action
at all on our part:
lower -----------|------------- higher
satisfaction satisfaction
15
Our action reducing his satisfaction down to point L, which we will call a sanction, is social pow er in th e
following sense: He ma y be willing to take an action desired by us, an action which will increase our satisfaction, if
we will refrain from the action which would lower his satisfaction down to point L.
L 0
lower -------|-----|--------------- higher
As we will see, sanctions, the power of the sword, are the distinctively political form of social power.
Th e power of the purse, convers ely, comes from our ability to refrain from doing something that another person
would like us to do. Such actions, which we will call inducemen ts, increase th e a ttainments of another person so
that their satisfaction is greater than it would have been in the absence of any action at all on our part:
0 M
lower -----------|-------|------- higher
satisfaction sa tisfaction
On the diagram, such an action increas es the other person's sa tisfaction from point 0 to point M.
Social power is exerted by inducemen ts beca use the other person may be willing to do what we want in order to
get us to do what he wants. Inducements, the power of th e purse, are the distinctively economic form of social
power.
Th e following table summarizes the three types of social power (as shown in Table 5):
Ta ble 3: Types of social power
Metaphor Pen Sword Purse
Oth er terms typewriter gun dollar
microphone stick carrot
Nature of thing communica tion destructive action productive action
done or not done
Name of action pure persuasion sanctions inducemen ts
Exa mple seduction rape prostitution
It should be noted that it is not meaningful to say that social power ca uses the actions taken by another person.
Rather social power causes possibilities and impossibilities for other people, it manipula tes th e circums tances
within which they are deciding how to act. A drawbridg e opera tor who lowers th e bridge in to position ma kes it
possible for us to cross that bridg e. But lowering the bridg e does not cause us to cross it, and indeed we ma y choose

not to do so. If we do drive across the bridge, this actualizes th e possibility, but th e action, as disting uished from its
possibility, is not ca used by the bridge operator.
Associations
Our definition of associations is as follows: An association exis ts when one person's satisfaction is being changed
by the actions of another person. The two persons are then said to be associated.
This definition is not as simple as it sounds. To understand exactly what it means, we need to s pecify what is
mean t by several of the words used in defining it.
We have alrea dy stipulated that satisfaction, on e of th e key terms, will be defined as th e ra tio of a person's
perceived a ttainments to his desires, and that it can be expressed as a poin t on a n umber line:
Ap
S = ------
lower -----------|-----------higher
Th e second key term in the definition of an associa tion is "changed". There are two possible kinds of change in
the oth er person's satisfaction: an increase, or a decrease. For purposes of our definition, th ese changes are
meas ured relative to th e level of satisfaction at which there would be no association at all between the people in
question, point 0 on th e diag ram.
Note tha t the 0 does not mean that the pers on whose satisfaction is being diag rammed has no sa tis faction.
Satisfaction is always a positive number, and since the diagram assumes (correctly) that the individual's satisfaction
coul d be lower, its current value mus t be grea ter than 0. Rather, the 0 means tha t there is no association betw een
the individual in question and some other specified person. (To diagram th e relationship of our individual to yet
another person woul d require an additional diagram: Jones ma y simultaneously be associated with Smith and not
associated with Baker.)
It must also be emphasized that each diagra m of satisfaction represents only a very few elements, abstracted out
of a very complex situation because th ey an d th ey alone are relevant to the exis tence and nature of an association
between particular persons. As noted above, there are many people with whom a given person, Jones, migh t be
associated. Imagine that he is associated with Smith because Smith has impos ed a sanction on him, with Kennedy
beca use Kennedy has conferred an inducement on him, an d is not associated at all with Baker. All three of th e
following diagrams a re th erefore simultaneously true:
17
1. Jones' relationship to Smith:
L 0
lower sat.-------|--------|-----------higher sat.
sanction
2. Jones' rela tionship to Kennedy:
0 M
lower sat.--------|-------|--------higher sat.
inducemen t
3. Jones' rela tionship to Baker:
lower sat.--------|-----------higher sa t.
0 = Jones' satisfaction if Baker
didn't act at all.
0 = (also) Jones' actual satisfaction,
since Ba ker hasn't acted, or if he
acted it had no effect on Jones'
satisfaction.
Obviously, thes e diagrams express only relative levels of satisfaction rath er than absolute sa tisfaction. Absolute
satis faction after all will be a composite representing th e net effects of actions by the many different persons with
whom on e is associated, by the person hims elf, and of events in th e natural en vironment.
Th e third key term in our definition of an association is "actions". In its normal usage, this word can very well
refer to inactions and to communications as well as to actions in a narrower sense: deliberate bodil y motions whose
primary significance is not th eir symbolic meaning. But for purposes of our definition of an associa tion, "actions "
will refer onl y to things done, not to words or to inactions.
Classifying associations
Voluntary, involuntary, and trust associations
Th e fact tha t there are two kinds of action which can create an association with another person suggests one
basis for classifying associations into different types. The additional fact that there are always at leas t tw o pa rties to

an association (the actor and the person whose satisfaction is changed by the actor) provides an additional basis for
defining types of association. Th e first person's action either takes place with the consent of the person to be
affected, or it is unilateral, without the affected person's consent.
Combining these two considera tions we find three possible types of association (and one impossible type!) as
shown in Tabl e 4:
Ta ble 4: Types of Associa tion
Sanctions Inducements
Unilateral 1.Involun tary associations 2. Trusteeship associations
Mutual consen t (Impossible!) 3. Voluntary associa tions
An involuntary association is created by the unilateral imposition or th e th reat of sanctions. They ma y be

extremely gross or high s ubtle. A grossly involuntary association exists, for exa mple, when the victim han ds over his
wallet in response to the robber's th reats. This associa tion invol ves a sanction that will be impos ed unless the victim
cooperates, and if the victim could have nothing at all to do with the robber he would gla dly do so. But th ere is no
such choice, for their rela tionship has been unilaterally established by the robber.
Air pollution exemplifies a more subtle involunta ry association. Here, th e sanction is imposed but not
threa tened, and the polluting companies, for example, have no des ire to manipulate the actions of others. They
merely want to achieve cheaply wha t oth erwise would be more costl y. They dump waste products from their
enterprise into th e atmosph ere. Th e poll ution is a sanction because it reduces attainments of the peopl e who
breathe the airtheir long-term health an d longevity and the general attractiven ess of environ men t. If the
magnitude of the sanction is great enough to be perceived, then an association is created between the company and
the people breathing th e air and that association is involun tary.
A secon d type of associa tion, which we will call trusts, is created by unilaterally conferring inducements. The
most fa miliar example is the associa tion between pa rents and children in the nuclear famil y. Children, especially
when very young, are in no position to give or to withhold consent to associate with their pa rents. Th e associa tion is
created unila terally by the parents, but th eir actionscreating, housing, feeding, clothing the chil dare
inducements from the chil d's poin t of view.
Voluntary associations, a third type, are created by th e exchange or transfer of in ducements or expected
inducements by mutual consent. Traditional difficulties fitting the family into general social analysis may derive
from its two-dimensionality. Although it is a trust associa tion between the pa rents (jointly) and their chil dren, it is
a voluntary associa tion between husband and wife. Voluntary associations can be fa r larger than a family. Four of
the predominant institutions in modern America corpora tions, la bor unions, political parties, and churchesare
basically voluntary associations.
19
Th e fourth combina tion of types sanctions by mutual consentcan exist only when sanctions are falsely
expected to be inducemen ts by the party who consents to them. (Since sanctions reduce another person's net
satis faction below what it woul d be if th e actor did nothing at all. Naturally, no one who sees it for wha t it is would
consent to such an action.) Instead of recognizing a fourth type of associa tion,"mis takes", we will regard these as a
special type of volun tary associations. Hence, th e definition of volunta ry associa tions is in terms of inducemen ts or
expected inducemen ts.
Private, public, and compound associations

An y set of objects can be classified in more than one way. For example the people in a room can be classified into
groups in terms of th e following cha racteristics: those who wear glasses and those who do not; male and female;
political orientation : Democrat, Republican, Independent, Libertarian, Socialist, and so forth; income per year;
heigh t. Clearly, classifying associations as involuntary, trusts, or voluntary does not begin to exhaust the
possibilities; nor need we ass ume that only one approach to classifying associations is important or useful. We will
now examine a second way in which associations can be sorted into ca tegories.
A priva te association is one which is not a government and is made up of parties none of which is itself a
government. We refer here to "parties" ra ther than to persons because once a simple associa tion of two or more
individuals exists this association itself ma y enter into still other associations. "Parties" is simply a convenient way
of recognizing that the constituen t elements making up an association can be either individuals or associations.
Govern ments, clearly, are not private as defined here, and this is obviously as it mus t be given the usual
connotation of the word "private". Nor are associations between another one govern men t and another private. The
association between husband and wife is private, since (a) neith er of them is a government, and (b) their marriage
does not constitute a government.
Public associations are defin ed by any on e or more of the following cha racteristics:
1. One of the parties is an organization that imposes sanctions on peopl e who have violated gen eral rules of
action laid down in advance.
2. It is an association betw een a govern men t and the public. (The relevant public consists of all individuals
subject to the jurisdiction of this government.)
3. All of the parties to the association are th ems elves governments.
Th e US government is public by virtue of characteris tic n umber one: Some of its laws are general rules of action
in the sense that th ey apply to anyone who takes th e prohibited action. And the available punish ments
deprivations of "life, liberty, or property", are clearly sanctions as we have defined them above. The United Na tions,
on the oth er hand, qualifies as public under characteristic n umber three, even th ough it is not itself a govern ment.
Its Cha rter is a mul tilateral treaty or con tract between a number of govern men ts.
A compound association is any to which at least one pa rty is a government and at least one pa rty is not a
government (and is also not the public as defined above). Thus th e US government ma y hire an individual to work
for th e Department of Justice or it may buy jet fighters from a private corpora tion. Th e res ulting association is not
private, since one of the pa rties to it is a government, an d it is not public, beca use th e oth er pa rties are not
governments. It is, ins tead, compound.

A periodic table of associations
More than one way of classifying associations can be used at th e same time, extending our analysis into a second
dimension. Outside th e context of politics, two-dimensional classifications are in fact quite common. For exa mple,
loca tions on th e ea rth's surface are described in terms of tw o numbers, one representing classifica tion by latitude
an d one indica ting classification by longitude. Th e roomful of people mention ed a bove can also be grouped on the
basis of more than one considera tion. For example, its individuals can be classified both in terms of gender an d in
terms of wheth er they are wearing glasses. Four categories of people are thus created. It is always possibl e, of
course, that no members of a possible subgroup may be found in a pa rticular population we are classifying. For
exampl e, only bespectacled males ma y be present, so that in ma thematical terms the category "males not wea ring
glasses" would be the "empty set".
Dmitri Mendeleev's periodic table of the chemical el ements is proba bly the most famous example of a two-
dimensional classification in the his tory of science. It established th e frame of reference within which chemical
resea rch has produced a dra matic increase in understanding and practical accomplishments during the last
century. It even suggested the existence of new elemen ts tha t were, in fact, later discovered or synthesized. It can
an d has been argued that the science of chemistry did not even exist before the periodic table.
A "periodic table" of human associations can be constructed by combining the two on e-dimensional
classifications which we examined above (as shown in Table 3):
1. Horizontal dimension: involuntary, trusts, voluntary
2. Vertical dimension: priva te, compoun d, public
Ta ble 5: Periodic ta ble of human associations
Involuntary Trusts Voluntary
Private 1.robber-victim 2.pa rents-children 3.h usband-wife
Compound 4. Govern men t-as-bandit 5.Government-as-trus tee 6.Government-as-contractor I

I
Public 7.Government-as- 8.Government-as-trustee 9.Government-as-contractor

legislator II II
Th e resulting diagram contains room for nine basic types of associa tion, eight of whichfor better or for worse
already exist:
1. Private-Involuntary. Your relationship with the robber who sticks you up as you walk through a park is a
priva te-involun tary association. It is private beca use neither you nor the robber is a govern men t. It is
involunta ry beca use th e robber unila terally crea tes the association by threa tening you with a sanction if you
do not hand over your money.
21
2. Private-Trust. The exa mple given earlier of a trust, th e parent-child association, is also priva te, since
neither th e pa rents nor the childrenthe parties to the association are govern men ts. Remember tha t a trust
is an association where one party unilaterally confers inducements on another party.
3. Private-Volun tary. The examples, as noted earlier, of voluntary associations are legion: marriages,
corporations, unions, parties, churches. As it happens, these examples are all priva te too, since they are not
governments and none of th e pa rties that make them up are govern men ts.
4. Compound-Involuntary. When a govern men t th rea tens particular people with sanctions, a compound-
involunta ry association is created. It is involuntary beca use sanctions are involved, and it is compound
because one pa rty is a government and the other party is neith er a government nor the public. (The public
includes everybody, but here only pa rticular people are subject to the sanctions, not everybody.) Examples of
such associa tions are, unfortunately, not difficul t to fin d: the German regime's extermination of Jews during
World War II is only a pa rticularly egregious case. We will discuss this type of association more fully, below,
when we examin e pseudolaws. Th e aspect of government which is involved in this type of association can be
called government-as-bandit.
5. Compound-Trust. Here government unilaterally confers inducemen ts on particular people. Since these
pa rticular people are not th emselves govern men ts and, being l ess than everybody, are not th e public, the
association is compound rath er than public. Government-as-trustee I, as we will call this aspect of
government, acts as residual trus tee for children whose pa rents have abused their responsibilities as trus tees
or who are seeking a divorce. Government-as-trustee I also presides over In dian reserva tions.
(Unfortunately, th ere is no residual trustee in case government abuses its responsibilities.)
6. Compound-Volunta ry. Government-as-con tractor I enters voluntary associations with non-govern men tal
pa rties, which may be individuals or associations. The rela tionship between government-as-con tractor I and
an individual employee of th e Department of th e In terior is a compound-voluntary associa tion. It is
compoun d beca use on e pa rty is a government and on e is not; it is vol unta ry beca use it is established by
mutual consent of the parties to th e exchange of inducemen ts. The inducement conferred by the worker on
th e government is the services he performs, say, as an accountant. The in ducement conferred by the
government on the worker is his salary and other benefits. Wh en government-as-contra ctor I buys jet
bombers from a private corporation, the other pa rty to the resulting association is itself an association.
7. Public-Involun tary. A public-involuntary association is exactly like a compound-involunta ry on e except

tha t here govern men t threa tens everybody with sanctions, not jus t particular people. This difference,
however, is crucially important. When government th rea tens sanctions against anyone who deliberately kills
anoth er or against all who fail to pay 24 per cent of th eir income to the Internal Revenue Service, it is not
selecting particular people or groups of people to th reaten. Since everyon e is in the same boat and subject to
th e sa me rul e, no one has an in terest in imposing rul es tha t are in tolera ble such as, say, a 97 per cent tax.
This power to th rea ten the entire public with sanctions is the essence of government, and we will call this
aspect of government government-as-legislator.
8. Public-Trust. There are no known historical or actual examples of this type of association, although it is
clea rly a possible type. Govern men t-as-trustee II, if it ever were to exis t, woul d be like government-as-trus tee

I except that it woul d act as trus teei.e. unila terally confer inducemen tsfor the entire public, not just for
selected individuals or groups of individuals.
9. Public-Voluntary. Another aspect of government, government-as-contractor II, enters in to volunta ry

associations with other govern men ts. These associations are public because all of th eir parties are
governments. The two govern men ts may be coequals, or they may have a superior-inferior arrangement.
Treaties are an example of voluntary associations betw een coequal, independent governments. Within th e
US, public-voluntary associations often exist between two or more s ta tes. These states are equal and
independent of each other, but s ubject to the national government in Washington D.C. Th e Constitution
requires that such "intersta te compa cts" go into effect only with congressional consent. There are also man y
volun tary associations between the national govern men t and those of the sta tes.
Laws, pseudolaws, and by-laws

Th e mos t important distinction to emerge from the categories crea ted by the periodic ta ble of h uman
associations is between three different meanings all commonly pointed to by the word law:
1. A general rule of action enforcea ble by sanctions (government-as-legislator)
2. A non-general rule enforceable by sanctions (govern ment-as-bandit)
3. A statement of the terms on which, and with whom, a government is willing to enter into volunta ry
associations (government-as-contractor)
Since these three meanings are so very different, using the same word to in discrimina tely refer to all of them can
onl y produce confusion. We will th erefore stipulate that th e word law will be used only to refer to the first meaning:
a general rule of action enforcea ble by sanctions. For th e other two meanings w e will assign the following terms (as
shown in Tabl e 6):
Pseudolaws: a non-general rule enforced by sanctions.
By-laws: a sta temen t of th e terms on which and with whom a govern men t is willing to enter into vol untary
associations.
Ta ble 6: Enforceable sanctions
Involuntary Trusts Voluntary
Private 1.robber-victim 2. parents-children 3.hus band-wife
Compound 4.Government-as-bandit 5.Govern men t-as- trustee 6. Government-as-contractor I

I
pseudolaws by-laws
Public 7.Government-as- 8.Government-as-trustee 9. Government-as-contractor II

legislator II
by-laws
laws
23
Th e two key el ements in distinguishing laws, pseudolaws, and by-laws a re generality and sanctions. To be a
general rule of action, it must apply to everybody without any exceptions whatever. It is because the public is
defined precisely as everybody who is subject to a given government that laws are an expression of government-as-
legislator and constitute public-involunta ry associations. Since generality is not an issue on e way or the other with
by-laws, th e firs t question to be considered, when translating the word laws as it is used by th e general public into
our more precise terms, is whether th ere is a sanction in volved at all in the rul e. If there is not, then the rule is a by-
law, which is "enforced" by withdrawn or denied inducements rath er than by sanctions. If th ere is a sanction,
how ever, we must still ascertain whether the rule is a law or a pseudolaw, and this is where we must consider
generality. The following are examples of rules which are not general, and which therefore are pseudolaws rather
than laws:
An y black person who does not ride in the back of th e bus shall be fined USD 100.
An y Jew who does not wear a yellow star shall be punished as follows ....
No woman can receive a license to work as a barten der unless the bar is owned by her husband or fath er.
An ybody un der 21 years of age who consumes alcoholic beverages shall be fined USD 200.
An y male who does not register for the draft upon rea ching age 18 shall be fined and/or imprisoned.
Rich people shall pa y a 70 per cent income tax, other people shall pay 24 per cent.
Gen erality requires that the rule appl y to th e equivalent of "anybody who", and all of th e above exa mples
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, age, or wealth. People are treated not merely on the basis of how they act, but
also on th e basis of who th ey are. Pseudolaws are enacted by government-as-ban dit, a term suggested by St.
Augus tine's famous observation: "Justice being taken away, then, what are king doms but great robberies?" 4 Th e
onl y difference between a compound-in voluntary association and a priva te-in voluntary one is that government is a
party to the former. In both, individuals are arbitrarily singled out and sanctions imposed or th reatened against
them. If anything, government-as-bandit is even more intolerable than private robbers, for it wields the resources
of the entire commun ity and on e cannot seek government protection from it. The word "by-law" reflects the fact
that when Congress determines the terms on which and with whom th e US government is willing to enter a
voluntary associa tion, it is doing no more and no less than is done by the boards of directors of any private
corpora tion. By-laws apply both to compound-volunta ry and to public-vol unta ry associa tions. Examples of by-laws
applying to compoun d associations include portions of th e Bacon-Davis Act, th e Ha tch Act, and the Philadelphia
Plan. Th e Bacon-Davis Act prohibits the federal government from making contracts with priva te firms pa ying th eir
employees less than "prevailing wages" as determined by the Secretary of La bor for ea ch occupation and region of
the country. The Hatch Act prohibits th e federal govern men t from retaining civil servants who engage in certain
types of politicking, including addressing a political rally or holding office in a political pa rty. (An y law prohibiting
such actions and enforced by sanctions would clearly violate the First Amendmen t; the Supreme Court, however,
has twice upheld the Hatch Act, which is enforced by withdrawn inducements.) Un der the Philadel phia Plan th e
federal govern men t contracts only with private construction firms that agree to hire a t least a certain percentag e of
minority employees. Th e Plan is an effort to overcome racial discrimination by th e building trades unions and
4 City of God, Book IV

acquiesced in by employers. By-laws applying to public associations incl ude the Hickenlooper Amendmen t and the
federal enactment producing th e 65 (originally 55) miles per hour na tional speed limit. The Hickenlooper
Amen dment cuts off foreign aid to any country that nationalizes property own ed by US citizens without paying
them fair compensation. It tries, via the power of th e US government purse, to extend the protection against
uncompensated seizures provided domestically by the Eminen t Domain Cla use of th e Constitution. When US
President Nixon proposed a national speed limit during the 1973 Arab oil embarg o, Cong ress lacked cons titutional
authority to enact a law requiring people to drive more slowly. The sta te governments had the power to enact such
laws but were not disposed to do so. Acting on Nixon's proposal, Congress merely enacted a by-law cutting off all
federal highway fun ds to any state whose legislature did not enact a law making th e s peed limit 55 or l ess. If any
state had refused to comply, its action woul d not have been illegal. It would merely ha ve been a violation of a
federal by-law. But the states, sometimes with great rel uctance, kn uckled under unanimouslyfew local politicians
were willing to climb off the federal g ravy train.
25
3. Developing Conceptual
Acuity
Evaluating and justifying government
Our basic relationship with government is an involuntary association, and in th is sense we are justified in saying
that government is an invol unta ry association. Actually, as we have seen, peopl e are associated with th e
organization called government in man y different ways. Some of our associa tions with government are volun tary,
others are trusts, and still others a re involuntary. But the involuntary associa tions are fun damental.
Th rough involuntary associations, government obtains most of the resources ena bling it to induce people into
voluntary associations with it. The policeman is hired by government-as-contractor I; as an employee, his
relationship with th e government is a compoun d-volunta ry associa tion. But govern men t obtains the money used
for his salary via the power of the sword. People who refuse to pa y taxes are forcibl y deprived of liberty or property,
though not, in the current US, of life.
Th e idea that government is basically an in voluntary association is neither new nor generally rejected. True,
social contract theorists ha ve argued that govern ment is a voluntary association, as if it were a volun tary
association, or ought to be a voluntary association. Social contra ct theory has been infl uential in America ever since
the "Mayflower Compact". However, contract theorists have alwa ys foundered on th e fact tha t not everybody
subject to a government consents, or has cons ented, to be governed by it. A contract, like any other voluntary
association, requires mutual consent of all the pa rties, not just a majority of them. But when a govern men t imposes
sanctions it does not require unanimity. To execute someone in the US requires unanimity of the jurors and judge
but not the unanimity of all parties, which would include the defen dant!
Various philosophies recognize that govern ment is ess entially an involuntary association. Mao Tse-tung,
Chinese Communis t l eader, wrote: "All political power grows out of the ba rrel of a gun."5 Anarchists, assuming tha t
all involuntary associa tions are ba d and s eeing that governments are invol untary associa tions, conclude that there
should be no government. St. Augustine, quoted earlier, bea rs repea ting: "Justice being taken awa y, what are
king doms but great robberies?" 6
The four functions of government

Th e belief tha t all involunta ry associations are ba d is ha rd to refute. For most people the general undesirability
of priva te-involun tary associa tions (robber-victim, air polluter-victim) and of compound-involunta ry ones (th e
Nazi extermination campaign against Jews, milita ry conscription, arbitrary economic regulations) is implicit in the
exampl es we have adduced. One is tempted to tidy things up and conclude that public-involuntary associations a re
5 Cann ot find this reference. We would a ppreciate any help.
6 City of God, Book IV

bad too. Before jumping to rash concl usions, how ever, let us think briefl y about four functions or services provided
by government:
1. minimizing private sanctions
2. facilitating priva te-voluntary associations
3. allocating scarce natural resources
4. protecting citizens from other governments
Minimizing private sanctions

First, government protects us from private-involuntary associations. Th rough law, it attaches artificial side
effects to private actions constituting such associations, thus ma king th em less attractive options. Drunk driving
ca rries the risk of accident, injury, property loss, and death. Govern ment increases the risks by threa tening fines,
imprisonment, and license revocation. The exis tence of law pres umes that people are less likely to commit murder
if the side effect of such will be th e el ectric chair.
Law can also be regarded as a price system calculated to run priva te-involuntary associations off the "market" by
making them too "ex pensive".
Of course, laws are not entirely successful. Sanctions provided for viola tors may be ina dequate to discourage th e
prohibited actionmere "slaps on th e wrist". If th e chance that a sanction will actually be imposed is low, people
may discount its severity by its improbability. Indeed, increasing the required sanction for breaking a law ma y
reduce the likelihood it will ever be imposed: electrocution deters no jaywalkers if juries refuse to convict flagrant
violators because they fin d the punishment excessive.
No legal system can eliminate all crime. Th e only way to put a complete end to crime would be to repeal all laws,
a "sol ution" which does not have much appeal. Thus government's function is not to eliminate priva te-involun tary
associations but to minimize them. While repealing all laws would be counterproductive, "decriminalizing" some
actions ma y be desirable if cos ts of outlawing them outweigh the benefits. As St. Thomas Aquinas noted many
centuries ago, it is impossible for government to outlaw all sins7. Govern ment should not spread its limited
enforcement capa bilities too thin, neglecting to enforce more important laws while pros ecuting less important ones.
"Decriminalization" is most frequently discussed in the context of personal drug use, sexual activity, and so forth,
which supposedly concern onl y th e "consenting adults" involved.
Facilitating private-voluntary associations

A second function of government is to facilita te private-volunta ry associations. A contract is a legall y enforcea ble
agreement, and government encourages private-voluntary associations chiefly through laws regarding contracts. Of
course, not all priva te agreements are enforceabl e. A co-ed agreeing to go out on a date with h er boyfrien d, for
exampl e, cannot be compelled to do so by a court if she tries to back out. Nor will any court order her to pay money
damages to her frien d even, if relying on her agreemen t, h e obtains thea ter tickets or ren ts an automobile. But the
fact that some ag reements are legally en forceable increases our options, as Gordon Tullock explains:
7 Summa Theologica, Part II, Article IV
27
It is clear that situations in which making such an enforceable promise is desirable are fairly frequent. I
wish to buy a house and do not have enough money to do so. Borrowing the money will improve my
satisfaction, but in order to borrow I have to convince the len der that I will repay. Perhaps I can get away
with an unenforceable promise, but for most people such loans are only possible if there is some
mechanis m to enforce the rep ayment.8
Govern ment not only makes enforceabl e agreements possible but it provides neutral judges to resolve dis putes
about such agreements. Some parties bypass the judge by jointly sending disputes to an arbitrator, but th e courts
are always availa ble when less extreme measures fail. Without government, terms of voluntary associations woul d
onl y be en forceable by the parties and their private associates, a messy and inefficient process at best. Government
thus allows volunta ry associa tions on a scale otherwise impossible. It is no exaggera tion to say that private
enterprise res ts on public founda tions.
Allocating natural resources

Th e third function served by govern men t is allocating scarce natural res ources. This function can onl y become
more important as popula tion increases while raw materialsat bes tremain constan t. Once something is
someone's property, the usual rul es of con tract can be used to determin e whether it has been duly transferred to
somebody else. But endless problems arise rega rding how something becomes th e property of somebody to begin
with. How do resources become the property of th eir first owner? The philosoph er Pierre Joseph Proudhon
answered this ques tion with his famous aphorism: "Property is theft!" Somebody simply assumes ownership of the
resources and it is his property as long as he can hang on to it. Th ere are man y terms for this process of creating
own ership: "conquest", "s qua tting", "claiming", "staking out", and so forth. But might is not right, and property in
resources (as in everything els e) can only be determined by law, not by just grabbing it.
It is often ass umed that natural res ources tha t are not already owned automa ticall y belong to the govern men t.
This assumption, however, is totally arbitrary and certainly cannot be done by government-as-legislator, which
mus t express its basic decisions in the form of general rules. Although government-as-contractor, like any priva te
person or association, can certainly own property, it has no more right to owna ble but unowned resources than
an ybody else. Government-as-trustee I is trustee only for particular people or groups of people. Since determining
which people shall own resources is the problem here, not the solution, government-as-trus tee I is no help.
All exis ting or his torical governments ha ve determined ownership of na tural res ources (land, minerals, etc.)
arbitrarily. It is equally arbitrary to assume the government is the owner and then give the resources away or sell
them (e.g. in th e US, the Homestead Act) as it is to assume the government is the own er and always will be (e.g. in
classical "Communist" coun tries). A solution to this dilemma, however, does exist, at least in theory. It is not
arbitrary to assume that th e public owns all previously unown ed natural resources, since th e public is by definition
inclusive. Government-as-trustee II, acting for the public, could lease selected portions of these resources to the
highest bidder, and the net receipts disburs ed in equal amoun ts to all members of the public in the form of a social
dividend. (Govern men t-as-trustee II, for the public, is like the chemical elemen ts whose possible existence was
indicated by Mendelyeev's periodic table. It has not been seen yet, but it could turn up at any time.)
8 Gordon Tullock, ,The Logic of the Law, N.Y.: Basic Books: 1971, p. 36.

Protecting citizens from other governments
A fourth govern men tal function is to protect us from other governments. One pa rt of this function, defens e
against ex ternal attacks, may not always be necessary. If there were a world govern ment, ex ternal defense would be
unnecessary. But th e fourth function would remain, for it includes defense against potential governments that
might try to replace a current one.
It is quite possible for two or more governments to rule over the sa me area at th e same time. In the United
Sta tes a t least three govern men ts us ually legislate for any one place: the federal govern ment, a s ta te government,
an d a city or county government. Often there are man y more than three. During revolutions several governments
generally exercise some control over the same area. In 1917 Russia was governed from February to October both by
the Provisional Govern men t under Alexander Kerensky and by the Petrograd Soviet, dominated by Lenin. Both
centers of authority issued orders that were obeyed to some extent. Likewise, large areas of South Vietna m were
under both the Saigon regime an d that of th e Vietcong during much of the time the United Sta tes was involved in
the war there. In many villages it was said tha t Saigon ruled by day, the Vietcong by nigh t.
Subjection to more than one government is tolerable, how ever, only if there is a clea r pecking order among
them, as in the United States. When one government makes an action illegal and another in th e same places makes
avoiding that action illegal, their subjects are da mned if they do and if they do not. They cannot protect th emselves
against sanctions for obeying th e law, for obeying one law requires violating th e other. The Supremacy Cla use of the
US Constitution is designed to avoid placing citizens in exactly this predica ment:
This Cons titution and the laws of the United Sta tes which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties
made ... under th e a uthority of th e United States, shall be the supreme law of th e land, and th e judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, anything in th e Cons titution or laws of any sta te to the con trary notwithstanding. (Article
VI, Sec.2)
A government unable to protect its subjects from the sanctions of oth er or would-be governments is, to say th e
leas t, not a completely viabl e one.
Justification of government
Th e dilemma faced by those seeking to justify existence of government can be summarized as follows: It is not
unreasona ble to assume that all involuntary associations are bad; and government is basically an invol untary
association.
Some social con tract theorists try to resolve th e problem by ass erting that government is, in fact, a volun tary
association. If true, this would simply make the belief that all invol unta ry associations are ba d irrel evan t in
evalua ting govern ment. But there is no historical evidence of an "original" contract, and even if there were an
original contract it could notby the logic of contractsbin d later genera tions.
Other social contract th eoris ts, following Rousseau, argue that government ought to be a volunta ry association.
But this does not justify existing governments, which are not vol unta ry associations. Rouss eau's ideas w ere highly
revolutionary, for no government coul d meet his test and still remain a government. None of the four government
functions discussed above could be performed by an organiza tion that enters only into voluntary associations, that
is to say by one which has no laws.
29
Another way out of the dilemma is to capitulate and say that govern men ts being bad, none should exist. The
anarchists take this position, sometimes in th e strongest possible way: there should be no government, period, now
or ever.
Sa ys Benjamin Tucker:
Protection they look upon as a thing to be secured, as long as it is necessary, by vol untary association and
cooperation for self-defense, or as a commodity to be purchased, like any other commodity, of those who offer the
9
best article at the lowest price.
Classical Marxists also conclude that governmentthe sta te"is unjustifiable. But they believe that it is neither
desirable nor possible to g et rid of it immedia tely. Rather, th ere must be a revolution in which the tabl es are turned
an d the previously ex ploited workers (proletariat) grab control of the state away from the capitalists (bourgeoisie).
During a transition period, the "dicta torship of the proletariat", the bourg eoisie is gradually "liquidated", an
ambig uous term which might mean anything from physical ex termina tion of its members to their absorption into
the ranks of the proletariat. Only when this process is finish ed is there no longer any need for the state, which can
then "with er" away and disappea r. The justifica tion given by ruling Marxists for their government is th erefore
similar to defending a war on the groun ds that it will end war: Their rule is said to be hastening the day when
government will no longer be necessa ry. The more negative one's view of govern men t, therefore, the more
defensible is the government whose lea ders claim th ey are seeking to destroy government.
Our analysis of associations suggests tha t governments are jus tifiable for reasons simila r to whose us ed by ruling
Marxists. Ra ther than denying that in voluntary associations are always bad or that governments are involun tary
associations, we need merely recognize that a world without any invol unta ry associations is impossible. And this
fact is not just tempora ry, as th e Marxists would have it, but permanent. One function of govern men t is to minimize
private-involunta ry associa tions. Without government, thes e private-invol untary associa tions would proliferate.
Even Tucker's proposed "voluntary association" for securing protection would have to impose sanctions in order to
protect its clients. If the wors t that coul d be done to a robber were to boycott him (with drawn inducements) and
denounce him (power of pen), the price of robbery would not be high enough to deter it. Tucker's proposed
organization would th erefore produce invol untary associations, violating the anarchists' own rule that th ere should
be no such associations in a decent society.
Anarchists, of course, might reply that these involun tary associationsproduced in protecting peopl e from
robbersare not as bad as those tha t would otherwise be produced by the robbers. But this argument, which is true,
lets the cat out of their philos ophical bag. Once one admits that a society without any involuntary associations is
impossible, and tha t all involun tary associations are not equall y bad, then th e premise that all involun tary
associations are ba d does not automa tically lead to the conclusion tha t government is unjustifia ble. Government
may then be justified as a lesser evil than the private-involunta ry associations that would otherwise multiply.
Govern ment is justifiabl e onl y as a lesser evil! This conclusion ma y border on praising government with faint
damna tion, but we need not regard it as derogatory or unpatriotic. Lesser evils are ra ther standard political logic,
9 Benjamin Tucker, Sta te Socialism and Liberta rianis m," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., Th e Anarchists, N.Y.: Dell,
1 964, p. 181.

for circumstances often exist wh ere the best thing we can do is to do the leas t bad thing possible. When US
President Truman had to choose between ordering the use of the A-bomb or in vading Japan to end World War II,
neither alternative had many positive a ttractions. Both woul d cause la rg e numbers of fatalities. Winston Churchill
once that said that "democracy is the wors t form of govern ment, except for all the others tha t have been tried from
time to time" 10. Or as James Madison, speaking of th e "a uxiliary precautions" buil t into the US Constitution, put it:
It may be a reflection on human nature, tha t such devices should be necessary; to control the abus es of
government. But what is govern men t itself, but th e greatest of all reflections on h uman nature. If men were angels,
no government woul d be necessary. (Federalist, Number 51.)
For more than 2000 years, philosoph ers have tried to find a satisfying positive justifica tion for government. To
the last man, they have failed. We can now see the reason for this failure: no such justification is even conceivable.
But it also, in our imperfect worl d, is not necessary.
The rule of law

If all political pow er grows out of th e barrel of a g un, this can only heighten our concerns about how that pow er
is organized and employed. Govern men t is a system for keeping the lid on problems posed by private-invol unta ry
associations. Government-as-bandit can be seen as a problem of th e solution. Government-as-bandit imposes
sanctions on people in an unprincipl ed way, and all of th e arg uments against private-involuntary associations apply
even more strongly wh en the ban dit is govern men t itself. Th ere can be no assurance, when government can single
out some people and impose sanctions on them, that the power will not be abus ed. Good government, th erefore,
requires elimination of government-as-bandit.
It follows tha t the only generally defensible involuntary associations are the public on es created by government-
as-legisla tor. The classical formula tion of this said tha t we should have "the rule of law". A more specific modern
way of putting it is: Laws, si; pseudo-laws, no!
Index numbers: a vital tool for clear thinking

As we have seen in Chapter 2, above, the word law as commonly used expresses three wildly differen t meanings
when observed from th e perspective of th e periodic ta ble of human associations. But this word is hardl y unique in
its ambig uity, and we need to remember that many of th e words used in politics and in the analysis of politics may
mean quite different things from time to time and from person to person. It is therefore us eful to find techniques
which can help us to sort out th e different meanings expressed by a single word.
One such technique is to add differen t index numbers to a word when it is being used to mean different things.
An index number is merely a small number placed jus t after and slightl y low er than the word being indexed. For
exampl e, we coul d distinguish between door 1 (pron ounced "door sub one") and door2 (pronounced "door sub tw o"),
if we noticed tha t sometimes th e word door refers to an opening in a wall through which one can go, and oth er
times it refers to th e object used to block up that opening so that one cannot go through!
10 House of Commons speech on Nov. 11, 1947
31
Overcoming stereotypes
Stereotyping is surely one of the most pernicious and troublesome temptations of human thought. Its danger is
probably implicit in the very nature of lang uage. Language appears to be rooted in classified experiences, different
events or things lumped in to th e same "class" or category, which in turn is expressed by a word.
"Cow ", for exa mpl e, is a noun which refers to a large number of different individual animals which share certain
characteristics in common. It is a useful term beca use it points to th e existence of thes e g eneral characteristics, but
it is dang erous to th e extent that differences between in dividual cowsBessy and Bossieare ignored even though
they may be important. (Bossie ma y be good-na tured; Bessy ma y be inclined to kick or bite people; Bossie's milk
may be conta minated, while Bessie's is pure and safe to drink.)
Th e semanticis t S.I. Hayakawa suggested tha t it is good to remind oursel ves periodically that "cow 1 is not cow 2",
that merely knowing what cows have in common is not all we need to know, tha t individual differences can be all-
important. He wen t on to note tha t keeping this fact in mind is even more important when dealing with words
relating to types of people: Jew, black pers on, Communist, Republican, etc. 11
When we stereotype, we ignore individual differences an d assume tha t knowing one thing about somebody tells
us all we need to know: "When you've seen one Jew, you've seen them all." "All men are alike!" "Black people are
lazy!" "You can always tell a Harvard man, but you can't tell him much!"
As Hayakawa notes, if a man assumes that all Jews are the same, and tha t all they care about is money, he may
be so busy watching his wallet that he does not notice tha t this particula r Jew is about to run away with his wife. Or
he ma y lose the opportunity to make a wonderful friend. By adding index numbers to our thinking, we can
remember that stereotypes and prejudice are based on the demonstrably false assumption that all individuals who
share one characteristic also share another one.
Let us frequentl y, therefore, take time out to remind ourselves tha t:
Jew1 is not Jew2
black person1 is not black person2
Communist1 is not Communis t2
ca pitalist1 is not ca pitalist2
(Just to keep ourselves on our toes, though, we might also want to ponder the implications of the following T-
shirt slogan: "When you've seen one a tomic war, you've seen them all!" I believe, however, tha t this is not a case of
stereotyping.)
Clarifying ambiguous words

An example of how th e indexing technique can be applied to separate the differen t meanings of words can be
seen in th e following analysis of "s egrega tion" an d "in tegra tion", surely two of the most con tentious terms in today's
political vocabula ry. Although clarifying the meaning of terms will not automatically bring conflicting political
11 S.I. Ha yakawa, Language in Thought and Action, N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939, p. 293.

positions into harmony, clarifying what th e va rious camps are fighting about may be an important step towards a
mutually agreeable settlemen t.
Th e basic distinction I have found that is relevant to sorting out "segregation" and "integ ration" is that between
a way of acting and a state of affairs or situation. Employing this dis tinction, we can genera te th e following Table
7:
Ta ble 7: Distinction between segregation and integration
Segregation Integration
State of Affairs segregation 1 integration 1
Way of Acting segregation 2 integration 2
integration 3
Segregation1 is a sta te of affairs, a situation. It exists if in a place where the ratio of th e ra ces is 85 per cent white
to 15 per cent black12 but in some smaller institution (a school, factory, office, club, etc) in that place th e percentages
of blacks and whites are very different from those in the general popula tion, say white 95 per cent, black 5 per cent.
This kind of segregation is sometimes called de facto, in itself an acknowledg ment that the word does not always
mean the sa me thing. Sometimes it is called "racial imbalance".
Segregation2 is a way or basis of acting. It is racially discrimina tory treatment for th e purpose of keeping the
races separated. If a personnel officer or admissions director generally rejects black applicants with personal
qualities such tha t th ey would be accepted if th ey were white, we ha ve seg regation 2. This kind of segrega tion is
sometimes called de jure.
Obviously, if seg regation2, racially discriminatory trea tment, is going on it will tend to produce the state of
affairs tha t we call segregation1. But racial imbalance (seg regation 1) can exist even when th ere is no racially
discriminatory treatment (segregation2 ) curren tly going on. It may reflect th e fact that discriminatory treatmen t
used to ta ke place, or it may ha ve entirely different reasons.
Turn ing to integration1, we fin d that like segrega tion1 it is a state of affairs. It is the opposite of segregation1 . It is
sometimes called racial balance. The ra tio of the races in some smaller institution is roughly the same as it is in a
larg er g eneral population.
In tegra tion2 is a way of acting, but oddly enough it is not entirely the opposite of segregation1. Like seg regation2,
integra tion1 involves trea ting people on th e basis of their race. Unlike segregation2 , in tegra tion2 treats peopl e on the
basis of th eir race for th e purpose of promoting racial togeth erness. Its goal is to bring about integ ration 1, racial
12 We are ass uming here an extremely simplified situation, which will rarel y or ever actually be the case, in which
all people are either black or white.
33
balance, which is th e opposite of the goal of segregation2 . Words which a ppear to be connected with integration 2
include "racial quotas", "bussing", and "affirma tive action", in one of its possible senses. 13
An issue arises a t this point as to means and ends an d ultima te values. Is it s eg regation in its sta tistical sense,
racial imbalance, segrega tion1, tha t is morally evil? Or is it segregation 2, racially discriminatory trea tment of
individuals without rega rd for their individual merits that is the basic problem, with segrega tion1 being alarming
onl y to th e ex tent it indicates that racially discrimina tory trea tment is going on?
If segregation2, racially discriminatory treatment, is th e basic evil here, then integra tion2 appears to be a pervers e
remedy, for it too entails trea ting people differently depending on their race.
This is where integration3, a third possible meaning of the term, comes in. It too is a wa y or basis for trea ting
people, but unlike integra tion2 it does not treat anybody on the basis of race. Instead, integ ration3 is colorblind
treatment; in tegration3 is th us th e opposite both of integra tion2 and of segrega tion2.
Even if we assume tha t a society in which everybody trea ts everybody else in a colorblind way would be ideal,
how ever, it does not necessarily follow tha t integration2racially discriminatory treatment for th e purpose of
promoting togetherness (integration 1)is an unacceptabl e strategy. It is possibl e tha t onl y the deg ree of personal
contact between people of different races made possible by integration1, the goal of integ ration2 , can bring about the
attitudes necessary ultimatel y to ha ve a colorblind society. But it is also possible tha t techniques such as quotas and
bussing will cause resentments among whites and self-doubts among blacks to such an extent that progress towards
colorblin dness is slowed rather than accelerated. Perhaps the only thing we can be sure about is that there is room
for legitimate disagreement here as to the best possible stra tegies for exterminating racism.
Inventing new and useful words

If w e are going to think productively a bout politics, w e need an adequate vocabulary. Given the rapid changes in
today's political situation and central issues, it is unlikel y that a static political vocabulary can be an adequate one.
We must th erefore be sensitive to opportunities to develop new vocabulary when that will hel p us to think more
effectivel y.
Imagine a citizen of ancient Greece, contemporary of Plato or Aristotle several hundred years B.C.E., before
whom a modern multi-speed bicycle suddenly ma terialized out of a time-warp. This person lacks words such as
chain, tire, derailleur, ca ble, bra ke, handleba r, axl e, gear, pedal, you name it, and he also lacks th e concepts or ideas
to which thes e words now point. How well could this observer des cribe what he has seen to someone else? Lacking
the above concepts, how well could he even perceive the bicycl e himself?
Th e advantag es and disa dvantag es of creating pa rticular definitions can be evaluated using the various
transforma tions of our standard model of rational decision and action, D X + Y: th e act of defining a word in a
certain wa y in pursuit of goal x also produces side effects Y. (See Cha pter 1 of this book.) There is one more issue,
13 In its other sense, which a ppea rs to have been th e original intention of Congress in enacting legisla tion requiring
it, "affirma tive action" meant special actions to bring job and other opportunities to the a ttention of minorities
so more would put th ems elves forwa rd to be considered as applican ts, but it did not require or perhaps even
contempla te preferential trea tment of particular individuals on racial grounds.

how ever, tha t needs to be considered, and this is wheth er the new definition should be attached to an exis ting word
or to a new word coined ex pressly for this purpose.
No general answ er can be given to this ques tion, becaus e eith er approach has both advantages and
disadvan tages, and th e ratio between th em in a pa rticular case will depend on th e circumstances. Much will depend
on whether any existing words are close enough, in th eir common meaning, to the new definition to make them
plausible pointers to it, on the one hand, and on how good a new word can be knocked together from meaningful
roots, on the oth er hand.
We have seen examples of both approaches to new definitions in this short book. The word lawsdefin ed herein
as general rules of action en forceable by sanctionsis an old word with a new, precise meaning. Th e word
coopetitiondefined as conflict over how to divide up the ben efits produced by cooperationis a new word
invented speciall y to us e with the new definition.
Th e history of the term pseudolaws, incidentally, is an in teresting example of the gyrations one ma y go through
before settling down on th e bes t word for expressing a given meaning. Originally, I ha d no special word for this
meaning. I used the word law to refer to the meaning now ex pressed by pseudolaw, but held my nose with my
fingers (as if there was a bad stink!) when I used the word law in this sense. This not only made clear the fact tha t I
mean t something other than law in its sense as a general rul e of action, but it also ex pressed th e disg ust which I feel
is a ppropriate when we encounter s uch things.
When I began to write down my thoughts, I originally put the world law in quota tion ma rks, "law", to indicate
that they were only so-called laws. During the pre-publication editing of my previous book, Thinking About
Politics: American Government in Association al Perspective, however, the publisher suggested tha t my distinction
might escape the rea der if I only used the quota tion marks for this purpose. Instea d, she propos ed that I use th e
term quasi-laws.
It was clear that my editor was correct in her belief that something needed to be changed. But un fortunately
there were two probl ems with th e proposed term: First, quasi- did not have the needed negative connotation, th e
feeling that disg ust is called for. Secon d, th ere was a danger of confusion with the concept of quasi-legislative
powers as this expression is used to des cribe the work of a dministrative agencies. I did not want to confuse th e
origin of the rules with th eir nature.
However th e editor's suggestion was helpful in tha t I immedia tely saw th e possibility that her recommended
prefix quasi- could be replaced by the alternative prefix pseudo-, th ereby simultaneously solving both problems.
There is no danger of confusing pseudolaws with th e quasi-legislative powers of reg ulatory ag encies. An d pseudo-
has an eminently satisfactory negative connota tion. (Just try calling someone a pseudo-intellectual, pseudo-athlete,
or pseudo-anything and you will see what I mean!) Thus I finally arrived at th e word pseudolaw, which appea rs to
be completel y suitable to its intended purpose.
Watching out for metaphors

Political science, as noted in the Introduction to this book, is a science that tries to connect the "micro" level of
individual lives an d actions with the "macro" level of collective circums tances and consequences. Th e distinctive
35
focal point of political science is govern ment, and the distinctive thing about the organization we call government is
that it can legitimately threaten sanctions against all individuals who violate its laws.
Alth ough our original definition of an association assumed that individual people are the parties making it up,
we th en observed that once associa tions exist, they become pa rties which can th en in turn enter into still further
associations. But given our definition of an association, thus gen eralizedthe rela tionship existing when on e pa rty's
satis faction is being changed by the actions of another partywe must be careful to note that we are now using
terms like "action" meta phorically rather than literally.
In deed, if we talk about "actions " by organizations and other associations, we are implicitly using a lot of other
words meta phorically too. Does an organization literally have goals, or does it just "act" (sometimes) as if it ha d
goals? Does it ha ve "satisfaction" (defined as a ratio, remember, between perceived attainments and desires) or do
we infer existence of an organizational equivalent to satisfaction from its "actions"?
We should be very ca reful not to take metaphorical language of this type too literally. Up to a point, the
analogies expressed by metaphors can be useful, but beyond that point th ey can be extremely misleading. We
should always remember tha t literally, organizations cannot actonly individuals can act, including acting on
behalf of an organiza tion. We must not confuse the organization which is ma de up of many individualswith an
individual, we mus t not confuse the macro with the micro.
As an example of the dangers of taking political meta phors literally, let us consider the concept of freedom
applied not at the micro level but at th e macro. We all know how importan t freedom is for us as individual human
beings. Therefore, w e g eneralize, freedom is good! But if freedom is good, then it seems to follow tha t all countries
should be free, all nations should be free, all "peoples" (as it is sometimes put) should be free.
Th ere is, however, at leas t one important difference between coun tries, nations, and "peopl es", on the one hand,
an d in dividual people, on the other hand. Th ese macro level en tities are made up of large numbers of individual
people, but it is usually far from obvious just which individuals "bel ong" to which countries, nations, or "peoples".
An d th ere are no adequa te democratic or legal procedures for determining where one country, nation, or "people"
leaves off and another begins when th ere is disagreement about this, which there always is! You can not resolve
democratically the issue who will be included in just which electora te, which is precisely th e issue in international
boundary disputes. Th us there is always an issue as to just what are th e ma cro-level entities tha t ough t to be free,
while no similar problem exists at th e micro-level of individuals.
A second important difference is that individual claims to freedom are not unlimited. Ra ther, in dividual freedom
is presumed to exist in th e context of a govern ment whose laws by definition are intended to limit the extent of that
freedom in th e interest of the general welfa re. No similar limit on freedom is generally acknowledg ed when it comes
to the claims of macro-level entities to freedom. Yet if law an d order are necessary to a decent life at the local or
na tional level, it would appear that they are equally necessary at th e world level. Unthinking ex tra polation of the
value of freedom from its literal and limited application to individuals to a metaphorical and unlimited a pplication
to countries, nations, or "peoples" prevents us from seeing the n eed for the rule of law at the world level, th e need
for a world government.

Another way of sta ting th is point is tha t there is a conflict betw een national freedom and maximizing individual
freedom. With national freedom comes res trictions on individual freedom in the na me of national defense: high
taxes, milita ry conscription, prohibition of travel to some countries, limits on immig ration an d emigra tion,
obstacles to the flow of capital, goods, and ideas.
Let th ere be no doubt about it: individual liberty cannot be maximized in a worl d in which national freedom
exis ts. Rather than uncritically hailing the virtues of national freedom, serious thinkers must th erefore ask how
much are we willing to pay for it?
A world government is not in the works in the very near future. Conducting foreign affairs with other
independent governments will con tinue to be a reg rettable necessity for some time. Things cannot be improved
overnight. But this is no excuse for failing to ask ourselves where we want to be going, or how to go about getting
there.
About the author

Pa ul F. deLespinass e was born in Ontario, Oregon in 1939. He graduated from Willamette University in 1961,
an d completed a Ph.D. in political science at The Johns Hopkins University in 1966. He spent a sabba tical year as
Fellow in Law an d Political Science at the Harva rd Law School in 1970-1971. He has been a Na tional Merit Schola r,
a Woodrow Wilson Fellow, and a National Defense Education Act Fellow.
His interest in Soviet politics led him to lea rn Russian, to rea d Pravda daily from 1962 to 1991, and to spend the
summer of 1989 in the USSR. His oth er interests include American constitutional law, political philos ophy,
economic regulatory policy, and race in American law and politics.
His college tex tbook Thinking About Politics: American Government in Association al Perspective was
published by D. Van Nostrand in 1981. His op-ed col umns have been published in a number of US news papers.
After a 36-year career at Adrian College in Michigan, he is now Professor Emeritus of Political Science and
Computer Science at Adrian and lives in Corvallis, Oregon. He can be reached at pdel es@proaxis.com.
37

Political Concepts

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Political Concepts

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Basic Political Concepts

This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

Basic Political Concepts

Copyrigh t 2008 by Paul deLespinasse

Edited by Ma risa Drexel

For any questions about this text, please email: drexel@uga.edu

This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License

Basic Political Concepts 2 A Global Tex t

1. Concepts of Decision-Making and Action..................................................................................6

2. Concepts of Human Association...............................................................................................14

3. Developing Conceptual Acuity..................................................................................................26

Basic Political Concepts 4 A Global Tex t

Th e elements of th e ex pression are (shown in Table 1):

Ta ble 1: Key for elements in expression

causation or expected causation

lea ving the circumstances within which action A is taken implicit.

Basic Political Concepts 6 A Global Tex t

Rational action in specific contexts

Ta ble 2: Six variations of th e ex pression

A X +Y An a d hoc or "retail" decision

RX+Y Th e act of making a rule, or a "wholesale" decision

O X +Y Th e act of organizing, or a "super wholesale" decision

Basic Political Concepts 8 A Global Tex t

D X +Y Th e act of defining a word

T X+Y Th e act of translating

The act of creating a rule: principled decisions

R - - > A ... Under circumstances C rul e R implies or requires us to take action A.

The act of organizing: constitutive decisions

The "act" of speaking: lies as political language

Basic Political Concepts 10 A Global Tex t

The act of defining: conceptual engineering

"Con flict over how to divide up th e benefits produced by cooperation."

The act of translating: hijacking authority1

1. What ought to be?

2. What ought to be done?

Basic Political Concepts 12 A Global Tex t

1. What ought to be? I ought to be on the other island.

2. What ought to be done? I ough t to sta y right where I a m.

Satisfaction, social power, and association

1. events in the natural environ ment

2. that individual's own actions

Basic Political Concepts 14 A Global Tex t

Social power and social causation

lower -----------|------------- higher

lower -------|-----|--------------- higher

lower -----------|-------|------- higher

Ta ble 3: Types of social power

Metaphor Pen Sword Purse

Oth er terms typewriter gun dollar

microphone stick carrot

Nature of thing communica tion destructive action productive action

done or not done

Name of action pure persuasion sanctions inducemen ts

Exa mple seduction rape prostitution

Basic Political Concepts 16 A Global Tex t

1. Jones' relationship to Smith:

lower sat.-------|--------|-----------higher sat.

2. Jones' rela tionship to Kennedy:

lower sat.--------|-------|--------higher sat.

3. Jones' rela tionship to Baker:

0 = Jones' satisfaction if Baker

didn't act at all.

0 = (also) Jones' actual satisfaction,

since Ba ker hasn't acted, or if he